


# Southern africa

VOL. VIII, NO. 6

JUNE 1975



**JUNE 1975**





...FORGE SIMPLE WORDS  
THAT EVEN THE CHILDREN CAN  
UNDERSTAND  
WORDS WHICH WILL ENTER  
EVERY HOUSE  
LIKE THE WIND  
AND FALL,  
LIKE RED HOT EMBERS  
ON OUR PEOPLE'S SOULS.

JORGE REBELO  
FRELIMO

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JUNE 1975

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Front cover: Eduardo Mondlane (assassinated Feb. 3, 1969) and Samora Machel at Second Congress of FRELIMO, 1968. The Struggle Continued!

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# OVERVIEW

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June 25th, the day celebrating the formal independence of Mozambique will be a day of joy and triumph for the Mozambican people and wherever men and women struggle to build free societies without exploitation.

It is a day that marks a significant victory, a great battle won. It is not the end of the struggle—only the beginning of a new phase. But it is human to celebrate, a human strength, not weakness, and we add our voices to the many millions that will hail the people of Mozambique on their day of Independence.

Recent events in Southern Africa, the continuing conflict in Angola, the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo and the web of accusation and counter accusation surrounding that tragedy, the fragility of Zimbabwean unity under the ANC, the deceptive flexibility and actual intransigence of the Vorster regime, the continuing talk of detente, all these events make an understanding of the context and nature of the FRELIMO victory particularly important.

The enemy that FRELIMO had to face was not simply the Portuguese army; a successful struggle had to overcome a complex of conditions created by the intervention of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambican history. Nor is the pattern unique to Mozambique, its general shape is common throughout Africa.

Everywhere it went "Imperialism violently disrupted the natural development of society, imposed its own civilisation and culture, while at the same time deliberately and artificially arresting the development of the indigenous populations, who were excluded from the enjoyment of the fruits of that civilisation." To make sure of its continued stranglehold Imperialism employed the device of divide and rule, carefully nurturing rivalry and suspicion between different tribal groups. It did nothing to create unity in the 'states' that it created. Everything it did was designed to preserve the power and profit of the imperial ruler—from the perpetuation of mass illiteracy to the deliberate distortion of the country's economy, so that even roads, railways and communication systems were built only to expedite the transporting of natural wealth out of the country. Nothing was aimed at creating national integration or internal development.

This is the legacy of colonial rule. The success of FRELIMO's leadership has lain in its analysis and understanding of the many forces at work inside the society it sought to transform, and in its tremendous ability to organise a popular movement on the basis of that understanding.

The struggle FRELIMO ultimately fought in Mozambique was an armed struggle, and when negotiations with the Portuguese began, FRELIMO spoke from a position of strength, the only issue at the negotiation table involving the details of a rapid transfer of power. But the Movement's strength flowed not only from the barrel of its guns but from the widespread political mobilisation of the population and the determined creation of a

fundamental national unity.

The profoundly political nature of FRELIMO's struggle, its determination to involve the people integrally in the process of their liberation is vividly reflected in the period of intense activity that has followed the laying down of arms in Mozambique. June 25 will not mark simply a change of personnel in an otherwise unaltered administration. It will not mean just a new set of black faces behind the piles of forms that departing white officials have left behind them. It will mean the intensification of a process of social transformation. Everywhere, in factories, on the docks, in villages, the "grupos dinamizadores" have been mobilizing the people. The people are being called upon to take up direct responsibility for their lives and the future of their country. "Unity", "production" and "vigilance" are common words in Mozambique at the moment—and they reflect a recognition of the tasks ahead.

Imperialism has been dealt a serious blow by the victories in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau/Cape Verde. But it would be foolish to believe that it has suffered final defeat. Imperialism has no intention of letting Africa out of its grip. Apart from anything else Africa contains all the minerals necessary for the nuclear age industries of the Metropolitan countries. This has serious implications. It means that these countries will fight hard to preserve their interests in Africa, and will see themselves as inevitably committed to a defense of the white regime in South Africa, which they correctly recognise as an invaluable agent on the continent. It also means that these powers will do whatever they can, directly and indirectly, to subvert the development of independent socialist states.

One can already see the signs of this in Angola, where U.S. oil interests have encouraged the growth of separatist forces in Cabinda, and are engaging in complex maneuvers involving interest groups in neighbouring States such as Zaire. It is disturbing to note also that the Western press, which studiously overlooked years of war against colonial rule is now meticulously reporting each incident in what it terms "a murderous vendetta among liberation groups." In similar vein *Time Magazine* reporting on forthcoming Mozambican independence comments that for the Liberation forces "the past may be easier to deal with than the future" and then goes on to predict inevitable conflict between different factions in the leadership. The groundwork is already being laid for future covert interventions, for the backing of one group against another.

There will be hard times ahead for Mozambique. There can be no doubt that the West will use whatever economic or political leverage it can to impede the new States, which poses a serious threat to its continued hegemony in Africa south of the Sahara.

Thus truly "the struggle continues".

**special**

# FRELIMO PREPARES FOR MOZAMBIQUE INDEPENDENCE

by Bill Minter



A grupos dinamizadores meeting in the barrios of Lourenco Marques. Credit Van Lierop

Mozambique's independence is scheduled for June 25 this year, thirteen years after the formation of FRELIMO. Independence comes as a result of almost ten years of armed struggle, which provoked the transformation of FRELIMO from a nationalist movement into a tempered revolutionary party, and the mutation of a struggle for independence into a struggle for revolution. Thus, while independence will mark an achievement and a conclusion, it also marks a beginning, a point of departure for the next stage in the struggle for a new society in Mozambique.

During the years of war, FRELIMO learned that the opening of a new front must be preceded by careful preparation, if it were to prove a real advance rather than an effort which could not be sustained. The people of the area had to be politically mobilized. They had to be organized. The minimal organizational basis of consistent supply of war materiel and communication with the rear

arenas had to be established. After the April 1974 coup in Portugal, when it was clear that independence was at hand, the same approach was applied to the transition to independence. FRELIMO efforts were directed towards ensuring that independence would come in such a way that the conditions for a continued revolutionary transformation of Mozambique society were established. No concessions were made to Spinola's schemes for a transition essentially under Portuguese auspices, and the guerrilla offensive was stepped up. The progressive forces in the Portuguese regime eventually gained the upper hand against Spinola, and the Lusaka Agreement was signed on September 7, establishing the terms of the transition to independence.

The period of transition, under a government directed by FRELIMO, was not a concession at the last minute to "moderation". In Mozambique, in contrast to Guinea Bissau, victory came while large portions of the country



Struggle and reconstruction were always linked. An armed militant is also a health worker. (Credit Van Lierop/U.N.)

were still under colonial administration, without direct experience of the armed struggle. In these areas, FRELIMO support was widespread, and FRELIMO clandestine organization present. But the support was not politically educated, mobilized and organized as in the liberated areas. This meant that a disorderly and hasty transition could give a wide variety of opportunities to reactionary elements: military adventures such as that immediately following the Lusaka Agreement; sabotage by destruction of essential files, machinery, etc.; economic and administrative chaos. If progressive forces in the Portuguese regime were willing to cooperate, however, there could be a different kind of transition. Reactionary forces would be suppressed jointly, FRELIMO would carry out the political mobilization of the people. The colonial administrative structure would be dismantled systematically, and the groundwork laid for new structures. The most urgent economic crises would be dealt with, and the transfer of effective economic power to the Mozambican government initiated. The withdrawal of Portuguese troops would be carried out, while FRELIMO's guerrilla army made its presence felt in every part of the country, and gained the capability to defend the country against external attacks.

So the time of transition has not been a time of passive waiting for some miraculous transformation to be effected when the Mozambican flag is raised and the Portuguese

flag lowered. It has been a period of hard work, with tasks laid out in President Samora Machel's speech at the installation of the transitional government (see *Southern Africa*, November 1974). In sum, the major tasks have been political mobilization for the people to take power, and a systematic dismantling of the colonial administrative structure while organizing new structures to carry out the essential tasks involved in the building of a new Mozambique.

The process of political mobilization had begun, of course, long before the April coup in Portugal. In the areas not yet reached by the armed struggle, clandestine FRELIMO cadres organized carefully. The FRELIMO radio was listened to. A steady flow of recruits from all over the country came to join the armed struggle. Other cadres remained in place, in all sectors of Mozambican society. When the coup came, clandestine activity could become semi-clandestine. FRELIMO sympathizers in the media and elsewhere could diffuse the FRELIMO line, and counter the fascist propaganda with its images of savage terrorists, of "red" and "yellow" perils. This semi-clandestine work was vital in counteracting the attempts to create groups to divert public support from FRELIMO and work towards a neo-colonial solution. In the months before the Lusaka Agreement, in many localities in the war zone, at local initiative of military commanders or administrators, de facto ceasefires were

organized, FRELIMO guerrillas addressed meetings to explain FRELIMO's position. Following the Lusaka Agreement, this process of "explicação" intensified. Officials of the transitional government, FRELIMO commanders and political commissars, FRELIMO cadres now no longer clandestine, organized meetings, listening to the questions of the people, explaining FRELIMO's position. They emphasized the aim of constructing a new prosperous society without exploitation of man by man, a united Mozambique not split by tribal, racial, or religious divisions, a Mozambique committed to the liberation of all, women and men. They stressed that FRELIMO had never defined its enemy in racial or national terms, but as "the system of exploitation and those who fight to maintain it."

By the turn of the year the emphasis had shifted from explanation to more specific organizational efforts. The party had been given the mandate in September to organize local committees in every locality and place of work. Preliminary organization took the form of "grupos dinamizadores", which would eventually be transformed into full-fledged local party committees. These groups had the tasks of spreading the FRELIMO orientation, and of organizing the people politically. They had the responsibility for discovering the problems and questions of the people, and channeling them to the transitional government. But also they were not to wait for the resolution of all problems for some higher official to act, but to begin immediate programs—of literacy work, for example, or of people's shops where Portuguese traders had fled and the system of exchange had broken down. They were not to substitute for the administrative structures eventually to be put in place by the new government, but to prepare themselves to orient and to guide those structures, to mobilize the mass participation which alone could make possible a real societal transformation. They were to cooperate with the FRELIMO army in vigilance against reactionary plots.

In February, representatives of political committees and "grupos dinamizadores" from all 110 districts of Mozambique met at Mocuba, in Zambézia province, to sum up experiences and outline the work yet to be done. It was decided that the time was not yet ripe for the transformation of the "grupos dinamizadores" into full-fledged party committees, but that the work of mobilization and organization should continue.

The administrative transition was in process at the same time. FRELIMO cadres, and others having the confidence of FRELIMO, were moved into key posts, beginning with the ministers installed with the transitional government, and continuing with other staff positions in the central administration, and with provincial governors, district and local urban administrators. FRELIMO troops, first in conjunction with Portuguese military units, and then alone, were moved into key positions all over the country. The most recalcitrant of reactionaries in the Portuguese military were isolated and shipped off to Portugal in the first units to leave. The Mozambicans who had been drafted into the Portuguese army were disbanded and sent to their homes. Training of new FRELIMO troops intensified in the training camps in the liberated areas and in Tanzania, with new recruits pouring in. Training essential to a conventional army was initiated, and units detached to form the nucleus of the new police force for Mozambique. Independent Mozambique will share borders with Smith's Rhodesia and Vorster's South

Africa. It must be able to defend itself against threats from the remaining bastions of white minority rule, and against subversive attempts from reactionary forces, whether their origin be in Africa, Europe or America.

Among the crucial tasks of the transitional government has been to lay the basis for the transformation of Mozambique's colonial dependent economy. The Mozambican economy suffers from a three-fold dependence: on Portuguese capitalism, on South African capitalism, and on the international capitalist economy, centered in the European Community and the United States. The development of agricultural production and of limited trade in the liberated areas can serve as a model of the kind of development to be extended to the whole of Mozambique. But the scale and range of the problems to be dealt with are altogether different. To develop the economy to serve the people, agricultural and industrial development must involve mobilization of the people, increased productivity and diversification, and step-by-step progress towards economic independence.

Immediate problems must be dealt with to ensure the supply of necessities for the people. The emphasis on agricultural production in the liberated areas must be spread to the whole country. And the government must gain control over the basic direction of the economy. That the progressive forces in Portugal are sympathetic to the direction FRELIMO wishes to take is an important asset. Thus the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which served as the bank of issue for Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, was taken over by the Portuguese government from its private owners shortly following the April coup, and the details of the distribution of its assets and the formation of a national bank for Mozambique are under discussion. Then, in March this year, Portugal also nationalized the private banks in Portugal. Since these banks, together with the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, formed the center of the Portuguese financial oligarchy's control over the Portuguese and colonial economies, this means that many assets in Mozambique are already under state control. Working out the effective implementation of this control by the FRELIMO government is of major importance. In some cases owners or managers have simply abandoned their assets, and administrative commissions of workers and FRELIMO cadres have been set up to run the enterprises.

But it is important to recognize that both the Portuguese and the Mozambican economies continue to be dependent on external influences. The South African role—in recruiting mine labor, in the transit commerce, in the Cabora Bassa project, in investment in various sectors of Mozambique's economy—is well-known. In the export sector, Western European firms are often the open or hidden partners of Portuguese interests, as in Portugal itself. The major products exported from Mozambique are all dependent on markets in the advanced capitalist countries. Fortunately, the market for sugar, one of the major products, is extremely good at present, and the release from colonial restrictions on its sale will bring in much needed income. But the structural dependence remains.

Such a pattern is not eliminated overnight. The possibility of doing so depends on the development of production at all levels for basic necessities—thus the continued importance of FRELIMO's emphasis on agricultural production by the army and the schools as well as the local communities. It also depends on the consolidation of FRELIMO control and mobilization of



the workers in the productive enterprises in Mozambique, and on the creation of new opportunities for productive work. Thus, the possibility of eliminating the export of Mozambican labor to the mines of South Africa depends on the organization of alternative work for the returning miners. If they were to return to unemployment, the action would backfire. Laying the basis for truly independent economic development requires much hard work. It will also require the solidarity of progressive forces around the world just as did the difficult years of armed struggle.

Reorganization is also under way in other sectors of Mozambican life. One notable example is education. During most of 1974, following the April coup, the schools in Mozambique were the scene of considerable disorganization, as the old pattern had lost authority, but no replacement was yet at hand. By early 1975, with the beginning of a new school year, the Ministry of Education under FRELIMO has initiated a reorganization of the schools. The "grupos dinamizadores", involving students, teachers, and other workers, are responsible for political mobilization, and feed into an administrative structure with representatives of the same groups, plus the local communities, headed by FRELIMO-appointed school directors. A national teacher's conference was held in Beira at the end of January, which introduced the most urgent modifications into the curriculum—political education, Mozambican history and geography, etc.—and discussed the problems of education in Mozambique. The FRELIMO educational system, which has continued functioning in the liberated areas and in the camps in Tanzania, fed its experience into the national conference, making possible the communication of the FRELIMO orientation to teachers from the rest of the educational system. During April conferences of primary and secondary teachers were held at provincial levels. This school year, in short, will see the implantation of a new direction to education all over Mozambique. In spite of the shortage caused by the departure of many teachers from the country, more students are being admitted to the schools, to carry out the directive that education must serve the broad masses. And, outside the formal school structure, "grupos dinamizadores" are organizing literacy classes in all regions of the country.



High school students build their own shelters. Bagomoyo, Tanzania, 1974. (Credit Minter)

It would be wrong to underplay the great difficulties which will face an independent Mozambique: economic difficulties, the lack of trained personnel, the threats from neighboring white-ruled countries, sabotage, attempts at division on the basis of tribe, region, race or religion. But the political and organizational basis is being laid for the Mozambican people, under FRELIMO leadership, to deal with the difficulties and to learn from them. And they will expect the solidarity of the progressive forces that supported them in their struggle up to now—the African countries (especially Tanzania and Zambia), the socialist countries (regarded as natural allies), and progressive forces in the rest of the world, including the advanced capitalist countries. And they are committed to the continuing struggle against exploitation, be it in Mozambique, in the rest of Southern Africa not yet free, or elsewhere in the world.

Bill Minter, a member of our collective is presently teaching at the FRELIMO Secondary School in Bagomoyo, Tanzania. He is the author of *Portuguese Africa and the West*. •

# MOZAMBIQUE



The spearhead of the long struggle—over 20,000 armed militants.




For thousands of Mozambicans FRELIMO brought the first health care.



An armed women's detachment—equality in the fight for liberation and the new society a FRELIMO goal.



Education for a new society—FRELIMO created schools wherever it went.



In a quiet Lourenco Marques suburb, the headquarters of P.I.D.E., the vicious Portuguese secret police.



Wall newspapers carry ideas to the people, Lourenco Marques, 1975.



A part of the international struggle—FRELIMO Vice-President Marcelinos dos Santos addresses a United Nations Security Council meeting.

On September 25, 1964, FRELIMO issued its call to arms:

**MOZAMBICAN PEOPLE**, workers and peasants, workers on the plantations, in the timber mills and in the concessions, workers in the mines, on the railways, in the harbors and in the factories, intellectuals, civil servants, Mozambican soldiers in the Portuguese army, students, men, women and young people, patriots,

**IN THE NAME OF ALL OF YOU**

**FRELIMO TODAY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS THE GENERAL ARMED INSURRECTION OF THE MOZAMBICAN PEOPLE AGAINST PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE.**

Our fight must not cease before the total liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.

**MOZAMBICAN PEOPLE,**

The Mozambican revolution, the work of the Mozambican people, is an integral part of the struggle of the people of Africa and of the whole world for the victory of the ideals of Liberty and Justice.

