

VOLUME XI NUMBER 9

SOUTHERN AFRICA

\$1 DECEMBER 1978

YEAR-END REVIEW: What happened this year in southern Africa



1978: The West Proposes,
South Africa
Disposes

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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VOLUME XI NUMBER 9

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Typesetting by Liberation News Service.
Cover and layout by The Letter Space.


Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010.

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/\$10.00; Institutional/\$18.00; Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/\$22.50; South and Central America/\$19.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 68206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.

Distributors: New York, NY: Triangle Exchange, Delhi Distributors; Washington, DC: Liberation Information Distribution Co.; Boston, MA: Carrier Pigeon, Third World Distributors; Chicago: Guild News Agency; Minneapolis, MN: Rainbow Distribution; St. Paul, MN: Isis News Distribution

Cover:
Top: SWAPO supporters greet UN Transitional Assistance Group/Credit: UN
Bottom: South African soldiers on maneuvers/Credit: UN
Right: Raid on Crossroads Squatter Camp, South Africa



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Looking at the Year



ZANU

Zimbabwean freedom fighters intensified their struggle this year, re-affirming their commitment to liberating their country from the illegal regime: ZANU militants in training.



Africans in Salisbury continue to oppose the Smith et al regime: here protesters demonstrate against draft of blacks and carry signs supporting freedom fighters, which were torn up by the police prior to all being arrested.

update

Muzorewa, Sithole Accept Election Postponement

Rhodesian Executive Council member Bishop Abel Muzorewa is expected to face growing pressure within his United African National Council (UANC) over the government's mid-November decision to postpone election of a black-led government until April. Muzorewa and his colleague Ndabaningi Sithole had strongly opposed the delay as a violation of the March "internal settlement" agreement, but backed down after lengthy deliberations in the biracial ministerial council.

The new schedule, agreed on after the four-man Executive Council flew to South Africa to consult with Prime Minister Pieter Botha, provides for publication of a constitution by December 22, a whites-only referendum on January 30, and elections for the new parliament on April 20.

Muzorewa had earlier threatened to resign if the original terms for "majority rule" independence by December 31 were not met, but pronounced himself satisfied with the new arrangements. Many members of the UANC, however, have been impatient with the Bishop's tendency to give in to Smith within the transitional administration. And yet another test is soon to come: the UANC has strongly opposed the draft of blacks for military service in the Rhodesian forces. It has adopted the slogan "No majority rule—no majority call-up."

Few expect that Muzorewa will be any more effective in changing government policy on this question than on earlier occasions. In the meantime, the war continues to expand, and in late November the Rhodesian government announced the extension of military rule to still more districts, bringing the total to some 75 percent of the country's land area. (The military command was removed from official civilian control in an administrative move just before Africans were admitted to cabinet positions in April.)

Anglo-American Plan Dead, Says Nigeria

British and American diplomats began in late November a new attempt to revive proposals for an "all-party conference" on Rhodesia, but initial African reaction was discouraging. Nigerian leader Olusegun

Obasanjo told the US Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, that the Anglo-American proposals were dead. The Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda said that the Smith government in Rhodesia had not yet been weakened enough by guerrilla action to negotiate seriously.

The Nigerian *Daily Times*, welcoming Andy Young with an editorial letter, expressed strong skepticism on US policy in southern Africa. "America has not been able to deliver on its promises," the paper said, "and we ourselves are beginning to have some difficulty believing in your country's sincerity, let alone its will."

Information Scandal Spreads

In new reports by the *Rand Daily Mail*, two ostensibly independent private South African groups, the Foreign Affairs Association and the Southern African Freedom Foundation, have been named as recipients of secret government funds. The Southern African Freedom Foundation has hosted former New Hampshire Governor Meldrim Thompson, as well as American Legion and other delegations, on visits to South Africa. South African businessman Werner Ackerman, who headed the Foreign Affairs Association, apparently served as conduit for funds to host nine visiting American congressmen in 1975.

The Information Ministry scandal, which began to emerge in May with accusations of secret slush funds and elaborate entertainment by officials, provoked the November resignation of former Information Minister Cornelius Mulder, and probably still has new revelations in store. One accusation not yet confirmed is that Michigan publisher John McGoff obtained an \$11.5 million loan from South Africa to fund his unsuccessful 1976 attempt to buy the *Washington Star*. A US Justice Department investigation is now underway on the allegations concerning McGoff.

South Africa Reminded of Vulnerable Link

Iranian officials reported in late November that oil production was approaching normal levels after cutbacks to as low as 20 percent during the oil workers' strike earlier in the month. But South

Africa, which gets some 90 percent of its oil from Iran, has received a strong reminder of its vulnerability.

In 1974 the Johannesburg *Financial Mail* quoted South African oilmen as saying that under no circumstances should Iran's component of South African supplies exceed 30 percent—such dependence on one supplier was just too dangerous. Now the same magazine reports that South Africa can expect no special consideration over other consumers of Iranian oil, in spite of Iran's 17.5 percent ownership in the South African Natref refinery.

According to researcher Bernard Rivers, who co-authored with Martin Bailey a UN report on South Africa's oil supplies, an interruption of several weeks of oil supplies is no problem for South Africa. But the threat of a longer—or permanent—cutoff of Iranian supplies is a nightmare to government officials.

For Iran, the 5 percent of its oil sold to South Africa is not of crucial importance, and even the present government has reportedly informed South Africa that it would abide by UN sanctions if voted in the Security Council. If the Shah falls, a new Iranian government might not wait for UN action to reduce the South African link.

White House Reverses On Ferrochrome

In a move which will probably reduce US purchases of a major South African export, President Carter has imposed a tariff on imports of high-carbon ferrochrome. Although White House officials had said only a few days before the announcement that no protection for American producers was likely, a major lobbying effort by the companies involved in domestic production and members of Congress apparently changed the administration's stance.

A four-cent-a-pound duty will be imposed on ferrochrome imports as long as the price is below \$.38. South Africa currently accounts for more than half of US imports, and the present price is about \$.34.

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$20 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

US: Its "New" Policy Has Aged Badly

by Steve Talbot

*But we are sick and tired of hearing
your song
Tellin' how you are gonna change
right from wrong
'Cause if you really want to hear our views
You haven't done nothin!*

—Stevie Wonder

"We have had some setbacks in our Africa policy," UN Ambassador Andrew Young acknowledged recently to a San Francisco World Affairs Council audience. "I think maybe Ian Smith sacked us. He threw us for a loss [by campaigning for his 'internal settlement' in the US] and then went back to bomb Zambia and to say before a controlled press in Rhodesia the lie that he had won the support of the Senate and this administration."

The Carter administration's southern Africa policy is in serious trouble, and State Department liberals, including Young, are worried. The Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia has failed to make any progress toward ending the war. Nigeria's head of state, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a key figure in Washington's Africa strategy, said last month that the US-British initiative in Rhodesia was "a dead matter." The US and the other Western powers in the so-called "Gang of Five" have also failed to arrange a settlement in Namibia. South Africa has made a mockery of the Western-sponsored UN settlement plan. Instead of punishing Pretoria with economic sanctions, the Carter administration has

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US Ambassador to the UN

"We've had some serious setbacks in our Africa policy."

lowered its public criticism of the apartheid regime to a whisper. Carter has even invited the notoriously hardline Prime Minister Pieter Botha to visit Washington if settlements can be arranged in Namibia and Rhodesia.

No New Policy

The harsh winds of reality have blown away the fig leaves on the "new" Carter policy, and it turns out to be the same old policy—the preservation of US economic and strategic interests. A new style had begun to emerge, it's true. Carter selected some advisers who were intelligent enough to recognize that supporting the white-supremacy-above-all-else boys would be unpopular, at home and abroad. Led by Young, these advisers developed a strategy which sought, by recognizing the existence of black aspirations and the liberation movements, to shape the politics of those movements to American interests, and to prevent the emergence of any radical, socialist direction.

US intervention had to be quick. The liberation movements in Namibia and Zimbabwe both appeared to be on the verge of seriously threatening white rule. The Americans pushed hard for settlements at the conference table.

But the policy has foundered almost as quickly as it was conceived because policy makers underestimated the seriousness of both sides in the southern Africa conflict. Neither the liberation movements nor the white supremacists were willing to make major concessions.

Following the failure of negotiations, the US turned its attention to undercutting the liberation movements' support in neighboring Angola and Zambia. But these ef-

forts have had too limited an effect to destroy either movement's ability to continue the fighting and to bargain with strength at any conference table.

Yet at the same time the US has been almost embarrassingly unwilling to use its clout to force Pretoria or Salisbury to concede.

The result is that the administration's southern Africa policy is now being hit from all sides. African countries which had welcomed the Carter administration's human rights rhetoric and its public support for majority rule are now frustrated and bitter if not openly hostile.

"Things are rougher at the [UN] General Assembly," a US official complained to the *Christian Science Monitor* last month. "And they're rougher because of the perception that the United States is full of hot air; that when push came to shove, the US would not deliver on its rhetoric regarding Rhodesia and South Africa."

The administration's decision to violate UN sanctions and permit Ian Smith to tour the US, and its failure to seriously challenge South Africa over Namibia (let alone the apartheid system) have convinced many African leaders that the US is once again "tilting" toward the white-minority regimes. If the administration takes no action to counter this image, Carter and company could soon see the complete public collapse of their much-touted southern Africa policy. Administration liberals are concerned that this might mean the destruction of their carefully nurtured links with influential African nations such as Nigeria and Tanzania.

Maintaining Interests

The State Department faces two problems in trying to maintain the confidence of African leaders. The first and most fundamental is the Carter administration's refusal to take firm action against South Africa or Rhodesia because it is preoccupied with maintaining US economic and strategic interests in southern Africa. Secondly US policymakers also fear a right-wing backlash in this country against any policy which may appear to ally the US with "black Marxist guerrillas."

