

VOLUME XII NUMBER 7

# SOUTHERN AFRICA

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September 1979

**ROBERT MUGABE INTERVIEWED**

Special Supplement

## **BREAKING THE LINKS: The South African Economy and the US**

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# SOUTHERN AFRICA

VOLUME XII NUMBER 7  
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## British Envoy in Namibia Talks

British special envoy Sir James Murray left Johannesburg in late August after the conclusion of talks with South African leaders on new proposals for a settlement in Namibia. The new proposals came up in talks earlier in August in Luanda between President Agostinho Neto and US Deputy Ambassador to the UN Donald McHenry. Reportedly, Neto told McHenry that in order to pressure South Africa into accepting a UN peace plan for Namibia, Angola would permit UN monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angolan territory. Neto was also reported to have accepted a proposed demilitarized zone along the Angola border with Namibia.

In New York, Zambia's ambassador at the UN said that his country had agreed with the Neto proposals and that he "assumed that the other front-line states did as well."

"After Murray met with the South Africans, he flew to New York, presumably to brief UN officials and representatives of the Western five, which have negotiated the deadlocked Namibia settlement.

Meanwhile Gerrit Viljoen took over his duties as the newly appointed administrator-general in Namibia. Viljoen replaces Marthinus Steyn who returns to the South African bench. Viljoen, the rector of Randse Afrikaanse University, is head of the Broederbond, an ultra right-wing, Afrikaner secret society which claims among its membership many of the top leaders of South Africa's Nationalist Party. □

## Buthlezi in US

In August Chief Gatsha Buthlezi, leader of the KwaZulu bantustan in South Africa, made his eighth visit to the US in order, among other reasons, to publicize a book he is about to publish in the US. Buthlezi's trip received little publicity, but he did stop to address New York's Foreign Policy Association and to appear on NBC-TV's *Tomorrow* show.

The title of Buthlezi's new book is

"Power is Ours," and it contains a collection of his speeches during the past two years. The publisher says it's "dramatic good stuff," but also admits that a South African ban on the book—a highly unlikely prospect—would boost US sales. □

## Mozambique Lays Economic Plans

The *World Business Weekly* recently wrote that Mozambique is a nation "sinking in economic turmoil." A summary look at some statistics, such as the \$300 million merchandise trade deficit on less than \$500 million in imports annually, might reinforce such a picture. And learning that the council of ministers meeting in early August concentrated almost exclusively on

economic topics might lead a superficial observer to conclude that the situation is indeed desperate.

But such an observer would be hard put in the health and education programs long to explain the sense of optimism and progress felt in that country even by skeptical diplomats and visiting journalists. Mozambicans readily admit the problems the country faces, but they can also point to substantial gains in many sectors—not only emphasized by FRELIMO, Mozambique's governing party, but also in basic sectors of the economy. The council of ministers heard a speech by President Samora Machel stressing that "the economic battle is a task for all of us," and laying out much to accomplish in the coming years, but the tone was one of confidence, not desperation.

The overall economic picture of the last five years, the president was able to report, had been a fall in production in 1975 and



Planning in the agricultural sector has meant increased food production.


1976, stabilization and the beginning of recovery in 1977, and, in 1978 and 1979, increasing growth. The reason: planning, organization, and success in mobilizing the energies of Mozambique's working people.

By 1980 it should be possible to lay out a long-term plan for the next decade, as well as a five-year plan for 1981 to 1985. In the meantime a 1979-80 plan includes the following objectives:

- Agricultural production, which increased 15 percent this year over last, should attain a 35 percent growth rate in the next season.

- Industrial production, which is growing at 20 percent per year, should continue the same rate.

- Supply of foodstuffs in 1980 should be 20 percent greater than in 1978; livestock production should double over the same two-year period.



Responding to the need for industrial planning, Mozambique's development goes ahead.

## Walter Rodney on Trial in Guyana

Walter Rodney, author of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* and a leading Africanist scholar, was arrested in Georgetown, Guyana, in mid-July, and although he is out on bail, a protracted series of court appearances is expected. Together with several colleagues in the opposition Working People's Alliance, with which he is associated, Rodney has been charged for responsibility for the July 11 burnings of several government buildings—the governing PNC party headquarters, the Ministry of National Mobilization, and the headquarters of the Guyana Sugar Company. The incidents took place approximately one week after the Working People's Alliance announced it would enter candidates in the forthcoming general election.

A group of scholars in the U.S., including historian Edward Alpers of UCLA, have begun a campaign to defend Rodney and the others. They present evidence that the accusations are part of a systematic campaign of repression against the WPA, a left-wing movement in which government opponents of both African and East Indian ancestry have joined forces. Rodney, who taught for some years at the University of Dar es Salaam, has been barred from teaching in Guyana.

(More information is available from Los Angeles Committee for Academics in Peril, P.O. Box 25722, Los Angeles, CA. 90025. And a "Guyana Alliance Legal Defense Fund" has been set up c/o Joseph Woolcock, School of Education, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 94305.)

## New Pressures on Zambia

Hardly had the commonwealth heads of state left the Zambian capital, Lusaka, when the pressures on the landlocked front-line country began to mount again. On August 22 and 23, Rhodesian air and ground forces launched no less than seven new raids on targets in Zambia. And increasing difficulties in oil supply were foreseen following an accident in Tanzania on the pipeline that supplies Zambia—a discarded cigarette butt had started a fire at the unnoticed leak in the line.

Air service is reportedly being restored between Botswana and Zambia after more than a month's suspension following an incident in which two Air Botswana pilots were arrested and charged with spying for Rhodesia. The ferry which crosses the Zambezi river between the two countries, however, has been closed indefinitely until the war in Rhodesia is over. Rhodesian jets destroyed the ferry in an April attack. While South African exporters, and importers in Malawi, Zaire, and Zambia, have called for the ferry to reopen, Zambian authorities are convinced that war conditions make the project impossible. □

**UPDATE** this month was jointly prepared by *Southern Africa* and *Africa News Service*, which publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$20.00. Address correspondence to *Africa News*, P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

# "Sharing Common Suffering, Enjoying Common Benefits"

## An Interview With ZANU President Mugabe

By Rebecca Reiss and Michael Fleshman

**It is our understanding that social and productive relations in areas of Zimbabwe that ZANLA forces control are left relatively undisturbed. Until now you have tried to build on existing land-use patterns and local political structures without pushing too hard for change. What problems will this pose for the socialist transformation of independent Zimbabwe?**

As we establish liberated zones and proceed to consolidate them, one task that we have is to build a basis for the future transformation of the economy. As much as we try to leave the people occupying their peasant holdings, we also bring them into association with each other on a collectivized basis. In areas which have been deserted by settler farmers, in some cases we leave the labor there to continue the productive process; in other cases we bring in our own peasant population to occupy these areas on a collective basis. Where the people have remained quite undisturbed by the war they continue to till their peasant holdings.

But you bring into the system collectivization by persuasion. All people come to work on a common piece of land (for part of their time) where they grow food for the forces, and also supplementary food for themselves. Where they've been driven out of their areas by the enemy forces, the situation is more ripe for the socialist process to take effect. There we organize them effectively into collective production units.

So the approach really varies. Similarly we also render them on a self-reliance basis health and educational services. Further, we insure that each liberated zone has a force to defend that zone apart from the ZANLA forces. We raise militia units out of the people. This is the way we proceed.

*Rebecca Reiss and Michael Fleshman are free-lance journalists. They have been active liberation support workers in California for several years.*

**And on the question of political structure?**

We are establishing people's committees. There are three operational provinces all told (bordering on Mozambique's Tete, Manica, and Gaza provinces). Actually we intend to sub-divide them into six. Each province has worked out a party structure that takes into account the organs of the party as we established them earlier on. Naturally some transformation has taken place. In these areas you get kraal committees and you have a village committee. Then you have a branch committee, then a district committee, going on up to the province. These people's committees have (more) personnel than were stipulated in the (1964) constitution because necessity demanded that these types of personnel be included.

You have the political commissar, the medical officer, the production officer, security and intelligence that are over and above (the usual committee positions). It is the tactical situation that has demanded that these personnel be included. You have to have someone in charge of production, and logistics in the broader sense, including food and clothes distribution, not just the arm. side of it. You have variation from province to province.

Generally we feel very happy with what is taking place in (liberated) areas in respect to the politicization programs, because we believe that our politics come first.

**What does ZANU plan to do with abandoned white farms?**

Take them over. Give them over to the people, pure and simple.

**Are you going to redistribute the land or . . . ?**

Yes, yes that's the number one thing we must do as a government on taking over. Land is the deepest of all grievances.

**Then you're not going to run them as state farms as for instance happened in Mozambique?**

This is quite different. You'll probably have state farms as models. Inevitably you must have some, but you must also have cooperative farms alongside the peasant holdings, which you'll have to retain for



Fleshman/Reiss

quite a considerable time. Our concern just now is to allocate as much land as possible to the people as a whole. Where we have to do this I think principally it must be done on a collective basis. This will ease pressure on the areas of peasant holdings. We will not disturb the peasant holdings except where the people on their own have agreed to have their land constitute one cooperative unit—which we shall encourage.

**Will this program be implemented in the purchase areas?**

The purchase areas are the areas where you have (capitalist) African farmers. If they would like to come together and establish cooperatives, then so much the better. Their land holdings are smaller than the land holdings that the whites have. They lack the capital, loans, and labor so they are better utilized on a collective basis than on an individual basis. But they too are free to continue their private farming.

**For how long?**

Well, it depends entirely on how long it takes them to adjust, but naturally we will be persuading them to come together. Where we can by persuasion effect collectivization is to me better than by compulsion. We are not short of land in the country, if most of the land which has been held under European occupation is utilized—given over to the bulk of the people.

**Is it more difficult to mobilize the farmers from the purchase areas?**

Yes, they form a kind of farming bourgeoisie, and they are used to property ownership now. They will probably be the most difficult to collectivize.

**At the moment there are some purchase areas in the liberated zones. Have you begun to . . . ?**

In the liberated zones, yes the (purchase area) farmers work alongside us. Collectivization cannot be done in one stroke; you have to start with the areas that raise the least controversy and that will yield the best model for future programs. If you fail once, it's not that bad, but if you fail twice, then in the eyes of the people you have proved that your system doesn't work. We are determined that the people must see it work, see it as a better system than the system of individual holdings.

**But won't one consequence of this policy be that the development of a mixed agricultural economy will eventually create a rich land-owning class?**

No, no, no! We will be working toward minimizing individualism and maximizing collectivism. It's the people who must grow rich in the process we envisage. In other words you can expect that the collective units you establish will get all the know-how

available, and the individuals will have to cater for themselves. I cannot see the government encouraging the granting of loans for a system that they do not favor, although it is in the interest of the government that every producer maximize production.

**What will your policy be toward white farmers who want to stay? Of course their land will be nationalized, but . . .**

If they want to stay they can stay.

**Will they be allowed to use all the land they had before?**

No, of course not. Don't forget that white farmers who constitute about 6000 own 50 percent of the land at present. They don't need all that, and in any case perhaps half of them have already deserted the country. The rest of them who'd like to stay (can) as long as they utilize the land. Land that they are utilizing cannot be snatched from them.

But the land they are not using, lying fallow or held for speculation, that must go. Gradually, their land will diminish in as much as the area of the purchase farmer will also diminish. But if we take over land from them, naturally it must be a just process.

**Let's move the focus from the countryside to the urban areas. ZANU contends that the working class must play a dominant role in the liberation struggle, and in the future society. But until now, the basis of the armed struggle has been, in fact, the peasantry. What is the role of the Zimbabwean working class today?**

A very strange situation. Political work first started in the urban centers among the workers. This is where we established our parties. This is where the actual hub of our nationalist politics was, in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gwelo, Umtali and so on. Action was first taken against the system by way of strikes and boycotts in the urban centers. Then the influence spread to the rural areas. The rural areas were being led by the working class.

But we have never had a working class in the same sense of the term as you have in Britain or the United States because the system has never allowed permanence. Workers had no rights to own permanent homes in towns. Once they stopped working, they had to go back to the rural areas.

This has been the system all along, and hence workers have not been without an aspect which connects them to the peasantry. Part is peasant and part is worker. Therefore it is difficult to say whether our workers haven't participated as fully in the war as the peasants.

Broadly we can say that when we started the armed struggle, because of the circum-

stances, and also because of the strategy we worked out, it was more advantageous to operate first in the rural areas. It was inevitable that the peasants should bear the brunt of the armed struggle.

However, in the process, we have tended to raise higher political consciousness among the peasants than among the urbanized working class. In the urban centers there is some level of political consciousness, but certainly not the same degree of preparedness to take risks. They (urban workers) are getting some salary, although by and large it's well below the poverty line. They have children to send to school and they must think twice before they can even go on strike.

Certainly the commitment has been greater in the rural areas than in the urban areas. We could also say that for the workers there hasn't been the same motivation arising from the presence of our guerrillas in urban areas as there has been among the peasants. But the moment our operations intensify, accompanied of course by cell work, I don't doubt the possibility of an uprising in the urban centers.



Fleishman/Reiss

### Are there any signs that urban workers are growing tired of the war?

There is talk among the stooge organizations, from Muzorewa, that the people have died enough, and that they must now have peace. But we do not get that view from our sources, and lots of support is still going to the rural areas by way of medicines, food, and clothing from the urban areas. How can people tire of war before they achieve victory?

There is a greater intellectual understanding in the urban centers than in rural areas. A high level of understanding, but a low level of political consciousness. Perhaps it is a disadvantage in some cases when you begin to think intellectually about some of the benefits that accrue to you, avoidance of suffering, and the salary you're getting—must you abandon it for some unknown benefit?

So you get that level of intellectualism which has a negative effect on the war. Of course this intellectual element (has) some sway on the ordinary city dweller. These (stooge) parties have been organizing through churches and various other bodies. But it is the youth that is our greatest support even in the urban centers. Where we have not drawn the fathers, we have drawn their children.

### Three new Patriotic Front structures emerged from the recent ZANU/ZAPU meetings at Addis Ababa: the coordinating council, the defense council, and the joint operational command. What are their tasks, and how do they differ from previous unity efforts? For example, why will the joint operational command succeed where ZIPA failed?

The coordinating council is the political body charged with the task of working out political and military strategy in general terms, but right at the top you have the joint executives as a policy-making body. Then the defense council gets the general strategy for reference to the joint operational command, which is really the command structure for operations.

The joint operational command is a 12-member body, six from each side (and) has the task of implementing the strategy spelled out by the defense council.

Let me say that there's a difference between the joint operational command and the ZIPA command. ZIPA was a unitary structure, uniting the two forces. The joint operational command doesn't unite the two forces, it unites the strategies and tries to coordinate the operations on separate fronts. It tries to supervise operations directed at selected targets on a joint basis. Perhaps it is the furthest we have been able to go—that units of ZANLA and units of ZIPRA can be combined for selected targets. But they remain ZANLA and ZIPRA.

### Does this structure represent a compromise between ZANU and ZAPU?

Yes, its the first attempt since the failure of ZIPA to work a common military strategy, to try to operate jointly. In other words to have a kind of military equivalent to the Patriotic Front political front. We try to work on a political level against the strategy worked out by Britain and the United States. Since the Kissinger plan, Geneva Conference, and the Anglo-American proposals, (we) resisted the bid to create a neo-colonial state in the country. We have also had the same diplomatic drive on the Zimbabwe question. That is at the political level. The joint operations that we envisage are intended to balance the cooperation we have at the political level.

### Does ZANU still maintain the position that it desires a single army and a single command?

Yes. We are for unity and we hold out that eventually there must be one party. But what we refuse to do is become the creators of one party. It will be created by the people, and it is the people who have a right to choose their leader. We can prosecute the war on a partnership basis with ZAPU, we can go along to the extent of welding our two forces into one, but the parties must remain separate.

### So you want a conference inside Zimbabwe where the people decide?

The process of merging ZANU and ZAPU can only take effect when we are back home, then you create a merger. What we envision is that if in one area there is a ZANU branch, the people come together, dissolve their two committees, and elect one committee. You come to the district level, the same, at the provincial level, the same. (Then) you have delegates to the congress and they choose one central committee.

### Would you try to unite ZANU and ZAPU before or after internationally supervised elections?

Our understanding, and I hope it is agreed to by ZAPU, (is that) the first two or three months must see us unite ourselves in one party before we go to elections. We do not object to that. But what we object to very strongly is that there should be an attempt to impose upon our people a leader imagined by some other person. Be they our friends or our enemies, they have no right to choose a leader for us. That is our right, and it is the kind of thing we'll resist from any quarter.

### Is there agreement in principle on this process by ZANU and ZAPU?

No, ZAPU would like one party now, and one leader. This is where we differ of course. This is why we cannot have one army, because they say one party first.

### During a television interview you were quoted as saying that you considered yourself to be a "practicing Christian." What did you mean?