The armed struggle which we announce today for the destruction of Portuguese colonialism and of imperialism will allow us to install in our country a new and popular social order. The Mozambican people will thus be making a great historical contribution toward the total liberation of our Continent and the progress of Africa and of the world.

feature

# Mozambique: the Tradition of resistance

by Allen Isaacman

On June 25th, Mozambique will become independent after a decade of armed struggle. While attention has focused recently on the courageous revolutionary efforts of FRELIMO that struggle itself was deeply rooted in a long anti-colonial tradition dating back to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Persistent efforts to resist the Portuguese invaders constitute a vital chapter in Mozambican history, despite repeated attempts by the academic allies of the Salazar and Caetano regimes to legitimate the rhetoric of lusotropicalism.<sup>1</sup>

In an effort to counter such distortions, I will document the long tradition of resistance and analyze the changing forms it has taken in response to intensified colonial pressures. I will focus on the Zambesi Valley, in the central part of Mozambique, which was the principal inland zone of Portuguese "control" until the early twentieth century.<sup>2</sup>

At the highest level of generalization, four broad patterns of resistance can be identified, each appropriate for a different phase of Portuguese imperialism, which I will discuss separately. From 1550 to 1880 Lisbon's military capacity outside the colonial enclaves of Sena and Tete was very limited. As a result, individual Zambesian states were generally able to resist Portuguese expansion, and there was no pressing need to create multi-ethnic alliances. As Portuguese pressure intensified during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the people of the Zambesi began to cast aside parochial concerns and organize somewhat broader coalitions. Although defeated, an embryonic Zambesian consciousness surfaced. During the early colonial period Portuguese exploitation not only generated a variety of localized protests but intensified the common sense of oppression. This shared anti-colonial commitment was dramatically manifested in the Pan-Zambesian rebellion of 1917.

## I. The Mirage of Portuguese Rule and the Success of African Resistance, 1550-1880:

The Portuguese first arrived at the Indian Ocean port of Sofala in 1505. From the outset their principal concern was the exploitation of the interior goldmines. By 1550 Portuguese merchants and adventurers had established several commercial and administrative centers in the Zambesi Valley. Despite their initial success and subsequent claims of vast territorial empire, rampant incompetence within the colonial administrative system and tenacious African resistance combined to frustrate Lisbon's imperial ambitions for more than three centuries.


As was the case throughout most of Mozambique, the Portuguese colonial structure proved incapable of

instituting or enforcing the proclamations of the metropole. At all levels of government, moreover, positions were filled with incompetent, often illiterate, officials who had been deemed unworthy of more important posts in India, Brazil, and Angola. From their perspective, the numerous opportunities for self-aggrandizement were the only compensations for appointment to this unhealthy backwater region, and they channelled their energies into such profit-making ventures as smuggling, extortion, and the slave trade rather than the enforcement of colonial legislation. To add to Portugal's problems, the army was under-staffed, poorly organized, and improperly trained, necessitating Lisbon's dependence upon a small group of European estateholders, known as *prazeros*, whose loyalty in the period after 1700 was dubious at best.<sup>3</sup>

Despite its precarious position, Portugal not only maintained the fiction of empire but periodically attempted to expand its holdings beyond the enclaves at Sena and Tete. The failure of Portuguese forces to make any permanent inroads, despite some initial successes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, testifies to the unyielding desire of the Africans residing in the Zambesi Valley to defend their homelands against the alien invaders. The efforts of the kingdom of the Muenemutapa, the Barue, and the Tonga best illustrate this commitment.

Portuguese aggression initially was directed at the kingdom of the Muenemutapa whose elusive goldmines were eagerly sought. In 1560 Lisbon dispatched a missionary expedition to the Zimbabwe, or capital, of the Muenemutapa in order to convert and coopt the royal family and to gain access to the mineral deposits. The mission proved a dismal failure; its leader was executed after being charged as a sorcerer. The Portuguese used this murder as a pretense for launching a major invasion against the Muenemutapa in 1569. Despite the unprecedented commitment of manpower and military resources, the Europeans confronted stiff African resistance and debilitating tropical diseases, and the expedition disbanded after three years of unsuccessful attempts to conquer the kingdom.

Economic incentives motivated the Portuguese to continue to try to undermine the autonomy of the kingdom of the Muenemutapa which, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, was wracked by internal dissension. Despite efforts by several rulers, including Mutuzianha and Kapatatraridze, to limit the Portuguese presence within the kingdom, their immediate successors converted to Christianity and ceded land to the Europeans



in return for military assistance against internal rivals. Although the Portuguese managed to rule through puppet kings during most of the second half of the seventeenth century, they failed to diminish the peoples' desire for independence. In 1692 the kingdom rallied behind Muenemutapa Nhaacunimbiti who seized the throne and, with the assistance of the neighboring Rozvi, drove the Portuguese out. Subsequent attempts by the Europeans to reestablish their influence proved unsuccessful. In desperation, the Portuguese launched a preemptive invasion in 1807 which was soundly defeated, thereby insuring the continued independence of the kingdom until the period of intensified European imperialism commonly known as the "scramble."

Portuguese expansionist activities against the Barue followed a similar pattern. With the help of the white settler community and their slave armies, Lisbon temporarily annexed outlying Barue provinces during the first third of the seventeenth century. By the 1650's the Portuguese had been driven out and they were forced to use Catholicism as a mechanism of political and social control.

Colonial officials incorrectly believed that the Barue royal family had adopted Christianity and that the monarch could not be invested until he had been sprinkled with holy water sent from Sena. As a result, Portuguese officials periodically attempted to withhold the water, known as *madzi-manga*, in an effort to influence the outcome of succession crises or to wrench concessions from the new king. In response, Barue soldiers attacked Portuguese estates and disrupted commerce until

the Portuguese yielded the water which the Barue considered holy, not because of any Christian affiliation but because it came from Sena the burial site of their first king. Perhaps the clearest expression of the Portuguese failure to manipulate Barue rulers was the abortive attempt by the Portuguese nation in 1767 to forcibly place a puppet on the throne. For the next hundred years, efforts to subvert the kingdom or manipulate rulers proved unsuccessful as did the few attempts at military intervention.

The opposition of the Barue and the Muenemutapa to Portuguese informal rule represented but a small chapter in the legacy of African resistance. Throughout the entire period of Portuguese occupation of the Zambesi, the Tonga repeatedly resisted the imposition of European rule. Their military prowess, highlighted by their decisive role in the 1569 conflict, drew the begrudging respect of European officials and chroniclers alike. "All these kaffirs of Mongas [sic] are . . . very valiant, and the most warlike of all the tribes then at the rivers, and therefore they gave great troubles to our conquerors, with whom they fought many battles."<sup>4</sup> During the seventeenth century, Tonga polities continued to defy the Portuguese, sometimes in collaboration with surrounding African peoples. In 1609, for example, they joined with the Tawara, the Barue and militants within the Muenemutapa kingdom in an effort to eliminate the Portuguese from Tete district. Although most of the Tonga polities were conquered by slave armies of the settlers and incorporated into the *prazo* system, they refused to pay taxes and rebelled whenever possible. "The bellicose natives residing north of Sena," wrote one observer in 1696, "are very powerful and rarely obey their Portuguese lord . . . they are generally in revolt refusing to pay the customary tribute to anyone."<sup>5</sup> Their commitment to armed struggle continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries undercutting the *prazo* system and frustrating Portuguese efforts to establish a permanent European community within this riverine zone.

On the eve of the "scramble," after almost three hundred years of supposed colonial rule, Portuguese holdings in the Zambesi Valley, as in the rest of the colony, were on the verge of collapse. With the exception of a skeletal administrative and military force in the towns of Sena and Tete the 50,000 square miles of the Zambesi Valley were unaffected by the Portuguese colonial system. Even within the two enclaves, moreover, Lisbon's presence was minimal. In the words of one high official, "The disgraceful state of Sena is horrifying, all is reduced to bush and mountains of ruin, the inhabitants are all dispersed, and the fort has almost completely fallen to the ground."<sup>6</sup>

## II. The Independence Struggle, 1880-1902:

When the imperialist powers gathered in Berlin in 1880 to establish the ground rules for the partition of Africa, they agreed that "pacification" was the minimum requirements for international recognition of colonial holdings. This prerequisite was particularly threatening to Lisbon whose claim to Mozambique was based exclusively on her historical presence. Moreover, the British and, to a lesser extent, the Germans had evinced great interest in Mozambique. To stave off European competition, Lisbon reinforced her garrisons at Sena and Tete and, with the aid of African mercenaries, initiated a policy of military aggression. Between 1885 and 1902 more than fifteen

major campaigns were undertaken in the region.

Portugal's new militancy posed an immediate threat to the sovereignty of the diverse Zambesian peoples. To thwart the imperialist forces several farsighted leaders proclaimed the urgent need to cast aside their narrow parochial loyalties in order to survive the European onslaught. At a secret meeting of Africans and Mulattoes, Chinsinga, ruler of Makanga, declared that "the Africans of all tribes must unit in good faith, in a coordinated attempt to acquire large supplies of arms and ammunition, and when we have achieved this, we must expel all the Portuguese. . . ."<sup>7</sup>

Despite such pronouncements it proved extremely difficult to organize an anti-colonial coalition. Several factors, including the heterogeneous ethnic and cultural composition of the peoples of the Zambesi, the intense historic rivalries which reinforced these divisions, and the failure to comprehend the implications of the new Portuguese policy, all militated against a multi-ethnic alliance. Most of the Zambesian polities instead sought to fight the Portuguese individually, or in small clusters, as they had done historically with great success. In a few cases, the Portuguese were even able to gain African allies by exploiting historical animosities between neighboring peoples or competing factions of a ruling elite. In short, the absence of a common sense of oppression and the unwillingness to shift or modify narrow primordial loyalties enabled the well-armed Portuguese and their African mercenaries to conquer most of the Zambesi Valley.

As it became clear that past strategies were no longer viable, Zambesian states discarded their parochial attitudes and particularistic concerns in favor of broad based alliances. Thus, the Nsenga of Mburma joined with their arch-enemies the Chikunda of Matakanya in an effort to defend their homelands against the Europeans. This coalition was rapidly expanded to include neighboring Tawara chieftaincies. Similarly, the Chewa of Makanga and the Tonga of Massangano overcame past differences and formed a short-lived anti-Portuguese coalition. These efforts, however, proved to be too-little-too-late, although they do suggest the beginnings of a broader Zambesian consciousness.

While most Zambesian states were initially reluctant to enter into new alliances, the Barue, under the leadership of Makombe Hanga, recognized that such coalitions were imperative to their survival. As soon as the Goan adventurer Gouveia was overthrown in 1891, Hanga began to forge an anti-colonial movement which extended to the neighboring oppressed peoples living inside the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) border. The Barue were uniquely suited to organize such a multi-ethnic alliance. Their historic prestige, their previous military success against the Portuguese, and the universally-held belief that they possessed magic that provided immunization against European bullets, all enhanced their reputation as anti-colonialists.<sup>8</sup> In addition, they had cultivated important marriage alliances with the Muenemutapa kingdom, Tonga chieftaincies, related Shona peoples living in Zimbabwe, and the royal family of Massangano. Hanga's revolutionary pronouncements also won the enthusiastic endorsement of the militantly anti-European spirit mediums of the Dzivaguru cult who sanctified his efforts and urged their followers to join his movement.

The initial concern of the African leadership was to prevent the Portuguese from consolidating their holdings

in the Sena-Tete region. In 1892 Hanga sent supplies and forces to help the beleaguered army of Massangano which was frustrating the Portuguese drive to control the entire area between Sena and Tete. Even with this assistance and a tenacious defense, however, heavy casualties and a shortage of supplies compelled the Tonga army to abandon the area. Many of the soldiers fled across the Barue frontier where they were rearmed and convinced by Hanga to join with their arch-enemies from Gorongosa in an effort to liberate that region. The rebels were able to mobilize a number of Tonga and Sena peasant groups whose land had been expropriated by the Companhia de Moçambique in the early 1890's. For more than a decade this alliance effectively challenged Lisbon's hegemony over the lower Zambesi Valley; although it failed to liberate the region, it contained Portuguese expansionism and provided additional time for the rebels to strengthen their military position.

The anti-colonial coalition enjoyed somewhat greater success on the Mozambican-Zimbabwean frontier. In 1900 the Shona chieftaincies united around Makombe Hanga, Muenemutapa Chicoco and the great leader Mapondera in a concerted effort to "regain their country and the women who had been taken from them."<sup>9</sup> Within a year the rebel armies under Mapondera's command had eliminated the Portuguese from the entire frontier region. In the fall of 1901 a British observer telegraphed the High Commissioner in Johannesburg that "the Portuguese government exercises no control over the people and their chiefs who live near the Southern Rhodesian border and are practically independent. The most powerful Makombe had defied them."<sup>10</sup>

The success of the liberation forces created an intolerable situation for Lisbon because they were effectively challenging Portugal's claim of sovereignty over the Zambesi Valley at the very moment that other European powers were eyeing this strategic region. In a desperate effort to destroy the growing coalition, Portuguese forces mounted a major campaign against the Barue in 1902.

By the end of the year the Barue and their allies had been crushed. Lisbon's ability to recruit a large mercenary force proved to be the crucial factor. Less than three percent of the colonial army of twenty thousand were of Portuguese descent. The mercenaries, armed with modern rifles and supported by heavy artillery, outgunned and outnumbered the Barue and their allies, making the outcome of the confrontation inevitable. However, the will to be free and the commitment to an anti-colonial coalition was to surface again.

### III. The Imposition of Portuguese Colonial Rule and Localized African Resistance, 1890-1915:

From the outset of the colonial period Portugal, like the other imperial powers, sought to impose its political rule and to promote profitable economic ventures. Lisbon's most immediate concern was to develop a system of social and political control. The Portuguese removed the historic leadership of most Zambesian societies in total disregard for the religious and cultural sanctity of kingship, and dispatched African police, drawn from the ranks of the mercenaries, to oversee the activities of the newly appointed chiefs and to intimidate the local population. Given their desires for self-aggrandizement and their monopoly of power, it is hardly surprising that the *sepaís* brutalized the local population.

To offset administrative costs, Lisbon embarked upon a policy of exploitation of cheap labor and agricultural produce. The imposition of a repressive taxation system and threats of violence compelled many peasants to enter the European labor force. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, thousands of workers were forcibly exported to Sao Tome, Rhodesia and South Africa creating substantial rural impoverishment and social dislocation.<sup>11</sup> Peasants who remained on their historic lands, most of which had been expropriated by multi-national companies, were required to provide a minimum of two weeks of free labor. One observer noted that the Africans were under the misguided assumption that after they had paid their taxes in kind and labor they could devote the rest of their time and energy to providing for their family. In reality, however:

... hardly had they been home a few days after working to pay their taxes when the *sypaes* come to take them against their will. . . . To their complete disgust they are sent sometimes a distance of ten days marching, and more, from their villages to work for a month.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, Africans had to provide at least one week of free labor each year to the state or face immediate incarceration.

Force also was used to prevent the peasants from trading outside the Company holdings despite the fact that such coercive activities were prohibited by law. In order to protect their monopoly and increase their profits, company officials, in collusion with the *sepaes*, compelled the Africans to sell their products to company stores at a low price and to pay exorbitant prices for any items which they desired to purchase. Along with the forced labor policies, these monopolistic practices intensified the process of underdevelopment.

These abuses by the Europeans and their African allies generated recurring protests aimed at ameliorating specific grievances rather than eliminating the repressive system which created them. Because of its sporadic nature much of this local opposition has been ignored by contemporaries and historians alike. Nevertheless, "day-to-day" resistance, withdrawal, social banditry and peasant revolts were an important part of the anti-colonial legacy.

Like the slaves in the American South, many peasants on Company estates covertly retaliated against the repressive system. Lacking significant power direct confrontation would have been senseless. Instead, they engaged in work slowdowns, feigned illness and surreptitiously destroyed the property of the Europeans. In addition, many Zambesi peasants took advantage of the absence of demographic data to alter their age or marital status which resulted in lower taxes or fled into the interior when the revenue agents approached their village. The dominant European population, as in the United States, perceived these forms of "day-to-day" resistance as *prima facie* evidence of the docility and ignorance of their subordinates rather than as expressions of discontent.

Flight across international frontiers was the most common expression of African protest. Although the clandestine nature of the exodus precludes any accurate assessment of its volume, thousands of Zambesian people fled annually to Rhodesia and Malawi in the misguided hope that British colonialism would be more benign. Between 1895 and 1907 alone it was estimated that more than 50,000 Africans "voted with their feet."

While many peasants withdrew from the Portuguese territory, others fled into the interior and organized fugitive communities committed to destroying the specific symbols of rural oppression. They attacked European plantations and retaliated against the *sepaes* in an effort to protect their village and kinship groups from continued harassment and exploitation. Like the social bandits of Sicily or northeastern Brazil, the Zambesian bands were led by individuals who were not regarded as criminals by their own society, although they had violated the laws of the colonial regime.<sup>13</sup> Of all the social bandits, the most successful was the legendary Mapondera. For more than a decade he battled Rhodesian and Portuguese colonial forces while protecting the rural peasantry against exploitative company officials and abusive administrators.<sup>14</sup>

The early colonial period also saw a number of armed uprisings by alienated members of the rural population who were unwilling to abandon their traditional homelands. Between 1890 and 1905 at least sixteen different peasant uprisings occurred in the Zambesi Valley. These insurrections tended to be localized and of extremely short duration. The alienated peasants vented their anger against their immediate oppressors, driving away tax collectors, attacking labor recruiters, harassing *sypaes*, and burning Company stores and warehouses. The relative isolation of the peasants, their commitment to the soil and their lack of a well-developed political consciousness frustrated efforts to build broader coalitions that would solidify their gains. Having manifested their discontent, most returned to their villages without thoughts of further subverting the system.

#### IV. The Zambesi Rebellion of 1917:

After the atomized protests had failed to alleviate the abuses, there were several desperate efforts at mass mobilization around the turn of the century. The insurgent leaders unsuccessfully attempted to convince the local peasants that the only way to end the exploitation was by destroying the colonial system which generated it. These movements, although crushed, demonstrated a new level of political consciousness and a commitment which transcended purely ethnic or cultural considerations.<sup>15</sup> While Portuguese officials dismissed the impact of these expressions of discontent and confidently predicted that the Africans had been permanently pacified, the level of rural alienation and the common realization of suffering intensified. African hostility finally erupted in 1917 when an alliance of Zambesian peoples, centered once again around the Barue, initiated an anti-colonial struggle on an unprecedented scale.