At the State Department conference in San Francisco at the end of October, US officials including Young, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose, and Young's deputy at the UN Donald McHenry portrayed themselves as moving too fast for most Americans in pushing for majority rule in southern Africa. In workshops and interviews, these liberals suggested that their position was vulnerable—caught between the demands of African states and intense lobbying from conservative Americans who believe the administration is selling out the white-minority regimes.

"Recently the forces of the right have been more active than the democratic forces."



"As a matter of national policy we simply don't engage in that kind of activity [Angola-style CIA intervention] anymore."

Donald McHenry, Assistant to Young



"Recently, the forces of the right have been more active than the democratic forces," Young, openly soliciting more visible support from his relatively liberal San Francisco audience, told the conference. Challenged by a sprinkling of radical critics in the audience, Young replied that they should mobilize a movement around southern Africa issues similar to the anti-Vietnam war movement.

McHenry echoed Young's argument that popular opinion is a drag on the "liberalization" of State Department policies. "There is an absence of domestic political consensus on which our foreign policy in southern Africa depends," McHenry said in an interview. "I am pretty sure that we are out in front of what the public would support." He cited "domestic politics" as the reason for the administration's failure to establish normal diplomatic relations with Angola.

In their bid to build a more active liberal constituency, Young and his State Department colleagues stress the argument that the Carter administration's Africa policy represents a sharp break from that of previous administrations. US Ambassador Donald Easum told the conference that his former chief, Henry Kissinger, "didn't know how to spell Namibia. He didn't know where it was on a map." Kissinger fired Easum from the State Department's top Africa post because Easum advocated closer ties with independent African countries, including Nigeria and Mozambique. Now he is actively pursuing the Carter administration's new policy of forging firm bonds with oil-rich Nigeria.

To emphasize what Young characterized as Carter's new "moral, human rights approach" to US policy in Africa, the State Department representatives, displaying remarkably short memories, claimed that Angola-style CIA intervention was a thing of the past. "I think the likelihood of that kind of involvement is minimal," McHenry declared. "As a matter of national policy, we simply don't engage in that kind of activity any more."

Despite these assurances, McHenry acknowledged that African liberation movements remain extremely skeptical of US intentions. He blamed this suspicion on the record of previous administrations rather than on Carter's indirect intervention in Zaire last spring or the current US role in southern Africa.

"It's hard to live down the past," he said. The US "had made serious mistakes in Africa," including support for Portuguese colonialism, and "we're still paying for it now." McHenry argued that this history made it difficult for him to establish anything more than "shaky trust" with liberation movements. Ironically, in the next breath, McHenry described SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, as "not very bright" and "a man whose organization has out-

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US Press: Telling It Like It Isn't

“If the American press gained any insight into how best to cover foreign affairs as a result of our Asian adventures, it has certainly not begun to show yet in the treatment accorded Africa.”

by Karen Rothmyer

In reflecting on US press coverage of Africa over the past year, I am reminded of a conversation I had in the early '70s with an uncle of mine. This uncle, a product of a working-class neighborhood in Chicago and a veteran of World War II, was voicing his opinions of Vietnam.

“Jesus Christ,” he said, “why doesn't the United States get out of that goddamn place? Those goddamn Vietnamese don't want us there anyway, except the guys who are making money out of it. They just want to be left the hell alone.”

If my uncle could write, I'd like to see him sent to Africa. If he had been around for the Zaire “invasion” or the Rhodesia attacks on ZAPU camps in Zambia, there would have been at least one reporter present who would rather talk to a man hauling garbage than to interview an official representative of anything. As a result, just maybe, we might have had some better idea of what was going on.

If the American press gained any insight into how best to cover foreign affairs as a

result of our Asian adventures, it has certainly not begun to show up yet in the treatment accorded Africa. Over the past year, as in times prior, a steady stream of dutifully recorded government pronouncements and comments by recognized “leaders” provided the basic stuff of which American reporting was made. Perceived confrontations between Communists and “moderates,” plus the occasional glimpse of daily life in Bamako or Timbuctu, completed the view of the African scene.

With notable exceptions, the press continued to reflect not the interests of America in general—surely a guy like my uncle must weary of reports about Rhodesian whites bravely defending their right to a gardener, a cook, and a swimming pool—but rather the interests of America's ruling class, the group to which most members of the press either belong or aspire.

That said, herewith a few comments on the handling of some of the more notable news items of the year.

Cubans in Africa. If ever there was a non-new story, this was it. Cubans have been in

Africa for several years now, in all sorts of capacities. The US government has never been happy about this, but this year it finally vented its frustration and wrath in the form of a barrage of statistics and dire warnings which were eagerly snatched up and, for the most part, uncritically reported in the press.

Clayton Fritchey, a syndicated columnist, managed to inject a little irony and humor into this otherwise hysteria-filled situation in a column carried June 24 in the *Washington Post*.

“Who do the Cubans think they are? Americans?” Fritchey quipped. “Cubans, like the rest of the world, ought to realize by now that the United States in principle is against foreign military or para-military interventions, although, of course, there are times when a great power must rise above principle, as in our Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.”

The *Washington Post's* editorial page, which probably would have applauded the rules on territorial acquisition in Africa set up at the second Congress of Berlin as a



brilliant triumph of international diplomacy, adopted a more sinister tone.

In an editorial on May 21, the *Post* declared:

"Given the public's raised consciousness of the Cuban-Soviet role, we do not think the administration would have great difficulty gaining public support for a well-conceived military-aid operation in critical African situations. We have in mind support of besieged friendly governments, as in Zaire."

I don't know who does the *Post's* public opinion surveys, but I suggest he be fired.

Zaire. Never guilty of waiting on facts before rushing in to provide a free flow of information, the press relied almost solely on French legionnaires and the Mobutu government during the early days of fighting in Zaire, with the result that frankly racist stories of Marxism and mayhem were the order of the day.

"Zaire Reports an Attack in South by Communist-Backed Katangans," the *New York Times* proclaimed on May 5 over a Reuters story that quoted President Mobutu as its authority.

On May 20, the *Washington Post's* David Ottaway had legionnaires dropping into "besieged" Kolwezi "in a daring bid to free up to 9,000 Europeans being held hostage by rebel forces there."

For sheer hypocritical bathos, however, *Newsweek* took the prize with a May 29 report headlined in large, bold letters, "Massacre in Zaire." It began:

"Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko stared through the window of a mining company guesthouse in the shattered city of Kolwezi. The battle-hardened president, a former army sergeant, put his hands to his face and moaned, 'Mon Dieu, they have smash-

ed their heads in.' Inside the guard-house, 35 European men, women and children lay dead. They had been herded into a room and executed by Katangan invaders before the attackers themselves were driven out of town by the French Foreign Legion."

A pathetic story indeed, until one's critical faculties begin to function. Just who says that these white people were killed by "Katangan invaders"—whoever they are? And can we really believe that Mobutu, who has personally seen to the jailing, torture, or execution of hundreds of Zairians, was genuinely moved by the killing of a few white folks whose deaths practically guaranteed the Western cash he needed to stay afloat?

The Associated Press was no less shocked at events in Zaire. "Rebel tribesmen on a rampage of murder and rape slaughtered as many as 200 persons in a 'hunt for the white man,' the AP shrieked in a story on June 5.

Meanwhile, the press elsewhere took a slightly different view. The London *Financial Times*, as reported in the (US) *Guardian* on May 31, said that French legionnaires were not bothering to find out whether or not Africans were supporters of the group claiming credit for the Kolwezi attack before mowing them down in the street. *Agence France Presse* reported that some of Mobutu's troops threw grenades into whites' houses after the withdrawal of attacking forces. And while the US press accepted virtually without question the notion of an outside invading force, London's *Guardian*, according to *Africa News* on June 12, reported that Mobutu is "so evidently hated by his own people" that the fact "can be verified in any street-corner conversation in the capital."

In the end, as several US newspapers quietly noted on back pages, the "massacre" of whites turned out to be

something less. According to the International Red Cross, a total of 136 Europeans were killed in one way or another during the fighting, compared with a minimum of several hundred Africans. It was also noted, just as quietly, that earlier figures on white deaths appeared to have been deliberately inflated.

As if to try to make restitution for its bad performance in Zaire, the press generally gave substantial coverage to announcements by liberal members of Congress that they were highly unsatisfied with the administration's "proof" of Cuban involvement in the Zaire affair.

Rhodesia. In the eyes of US reporters, if one dead white equals 100 dead blacks, one embattled white farmer must surely equal 1,000 hungry, underpaid black farm workers. Judging by the number of stories in the past year on Rhodesia's minority European population, every white person there must by now have been interviewed at least once. Black voices are rarely heard.

Perhaps the most "touching" tribute of the year to this group was delivered by CBS correspondent Morley Safer in a January 29th piece on "60 Minutes" which revealed the profound, probably unconscious and almost automatic racism of much US reporting.

"There are reports of mercenaries being brought in to fight Rhodesia's war," Safer reported. "In fact, it is mostly a people's war and a people's army. They're a stiff-necked bunch, these people, and love them or hate them, you've got to admire their grit: an odd combination of 20th century delights and technology and a 19th century pioneer spirit.

"You are tempted to compare this place with Vietnam. The two wars have

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Jules Feiffer

Namibia

by Bill Johnston

The year opened with the five Western members of the United Nations Security Council still busily pursuing their attempt to achieve an internationally acceptable solution to the UN's longest-running problem: independence for Namibia.

Representatives of the United States, Britain, Canada and West Germany had for nine months been shuttling about three continents, pressing, persuading, and negotiating with officials of the South-West Africa People's Organization, of South Africa, and of the five front-line African states—Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique.