All of us have gone through missionary hands. It may not have made us pious people, prayerful as such, but certainly we have been strengthened in certain of our principles. My own view is that rather than spend hours and hours of worship in church, why can't you be out of the church and be with the people? Assist them to live better, to love each other better. To hold the resources of a country as nature-given, or God-given resources belonging to everybody. To resist the ambition of becoming Rockefellers and become people, equals in society, sharing common suffering, enjoying common benefits. That is my gospel. □

Fleishman/Reiss

Robert Mugabe



# OAU Summit Meets

by Steve Talbot

**Monrovia, Liberia**—Only 30 of Africa's 49 heads of state attended the sixteenth Organization of African Unity summit conference held in steamy, rain-soaked Monrovia, Liberia in late July. Beleaguered leaders, such as Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, begged off, pleading pressing problems at home. Cynical Western journalists often joke about African leaders fearing a coup while they are at an OAU conference. In fact several heads of state have in the past been rudely informed while at such summits that their services were no longer required back home. This time it was Western correspondents at the OAU who were jolted by news that President Carter's entire cabinet had offered to resign, and the Africans could laugh about the "coup" in the "unstable" United States.

But Africans—living on a continent plagued by economic underdevelopment, torn by wars, and burdened by four million refugees—cannot afford to be smug. OAU delegates tackled a number of thorny problems, including the Western Saharan guerrilla war, the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa, and a strategy for Africa's economic development in the next 20 years. The summit was also confronted with the continuing debate over Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and jarred by an unexpectedly antagonistic clash over Tanzania's role in toppling the Idi Amin regime in Uganda.

## Agreement on Zimbabwe

In a politically heterogeneous continent where governments range from parliamentary democracies to military juntas to self-styled "empires" and Marxist states, the strongest point of agreement—the OAU's glue—is opposition to the white-minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia. Some observers predicted that this unity would begin to dissolve now that the new Rhodesian regime is nominally black-led. Zaire's prime minister made it clear that he was not entirely opposed to Bishop Abel Muzorewa's administration in Salisbury, and he proposed that the OAU and Britain organize a conference of all the "factions" in the Zimbabwe conflict.

But Zaire—with one of Africa's most rightwing governments and a reportedly ex-

tensive clandestine trade with South Africa—represented a minority position. The vast majority of African states, including powerful and influential Nigeria, supported the Patriotic Front guerrillas as the sole and authentic representative of the Zimbabwean people. A resolution to that effect was adopted with Zaire, Lesotho, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Liberia expressing reservations.

Speaking on behalf of the liberation movements in southern Africa, Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua Nkomo made a rousing appeal for increased material aid to the guerrillas and their allies, the front-line nations, which continue to suffer from Rhodesian raids. The burly Nkomo denounced Muzorewa saying, "The bishop has given his soul to the racists in South Africa. He reports to [South African Prime Minister] Botha. They have worked out a military strategy. But I'm sure that Africa has more guns than South Africa." He evoked laughter and applause when he asserted, "Zimbabwe was not colonized by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The imperialists and racists are using the face of the bishop as a shield."

Defending the role socialist countries were playing in supporting the liberation struggle, Nkomo asked, "Who mowed down the children in Soweto? Was it the communists? Who is killing the children of Zimbabwe and Namibia? Is it the socialist countries? Who does Botha represent? Western interests."

The OAU agreed with Nkomo and his co-leader Robert Mugabe that the April elections in Rhodesia were a "sham and fraudulent," that the constitution still entrenches white-minority power and privilege, and that Muzorewa is a front for white interests. Nigeria's head of state, Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo said, "Our organization should not be deceived or lured into accepting shadow for substance" in Zimbabwe.

In a move which could have a strong negative impact on the British economy, the OAU resolved to impose a "secondary boycott" against any country which lifts sanctions against or recognizes the Muzorewa regime. Nigeria has already threatened to withhold important contracts from British firms if the new Thatcher government recognizes Rhodesia. And the OAU specifically admonished "certain elements in the US Congress"—a clear

reference to Senators S.I. Hayakawa, Helms, and their allies—for trying to compel the Carter administration to lift sanctions.

But despite some strong words, little in the way of effective concerted action proposals came out of the meeting. Countries were left to act on their own, and there was a strong undercurrent of support for more "talks" in some form.

## Targetting Oil

The OAU condemned South Africa for being "deceitful" in the last two years of Western-sponsored negotiations over Namibia's independence. It reasserted unqualified support for the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against Pretoria for failing to end its colonial occupation of Namibia.

Well aware, however, that the United States and other Western nations on the Security Council are likely to veto any African proposal for sanctions against South Africa, the OAU added that if the Security Council fails to act, an extraordinary session of the OAU council of ministers will be convened "to devise a new strategy for the liberation of Namibia."

South African liberation movement leader Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress (ANC) made a special appeal for an international oil embargo against South Africa. At a press conference Tambo thanked Iran, OPEC, and Nigeria for cutting off oil shipments to Pretoria. "This is the moment to impose a total oil embargo," Tambo demanded. "It is urgent. It could change the balance of forces very substantially in southern Africa." The OAU responded by denouncing the "perfidious role played by international oil companies" in supplying South Africa and Rhodesia and by urging an oil embargo.

## Other Problems

In 1978 the war between Somalia and Ethiopia dominated much of the OAU summit discussion. This year the Horn of Africa, including the continuing guerrilla war in Eritrea, was barely mentioned. Instead delegates turned their attention to the escalating war in the Western Sahara, the former Spanish colony, where a desert

*Steve Talbot writes for the Berkeley-based International Bulletin. He is currently working on a film about US involvement in southern Africa.*





OAU meets in Liberia.

guerrilla movement, POLISARIO, is fighting for the territory's independence against Moroccan and Mauritanian attempts at annexation. POLISARIO has been given strong support by Algeria, which also has a common border with the territory.

Morocco's King Hassan has recently sought increased military aid from the US to combat the POLISARIO. The movement sent a delegation to meet with an *ad hoc* committee of the OAU and found a great deal of sympathy. Although Morocco walked out in protest and is threatening to quit the OAU, 33 OAU member states voted to adopt a resolution saying that the people of the Western Sahara had been denied their right to self-determination. The OAU called on the UN to organize a referendum in the territory to determine the popular will. Only Zaire and the Comoros Islands voted against, although Egypt, Tunisia and other friends abstained. Hassan himself refused to attend the summit, a move which seemed likely to frustrate OAU attempts to mediate tensions in the area.

The arrival of Egypt's Anwar Sadat, accompanied by a huge delegation including 40 armed "technicians," immersed the OAU in debate over the Middle East. Libya and Algeria led an unsuccessful drive to expel Egypt. Surrounded by a dozen bodyguards, Sadat gave an impassioned one-hour speech defending his peace treaty with Israel. It was well-received, although the final OAU resolution on the Middle East still stressed that the crux of the thirty-year conflict was the Palestinian issue and reaffirmed its support for the PLO.

A number of correspondents were disappointed when Libya's Colonel Qaddafi did not show up for a great debate with Sadat. But Qaddafi may have decided that his presence at the OAU would only inflame African criticism of his military support for the despised Idi Amin. Libya continues to provide sanctuary for Amin. Although most OAU delegates seemed to favor Tanzania's role in overthrowing Amin and hoped to avoid a fratricidal debate over whether Tanzania had technically violated the OAU's cardinal rule

against interference in the internal affairs of a member state, when Uganda's issue still erupted. It began when Sudan's President Numeiry castigated Tanzania for sending troops into Uganda. In an impromptu response, which won applause from most delegates, Tanzania's President Nyerere chided Numeiry—the outgoing head of the OAU—for not condemning Uganda's invasion and occupation of northwestern Tanzania last October. It was this invasion that prompted Tanzania's intervention alongside anti-Amin Ugandan forces.

The debate might have ended there, but Nigeria's head of state, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, raised it again the following day, insisting that Tanzania's "ill-advised" intervention had set a "dangerous precedent." By then, Nyerere had departed Monrovia, so it was left to Uganda's current leader, Godfrey Binaisa, to counter the imposing, elaborately robed Nigerian leader.

In a dramatic speech which drew repeated applause, former attorney Binaisa

*Continued on page 31*

# Jesse Jackson Goes to South Africa

**Jackson has joined a growing stream of black Americans going to South Africa to "see for themselves." Angry African activists allege that the Americans are using the South African stage to build their careers back home.**

The Reverend Jesse Jackson is nothing if not outspoken. The civil rights leader is the most outspoken American black figure to have visited South Africa in years. Jackson's two-week visit in late July produced a torrent of white reaction as Jackson pulled few punches in his assault on the system of apartheid, which Jackson characterized to the utter fury of some white officials as "worse than Hitler."

Yet since his return, Jackson has expressed a view of apartheid, and a view of what can and should be done internationally to end apartheid, that has been oddly muted. Jackson's visit to South Africa may have confused as many people as it has encouraged.

Upon his arrival at Jan Smuts airport in Johannesburg, Jackson sought to display a degree of flexibility unexpected by most South Africans. He told reporters that he had come "with an open mind" to have a "close look" at the country, and typical of his poetic style, he said he hoped that his visit would be "therapy and not a threat."

Jackson's visit may possibly have turned out to be therapeutic for many blacks in South Africa, but it certainly was threaten-

ing to the country's white population. Jackson visited Johannesburg, New London, Port Elizabeth, Durban, the Crossroads squatter camp outside of Capetown, and Soweto. He spoke with government officials, labor leaders, black consciousness activists, banned writers, and American and Afrikaner businessmen. Black crowds cheered him and white commentators cursed him.

"Segregation is wrong, segregation is a lie, segregation challenges God's right to make people of different colors," Jackson told a crowd of Africans, huddled together by the light of kerosene lamps flickering in the night, in Crossroads. "This land is changing hands," chanted back the crowd. In Soweto thousands of blacks, with fists clenched and chanting black power slogans, cheered him as he told the crowd that he would urge President Carter to oppose US investment in apartheid.

"A vicious demagogue," was the way one white protested his visit. Charges of "anti-white racism" and association "with communist organizations" abounded as white reaction was mostly hostile. Some government organizations, though, at-

tempted to display an open-mindedness of their own, and Jackson was interviewed on the government-owned radio station and in South Africa's influential *Financial Mail*. Jackson also met with Minister of Cooperation and Development Piet Koornhof, who is most credited with obtaining permission for Jackson to visit South Africa in the first place.

## Praise For Koornhof

Jackson consciously softened his stance during these encounters with the more liberal wing of the Afrikaner establishment. He praised Koornhof for his "integrity" and "courage," and in the *Financial Mail*, he said he would "probably not encourage" US businesses to leave South Africa. "They are doing some good here," Jackson said. "But I remain opposed to new investment by them or anyone else. We will continue to attempt to stop new bank loans to South Africa, the sale of Krugers, and sporting and cultural ties. All this acts as a pressure for change in South Africa.

While in South Africa, Jackson also announced that he would work to stop the upcoming heavyweight title fight between black American John Tate and white South African Gerrie Coetzee. The fight is scheduled for October 20 in an all-white stadium in Pretoria that is being desegregated for fight night only. Jackson called the event "an insult to blacks all over the world."

Perhaps the most controversial step Jackson took in South Africa was his attempt to unite what are generally considered to be irreconcilable tendencies among black political leaders. In Johannesburg Jackson organized a meeting that included Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, Dr. Nthato Motlana, chairman of the Committee of Ten, a group of Soweto leaders, and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of the government-created Zulu bantustan. The meeting angered many blacks, particularly younger activists who condemned Jackson for associating with Buthelezi. Tom Manthata, also a member of the Committee of Ten, called Jackson "a diabolical Western agent" who was more



Some students welcomed Jackson in Soweto, but many questioned his coming.

interested in advancing his political career in the US than in furthering "the real interests of South African blacks."

Obviously smarting from such criticism, Jackson implied in a press conference soon after his return to New York that those blacks who criticized him were somehow representing sinister forces. "We have an understanding about those blacks that attack us," Jackson said, adding obliquely that they were "assigned that in the script." But that didn't satisfy all his critics. The New York office of the Pan Africanist Congress echoed Manthata's charges, saying that Manthata's statement "is assuming awful reality."

#### Facing Two Directions

And back in New York, Jackson was still a bundle of contradictions. "Disinvestment

is working contrary to most official reports," Jackson announced, but later when asked if he supported economic sanctions against South Africa, Jackson hedged. "There is some leverage that can be gained from proximity," he said. "If we are altogether out of the picture, we may not have the leverage to make any decision about South Africa at all."

Still later, on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers," Jackson said, "I am convinced that we must intensify the disinvestment program in South Africa and withdraw bank loans."

There is also some controversy surrounding the sponsorship of Jackson's trip. Jackson's visa was originally denied by the South African government, and afterwards, a variety of strings were pulled. A vice president of the Minneapolis-based

computer company, Control Data, told *Africa News* that he pressured Chief Buthelezi to support a visa for Jackson, and at least one member of the International Communications Agency, the official US government information agency in Washington, boasted that Jackson's trip was an ICA project. ICA officially denies this, but Jackson's office would not say whether his Chicago-based Operation PUSH totally funded the trip. According to reports, even Secretary of State Vance raised the question of Jackson's visa with Koornhof when Koornhof visited the US in late June.

Through all the criticism, Jackson remained unperturbed. Asked in New York how he eventually succeeded in entering South Africa, Jackson answered cryptically, "It was God's will." M.S.□

## US Corporation Helps Pretoria Buy Muzorewa

Despite two official government reports in South Africa, and hundreds of column inches of newspaper copy throughout the Western world, the extent of the South African influence-buying scandal known as Muldergate, is still not known. The key South African slush-fund operator, Eschel Rhoodie, has been sitting in a French jail awaiting possible extradition to South Africa on charges of fraud and theft. To defend himself, Rhoodie has been letting out a small trickle of new information on the scandal leak bit by bit.

According to Rhoodie's newest revelations which were published recently in an interview in a Dutch magazine, the South Africans paid out considerable sums to bring Bishop Abel Muzorewa to power in Rhodesia and to maintain clout in the refurbished government in Salisbury. Rhoodie charges that the South Africans funneled \$1 million to Muzorewa's party, the UANC, to be used during last spring's elections. An additional \$475,000 also greased the palm of James Chikerema, Muzorewa's erstwhile right-hand man, who soon after the elections, bolted from the UANC to deprive Muzorewa of a majority in the Salisbury parliament.

#### US Corporation Implicated

Rhodie has so far refused to divulge specifics about the \$1 million payment to Muzorewa, but the South African press has suggested that it was officials of the American firm Allegheny Ludlum Industries, a major minerals dealer in southern Africa, that first suggested

payments to Muzorewa. The company wanted a stable, pro-Western government in Rhodesia, and according to Rhodie, Ludlum officials made it clear to the South Africans that they were willing to pay for it.

Rhodie does say that an unidentified Ludlum official first approached Chikerema in Rhodesia and later introduced him to two South African businessmen, one of whom Rhodie has identified as David Abramson, whose name has been mentioned in connection with several South African currency violations.

Rhodie's unnamed Ludlum official has subsequently been identified. An early-August report in the *Johannesburg Sunday Times* says that the official is Ludlum vice president E.F. Andrews, a long-time friend of the South African government.

Both Rhodie and General Hendrik van den Bergh, at that time head of the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS), supported the original plan to bribe Chikerema. This involved a meeting in Johannesburg that was to be filmed and tape-recorded in order later to blackmail Chikerema. That operation never came off, according to Rhodie, but the money was eventually paid through a deposit in a Swiss bank account from an unnamed American company acting as intermediary. Chikerema denies ever receiving any money from South Africa.

Incidentally, in his recent charges, Rhodie indicates that there were serious clashes inside the South African government on tactics to be adopted towards neighboring African states. Rhodie por-

trays the present prime minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, as a man who, while defense minister in the mid-1970s, continually had to be restrained from sending arms and troops across African borders.

Botha organized the South African invasion of Angola in 1975, and Rhodie says, in one other instance Botha arranged to smuggle arms to opponents of the Mozambican government of President Samora Machel. General van den Bergh is said to have found out about the planned arms shipment. Worried that the delivery of these weapons would shatter the behind the scenes negotiations then in progress between the Mozambique and Pretoria governments, van den Bergh allegedly had his agents sabotage the weaponry while it was in transit.

A short time later a cooperation agreement was reached between the two governments, South Africa agreeing to help repair Mozambican rail and harbor installations, facilities which are of considerable importance to South Africa for its imports and exports.

According to Rhodie, BOSS agents also foiled another of Botha's plans. Botha allegedly had plans to airlift some 500 soldiers to Rhodesia to help back Ian Smith's government. At the same time Prime Minister Vorster was assuring the world that there was no South African military involvement in Rhodesia.

Informed of Botha's plans by van den Bergh, Vorster is said to have ordered the airlift plan scuttled. M.S.□

# Thatcher Compromise— Substance or Style?

London—With the dramatic unveiling of the so-called Thatcher plan on Rhodesia at the British Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, Zambia, last month, the new Western initiative to salvage the Salisbury government was underway. But like most other Western efforts to direct the Rhodesian issue—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's six-point proposal in Lusaka resembled nothing so much as Henry Kissinger's 1976 attempt at an all-party conference in Geneva—it seems certain that the new round of talks scheduled for September will face serious difficulties in reaching any agreement.