Expanded demands for cheap African labor precipitated the rebellion of 1917. In 1914 Portuguese officials began constructing a major road system. *Sepeas* raided African villages forcibly recruiting thousands of young men and women to work on the roads without compensation. They were transported great distances and subjected to flagrantly abusive practices. A member of the Barue royal family informed British officials that:

When the Portuguese conquered us year ago [they said that] we should have to pay taxes which was 1 shilling a man and his wife. After they caught some young girls and young boys and made them work on public works for no pay nor were they given food. Lately the white men at Mungari and Nysiwiza have been ravishing children who are too



young for a man to sleep with. Many of the girls were very ill and had to be sent back. One sepoy, Nyakatoko, actually cut the girl's private parts so that he could penetrate her.<sup>16</sup>

In 1916 the Portuguese ordered the recruitment of a minimum of 5,000 Africans to fight the Germans on the northern frontier. The hostility toward the Portuguese, the reported high mortality rate among African levies, and the low financial inducements which the Europeans offered combined to discourage enlistment. As a result, the Portuguese resorted to coercion and duplicity in order to meet their manpower needs. The conscription of an unprecedented number of peasants created new social and economic hardships and intensified the anti-colonial sentiment throughout the Zambesi Valley.

The continued prestige of the Barue and the adoption of a militant anti-Portuguese posture by their leadership propelled them to the forefront of the liberation struggle. By the beginning of 1917 Barue emissaries had revived and expanded the 1902 alliances. Zambesian peoples who in the past had remained neutral or had previously aided the Portuguese committed their forces to the rebellion. The anti-colonial coalition included Africans living in Zimbabwe and groups residing along the Mozambique-Zambian frontier at Zumbo, as well as a number of mulattoes whose ancestors had fought against the Europeans.<sup>17</sup> A number of chiefs who had been reluctant to join or who were paid agents of the Portuguese were replaced by young militants who were eager to join the alliance. The goal of the insurgents was to liberate their homelands and drive out the Portuguese as well as the African collaborators who helped to perpetuate the oppressive system.

By March 1917, plans for the rebellion had been formalized. The rebels were divided into three armies and were assigned to drive the Portuguese out of Sena, Tete or Zumbo district. The actual conflict broke out on March 27th and for the next three months the Zambesian forces scored a number of impressive triumphs. In the region of Sena every post, with the exception of the town of Sena itself, was captured by May. Zumbo was abandoned in early April, and by the end of May Lisbon's holdings had been reduced to the garrison towns of Sena and Tete where the defenders were badly demoralized. The Barue also expanded their activity to the white settler-dominated Manica highlands and the insurrection inspired oppressed Africans as far south as Lourenço Marques to consider rebelling.

Despite these initial gains, the rebels had been effectively quashed by the end of 1917. As in the case of the earlier struggles, superior firepower and the recruitment of a large mercenary force proved critical. No less than 20,000 African collaborators were induced to join the colonial army with offers of high salaries and assurances that they could enslave their female captives and keep all their plunder. The Portuguese scorched earth policy, moreover, was demoralizingly effective. Ordered the Governor of Beira:

You must burn all the rebel villages destroying all the fields, confiscating all their cattle and taking as many prisoners as possible including women and children. . . . it is indispensable that these actions be carried out as rapidly and violently as possible in order to terrorize the local population and prevent further revolts.<sup>18</sup>

Although the major liberation forces had been defeated, remnants regrouped around Makombe Makosa who had replaced Nongwe-Nongwe as the leader of the insurrection. Throughout 1918 they engaged in guerrilla warfare from their base in the inaccessible Gaerezi mountains, attacking European plantations and government outposts. A major Portuguese counterattack, however, coupled with widespread famines severely undercut their efforts, and sometime after 1920 the guerrillas abandoned their last holdings and fled into Zimbabwe.

## V. Conclusion:

The defeat of the liberation forces marked the first time in nearly 350 years that Lisbon had really "pacified" the Zambesi Valley. During the pre-1920 period the most salient characteristic of African-Portuguese relations was the commitment of the indigenous peoples to remain outside the sphere of Portuguese control. The continuous anti-colonial activities of the Barue, Tonga and Muene-mutapa, among others, testified to this ongoing tradition of resistance. Viewed from a slightly different perspective, between 1884, when Lisbon initiated its new phase of aggression, and their victory in 1902 there were only two years in which the Portuguese were not embroiled in at least one major confrontation. As the intensity of Portuguese pressure increased, the Zambesian peoples began to discard their parochial tendencies and to create broader alliances based on more viable political entities. The shift in primordial loyalties reflected a new level of political consciousness which recognized the Portuguese for the first time as the common oppressor. This pan-Zambesian approach reached its zenith during the 1917 rebellion. The nature of the appeal, which was phrased in anti-colonial but non-racial terms, and the broad base of the alliance placed the insurrection in a transitional category between earlier forms of African resistance and the recent war of liberation.

The links with FRELIMO extended beyond a shared anti-colonial commitment. Throughout the colonial period Zambesian elders defiantly transmitted accounts of African resistance which served as a source of pride and a testimony to past unity.<sup>19</sup> Spirit mediums also kept alive anti-colonial sentiment and as late as 1972 they were thought to have provided the liberation forces with special medicines to neutralize Portuguese weapons.<sup>20</sup> FRELIMO communications, moreover, recalled with pride the past resistance to Portuguese rule.<sup>21</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that during FRELIMO's formative stage the liberation forces included freedom fighters from the Zambesi Valley, despite the location of their bases in distant Tanzania. Most impressive, however, was the enthusiastic reception and continued support of the peasants of the Zambesi Valley during the critical Tete and Manica-Sofala offenses of the early 1970's.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>For a brilliant critique of lusotropicalism, see Gerald Bender, "Race Relations in Angola" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975).

<sup>2</sup>For an analysis of the long tradition of resistance in the Zambesi Valley, see Allen Isaacman, *The Anti-Colonial Legacy in Mozambique: A Study of the Zambesian Resistance, 1850-1921* (University of California Press, title and publisher tentative). A somewhat



longer and more detailed version of this article is to appear simultaneously in *Africa Today*.

<sup>3</sup>For a general discussion of the relationship between Lisbon and the prazeros, see Allen Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution, The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902* (Madison, 1972) and M.D.D. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi* (New York, 1973).

<sup>4</sup>Joao dos Santos, "Ethiopia Oriental," in *Records of South-East Africa*, ed. G. M. Theal (Capetown, 1901), 7:263.

<sup>5</sup>Frei António Conceição, "Tratados dos Rios de Cuama," in *O Chronista de Tissaury Periódico*, ed. J. H. da Cunha Rivara (Nova Goa, 1867), 2:64-65.

<sup>6</sup>Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (A.H.U.), Moç., Maço 25: Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcelos e Cirne to Paulo José Miguel de Brito, 6 March 1835.

<sup>7</sup>José Fernandes Júnior, "Narração do Distrito de Tete" (Unpublished paper, Makanga, 1955), p. 50.

<sup>8</sup>Interview with Chief Makosa, 12 July 1972; interview with Stephen Mugomedza, 19 July 1972; interview with Samacande, 21 July 1972; interview with Sande Nyandoro, 1 August 1972; Francisco Gavincho de Lacerda, *Cartas da Zambézia* (Lisbon, 1939), p. 143.

<sup>9</sup>Interview with Enoch Mapondera, 10 July 1972; Rhodesian National Archive (R.N.A.), A/11/2/12/13: W. H. Milton to J. F. Jones, 9 March 1901; R.N.A., R.C. 2/4/3, HC 238: Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, Johannesburg, 21 March 1901; R.N.A., R.C. 3/3/3, Adm. 178: Native Commissioner, Darwin, to Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, undated.

<sup>10</sup>R.N.A., RC 2/4/3, HC 238: Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, Johannesburg, 21 September 1901.

<sup>11</sup>See James Duffy, *A Question of Slavery* (Oxford, 1967).

<sup>12</sup>Carlos Wiese, "Zambézia—A Labour Question em Nossa Casa," *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, 10 (1891), 244-45.

<sup>13</sup>For a discussion of social bandits see the classic work of Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (New York, 1969).

<sup>14</sup>Interview with Enoch Mapondera. The author is currently writing an article on the career of Mapondera as a social bandit and subsequent guerrilla leader.

<sup>15</sup>The major rebellions were the Cambuemba Sena Tonga insurrection of 1897, the 1901 Makanga uprising, the Tawara insurgence of 1901, and the abortive Shona rebellion of 1904.

<sup>16</sup>R.N.A., N 3/26/2/6/8: H. S. Taberer, 7 May 1917. Other corroborating accounts can be found in R.N.A., A 3.18/38/5 and in interviews with Chief Makosa, Chief Dendera, Samancande and Stephen Mugomedza.

<sup>17</sup>The alliance also included a small number of Portuguese. For a detailed discussion of the ethnic and racial composition of the liberation forces, see Isaacman, *The Anti-Colonial Legacy*, Chapter 8 and T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese South-East Africa—The Makombe Rising of 1917," *St. Anthony Papers—African Affairs*, ed. Kenneth Kirkwood (London, 1963), pp. 54-80.

<sup>18</sup>Arquivo da Companhia de Moçambique (A.C.M.), Cx. 1857: Telegram from Governor in Beira to Commandante Militar, 4 May 1917.

<sup>19</sup>In 1968 when doing field work in the Zambesi Valley, several elders recounted with pride the wars against the Europeans. A number of younger people indicated that this was a very vital part of the oral history which was transmitted to them. Because of the sensitive nature of our discussions, this material was never taped. It is interesting to note that Basil Davidson found a similar phenomenon when travelling through liberated areas of Angola (Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm* [New York, 1972], pp. 20-21).

<sup>20</sup>In 1972 several elders adamantly refused to discuss the question of how bullets were turned into water during the 1917 rebellion, claiming that the spirit mediums had provided similar potions to FRELIMO in the current struggle against the Portuguese. In neighboring Zimbabwe the *Sunday Times* reported that the Smith regime had initiated an intensive campaign in an effort to discredit the rebellious spirit mediums (*African Studies Association Newsletter*, VI [1973], 55).

<sup>21</sup>See, for example, Ronald Chilcote, ed., *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa* (Stanford, 1972), pp. 383-99. In various issues of *Mozambique Revolution* this theme is emphasized.

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# South Africa

## POLITICS

### BLACK REACTION TO "DETENTE"

#### Inside the System:

Black leaders working inside the system have generally welcomed the recent efforts by independent black African states to bring about some change in Southern Africa, through negotiation with the white regime in South Africa. Even these leaders, however, feel that although

Prime Minister Vorster has reached "detente" with some neighbouring Black states, he has yet to reach "detente" with Blacks inside the country and strongly urged Mr. Vorster to do so.

#### Outside the system:

The African National Congress, banned in South Africa

and committed to the forcible overthrow of the white regime, is on the other hand alarmed by the "detente" and has urged the OAU (Organization of African Unity) to stand firm against South Africa's apartheid in general and the Bantustan system in particular. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, April, 1975; *Guardian*, London, March 27, 1975)

## LABOUR PARTY WINS MAJORITY IN COLOURED COUNCIL:

### Background:

The Coloured Representative Council is the government sponsored body for "representation" of the Coloured people (i.e. people of mixed origin). The Council consists of 40 elected members and 20 members nominated by the White Government. There have been two major parties in the council, namely the Labour Party and the Federal Party. The Labour Party is totally opposed to the Government's policy of apartheid, whereas the Federal Party, although demanding full citizenship for the Coloureds is sympathetic to the policy of apartheid as applied to other population groups. In all the elections to the Council held so far the Labour Party has won the majority of the elected seats. However, since the Government chose the nominated members almost exclusively from the Federal Party, the Federal Party managed to control the Council, until very recently.

### Recent events:

Late in 1974, aided by a minor revolt in the Federal Party, the Labour Party managed to pass a resolution in the Council, demanding abolition of the Council and full citizenship for the Coloureds. This was followed by a stalemate in which the Council was suspended and reconvened and finally the Government called for fresh elections to the Council.

### Election:

Although the Labour Party contested this election, 16 campaigned on a platform of abolition of the Council itself. The Party said that if it wins the majority, it will refuse to run the Council. The Federal Party, on the other hand, hoped to get a better deal for the Coloureds by working through the Council. In the election held on March 18, the Labour Party won 31 out of 40 elected seats which meant that the Labour Party will have a majority in the Council, even if all 20 nominated members belong to the Federal Party.

### After the election:

On March 19, just after the election, the Government introduced a bill in Parliament, empowering the Minister of Coloured Affairs to take over some of the powers of the Council, including that of passing its already very limited budget. Obviously, this was done to deal with a situation arising out of the possible non-cooperation of the Labour Party. The Government said that it will allow the Labour Party to take control of the Council but reemphasised its intention of not allowing Coloureds to vote for the present all white Parliament.

It appears that the Labour Party has changed its tactics since the election. It is presently thinking in terms of taking control of the Council and pushing its fight against apartheid there. Also as a tactic, the party has decided to confine its demand for full citizenship to the Coloureds alone.

### White Opinion:

As expected the Afrikaans press supported the Government, while the English press and white opposition parties criticized the Government's move to curb the power of the Coloured Council. The English press in general, felt that the Coloureds should eventually be given full citizenship. A leading Johannesburg paper urged the Government to hold a referendum to decide whether the Whites now favor full citizenship for the Coloureds. The paper also quoted a recent survey by the paper itself, which indicated that the majority of whites now favor full citizenship for the Coloureds. The English press however did not feel that the Labour Party should engage in a direct confrontation with the Government and welcomed the change of attitude from Labour Party. (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., March 24, 1975; *SABC*, Johannesburg, March 21, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, March 21, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975)

### UP AND RP POLICIES OUTLINED

Of major importance to internal white South African "development" was the recent Budget presented to Parliament by the newly appointed English-speaking Minister of Finance, Senator Horwood. The South African budget is now a record \$9.4 million, a 19 per cent increase in Government expenditure. (See economic section for breakdown in figures).

The United Party, during the debate on the budget, further clarified their federalist position. According to MP Vanse Raw, the UP intends to phase out the white parliament eventually in favor of an all-race Federal Assembly. He further stated that when residual powers held by Parliament ("the keys to the security of the state") were transferred to the Federal Assembly, then "without equivocation this parliament will be functus officio. It would have no further role to play as the sovereign authority in South Africa".

The breakaway United Party faction, the newly constituted Reform Party (RP), maintains that United Party policy still allows the Whites to entrench themselves in power forever, because the policy gives the Whites a unilateral and total veto right over the transfer of powers to the all-race legislature.

The Reform Party released a 15-point statement of principles. The following points appears to be distinctive RP positions:

- The party stands for the establishment of a permanent multiracial commission to review discriminatory laws and practices. The commission would evolve a systematic procedure for their removal and be available to deal with complaints.
- The RP advocates a tolerant "doctrine of choice" on the use of public amenities. This would allow amenities to be shared by all races where only one such amenity exists, but allow separation of races and sharing where numerous amenities are possible. This policy extends into areas of race relations such as occupation of train compartments, schools and residential areas.
- In a proposed federation, common matters such as the administration of the railways and airways could be dealt with by corporations of a non-political nature.
- Essential for the homelands concept to be meaningful are that they must be economically viable, not dependent on the export of labour for economic survival, have a professional administrative, technical and academic backing necessary to run independently, and not be land hungry.

A week later, the RP further clarified their position on "the consolidation of the Black homelands" by a speech of the leader Harry Schwarz. Major features are:

- Calls for a truly representative multiracial commission to recommend what territory should be added to the homelands.
- Believes meaningful consolidation can best be achieved by drawing new boundaries without necessarily buying the land involved and without removing population groups.
- Believes black groups asked to consider independence should do so on the basis of a consolidated entity, not of a scattered collection of non-contiguous pieces of land.
- Stands for the people of the homeland concerned taking the decision on whether their homeland should become independent, because independence cannot be foisted on an unwilling people.

### NEW STATE PRESIDENT INSTALLED

White South Africa has also installed Nico Diederichs as new State President. Diederichs was the former Minister of Finance, a post he held for 15 years. The State Presidency is largely a ceremonious position.



Dr. Nico Diederichs, third State President, installed.

### NAT -SPLIT OR UNION?

Rumors of a possible split within the ruling Nationalist Party continues, but, as Douglas Brown of the *London Telegram* observes, "If history is any guide it is difficult to imagine the ordinary Afrikaner losing his nerve and allowing the national unity, at any stage in the future, to be dangerously undermined. One suspects that as each new challenge arises a consensus will be reached on the manner of meeting it."

What about the opposition parties uniting? The Democratic Party of Theo Gerdener recently rejected a merger with the newly constituted Reform Party and the Progressive Party. The Progressives were not able to come to a decision on joining forces with the RP, so that what exists in reality is a number of opposition parties probably with an unsigned "non-aggression pact".

### CENSORSHIP

On the censorship front, C.P. Mulder, Minister of Information and the Interior, announced the composition of the new Publications Appeal Board, the Directorate of Publications and the panel from which committees will be appointed to examine publications and entertainment. The new chairman of the Publications Appeal Board is Justice J.H. Snyman. The Board was promptly denounced by several writers for the "conspicuous shortage of English names on lists weighted with retired academics and domineers" (ministers). The Eastern Province *Herald* stated that "almost certainly the new censorship will interfere with natural processes of social evolution"!!

Regarding the opening of the Nico Malan Theatre in Cape Town to all population groups, Mulder also stated that this decision does not mean that theatres all over the country could do the same.

### NEW METROPOLITAN AREAS TO BE ESTABLISHED

The Nationalists also revealed a new "National Physical Development Plan (NPDP), which is the establishment of three entirely new metropolitan areas at Richards Bay, Saldanha and East London-King Williams Town within the next 25 years. It will create new focal points away from existing metropolitan areas to cater for the expected doubling of the population by the turn of the century.

### Titbits of white politics:

\*United Party senators called on the Nationalist Government to accommodate Black workers. Why? To maintain economic growth.

\*The Transkei will be allowed to have a 'military unit'-wearing South African army uniforms until independence. However, the UP maintains that this "raises issues of fundamental importance to future defence strategy."

\*John Vorster is leading a Nationalist crusade to "beat out any publicity being given to the party's internal troubles" which might damage its electoral strength. The target in the campaign is the Nationalist Press.

\*The Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Rumpff, says social separation by color alone will disappear "naturally." He also said that African "Primitive laws should be adapted to our own common law. For if there is one facet of our White civilisation here that is beyond condemnation, it is our common law"!