The Western nations, not entirely facetiously termed "The Gang of Five,"

had by late January come up with a set of proposals which they averred provided "an effective basis for implementing Resolution 385 while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved." Security Council Resolution 385 of January 1976 is the cornerstone in the world organization's dealings with South Africa over the future of the International Territory of Namibia.

The Western proposals declared that the "key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with appropriate United Nations supervision and control." This reflected the language of Resolution 385: "It is imperative that free elections under the super-

vision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity." However, the Western Five whittled away the clarity and strength of the UN language in their proposal, which said: "The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of the results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of all aspects of the political process at each stage."

The Western version left South Africa—armed with all the apparatus of 60 years of occupation—to run the elections,



Commissioner Ahtisaari driving through the crowd of SWAPO supporters in Ovamboland during UN visit to territory.

UN/Sonderling

NAMIBIA

Area: approximately 317,827 sq. mi.

Population: 2.5 million (1978 est.)

Capital: Windhoek

Liberation Movements Recognized

By The OAU: Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) f. 1958

National Currency: Rand (1.15 per US\$1)

Political Status: United Nations trust territory illegally occupied by South Africa.

while the UN, a newcomer on the scene, tried to keep track. This was a difference not lost on politically astute Namibians.

Proposal Terms

The Western proposals also called for a special representative of the Secretary-General, supported by a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), to be present in Namibia and monitor events. In addition, it required South Africa's administrator-general to repeal all discriminatory laws; that all Namibian political prisoners and detainees be released; that refugees be allowed to return; that hostilities cease; that all but 500 of the estimated 40,000 South African soldiers now in Namibia be withdrawn; that SWAPO and South African troops be confined to bases under UN surveillance. Provisions were outlined for SWAPO personnel to return peacefully to their country. The South African police were to maintain law and order in Namibia, but the UN's special representative "shall decide when it is appropriate" for members of UNTAG to accompany the police.

The Western proposal called for South African forces to be reduced by stages to 1,500 men at two bases in northern Namibia before an election campaign of about four months duration. A constituent assembly was to be set up a week after the elections were certified. In February 1978, the Western Five spoke of independence for Namibia by December 31, 1978. This date was first set by the South Africans in their own plan for establishing an "independent" Namibia under carefully managed circumstances. Pretoria intended to hand over "power" to the acceptable black leaders it had groomed during the long Turnhalle constitutional conference. In preparation for their new role, these leaders had formed a political organization, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

February Summit

Following through on their plan, the Five called a summit meeting in New York in early February—almost 10 years to the day after the sentencing of SWAPO patriots to

imprisonment on Robben Island as a consequence of South Africa's first terrorism trial. SWAPO leadership, South Africa's foreign minister, representatives of the front-line states and the Western foreign ministers assembled within the shadow of the United Nations, and a spate of meetings ensued; the air was pregnant with "settlement." But Pretoria's foreign minister Roelof (Pik) Botha, just after a television interview in which he fulminated about the danger of Namibia being overrun and governed by "a Marxist, terrorist organization" (SWAPO), suddenly left for home, ostensibly in great pique over the intolerable demands of the Western plan.

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma stayed on to talk with UN and other officials, and to outline his movement's position. In a shift from its original demand for the total withdrawal of all South African military and police personnel, SWAPO now wanted the 1,500 Pretorian troops confined to bases in the southern part of Namibia and agreed to the presence throughout elections of Pretoria's police, provided they carried only sidearms and were under UN command.

Nujoma also raised the issue of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port—which South Africa had recently legislated to be a part of its Cape Province. The Western powers had devised a "finesse" of the Walvis Bay matter, by which the problem would be passed over at present and handed on to the future government of Namibia to thresh out with the South Africans. Nujoma reiterated that Walvis was part of his country and rightly pointed out that the port and its surrounding enclave (including a powerful South African military base) would be certain occasion for war between Namibia and South Africa.

Attacks on SWAPO

Meanwhile, in Namibia the South African administrator-general, Judge Martinus Steyn, was engaged in inducing the appearance of liberalization by revoking some apartheid legislation. At the same time, he was cracking down hard on

SWAPO and any other dissidents. In January he banned a newly published and explicitly documented booklet—'*TORTURE—A Cancer In Our Society*'—written by Father Heinz Hunke, a Roman Catholic priest, and an Anglican layman, Justin Ellis. Said Steyn piously: "Torture and assaults on detainees are not tolerated." All allegations should properly be made to the police, who would then investigate themselves, he said.

The South African security police raided the ecumenical Christian Centre ten days after the break-up of the New York talks. SWAPO members and their leaders inside the territory were under increasing harassment. All the while, Pretoria's hand-picked "leaders" belonging to the Turnhalle Alliance were campaigning throughout the country—heavily funded from West Germany, as well as South Africa—openly preparing for the elections that South Africa had vowed would take place in time for a regime to be set up in the Namibian capital of Windhoek by the December 31 deadline.

On March 27, the president of the Turnhalle group and expected first president of a South African puppet state of South-West Africa/Namibia was assassinated. SWAPO was blamed for the deed; SWAPO officials in Windhoek denied it. Chief Clemens Kapuu's murder gave Pretoria an excuse for crippling SWAPO, and repression of Namibia's largest and only nationwide movement became intense. Anti-SWAPO groups were issued arms, and with these and clubs they set about attacking SWAPO adherents and meetings. Judge Steyn on April 18 promulgated another of his proclamations—AG 26, entitled "Provisions for the Detention of Persons in order to prevent Political Violence and Intimidation." It empowered him to incarcerate people indefinitely without recourse to court of law. The campaign against SWAPO intensified. Virtually all the movement's internal leadership was swept up into jails.

South Africa Says Yes

But little world attention was turned to what was happening to the Namibian people. Neither internal political support for SWAPO, nor the movement's continuing guerrilla war, which was tying up thousands of South African troops, featured in Western press reports about Namibia. Pretoria captured the headlines late in April by announcing it would accept the Western proposals—just as the UN General Assembly was gathering for a special session on the disputed territory. Prime Minister Vorster took pains to specify his government's restricted interpretation of the Five's document, but the delight in Western capitals was only tempered by preparations to put pressure on SWAPO to accede.

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Zimbabwe

by Patrick Lawrence

Zimbabwe's war for independence, which was launched in its current phase in 1972, seems to have entered its crucial, possibly final stages this year. Both wings of the Patriotic Front alliance stepped up their military commitments in 1978, while the Salisbury government's ability to resist the guerrilla struggle has apparently reached its limit. These have emerged as the two key developments in Zimbabwe over the past year.

For British and American officials, however, 1978 can probably best be described as the year of the internal settlement. No other event aside from the war itself has so overshadowed the diplomatic dealings of the Foreign Office and the State Department as Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's March 3 agreement with three African leaders. Nothing close to majority rule, even by the "moderate" standards of Western policymakers, has emerged from that accord. But officials seeking an internationally credible settlement in Zimbabwe spent much of the past year struggling to fashion their response to it. At best the result has been ambiguous and vacillating.

The position has not been so complex for the Patriotic Front. At times during the past year Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe appeared variously closer to or further away from future negotiations with Smith and the other Salisbury signers. But nothing has been so clear or so consistent as the Front's rejection of the internal settlement—and the consequent failure of that settlement. In the Front's view, the status of government in Salisbury had been changed not an iota: Three Africans had simply chosen to join Smith's illegal colonial administration.

Indeed, one of Salisbury's key objectives in constructing its "interim government"

“...nothing has been so clear or so consistent as the Front's rejection of the internal settlement and the consequent failure of that settlement.”

—to attract guerrillas away from the Front—has failed miserably; it was immediately clear last spring that the war had been stepped up precisely as a result of Smith's March 3 move.

Internal Settlement

It was in the wake of the Patriotic Front's rainy-season offensive last winter, in fact, that Smith launched his plans for an internal accord. British and American diplomacy had been dragging on inconclusively, while the war was taking an increasingly heavy toll. Suddenly in mid-February, Smith announced that he had reached basic agreement on a settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau. Two weeks later, the settlement was signed, installing its signatories as members of a four-man council, the first head of which was Prime Minister Smith. The council was to be the main executive of government in the transition period leading up to elections, then scheduled for the end of the year.

Broadly, the accord provided for a one-person, one-vote election in Rhodesia—which Smith viewed as essential to

winning Western support. But the voting structure was designed to give whites a virtual veto over the legislative power of Africans. A two-thirds majority was required to pass any new legislation. At the same time, 28 seats of the 100 proposed for the new legislature were to be elected by whites only; black voting was confined to the remaining 72.

The whites-only bloc in government thus possessed power to destroy any African initiative it did not care to see passed into law. Smith was clearly seeking the appearance of majority rule while preserving minority rule more or less intact.

West's Response

Washington and London publicly rejected the Smith accord. But their response was quickly complicated by domestic political considerations. Political realists in the US and British administrations have long understood that without the participation of the Patriotic Front, no government in Zimbabwe would succeed in gaining international acceptance. Nor was it likely to survive long.

At the same time, significant sections of government in both London and Washington recognized that Smith's design was not far from the type of moderate, pro-Western formula the West has been seeking since then-Secretary of State Kissinger announced support for majority rule in 1976. As a result, right-wing support for the Smith settlement began to mount.

Diplomatically, British and American officials at first responded by calling for the continuation of talks with Front leaders Nkomo and Mugabe on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals outlined in 1977. The five front-line states, apparently concerned that the West might move



Robert Mugabe rejected March 3 Internal Settlement at Security Council meeting and pledged continued armed struggle. Mugabe (center) speaks with session chairman, Ivor Richards (left) during break in proceedings.

UPI/Nagata

rightward, away from its own plan, had urged the Front to accept the broad outline of the Anglo-American plan—UN-supervised elections, the presence of a British administrator in the transition period leading to independence, and the dismantling of the minority regime's police and military. Talks on the proposals had begun in Malta in January. But soon after March 3, Foreign Secretary David Owen and US Ambassador Andrew Young shifted to a call for an "all-party conference"—negotiations to include Smith's new government and the Front. Throughout the year, Western policy continued to center on bringing the two sides into such a conference. The Smith government responded that it would have to be on the basis of the March 3 settlement, a precondition the Front would not accept.