Thatcher has been faced with enormous pressure on the Rhodesian question. During her campaign last spring she promised to recognize the government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Salisbury if elections were judged "free and fair" by a team of visiting Conservatives. Predictably, that judgment was made and Thatcher then argued for some time that a renewal of the current order to maintain economic sanctions

against Rhodesia, due in November, would never make it through the House of Commons. It was to soothe impatient Tory MPs that Thatcher stated in Australia in June that sanctions would not be renewed in the fall.

That statement dominated the pre-conference attitude of many African leaders. There was much speculation here that Nigeria's sudden nationalization of British Petroleum's assets in that country was intended in part as a display of firmness on the part of the Lagos government, though Nigerian officials never acknowledged the connection. More importantly, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, both key members of the five front-line states, made scathing attacks on the attitude Thatcher was bringing to the conference. Nyerere threatened to withdraw from the conference if Britain were to drop sanctions and recognize the Salisbury government.

All this, however, seemed to be more diplomatic show than substance—particularly in view of the reception accorded Thatcher's remarks at the opening of the Rhodesia debate in Lusaka. "The British government is wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia," Thatcher stated. "The aim is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable." The applause at these pronouncements, which were broad enough to win approval from any number of opposing quarters, was led by President Nyerere.

## British Proposals

But the surprises were not over. Thatcher's opening salvos were delivered on Friday, August 3; by Sunday August 5 after a weekend of intensive, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, Thatcher had a clear shot at the consensus she sought for a six-point plan on Rhodesia:

- Britain would assume its legal responsibility as the colonial power in Rhodesia, and there would be British sponsorship for a new conference.

- All parties to the conflict must be invited to such a meeting and all must have full power to negotiate. This allowed for the presence of both the Patriotic Front and

representatives of the Muzorewa government though Britain has since let it be known quietly that former prime minister Ian Smith, now minister-without-portfolio in the Muzorewa government, would do best to stay home.

- Britain will draw up a new constitution that will be the basis for a Zimbabwe formally independent of Britain. By the time the plan was presented Thatcher had already acknowledged that there were "certain defects" in the current constitution. But Thatcher insisted that the new constitution would also have to include safeguards for the white minority "during a minimum period following the transfer of power."

- Financial assistance for emigrating whites would have to be provided. Under the previous Anglo-American proposal, this was known as the Zimbabwe development fund. President Nyerere has suggested that it be renamed the commonwealth resettlement fund, and so it apparently stands. With pledges from the US, Britain, Canada, and West Germany, it is now reported approaching its \$1.2 billion target.

- The voter rolls so conspicuously absent from the elections staged in April must be established. New elections would be conducted under the formal auspices of the British government, with commonwealth or possibly UN observers present during the polling.

- A ceasefire must be established during the negotiation process.

Thatcher's proposals are believed to be largely the work of Foreign Secretary Carrington. For several months in closed-door cabinet sessions Carrington is said to have argued against Thatcher's desire to move toward recognition as soon as possible after the election. He maintained that such recognition would leave Britain diplomatically isolated and would not have provided Rhodesia with what the Tories hoped most to provide—a massive dose of economic stimulation through the lifting of international trade sanctions.

The best way to salvage the Muzorewa regime, Carrington is reported to have argued, would be to make the minimum concessions necessary to win international approval, with British recognition following as soon as it would be diplomatically respectable. Hence British policy on Rhodesia was tied to the commonwealth





Margaret Thatcher

conference, where the battle for international acceptance would be launched.

#### Front-Line Response

An important part of that battle, of course, would have to be support for Britain's plan from black African leaders. It is now clear that Britain has sought to achieve this, first by splitting the front-line states along Anglophone lines—attempting to take Zambia and Tanzania along with it while leaving Angola and Mozambique more isolated. But it is not clear how successful this strategy will prove to be.

There are now signs that the different ways in which independence was achieved among the front-line states may be affecting their diplomatic strategies on the Rhodesia question. President Nyerere, who led his country to independence through a negotiated settlement with Britain, argued explicitly in favor of general support for Thatcher's plan. "In Kenya white settlers were paid large sums of money by Britain to make possible racial harmony and peaceful transition to independence," Nyerere reminded the Lusaka conference. He said the commonwealth resettlement plan would be useful in easing the emigration of "racialists or those unable to accept the loss of economic privilege." Nyerere also referred to Tanzania's 1961 independence formula, which contained guarantees for Asian and white seats in the legislature.

Angola and Mozambique, on the other hand, have remained mostly silent since the commonwealth summit ended, although one Mozambican official expressed skepticism at Thatcher's intentions—especially

toward the Patriotic Front.

Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda reportedly promised Thatcher that they would win commitments from the Patriotic Front to attend the London talks. Formal acceptance by front co-leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo came August 20, after some initial hesitation.

When the front eventually accepted the invitation to the London talks, front co-leaders Mugabe and Nkomo stated jointly that there would be no ceasefire, as Nyerere had promised. According to a BBC report, they also said they would demand a greater sharing of constitutional authority—presumably a call for the dismantling of the entrenched white minority clauses in the current constitution—and a larger role for the front in the transfer. This latter appeared to be a reference to the military role of the front's soldiers during the election and transition to independence.

#### British Strategy

Such demands are likely to prove the main stumbling blocks at the all-party conference in September—just as they did in Geneva in 1976. But Foreign Secretary Carrington, according to one report circulating here, is prepared to push his policy through even if the conference does not meet the front's demands. Indeed, it appears that Carrington and his fellow ministers may have been banking on a walkout by the front. Once the label of "intransigents" is firmly affixed to the nationalists, Britain can proceed with its own alterations to the current constitution and hope to win international support without front participation.

The Zambian and Tanzanian promises to win the cooperation of the two wings of the Patriotic Front may well have been in exchange for commitments from Thatcher to "deliver" her Tory constituents in parliament, the South Africans, whose support is viewed as crucial to the plan's success, and the Muzorewa government. All three balked initially, but it then became clear that the only stubborn members of Thatcher's camp would be the Conservative MPs.

Some observers believe that it was British assurances that neither Mugabe nor Nkomo would come to power through the Thatcher plan that finally won Pretoria's tentative support.

On Salisbury's part, Muzorewa's initial objections seemed more stage-managed for the benefit of the white minority at home than substantive. Even his initial rejection of the Thatcher plan was cautious, and he conceded that there were "certain positive elements" in the outlined settlement.

Even minister-without-portfolio Ian Smith seemed suddenly sanguine. He originally noted "an over-abundance of hot air" in Lusaka. But a week later he stated: "Some people believe there's not much

hope, but our analysis gives us a different idea of the outcome." Late in August Salisbury announced that Smith would attend the conference.

All this raises the strong possibility that, given the Conservatives' evident sympathies for Salisbury, some degree of planning had gone into coordinating Thatcher's actions and the Muzorewa government's responses. In fact, Muzorewa's political position at home has been seriously weakening, making it difficult for him to resist Britain's proposals effectively. Shortly before the Thatcher plan was unveiled, followers of the Rev. Ndabingi Sithole, who has walked out of parliament, threatened to team up their twelve parliamentary seats with those of James Chikerema, another opposition leader in Salisbury. This move seriously threatens the bishop's government majority.

#### Skepticism In Order

The pieces are thus in place for yet another round of negotiations on Rhodesia. But even before the commonwealth conference ended, some signs of skepticism had begun to appear. In spite of public pronouncements of harmony at a conference where most matters were settled in private negotiations, some African officials worried over Thatcher's intentions. According to Mary Lestor, a Labor MP who attended the Lusaka conference as a delegate from the British anti-apartheid movement, Africans were left confused by Thatcher's ill-defined promises. "The big question everybody was asking was what does Mrs. Thatcher mean by 'genuine black majority rule,'" Lestor said on returning to Britain. "Many people were wondering about her real feelings once she got home." P.L. □



Lord Carrington

## More Twists on Sanctions

In mid-June, White House officials refused to accept a proposal that would have given Congress the power to usurp the president's ultimate veto right in regard to an ending of sanctions against Rhodesia. Two months later, the administration has approved the same proposal when House and Senate conferees to the Foreign Relations Authorization bill agreed to compromise language. The language, which was later adopted by both full houses of Congress, provides that sanctions against Rhodesia will be lifted by November 15 unless the president determines it would not be in the national interest to do so. But, if the president decides to continue sanctions, the Congress has 30 legislative days to overturn the decision by a concurrent resolution—which does not require presidential approval.

This reversal of the administration's approach reflects the twisted path the sanctions battle has taken. The new British negotiating effort following the commonwealth meeting means this recent vote will not be the last word from Congress on Rhodesian sanctions.

For the past year, momentum for a lifting of sanctions has continued to build in the Senate. One Senate staff member expected that sanctions would be ended by the end of the year, and that all the most liberal Senators could do was to postpone the decision as long as possible. Long-time supporters of white rule in Rhodesia such as Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina continued to take the lead in the move to lift sanctions, but the venter of multiracialism provided by the internal settlement made it easier for moderates to agree to this position.

The election in April gave an additional boost to those in the Senate who favored ending sanctions. Rhodesia had supposedly achieved American-style democracy. Ironically several Senators compared the Rhodesian turnout favorably to lower voter participation caused by popular cynicism in many American elections, and the intimidation by the security forces and private armies to Chicago machine politics.

The House of Representatives has taken a less confrontational course with the administration on this issue. President Carter's June 7 statement, explaining why it would not be in the US's economic, diplomatic, and geopolitical interest to lift sanctions had a surprisingly strong impact on House members. Carter's speech helped switch the focus of the debate from the con-

tentious issue of whether majority rule had been achieved in Rhodesia to a more pragmatic consideration of foreign policy objectives.

Liberals in the House fought not only to gain time, but to retain the president's discretion over lifting sanctions. Representative Stephen Solarz, chairman of the Africa subcommittee, steered a bill through the House providing that sanctions would be lifted October 15 unless the president determined that it would be in the national interest to retain them. The House adopted the bill on June 28 by an overwhelming margin of 350 to 37, after it rejected by a 100-vote margin an amendment that would have ended sanctions unconditionally on October 15.

To retain the provision for presidential discretion, liberals conceded on almost every political point about Rhodesia. The bill's preamble called the April election "a significant step" and said that US national interest required encouragement of "multiracial democracy" with "majority rule and protection of minority rights." When Senate and House representatives met in conference to iron out an acceptable version of the foreign assistance authorization bill, another statement from the preamble of the original Senate-passed language was accepted, which said that the April election brought a "transfer of power to a black majority government" in Rhodesia.

### Waiting On The British

Senate conservatives thought they had things guaranteed when the provision allowing Congress to lift sanctions on its own by concurrent resolution was agreed to in the Senate-House conference. But the commonwealth conference and the resulting shift in British policy was a significant new twist.

The November 15 date for the president to make a final determination on sanctions was explicitly selected to fall immediately after the British parliament's November 9 vote on whether Britain would renew sanctions. Jesse Helms had been engaged in private diplomacy with Britain's new Conservative government, and felt confident that parliament would vote to end compliance with sanctions.

Now the parliamentary decision is again an open question which will be determined in large part by what happens to the new commonwealth initiative. Even members of Congress who support the Muzorewa-Smith regime are not so parochial as to think the United States should lift sanctions alone. As conservative Republican representative Erlenborn of Illinois said in April, "When our constituents are already worried about gasoline shortages this summer, why risk action by the Nigerians to interrupt oil supplies or jack up the prices? We should let the British assume the lead, not take them off the hook." C.R.□

## State Department Sets Out Ex-Im Rules

Almost one year ago the Congress passed the only bill ever to restrict US economic ties with South Africa. What had started out as a proposal to prohibit all financing to South Africa by the Export-Import Bank ended up as a compromise restricting certain transactions. But since October when the bill was passed, no Ex-Im Bank financing has gone to support sales to South Africa, because the State Department has not yet completed the regulations implementing the new law.

The compromise language offered by Rep. Thomas Evans of Delaware called for an end to all Ex-Im Bank loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to the South African government and its agencies. This included the parastatal companies, such as those producing steel and electricity, which had accounted for up to a quarter of the total Ex-Im Bank involvement in South Africa in recent years. On this section the legislative history was clear and rules were easily set.

The contentious provision requires the Secretary of State to certify that any private

purchaser "has endorsed and is proceeding toward the implementation of" fair employment practices in order for that company to be eligible for Ex-Im bank assistance. Rep. Evans modelled the language after the Sullivan code of fair employment principles, which have provided a convenient excuse for companies being pressured to withdraw from South Africa to remain. Rep. Evans and corporations seeking a continuing market in South Africa, such as Caterpillar tractor, have complained that the intent of the law is not being carried out because of the long delay in writing the regulations.

In June lawyers for the State Department's economics and business bureau drafted certification procedures and a questionnaire for companies that apply for Ex-Im Bank financing. The questionnaire requests information on segregation of work facilities, an employment and wage profile, training programs for African workers, housing and educational programs, and willingness to engage in collective bargain-

*Continued on page 31*



# BREAKING THE LINKS

The recent upsurge of activity on US campuses has helped raise in the national consciousness serious doubts about the virtue of the US corporate role in southern Africa. Moved by the images of South African students mowed down by police bullets as they demanded freedom, US students have picked up the banners and begun to build a movement in solidarity with that struggle for liberation.

Logically, activists looked to see whether there were US structures that might be buttressing the apartheid system. They found the US corporations, which along with other foreign investors, were providing critical capital, technology, and equipment. Thus strong student voices joined those of unionists and concerned black and white community groups, all urging US corporations to stop dealing with apartheid.

Students who called their universities to press US corporations to withdraw from South Africa met with three major arguments.

First, that the university ought to be non-political, a primary line of defense over which few students even broke stride as they moved to press their demands.

Second, that the apartheid system is bad, but is now changing rapidly.

Third, that the forces of free enterprise have an interest in changing that system and thus that US corporations can play a critical role in "ending apartheid" if they stay in South Africa.

Activists now find themselves confronted with a stream of slick corporate apologists carrying glossy reports, who argue that the students are "out of date," that the latest data shows that apartheid is crumbling, and US corporations are helping pull out the loose bricks.

This special supplement looks closely at some of that latest data and concludes that the extravagant claims about the imminent demise of apartheid (at the hands of its major beneficiaries) have nothing to do with reality.

It is worth restating a basic truth about South Africa that is often buried under the verbiage of liberal historiographers and political scientists. There is no fundamental contradiction between the South African economy, a capitalist (or private enterprise) economy and the apartheid system. The superstructure of apartheid was constructed largely as a response to the needs of the first major industrial investors in South Africa.

The diamond and gold mines which were built in the late nineteenth century had an almost insatiable appetite for cheap labor. The state was only responding to that need when it took on the task of driving Africans off their land, herding them into labor reservoirs (today called bantustans), imposing taxes, and channeling the resulting stream of men to their appointed work places via the pass and contract labor system.

Segregation, apartheid, race and class, all have been closely interlinked in South Africa, and with minor exceptions the pattern has been simple. Blacks are the workers, super-exploited because they have been deprived of any independence, any right to organize; whites are the owners of property. Even those whites who do not fall into that category—the small group of white workers and the middle class—benefit from and cling to that basic division of status in the society.

But precisely because the apartheid system worked so well for investors, the economy has expanded rapidly, producing wealth that needed new fields for investment. So the shape of

the economy has changed significantly in the past 25 years—creating new needs and thus new tasks for the state.

The old economy, based primarily on mining and agriculture, has given way to a system in which manufacturing plays a central role, now contributing almost 30 percent to the country's national income and absorbing on the order of a quarter of its workforce.

That change has called for other changes. The old system of labor control was developed at a time when much of the work in the mines could be classified as unskilled, so that black workers could be treated as interchangeable units of labor, serving their six or nine month contracts; then replaced by new bodies. Today's industry requires workers with more skills—hence the move to change the regulations, to allow a certain number of black workers to acquire some skills and live permanently in the towns, so that the same faces will appear at the factory gate each morning, and training will not be wasted.

But as Michael Shafer's analysis of the Wiehahn commission shows, such changes have nothing to do with abolishing apartheid. The adjustments are all being made inside the system—indeed the careful engineering is possible precisely because there is an overriding system of absolute control.

The migratory labor system is not being dismantled, no are blacks becoming citizens of South Africa. But the migratory labor system is being re-defined—with new categories such as commuter workers, who are not allowed to live in town with their families but who live with them in the bantustans and travel long distances to work. There were 291,000 such workers in 1970. Now there are 725,000.

The recent Riekert commission has been much hailed in corporate and liberal circles because it lifts some restraints on black workers and clears a space for the creation of a small settled black elite, who may even have the right to run businesses in town. But it also makes perfectly clear that "influx control," the laws which prevent free movement, will not only be retained but reinforced.