\*Immigration to South Africa dropped in the early 1970's and in 1973. From the figure of 9,805 in 1960, annual immigration rose to 48,051 in 1966. After 1966 it dropped and since 1970 the decrease has been steady. In 1970 there were 41,523 immigrants; in 1971, 35,845; in 1972, 32,776; and in 1973, 24,016. Immigration from Rhodesia to South Africa was as follows: in 1969 there were 3,441, 1972 figured 2,047 and rose to 2,706 in 1973 (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 15, 29, April 5, 12, 19, 26, 1975)

## ECONOMICS

### DEFENCE DOMINATES BUDGET

The new Minister of Finance, Senator O.P.F. Horwood, announced his budget in Parliament on March 26. The most striking feature of the budget was a 36 percent increase in the defence allowance, bringing defence up to almost \$1.5 billion.

The priorities of the South African Government are clearly stated in the budget. Horwood said that second to the defence priority was that of providing for an adequate economic infrastructure. And the budget was received widely as conservative but "hopeful." Nevertheless, for the majority of South Africa's people, the budget is clearly not for them. This is illustrated by the following allocations: for the entire Bantustan program including education, economic development, land purchase, administration, social welfare, and pensions, only \$560 million. Of that, about \$100 million will go for African education while \$310 million has been set aside for "National" (White) education. Almost as much has been allocated for prisons, \$95 million, as for African education.

The total South African budget for 1975 is about \$7,355 million. (*South African Digest*, April 4, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Vol. 4, No. 9, April 4, 1975)

### SUPREME COUNCIL OF EMPLOYERS FORMED

South Africa's ten most powerful employer organizations have formed the Employer's Consultative Committee on Labor Affairs. The impetus for this committee came from problems relating to Black labor relations, and Black labor cannot but tremble at the implications of this new move. The Committee is set up to be an authoritative mouthpiece of employers, and although all decisions of the committee must be unanimous, the potential power of such a group is extremely great.

If this committee functions the workers' ability to apply pressure against competing factory owners will be severely curtailed. The new committee includes the following organizations: Handelsinstituut, Assocom, the Automobile Manufacturers Employers Organization, the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Motor Industries Employers Association, the Sugar Millers Association, The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation, the Chamber of Mines, and the Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 15, 1975)


### THE RICH GET RICHER

Much attention has been given by supporters of White South Africa to increases in wages and improvements of other kinds for Black workers. The South African *Financial Mail* has published statistics which tell the true story of economic growth in South Africa, and the fact is that although Black wages have risen more than White in the past two years, the absolute gap between Black and White wages has widened.

To look at a specific case: manufacturing. In 1969, according to the Department of Statistics, the average monthly wage for Whites was \$395; for Africans \$70, with a gap of \$325. In Sept., 1973, the latest date for which figures were available, the average White wage was \$555, the African \$113, with the gap increased by \$117 to \$442.

The Government claims it is concerned about this problem, but no significant action seems to have been

## HOUSEHOLD INCOMES: THE GAP WIDENS



taken to alter it. In fact, the mid-1974 wage increases on the state owned South African Railways widened the gap between Black and White pay by a sizeable margin.


The division of the GNP by race shows an even greater inequity, as illustrated by the Household Incomes Chart. (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1975. R1 equals about \$1.45) White *per capita* income rose from about \$94 a month in 1962 to about \$209 in 1973; that of Indians rose from about \$17.50 to \$42; of Coloureds from about \$14.50 to \$32; and of Africans from \$6.25 to \$13.80. Thus, although the *per capita* income of each group has more than doubled, White *per capita* income is still 16 times that of Africans, and the White-African disparity has more than doubled from about \$88 to \$185.

There is little reason to be optimistic about this situation changing. For one thing, if Black wages are to increase, then employers will insist that the productivity of Black workers must also increase. This means that Blacks will have to be better trained. The picture of Black education is grim. A recent study by the Human Sciences Research Council estimates that in 1980, 33 percent of African male workers will still be without any education; 47 percent will have only a primary school education; 20 percent will have a secondary education; and a bare 1 percent will have a matriculation certificate or university degree. This situation will have to change or other training will have to be offered for Blacks to qualify for the higher paying, more skilled jobs.

But, of course, White workers will not allow Blacks to move up into more skilled jobs if this appears to be a threat to their positions, and they never agree to a raising of the color bar unless their wages are increased, again widening the gap between Black and White wages.

Another set of charts from the *Financial Mail* of Feb. 21, 1975 further illustrates the gap. These figures are for 1973. R1 equals about \$1.45.

## THE BIG WHITE BITE



### MINE DEATHS INVESTIGATED

Although the Government has set up a Commission to study the events at Northfield Colliery which took the lives of thirty coal miners, the Commission's report may never be made public. Minister of Mines Dr. Koornhof said that the Cabinet would decide if it was in "the national interest" to release the report which is to be submitted within two months. (For a report on the mine deaths, see *Southern Africa*, May, 1975)

According to Dr. Koornhof, investigations that have been made so far have not revealed the cause of the deaths. Koornhof stated that the matter was extremely serious and not one for political exploitation. Further he said, it was not appropriate for there to be a commission of inquiry into the general labor situation in South Africa as suggested by the United Party, because such an inquiry would take too much time. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 15, 1975)

### "GOLD MINING HAS CHANGED"

This is the message that the Chamber of Mines is trying to put across to Africans on the Reef, to persuade them to sign up as mine laborers. A major promotional job is being done, a job that is necessary because South African Blacks have been reluctant to work on the gold mines. (For background, see *Southern Africa*, May, 1975) As of Dec. 31, 1974, South African Blacks comprised only 70,996 of the 299,680 Blacks on the gold mines, and even that figure was down 8,000 from October last year. (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 1975)

The Chamber of Mines has set a target of 50,000 additional Black South Africans a year. Most Blacks think of mining as hard labor rewarded by slave wages. To

overcome this, a number of techniques are being tried. These include the use of films and other audio-visuals, touring the mines with potential workers, and the distribution of handbills. A handbill that has been widely circulated states that wages on the mines have tripled in two years. "Gold mining has changed! Save a lot of money, and be a man of standing."

So far just over 100 men have been recruited, but the Chamber of Mines says that the scheme is barely off the ground, and it is too early to judge its success. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 12, 1975)

### DEFENSE

#### "WE PRAY FOR PEACE BUT..."

"We pray for peace," stated South African Minister of Defense P.W. Botha, "but we work to ensure that we have the means of maintaining a peaceful and orderly existence in the country we love."

It is not unusual for nations to talk (and pray for) peace while preparing for war. In particular, however, it comes as no surprise that while South African Prime Minister John Vorster has recently assumed the "dove of peace" role *vis a vis* Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa's 1975 defense budget is slated to rise by 36 per cent over 1974 spending. This rise represents a 100 per cent increase over the past two years, and will bring total defense spending to more than 1.5 billion dollars. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 29, 1975; *Financial Times*, London, March 29, 1975) Expenditure on defense, police and prisons now constitutes nearly one-fifth of South Africa's revenue budget. At a more "personal" level, one out of

two white adults in South Africa now owns a firearm. From July to December, 1974, the number of privately owned weapons increased by 53,200, with some gun salesmen in South Africa reporting nearly a 100 per cent increase in sales following the establishment of the transitional government in Mozambique. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, April, 1975)

Clearly, detente and military build-up are the external and internal aspects of South Africa's efforts to keep white supremacy intact in South Africa. The White Paper on defense and armament production tabled in the South African Parliament during the last week in March detailed plans for the expansion and reorganization of South Africa's defense forces. These plans include the procurement of more submarines and jet interceptor aircraft and the reorganization of the army into two main forces: 1) a conventional fighting force, and 2) a counter-insurgency force. In addition a new unit, No. 250 Air Defence Unit, has been established and equipped with missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Extensions at Silvermine, which houses the maritime operational and communication centre, are to be carried out, while a new military complex is to be built at Saldanha Bay. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 29, 1975)



As Botha explained in a briefing to Parliamentary defense groups on the functions of the Armaments Board, South Africa's need for a "more adequate insurance policy" requires an "extra premium." South African commerce and industry, pointed out Mr. Botha, were "relying extensively for their future on the coverage that a policy of military preparedness affords them." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 22, 1975) Plans for naval "coverage" include the enlargement of the Simonstown naval base to double its present capacity and repeated invitations to the "entire free world" to use this base in the face of Britain's determination to negotiate an end to its own involvement in the base.

Ironically, while the British Labour Government argues that its decision to terminate the twenty year old Simonstown Agreement is part of a general withdrawal from military responsibility outside the NATO area, South Africa is stepping up its courtship of NATO, now pursued even through blatant ads. (See *New York Times*, March 18, 1975) Here, however, the "coverage" to be gained through direct contribution to South Africa's

defense is presented in terms of protecting the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, keeping the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean open, and, of course, undercutting "the strategy of communism to secure world domination." (*South African Digest*, March 14, 1975) With the major NATO powers apparently undergoing a crisis of confidence and expressing increasing fears about the reliability of certain members (Portugal and Turkey, in particular) South African propaganda now seems beautifully timed and orchestrated to appeal to alliance strategists.

In the meantime, South Africa has recently achieved both successes and set-backs in her quest for military hardware from abroad. Israel is to provide Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles for the South African navy (South Africa's first sea missiles). South Africa also uses Israeli Uzi guns and an extensive range of military equipment, and in light of last year's visits to South Africa by General Dayan and General Haim Hertzog, former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence, Israel's contribution to the apartheid defense structure seems likely to be a growing one. Britain, on the other hand, has announced that it will no longer sell "Buccaneer" strike aircraft produced by Hawker Siddeley to South Africa. Since 1965, South Africa has bought several "Buccaneer" and wanted more. (*Sechaba*, Feb., 1975; *A.F.P. Inter-African News Survey*, March 21, 1975)

Thanks in part to a nuclear reactor provided by the U.S. under the "Atoms For Peace Program" ten years ago, South Africa now has a "unique process" for producing enriched uranium. While South Africa produces one quarter of the western world's uranium, the enrichment process is necessary to make raw uranium militarily useful. The American corporation Allis-Chalmers helped construct the facility for this in South Africa, and South African technicians were trained in the Atomic Energy labs at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. For its own purposes, the apartheid regime could make nuclear bombs, but that's not all. With U.S. requirements for nuclear power slated to increase ten times in the next decade and five times the current production capacity, the U.S. may become a prime customer for South African uranium. As Louw Alberts, Vice-President of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board stated bluntly, "We now have a bargaining position equal to that of any Arab country with a lot of oil." (*Africa News*, April 10, 1975)





Prime Minister Vorster (right) welcomes French Minister of Foreign Trade, Norbert Segard (center).

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

### "DÉTENTE" MANEUVERS AND THE OAU MEETING

The basic objective behind South Africa's "détente" initiatives is to legitimize the current status quo in southern Africa by obtaining the recognition of its regime from the Black African states. *Die Burger* stated that "South Africa is seeking relaxation and peaceful co-existence in Africa on the basis of the National Party's internal policy [apartheid]. When Mr. Vorster talks to Black leaders in Africa and their envoys he explains National thinking on problems of [race] relations." (our emphasis) *Die Transvaler* commented that "in a last attempt to avoid a bloody clash here he [Vorster] set to work . . . to avert the threatening crisis [the spread of the armed struggle to South Africa]. A few responsible Black leaders, among them President Kaunda, President Khama and leaders of French-speaking countries, fell in with this." In addition the *Pretoria News* wrote that "the mere fact that neither South Africa nor Rhodesia will be represented at this meeting [OAU conference in Dar es Salaam] underlines its importance, for until these countries [the Vorster and Smith regimes] are numbered among its members the OAU must remain something of a pretense, a body embracing merely parts, not the whole of the . . . continent." In reference to the OAU talks (see International Relations) the *Star* specifically commented that "the emphasis of the talks appears to have changed. . . . It will be on South Africa rather than Rhodesia. This may be an adroit piece of stage-management. Kaunda, a partner in détente, will be free to denounce the iniquities of apartheid, to join in the united call for change in South Africa and for a free Namibia. But it will not make one iota of difference to the pursuit of peace in Rhodesia. Black Africa might be able to say it has honoured its obligations—and détente's architects can get on with the job." (italics added) Furthermore, in an interview Vorster stated that "the aim of my policy is to normalize relations with African countries. . . . But my government's policy remains that of separate development [apartheid] and it will be our policy as long as the National Party remains in power." (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Mar. 21, Apr. 11, 1975, *Reuter*, Lagos, Mar. 30, 1975)

In order to assist in the détente maneuvers, South Africa is increasing its offers of technical assistance to

Black African states. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs is planning to allocate \$3.12 million for technical assistance to foreign countries during the 1975-76 fiscal year. Although not specially noted, most of this money is earmarked for assistance to African countries. (The total aid allocation represents an increase of \$1.50 million over the past fiscal year.) In this regard Prime Minister Vorster stated in his speech at Stellenbosch University that he "foresaw the closest economic cooperation between politically independent countries, when technical aid would be given and received. Eventually there will be an economic power bloc in Southern Africa." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Mar. 29, Apr. 5, 1975) (5, 1975)

The "détente" initiatives have not gained the support of most African leaders. Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs, stated that it was everyone's duty to "continue the diplomatic, economic, and cultural isolation of South Africa . . . until that Government treats the Black man in South Africa as a full citizen of the country of his birth." It was dangerous to believe "that the South African Government is about to change its policy toward the Black man." At the April OAU meeting in Dar es Salaam, Samora Machel of FRELIMO said that "Africa has nothing to discuss with the Pretoria regime. It would be a serious mistake on our part, a betrayal of the struggle of Africa and all oppressed people." The position of the African National Congress of South Africa (represented by its president, Mr. Oliver Tambo) was that the liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia should wage simultaneous guerrilla wars to topple the continent's last white minority regimes. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Mar. 29, 1975; *Washington Star*, Apr. 9, 1975) Additionally in an interview (see Resource Section) Mr. Makatini of the ANC responded with the following analysis of the politics of South Africa's current "détente" initiatives. "We [ANC] make a clear distinction between African countries that might be involved—or active—in the attempts toward the 'so-called détente.' The first category . . . is . . . those countries . . . devoted to the cause of African liberation. . . . We reproach them . . . that . . . [before talking] to Vorster . . . they did not consult us, the liberation movement recognized by the OAU as the authentic representative of the oppressed people of South Africa. . . . We would have perhaps made it clear to them [that] this [dialogue with Vorster] would not work. We know the South African fascists better than any African leader . . . Another category of countries . . . are [those] tempted by the fat carrot that Vorster is brandishing at a time a number of them are going through serious crises. . . . There are also countries [which are] receptive to the pressures by the western countries who fear that the situation in southern Africa is getting out of hand. . . . The offensive waged by . . . the Third World countries during the last United Nations General Assembly and Security Council debate . . . made it clear to some western countries that the balance of forces was shifting to the side of the oppressed masses. . . . It became very embarrassing . . . for western countries—who are . . . creators, collaborators, and partners of the exploitation that goes on in South Africa— . . . to defend South Africa. So that, they found it fit to break this front. . . . They have been planning to move towards . . . the torpedoing of the OAU. . . . The danger of the 'so-called détente' is that: One, the idea is to impose the acceptance of South Africa as a sovereign state, recognized by the OAU; so that, the logical step would be for South Africa to apply and be

admitted as a member of the OAU and then the liberation movement would be seen as a subversive organization. The second thing is that Vorster hopes to get, for the pressures that he is alleged to be exercising on the Ian Smith regime, the African countries to recognize the tribal states ["Bantustans"] he is creating as a part of his program to balkanize the country. The third is to salvage his regime from international isolation and economic [sanctions]; South Africa is progressively becoming an imperialist power within the African context. The international boycott has deprived her of a big market. . . . The increase in the gold price put her in a position where she is ready to give financial and technical assistance to the African countries. . . . [Lastly] once South Africa achieves all these goals we will be blocked by [the African states] who will not allow us transit facilities to prosecute the legitimate armed struggle for the seizure of power and majority rule in South Africa."

### **SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES**

A new South African "private" propaganda agency—the Foreign Affairs Association—has been created to promote South Africa's viewpoint in the world and influence people concerned with international affairs. The organization's sponsors are a number of prominent South African businessmen including Messrs. Louis Luyt, Jan Pickard, Werner Ackermann who recently financed the South African visit of several American Congressmen, Dennis Greyvensteyn, and Piet Liebenberg. Its director is Mr. Cas de Villiers, the current editor of the *Bulletin* of the Africa Institute (University of South Africa), a pro-apartheid organ. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Mar. 29, 1975)

Nathaniel Davis' appointment as the new US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa re-assured South Africa that

the US Government continues to be an ally of South Africa's strategies to maintain the status quo in southern Africa. The *Star* (Johannesburg, Mar. 13, 1975) wrote that "we hope that United States policy will be uninfluenced by the rumpus over Mr. Davis' appointment, and that the US will use what influence it has in Africa to promote change through conciliation and negotiation."

Meanwhile, Dr. C.P. Mulder, South Africa's Minister of the Interior and Information, visiting France during early April to confer with South African information officers and diplomats posted in Western Europe, addressed a meeting of French cabinet ministers, businessmen, and politicians. He stated that "we [South Africa] need participants in development and I can assure you that it is a cooperative association worth joining." Thanking France for its assistance in supplying "weaponry to help us safeguard the sealanes along which 85 percent of the bulk of oil supplies for Europe are shipped," he then noted that a consortium of five French banks were financing the construction of a new fleet of container vessels for Safmarine, and that French interests have aided South Africa's development of a telecommunications system, including a ground satellite station. Mr. Andre Rossi, the French Information Minister, responded that France will expand its trade with South Africa, which has increased 80 per cent over the past two years. (Counting both military and commercial trade France ranks second as South Africa's trading partner.) Additionally, a 20 person delegation, headed by French Trade Minister, Mr. Norbert Segard, visited South Africa and held discussions with Prime Minister Vorster and other cabinet officials concerning methods of increasing South African-French cooperation. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Apr. 12, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Apr. 11, 1975)

# Namibia

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### **BLACK WORKERS SHOT IN WINDHOEK**

One man was shot dead and 10 others wounded—three seriously—by South African Police on April 23 at the gates of Katutura township in Windhoek (*Times*, New York, April 24, 1975)

The police were demanding residence documents from African workers, said South African Minister of Police James Kruger in a statement in Parliament in Cape Town. Kruger added that 295 Blacks had been arrested, 127 of them for throwing stones, and 168 for being in the township illegally.