At home, the State Department and the Foreign Office have come under increasing pressure from conservatives to accept the internal settlement. Britain's Labor government, fighting off a Conservative Party offensive that had seized on the Rhodesian question, was the first to feel this; it was not long after the Salisbury accord was signed that Owen termed it "a significant step toward majority rule." In the US, this pressure built up steadily over the summer, culminating in a congressional campaign to end economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the October visit of Smith and other members of his executive council.

Seeking Splits

Another aspect of Western policy emerged in the wake of the internal settlement. By last spring it had become clear that British Foreign Secretary Owen was leading an ef-

fort to split the Patriotic Front by attracting Nkomo into the Salisbury agreement. Explicit evidence of this came with the publication of the minutes of a meeting between Owen and the Rev. Sithole, in which the foreign secretary volunteered Britain's "services" in Salisbury's attempt to lure Nkomo into the minority administration.

The mid-August Lusaka meeting between Nkomo and Smith, which excluded Mugabe, but included high-level Nigerian and Zambian representation was seen by many as an extension of this policy, with Nigeria being used as a new agent for the West.

Nkomo denied any sinister implications to the meeting. He pointed out that he had refused Smith's invitation to join the government, and declared that all such decisions could only be made by agreement of both wings of the Patriotic Front. Mugabe and his executive, once informed of the meeting and asked to participate in a second meeting refused to do so, and the immediate Smith initiative appeared to have ended there, although it had continuing ramifications in the damage inflicted on trust between the two wings of the Front.

This strategy also carried over into policy towards the front-line states. By late summer British and American officials had succeeded in driving a sizable wedge between Zambia and the other front-line supporters of the Patriotic Front, notably Tanzania and Mozambique. This depended primarily on Lusaka's political and economic vulnerabilities, and it had two immediate effects: the secret meeting between Nkomo and Smith, which was arranged with the cooperation of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and the opening to rail traffic of Zambia's border with Rhodesia. Zambia has also appeared active in supporting the all-party conference sought by the West.

Smith: Soft Soap and Guns

For several months after the March set-

ZIMBABWE (SOUTHERN RHODESIA)

Area: 150,803 sq. mi.

Population: 6.1 million (1977 est.)

Capital: Salisbury

Head of State: President John J. Wrathall

Head of Government: Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith

Liberation Movements Recognized by the OAU:

Patriotic Front—united front, f. 1976, by two movements

Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)—f. 1961, and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—split from ZAPU, 1963

National Currency: Rhodesian dollar (.62 per US\$1)

Political Status: Nominally ruled as British colony until November 11, 1965 when white minority declared unilateral independence (UDI). After March 3, 1978, "internal settlement" governed by interim 4-man executive, not recognized internationally.

South Africa

by Andy Marx

If there were many South African whites who hoped that 1978 would mark a return to the pre-Soweto days when the constant violence and turmoil produced by apartheid impinged only on blacks, they must now be pinning their hopes on 1979. That is, if they haven't realized that those days are gone forever and that normal will never be the same.

True, 1978 didn't produce any single event like the Soweto uprising of June 1976, the mass jailings and bannings of October 1977, or the murder of a well-known leader such as Steve Biko to symbolize it as a year of political unrest. But it did produce a daily barrage of evidence that the aftershocks of the Soweto eruption are still shaking open new cracks in the inherently unstable structure of a society built on a foundation of racial oppression.

The South African government itself has offered ample proof that organized political resistance continues to mount. The proof has come in the form of a steadily increas-

ing number of political trials. At last count there were more than 60 such trials in progress across the country, with an equal number reportedly being prepared for the docket. In a year which saw the death of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, founder of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the sixtieth birthday of African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela, a number of government cases charging groups of young people with "membership in a banned organization" demonstrated that a new generation of militants is stepping forward to fill the ranks.

Further government testimony to the growth of organized resistance came with an increasing number of reports that police had clashed with armed guerrillas or discovered caches of arms. The most dramatic action of the growing armed resistance took place on August 11, when the ANC reported that ten South African soldiers were killed in a clash 75 miles from Pretoria. Numerous other incidents were

also reported, including the assassination of a hated policeman in Soweto ten days after the June 16 anniversary of the Soweto uprising. And charges filed against some of the 91 trained guerrillas and 600 "untrained terrorists" whom the police claim to have captured suggest that there have been numerous other incidents which have gone unmentioned in the press.

Fending off the growing but admittedly still embryonic clandestine resistance organizations has been by no means the only preoccupation forced on the government by increasing black militancy. Simply keeping the machinery of apartheid running from day to day has become more and more difficult. Two attempts to stage government-sanctioned elections in Soweto, for example, succeeded only in saddling the government with "elected representatives" chosen by less than six percent of the voters.

The other 94 percent showed their unwillingness to cooperate with apartheid and



Vorster: Out



Botha: In

Two sides of the same coin

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Area: 472,359 sq. mi.

Population: 26.1 million (1976 est.) (1976 est.)

18.6 million Africans (71%)

4.3 million whites (16%)

Capitals: Cape Town (legislative); Pretoria (administrative)

Liberation Movements Recognized by the

OAU: African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), f. 1912, banned 1960;

Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) f. 1959, banned 1960;

Note: A number of other black political organizations continue to function illegally, including the Unity Movement, f. 1943, the Black People's Convention, f. 1972, and other Black Consciousness groups

Head of State: President Balthazar Johannes Vorster

Head of Government: Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha

GNP: \$37.19 billion (1977 est.) Average income per person: White \$248, Black \$21

National Currency: Rand (1.15 per US\$1)

Political Status: White minority-controlled Republic, no black franchise

their contempt for those who do not share that unwillingness by boycotting the elections.

Similarly, government efforts to drive black squatters from the Cape by bulldozing their homes were met with determined resistance and fierce community pride. Although the government succeeded in flattening the Unibel Camp in Cape Town in January and initiated massive police raids and arrests at the Crossroads camp in September, the squatters from both camps vowed to continue fighting for the right to live with their families where they work.

White Tensions

The strains of growing pressure against apartheid have even opened unprecedented ruptures within the white power structure. New Prime Minister Pieter Botha's first month in office has been scarred by a fusillade of new revelations about illegal use of millions of dollars on the part of the Department of Information and about the efforts of Botha's predecessor to smother the investigation. As with the Watergate scandal in the U.S., the facts of the case itself have often been overshadowed by the battle between powerful interests seeking to hush the matter up and equally powerful interests quite prepared to rattle the government by exposing it. The *Rand Daily Mail*, for instance, which published much of the material, is owned by major finance and mining interests which have tactical dif-

ferences with the current government.

In the long run, the significance of the affair may be measured not so much by the fact that Connie Mulder resigned in disgrace instead of becoming prime minister but by the heightened intensity of conflict within South Africa's white ruling elite that it revealed.

Corporate Aid

Not that the apartheid system is about to come apart at the seams. In fact, at the international level, the apartheid regime's corporate critics continue to offer daily reminders that they aren't really about to bite the hand that has fed them. Indeed the area of foreign trade and investment has been one of the few bright spots for Pretoria this year. After several years in which the flow of foreign loans and investments dried up, Western capital has turned the tap back on. During the first half of 1978, according to World Bank figures, South African borrowers raised \$206 million on international bond markets compared with only \$23.9 million last year. And South Africa's foreign trade has been running at record levels, boosted in part by an astonishing 64 percent jump in exports to the U.S. in a single year.

Aside from this boom in foreign trade and investment, 1978 was a year in which increasing attempts were made to isolate South Africa internationally. As the year drew to a close, the U.S. and its Western

allies were doing their utmost to stave off a vote on mandatory economic sanctions against the white supremacist state. But they were having a hard time patching together another delaying tactic in the face of South Africa's sabotage of UN-sponsored and monitored elections in Namibia.

And while Prime Minister Botha could predict confidently that an oil embargo would prove just as leaky as the existing arms embargo, the popular uprising which has threatened to topple the Shah of Iran posed a very real threat to the continuing flow of oil to South Africa. Iran presently provides 80 percent of South Africa's oil. And no other major oil producer could be expected to take up the slack if events in Iran brought that nation into compliance with the boycott adhered to by Arab and African oil-producing states.

Still, the root of all the South African regime's problems lies right at home. And an episode in mid-November demonstrated once again how completely unresolvable those problems are within the narrow limits defined by apartheid.

More of Same

Almost two and a half years after the Soweto uprising, the South African government finally took the wraps off a plan for revamping the educational system against which the initial Soweto protests were directed. True to its colors, the government offered a program of "reforms" which completely ignored the most fundamental measure of the separate but unequal school system—the massive revenue gap of \$750 per pupil provided to schools for whites and \$65 per pupil to schools for blacks. Pretoria announced that it would move toward declaring schooling for blacks mandatory, but made no commitment to providing the free tuition and books that would alone make it possible for many blacks to enroll in school. (At present white children attend schools for free while blacks, whose household incomes average less than ten percent of the white average, must pay as much as \$150 in class and book fees.)

In fact, the most decisive response to the Soweto rebellion included in the proposals was not a sweeping reform but a law which would provide stiff punishments for those who oppose the system. The measure would impose a \$46 fine and up to two months in jail on the parents of any student who participated in a boycott of the schools. Teachers who boycotted classes would face an even stiffer fine of \$230.