It is in this context that our supplement articles deal with the claims being made in favor of the "progressive" role of US corporations in South Africa. Gail Morlan, in a critique of the Sullivan principles, shows why such codes of conduct are irrelevant to the basic struggle for freedom; other writers deal with the forms of aid that flow from US corporations to apartheid and with the hypocrisy of the corporations, which have not even begun to implement their much-trumpeted internal reforms.

Finally the supplement reports briefly on the progress and some of the problems facing the student sector of the US liberation support movement.

Student activists have played an important part in forcing Americans to think about the nature of apartheid and to confront the ugly truth that US corporations play a vital role in the survival of that system. Now such students are seeking ways to broaden their own understanding of the links between repressive systems at home and abroad and are reaching out for new allies.

We hope that this supplement will be a useful tool in that process.

Jennifer Davis



# BREAKING THE LINKS

## Sullivan Code— Cleaning Up the Corporate Image

by Gail Morlan

Despite the Reverend Leon Sullivan's claims that his principles of labor reform can be "a tremendous force for change and a vital factor in ending apartheid," the principles serve in fact as part of a strategy to perpetuate the corporate status quo in South Africa. Well over 100 U.S. companies doing business there have endorsed the principles. But they have endorsed them not to end apartheid, but to justify their continued operation under apartheid. The Sullivan principles are, fundamentally, a sophisticated public relations effort.

### Black Militancy Provokes Corporate Response

This public relations effort was made necessary by a new militancy among black opponents to the South African system. According to Sullivan, the principles which bear his name grew out of an overnight 1975 visit to Johannesburg during which he was urged by black and white leaders to make US companies agents of change in South Africa. Returning to the US, Sullivan, a General Motors board member, spent many months meeting with corporate executives and finally emerged with the six principles and 12 leading US corporation signatories.

In the months during which the code was being developed, South Africa was shaken by powerful black protest which started with an uprising led by young Soweto students in 1976 and eventually left an estimated 1,000 Africans dead. Pictures of defiant black children facing armed white police shattered US public indifference to events in South Africa, and helped destroy public complacency about the role of US corporations in South Africa.

The uprisings threatened the stability of the apartheid state and demonstrated both the demands of the blacks for fundamental change and the brutal power of the Pretoria regime.

They provoked university students in the US to call for divestment of stock in

companies doing business in South Africa. Many churches, unions, and members of the black community joined in demanding an end to bank loans and corporate investment by US firms.

Faced with this situation, the companies moved to justify their continued presence in South Africa. They could no longer remain silent as they had in 1970 when the Polaroid Corporation, itself under pressure from black US employees because of its South Africa activities, had urged in vain other US firms to join it in a program of South African workplace reforms.

Within a few months of the announcement of the principles in early 1977, 120 corporations had signed them, hailing them as a great step forward.

What had changed in the intervening years was not the nature of apartheid nor the nature of the corporations, but the nature of black resistance to apartheid.

The Sullivan principles provided precisely what the companies were looking for: a guaranteed public relations success which promised maximum credit for minimum change. The principles sound impressive. They mandate nothing, and there is no way they can be effectively enforced.

### No Challenge to Apartheid

Apartheid is not the product of some out-

moded race-discrimination which simply makes it difficult for blacks to move up the job ladder.

Apartheid is a tightly meshed system of total dispossession that deprives blacks of their citizenship, freedom of movement, land ownership, organizing rights, and education. The whole purpose of the system is to maintain the black population as a vast reservoir of powerless, cheap labor, to be used when and where the bosses decide.

The black demand for change in South Africa involves real political power, the destruction of the entire apartheid system, and the achievement of the right to make laws, to shape the economic future of the country, and to be free of the pass laws and security police. None of these things are affected by the Sullivan principles.

There is a fundamental contradiction between the demands of South African blacks and the needs of US corporations, a contradiction that the Sullivan principles attempt to obscure.

US corporation have been attracted to South Africa because it has a highly controlled labor force. The Sullivan principles do not change this fact. Sophisticated companies are quite willing to make work place alterations and even recognize company unions. But they are not prepared to allow militant unions with the power to represent

### Statement of Principles of U.S. Firms With Affiliates in the Republic of South Africa

Each of the firms endorsing the Statement of Principles have affiliates in the Republic of South Africa and support the following operating principles:

1. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work facilities.
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.
4. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, Blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs.
5. Increasing the number of Blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions.
6. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

We agree to further implement these principles. Where implementation requires a modification of existing South African working conditions, we will seek such modification through appropriate channels.


We believe that the implementation of the foregoing principles is consistent with respect for human dignity and will contribute greatly to the general economic welfare of all people of the Republic of South Africa.

Gail Morlan was for many years a member of the Southern Africa magazine collective; she is now writing a novel.





# BREAKING THE LINKS



Militancy in South Africa spurred strong US solidarity demonstrations and put corporations on the defensive.

the real needs of the workers. They will argue with the government over the right to use more blacks as skilled workers, but they will not confront the government over apartheid.

### The Bantustan Policy

Perhaps the most damaging effect of the Sullivan principles is the impression they give that reform is possible in South Africa, and that US corporations have the will and the power to improve the condition of South Africa's black majority. Quite the contrary is true. As US involvement has expanded, conditions for blacks have grown worse. US corporate investment in South Africa has nearly tripled in the last ten years now approaching \$2 billion—one-fifth of all foreign investment there. US bank loans now account for about one-quarter of all South Africa's foreign loans. US presence provides jobs for about 100,000 people or 1 percent of the official work force, including 70,000 Africans, "coloureds," and Asians.

While US corporate investment has grown so has the systematic dispossession of some 20 million Africans who make up over 70 percent of the population. The cornerstone of this dispossession is the bantustan policy. Under this system, 13 percent of the land area is allocated to the 80 percent, divided among eight "tribal groups." Every African is assigned to one of these groups, and it is with this group, located on a fragmented, isolated, and often desolate bantustan, that each individual is supposed to identify. There are no African South Africans left, only Zulus, or Xhosa, or Tswana, whose country is some "independent homelands" undergoing "separate development."

The ultimate in black dispossession, the bantustan policy is a strategy guaranteed to supply the economy with the one resource that cannot be taken from the blacks: their labor power.

US corporations, with or without the Sullivan principles, are unwilling and unable to abolish the bantustan system. In fact, the principles could be thoroughly discussed without even mentioning the bantustans, which is to say that they could be implemented fully within a system that maintains forever white power and black subjugation.

### Workplace Reform and the Myth of Monitoring

Even at the level of in-plant reform, the principles leave gaping holes. US companies have always avoided close critical inspection of their operations, both in the US and abroad. The independent information gradually assembled on US corporate operations in South Africa has revealed a record of acceptance of apartheid norms, and close and friendly relations with powerful South African institutions.

Now change is promised—but how will such change be monitored? Minority groups in the US know that even with the weight of federal equal opportunity legislation on their side they have often been unable to force company compliance. Workers have never found corporations eager to see the development of strong trade unions.

Why should things be different in South Africa? There custom and the law are on the other side—and indeed new laws such as the Protection of Businesses Act specifically shield businesses by making it illegal to

provide information on corporate operations without consent of the minister of economic affairs.

### An Obstacle to Change

Since the Sullivan principles are basically a public relations effort, it might be argued that although they can't do any fundamental good, they also do no particular harm.

But the principles are not neutral and innocuous, because by justifying a continued US corporate presence in South Africa, they are being used to defeat attempts to end US economic support for apartheid.

The fact is that a continuing flow of foreign capital is vital for the growth, even the survival, of today's South African economy. Giant projects such as the new nuclear power stations aided by Westinghouse, and the gas-from-coal plants involving Fluor and Babcock and Wilcox—both will strengthen the apartheid state's ability to resist change—all need huge infusions of foreign capital and know-how. The Sullivan principles allow the dollars to keep pouring in.

In addition US corporations in South Africa produce a range of products necessary to keep the wheels of an industrialized economy turning. Some corporations, such as General Motors and Ford, give direct strategic assistance to the South African government by supplying trucks and other vehicles to the police and military.

Yet Fluor, GM, and Ford have all signed the Sullivan principles. So, too, has Control Data, whose chairman commented in 1979 that "the little bit of repression that is added by the computer in South Africa is hardly significant" compared with the good the company feels it is doing. Other signatories include Mobil and Caltex, which refine almost half of all oil used in South Africa and continue to sell petroleum to the government and the military.

### Blacks Demand Withdrawal

Only the dismantling of the bantustan system and the destruction of apartheid can meet black needs in South Africa. This is no job for the corporations; they want reforms to improve and preserve the system, not a revolution which will destroy it.

Throughout South Africa black voices have been calling on the foreign corporations to get out, to stop supporting the apartheid state. The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress call for withdrawal.

It is time to recognize the Sullivan principles for what they are: a part of the strategy to enable US corporations to reap high profits while remaining in South Africa. They are an obstacle to black liberation. □



## Slouching Toward Reform— US Corporations Under Apartheid

by Truman Dunn

Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, US corporations operating in South Africa continue to claim that they are doing black South Africans an enormous favor by maintaining their investment in the apartheid regime.


In reality it is clear that even the most progressive reforms imaginable will not alter the power structure of on-going white domination in South Africa, but US corporations have demonstrated that they will not jeopardize profitable partnerships with apartheid by implementing even the most modest of reforms.

For years US corporations took full advantage of South Africa's cheap black labor practices with no accountability at all, but growing public awareness at home has begun to challenge such corporate conduct. The Sullivan principles, now three years old, have provided the corporations with the cosmetic tools needed to change their image rather than their practice. More than 120 corporations have now signed the principles, which supposedly pledge them to institute major workplace reforms.

The South African government's Protection of Businesses Act permits US corporations to hide their most glaring racist labor practices. But even the limited reports examining progress issued in the past five months by three monitoring groups—the independent Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Arthur D. Little, a Boston consulting firm acting on behalf of the Reverend Leon Sullivan, and the US State Department—indicate that US corporations in South Africa have been making very few changes either on or off the factory floor.

Reluctant publicly to pledge reform in the first place, corporations are doing only what is absolutely necessary to stem public pressure. One corporate official told the Investor Responsibility Research Center that his company actually held off signing the

*Truman Dunn works as a research associate for the American Committee on Africa.*



Ford: Black workers on the floor, but few in the front office.

Sullivan principles until it realized that "the principles were being used to pacify the critics in the States." Said another American company official in South Africa, "You have to remember who signed the principles. We didn't sign the principles, the home office did."

**Principle One—Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities.**

Taking down signs indicating segregated facilities is about as far as corporations have gone in de-segregating their plants. The Arthur D. Little report indicates that 73 percent of US corporations claim to have "integrated facilities." But this figure is misleading. In actuality, the report admits only 29 percent of all black laborers in US plants work in integrated circumstances.

Corporations resisting full integration provide a number of excuses for their inaction. Companies told IRRC that fear of white reaction, the eating and hygiene habits of blacks, and tradition make in-

tegration unfeasible. Uniroyal reported that "separate facilities have traditionally been provided and, forced integration will only lead to disaster." Hewlett-Packard and Monsanto claimed they could not integrate because they share buildings with South African companies.

Even when signs have been taken down, color codes or symbols have been used to designate separate facilities. Companies such as GM provide separate facilities for salaried and hourly workers. Nearly all hourly workers are black, and are classified as unskilled or semi-skilled, while salaried workers are mostly white and classified as doing skilled or white-collar work.

**Principle Two—Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.**

**Principle Three—Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.**

US corporations have moved at a "snail-like" pace, according to the *Financial Mail*, in raising black wages and hiring blacks

above the unskilled and semi-skilled level. The US State Department survey of 30 major US corporations found no blacks at the senior management level. Almost all blacks remain at unskilled and semi-skilled hourly positions. For example, GM employs only four blacks in salaried positions out of a workforce of 4,500. IBM has only four black managers out of 1,443 employees.

US firms claim that salaries for blacks have increased by a greater percentage than for whites, but even the smaller increases for whites have been enough to increase the average wage gap between black and white workers from \$250 per month in 1974 to \$280 per month in 1978.

The adequacy of black wages is frequently judged in South Africa by comparison with an absolute poverty line calculated by the University of Port Elizabeth, called the household subsistence level (HSL). Figured according to region in the country, the average HSL in 1978 was approximately 168 rand (\$192) a month for a family of six. The HSL provides for only the barest of essentials and does not include such basic necessities as medical treatment, household items, or education, which is free to whites, but not to blacks.

Realizing the inadequacy of the poverty line as a wage standard, in 1973 the US State Department recommended that all US firms pay a minimum wage 50 percent above the South African HSL, or \$256 for 1978. Nevertheless, IRRC reports that "nearly all, 95 percent of the US companies," responding to its questionnaire, reported paying a minimum wage under \$238, well below the proposed minimum level.

Many companies were not even paying the absolute poverty wage of \$192. The State Department survey noted that nearly 40 percent of the responding companies paid below \$192 a month. Masonite reported to IRRC that it pays its 165 male migrant workers on its forestry plantations \$36 a month and 338 women are paid \$32 a month. The company's managing director unashamedly said, "There has been a big improvement since 1972."

Some corporate representatives don't even see a need to excuse the wage gap. One Firestone representative said that if the company raised African wages too rapidly, blacks would simply work less.

**Principle Four**—Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.

**Principle Five**—Increasing the number of blacks in management and supervisory

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## New \$ for South Africa

The *Financial Mail* reported in a September 1978 article on foreign investment that about ten more US firms had moved into South Africa than had left in the previous year.

Citing a similar pattern among European firms, along with a noticeable improvement in South Africa's ability to borrow funds abroad, the *Financial Mail* offered the theory that "with the economy slowly recovering, perhaps it is the old argument that politics is further [away] on most businessmen's horizons than profits."

Certainly this appears to be true for US companies. While figures on new US investment in South Africa during 1978 are not yet available, projections by the Commerce Department are that there was an increase of \$230 million in capital expenditures during the year.

Commerce has projected a further increase of about \$277 million in 1979, 20 percent above the 1978 figure.

Thus, US firms continue the expansion that has seen the value of direct US investments in South Africa triple in the past decade to about \$2 billion today. This does not include at least \$2 billion in US investments in South African shares or another \$2-3 billion in loans by US banks.

Among those firms which have entered South Africa for the first time in recent months is L & M Radiators of Minnesota, which, according to the *Financial Mail*, has built a \$600,000 plant.

Another is Intermagnetic Corporation, the first American company to invest in Transkei. In cooperation with the Transkei Development Corporation, Intermagnetic established a new company, Intermagnetics Transkei, and built a \$1 million factory to produce magnetic tape and tape cassettes. The factory will make southern Africa self-sufficient in these two products.

Among already established companies that have increased their investment over the past year is Addressograph Multigraph, which according to press reports has invested close to \$600,000 in two new product lines.

### General Motors

In a far larger fund transfer, General Motors increased its investment in 1978 to \$157 million from \$119 million, according to company reports. About \$4.5 million of this was publicly reported by the company

as intended to pay for the construction of integrated facilities and for training, but the company failed to respond to a request for an explanation of the additional amount.

Just recently, GM reported that it had given its South African operation \$24 million to cover continuing losses.

Certainly it is true that GM has been losing money, in part because of the recession and increasing competition, but it is not clear whether in fact all the funds sent last year and this year are being used to make up the loss. One possible reason for suspicion is a report in mid-1978 in the South African press that GM had plans to build a new bus and truck facility. GM, which has told church stockholder groups it has no plans for expansion, denied the report.

### Build Trucks

By far the most important prospective new investment to have been considered in the past few months is that by Eaton Corporation of Cleveland, which currently sells transmissions, axles, and brake components for trucks in South Africa.

*Business Week* reported in May that Eaton was considering the construction of a gear-and-axle plant to complement a diesel engine plant to be built by the government. Eaton officials now say that plans for the plant have been dropped. The diesel plant was to have produced heavy truck engines for customers including the South African defense force, in order to ensure that any possible trade sanctions would not affect South Africa's strategic capabilities. US regulations already forbid sales of items to the South African military or police containing parts made in the US.

The Eaton project was expected to have been built in one of the bantustans, at an undisclosed cost, and almost certainly would have had government assistance.

Government officials concede that the diesel plant probably wouldn't have been able to produce engines competitive with imports, but they say that strategic considerations come first. The engine plant, planned at a cost of \$300 million, had been receiving technical assistance from two firms. One of them is Britain's Perkins Diesel, a subsidiary of Canada's Massey Ferguson, which has a large US shareholder ownership.

over



# BREAKING THE LINKS

## Some Caution

Despite the confidence shown by US firms in making or considering new investments in South Africa, it is clear that US companies are acting cautiously following the events of Soweto and the mid-70's recession. According to a recent report by the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, US subsidiaries sent home nearly two-thirds of their profits in 1976 and 1977, in contrast to earlier years when they reinvested 60 percent or more in South Africa.

Return on investment for 1978 is not yet computed, but if it follows the trend of the past two years, it will reflect a moderate improvement in the South African economy. In 1977, return was 11 percent, substantially down from the best years but on a par with the rest of the world.