The *Windhoek Advertiser* of April 24 says that "From South Africa, a large contingent of police reinforcements arrived by nightfall to be on stand-by duty in Windhoek for an indefinite period." Katutura was being patrolled by foot and mechanized police units. The newspaper refers to a statement by the Windhoek town clerk that "there were inciters and organisers of a labour strike in the Ovambo hostel. For that reason it was decided to restore order and to purge the place of vagrants."

BBC broadcast of April 24 reported that members of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) were attempting to ascertain the names and number of wounded in a local hospital but were denied admittance or information.

On May 1 the BBC reported a court hearing in Windhoek at which 78 of the detained appeared. Thirteen filed affidavits of police misconduct, claiming that the police opened fire when the people fled. Police countered by saying that they were stoned. Anglican Bishop Richard Wood declared that medical evidence showed that the wounded were shot from behind. The South African Police contend this occurred because the workers were leaning over to pick up stones. BBC put casualty figures at 11 wounded and one killed.

The *Advertiser* on April 25 editorially condemned the "Ovambo compound, recently elevated to the title of 'hostel' . . . . Over 6,000 souls dwell inside the grey walls of this sombre and depressing institution", adding "The






Municipal police capture a worker outside the Ovambo Hostel in Katutura after passbook raid.

fact that since 1970, the Windhoek *Advertiser* has reported six serious riots at the hostel, should be thought-provoking" and that "the sustained efforts of politicians and journalists for a new future for the people of South West Africa had been seriously damaged."

The English-language paper on the same day features a front-page report entitled "Stinging Black Anger Is Rising" and refers to strong statements from Namibian organizations including the Namibia National Convention and SWAPO. Mr. David H. Meroro, SWAPO national chairman, termed the hostel in Katutura a "slave-labour camp" on which the Namibian economy is based and said those shot were "martyrs of a vicious and deeply-ingrained system".



Defiant slogans. Free Namibia and SWAPO, appear overnight on Windhoek public building walls.

## SWAPO LEADER CONVICTED

Mr. Meroro was recently convicted on a charge of illegally possessing eight copies of a publication entitled "African Communist" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, April 17, 1975). The regional court magistrate sentenced the SWAPO leader to two months imprisonment, conditionally suspended for one year, taking into account the five months Mr. Meroro had already spent in solitary confinement under the Terrorism Act after his arrest in a police sweep in February, 1974. He had been released on bail since last July. Cheering SWAPO supporters welcomed the bespectacled father of 13 as he emerged from the courthouse in Windhoek. Africa News states "Political observers in Namibia believe the South Africa Government was anxious to avoid angering critics, who were already disturbed by testimony that Meroro had been tortured while in prison."

## SWAPO SUPPORT GROWS

A rash of what Divisional Commissioner of Police Brigadier W. Louw calls "daubing"—slogan painting on walls—has broken out in Windhoek. The *Advertiser* of April 28 prints a photograph taken of the side of a building near Katutura depicting in bold graffiti letters SWAPO NAMIBIA. The brigadier, says the *Advertiser*, "said that there was no malicious damage of property and replying to questions about the situation in Katutura's Ovambo hostel, he said that a perfectly normal situation prevailed".

## OAU RESOLUTION ON NAMIBIA

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Dar es Salaam from April 7 to 10 (See International Organizations), unanimously adopted a resolution on Namibia. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma led a delegation which participated fully in the deliberations.

The OAU statement condemned South Africa's illegal and continuing occupation of Namibia and the Vorster regime's political manipulations to partition the country through the use of Bantustans, bogus elections and the Vorster-created multi-racial council. The OAU set up a special committee, composed of the African members of the Council for Namibia (Burundi, Egypt, Liberia, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria, Botswana, Senegal) and the Secretary-General of the OAU "to deal with all matters related to Namibia and, *if need be*, make contact with South Africa after consultation with SWAPO and on condition that South Africa: recognises the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence; respects Namibia's territorial integrity; and recognises SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people."

liberation struggle and political mass mobilization, reaffirmed "its recognition of SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people" and increased material and financial assistance to SWAPO "to enable it to continue and intensify the armed liberation struggle in Namibia."

## COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

The Manchester *Guardian* on April 28, 1975, carries a dispatch from Kingston, Jamaica, where the Commonwealth Conference was preparing to meet, asserting that Zambia, Tanzania and Canada were circulating a plan to

"restore the disputed territory of South West Africa (Namibia) to membership of the Commonwealth". The plan would be in two stages, the first asking that the 33 Commonwealth nations approve bringing Namibians "into full participation in the Commonwealth scholarship scheme". The report noted that at least 4,000 young Namibians had fled their country since last year.

The next stage would be "to assess the political status of Namibia and recognise her as a dependent territory of the Commonwealth, potentially a full sovereign member when she achieves independence. The initiators will argue that when South Africa in the person of the late Dr. Verwoerd withdrew from Commonwealth membership at the 1960 London conference, the South Africans had no legal authority for dragging a mandated UN territory with them."

#### CHURCH LEADERS PROTEST ELECTION INTIMIDATION

Three religious leaders in Namibia—the Rev. Dr. Lukas de Vries, President of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Bishop Leonard Auala of the Ovambo-Kavango Evangelical Lutheran Church and Bishop Richard J. Wood of the Anglican Church have accused South African occupation authorities of blocking efforts to make a legal investigation into allegations of intimidation during elections in the Ovamboland area in January (*Times*, London, April 15, 1975) The churchmen stated "sworn affidavits indicated that there was a *prima facie* case of intimidation from officials 'at all levels'."

They pointed out that an investigating team was forced to conduct inquiries in a courtroom and many people were therefore afraid to make statements. "There were allegations of threats of dismissal, loss of pensions, refusal of ploughing rights and other reprisals and of acts of violence."

Delegates to the synod of the white German Evangelical Lutheran Church, meeting in Windhoek, by a vote of 31 to three, decided to ask for admission to VELKSWA, the United Evangelical Lutheran Churches (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, April 21, 1975) The merger of black and white Lutherans in Namibia was hailed at an inaugural service with greetings from Bishop Auala and Dr. de Vries, who is the president of VELKSWA.

#### SECURITY COUNCIL DEADLINE MAY 30th

The countdown proceeds toward the UN Security Council deadline of May 30 for South Africa's response to resolution 366 which demands the usurper declare its intention to withdraw from Namibia. The Windhoek *Advertiser* of April 28 reports that the United States, Britain and France are prodding the South African Government. A "demarche" was made in Cape Town where South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller met with the ambassadors of the three Western powers. The UN missions of these powers released the following statement in New York:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States made their views on Namibia known to the Government of South Africa on April 22. These views are consistent with those they stated publicly during the Security Council's consideration of the question of Namibia last December. This action underlines the importance they attach to an early resolution of the problem of Namibia. On April 24, they briefed the Secretary General,

Dr. Kurt Waldheim, on the action they had taken with the South African Government."

Related to the Security Council measure is the Council for Namibia decree affecting exploitation of the natural resources of the territory without approval of the Council. Namibia is becoming a public issue for the business community. "This May, the United Nations Council for Namibia will mail hundreds of letters to governments and companies around the world asking them to support a U.N. decree that calls for the seizure of exports from the South African-controlled territory as 'illegal goods.'" (*Business Week*, New York, May 5, 1975, in an article entitled "Foreign companies are running scared")

The chairman of "one large U.S. corporation" confesses "We're scared to death of the political situation." The chairmen of the two big American companies extracting Namibia's base metals (through Tsumeb Corporation), AMAX's Ian MacGregor and Newmont Mining's Plato Malozemoff both deny expressing or agreeing with this sentiment. The former averred at AMAX's annual shareholders meeting in New York on May 1 that the whole thing was a tangled issue which will be settled in the courts. Newmont Vice President Richard Leather on the next day in Wilmington conceded that the directors had discussed the matter in detail but he was not prepared to outline their decisions.

The Australian government will stop promoting trade with and investment in South Africa, according to Overseas Trade Minister Crean. The Australian government has also announced that it will support any UN decision to impose economic sanctions against South Africa. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, April, 1975) Australia's CARE (Campaign Against Racial Exploitation) is launching a major boycott campaign of South African products sold in chain stores and a move to dissolve the Quantas-Johannesburg air link. (*National Union*, March 10, 1975)

The UN Sanctions Committee has accused the Netherlands of importing large quantities of tobacco from Rhodesia, in violation of an international boycott. (*Africa News*, April 14, 1975) The large Dutch company, Zephyr, which has been a major sanctions buster, is being ordered to appear on such charges. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Feb. 27, 1975) More than 1,000 workers at the giant Dutch-West German Estel iron and steel plant have appealed to the firm to decide against investing in South Africa. (AFP Inter-African News Survey, March 7, 1975)

The Austrian company Voest may withdraw from its 25.6% participation agreement in the iron ore processing plant of the South African Saldanha Bay iron ore project. (*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, March 11, 1975)

The International Press Institute (IPI) is still hoping its assembly will be held in Nigeria in May, despite threats by the Nigerian government to exclude white South Africans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 15, 1975) The Nigerian National Committee of the IPI has decided to hold its own "international press conference" in Lagos at the same time that the IPI general assembly is held in Zurich, the place settled upon as an alternative by the IPI if they cannot meet in Nigeria. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975) •

# Zimbabwe

## SITHOLE RELEASED

Two days after Rhodesian Chief Justice MacDonald, in an open court, upheld detention charges issued against Ndabaningi Sithole, the Rhodesian Government released the ZANU President to attend the Organization of African Unity meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dar Es Salaam. Smith was forced to release Sithole under pressure from South Africa. He said, "In all honesty, I must tell you it is not a decision to which the Rhodesian Government readily agreed. However, we were assured that to do so would significantly assist the cause of detente." (Reuter Wire Service, Salisbury, April 4, 1975) Smith's acceptance of South Africa's gunbarrel diplomacy makes his government look particularly foolish, having agreed to release a man who 48 hours earlier had been branded in the High Court as a murderous, anti-Christ leading the forces of a communist crusade against Rhodesia. (*Guardian*, London, April 7, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 3, 1975; *Africa News*, Durham, N.C., April 17, 1975; *Reuter Wire Service*, Dar Es Salaam, April 14, 1975)

One of Rhodesia's members of parliament accused South Africa of interfering in Rhodesia's internal affairs and said, "It must be obvious to everyone that we had no choice in the matter of Rev. Sithole's release." (*Reuter Wire Service*, Salisbury, April 6, 1975) Smith's decision was made after a visit to Rhodesia by South Africa's Foreign Minister Muller.

When Sithole was re-arrested on March 4, he was also charged with plotting to assassinate other African leaders. This was not considered by the Court. Sithole left the Court when these charges were subordinated to those

implicating him in violations of the cease-fire. He was quite prepared to deal with the first major charge, but Smith decided that the evidence was not strong enough to pursue it. The High Court found Sithole in a large degree responsible for the deaths of 38 persons in Rhodesia's war zone since the Lusaka "agreement" to a cease-fire. His defense argued that he cannot be detained for breaking the ground rules of a cease-fire when he and his accusers differ on the interpretation of the basis for the cease-fire. (*Observer*, London, April 5, 6, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975; *Washington Post*, April 3, 1975; *Times*, London, April 3, 1975; *Sunday Tribune*, Johannesburg, March 9, 1975.)

The ANC issued statements immediately after Sithole's arrest and after the Court's decision saying that talks would not resume until Sithole was free. Since his release, he has chosen to stay in Dar Es Salaam until Bishop Muzorewa returns to Salisbury to ascertain his status there. This could mean that talks may resume outside of Rhodesia because the ANC insists on Sithole's presence.

## ZANU AND ZAPU BANNED: CHITEPO COMMISSION CALLED

The Zambian Government has closed the offices of ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI in Lusaka and has sent Zambian forces to occupy the guerrilla camps in Zambia. The OAU has chosen the ANC as the only representative of Zimbabwean people and will be sending its financial support for liberation through the ANC. Samora Machel has pledged full support to the ANC, whether it undertakes a political and diplomatic or an armed struggle. The ANC has opened offices in Dar Es Salaam and in Lorengo Marques.

These events follow the arrest in Lusaka of over 50 ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI leaders by the Zambian Government. The arrests were made after the state funeral of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo.

On April 3, President Kaunda announced that a commission of inquiry would be set-up to investigate Chitepo's death. Sithole, Nkomo and Muzorewa have given support to Kaunda's efforts to find those responsible, although some ZANU leaders feel that the move is a severe blow to the liberation struggle. They point out that the military chain of command to the men and women in the struggle in the war zone has been cut.

The underlying question is whether Chitepo's death was a result of internal jealousies within ZANU or whether an agent of Smith acted on behalf of racist and imperialistic powers. The former ZAPU publication, *Zimbabwe Review* (April 5) says, "It is no secret that within a movement and between movements there are attitudes and prejudices. The death of such a comrade very easily falls within the grooves of these prejudices and their difficult and often very dangerous interpretations . . ."

In his comments about Chitepo, President Kaunda warned that the armed struggle was not over. "It will be intensified unless majority rule is achieved. Smith must



Slain ZANU leader, Herbert Chitepo.

not be under any illusions whatever. 1975 is a year of decision. Only his positive decision can help avert the escalation of a war which he is bound to lose . . . No country, no people in the world, apart from the Zimbabweans themselves have suffered more for the freedom of Zimbabwe than Zambians. . . ." (Press Release of the Permanent Mission of Zambia to the United Nations, April 3, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 29, April 5, 12, 1975; *Guardian*, London, April 8, 9, March 22, 29, 1975; *Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, March 29, April 8, 1975; *Reuter Wire Service*, March 28, April 16, 1975)

### NEW PROSPECTS FOR TALKS?

The OAU Dar Es Salaam Declaration, issued at the conclusion of the meetings, April 11, affirmed efforts to talk with and use South Africa in the efforts for constitutional change to majority rule in Zimbabwe. The Declaration did not, however, rule out the use of force if talks fail. On Muzorewa's return from Dar, Smith offered to resume talks, but the ANC refused until Smith gives assurance that Sithole is free when he returns to Rhodesia. Sithole is a member of the negotiation team and talks cannot be resumed without him. Before his re-arrest, Sithole had said, "What we want is an immediate interim Government dominated by blacks, which can pass legislation to achieve full-fledged majority rule. It would act more or less on its own, without a parliament, like the transitional Government of Mozambique. The length of the transitional period could be worked out at the conference on a basis of give and take." (*Observer*, London, March 2, 1975)

If talks fail, the guerrilla forces have been assured of assistance from Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania. Extensive FRELIMO facilities will be at the disposal of the ANC. When Mozambique becomes independent on June 25, its 800 mile border with Rhodesia will be open to guerrilla penetration. A recent confidential report in Rhodesia said that ZANU now has 10,000 men and women waiting to invade when the talks fail. (*Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, March 9, 1975) Surface to Air missiles (SAM 7) and other Soviet weapons have been delivered to Zimbabwean guerrillas in Mozambique. In addition, Zambia's Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, announced at the OAU conference that South Africa will take its troops out of Rhodesia by the end of May. They are currently out of the action, but stationed in Rhodesia. South Africa has not disavowed this statement. (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., April 19, 1975; *Washington Post*, April 2, 9, 19, 1975; *New York Times*, April 19, 1975; *Voice of America*, Broadcast, April 19, 1975; *Guardian*, London, April 10, 14, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 29, 1975)

### GROWING ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Already facing mounting international and internal domestic pressure, Rhodesia's whites are also facing growing economic problems which could bring their downfall. Figures published in April by the regime's Finance Ministry, for 1974 showed the worst balance-of-payments deficit for any year since U.D.I. in 1965, except one.

At the heart of these trade problems is the situation in Mozambique's ports through which pass over four-fifths of Rhodesia's exports and imports. Though the transitional government has continued to permit passage of goods to Rhodesia, labor problems and general disruption in the wake of last year's Portuguese coup reduced the flow of goods by fifteen per cent.

In addition, wage increases for Africans were less last year than those for whites, and African unemployment continues on a large scale. White prosperity has not been affected though. The minority continue to get most of the benefits from the annual economic growth rate of 6.5 per cent, coupled with a relatively low inflation rate.

According to *Business Week* magazine, an additional blow for Rhodesia's sagging economy could come this year if the U.S. Congress decides to repeal the "Byrd Amendment" allowing imports of strategic minerals despite international sanctions. U.S. firms have been buying about one-seventh of Rhodesia's chrome-ore output, and the Salisbury regime makes even more money on these sales since they do not have to pay the high fees to middle-men which are necessary for all illegal sales.

Rhodesian Government spokesmen express optimism about the country's future even with these mounting problems. And many observers believe the whites can withstand the troubles transport is causing them unless Mozambique, and perhaps South Africa, join in international sanctions. Leaders from Commonwealth nations meeting in May discussed a plan to compensate independent Mozambique for its financial losses, should it decide to stop the flow of Rhodesian goods. This would be a severe blow for Ian Smith's regime and seriously weaken its ability to withstand African pressure.

Some African leaders have expressed the hope that South Africa, too, would join—at least quietly—in squeezing Smith with an embargo. In a special survey of South Africa in February, London's *Financial Times* reported that "Pretoria is now preparing plans, though it would never admit this, to mount economic sanctions against Rhodesia." The prestigious daily said the discreet pressure tactic would involve denying Rhodesian businessmen the vital financial cooperation they now get from South African banks, and squeezing critical transport routes to and from Rhodesia.

The other weak link in white Rhodesia's fence is mounting domestic dissatisfaction among the six million Zimbabweans. Besides the strong political desire for majority rule, the black population is increasingly hurt by unemployment, low wages, and numerous restrictions. No amount of negotiation can stop this pre-set time bomb, unless the whites agree to a rapid handover of power. (AFRICA NEWS, May 8, 1975; BBC Radio Newsreel, April 29; *Business Week*, April 7; *Financial Times*, London, February 25, 1975) ■

# ANGOLA

## ANGOLA STILL TENSE FOLLOWING RENEWED VIOLENCE

With the transitional government in power less than three months at this writing, a peaceful transition to independence in November of this year in Portugal's last colony seems increasingly remote. With each month that passes, the clashes between rival movements, in particular the FNLA and MPLA, grow steadily worse. Cabinet meetings in the Transitional Government are reported to be deadlocked over minor points and little cooperation between the movements is exhibited with each movement seeming to jockey for a more advantageous position.