All in all, the long-awaited proposals on black education guarantee one thing—that the schools will remain a major battleground as events in South Africa continue along a trajectory defined by the contravailing forces of repression and resistance. Welcome to 1979. □

Angola

by Mike Shuster

Nineteen-seventy-eight must have been a confusing year for Angolans and the MPLA. Since coming to power three years ago, the MPLA has endured continuous Western hostility to its attempt to establish socialism in the former Portuguese colony. That hostility reached its peak in 1978. Yet at the same time, the West seemed to be giving some signals that it might just be willing to accept the MPLA as a permanent fixture in southern Africa, but for a price.

Most recently, Angola's Minister of Defense announced in early November that the MPLA was placing the entire nation on war alert. South Africa was building up its troops on the Namibian border, according to Angolan officials, and was preparing to invade. In response Angola called on all its people to ready themselves for the attack, and a curfew was placed on most towns in the southern third of the country.

South Africa acknowledged the troop increase, but claimed it was in response to a build-up of Cuban and East German troops in southern Angola. South Africa made

repeated charges in 1978 of the presence of East German troops in Angola, but has brought forward no evidence in substantiation.

By November 11, the third anniversary of Angola's independence, the atmosphere in Luanda was charged. The day before, a bomb had exploded in a crowded Huambo market, killing 24 people and injuring 60. This was the second bombing of its kind in a week. The first killed 16 and injured 54 in the market in Canhe.

South Africa Boosts UNITA

In a speech commemorating independence, Angolan President Agostinho Neto accused South Africa of responsibility for the bombings. UNITA members had thrown the bombs, he said, but it was South Africa, with its support for UNITA, that was carrying on what he termed "a permanent undeclared war" against Angola.

This is a "war of hypocrisy and limited violence," Neto declared, "designed to exhaust Angola's energy and force surrender

to South Africa's diabolical scheme of dominating the African continent. To achieve this, the South African racists are training, arming and transporting UNITA bandits from training camps in Namibia to Angola."

Neto went on to divulge that the South African army had helped Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's head, make two trips inside Angola in 1978. The first of these trips, according to Neto, occurred in March; the second in early November. During the latter trip, the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA, closed in on Savimbi's group, which included several South African officers and an unidentified Frenchman, and Savimbi was only rescued through the use of a South African helicopter. FAPLA soldiers recovered the text of a radio message sent to the South Africans to arrange Savimbi's rescue.


"There is intensive aerial reconnaissance overhead," the message read. "It looks like the start of a new offensive and I request a chopper to evacuate us tomorrow Wednesday November 1 at 21 hours Angola time. I am bringing 15 people, including your team and the French friend. Please bring Tim's food. My best wishes." The message was signed by Nzau Puna, another UNITA leader.

Emerging Pattern

In his independence day speech, Neto also gave some indication of how Angola had viewed the past year. He said that Angola was now aware of the Western "formula" for dealing with events in southern Africa.

The Western powers have been "drawing up plans and more plans for eventual peaceful solutions," Neto pointed out, "when at the same time they are arming and approving racist acts of aggression against the people of southern Africa."

Neto implied that the West and South Africa had been collaborating closely throughout the year. "After each act of aggression by the racists, the Western powers expressed their concern and launched new diplomatic offensives while they fake con-



Presidents Neto (right) and Mobutu in Zaire.

Afrigue-Asie

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Area: approximately 481,351 sq. mi.

Population: 6,200,000 (1977 est.)

Capital: Luanda

Head of State and Government: President

Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto

Ruling Party: Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola (MPLA)—Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. f. 1956

GNP: per capita \$330 (1976)

National Currency: Kwanza (27 per US\$1)

Independence: November 11, 1975

traditions with their proteges. The people of southern Africa bury their dead in suffering, humiliation and pain."

Unquestionably, a pattern of soft talk and tough action has emerged. And it has been this pattern, alternating between the threat of military hostility and the balm of diplomatic cooperation, that has confused many people who follow events in Angola.

In the early months of 1978, hostility between Angola and the West remained at a low level, with border skirmishes, continual since 1976, on both the northern and southern borders. But in May, the Shaba uprising in Zaire and the South African attack on Kassinga brought Angola closer to confrontation with the West than it had been since the 1975 war.

On May 4, South Africa launched a devastating air attack on the southern Angola town of Kassinga, where SWAPO camps were located. More than 600 Namibians and Angolans lost their lives.

Carter Blames Angola

Less than two weeks later guerrilla fighters of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), many of whom had been refugees in eastern Angola, occupied the Zairian town of Kolwezi in the second uprising against Mobutu in Shaba (formerly Katanga) Province in as many years. The key mining town was only retaken after Belgian and French paratroopers, with American logistical support, were dropped into Shaba. Hundreds of Africans and some Europeans were killed in the fighting, and Kolwezi is still defended by more than 1500 Moroccan troops.

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko blamed Angola and Cuba for the insurrection, and President Carter stated publicly that the two socialist allies had organized the Katangese refugees into an "invasion" force. These charges were eventually shown to be false, but not before the CIA had resurrected contingency plans to re-arm and re-supply UNITA in an effort to bring down the MPLA government. The CIA's

plans were revealed publicly by Senator Dick Clark (since defeated in his bid for reelection) who had opposed U.S. involvement in the Angolan war in 1975.

The publication, though, of John Stockwell's *In Search of Enemies* helped head off the move within the administration to revive its anti-MPLA covert effort. Stockwell was a long-time CIA agent and head of the agency's Angola Task Force in 1975. His account is an expose of the CIA's deceit as it attempted to involve the US in the Angolan war just as the war in Vietnam had ended.

Despite cries for military intervention from within the administration, the diplomats prevailed, for the moment. In June, Donald McHenry, the first US diplomat to visit Angola since the war in 1975, arrived in Luanda. McHenry's visit was instrumental in reducing tensions between Angola and Zaire and in bringing about a temporary settlement in Namibia.

US Linkage

The two sets of problems were closely linked in McHenry's deal. In exchange for Angola's support of the Western plan for UN-supervised elections in Namibia, the US would see to it that Zaire would end its harassment which had taken the form of support for FNLA and UNITA attacks along the Angolan border. Angola agreed, and both SWAPO's agreement to the Western plan and the detente between Angola and Zaire quickly followed.

But the Western plan for Namibia fell through when South Africa, fearful of a SWAPO victory, withdrew its support in August.

Still, the peace with Zaire has held. Angolan officials reported in the fall that after Neto and Mobutu exchanged visits to their respective capitals, skirmishing along the Zaire border had ended. At the same time, the two countries were able to announce the reopening of the Benguela Railway, which had been closed to rail traffic into Zaire since the war.

The reopening has important advantages for both countries. Zaire will be able once again to export its copper and cobalt via the quickest and cheapest route. And Angola will earn important foreign exchange from fees it will charge on the railway and at the port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast.

But many observers fear the inability to reach a solution in Namibia will eventually undermine the peace with Zaire. The West had a stake in the Angola-Zaire detente, the reasoning goes, only as long as an Angolan-supported Namibian settlement was in the offing. Without it, Angola will still remain the major base for SWAPO guerrilla activity, which will inevitably increase.

Neto emphasized this point in his independence day speech. "If any aid is requested for the liberation of Namibia," Neto proclaimed, "we shall not hesitate to send some of our detachments to liberate this part of Africa dominated by the racists."

Thus many observers see Angola again becoming a target of military action as the war in Namibia heats up. And they point to the November South African build-up on the border as evidence.

And by the end of November, the pattern was repeating itself. Just as Angola was alerted to the possibility of a South African invasion, the State Department announced that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose would fly to Luanda for more talks with MPLA officials. Moose is the highest ranking US official to visit Angola since the war. Donald McHenry is accompanying him.

Shortages Still Serious

On the domestic front, maintaining peace on its borders, at least for a short time, has helped Angola to proceed with the reconstruction still needed following the 1975 war. Shortages of all necessary goods are still serious, but with more direct relations with Europe this year, Angola hopes to begin trading with countries from which it can purchase badly needed goods.

Officials also appeared willing this year to encourage Western corporations to invest in Angola, but in the summer, the government announced that it had arranged to purchase 51 percent of Cabinda Gulf Oil and Diamang, Angola's two largest earners of foreign currency.

This year was also the first full year of MPLA's existence as a Marxist-Leninist party. Neto commented in his speech November 11 that the work of the party was still far from perfect. "One can't be a party member," Neto said, "just in order to be a party member, to have a membership card and enjoy certain privileges in the country."

Neto said constitution of the party will be one of the major concerns in the fourth year of Angolan independence. □

Mozambique

Moatize Coal Mines, Tete Province—nationalized this year.

by Bill Minter

This year saw advances in Mozambique's efforts to build a new society, in spite of continuing economic problems and recurrent attacks from Rhodesia.

The post-independence collapse of agricultural and industrial production provoked largely by the flight of Portuguese technicians, had already been checked in 1977.

Dubbed "the year of planning," 1978 placed an emphasis on renewed expansion, with key sectors and enterprises chosen for special attention. Participants in the country's first national planning conference, held in March, stressed that only concentrated efforts aimed at mobilizing workers and peasants, and supplying them with the government subsidies they need, could solve Mozambique's economic problems. The conference established a permanent National Planning Commission, and planners continue to emphasize the importance of

developing and coordinating the planning capacity of Mozambicans at all levels, from the factory or cooperative farm, through the provincial governments and up to the national ministries.

Comprehensive statistics are not yet in for 1978, but there are indications that advances have been made, in spite of several new blows suffered by the economy. In March the Zambezi river valley was hit by the worst floods in living memory, leaving over 200,000 people homeless and thousands of acres of crops destroyed in three provinces. In April, gold payments from South Africa for miners' deferred wages were revalued at the free-market gold price, causing a loss to Mozambique of over \$23 million a year. A disastrous decline of production was revealed at the giant British-owned Sena Sugar Estates, and the government moved in August to take over from the absentee owners who had run the

firm into bankruptcy.