In general it seems true that US corporations, along with other "economic experts," are being persuaded that South Africa may not be too bad a risk after all. In 1973 the University of Delaware Business Environment Risk Index rated South Africa among the top ten countries of the world in which to invest. After the Soweto uprising the rating changed and in 1978 South Africa was in 20th place on the list. Now South Africa has improved its position, moving up slightly to 18th place, overtaking France. The position of number one is taken by West Germany, followed by Switzerland, the US and Japan. African countries rate very low on the list, being regarded as high risk areas, with the Ivory Coast rated 30th, Kenya 36th and Nigeria 37th.

To help overcome any remaining fears, the South African government has promised various reforms, and Pretoria has also taken several steps to encourage investment. The most important was the introduction of new exchange control regulations, which favor foreign investors. Previously, companies wishing to put money into South Africa had to buy so-called commercial rands with their own currency at the official general exchange rate—in dollar terms an average of \$1.14 to the rand. For some months new investors have been permitted to buy "financial rands" at a considerable discount, meaning every dollar of investment now goes further.

The government has also decided to increase the amount of capital foreign firms can raise locally.

## Shielding Investors

In a move which appears designed to protect foreign investors from critical examination in their home countries, the South African government also passed the Business

*Continued on page 28*



Black strikers in 1974 . . . protest will still be difficult.

by Michael Shafer

When it was first released on May 1, the Wiehahn Commission report on labor in South Africa raised hopes that reform was finally in the offing. At first glance, its recommendations that black unions be recognized and job reservation be ended seemed almost revolutionary against the backdrop of apartheid. Within 24 hours the government made known its approval in a white paper on the report and announced that new legislation formalizing the commission's recommendations would soon be put before parliament.

The euphoria did not last long, though, as the implications of the report's fine print became clear. By the time the new Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act based upon its recommendations passed parliament recently, even those initially encouraged by the Wiehahn report had completely reversed their evaluations.

*Michael Shafer, a PHD candidate in political science at Harvard, has been working as a research associate this summer at the American Committee on Africa in New York.*

The new legislation does not herald the reform of South Africa's apartheid labor policies, nor even the beginning of such a process. Rather, it marks the start of a new and sophisticated effort to control and, if possible, to break the black trade union movement. Like many other recently announced "reforms," this legislation displays the characteristic features of the "moderate" apartheid policies of the present Botha government: cosmetic de-racialization and concessions to a tiny minority of blacks, combined with substantial tightening of the restrictions on most Africans.

## Wiehahn's Roots

Today's efforts to control the black union movement are but the most recent in a long history of labor repression that began at the turn of the century. In the 1920's the African trade union movement mustered 146,000 members. The depression and a special amendment to the Riotous Assemblies Act, originally aimed at white labor, killed the movement in the early 1930's. But it soon reappeared. By 1945 the Council for Non-European Trade Unions, founded in 1942, had 119 affiliated unions

# BREAKING THE LINKS

with a total membership of 148,000. In 1946 the strongest of these, the African Mine-workers Union, took 74,000 men out on strike. Police broke the strike only by killing nine and wounding 1200 more.

The coming to power of the Nationalist Party brought new forms of repression. Hundreds of union leaders and members have been harassed and imprisoned under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which defined communism as any effort to bring political, economic, or social change, and under the Bantu Labor Act of

African regime that they continue to be carefully controlled.

The immediate impetus for Wiehahn and the new labor legislation lies in the African strikes of 1973 and the Soweto revolt of 1976. In 1973 more than 67,000 black workers participated in 246 strikes across South Africa. Strikers virtually paralyzed the industrial center of Durban by forcing 120 companies to shut down, idling 70,000 workers.

The government responded with minor pay concessions, greatly increased repres-

constitute "civilized" labor.

## Registration a New Weapon

The most often cited "reform" called for by the Wiehahn Commission is the registration, or official recognition, of black unions for the first time in the history of South Africa. What is overlooked is that registration provides the most effective means of controlling unions. The requirements for registration allow recognition of only those unions directly supportive of the government and its defini-



Prof. Wiehahn

1953, which declared all strikes by African workers as criminal offences.

But the union movement had begun to overcome even these measures by 1961. Then, with the Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent banning of all major African political organizations, it too faced new and more severe attacks. Numerous trade unionists suffered banning, imprisonment, and exile, and the unions were once again far reduced in strength.

Yet the 1970's saw another revival of black labor organization. Today the African trade union movement is comprised of some 27 unions with between 50,000 and 70,000 members. Attempts at joint organization have included the recent formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) representing 12 major black unions and 45,000 workers. Organizers for SACTU (the South African Congress of Trade Unions, linked to the African National Congress) also continue to work inside South Africa clandestinely. The unions still represent only a tiny portion of the total black work force of 9.5 million. Their potential for growth, though, makes it essential to the South-

sion, and an effort to fragment the African unions through the implementation of a long-ignored measure calling for the creation of factory-based "works committees" with token negotiating powers. Soweto and the active role played by trade unions in the events of 1976 proved these measures insufficient. Faced with revolt at home and pressure from abroad, the South African government placed the country on a war footing in 1977 and formed a number of study commissions, of which Wiehahn was one, to develop a new strategy for apartheid.

In constituting the Wiehahn Commission in 1977, the government charged it to make recommendations for "the adjustment of the existing system." The commission found many aspects of the South African labor system "exemplary" and proceeded in its task on the assumption that as much as possible of it should be retained or simply "modernized." At no point did Wiehahn challenge or even question what has been, since the beginning of settler rule, the central proposition of South African labor policy: that Africans are not equal citizens and that black workers do not and cannot

## The Wiehahn Commission at a Glance

- The new legislation will provide the means necessary to co-opt the small but increasingly essential skilled portion of the black labor force, while further removing the African majority from political, social, and economic equality.
- The registration of African unions will eliminate from their ranks a substantial majority of their members through an exclusive definition of eligibility denying the status of "employee" to all but a tiny minority of black workers.
- The effective reservation of skilled jobs for whites will continue to exist, although it will be enforced by new and no longer overtly racial means.
- Unions will be stripped of their important political function in the black community and of control of labor-relations training.
- All facets of union operations will be opened to direct government scrutiny.
- The few loop-holes by which international pressure for change in South Africa's apartheid labor policies have been brought to bear will be sealed.
- Two new institutions, the National Manpower Commission and the Industrial Court, will greatly improve government surveillance and control capacities, not the least because both will be largely exempt from statutory regulation.

tion of "the national interest." Unions not found to be "legitimate," "bona-fide," and "relevant" will be effectively eliminated.

Whether a union fills this description will be decided by the industrial registrar in secret and without reference to a fixed and known standard. In the language of the new legislation, a union seeking recognition may initially be registered "provisionally" by the registrar "on such conditions as he may determine." The registrar is also free to amend any of the conditions at will and "at any time and without giving reasons therefore, [to] withdraw the registration of a trade union." Black unions thus may apply for registration, but it may be denied without explanation or granted provisionally under whatever terms, however arbitrary, that the registrar desires. Registration may be rescinded without reason.

The new legislation will emasculate the presently unregistered black unions. By its definition of eligibility, estimates Helen Suzman, opposition member of parliament, fully 80 percent of their members will not qualify and will consequently be



# BREAKING THE LINKS

stripped of their union rights. The *Financial Mail* points out that as a result of Wiehahn, "the Durban black union movement, regarded by many as the backbone of the entire movement, could be put out of business." A registered union caught with ineligible members will be subject to a fine of almost \$600 per worker and may lose its registration, while unregistered unions seeking recognition must purge ineligible members to qualify.

## Excluding Migratory Work

But the cutting edge of the new legislation is its exclusive definition of eligibility for membership in a registered union. Contrary to the Wiehahn Commission, which recommended that in time eligibility be extended to migrant laborers, the new law denies it to all but a small minority of African workers with residency rights in the white areas and with long-term employment. In South African usage, the term "migrant" refers not only to foreign workers, but also to South African blacks from the various bantustans, both those such as Transkei which Pretoria considers "independent" and those such as KwaZulu still administered directly by South Africa. Thus, the vast majority of African workers are denied the status of "employee"—a person eligible for union membership—because either they fail to meet the residency requirement or, even if they do, they do not work at an approved job.

Barred from union membership are African miners, agricultural workers, and domestics, to name just a few, although they constitute 90 percent of the work force in mining, 75 percent in agriculture, and virtually 100 percent in domestic service. These workers are the potential strength of the black union movement and those most in need of unionization. According to the most recent figures available, a full-time agricultural worker receives in cash and kind the equivalent of just \$47 a month, or less than one-third of the amount referred to by the *Financial Mail* as the "scientific measurement of the rock-bottom income an ordinary African family needs to keep body and soul together." Similarly, the 666,000 blacks employed in South Africa's \$7 billion mining industry take home far less in wages than their white counterparts who constitute just 10 percent of the mining work force.

## No Politics Allowed

In order to register, a union will also have to cease all contacts with political or quasi-political organizations as they are defined by the government. This measure will break the close link between the African unions and the black consciousness movement. Unions will be forced to file detailed reports



of membership, revenues, and expenditures, and any other information that the government may desire. The new legislation strips the black unions, both registered and unregistered, of the right to engage in industrial-relations training. The white paper on Wiehahn explains that the government should assume this essential union function in order to apply "corrective training" and "to impart a distinctive character" to labor relations in South Africa.

Both Wiehahn and the new labor legislation have been highly praised for the elimination of laws barring blacks from skilled jobs. This is only partially true and very misleading. In fact, the commission recommended the immediate removal of only those job reservation categories no longer in use. As for the remaining five categories, it suggested that they be "phased out" over an undetermined period "in cooperation with the parties concerned," that is, the white unions at whose insistence job reservation was first instituted. Among the categories still in force is that one which regulates the motor assembly industry and the operation of the American giants, GM and Ford. To defend potentially threatened white workers, the commission also suggested a battery of protective measures including recourse to the minister of labor. The report does not address the Mines and Works Act and the Black Building Workers Act, both of which still contain job reservation clauses and regulate industries employing hundreds of thousands of African workers.

Statutory job reservation covers less than one-half of one percent of the work force and is neither the most common nor the most effective tool used to deny Africans skilled jobs. Today access to these positions depends far more on closed shop contracts with white unions. Citing the possibility of "labor unrest" if these contracts were outlawed, the commission sanctioned their continued use. As a result, overtly racial job discrimination has been removed from the statute books, but not from practice.

## Wiehahn Didn't Blink

The author of a recent Sunday *New York Times* article on South Africa suggested that the government "winked" at the violation of petty apartheid laws by American multinational signatories of the so-called Sullivan principles. The author does not speculate on the government's likely response to calls for more fundamental change, but the commission's report supplies the answer.

Wiehahn's work attempts both to reduce growing international pressures against the regime, such as that brought to bear by the divestiture movement and the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, and to block any effect such pressures might have. To achieve the first end, the commission's report embraces many of the cosmetic changes demanded by Sullivan and the other corporate codes-of-conduct in the hope of strengthening the multinationals' hand at home.

The report recommends, for example, that statutory segregation of work and rest facilities in the work place be ended, although it diminishes the recommendation's impact by suggesting that such integration should be a matter decided by employers and their employees. It is not a fundamental change. As Foreign Minister Pik Botha once argued, "I am not prepared to die for apartheid signs in a lift."

But where foreign actions, whether by governments, companies, or private groups, go further, the commission is adamant. It emphasizes that it "can certainly not be influenced in its deliberations and recommendations" by outside pressure and flatly rejects what it refers to disparagingly as "alien labor practices." The commission's stance exposes the dishonesty of the position taken by American corporations operating in South Africa, many of whose officials testified at its hearings, that their presence is a positive force for change.

## Prospects for the Future

During a recent tour of the United States, Minister of Cooperation and Development Pieter Koornhof told a Palm Springs audience, "If there are any who are still skeptical about our real intentions, they need only to study recent developments in South Africa." Taking Wiehahn in evidence, those intentions seem to be to break the autonomy of the African trade union movement, to create a settled, semi-privileged class of blacks in the urban areas to fill shortages of skilled labor, and in doing so to strip the African majority of its logical leaders. Whether South Africa's "labor reforms" will achieve their end is an open question. African unionists' successes in overcoming past efforts to cripple them suggest that they may not. □



## BREAKING THE LINKS

# Swapping Energy Know-How

**South Africa is working hard to guarantee itself access to new technology being developed by US scientists which may reduce the cost of turning coal into oil. Western technology has helped make apartheid almost self-sufficient in weapons production. The same thing may be happening with energy.**

by David McGloin

With the advent of gas lines in the United States in May, Congress and the administration have launched crash programs to develop synthetic fuels from coal that are dangerous and ill-conceived. They are likely to be costly to the environment, to the taxpayer, and to US political credibility in Africa. The Carter administration is quietly promoting closer collaboration between South Africa and major US corporations that will be a boon for apartheid South Africa's political fortunes.

South Africa, which is oil-poor but coal-rich, has been producing oil from coal since 1955. Production was on a small scale until 1973, when all OPEC members except Iran placed an embargo on oil to South Africa. Since then, South Africa has actively sought to expand alternatives to imported oil. Following the Iran oil cut-off in early 1979, South Africa has been forced to pay up to \$40 per barrel of oil on the world spot market. The oil squeeze and the threat of United Nations sanctions have caused South Africa to look for ways to increase its energy self-sufficiency. One answer is to make oil from coal.

Overall expenditure on SASOL—the state-owned South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation project to transform coal to oil—will reach \$6.7 billion by 1983. SASOL supplies less than 10 percent of South Africa's oil needs today, but by 1983, Pretoria hopes the oil from coal process will satisfy 30-50 percent of its requirements.

On April 25, 1979, the Department of Energy announced that it had obtained State Department clearance to offer to buy the SASOL I data bank from any private corporation that could arrange a deal with the South African parastatal corporation. The Department of Energy was unwilling to buy the data directly because it did not want

*David McGloin, a Princeton undergraduate, researched this article while working as a summer intern for the Washington Office on Africa.*



SASOL II under construction.

to be involved in extensive negotiations with South African authorities. It has also refused to disclose any specifics of its offer, but, in April the *Johannesburg Star* reported that the decision is "likely to earn SASOL millions of rands in license fees for its various processes." The data bank which has been accumulated over the last twenty years of operations, consists of SASOL's collection of data on its fine tuning of the Fisher-Tropsch, coal-to-oil process.

US Department of Energy willingness to deal even indirectly with the South Africans was widely heralded in South Africa and by some business interests in the United States. An April 25 *Rand Daily Mail* article declared, "The United States dramatically brushed aside scruples yesterday and decided to allow American firms to seek vitally needed oil-from-coal technology from South Africa." On April 28, the *Johannesburg Star* ran the headline, "World Wants SASOL Processes."

Pretoria's spokesmen were soon insisting that South African know-how could make a valuable contribution to the West. Said Minister of Finance Owen Horwood, "Many overseas countries were interested in South Africa's SASOL projects and were asking themselves why they had not thought of doing the same thing." A South

African journalist wrote an editorial-page column on the importance of the SASOL project for the US in the *Wall Street Journal* on July 23, and Representative Moorhead of Pittsburgh who had lobbied for the Department of Energy decision claimed that it was "the most encouraging news the American people had had in weeks." Moorhead probably sensed the political bounty of being out front in the rush to save the US consumer the long wait in the gas lines. In addition Moorhead's district borders on large coal reserves and is also the headquarters of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, a corporation whose management has been an active proponent of continued business ties with South Africa.

South Africa and its advocates are naturally delighted with the favorable publicity for SASOL. It helps them build a picture of US dependency on South Africa for resources and even technology—the reverse of the more common (and accurate) view of the US-South Africa relationship.

### Old Technology

The SASOL contribution is not as significant as Moorhead or the South Africans contend. SASOL technology is relatively simple. It was developed in the early 1900's by German scientists. The method, which was developed by Lurgi, a subsidiary of Germany's Metallgesellschaft, is an indirect one which turns coal into gas and then into oil. According to a US Department of Energy 1977 fact sheet, "That coal can be used in this way (to supplement our supplies of oil) is of no doubt. Whether it will be is not so much a question of technology as of economics."

South Africa has made SASOL economically viable by forcing every gasoline service station to carry SASOL products equivalent in value to 10 percent of its overall sales. This means that there is a substantial forced subsidy paid by the consumer or by the gasoline dealer. The gasoline dealer must pay for the 10 percent SASOL products whether they are sold or not.



# BREAKING THE LINKS

Acting US Assistant Secretary of Energy, Dr. John Deutsch, recently told a House subcommittee hearing on economic stabilization, "I would not characterize it [South African technology] as being more advanced than ours. What I would characterize is that, because it is in operation, it has the benefit of practical experience." Deutsch added that "Knowledge of this practical experience could save the U.S. three to five years in the development of coal-to-oil plants if the decision were made to use the South African's Fisher-Tropsch technology." A spokesman for the Fluor Corporation, the US company which holds the contract for the construction of the SASOL projects, estimated that any synthetic fuel development in the US would take about seven years to reach an effective operational level. Thus, Deutsch is not talking about immediate relief. The time saving to which he refers seems at most to be the difference between ten and seven years.