Most recently fighting broke out in black working class districts, *museques*, near Luanda when FNLA attacked installations of MPLA on March 24. The same morning simultaneous attacks were initiated by FNLA against MPLA headquarters in Luanda and in the neighborhood of Cazenga, an MPLA stronghold. Luanda Radio also reported incidents in other parts of the country in which FNLA troops arrested MPLA students sent to the rural areas to conduct literacy classes. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Mar. 25, 1975)

The violence continued for another two weeks particularly with FNLA launching the attacks against MPLA and with FNLA defying the orders by the Portuguese High Commissioner to keep its troops confined to barracks. On March 27 FNLA troops were illegally on the streets and the Portuguese News Agency, ANI, reports that the FNLA machine-gunned to death at least 51 young recruits to the MPLA. (*New York Times*, Mar. 28, 1975) Other reports from South Africa indicate that the massacre involved larger numbers of people

including civilians not directly involved with any of the liberation movements. These reports say that National Front troops rounded up more than 100 civilians, shot them and left them to die; these people may have been involved in the popular unrest and demonstrations against FNLA some weeks past. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Mar. 29, 1975)

The Angolan movements signed agreements to end the bloodshed, but within 48 hours shooting once again broke out. (*Guardian*, London, Mar. 30 and 31, 1975) During the renewed acts of violence, FNLA commandos staged an assassination attempt against a top MPLA leader, Lope Nascimento, currently serving on the three-man Presidential Committee. (*Financial Times*, London, Mar. 29, 1975)

The fighting spread outside Luanda and the capital of Eastern Angola, Luso, was the scene of heavy street fighting between MPLA and FNLA. Conventional army weapons were used in this battle for command of Luso, which was said to have been initiated by MPLA troops that surrounded FNLA headquarters. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 12, 1975) An armed forces spokesman in Luanda put the death toll for the two weeks of violence at more than 200, but other sources close to the military claim that nearly 1000 have died. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975)

Portugal's new Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, flew into Luanda to assess the situation which was reported to have been put under control by Portuguese troops and UNITA forces. UNITA's leader, Dr. Savimbi, claimed that "the position of our party is to keep the balance, we cannot join anyone against anyone". (*Daily News*, Dar Es

MPLA President Neto in Angola—mobilizing 'poder popular.'



(Credit: Angola Comitê)

Salaam, Mar. 28, 1975) Despite Savimbi's claim, it is known that an informal and increasingly close partnership between FNLA and UNITA is growing, fostered by their joint dislike of Dr. Neto and the MPLA. (*New York Times*, April 13, 1975)

Johnny Eduardo, currently FNLA's representative on the Kennedy College, said that total war against MPLA was averted by FNLA's President, Holden Roberto, who ordered the fighting stopped because of the high number of civilian casualties. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975) FNLA leaders in Luanda clearly wanted to use their recently trained and well-equipped army to neutralize MPLA's military effectiveness in the capital city.

After the violence had subsided, all Portuguese newspapers in Angola were confiscated following a protest by Johnny Eduardo claiming that the media reflected an MPLA bias in their reporting of the events. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975)

Following these most recent clashes the UN and the OAU (Organization of African Unity) sent a joint delegation which is intended to suggest ways for the three liberation groups to work together. Some diplomats favor a UN peace keeping team or the establishment of an international observer to avert the possibility of civil war which many western observers see as a possibility when the Portuguese withdraw. (*Africa News*, April 14, 1975) This proposal was strongly rejected by Dr. Neto of the MPLA noting that the UN involvement in neighboring Zaire (then the Belgian Congo) did more damage to the country than did Belgian colonialism. Neto clearly sees the threat to MPLA were such a "neutral" international body sent to Angola—if Zairian history is any indication, at that time the UN forces were dispatched as much to put down the progressive Lumumbists as to maintain order. MPLA, being the most progressive of the liberation movements, might be the target of such an attack. A campaign to prepare the way for such a move may well be under way, for it is mainly the western and South African press which are predicting civil war as inevitable in Angola.

It is clear that the attacks in the most recent Angolan violence were initiated by the FNLA and this political-military move should be interpreted. An obvious explanation is that FNLA wants to defeat MPLA militarily and then perhaps form a coalition with the more politically compatible UNITA. Others believe that the recent effort to wipe out the MPLA forces was too closely tied with the counter-revolutionary moves in Portugal and the conservative coup attempt in Guinea Bissau to avoid the appearance of a larger plot to reverse the present course of de-colonization.

#### **SOUTH AFRICAN JET FIRED UPON AT LUANDA AIRPORT**

South Africa has protested and the Portuguese government has apologized to South Africa for the shooting of a Jumbo jet as it attempted to land at Luanda airport. The plane, en route from South Africa to London, was perhaps mistaken for a Portuguese plane carrying leaders of one of Angola's rival political groups, or it may have been caught in the cross-fire in fighting between the liberation movements. (*Africa News*, April 17, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 12, 1975)

Meanwhile South Africa has pledged that it would not intervene militarily in Angola in any border difficulty. The statement was made amidst unconfirmed reports that



Portugal's new Foreign Minister Melo Antunes seeks peace in Angola.

SWAPO guerrillas had joined with UNITA soldiers in Angola.

#### **"PEOPLE'S POWER" CAMPAIGN OF MPLA**

"Poder Popular" (People's Power) slogans are painted on walls amid the many posters admonishing Angolans to support one movement over another. The campaign was begun by the workers and it has the greatest strength in the black slums, *museques*. The driving force behind "People's Power" is the MPLA and among its early successes was the raising of the wages of black workers in Luanda to parity with white workers. The basic goals of the "Poder Popular" campaign are self-help through community organization and the involvement of the masses of people in the democratic process.

The People's Commission of the campaign is heading an adult literacy program where classes are held in the evening and the teacher is paid by the neighborhood. "Poder Popular" also means that workers are organized to protect their own self-interests, particularly when they are not served by the government, and a number of demonstrations have been organized to protest the censoring of the media by the government. The Organization of Angolan Women (O.M.A.) has had a strong role to play in this mobilizing effort.

Spearheading the campaign against "Poder Popular" from his home-base in Kinshasa is Holden Roberto—in his broadcasts to Angola he claims that "within the context of our country, direct democracy is not possible". (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Mar. 27, 1975)

#### **CABINDAN INVASION LIKELY, SAYS SAVIMBI**

In an interview in Dar Es Salaam, UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi, warned that an invasion of Cabinda is likely because of the vast wealth in oil in the small enclave. He noted, however, that the failure of Chipenda to get his faction recognized and his joining with FNLA has partly solved the Cabindan problem. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Mar. 17, 1975)

And in a real switch on the Cabindan political scene, FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of

Cabinda) accused the Gulf Oil Company of financing Angolan political parties opposed to FLEC. It has been alleged for some time that FLEC itself was receiving considerable support from Gulf Oil. In any event FLEC has announced a military readiness on the part of its supporters on the on-shore and off-shore installations. (*AFP Interafrican News Survey*, March 11, 1975)

#### OTHER NEWS FROM ANGOLA

1) The port of Lobito was paralyzed by a strike for several days in early April. MPLA occupied the harbor and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the workers to return to their jobs but UNITA had already agitated among the predominantly Bailunde workers to reject MPLA proposals because of MPLA's non-Bailunde ethnic composition. UNITA then sent a military unit to the deck whereupon MPLA withdrew. (*Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, Feb. 28, 1975)

2) Portuguese will remain the official language of

Angola and the language of primary instruction, while French and English will be taught in the secondary schools and in the universities. (*Washington Post*, Mar. 13, 1975)

3) Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping met a delegation from UNITA, New China News Agency reported. (*Washington Post*, April 1, 1975)

4) FNLA has purchased a cable television firm, Angola Television, and reports that broadcasts are to begin within four weeks. Other capitalist interests in Angola requested the transitional government to sever its economic ties with Portugal in order to avoid the effects of Lisbon's recent nationalization measures. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, date not written on clipping)

Despite these efforts all Portuguese banks and security companies were nationalized following the Lisbon counter-coup attempt. Measures are now being undertaken for the transfer of the banks' administrations from Lisbon to Luanda.

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# MOZAMBIQUE

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#### THE TALKS BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND PORTUGAL

The third and possibly final phase of negotiations between Portugal and Mozambique (FRELIMO) began early in April. The discussions dealt with future economic and financial arrangements between Portugal and Mozambique, the establishment of an authority to administer the Cabora Bassa dam, the future supply of power from the dam and the Zambesi development scheme. The talks have been taking place between FRELIMO (Joaquim Chissano and Machel) and delegates from Portugal's Minister of Finance, Commission of Decolonisation, Zambesi Planning Authority, National Overseas Bank and National Development Bank. The outcome of the negotiations are of crucial importance to South Africa.

FRELIMO is trying to establish meaningful socio-economic contacts with Portugal before Mozambique becomes fully independent on June 25, in an effort to ensure as much assistance as possible. The future government of Mozambique is facing a major crisis: feeding the country's eight million people. In Beira province and the northern region of Cabo Delgado, 80,000 people are believed to be living in famine conditions. There will not be enough foreign exchange left to pay for a single week's imports when the country achieves independence on June 25.

It was agreed that Portuguese will continue to be the official language and Mozambique will retain the escudo monetary system.

The most delicate issue between Portugal and Mozambique is the tremendous size of the debts that the latter will inherit—roughly \$2 billion (£850m). Lisbon proposes to take on the responsibility for rescheduling about \$875 million of the debt (£350m). The other \$1¼ billion arises out of the Cabora Bassa project. Mozambique will have a five year grace period before phased repayment is initiated.

The largest debt is the Cabora Bassa dam (see above), which was built by the Portuguese to supply power to

South Africa. It was financed by an international consortium made up primarily of German, French, South African and Italian interests. Because of its relation to South Africa the dam is a complex issue.

It appears that efforts are being made to form a new international consortium to take over the Cabora Bassa operating company from Portuguese State control. Lisbon cannot afford to take an overwhelming share in the corporation, but neither the Portuguese nor FRELIMO appear disposed to offer South Africa more than a possible minority share in the company.

This may be difficult. South Africa is Mozambique's largest customer as far as the dam is concerned. Also, virtually the entire electricity supply for Lourenco Marques will come from Cabora via the South African Apollo station where the DC power is converted to AC before being sent off to the border. Mozambique has to sell the power, albeit at a much higher rate than previously agreed upon with the Portuguese, as a means of obtaining desperately needed foreign exchange. It is unlikely that South Africa will accept a minority role in the project.

During the war, FRELIMO vowed to destroy the dam. However, its operation is of crucial importance to Mozambique's survival. The March 15 Johannesburg *Star* points out the potential economic impact of the dam: 1. Exploitation of local mineral reserves. 2. Irrigation for farming or forestry. 3. Navigation downstream for commercial shipping. 4. Development of steel and fertilizer industries. 5. Establishment of a fishing industry on the lake. 6. Flood control and utilisation. 7. The regulation of the Zambezi's flow will open up vast irrigated farming regions in tributary and coastal areas. And lastly and most importantly, four million people could make their homes in the presently sparsely populated lower Zambezi region. From that area, Mozambique's eight million could be fed. (*African Communist*, (Britain), First Quarter, 1975; *Africa News*, Durham, April 3, 1975; *Financial Mail*, Jan. 24, 1975, Feb. 14, 1975, April 9, 1975; *Rand Daily Mail*, Feb. 15, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 15, 1975, April



5, 1975; *Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 30, 1975, April 3, 1975; *Washington Star*, April 1, 1975.)

### THE SEVEN HOUR CONFSSIONAL

As can be expected in the process of every political metamorphosis Mozambique has its traitors, defectors and murderers, people who have lived their entire lives in poverty, and betrayed their own people for something small and ephemeral. Wherever there are people not thoroughly politically educated—from "leaders" to peasants, there are political criminals. Three thousand young Mozambicans met their own traitors at a FRELIMO camp in Nachingwea, Tanzania on March 23, 1975 when for 7 hours, two hundred thirty seven men and two women were presented by Samora Machel, FRELIMO's president.

A 50 year old woman, Veronica Anayiva had led Portuguese troops to a FRELIMO orphanage in the Mozambique woods. Many of the children had been slaughtered. Two men told how they had killed FRELIMO's deputy chief of operations by stabbing him in the back under orders from a Makonde chief.

In a lengthy, hand written statement, Paulo Jose Gumane, who was President of COREMO, a small, ineffective opposition group in opposition to FRELIMO, told how since 1962, he had been receiving money from the PIDE, Portugal's secret police, the United States and Israel. Zambia's former Vice President, Simon Kapwepwe helped to found and finance the Party.

He also revealed a maze of co-operation involving Swaziland, Malawi, South Africa, Rhodesia, Portuguese colonial business interests and supporters of General Spínola. After the April 25 coup, they had planned to stop FRELIMO from coming to power. The deputy Premier of Swaziland was South Africa's personal "go between."

The CIA was also deeply involved. According to Gumane, the consular officer in Lusaka, Zambia, Clagett J. Taylor, advised COREMO to open an office in Mozambique before FRELIMO did. His exact words were: "if you do this, we are prepared to help with money, once

you are established inside the country."

Paulo Gumane added that five anti-FRELIMO African Parties, in early August, formed the National Coalition Party (PCN). On September 7, with white settler extremists who seized the Lourenco Marques radio station, they called for a revolt against FRELIMO. The plan to invade Mozambique was to have been carried out last December or January, but one by one, the plotters were arrested as they tried to leave the country. A military operation and the receiving of financial support from the Ian Smith regime did, however, continue.

The March 30 *Africa News*, reported that Swaziland's ambassador said he was not aware of the charges and hence could not comment. But, he did not think that Swaziland would sanction an invasion of Mozambique.

Rev. Simango, a former FRELIMO Vice-President who lost in a leadership struggle with the current President Samora Machel and Vice President Marcelino dos Santos, six years ago, also publicly confessed. He has been a captive of FRELIMO since November, 1974.

Simango revealed that he was President of the PCN and that he had received \$16,000 from the Rhodesia government, while he was in Rhodesia, through a Portuguese company. Simango fled to Cairo from Dar es Salaam after being expelled from FRELIMO in late 1969. Simango has now admitted that he was involved in the parcel bomb assassination of FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane in 1969.

According to Simango's story, the parcel bomb was put together in Tete and then delivered to Mbeya, a Tanzanian town, and then taken to Dar es Salaam by a priest. The priest in turn gave the parcel to Mr. Nungu, Mondlane's private secretary who knew that the package contained explosives.

Samora Machel told the traitors that they would not be killed, but would be used as examples of political criminals. (*Africa News*, Durham, March 20, April 24, 1975; *BBC Focus*, March 17, 1975; *Observer*, March 23, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 29, 1975; *Times of Zambia*, March 18, 1975)

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## REPUBLIC of GUINEA BISSAU

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### PLOT AGAINST INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY

Independence must not only be won, but then defended. Such was the lesson learned in Bissau after an anti-PAIGC coup attempt was unfolded at the end of March. Apparently the plotters sought to time their action to follow an aborted coup in Lisbon on March 11 led by right-wing military officers. In Bissau the conspiracy was to liquidate the leaders of the new progressive government. Another goal seems to have been to stop the decolonization of the Cape Verde Islands. (*Reuters*, March 29, 30, 1975) (Rumors of a plot had been indicated in *Southern Africa*, April 1975.)

The coup was based among the former personnel of the Portuguese "local militia" and the "African commandos" which were basic parts of the colonial military. Some ex-soldiers of these groups were arrested as well as thirteen principle figures in the plot itself. The Ministry of Information in Bissau indicated that they will be charged

with high treason in a military court. (*Africa News*, Durham, April 3, 1975)

Those arrested included two former captains of the "African commandos", Zacarias Saiegh and Adramane Cesseko, and at least four former lieutenants, Bakar Djassi, Justo Nascimento, Tomas Camara, and Sicre Marques Vieira. The conspiracy also included Fernando Lima, former President of the Legislative Assembly and his former Vice-President Paulo Rodrigues. Manuel Gardette, former Deputy in Lisbon's National Assembly was also held. Finally two collaborators of the old secret police, PIDE-DGS were also imprisoned. These two were Francisco Correia and Jose Almeida. Jose Manuel Miranda was likewise placed under control. (*Le Soleil*, Dakar, April 1, 1975; *Reuters*, March 30, 1975)

When the plot became known a curfew was declared for six nights followed by an emergency meeting in Lisbon between Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves and



Major Pedro Pires of Guinea-Bissau. Further details will be reported as they become available but it is not unlikely that this action is linked to other anti-PAIGC activities in the Cape Verde archipelago.

### DECOLONIZATION MOVES AHEAD FOR CAPE VERDE


On February 5, 1975 a four-member mission from the UN Special Committee on Decolonization arrived in Praia in the Cape Verde Islands. Upon the return of the Committee to New York, the chairperson, Heisham al-Kilani of Syria announced that the people of the Cape Verde archipelago regard the PAIGC as their "only lawful representative". While on the mission the committee met with PAIGC Secretary General Aristides Pereira and Major Pedro Pires who is in charge of Cape Verdean affairs. (*Delegates World Bulletin*, United Nations, April 21, 1975)

Elsewhere Pereira noted that he was studying the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as "a good example" of a possible union between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. When the elections are held on June 30 the PAIGC will be able to determine whether the union will be step-by-step or all at once. Pereira admitted that it was "a delicate problem" in which equality of both sides must be stressed. As a concrete step toward unity Guinea-Bissau has purchased a freighter and three smaller vessels to improve transport. Other concerns for the Islands are in an intensive search for water resources and conversion of large plantations to worker management. (*AFP*, Paris, February 28, 1975)

Following independence on July 5, 1975 other changes will be made in the legal system. Carlos Reireis, Minister of Justice and Social Affairs, indicated that peoples' juries will replace professional judges. Throughout the Islands, Cape Verdeans will replace Portuguese functionaries. Other legal goals are to make the judicial system less expensive and less bureaucratic. The prison system will also be changed to make it rehabilitative, not repressive. (*AFP*, Paris, March 11, 1975)

Despite these notes of optimism the situation in the Islands remains grave. It has been reported that 90% of the crops have been lost as well as about 80% of the livestock. During the Portuguese rule of the Islands they preferred not to speak out about the severe conditions in order to have a ready reservoir of labor for contract. (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, West Germany, March 14, 1975) In view of this emergency the Portuguese representative to the United Nations, Jose Veiga Simao has requested \$20 million in aid from the UN Development Program. Meanwhile Silvino da Luz of the PAIGC notes that there is nothing firm about this funding and the only promise from the UN is \$2 million which will not be available until about June 1975. Consequently, da Luz has been touring African and European nations in search of more emergency support. Portugal has promised at least \$18 million for 1975 to cover two programs. Twelve million dollars will go for road building to give work to the many unemployed. Some workers have not been paid for more than a month. The other six million will go toward port development, aviation and health. (*AFP*, Paris, March 14, 21, 1975; *To the Point*, South Africa, February 8, 1975)

Road workers build in stone in drought-stricken Cape Verde.