The new shocks to the economy joined the long standing lack of technical personnel and the border closure with Rhodesia (estimated to cost Mozambique as much as \$100 million a year) to create a desperate shortage of foreign exchange. A mid-year UN mission predicted a \$600 million import bill for 1978 as against only \$200 million earned in exports.


Still, FRELIMO remained confident that, relying on the people, the country could deal with economic difficulties. One of the key industrial firms, Cometal-Mometal, involved in engineering, metalworking and the production of railway cars, was taken over by the state and reorganized in February, thereafter showing a dramatic recovery, with production up 14 times this year over the last quarter of 1977. Two sugar estates in the south this year exceeded, in half the season, their total production



Ian Smith's visit to the US in October sparked off large demonstrations through the country; demonstrators in Washington DC chant their opposition to the illegal leader's visit.



South African government is determined to destroy Crossroads squatter camp. After harassing residents all year, a new minister of black affairs has warned that relocation will go ahead, although renouncing plans for immediate demolition. Wrecking crews have already bulldozed many homes.



Magubane

South African woman shakes finger at policeman: she was one of the thousands of people who marched to PAC leader Sobukwe's funeral on March 11th.

Mass grave holds bodies of some of the Namibian victims of massacre by the South African army at Cassinga, Angola on May 4th. The number of dead totalled close to 1,000 children, women and men—a third of the refugees living in the camp at the time of the attack.



Mozambique expanded its health programs this year, concentrating particularly on preventive medicine: an intensive vaccination campaign was undertaken throughout the country.



Pagano

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Area: approximately 308,641 sq. mi.

Population: 9,444,000 (1976 est.)

Capital: Maputo

Head of State and Government: President
Samora Moises Machel

Ruling Party: Frente de Libertacao de Mo-
cambique (FRELIMO)—Mozambique Liberation
Front. f. 1962

GNP: per capita \$170 (1976)

National Currency: Mozambique escudo
(38.7 per US\$1)

Independence: June 25, 1975

goals for last year. The Moatize coal mine, hit with major mine accidents in 1976 and 1977, was finally initiating new safety procedures after government intervention in late 1977 and nationalization in May 1978. Many communal villages and state farms reported increased production. A record rice harvest on the state farms in the Limpopo area was harvested with the aid of over 40,000 volunteers.

Problems Remain

The advances made were visible, their source in popular mobilization evident. Nevertheless, the FRELIMO Central Committee meeting in August concluded that they were not enough. The need to mobilize so many volunteers at the last minute to save the rice harvest itself indicated inadequate planning, in spite of the positive aspects of the mobilization. Above all, the Central Committee said, insufficient attention had been given by the Ministry of Agriculture to communal villages and the family peasant sector; there had been too much concentration on the more capital-intensive and technically advanced state farms.

Minister of Agriculture Joaquim de Carvalho was dismissed from both his government and his party posts, accused, among other charges, of refusing "to implement the priority defined by the leading bodies in relation to communal villages."

Literacy Campaign

Health and education programs, which together accounted for almost half of the \$390 million 1978 state budget, continued to advance this year. Health programs continue to stress preventive medicine, as the way to make the best use of still very scarce health resources. The national vaccination campaign against tuberculosis, smallpox and measles, which won World Health Organization acclaim for its coverage, was coming to an end, ahead of schedule, and a new campaign aimed at tetanus, diphtheria and whooping cough was launched. A new

national literacy campaign began in July, with particular attention to those in the military and to those holding political responsibilities in villages, factories, or urban residential areas.

Political Growth

Both the elections to the National People's Assembly in late 1977, and the continuing recruitment of new party members for FRELIMO, now organized as a Marxist-Leninist party, carried on the trend of bringing ordinary peasants and workers into positions of leadership. In organizing the elections and the party-structuring process, FRELIMO has continued to stress that candidates must be chosen for their political commitment and closeness to the people. Thus, instead of allowing the political process to be controlled by the small minority that is already literate, FRELIMO is encouraging those who are illiterate to learn, so that they can carry out their responsibilities.

The decision to transform FRELIMO from a national liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist party was taken at the third FRELIMO congress in 1977. It reflected the analysis that the liberation movement had completed its tasks with the destruction of fascist and colonial oppression and the establishment of democratic liberties. The next phase of the struggle was the building of socialism. Achieving this would require radical economic and social transformations, tasks which could only be carried out under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party.

Frelimo believed that the basis of this party existed already in the class-conscious vanguard forged in the armed struggle. But the party's presence had to be established throughout the country—in the factories, the cooperatives, inside the state apparatus and in every village.

This implied the admission of a large number of new members on a selective basis. Members have to be working people whose thoughts and actions reflect a

conviction that the building of socialism is the only way to achieve the total liberation of mankind.

The process of party building was begun in earnest in February, and the organizing brigades have given priority to seeking members in factories, in commercial, transport and construction enterprises, communal villages, state farms, agricultural cooperatives, the bigger schools and hospitals, government offices and in the defense and security forces. The membership recruiting has provided opportunities for in-depth meetings to explore problems, evaluate previous leadership, and improve work methods.

In August, after a period of national discussion, amendments to the Constitution were adopted reflecting advances in organizing the People's Assemblies and in setting up a new judicial system. The August FRELIMO Central Committee meeting removed three other members in addition to the Agriculture minister from its ranks, and there were also several reshuffles of government positions during the year. But both the party and the state's top leadership team, headed by President Samora Machel, remained the same.

Rhodesian Attacks

In 1978 Mozambique continued to feel not only the economic but also the military effects of its decision to support the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe against the white-minority government. There were no attacks as heavy as those in November, 1977, when Rhodesian troops killed several hundred people at refugee transit centers. But border probes, smaller incursions, and bombing raids on refugee camps became virtually constant as fighting in Zimbabwe escalated throughout the year. Thousands of Zimbabwean refugees continued to pour into Mozambique. In March the Mozambican government adopted universal military service for men and women.

Mozambique joined other front-line states in supporting the Zimbabwean guerrillas' refusal to accept Smith's "internal settlement" with several black leaders, regarding it as simply a ploy to maintain effective white domination. Later in the year Mozambique became increasingly concerned as Zambia hosted a secret meeting between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo of the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front. Mozambican leaders were increasingly convinced of Zambia's vulnerability to Western pressure and direction when Zambia first appealed to Mozambique to open its border with Rhodesia to allow the transport of fertilizer into Zambia, and then opened its own border with Rhodesia, on the grounds that it needed access to the rail route that runs through Rhodesia to South Africa.

Although relations with Zambia were strained, Mozambique forged closer ties

continued on 27

US Students Fight Apartheid

by Witney Schneidman

A significant political movement has emerged on the nation's campuses this year. In the late 1960s organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) grew dramatically in response to the country's increasing involvement in Southeast Asia. Their most important role was to build and coordinate the anti-war demonstrations erupting on most campuses in the country.

This year has witnessed the beginning of a similar political awakening as a result of the US role in southern Africa. Groups have carefully demonstrated how the financial holdings of their schools in companies doing business in South Africa support the existence of the apartheid regime. They have mobilized students around a call for divestment, building both local organizations on individual campuses, and regional coalitions.

Working coalitions have been operating on the East and West Coasts for many months. In October 400 activists from 25 universities and 15 trade unions met at Northwestern University near Chicago and established a Midwest Steering Committee to coordinate work in the Midwest.

In early November a dozen university and community groups met at Duke University for a similar regional conference aimed at strengthening their work in the South. The Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa (NECLSA), which already encompasses groups from at least 20 campuses, held its second conference in New York in November, bringing together more than a thousand activists from scores of campuses. NECLSA pledged itself to a week of coordinated actions in April 1979.

Aim: Divestment

A nation-wide campaign is developing, with students protesting the activities of



Students picket Princeton University administration building during extended protests calling for disinvestment.

American corporations and banks in South Africa, the role of the American government and the way in which universities profit from this situation.

One of the earliest demonstrations occurred in May 1977 when 200 students were arrested during a sit-in at Stanford University. Since that time demonstrations have been held as far afield as Oregon, Tennessee, southern California and Ohio. Students have used a variety of tactics. Four thousand Harvard students marched through Cambridge with candles and torches to protest Harvard's \$350 million connection with South Africa. At Princeton in April a 60-day-long picket was maintained while 200 students executed a meticulously planned take-over of Nassau Hall and occupied it for 27 hours.

According to one activist, the campus divestment movement has three major goals. One is to raise students' consciousness and to increase their involvement in political activity during and after their college years. Another goal is to gain further domestic support for the liberation of southern Africa. The most immediate objective is to pressure universities to divest or withdraw interests that they hold in American corporations and banks doing business with South Africa.

Progress Made

The Oregon Board of Higher Education was among the first bodies to respond to this pressure when in November 1977 it voted to sell its holdings in 27 companies having "substantial" business activities in

southern Africa. This involved \$6 million worth of holdings in such corporations as GE, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, 3M, Xerox and Exxon. Since then the trustees at Hampshire College, Smith College, University of Massachusetts, Columbia, Wesleyan and others have made either significant or minimal gestures to disassociate their universities from financial support for apartheid.

In February 1978, the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents voted to sell its holdings in corporations doing business with South Africa as these investments were in violation of a state law prohibiting the university from investing in any corporation that practices or condones discrimination.

Bank Actions

The campus movement has also been closely linked to the campaign to stop all bank loans to South Africa. The establishment of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA) has given support to active grassroots organizations throughout North America and Europe. Small gains were made in March when Citicorp, the second largest bank in the US and the largest US lender to South Africa, announced that it would make no new loans to the South African government or its parastatal corporations.

Since then Chemical Bank has announc-

ed similar action. Four midwestern banks, Continental Illinois, First National Bank of Chicago, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis and First Wisconsin have also adopted the Chemical position. At this time these banks still refuse to discontinue loans to US, European or South African corporations which are essential to the continuation of apartheid.