## Pretoria's Benefit

On the other hand, South Africa could benefit considerably from American and European development of more sophisticated technologies for coal-to-oil conversion and from close and friendly relationships with the corporations and agencies involved in the process. The US Department of Energy is already funding several smaller demonstration plants using more advanced technologies. On July 15, 1979, the *New York Times* reported, "There is only one commercial scale indirect liquification plant in the world, South Africa's SASOL I, which has been operating since 1960, but the economics of the process are in question. By far, the preferred technique is direct liquification at this point. Two direct liquification pilot plants are in operation in the United States."

A recent Engineering Societies Commission on Energy report on the costs of synthetic fuels further supports the contention that several processes exist that are more economical than the South African process. Because the various processes turn out different products—gasoline, natural gas, boiler fuels, and others—the engineering study estimated how much it would cost to produce 1 million BTUs of energy by each process: \$3.62 by the Gulf process, \$3.96 using Exxon's procedure, \$4.84 through Mobil's M-gasoline, and \$4.99 by the Fisher-Tropsch process used in South Africa.

South Africa does not have the research and design capacity of the United States. It is spending roughly \$6.7 billion to develop its coal-to-oil facilities and that amount has severely taxed available capital. In contrast,

## Oil Facts

South African oil consumption, 1978; 247,000 barrels a day.

SASOL I, completed 1955, output: 18,000 barrels a day.

SASOL II, projected 1980 output: 60,000-66,000 barrels a day.

Estimated cost: \$2.85 billion.

SASOL II expansion, projected 1982 output: 60,000-66,000 barrels a day.

Estimated cost: \$3.8 billion.

Estimated production cost per barrel: \$16-\$20.

## Fluor and its Workers

SASOL II and SASOL II Extension will employ about 20,000 on-site workers at the height of construction, approximately 7,500 of whom are expected to remain when the plants are in full operation.

There has been a shortage of trained skilled labor at the remote and unattractive site, but black workers, having few job choices, have been attracted by promises of decent wages and training.

Fluor has, however, proven itself less than a model employer. While some training of Africans is going on—in large part because of a shortage of skilled whites—the numbers do not appear substantial. Of the 4,500 African workers hired for the first part of the project, SASOL II, 3,200 will mine coal—one of the lowest paid and most exploited positions for blacks in South Africa.

Fluor has committed itself publicly to paying equal wages for equal work through its endorsement of the Sullivan principles. However, according to the Johannesburg *Sunday Times*, African welders at the SASOL plant were up in arms early in 1979. After being promised \$3.45 an hour plus a daily bonus, they were being paid only \$2.20 an hour and no bonus. White workers were getting \$4.00 an hour plus bonus for the same work. When the black workers took their complaints to Fluor, they were told that the matter would be looked into. Four months later, nothing had changed.

When the issue was raised at the Fluor annual meeting in 1979, William McKay, president of Fluor Constructors International, said, "The blacks are not getting equal pay to the whites. This is not saying they do not get equal pay for equal work. You cannot produce a journeyman worker overnight." He added, "We do not have too much control over the actual wages paid, because they are controlled by forces beyond our control." □

projected US spending on similar projects in the future makes this figure seem marginal. Since 1975, the US Department of Energy has spent almost \$3 billion on research projects for synthetic fuels. New estimates, after the recent gas shortages put the cost of synthetic fuel development for the United States at up to \$100 billion.

Some US interests are pushing hard for quick use of the South African process. One Fluor executive says that any major development of synthetic fuels in the short-term must rely on SASOL technology. But reliance on a rapid development of SASOL-type plants here raises several questions. The Rand Corporation recently released a report which states, "If we go too fast one way, we forego the opportunity to develop other technologies later." The study also concludes that all synthetic fuel programs are likely to be far more expensive than currently estimated.

Environmental action groups are alarmed at the crash moves to develop synthetic fuels. In a July report to the Council on Environmental Quality, a group of scientists warned that if the trend toward burning fossil fuels continues, "climatic zones will shift and agriculture will be displaced. It would threaten the stability of food supplies and would provide a further set of intractable problems to organized societies."

## Helping South Africa—Fluor

When considering the dependency issue, it is worth emphasizing that US and European corporations have already made money and technology available to South Africa's energy program that could not have come from internal sources. As much as 60 percent of the funding for SASOL II may have come from Western sources, and Fluor, the primary US contractor for the construction of SASOL I, SASOL II, and the proposed extensions to SASOL II, has access to the sort of worldwide market connections and engineering technology that is not available to South African firms. Fluor is one of the largest engineering and construction firms in the world, with revenues of \$2.9 billion and earnings of \$78.4 million in 1978. Fluor has more experience than any



## BREAKING THE LINKS

other company in the building of coal-to-oil plants, in the US and abroad.

Fluor has already made a major contribution to the South African energy self-sufficiency program.

It helped build the original SASOL I pilot plant and has a \$4.2 billion contract as the major contractor for SASOL II and the recently announced SASOL II extension.

Its South African contract accounts for a significant fraction of its overall business. So it is not surprising that the corporation has tried to use its political muscle in the US on South Africa's behalf.

In 1976, Fluor mobilized conservative senators to pressure President Ford to lift Export-Import Bank restrictions on direct loans to South Africa in order to put together a \$450 million Ex-Im credit package that in one transaction would have more than tripled the Ex-Im Bank's exposure to South Africa. When Ford turned down the request, Fluor went to Japanese and European export credit banks for help.

Fluor now plans to manage a larger share of the building of the SASOL II extension than it did for SASOL II. Its contract has been revised to include "management and coordination of the total project, including a major portion of the engineering, design, procurement, construction, and a multitude of other supportive functions." Its earlier contract for SASOL II had included only responsibility for "engineering and construction work."

Several other US corporations such as Babcock and Wilcox, the three-mile Island engineers, Badger Corporation (a subsidiary of Raytheon), Chicago Bridge, Honeywell, and Goodyear have also supplied equipment or construction skills for the SASOL project.


### Mutual Admiration—Friendly Collaboration

South Africa has been lucky with the timing of SASOL. The current international gas crisis has enabled it to derive a double advantage from the project. Not only will it move towards its long-term goal of expanding oil self-sufficiency, but it has also seized the chance to manipulate its superiority in a small part of the synthetic fuel industry to promote its image as a worthy co-worker in the development of synthetic energy and to win powerful friends.

Since 1974, South Africa has participated in the annual meeting of the International Committee on Coal Research, a group which includes countries such as the US, West Germany, and Brazil. In 1975 it played host to a conference of the organization. An executive of the American Natural Resources Corporation, a consortium of US energy producers working on coal gasification, stressed his corporation's appreci-

*Continued on page 28*

# Bank Campaign; Planning for the Eighties



New York, 1978

LNS/Sierakowski

by Bill Hartung

The Campaign to Oppose Banks Loans to South Africa (COBLSA) gained new impetus in late July as representatives of 12 local committees from the United States, Canada, and England met in Minneapolis to discuss their organizing experiences and to plan a coordinated strategy for the next nine months. Activists from California, Oregon, Seattle, Minnesota, Chicago, Rochester (New York), New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Toronto, Montreal, and England attended, along with representatives of the American Committee on Africa and Clergy and Laity Concerned, the two sponsoring organizations for the campaign in North America. Reports of recent organizing efforts by local committees served as a basis for discussion of how to strengthen the campaign and broaden its base of support.

### New Victories

"More than \$127 million has been

*Bill Hartung is an active member of COBLSA in New York.*

withdrawn from banks lending to South Africa," reported Dumisani Kumalo, campaign coordinator and exiled black South African journalist, in his summary of the campaign's achievements to date. Important new victories for the campaign in Oregon, Montreal, and California were described in detail by local organizers.

In Oregon, the state's largest bank, US National Bank of Oregon, pledged to make no further loans of any kind to or in South Africa and to sell its stock in the Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO), a consortium of banks and corporations that has financed trade with South Africa. "This action by the bank is clearly a response to pressure mobilized by the campaign, and it is the first time that a member bank has ever decided to withdraw from PEFCO," stated activist Marion Malcolm at the conference.

The Oregon campaign won its victory in a surprisingly short time. The first major public action came in early April of this year, when 18 organizations and 100 individuals withdrew accounts worth more than \$300,000 in protest of the bank's involvement in lending to South Africa. By mid-June the campaign had won its demands.

Marion Malcolm noted several key factors leading to the victory. She said that because new, competing banks are opening in Oregon, the bank was even more concerned with the effect of the campaign on its public relations than it was with actual losses due to withdrawals. A second factor was the marginal importance of the bank's involvement in lending to South Africa relative to its total business. Also important was the careful homework which had armed campaign representatives with extensive information about the bank's operations and about the various ways in which credit could be extended to South Africa and to corporations involved there. This helped to impress the bank with the seriousness of the campaign demands.

Finally and most importantly, the bank felt threatened by the campaign's growing links with labor unions. Like most banks in the United States, US National Bank of Oregon is not unionized, but in addition Oregon activists had publicized the bank's



# BREAKING THE LINKS

use of non-union contractors in the construction of one branch and the renovation of another. US National Bank of Oregon's statement on halting lending to South Africa and on withdrawing from PEFSCO came shortly before a meeting of the Lane County Labor Council in which bank campaign activists had the votes to win pledges of union withdrawals from the bank.

Pat Bolland of the Dawson College anti-apartheid bank campaign in Montreal described how his group had pressured the college into withdrawing a \$25 million per year account from Bank of Montreal. This is the largest withdrawal so far in the Canadian bank campaign. Unlike many other campus-based campaigns, which have been initiated by students, members of the Dawson teachers union took a leading role in this campaign.

As in Oregon, the campaign at Dawson maintained strong momentum from the start. From its inception in early November 1978 with a "Canada-Southern Africa Week" held on five Dawson campuses with speakers, films, slide shows, classroom presentations, and visual displays, the campaign gained support rapidly. By mid-November the Dawson teacher's union had passed a resolution transferring its own funds out of the Bank of Montreal and calling on the college to do the same. By November 17, 2000 students and workers at the college had signed a petition asking that Dawson's funds be removed from the Bank of Montreal because of its lending to South Africa.

At a college Board of Governors meeting on the same date (to which the Bank of Montreal refused to send a representative) a motion supporting the petition demand was passed ten to zero with one abstention.

From that point on much of the campaign involved monitoring the actions of the college's finance committee to implement the motion. The search for a new bank revealed the intense competition for institutional accounts among banks in Quebec province, as well as details of financial dealings with South Africa by two banks that had not been previously implicated. A decision was made to move the college's account to Banque Provinciale du Canada, which had no financial dealings with South Africa in five years, on the condition that the bank inform Dawson College of any loans to South Africa it makes in the future.

The bank agreed to these terms, understanding that any future loans it might make to South Africa would be met with action for withdrawal by the Dawson bank campaign. The move, completed in May 1979, also saved the college \$8000 a year in service charges, undercutting the argument that action against corporate sup-

**Bank Loans to South Africa, 1972-1978**, a study released this May by the UN Centre Against Apartheid, documents \$5.5 billion of bank loans to South Africa and corporations operating there. US institutions accounted for \$2.8 billion of this total. In all, 382 banks from 22 countries were found to be involved in such lending.

US banks heavily involved in lending to South Africa include Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover, and Bank of America. Beate Klein, director of the project, pointed out that because of difficulties in documenting loans to South Africa, these figures are conservative estimates of the actual credit flow from Western banks to South Africa.

port for apartheid is "too costly." Commenting on factors involved in the campaign's success, Pat Bolland said that the college had been concerned about its image in the community. Also, unlike many colleges, Dawson's board of governors is not composed of corporate directors with direct interests in investments in South Africa. The Dawson committee plans to mobilize at other community colleges, at health centers, and among non-governmental organizations in the fall.

## California Successes

Stop Banking on Apartheid (SBOA), the California chapter of the campaign, also reported several recent successes. The passage of the Berkeley Responsible Investment Ordinance in April marked the first time that a city had been required by law to divest its funds from banks lending to South Africa, and the action is serving as a model for other cities. Similar initiatives are likely to come to a vote in 12 California cities on their next ballot. Another important step was taken when the California Nurses Association committed itself in June to withdrawing its \$10 million dollar retirement account from Wells Fargo Bank because of its loans to South Africa.

The California actions offer an example of a sustained, creative campaign which has continued to reach new people while operating in the home territory of Bank of America, the largest bank in the United States. SBOA has sought to serve as a resource center for the broader movement for social change in the US. It has not asked other groups to join it as a coalition but rather hopes to call on other groups for specific support at specific times. SBOA distributes alternative investment packets with positive suggestions for organizations seeking to divest their funds from banks or corporations involved in South Africa, and "special interest" leaflets showing the con-

nections between US corporate support for apartheid and the nuclear industry, the attempts to reinstitute the draft, and other issues.

In its function as a resource center, SBOA has helped women employees of that Bank of America contact union organizers, and it has assisted a community health center, Clinica de la Raza, in setting up a credit union. In turn, groups that have been helped in this way will often support the campaign on a day of leafletting or withdrawals. In SBOA's view the key to its continuing growth lies in understanding that the demand for an end to US bank loans to South Africa can arise in a way that complements other domestic and international struggles and respects the priorities that particular organizations and communities have set for themselves.

## Uniting Demands

Many local campaign representatives stressed the importance of uniting with other groups opposed to discriminatory or oppressive bank practices. Representatives from Washington, DC, Seattle, and California noted the strength their campaigns had gained by joining with local chapters of Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH) to demand an end to loans to South Africa and Chile. Many of the same US banks that have participated in lending more than 3 billion dollars to South Africa in recent years have also greatly increased their loans to the Chilean junta. In 1978, private bank lending to Chile reached \$927 million. The D.C. bank campaign has also expressed its solidarity with the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua by exposing a \$2 million loan by Riggs Bank to the regime of deposed dictator Anastasio Somoza and by organizing a picket against the bank in conjunction with Nicaragua support groups.

The demand for an end to redlining, the bank practice of denying home mortgage and home improvement loans to specific neighborhoods (often on a racially discriminatory basis) has been an important issue in many local campaigns. Carolyn Long, of the D.C. bank campaign said that information on Riggs Bank's redlining practices had often commanded the most immediate reaction from bank customers. The Minneapolis committee has been working closely with local anti-redlining groups, and the New York committee, having exposed the redlining practices of five New York-based commercial banks, which are also lenders to South Africa, has adopted the demand, "Redline South Africa, Not New York." Until recently anti-redlining activity had focused exclusively on the activities of savings banks. COBLSA has shown that commercial banks are also involved. As the campaign progresses more



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people are realizing that the same banks that drain much needed funds from communities in the US also supply funds in abundance to help maintain some of the most repressive regimes in the world.

## Labor Ties

All the local bank campaign committees aim to build ties with the labor movement, but the campaign against Seattle First National Bank (SeaFirst) has achieved the most direct cooperation to date. The United Food and Commercial Workers recently formed in a merger of the Retail Clerks International Union and the Amalgamated Meatcutters, has initiated a withdrawal campaign against SeaFirst because of its refusal to bargain with them as the legitimate representative of the bank's 4800 clerical employees. SeaFirst had previously had a company union, but in 1978 union members voted to affiliate with the Retail Clerks, partially as a response to attempts by the bank to break the union.

The significance of the campaign from the point of view of the banking community was stressed by Patrick M. Fahey, SeaFirst vice president for "public responsibility," who told *Business Week*, "Banking is a

vast, untapped group of unorganized workers." Needless to say, Mr. Fahey and his colleagues would like to keep it that way.

The union has drawn support from the local American Friends Service Committee chapter, NICH, and groups concerned with funding for conversion from military to civilian production. These groups have raised demands for an end to SeaFirst lending to South Africa and Chile along with the union's demands, and weekly pickets outside SeaFirst have helped inform customers about bank policies.

Mike Young, head of the United Food and Commercial Worker's campaign against SeaFirst, has been very receptive to the linking of the union issue with the broader question of how the bank uses its funds. In addition to helping to pass a resolution in the Seattle council of churches calling on its members to withdraw their funds from banks that lend to South Africa, he spoke with Oregon trade unionists on the issue at the invitation of local activists. The latest move against SeaFirst was a vote in mid-July by the local AFL-CIO executive council urging all its members and all SeaFirst customers to

withdraw their accounts from the bank.

## Coordinated Actions Planned

Several important decisions were made at the Minneapolis meeting. Campaign members agreed to maintain the current demand for no more credit of any kind to South Africa until genuine majority rule has been achieved. It was agreed that the campaign should place a high priority on supporting bank workers' struggles. It was resolved that wherever possible groups should work with Chile solidarity organizations on a local basis to raise common demands against bank loans to Chile and South Africa. A commitment was made to expand outreach among trade unions, black organizations, students, religious organizations, and anti-redlining and other community groups.