## REACTIONARIES CONTINUE ANTI-UNITY CAMPAIGN

Two tiny parties, the UDC headed by Dr. Aguiinaldo Veiga (in exile in the United States) and the UPICV, led by Jose Leitao continue to try and stand in the path of unity with the Republic of Guinea Bissau with the Cape Verde Islands. Veiga was a long-time administrator and lawyer who served Portuguese colonialism in a variety of ways and never spoke about independence for Cape Verde until well after the Portuguese coup on April 25, 1974. In a major effort to halt progress these groups, with the backing of a few rich Cape Verdeans, have declared a "government-in-exile" from Boston, Massachusetts. The thrust of their campaign has been to preserve their investments in hotels and tourism at the expense of the majority of Cape Verdeans. Increasingly such reactionary Cape Verdeans have become known as "gusanos" (Spanish for worms) as this is the term applied to those counter-revolutionary Cubans who could not work for socialism in the Caribbean.

Groundless charges of "communistic" policies for the islands and of widespread jailings and brutality have been the chief tactics of their psychological warfare effort.

Their newspaper has even suggested "that the Russians will drive out all the natives in the Islands" and that "the traitor" Pedro Pires is a "chief terrorist lackey for Russia". Ironically the same newspaper has printed numerous pictures from the Islands showing the people holding posters of Amilcar Cabral and showing slogans supporting the PAIGC. (*Cape Verdean*, Lynn, Mass., February, March 1975; *Daily World*, New York, March 28, 1975)

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## SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

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In agreements reached on November 26, 1974 the Portuguese government and the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP) reached accords which will lead to elections on July 7, 1975 to be followed by independence on July 12, 1975. Recently it is alleged that certain problems have arisen within the MLSTP, but that Portuguese troops have the situation completely under control. The difficulties are not expected to interrupt the independence plans. (*Washington Post*, March 28, 1975)

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# UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

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## US URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA OPPOSED


Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin revealed in April that US companies have sold enriched uranium to South Africa as well as nuclear technology for building nuclear weapons, with the full knowledge and approval of the US Government. Aspin has opposed the shipments, saying: "South Africa has the fear to want to build a bomb, and it has the technical skill to be able to build a bomb. All it needs is weapons-grade uranium, and the US government is now supplying that." Aspin expressed concern that the US could not exert effective safeguard controls over how South Africa used the uranium, citing South Africa's failure to sign the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Aspin's revelation came in the wake of an announcement by South African Prime Minister Vorster that a pilot uranium enrichment plant had just been successfully built at Pelindaba, near Pretoria. The plant uses a unique enrichment process which is reputed to require less capital, but more energy, than the US process. This nuclear development gives South Africa an important boost. Experts agree that once a country develops uranium enrichment techniques, it is a fairly simple step to develop nuclear weapons. Thus South Africa could gain the psychological and military advantage of being the only sub-Saharan African country with nuclear weapon capability. South Africa's large reserves of uranium and the new technology to enrich it give it another important strategic lever, since its export market for enriched uranium will soar as industrialized countries begin to

depend more heavily on nuclear energy. As Louw Alberts, Vice President of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board put it: "We now have a bargaining position equal to that of an Arab country with a lot of oil."

Prime Minister Vorster expressed pride that the pilot project was completed "without assistance from foreign countries." But the facts suggest a different picture. A US company, US Nuclear Corporation of Oak Ridge, Tenn., provided the enriched uranium for the plant, and IBM and Foxboro Corporation of Foxboro, Mass. provided some of the technological equipment. According to the April 12 *Star*, a larger scale enrichment plant is next on the South African agenda and "will be developed in co-operation with friendly outside interests . . . because of the capital costs involved."

Two days after the uranium shipments to South Africa were revealed, Congressman Charles Diggs introduced a bill aimed at South Africa which would prohibit the transfer of nuclear materials and technology to countries which have not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Congressman Dodd of Connecticut and Senator Henry Jackson (a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to which the Diggs bill was referred) have also come out against the uranium shipments to South Africa. But Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Representative Price, the Vice-Chairman, immediately supported the shipments. Price said that "the export of US nuclear technology, materials and facilities is a major factor in our constant battle to develop a favorable balance of payments," and said that South Africa could produce a nuclear weapon without the



Inside South Africa's successful pilot plant for the enrichment of uranium at Pelindaba.

assistance of the United States if it wanted to.

Congressman Diggs plans to try to rewrite his bill so that it will be referred to the International Relations Committee, where he hopes hearings could be held and the bill could be reported out for action by the full House. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 22, April 12, 1975; *Africa News*, April 10, 24, 1975; *Washington Post*, April 14, 1975; *New York Times*, April 24, 1975; "US Business Involvement in Southern Africa", hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 21, 1971)

#### KAUNDA IN WASHINGTON: WARNS US OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda warned President Ford and the American people that southern Africa "is poised for a dangerous armed conflict" and called on the United States to end its support for the white minority regimes.

Kaunda gave his critique of US policy on southern Africa at a dinner given in his honor during his official visit to Washington on the weekend of April 19. The political tone of his 20-minute toast was a shock to most of the 120 guests, and a reportedly unpleasant surprise to President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, with whom he had met earlier that afternoon.

Kaunda's criticism of US policy in southern Africa stressed two somewhat conflicting themes. His strongest words were of opposition to current US support for the white minority regimes. He criticized the United States for "giving psychological comfort to the forces of evil" and called on the US "to desist from direct and indirect support to minority regimes." Kaunda referred obliquely to US abstentions at the United Nations, which he said could be interpreted as "a deliberate act of policy to support the status quo." In a press conference with 20 senior editors and reporters he reportedly expressed concern about two recent manifestations of US policy: the appointment of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and the failure to repeal the Byrd Amendment which broke US compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia.

While citing these signs of continuing US support for the white regimes, Kaunda also urged greater US involvement in southern Africa, but on the side of the oppressed. He appealed to what he saw as America's history in the late 50's and early 60's, when the US "boldly marched ahead with the colonial peoples in their struggle to fulfill their aspirations," and he urged the US to "support our efforts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia immediately, and an ending of apartheid in South Africa" by standing up and being counted "in implementing the Dar es Salaam strategy for "a peaceful solution to the crisis in southern Africa." When asked at an April 21 press conference to clarify how the US could assist the African states, Kaunda answered in general terms that "it is up to the United States government to find a way" to use any means to put pressure on South African Prime Minister Vorster.

As President Kaunda met with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, a group of about 150 demonstrators called on him to take a more militant stand on the political situation. The demonstration was sponsored by a coalition of groups called the ZANU Support Committee, spearheaded by the Congress of African People. They carried signs saying "Free Zimbabwe" and "Free Sithole", and their leaflet questioned the Zambian arrest of 69 ZANU members. Their position on US involvement in southern Africa was unequivocal. One sign read, "Imperialism died in southeast Asia. It will be buried in southern Africa." (See *Action News*)

During his brief visit, Kaunda met with several members of Congress, including Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa (who may visit Zambia later this year), and Senator Charles Percy and House Minority Leader John Rhodes. He also met with Cardiss Collins, John Conyers, and Yvonne Brathwaite Burke of the Congressional Black Caucus, with whom he expressed dismay at what he characterized as a lack of understanding among some segments of the Black community about southern Africa, as witnessed by the ZANU Support demonstration. Kaunda also asked to meet with Leon Sullivan, black economic organizer and GM board member, while he was in the United States.

Ford and Kissinger made little public response to Kaunda's visit. When asked by Dorothy Gilliam of the *Washington Post* to comment on Kaunda's dinner statement, Ford said, "We don't talk about that at an affair like this. You know you sweet girls understand that." One dinner guest said that Kaunda saved the evening by playing his guitar and singing with his wife. The only public comment from the Administration was a statement by White House press secretary Ron Nessen who said that the US intends to develop closer relations with the countries of Africa and cited President Ford's statement that he welcomed self-determination in Africa and change through peaceful means. (*Washington Post*, April 20, 21, 1975; *New York Times*, April 20, 25, 28, 1975; *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 22, 1975; *Chicago Tribune*, April 20, 1975; *Africa News*, April 24, 1975)

What role the United States has or will play in the whole detente arena is yet to be revealed. There is no doubt that Washington encourages anything which improves or increases South Africa's status and security in relation to the rest of Africa and the international community. But this may not be President Kaunda's vision of change for southern Africa, or his idea of appropriate US policy. What bedfellows emerge on the

detente playground or just how concretely real change unfolds in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself are areas to be watched carefully.

### **SOUTH AFRICA PLANS CAMPAIGN AGAINST US ARMS EMBARGO**

Considerable evidence is mounting that indicates that South Africa, with some of its allies in the United States, is preparing an all-out attack on the US arms embargo. While South Africa has pushed for closer military links with the US for many years and received a sympathetic ear from Nixon, NATO and company, its campaign appears to have escalated in recent months.

One of South Africa's tactics is to try to sell to the American public the idea of South Africa's strategic importance and the desirability of a western naval base at Simonstown. The South African Department of Information launched its biggest and most costly overseas advertising campaign in early March, placing half-page ads in major US newspapers. The first in this series asked "Could an organization like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?" The ad questioned whether South Africa should bear the sole responsibility for surveillance and protection of the "vital southern sealanes" along which "vital supplies", including oil, are carried to the Western world. The ad was a thinly veiled invitation to NATO or the United States to establish a base at Simonstown, a move which would violate current US policy. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 29; *New York Times*)

South Africa is also trying to propagate the concept of its vital military importance to members of Congress. According to a *Business Week* article of April 21, 39 legislators and businessmen, including their wives and aides, have recently been given the grand tour in South Africa. A major item on every itinerary is a visit to the


Simonstown base and the secret Silvermine Communications facility, and a briefing with top South African military officials. In January, Representative Bob Wilson, ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, came back from South Africa raving about South Africa's strategic assets, and openly advocating that the US end its military embargo.

Democratic Congressman John Dent, and Armed Services Committee members Richard Ichord and Harold Runnels came back from a South Africa trip in April with similar positions. In a report of the trip published in the April 22 *Congressional Record*, they said that "the subcontinent of South Africa is without a doubt the richest in strategic materials, both for war and peace." While their main recommendation was for co-operation in energy production, they also said: "Any lack of appreciation by this nation, regardless of outside or other compelling influence of the need of a review of our policy toward South Africa would be extremely shortsighted and could create irrevocable harm to the future of this country."

The basis of the attempt to erode the arms embargo came most clearly from a private citizen, and a close friend and advisor to President Ford, Melvin Laird, a former Congressman and Secretary of Defense and a likely candidate to be President Ford's re-election campaign manager, stepped off the plane in Johannesburg in early April and said that the US would review its embargo on arms because of "South Africa's detente policy." Although Laird insisted that he made his statement only as a "former Congressman," it seems unlikely that his comments were unrelated to the current South African campaign. Whatever his intent, the *Rand Daily Mail* covered the story with front-page, nine-column banner headlines: "Arms Ban May Go: US Moves to Reward Detente." (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 5, 1975)

South African advertisement in US papers.

# Could an organisation like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?



The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the keeper of peace on behalf of the Western World, in the Northern Hemisphere.

But what about Western interests in the South?

Every month, an average of 2,270 ships pass the Cape of Good Hope. In addition to their vital supplies, they carry 20 million tonnes of oil - of which 90% is destined for Europe.

Since the closure of the Suez Canal, the number of ships passing the Southern tip of Africa has more than trebled.

Even with the canal reopened, its future is uncertain, and its use in this day of supertankers, limited.

Simonstown, near Cape Town, is the only adequately equipped naval base in the Southern Hemisphere between South America and Australia.

It has a highly sophisticated communications surveillance system covering an area with a radius of 5,000 sea miles.

In this way we are contributing to the protection of the vital Southern sea lanes.

But should we alone be responsible?

It appears that South Africa is looking not only for a better public image but also for concrete ways to further weaken the arms embargo. In April, Representative Wilson asked for briefings from the State Department and the Secretary of the Navy, J.W. Middendorf, in which he pressed for an explanation of why an aircraft company in his district could not sell aircraft to South Africa and why the US was not co-operating with South Africa on naval intelligence. Wilson's office has also been asking Adminis-

tration officials about the statutory basis of the arms embargo against South Africa, which suggests that he is fashioning anti-embargo legislation to bring before the Armed Services Committee. South African Embassy officials and several Washington lawyers have also been trying to obtain useful information from people in Congress and the State Dept. to argue for closer US military links with South Africa.

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## **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

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### **O.A.U. RESPONSE TO SOUTH AFRICAN DETENTE**

At a special conference of the Council of Ministers of the 42-nation Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in early April, delegates overcame initial division to adopt a strategy toward South African detente closely approximately the Tanzanian position paper presented by Julius Nyerere. The special session was regarded as particularly necessary by several African states and liberation groups which feared that armed struggle in South Africa was being compromised by the growing number of contacts between South Africa and various black African leaders. These contacts have been of two distinct kinds. On the one hand, Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana have been involved in largely secret diplomacy with South Africa to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesia dispute; on the other hand, and with very different objectives, a number of West and Central African states have recently had contacts with South Africa that indicate an interest in some kind of dialogue. (*The Washington Post*, April 7, 1975; *Daily News*, Tanzania, April 8, 9, 10, 11, 1975)

Any detente or dialogue with regard to the internal South African situation was categorically rejected by the special session, which set forth its strategy formally in the "Dar es Salaam Declaration." This document states in effect that South Africa must end its support for the white-minority government in Rhodesia, give Namibia its independence on African-dictated terms, and totally abandon its policy of apartheid at home before any kind of detente is possible. (*The Washington Post*, April 12, 1975) According to the *Post* (April 12, 1975), the main thrust of the meeting was to condemn South Africa's policy of detente, and put it on notice that its current contacts with Zambia and Tanzania are for the limited and specific purpose of arranging for the independence of Rhodesia and Namibia from white rule. The OAU also condemned such countries as Liberia for having "direct dialogue" with South Africa, and others like the Central African Republic that have sent delegations and shown interest in trade or aid links.

The Declaration represented a victory for the policy of Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique, who, with the backing of Algeria, were in firm control of the meeting. The Tanzanian-Zambian strategy seems to seek first to continue secret contacts in an attempt to resolve the situation in Southern African peacefully before turning to armed struggle. For example, although Libya, Lesotho, Uganda, and Kenya made speeches directly or indirectly

critical of states engaging in covert or overt contacts with Rhodesia's government and urged a total boycott of that country, a resolution introduced by Guinea for an end to all contacts of any kind with South Africa did not pass. (*The Washington Post*, April 12, 1975) According to the *Daily World* (April 12, 1975), what the OAU agreed upon was to help "in genuine negotiations to facilitate the transfer of power to the African majority." In other words, the OAU will take part in talks to eliminate the present apartheid regime, in addition to continuing its aid to the national liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. President Samora Machel of FRELIMO stressed that all "talks" conducted between South Africa and Zambia/Tanzania/Botswana have not been motivated by trade and aid objectives, or a desire for political and economic links, but singly for the transfer of power to the Africans in white-dominated areas. (*Daily News*, Tanzania, April 9, 1975)

In more detail, the Declaration called for South Africa to recognize SWAPO as the sole representative of all Namibians and stated that any contacts with Pretoria should be solely for the purpose of arranging for the transfer of power to SWAPO; South Africa's homelands policy was labeled totally unacceptable; the ANC and PAC of South Africa were urged to unite; a boycott of ships and planes bound for South Africa was recommended, as well as a tightening of the Arab states' boycott of oil sales to South Africa; a study of multinational companies dealing in Africa is to be undertaken, and an investigation of the growing trade between South Africa and black Africa. (*The Washington Post*, April 12, 1975; *The Washington Star*, April 11, 1975)

An interesting sidenote of the meeting was the release from detention of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union. The history of Sithole's detention has been a complicated one. Prime Minister Ian Smith reversed his own tribunal's ruling by freeing Sithole whose men Zambian President Kaunda still has in jail. (*The Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1975)

### **U.N. COMMITTEES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ENDORSE OAU RESOLUTION**

The ninth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, which met in Dar es Salaam from April 7 to 10 to discuss the situation in Southern Africa, was followed closely by United Nations bodies concerned with Southern Africa. The Committee of 24 (on decolonization), the Council for Namibia and the Committee against Apartheid were represented at the session

by their respective chairmen—Ambassador Salim of Tanzania, Ambassador Banda of Zambia and Ambassador Ogbu of Nigeria. They expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the meetings and support for the OAU resolution, which reflects the stand taken by the United Nations in recent years.

Following the session, the Council for Namibia met in closed session to hear Ambassador Banda's report. The Council decided to endorse the decision of the OAU Council of Ministers to establish a special OAU Committee on Namibia, to be composed of the African members of the Council. The Committee is to "deal with all matters related to Namibia and, if need be, make contact with South Africa after consultation with SWAPO and on condition that South Africa: (a) recognizes the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence; (b) respects Namibia's territorial integrity; and (c) recognizes SWAPO as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people."