Trustee Tactics

Besides deferring the study of the divestment issue until a later date, many universities have taken other types of evasive actions. At one point the president of Columbia University, William McGill, with the aid of Philadelphia minister, the Rev. Leon Sullivan, author of the cosmetic Sullivan principles, sent a letter to universities throughout the country urging them to pressure corporations in which they held stock to adopt the Sullivan principles before taking stronger actions.

Ohio's Miami University yielded to pressure and reversed an April decision to divest when the school's major corporate supporters threatened to cut off funding if Miami carried out their decision. During the summer Princeton University deemed it judicious to purchase 20,000 shares in Manufacturers Hanover Trust, which has been specifically targeted by COBLSA.

Despite considerable tactical and internal political differences, the student movement

has developed some very clear positions. In general, the emphasis will be on immediate divestiture rather than support for shareholder resolutions which could take several years.

Student Aims

Specifically some groups have linked the divestment issue to Carter's human rights campaign while others have transformed the popular anti-apartheid sentiment into concrete support for the liberation movements of southern Africa. Some black students have expressed the opinion that this issue has provided an excuse for avoiding issues in the United States. They stress the importance of making clear connections between problems in the US and South Africa.

The student movement for divestiture has made important gains this year as it has generated activity and concern throughout the country. It has linked itself to trade unions and independent organizations which are taking a firm stand against further American involvement in South Africa. A national infrastructure is being developed which will not only challenge America's largest financial structures but also work to prevent further interventions in support of the South African minority government. The challenge for 1979 is to consolidate and extend these gains, while preparing for a long struggle. □

No. 46—STEVE BIKO

by Hilda Bernstein (1978, 150pp, illustrated)

"Reads like a detective story." —IN THESE TIMES, Chicago

Steve Biko was the forty-sixth person to die in security police detention in South Africa. For the first time, the inquest revealed full and horrifying details of how political detainees are treated. From a close reading of the inquest proceedings given in this book, it is possible to reconstruct the events and to identify the likely culprits responsible for Biko's death.

"It will be a long time, if ever, before I forget this harrowing account of calculated inhumanity. A moving and well-written book."

—MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL, UK

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1978 Chronology

In the brief space available we could not hope to include every event of importance affecting the current and future lives of the people of southern Africa. We also recognize that chronologies, which focus on dates, apparently isolated events, and the activities of leaders, are no substitute for an analysis of the forces at play in a society.

But they can serve as "memory ticklers," useful notes for people working to mobilize support for the liberation struggles of southern Africa. It is in this spirit that we have compiled the following 1978 chronology.

JANUARY

- Unibel squatter camp in Cape Town razed by government; 20,000 left homeless.
 - Patriotic Front leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, meet in Malta with Britain's Foreign Minister David Owen to discuss Anglo-American proposals for a Zimbabwe settlement.
 - Angola suffers continued attacks across its borders from Zaire and South African-controlled Namibia.
 - In South Africa trial opens of Zephaniah Mothopeng, 65, and 17 others, all charged under Terrorism Act with conspiring to overthrow the government and with furthering the aims of the banned Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The trial, held *in camera*, continues throughout the year; is one of scores of political trials involving apartheid opponents from many popularly supported organizations.
 - South African government-sanctioned Kwazulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi forms alliance with Sonny Leon of the Colored Labor Party, and Y.S. Chinsamy of Indian Reform Party, in attempt to create "moderate" black leadership acceptable to whites and their Western allies.
- January 8 Richard Turner, banned white university lecturer, anti-apartheid activist, shot to death by unknown assailants in South Africa.
- January 16 Opening of re-trial of 12 African Nationalist Congress (ANC) members charged with conspiring to overthrow the state by force. First trial of the Pretoria 12 ended when judge died, after 100 prosecution witnesses testified.
- January 17 Opening of new school year in South Africa, with more than half of primary school students staying out of classes, continuing boycott of Bantu education begun in mid-1976.
- January 22 Soweto community meeting endorses continued support for school boycott.
- January 25 Senator Dick Clark releases Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending that the president take steps to "actively discourage American investment in South Africa." Says that US companies have been "pivotal in directly assisting the South African government during its worst economic difficulties."

FEBRUARY

- Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole reject new Anglo-American proposals worked out at Malta; endorse plan for an "internal settlement."
 - Israeli Finance Minister pays official visit to South Africa, holding talks on expanding trade.
 - Mozambique launches campaign to restructure FRELIMO, designed to bring tens of thousands of new members into the party, and to establish party cells in communities and workplaces all over the country.
- February 9 Five Western ministers meet with South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha and separately with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma at the United Nations, to discuss proposals for settlement.
- February 18 Only 6 percent of Soweto voters participate in elections for puppet local council.
- February 26 Mangaliso Sobukwe, 53, founder and president of the banned Pan Africanist Congress, dies in Kimberley, South Africa.

MARCH

- In Mozambique, 400,000 peasants left homeless after heavy rains and Zambezi River flooding; at least 45 people drowned, 940,000 acres of crops destroyed.
 - 60 American corporate executives tour Rhodesia, South Africa and Tanzania. Despite strong rebuke from President Nyerere about continued US financial aid to apartheid and colonial regimes, businessmen generally agree on continued investment.
- March 1 ANC member Solomon Mahlangu, convicted of murder and other offenses under Terrorism Act, sentenced to death. Mahlangu pleaded not guilty to the charge of shooting two men in Johannesburg in June 1977. Judge accepted that he had not fired fatal shots, but found him guilty of common purpose. Co-defendant, Mondy Motloung, could not stand trial because of brain injury sustained at hands of police. Mahlangu was refused leave to appeal; at year end still awaiting execution.
- March 3 "Internal Settlement" signed, ensuring white hegemony over black-governed Zimbabwe. Co-signers Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau to comprise interim executive council, headed by Smith, to lead country until independence.
- March 6 Violent confrontation between DTA and SWAPO in Windhoek ghetto leaves 3 dead.
- March 11 Mangaliso Sobukwe buried. Thousands of blacks attend funeral as symbol of protest, Angry militants attack Chief Buthelezi as sell-out, prevent him speaking and force him to leave.
- March 14 Internal settlement in Rhodesia denounced by a meeting of Security Council; earlier by African heads-of-state and international community. Patriotic Front leaders tell Security Council they will renew war effort. Muzorewa, visiting US, is refused access to Security Council, but lured by sanctions breakers, hosted by Union Carbide.- During UN debate, Rhodesian planes attack Zambian troops, killing 20.

March 14 Olin Corporation, major US manufacturer of firearms, pleads no contest to charges that it conspired to ship 3,200 rifles to South Africa in violation of arms embargo. Company ordered to pay \$510,000 to local charity programs as reparation.

March 23 13 black community leaders in South Africa released after 5 months detention without charges. Those released include Dr. Nihato Motlana, leader of Soweto's Committee of 10, and Percy Qoboza, editor of the banned, black-oriented paper, *The World*. Hundreds more continue to be held in detention, without trial, in solitary confinement. During year reports continue to filter out about deaths of detainees under police torture.

March 27 Chief Clemens Kapuuu, president of the DTA, shot dead. South African police allege SWAPO responsibility; SWAPO denies charge.

APRIL

- Establishment of \$20 million fund for destabilization of Angola disclosed; money to go to UNITA. Backers include South Africa, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco.
 - Rhodesian interim executive council orders release of 461 political prisoners. Of first 100 released, most are supporters of Muzorewa and Sithole.
- April 1 Police teargas 1,000 demonstrating in northern Transvaal against rent increases.
- April 2 Rhodesia devalues currency for second time in 6 months as economy buckles, raising war costs, estimated at \$1.5 million daily.
- April 7 Trial of ANC Pretoria 12 ends. Six acquitted, six sentenced to long prison terms. Eleven men, one woman in detention for 16 months, on trial for nearly a year.
- April 10 Chief Mantanzima of Transkei bantustan "breaks" relations with South Africa.
- April 12 Western plan for Namibia presented to SWAPO and South Africa.
- April 17 South Africa expelled from Davis Cup competition in Nashville after largest anti-apartheid demonstration in US sports history.
- April 17 Soweto Community Council elections again draw only 6 percent of electorate.
- April 18 South African Security Police chief admits 2,500 political prisoners tried since 1976.
- April 26 South Africa accepts Western plan for Namibian independence: UN-supervised elections and phased withdrawal of South African troops by year end.
- April 29 Rhodesian interim executive sacks Byron Hove, black associate justice minister, for criticism of police and interim executive.
- April 29 SWAPO gives qualified agreement to Western plan, contingent on three changes, namely that Walvis Bay be acknowledged part of Namibia, South African police be disarmed, and South African administrator be placed under UN supervision. SWAPO offers ceasefire if all conditions met.
- Malta II—in Dar es Salaam, talks are held between Patriotic Front leaders and American and British Foreign Ministers.

MAY

- Mozambique nationalizes privately-owned Coal Company of Mozambique, site of 250 miners' deaths as result of poor working conditions.
 - South African security police admit as many as 100 suspected guerrillas captured recently; fear escalation of guerrilla activity. Continuing reports of guerrilla activity, some clashes with police, throughout the year.
 - John Stockwell, former head of CIA's Angola Task Force during 1975-76 war, publishes *In Search of Enemies*, critical of US government role in Angola.
- May 1 AZAPO (Azanian People's Organization) formed to maintain black consciousness movement in wake of widespread bannings.
- May 4 South Africa attacks SWAPO refugee camps in Cassinga, Angola, killing up to 700 people, mostly women and children.
- May 5 AZAPO president detained by police. Member of Soweto Action Committee also detained.
- May 8 In response to Cassinga attack, SWAPO breaks off talks with Western diplomats at UN on Namibian settlement.
- May 13 Katangese rebels occupy Shaba mining town of Kolwezi in Zaire.
- May 14 Rhodesian forces open fire on countryside meeting, killing 94 villagers in effort to kill one guerrilla.
- President Kaunda of Zambia meets President Carter at White House.
- May 17 Tanzania releases 11 former members of SWAPO, detained since 1976 for attempted coup against SWAPO leadership, as condition for South African release of Namibian political prisoners.
- May 17 Belgian and French paratroops dropped in Kolwezi to aid Mobutu. In intense fighting, many civilians, black and white, are killed. European forces retake Kolwezi.
- May 19 GM South African "contingency plan" exposed. Will mobilize white employees to resist black rebellion in collaboration with South African government.
- May 24 Senator Dick Clark reveals US reconsidering involvement "in Angola civil war." Clark discloses CIA Director Stansfield Turner approached him with plan to re-supply UNITA.