To help spread more widely the bank campaign's message, plans were made for two national weeks of coordinated action, November 11-16, and March 16-21. In February, black history month, local bank campaign groups will sponsor educational and cultural activities, and Dumisani Kumalo, coordinator of the national campaign, will make a speaking tour. □

## More History to Make

**The US student anti-apartheid movement is broadening its base and taking on new issues, as it plans for the future.**

Today's participants in the student anti-apartheid movement are likely to identify the Soweto uprising of June 16, 1976, and the brutal murder of Steve Biko in 1977 as catalysts for the eruption of student anger over US corporate support for the apartheid regime. But student opposition to apartheid, and support for the liberation struggle has roots that reach through at least 25 years of history, a fact that can help put in perspective any temporary slowing down of the movement's growth.

Arthur Waskow writing in the Fall 1978 issue of *Politics and Education* recalls that "SDS's [Students for a Democratic Society] first official act of civil disobedience" was a demonstration held to protest the renewal of loans made to the government of South Africa by US banks. On March 19, 1965, two days before the fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, 600 demonstrators staged a sit-in at the lower Manhattan headquarters of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a prime mover in loan arrangements to South Africa. Many were arrested.

But the escalation of the Vietnam war absorbed much of the energy and attention of SDS and other student activists, so that the demand for an immediate anti-apartheid campaign was muted. Yet a chronology compiled by *Politics and Education* demonstrates that there have usually been some student activists in the last twenty years prepared to protest US support for apartheid and colonial regimes in southern Africa. Black students have often played a leading role in mobilizing opposition to South Africa's system of racism.

Entitled *Fragments of a Forgotten History*, the chronology refers to a variety of actions including:

- December 25, 1965—30 members of the NAACP and the Brooklyn College DuBois Club picketed the residence of Arthur Goldberg, the US Ambassador to the UN, to protest US support for South Africa.

- March 21, 1966—five leaders of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee were arrested for sitting-in at the

South African consulate in New York.

- April 20, 1966—300 students from Columbia, Barnard College, Jewish Theological Seminary and Union Theological Seminary demonstrated against First National City Bank's involvement in South Africa. Depositors were urged to withdraw their accounts in protest against the bank's loan to the South African government.

- April 19, 1968—200 students at Princeton demanded that the university sell its \$100 million worth of stocks in corporations operating in South Africa.

- May 17, 1968—300 students at the University of Wisconsin at Madison took over an administration building and demanded that the university withdraw its holdings in Chase Manhattan Bank.

- December 13, 1968—50 law students at Harvard demonstrated against campus recruitment by Milbank, Tweed, Hadley, and McCoy, the law firm which represents Chase Manhattan Bank.

- March 9, 1969—Cornell SDS and the



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Afro-American Society claimed "clear victory" when it was reported that stocks in five banks which made loans to South Africa had been sold earlier in the year.

• March 10, 1969—Cornell officials asked recruiters from the Chase Manhattan Bank to leave, following a protest by 250 students.

• March 11, 1969—75 Princeton students sat in at an administration building to protest Princeton investments in corporations operating in South Africa.

• March 15, 1972—300 black students from Southern University in Baton Rouge demonstrated at the terminal in Burnside, Louisiana, against the importation of 25,000 tons of Rhodesian chrome.

• April 18, 1972—As part of a national student strike against the war in Vietnam, 2,000 Barnard and Columbia students voted to strike against university complicity with the war and the sale of stocks in companies operating in South Africa, and the dismissal of trustees holding stocks in those companies.

• April 20, 1972—Two dozen black students took over a Harvard administration building for a week in opposition to the university's decision not to sell \$18 million of Gulf Oil stock. The building occupiers and 500 supporters outside said that Gulf was financing the Portuguese military effort in Angola.

• May 27, 1972—the first African Liberation Day demonstration brought a crowd estimated from 10,000 to 50,000, including many student activists, to the South African embassy and the Washington Monument.

### Strategy Meeting

The failure of current student activists to draw on the legacy of anti-apartheid struggle that they have inherited was one of a host of questions discussed on July 28 at an evaluation-strategy meeting held in New York. The meeting was sponsored by a student organization, the South Africa Catalyst Project, the American Committee on Africa, and the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies.

The July strategy meeting included representatives from some 35 Midwest and Northeast campuses, and from concerned organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa, the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, Concerned Citizens Committee on Southern Africa, Corporate Data Exchange, the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, the Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa, the Washington Office on Africa, and *Southern Africa*.

It was generally agreed that the student divestment movement has made substantial contributions to a heightened awareness about apartheid and the US economic support for that system—both on and off campus. The subsequent media coverage has helped to force South Africa-related issues into the national political arena. The victories achieved at some universities where the authorities finally agreed to sell all stock in corporations doing business in South Africa have demonstrated that direct and even militant political action is a legitimate and often necessary way to confront political problems.

The struggle for divestment has also forced many people to look more critically at the nature of education in the United States. By noting the composition of boards of trustees, and the numerous functions that universities play in corporate society, the idea of university neutrality and of an "objective" liberal arts education has been challenged.

A publication entitled *Anti-Apartheid Organizing: On Campus and Beyond* by the South Africa Catalyst Project describes the current state of the movement. "While local demands and forms of protest have varied, the divestment movement has grown rapidly to include anti-apartheid groups at some 150 schools of all sizes and shades. From small liberal arts colleges, such as Grinnell and Oberlin, to large public universities, such as the University of Michigan and Indiana State, to state and community colleges such as California State Dominquez and Philadelphia Community College, the issue of university investments, U.S. corporations and South Africa has become a major one for student organizing.

"The rapid expansion of actions indicates a movement not of naive idealism, but of collectively demonstrated strength, commitment and purpose."

A list of universities adopting some form of divestment compiled by ACOA's Terri Ann Lowenthal attests to the strength of the movement. Among schools that have voted for full divestment from banks and corporations doing business with South Africa are: Antioch College, divested of holdings amounting to something in the six-figure range in May of 1978; Hampshire College, for the second time selling holdings worth \$200,000 in March 1979; University of Massachusetts (Amherst), divested holdings worth \$620,000 in October, 1977; Michigan State University at East Lansing sold stock valued at \$9 million in December, 1978; Ohio University disposed of \$38,000 worth of stock in January 1978; the University of Oregon sold stock valued at approximately \$6 million in November 1977; and the University of Wisconsin



Princeton demonstration last year.

divested holdings valued at approximately \$10 million in February 1978.

Universities and colleges which have agreed to partial divestment include the following institutions: Amherst College sold \$1 million worth of stock in Blue Bell Incorporated in March 1978; Boston University divested approximately \$5 million worth of non-voting shares in ten corporations in April, 1979; Brandeis voted for selected partial divestment based on a case-by-case review; Columbia divested \$2.7 million worth of stock in three bank corporations following a report by a trustee committee in February 1978; Harvard sold Citicorp and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company stock worth \$600,000; University of Michigan voted to divest from Black and Decker stock because of the firm's refusal to sign the Sullivan Principles; Smith College sold \$687,728 worth of stock in Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in November 1977; Tufts sold \$300,000 worth of stock in Citicorp and Manufacturers

# BREAKING THE LINKS

WE MADE  
NAPALM FOR  
VIETNAM.



BUT WE  
WERE KICKED  
OFF CAMPUS.




THEN DOW STEPPED  
UP BUSINESS IN  
SOUTH AFRICA.



BUT NOW  
UNIVERSITIES ARE  
DIVESTING DOW  
STOCK.



I'M FURIOUS!



Hanover Trust Company in early 1978; Vassar College sold \$2.5 million in stocks and bonds in five banks making loans to South Africa; and Yale, which sold \$1.6 million worth of holdings in Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in April 1979, because of the bank's policy of lending to South Africa.

## A Current Impasse?

Despite the readily apparent successes of the movement, many activists at the July meeting were concerned that the movement seems to have reached an impasse. They cited the difficulty experienced in trying to expand the movement and inspire the activism of past years. Some attributed this impasse to the changing political climate in both South Africa and in the US. Others thought that the focus on divestment might have been a mistake.

Most participants felt that divestment had proved an effective focus for organizing students. Through raising the issue of university investments, activists were able both to educate students on the economic support for apartheid that US corporations provide and to expose university complicity in such support. Yet it was conceded that although divestment was an excellent basis upon which to initiate a movement, it was an extremely difficult struggle to win. This complexity often resulted in frustration, demoralization, and diminishing activism among students.

Critics of divestment suggested that perhaps the movement may have narrowed its goals too much and that this inhibited the development of alternative methods of struggle. They cited the many options, available to the university administrations, which sidetrack the struggle and involve students in unending debates over such questions as administration-sponsored investment advisory committees, shareholder resolutions, the Sullivan principles, and reinvestment.

Even after university trustees have agreed to divestment, the battle is not over. For example, in Oregon the state attorney general

has challenged the power of the board of education to authorize divestment.

Another problem discussed was the movement's relationship to black and third world students. Many activists agreed that the objective conditions of a racist society influence the outlook of members raised in a white supremacist culture and that this cannot simply be ignored. The way that many anti-apartheid groups have operated tends to reinforce racial conflicts within the groups, and the negative legacy of racism remains undiscussed.

A Princeton student offered some suggestions. "First and foremost, it is important for white students to respect the cultural and political autonomy of the black student community. It is best, therefore, for each community to organize its own constituency at least at first. Racial and cultural tensions will inevitably arise. These should be acknowledged and dealt with openly and honestly, in an attempt to build a working relationship based on mutual respect and common purpose. A successful South Africa solidarity movement on a majority-white campus must be multi-racial."

This kind of analysis can only strengthen the anti-apartheid movement.

Despite the intensive discussion of some of the movement's problems, most conference participants believed that the problems were far outweighed by successes. The movement has clearly demonstrated that student activism is alive and well. There is now a new upsurge of campus activity focusing on nuclear power, the draft, and affirmative action programs, all issues that anti-apartheid activists felt could easily be linked in common struggle. They pledged to restructure activities so as not to focus solely on South Africa, but to raise the question of the transfer of nuclear technology between the US and South Africa, to identify southern Africa as a potential scene of US military intervention, and to stress the connection between US support for apartheid and domestic racism at home.

Student activists also recognized that too much of their anti-apartheid organizing has been conducted through a purely political, pseudo-academic, medium. The remarks of Mtshana Ncube, the US and Canadian representative of ZAPU, at the successful Amandla Festival of Unity in Boston impressed many people. "Today you are singing about our struggle," he told the 14,000 in attendance. "But you are simultaneously raising material support for our people who are victims of colonialism, fascism, and racism. In the process you are educating many on the condition of the oppressed throughout the world. Art, and therefore culture, is a direct instrument for liberation."

Looking toward the future, many activists also felt that the political situation in southern Africa demanded that more time and energy be spent on Zimbabwe. A joint speaking tour of representatives from the Patriotic Front was proposed with ACOA taking responsibility for the arrangements.

Chris Gray, writing in the fall 1978 issue of *Politics and Education* provides a valuable summary of the student anti-apartheid movement. "Overall, it is unlikely that the protesting will be enough to force a massive corporate withdrawal from South Africa or the imposition of U.S. sanctions, but the growing anti-apartheid movement will probably provoke a national debate on the whole issue of U.S. complicity in apartheid. It will bring increasing pressure on both multi-national corporations and the U.S. government.

"In struggling over this issue countless individual lives will be changed as people recognize the web connecting apartheid, freedom, justice, and protest with the less abstract realities of IBM computers, Ford police vans, university investment committees and jails. Behind all the numbers, behind all the demonstrations and movements, are real people confronting deeply serious questions."

The students involved in the anti-apartheid movement have a legacy to be proud of and more history to make. M.B. □

## New Dollars

*continued from page 18*

Protection Act in 1978. This prohibits "the furnishing of information relating to businesses in compliance with foreign orders, directions or letters of request."

Several US companies immediately began citing the law as a reason not to reveal information about their subsidiaries' activities to critics of their investments in South Africa.

However, asked specifically about the law, the government said it wouldn't interfere with companies' submission to their home offices of reports on their progress as measured against standards such as the Sullivan code.

The Investor Responsibility Research Center says further that a South African law firm, asked to give an opinion on the meaning of the law, consulted with the government and reported that it "is not intended to prohibit or restrict the normal business information passing between a South African business and a foreign parent or affiliate." In a key addition it noted that the law does offer "the machinery to refuse the information if it does not wish to do so." **K.R. □**

## Corporate Reform

*continued from page 17*

**positions.**

Because of a shortage of skilled white labor, both South African companies and foreign firms, including US companies, have been forced to begin training blacks for middle level positions, so that it is not surprising that some US firms can point to slight increases in the number of blacks being trained for clerical and technical jobs, but always at the lower end of the ladder.

The number of blacks training for white-collar jobs continues to be meager. As of December 31, 1978 Ford had four blacks in a commercial program for administrative and clerical positions and three blacks in a management intern program. Caterpillar had four blacks receiving managerial training. IBM had 14 blacks training for what it considered professional positions.

US firms in South Africa employ almost no blacks in salaried management positions. The first Arthur D. Little report indicated that only 7 percent of US firms had Africans at management level with only 10 percent having courses for management trainees. According to IRRC, a number of companies such as Bendix, Nabisco, Parker Pen, Phillips Petroleum, Phelps Dodge, and Uniroyal have no blacks in salaried positions. Corporate excuses for having few salaried blacks include that offered by a

Uniroyal executive who said, "traditionally the non-white has received weekly wage payments and this has resulted in his developing a weekly wage budget concept."

**Principle Six—Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment, such as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.**

The proposed attempts to improve the quality of life outside the workplace do not deal with the primary and confrontational issue of black citizenship. They focus on reforms designed only as a means of pacifying black unrest. The business community was not at all concerned with housing conditions for blacks until the 1976 black uprisings in the vast ghetto of Soweto. After the uprising three South African white millionaires, led by Harry Oppenheimer of the South African conglomerate Anglo-American, formed the Urban Foundation to provide loans for blacks to build homes. The Urban Foundation has won considerable US corporate and bank support including loans from Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of America, and Morgan Guaranty, and grants from Ford, Mobil, and Otis Elevator.

While US corporations boast of so-called improvements in black housing the laws of apartheid remain unchanged. In order to qualify for any home-loan, blacks must have legal urban residency. Becoming a legal urban resident for an African is like running a mined obstacle-race. Ten years continuous employment with the same employer may permit qualification—but if you are a man your wife may not qualify and vice versa. Only a privileged few can be fairly sure that they are entitled to live permanently in a town. Even those few can never own their homes. The government only allows a 99 year lease, which can be broken by the authorities for a variety of reasons at any time.

Leon Sullivan claims his principles make US companies a force for change in South Africa. In fact the evidence indicates that those companies have a very poor record regarding racial discrimination and reform, a record that is frequently worse than that of South African companies.

IRRC found several managers of US companies in South Africa who agreed with William Degenring of American Cyanamid that "a lot of South African companies are a hell of a lot better than US companies." At best, US companies only stay abreast of South African companies doing just what is necessary to maintain stability in South Africa and at home. In black eyes all foreign companies simply help maintain apartheid, a system which ought to be destroyed, not "improved" by marginal reforms. **□**

## Swapping Know-How

*Continued from page 23*

ation of South African willingness to test US coal in SASOL facilities. This is something South Africa has done for numerous coal companies which are considering coal-to-gas or coal-to-oil transformation projects.

There are other established links between the South Africans and multinational corporations now working on coal-to-oil conversion. Since the early seventies, South Africa has exported coal to the Southern Company, a utility company with operations in the deep South. Southern Company claims that it uses South African coal because of its very low sulphur content. The United Mine Workers of America claim that the real reason is the cheapness of African labor. The UMW says that Southern Company could get low sulphur coal in this country but does not want to pay union wages.

The average weekly wage for US coal miners is \$425.77. Average South African coal miners, mostly black, earn about \$40 for a longer week, and are not allowed to organize a union. Pit-head prices reflect these differences; the price at the pit-head for US coal is almost \$20 a ton; in South Africa it is between \$5 and \$10 a ton.

Southern Company is currently building a direct liquification demonstration plant in Wilsonville, Alabama, and South African experts will no doubt be sympathetically treated when they enquire about the technology being developed.

Indeed corporate executives in coal and coal engineering displayed little reluctance to talk about their dealings with South Africa when I interviewed them recently. A National Coal Association executive who recently visited the SASOL plant in South Africa told me he was enthralled by the country. He had liked it so much that he was tempted to stay.

Commenting on the Ex-Im Bank restrictions that the US government has placed on loans to the South African government, a Fluor vice president said, "They [Japan, France, England etc.] have to export or die. We sit behind people like Andrew Young and plan to change other people by exporting our moral values."

South Africa is working hard to guarantee itself access to any advances Western scientists may make in improving the viability of the coal-to-oil transformation. It may be appropriate to recall that by the time the United Nations got around to imposing a mandatory military embargo on South Africa, Western arms technology had helped make South Africa self-sufficient in arms production. The same thing may happen with energy. **□**

# Resources on Southern Africa

*Any attempt to squeeze all of the currently available resources on southern Africa into one page is bound to fail. Thus, this list is meant as a beginning and is in no way intended to be thought of as complete.*

## Organizations involved primarily with supporting African Liberation

### American Committee on Africa/Africa Fund

198 Broadway  
New York, NY. 10038  
(212) 962-1210

The Africa Fund distributes literature on southern Africa, serves as a source of speakers, films, and information on African liberation struggles. Currently in preparation are five new pamphlets on topics such as the Wiehahn Commission, the Sullivan principles, and Fluor Corporation. Write for a publications list.

### Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA)

Dumisani Kumalo  
198 Broadway  
New York, NY 10038  
(212) 962-1210

This is the national body responsible for coordinating the activities of the local bank loan committees (see related article this issue). COBLSA publishes a quarterly newsletter which is available on request.

### Institute for Policy Studies - Africa Project

1901 Q Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC. 20009  
(202) 234-9382

The Africa Project specializes in publication and research on Africa and US government and corporate involvement in Africa. Special publications coming this fall will include a follow-up study on the Sullivan principles and a new study on US intervention in Zaire.

### International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa

P.O. Box 17  
Cambridge, MA. 02138  
(617) 495-4940

IDAF is an international organization providing legal and material aid to victims of apartheid. In addition, it produces excellent publications dealing with southern Africa, a number of good pictorial exhibitions and a film and slide show. Write for a publications list.

### North East Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa

c/o South Africa Catalyst Project  
Box 177  
Amherst, MA. 01002

NECLSA is a coalition of campus anti-apartheid organizations that coordinates regional campus actions and publishes a newsletter that gives up-to-date information on local campus organizing in the Northeast. Write for subscription information.

### South Africa Catalyst Project

West Coast  
3470 Middlefield  
Palo Alto, CA. 94306  
(415) 494-0355  
East Coast  
P.O. Box 177  
Amherst, MA. 01002

The Catalyst Project, which recently published an excellent guide to organizing support groups for southern Africa liberation, provides information on corporate involvement in southern Africa and organizing efforts in the US. Write them for more information.

### TransAfrica

1325 18th Street, N.W.  
Suite 202  
Washington, DC. 20036  
(202) 223-9666

A black lobbying organization that monitors current US policy towards Africa and provides information on recent policy and legislative developments related to Africa and the Caribbean. TransAfrica distributes regular mailings and also a quarterly bulletin. Write for details.

### United Nations - Centre Against Apartheid

UN Secretariat Room 3580  
United Nations Plaza  
New York, NY. 10017

The center publishes a series of free papers, entitled "Notes and Documents," which deal with foreign investment in South Africa, trade-union actions and other aspects of the struggle against apartheid. Write to be put on the mailing list for "Notes and Documents."

### Washington Office on Africa

110 Maryland Ave., N.E.  
Washington, DC. 20002  
(202) 546-7961

Provides information on Africa with special reference to the US government policy towards Africa. WOA also publishes a quarterly newsletter entitled "Washington Notes on Africa." Write them for details.

## Resource distributors:

Many local organizations distribute information on southern African liberation. We mention NWRC only to provide resources for those people in geographic areas that don't have easy access to the organizations listed above.

**New World Resource Center**  
1476 West Irving Park Road  
Chicago, Ill. 60613  
(312) 348-3370

NWRC has a huge selection of progressive materials, including speakers, films, and literature on southern Africa liberation struggles. Write for a literature list.

## Periodicals dealing with southern African liberation.

Again, this is by no means an exhaustive list.

**Africa News**  
P.O. Box 3851  
Durham, NC. 27702

**Southern Africa Magazine**  
17 West 17th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10011

**Africa Today**  
c/o Graduate School of International Studies  
University of Denver  
Denver, Co. 80208

**UFAHAMU, African Activists Association**  
African Studies Center  
University of California  
Los Angeles, CA. 90024

**Journal of Southern African Affairs**  
Room 413  
Art/Sociology Building  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD. 20742

**Facts and Reports**  
Holland Committee on Southern Africa  
Da Costastraat 88  
Amsterdam, Holland.

## Official liberation movement representatives.

Theo Ben Gurirab  
SWAPO Observer Mission to the UN  
801 Second Ave.  
New York, NY. 10017  
(212) 986-7863

Tirivafi Kangai  
ZANU (The Patriotic Front)  
211 East 43rd Street No. 902  
New York, NY. 10017  
(212) 697-7910

L.S. Makhanda  
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania  
211 East 43rd Street, Suite 506  
New York, NY. 10017  
(212) 986-7378

J.M. Makatini  
African National Congress of South Africa  
310 East 44th Street, Suite 1703  
New York, NY. 10017  
(212) 490-3487

Callistus Ndlovu  
ZAPU (The Patriotic Front)  
104 East 40th Street No. 401  
New York, NY. 10017  
(212) 682-8481

## Articles, books, and other information sources:

The magazines listed above are a good source of articles and book reviews. A few of the very newest and most available books are listed below.

Magubane, Bernard, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979.

*U.S. Bank Loans to South Africa*, CDE Handbook, Corporate Data Exchange Inc. (Beate Klein, Research Director), 1978.  
Write: Room 707, 198 Broadway, New York, NY. 10038.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *US CORPORATE INTERESTS IN AFRICA*, Report of the 95th Congress, 1st Session. (This report, done for Senator Dick Clark, is no longer in print. Check your local library).

Lawrence Litvak, Kathleen McTigue, and Bob DeGrasse, *SOUTH AFRICA: FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND APARTHEID*, Institute for Policy Studies, 1978.

South Africa Catalyst Project, *ANTI-APARTHEID ORGANIZING ON CAMPUS . . . AND BEYOND*, 1978, available from Catalyst Project.

In addition, if you have access to a library, ask them for two excellent British journals, the *Review of African Political Economy* and the *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Last but not least, if you can, read a book called *Class, Race and Gold*, by F. Johnstone, published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, which does a great job of showing the links between foreign investment and the growth of capitalism and racial discrimination in South Africa.



## OAU Summit

Continued from page 7

condemned Amin as a "primitive fascist" whose downfall was enthusiastically welcomed by Ugandans. Binaisa described some of Amin's atrocities—his delegation had previously circulated a photographic dossier on "Amin's Bloody Rule"—saying, "I know I might turn your stomach. But these are the truths that must be spoken. For too long when we tried to say these things, we were told to get lost. But fascism is fascism, regardless of color, and Amin killed as many as half a million people."

Turning to face the Libyan delegation, Binaisa condemned Qaddafi's military support for Amin, adding, "We will forgive but never forget." The conference hall exploded with applause. But Binaisa upset the delegates and received only scattered applause when he urged official OAU condemnation of the Central African Empire (where Emperor Bokassa's regime has been accused by Amnesty International of murdering students) and Equatorial Guinea (where torture is reportedly widespread). "History will blame you if you do not act," said Binaisa, concluding "Long live Africa, long live the OAU," and then adding pointedly, "but the struggle continues."

The controversy was resolved the next day behind closed doors. Binaisa agreed to drop his resolution condemning Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Empire, and the OAU made no criticism of Tanzania's intervention in Uganda—an implicit vote of support for Nyerere. The OAU will also convene a special session in the next year to draft a human rights charter, including specific sanctions for states which violate the human rights of their population.

### "Pan-African Defense Forces"

To avoid the necessity of such unilateral interventions in the future, the OAU proposed the creation of a "Pan-African Defense Force." Some countries also want this proposed "blue helmet" peacekeeping force to be available for use against South Africa and Rhodesia. The Ethiopian delegate said that the creation of an all-African defense force to help liberate southern Africa was necessary to overcome the "humiliation" of the so-called African defense force proposed by France last year and nominally dispatched to Shaba province in Zaire to help Moroccan troops suppress local insurgents. But the creation of a pan-African defense force is still fraught with political problems, and it will be studied for at least another year before it is established. Citing Africa's chronic underdevelopment and the pessimistic forecasts of African economists about the

continent's economic future, the OAU decided to hold a special session in Lagos, Nigeria, next January to discuss development strategies. The "Africa in the year 2000" conference will try to lay plans to increase food production, develop indigenous industry, increase regional cooperation, and aim toward the eventual establishment of an African common market.

Other OAU resolutions called for the establishment of a pan-African news agency headquartered in Senegal; urged countries to take "legal and educational measures to abolish female circumcision [still widespread] and child marriage"; and demanded that Western countries crack down on the recruitment of mercenaries. Said President Albert Rene of the Seychelles Islands, "Mercenarism is not one of the Western technologies we need to import."

The convening of the OAU in Monrovia, Liberia, gave the summit an incongruously American flavor. It also underscored many of the contradictions and problems among the states that make up the OAU. Liberia, founded by freed slaves, is a small (population: 1.7 million) piece of Americanized Africa. The ruling Americo-Liberian elite—about 5 percent of the population—controls a government modeled after Washington. The flag is a familiar red, white, and blue (with one lone star), the paper currency is US; and the latest New York disco music blares from nightclubs and bars.

The Liberian economy is heavily dominated by the activities of a US corporation—the Firestone Tire and Rubber plantation in Liberia is the largest in the world, producing 5 percent of the world's rubber and 33 percent of the world's latex. The 220 square-mile plantation is reminiscent of the old American South—a company town complete with low wages, company housing, a company church, a company store, and even a company courthouse and jail. During a guided tour of the plantation, an angry worker took me aside to dispute the company spokesperson's public relations spiel, saying he earned only \$180 a month after twenty years of service and insisting that the 12,000 employees are now locked in a fight with management to establish a union.

Liberia has long boasted of its political stability and tranquil population. But last April, demonstrations erupted over a dramatic price hike in the cost of rice the staple food. Forty-one people were killed, hundreds injured and some \$35 million in property destroyed. Leaders of the opposition Progressive Alliance of Liberia were detained. The increase in the cost of rice was rescinded and a kind of truce was negotiated—at least for the duration of the OAU conference. But unless the Liberian government allocates a greater share of the nation's wealth to its working population, continued tension is likely. □

## Sanctions Twists

Continued from page 12

ing with labor unions.

Although the proposed questionnaire is fairly comprehensive, the procedures for its use have been left vague. The need for an on-site inspection to verify the corporations' reports is left up to the discretion of embassy personnel "as appropriate." An ad hoc task force within the State Department would then "conduct appropriate interagency, congressional, and other consultations" in order to evaluate the completed questionnaires. The questionnaires will be available to the public "except for portions which the Department of State determines to contain trade secrets or proprietary or confidential business information."

But the guidelines do not set out by what standards the companies' responses would be judged. For example, it is not clear whether companies must be "making progress toward implementing" all or only some of the employment principles specified.

A second draft of the guidelines is expected to be completed in the early fall. This draft, like the first one, will go to members of Congress involved in writing the original legislation and to some of the companies that will be affected. Views have not been solicited from labor unions.

One small battle over implementation has already been won. Some officials at the State Department sought to exclude from the legislative restrictions insurance policies backed by the Ex-Im Bank through the Foreign Credit Insurance Association. One hundred and fifty applications under this program had been pending. Lawyers vetoed exempting these requests from the employment questionnaire procedures on the grounds that the Congress clearly intended the legislative restrictions to cover all types of Ex-Im Bank activities in South Africa.

Because no new authorizations have been granted since October, total Ex-Im Bank exposure had decreased to about \$175 million by the early summer, as outstanding loans were paid off. □

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## Music for Freedom

Fourteen thousand people gathered in Harvard Stadium in Boston on July 21 to attend a benefit concert for liberation movements in southern Africa. The concert, which featured Jamaican reggae star Bob Marley, Patti Labelle, Eddie Palmieri, Olatunji, and Jabula, a South African group from Europe, combined political consciousness-raising and culture on a scale never before realized in the United States in connection with the southern Africa issue. In addition to the musical performances, Dick Gregory and Mshana Ncube, ZAPU representative to the US and Canada, spoke at the event.

There was a special significance in the coming together of such a large and enthusiastic multiracial crowd in Boston, which has been torn by racial strife in recent years. Boston police and other city officials had expected outbreaks of violence and were extremely nervous. But not a single incident marred the spirited seven-hour concert, held in the open on an oppressively hot, humid day.

The Amandla Production Group, which planned the concert, had organized 250 volunteer security people from local communities who were trained in the martial arts to help keep things running smoothly. Mostly people seemed united by their support for southern African liberation and their enjoyment of the music, but in the end even the police admitted to nothing but praise for the "peoples security force." Also on hand to help was a group of volunteer medics, dubbed "barefoot doctors," but they were not needed.

While most people felt the concert was a tremendous success as an expression of solidarity with the southern African liberation struggle, it fell short of its principal objective, which was to raise money for the liberation movements. When it was all over, the Amandla Production Group, which is associated with the Haymarket Foundation, had barely managed to cover the expenses of the concert, thanks to the fact that many of the people who had loaned "front money" simply donated the money to the cause. Concert planners attributed the financial loss to the late commitments from the big name performers such as Bob

Marley which did not come until the middle of June. This meant that much more money was spent on advertising, production, and staging than would otherwise have been necessary.

But Amandla Productions is still hoping that symbolic contributions can be sent to the liberation movements as an expression of solidarity. If so, the money will go to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, SWAPO of Namibia, and ANC and PAC of South Africa.

## Sports

ACCESS, the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society, has launched a "Stop the Fight Campaign" in response to the mid-July announcement that John Tate and Gerrie Coetzee will fight for the heavyweight boxing title in Pretoria on October 20. STFC—a coalition of 25 civil rights, religious, political, and sports groups spearheaded by ACCESS—sees the fight as a major propaganda tool for the South African government, which they believe is secretly providing funds to help promote the event.

Bob Arum, chairman of Top Rank, Inc., the American promoter of the fight, initially claimed that he had "licked apartheid" because the South African government assured him that the 90,000-seat Loftus Stadium will be fully integrated," as will all future boxing matches held in South Africa. But the comment of an ACCESS spokesperson—"there is no way that the South African government will integrate sports. Who does Arum think he is kidding?"—has proved more on target. Arum, on a visit to South Africa, was soon accusing the South African government of lying after the minister of sport denied that he made any promises to end apartheid in sport in the near future. Arum is nonetheless continuing to promote the fight, but he says it will be the last one he promotes in South Africa.

While stepping up pressure on Arum to cancel the fight, STFC is also targeting the NBC network, which will be broadcasting the fight. So far all that NBC will say is that the network is prepared to reconsider its decision in light of new information.

This is not the first time that Tate, a black American, will fight in South Africa.

His match against ex-policeman Kallie Knoetze in the bantustan of Bophutha-Tswana was criticized by SACOS, the non-racial South African Council on Sport as nothing more than a massive propaganda exercise for the apartheid regime.

SACOS, which operates inside South Africa, has charged that the South African Southern Sun Hotels, which has promoted South African boxing in the U.S., has used laundered ministry of information funds to do it, spending an estimated \$1 million in the US last year. Southern Sun Hotels is co-promoting the Tate-Coetzee fight with Bob Arum's Top Rank, Inc.

The Stop the Fight Campaign aims to end South Africa's use of boxing as an international propaganda tool by helping to expose how South Africa has manipulated international boxing to enhance its overseas image and how American promoter Bob Arum has helped to promote apartheid. ACCESS plans to coordinate letter-writing campaigns to and meetings with television network executives and potential advertisers for the fight and will take other actions deemed appropriate by its members.

For further information contact STFC/ACCESS, P.O. Box 518, New York, NY 10025, (212) 665-6812.

In other actions, ACCESS has called on officials of the Amateur Athletic Union to take appropriate punitive actions against the organizers of the New Jersey Olympic Track Classic. The organizers of the classic have decided to allow South African runner Sidney Maree to compete in the meet, contravening both AAU and International Amateur Athletic Federation bans on participation of South Africans in international events. In June ACCESS representatives met with officials of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa to discuss sanctions against American athletes who compete with Maree. □

## International

In Holland, two Dutch anti-apartheid groups, Kairos and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa joined forces to press for an oil embargo of South Africa and the withdrawal of all Shell investments from South Africa. Their campaign, waged on a national, corporate, church, labor, and grass-roots level, has reached about one-

quarter of the 14 million people in the country and enlisted the formal support of at least 40 organizations, including two national parliamentary parties. The campaign has been largely an informational attack against Shell, a multinational of which 60 percent is owned by a Dutch company. They decided not to organize an initial boycott of Shell because there are no realistic alternative sources of oil that are not also deeply involved in South Africa and because such a boycott would hit first and hardest against the small pump-owners, whose income derives from sales. The informational campaign has included postcard mailings to parliament, delegations to numerous groups, educational meetings in about 150 settings around the country, extensive newspaper advertisements, 1.25 million handouts imitating Shell brochures but describing Shell's role in shoring up the apartheid regime, and actions at Shell's annual general meetings in Holland and in London. □

**ACTION NEWS AND NOTES** was prepared by members of the Boston Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa who have taken responsibility for this section and plan to reorganize and update it. A mailing will be sent out to groups working around southern African issues in the near future. In the meanwhile, please send information about your group's activities to *Southern Africa* magazine, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.

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
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Poster used in Dutch campaign.

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
**BREAKING THE LINKS:**

**The South African Economy and the US**

Reprints of this 20-page resource are available to groups at 50¢ per copy for orders of 10 copies or more. (Sorry, orders under 10 not accepted). Send your check to: *Southern Africa*, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.

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