It is likely that this Committee will be headed by the President of the Council, at present Ambassador Banda. (U.N. press release NAM/163)

The OAU decisions are also expected to influence the proceedings of a conference organized by the Committee against Apartheid at UNESCO headquarters in Paris at the end of April to assess the changing situation in Southern Africa and to develop new strategies of action. The conference will be attended by the Southern African liberation movements and by anti-apartheid movements from all over the world, as well as trade unions, church groups, and representatives of the OAU, the Committee of 24, and the Council for Namibia. It will be the largest conference of its kind ever organized by the United Nations, and it is expected to acquire particular significance because it is the first meeting of importance to follow the OAU session.

#### **COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA TO SEND MISSIONS ABROAD**

The Council will soon send a special mission to Brussels to meet with European Economic Community and NATO officials on the question of Namibia. In a recent report on the proposed meeting with the EEC, the Council's Standing Committee II pointed out that "the organic link with the United Nations recently acquired by EEC through its observer status in the United Nations makes it, as a minimum responsible for upholding and giving effect to United Nations resolutions, and the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia, and for respecting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice."

The Council intends to raise the issue of South Africa's claim to represent Namibia in its international dealings; EEC involvement in Namibian foreign trade, especially where South Africa acts as the intermediary; the necessity

of excluding Namibia from existing trade agreements with South Africa; the role and responsibility of EEC in exerting pressure on South Africa for the termination of its illegal occupation of Namibia; and the possibility of negotiating trade agreements concerning Namibia with "legitimate authorities" (i.e., the Council) in the future.

The mission, which is to consist of the President and one or two members of the Council, the Commissioner for Namibia and the SWAPO representative, is expected to visit Brussels before the Security Council meets again on Namibia at the end of May. Last December, the Council adopted a resolution demanding that South Africa take steps to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia and to transfer power to the people of the Territory with United Nations assistance, and set a May 30 deadline to review South Africa's compliance.

A six-member mission of the Council, headed by Ambassador Banda and accompanied by the Commissioner for Namibia and the SWAPO representative, left at the end of April to meet with Government officials in India, Indonesia and Japan, at the invitation of these Governments. (U.N. press releases NAM/163 and 165, document A/AC.131/L.23)

#### **APARTHEID COMMITTEE HEARS REPORTS ON IBM, SOUTHERN CO.**

On April 16, the Special Committee against Apartheid gave a hearing to two representatives of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S., Dudley Thompson and Rhodes Gxoyiya. Mr. Thompson reported on actions by United States coal miners and by various other groups to stop imports of South African coal into the United States by the Gulf Power Co., a subsidiary of the Southern Co. of Alabama. He informed the Committee of the stockholder proposal submitted to the Southern Co. by the United Church Board for World Ministries (and to be voted on at the company's annual meeting May 28), which demands that the company stop purchases of coal from South Africa so long as apartheid exists.

Mr. Gxoyiya reported to the Committee on continuing action by the churches against IBM sales of computers to the South African Government, the South African Atomic Energy Board, the Ministry of Defence and other Government agencies. He said a stockholder proposal calling on IBM and its subsidiaries to stop selling or leasing computers to South Africa had been filed with IBM. The Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Valderrama of the Philippines, had already spoken at a hearing organized by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in November 1974. The Committee has emphasized campaigns against foreign investment in South Africa as part of its programme of work for 1975. (U.N. press release GA/AP/463)

## **ACTION NEWS and NOTES**

### **POLITICAL ACTIONS**

#### **ZANU REP TOURS US**

Tapson Mawere, the Representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to the US, Canada and the Caribbean, has been extremely active over the past several years participating in numerous meetings, rallies, protests and pickets concerning US support for the minority regime in his home land, Rhodesia. As a result of the conference in Atlanta on American imports of South

African coal (see *Southern Africa*, April, 1975), Mawere was invited to tour a number of southern and midwestern cities in March and April. He met with groups in Louisville, Ky., Jackson and Tougaloo, Miss., New Orleans, Nashville, Tenn., Tuscaloosa, Ala., cities in Florida, Norfolk, Va., Chicago and Dayton. Mawere not only provided information about Zimbabwe and the enduring struggle there, but encouraged the collection of food, clothing, medicines and other non-military goods for the people there. Speaking in Louisville at meetings sponsored

by the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Mawere said that ZANU and the Zimbabwean people were "infuriated, first by the arrest of their president [N. Sithole] and then by the assassination of their chairman [H. Chitepo]. . . . We can't trust the Rhodesian government any more. . . . We don't see any other course of action but to continue to fight." (For background on the Zimbabwe situation see *Southern Africa*, April, May, 1975). The ZANU rep also said that he was not trying to recruit fighters in the US or to dictate what Americans should do. "As our brothers and sisters in America begin to understand their conditions they will design an action [suitable to their own situation]. . . ." (*Louisville Courier-Journal*, March 19, 1975)

#### **GROUPS PROTEST ZAMIBIAN PRESIDENT'S WASHINGTON VISIT**

Member of the Congress of African People (CAP) and the Norfolk based ZANU Support Committee picketed in front of the White House on April 19, several hours prior to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's meeting with President Ford. The groups, whose representatives numbered about 100 people, were protesting the Zambian arrest of more than 50 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leaders and members in March.

The CAP leaflet describes the demonstration as a protest against Kaunda's "arrest of fifty Zimbabwe freedom fighters . . . , so that detente sellout negotiations for peace at the expense of the people of Zimbabwe can go forward led by ANC and Rev. Muzorewa under the real guidance of Vorster-Smith and Kaunda."

The leaflet continues that "it was in Zambia that most operations were launched, and supply lines ran deep into Zambia, for the ZANU forces. Kaunda, under the guise of looking for Chitepo's murderer has arrested the Supreme Council . . . when imperialist press is making it seem that reformist ANC is the only liberation force in Zimbabwe! Kaunda is making Afrika safe for imperialism, and whoever follows or supports him is an enemy of Afrikan Liberation!"

President Kaunda's visit to the US received considerable publicity in the establishment media, with the *New York Times* running editorials, op-ed pieces and articles supporting Kaunda's policy of negotiation and communication with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa concerning the future of Zimbabwe.

#### **EASTER PROCESSION TO SOUTH AFRICAN AND SOVIET EMBASSIES**

On Easter Sunday, 150 parishioners gathered on the steps of Washington, D.C.'s Metropolitan AME Church, and heard Rev. Robert Pruitt and Rev. John Steinbruck call on Christians to act on the Easter theme of liberation. After a short prayer, Pruitt and Steinbruck led the church group, as well as reporters and television crews, in a procession to the Soviet Embassy and the South African Embassy, protesting the detainment of prisoners of conscience.

At the South African Embassy the crowd was ordered by the DC police to remain 500 feet away from the building because "demonstrations" are illegal if any closer. A delegation approached the Embassy front door to deliver petitions and letters. A South African Embassy worker appeared and listened to the delegation declare, in prayer, their solidarity with South African political prisoners. The Embassy worker then somewhat sheepishly accepted several letters, palm leaves, and a statement protesting the closing of the Federal Theological Seminary. Meanwhile, police officials had finally admitted they

could not block the crowd's procession as long as no signs were displayed. The remainder of the marchers then moved down the sidewalk opposite the Embassy, and stood silently watching the exchange at the door. (Press Release, Washington, DC)

#### **NAMIBIAN ACTION PLANNED**

Operation Namibia, a "transnational nonviolent direct action campaign to aid the struggle for freedom in Namibia," (4811 Springfield Ave., Philadelphia, Pa. 19143, (215) 724-1858) is planning a number of future actions including a "Free Namibia Day" on May 31 (the day after the UN Security Council has ordered South Africa out of Namibia); a nonviolent blockade of Walvis Bay (in Namibia) and a possible freedom march into Namibia. The group is looking for local organizers, participants and funds.

#### **SHARPEVILLE COMMEMORATIONS—1975**

A late report shows that the 15th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa received widespread attention in New York and Chicago, and that March 21 became a focus for opposing US policy towards Southern Africa. In New York City the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa conducted its annual daytime vigil in front of the Fifth Avenue South Africa Airways office, and the Pan African Students Organization in the Americas (PASOA) demonstrated in front of the South African UN Mission and the Liberian Mission in protest over the latter country's cordial relationship with South Africa. Earlier in the week there had been pickets in front of the Union Carbide Building and at Barclays Bank against their economic support of apartheid. In the evening there was a meeting in Harlem sponsored by the African Liberation Support Committee of New York, and a rally at Columbia co-sponsored by PASOA and the National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation, which is spearheading a campaign to collect one million signatures calling for South Africa's expulsion from the UN. At the Columbia meeting, speakers included representatives of the Somali Mission to the UN, the Khymer Residents in the US, the New York Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, as well as a viewing of the film "Last Grave to Dimbaza" and poetry readings. In Chicago an Ad Hoc Committee of the National Anti-Imperialist Movement also sponsored a meeting held at the Taxicab Drivers Union Hall where the over 100 participants passed a number of resolutions calling for pressure to end US links with South Africa and local mobilization of people. There were also African dancers and drummers. (*Daily World*, March 25, 28, 1975; *Muhammed Speaks*, April 11, 1975)

#### **ECONOMIC ACTION**

##### **DOCK ORGANIZING CONTINUES**

In 1974 and 1975 more than 10 ships have been boycotted by Philadelphia longshoremen supported by a group called the Coalition to Stop Rhodesian and South African Imports. The group recently boycotted the Moore-MacCormack "Ditte Skou" preventing its off loading in Philadelphia, and also held a demonstration calling on people to "Unite behind the Longshoremen" on April 28. The Coalition has also prepared some excellent leaflets linking together the interests of US and international workers.

The Coalition is focussing on longshoremen in Eastern cities not unloading chrome, iron, steel, asbestos, nickel or lead from Rhodesia or South Africa. •



# UPDATE

## ZAMBIAN LEADER DISAPPOINTED BY U.S. ATTITUDE

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia says he is disappointed with the United States response to the volatile situation in Southern Africa.

Kaunda told a welcome-home reception in Lusaka that his recent visit to the United States, en route to the British Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica, convinced him that Southern Africa "didn't seem to count" to Americans. Top level talks in Washington won Kaunda a pledge of closer U.S. relations with Africa, but no assurance of opposition to the white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia.

While in Washington, Kaunda met with President Ford and other officials. He also shook up a number of American dignitaries at a formal White House dinner, delivering a toast which chided the U.S. for giving "psychological comfort to the forces of evil" in Southern Africa.

## NAMIBIANS JAILED FOR STONE-THROWING

A court in Namibia has set bail for 78 African workers charged with throwing stones at policemen. The workers were among the 300-odd persons arrested in Katatura township, following a confrontation with South African police that left one dead and eleven injured.

Bail for those still in detention has been set at \$400—a sum that will be out of the reach of most.

Defense counsel charged that South African police did not fire on the crowd in self-defense, and produced medical evidence that most of the injured were shot from behind. Police claimed the injured were picking up stones.

## WHITE EXODUS AFTER ANGOLAN FIGHTING

Whites are leaving Angola in large numbers, following the latest outbreak of violence between liberation groups there. That fighting—principally between MPLA and FNLA supporters—left over a thousand dead, and for the first time involved civilians.

In a rare show of unity, leaders of the three Angolan movements have made impassioned pleas asking foreigners who provide much of the colony's skilled labor to stay. But observers say as many as 7 thousand, mostly Portuguese, are packing their bags.

MPLA and FNLA leaders have also forged an agreement to disarm all Angolans who are not soldiers in one of the liberation armies. The pact is expected to have greatest impact on the MPLA, which has thousands of supporters in Luanda.

## ZANU FACTION FEUD TAKES MORE LIVES

The bodies of 14 Zimbabwean nationalists have been found in a shallow grave in Zambia. Zambian authorities say the dead were all members of ZANU, the Zimbabwe African National Union, and that all were killed some weeks prior to their discovery.

Observers say the deaths are the result of a ZANU faction feud, and they fear many more bodies will be found.

The killings were uncovered at a time when Zambian

authorities are investigating the March assassinations of prominent ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo, an investigation that has led to the arrest of ZANU officials in neighboring Tanzania, as well as scores of ZANU members in Lusaka.

## RHODESIA AGAIN REJECTS MAJORITY RULE DEMAND

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith again rejected African demands for majority rule last month, raising the likelihood of a stepped-up guerrilla war in Southern Africa.

Insisting that his government has not yielded to South African or world pressure, Smith told a BBC television audience that Rhodesia could not endorse the principle of majority rule. He said Rhodesia could stand off a large-scale guerrilla campaign by nationalist forces, and that South Africa would remain a Rhodesian ally.

Reacting to the Smith statement, African National Council spokesman Ndabaningi Sithole said he saw no point in further talks, and called for an intensified guerrilla war.

## COMMONWEALTH TO TIGHTEN SANCTIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE FUND

The British Commonwealth recently approved a plan to tighten the economic embargo on Rhodesia, by closing off Rhodesia's vital sea outlets in neighboring Mozambique.

Over 80% of Rhodesia's trade is routed through Mozambique, and the Portuguese colony has long relied on the revenues it earns from the sanctions-busting operations. But the British Commonwealth wants to compensate Mozambique's new FRELIMO government for the money it would lose by shutting off Rhodesian trade when it assumes full governing authority this month.

FRELIMO leader Samora Machel has not directly stated that his government will bar Rhodesian goods, but he has predicted that a quick change-over to African majority rule in Rhodesia will follow Mozambique's independence.

The United Nations has already been asked to establish a special fund to assist Mozambique in enforcing sanctions, and Britain has promised a "handsome" contribution.

## SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST LEADER DIES

Bram Fischer, one-time chairman of the South African Communist Party, died from a brain tumor last month, after spending the last ten years in jail. Although the government had earlier turned down several requests for Fischer's release, he was finally freed in March of this year, and died in his home, at age 67.

Fischer was for many years a leading opponent of white rule in South Africa. •



# reviews

**THE HISTORY BOOK**, Jannik Hastrup & Li Vilstrup, Danish short films, 1972. Nine episodes, color, English dialog. Total time, 2 hours, 32 minutes.

*The History Book* is a film series of nine animated episodes, each of which is 15-20 minutes long. It depicts a Marxist analysis of Western Civilization, from the end of the Middle Ages to the present, giving emphasis to the relationship of Europe and Africa. Narrated by a rat (to provide Brecht's "rat's-eye view of history"); the animation is quite well done, with old masterpieces, drawings and etchings mixed in.

The first six parts of the series are the best, covering the period from the Middle Ages to the division of Africa at the end of the 19th century. This part effectively depicts the development of capitalism and the relationship of the means of production to the progression of history. However, the last three episodes are much more rhetorical, and events are often disconnected and not explained clearly.

In the last episode one sees an animated Amilcar Cabral telling other animated people (in the bush of Guinea-Bissau) "we have a party now", yet the benefit of having a party is never made clear to the viewer. Another problem with the last segment is that an interview with Gil Fernandes becomes boring, not because of what he is saying, but because the camera is always on him. In this section, which relies entirely on audio, some pictures of Guinea-Bissau would have given greater overall effect.

The early segments of the film are not blameless. A condescending section shows Vasco de Gama arriving at the Cape of Good Hope, where he is met by Africans whom he easily swindles. Other faults might be pointed out; however, the overall impact of the film is quite good.

*The History Book* was produced largely for use in classrooms and certainly provides a perspective on history that students rarely see. I would recommend that history teachers, in high schools and colleges, show at least the first six in the series to their classes. The series can be rented either in individual episodes or all at once. *The History Book* is distributed by Tricontinental Film Cen-

ter, 333 Sixth Avenue, N.Y. N.Y. (elementary and secondary schools, 25% discount)

**THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD—A CoDoc Bibliography**. Edited by Harry Strharsky and Mary Reisch with Bill Arnold and Colleen O'Connor. CoDoc International Secretariat Press, Washington D. C., 1975, 237 pps. Although the authors state that the bibliography was produced with "no intention to be complete", they have nonetheless done an important job of organizing a vast quantity of diverse materials. The 1301 listings include corporate documents, government publications, books, pamphlets and research group reports. The bibliography is divided into two sections: 1. Transnational Corporations: General Theory and Description and 2. Transnational Corporations and the Third World. Perhaps the best feature, however is the extensive indexing. Indices are provided of author, subject, geographical region, language, corporation, trade union and the like. There are also numerous lists of relevant magazines, organizations, and governmental committees. All in all the bibliography is a very valuable tool. Available from CoDoc International Secretariat, 1500 Farragut Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20011.

**TAPE INTERVIEW WITH JOHNSTON MAKATINI, South African African National Congress Rep in Algeria**, reel-to-reel (3 3/4), 60 minutes, available from the Amilcar Cabral Study Group, 2622 Wabash, Kansas City, Mo. 64127. An excellent overview of the history of the ANC including its establishment in 1912; the 1949 "Program of Action"; the 1952 "Defiance Campaign"; 1960 "Stay at Home Campaign"; the founding of the military wing of the ANC, "Umkonto we Sizwe" in 1961; the capture of the underground military high command in 1963; the ZAPU-ANC military alliance of 1967 and the current problems of "so-called detente" between South Africa and Black African states. Makatini talks of the complexities of the struggle in South Africa, the heavy concentration of white settlers and imperialist corporate and political interests.

*Note to readers:*

Elisa, Andrade, *The Cape Verde Islands* (listed in the April issue of *Southern Africa*) is available through the PAIGC U.S. National Support Committee, P.O. Box 2053, Tanton, Mass. 02780. Price, \$1.50.

How can we tell you the size of our Dream?!

During centuries  
we waited  
that a Messiah might free us...

Until we understood.

Today  
our Revolution  
is a great flower  
to which each day  
new petals are added.

The petals are the land  
reconquered,  
the people freed,  
the fields cultivated,  
schools and hospitals.

Our Dream has the size  
of Freedom.

FRELIMO, 1969

We never accepted.

We were as tall trees  
bending when the strong wind blows  
but who know  
submission is just for a time

We stowed anxiety in our hearts  
courage in our hands  
bullets in our homes


Tenderness and hatred impelled us

Our sons measured their height  
by the length of guns

The anguish of waiting weighed on us  
like an endless yearning

.....  
Happy those who live in our time  
in freedom  
building freedom

FRELIMO New Year's Greeting, 1970



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