JUNE

- As many as 5,000 blacks reported detained in weeks prior to June 16, Soweto memorial day.
 - Angola's President Agostinho Neto and Portugal's President Ramalho Eanes meet in Guinea-Bissau. Talks lead to normalization of relations, plans for repatriation from Portugal of many who fled Angola in 1975.
- June 2 US House of Representatives passes restriction on Ex-Im Bank financing to South Africa, barring funds to the government and to corporations not practicing fair employment.
- June 16 Second commemoration of Soweto uprising, demonstrations in South Africa and around the world.
- June 23 Eight British missionaries and four children killed at Elim Mission in eastern Rhodesia. ZANU blames black government commandos who dress as guerrillas and massacre innocents to foment hatred of Front forces.
- June 28 US Senate comes within 6 votes of lifting sanctions against Rhodesia; effort spearheaded by Rhodesia-supporter Jesse Helms.
- US diplomat Donald McHenry in Luanda for exploratory talks with MPLA, re Namibia settlement, relations with Zaire.

JULY

- Church of Christian Liberty, near Chicago, invites Smith and Rhodesia interim executive council to church conference; later announces is recruiting Green Berets to re-open Elim Mission.
 - Rhodesian troops raid Mozambique, striking at ZANU bases.
 - PAC holds first party conference in 15 years in Dar es Salaam; elects Potlako Leballo chairman; purges dissidents.
 - South Africa begins registering voters in Namibia for "internal settlement" elections in November.
- July 10 Lungile Tabalaza killed in plunge from fifth story of police station in Port Elizabeth where Steve Biko was tortured before his death. Later, Paulos Cane, killed by "systematic torture" in Natal prison, becomes 26th detainee known to have died in police custody since 1976. Government orders investigation.
- July 12 After meetings in Luanda between SWAPO and Western five, SWAPO agrees to Western plan for Namibia.
- South African Council of Churches urges foreign investors to "radically revise" investment policies in South Africa; states "foreign investment and loans have largely been used to support the prevailing patterns of power and privilege."
- July 20 Protection of Businesses Act comes into effect in South Africa; prohibits foreign firms from disseminating information about their activities without consent from Minister of Economic Affairs.
- July 26 Bishop Muzorewa lobbies with Senate conservative Jesse Helms in effort to lift sanctions. "Case/Javits" amendment passed requiring sanctions to be lifted after elections and agreement by interim executive to all-party conference.

- July 28 UN Security Council approves Western plan for Namibia, also passes resolution declaring Walvis Bay part of Namibia. South Africa protests Walvis Bay resolution.
- July 28 11 members of the Soweto Students Representative Council, ages 18-23, indicted under Terrorism Act in connection with Soweto uprising and continuing resistance to Bantu Education and apartheid. Most have been held for over a year, with no outside contact.
- July 30 Following two meetings between Presidents Neto and Mobutu, Angola and Zaire announce plans to normalize relations.
- July 30 More Rhodesian raids into Mozambique.

AUGUST

- 3,000 workers strike copper mines near Salisbury; police kill 4.
- World Council of Churches donates \$85,000 to Patriotic Front; draws fire from conservative circles.
- August 14 Smith and Nkomo hold secret meeting in Lusaka. Reportedly Nkomo rejects leadership of government offered by Smith.
- August 21 UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) returns from Namibia; prepares report for Secretary General Waldheim.
- August 23 SWAPO offensive against South African bases in Caprivi Strip. 10 South African soldiers killed.
- August 25 South Africa attacks Zambia-based SWAPO camps in retaliation for SWAPO attack. 18 guerrillas and 12 civilians reported killed.
- August 30 US presidential aspirant John Connally tours South Africa and Namibia; praises the government and promises new US support.
- August 30 UN Secretary General Waldheim issues operational plan for steps to Namibian independence, based on Commissioner Ahtisaari's report.

SEPTEMBER

- President Neto warns South Africa on continued violations of Angola's territory; announces 51 percent takeover of Cabinda Gulf Oil.
- Tanzania nationalizes Lonrho holdings, multinational with long history of economic exploitation and manipulation of southern African politics; played a role in the August secret meeting between Nkomo and Smith.
- September 3 ZAPU shoots down Air Rhodesia plane on regular commercial flight. Smith alleges ZAPU killed survivors. Nkomo places blame on Rhodesian soldiers; also alleges civilian flights carry military personnel.
- September 7-8 SWAPO and South Africa present UN with reservations and requests for clarification of UN plan for transition period.
- September 14 Cape Town Crossroads squatter camp raided, 500 arrested, 3 killed including one baby.
- September 15 Neto announces plans to free MPLA dissidents and former FLNA members from prison.
- September 16 Neto begins state visit to Maputo, during which treaty of friendship signed between Angola and Mozambique.
- September 18 Trial opens of Soweto students indicted in August.
- September 20 Vorster resigns, after announcing rejection of UN transition plan for Namibia. Pieter Botha, South African Defense Minister, succeeds Vorster as Prime Minister.
- September 27 World Council of Churches gives SWAPO \$125,000 humanitarian aid.

OCTOBER

- New record for white emigration from Rhodesia as 1800 flee in one month.
- Scandal hits South African government, implicating former Information Minister Connie Mulder in use of government funds to establish pro-government English language newspaper, *The Citizen*. Also reveal South African government attempts to buy *Washington Star* in US. Botha appoints commission of enquiry.
- South African police raid squatter settlement in East London.
- October 5 Five Western Foreign Ministers in Pretoria to avoid crisis over rejection of Namibia plan. Reach "compromise" in which South Africa will proceed with internal elections this year and possible UN elections next year.
- October 6 Amid domestic and international pressure, Zambia's President Kaunda opens border with Rhodesia, over protests of front-line allies, Nyerere and Machel. Action strains front-line unity.
- October 7 Smith arrives in US, tours for a week. Met by numerous demonstrations, sympathetic press response, reports of private assurances of support from major government and corporate figures.
- October 12 Smith tells Senate he will go to all-party conference "without preconditions" in bid to convince Congress will fulfill requirements of bills designed to lift sanctions.
- October 12 Congress renews year-old ban on bilateral aid to Mozambique and Angola.
- October 15 US Senate okays compromise passed earlier by House cutting Ex-Im financing to South Africa.
- October 19 Rhodesia mounts major bombing raids into Zambia and Mozambique, temporarily assume control of Zambian air traffic over Lusaka airport and Zambian air force base.
- October 28-29 Front-line states meet in Dar es Salaam; discuss Zambia-Rhodesia border opening. Mozambique conspicuously absent. Unity remains strained.
- New Anglo-American "Option B" plan for Zimbabwe circulated, stipulating elections could be postponed until after achievement of independence and lifting of sanctions. On return to Salisbury from Washington, Smith announces elections delayed until 1979.
- October 30 Majority of black university students in Rhodesia sign petition opposing draft of African youths next year.
- October 31 Rhodesia announces troops have destroyed Zambian military outpost. First time Smith regime reports attack on Zambian installation. Previous incursions have always been described as directed against Patriotic Front bases.

NOVEMBER

- November 2 Rhodesians bomb ZAPU refugee camps in Zambia.
- November 7 Whites attacked in Lusaka amid reports that some aided invading Rhodesian forces. Considered worst such incidents since independence.
- November 7 Minister of Plural Relations Connie Mulder resigns in wake of South African information ministry scandal.
- November 7 Senator Dick Clark, chairman of Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs, defeated in re-election bid.
- November 8 Zambian government appeals for calm. President Kaunda blames abductions and harassments of white farmers on Rhodesian units disguised as guerrillas.
- November 10 South African Prime Minister Botha orders confiscation of scandal documents; dismisses investigating judge; sets up closed inquiry panel; attacks press coverage.
- November 11 Benguela Railway re-opens operations from Angola into Zaire.
- November 13 Security Council condemns South African plans to hold December "internal elections" in Namibia, in contravention of UN plan; threatens, but does not impose, sanctions.
- November 16 Rhodesian interim executive postpones elections for majority rule until April 20, 1979.
- November 27-28 South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha meets with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim over Namibian impasse.
- November 30 Foreign Minister Botha in Washington for talks with Secretary of State Vance.

COMPANIES LOBBY AGAINST ARMS EMBARGO

American corporations whose sales have been hurt by the embargo on US exports to the South African military and police are lobbying hard for new loopholes in the policy.

In February 1978, the Carter administration issued new regulations prohibiting the export or re-export of all US-origin goods and technical data "to or for use by or for" the military or police in South Africa. This new policy was probably the most important economic sanction against South Africa by the United States, precisely because there were no loopholes. But now it may well be compromised.

The Commerce Department and the State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs are urging a weakening of the policy to permit certain "non-essential" commodities to be sold to the military or police, and to allow export of US goods if an "insignificant amount" (perhaps five percent) is resold to the military apparatus. Within the State Department, however, there is still considerable debate, which may not be resolved for several months.

General Tire and Rubber Co. has been one of the most active corporate lobbyists on this issue. One executive wrote to members of Congress who represent districts where General Tire plants are located asking them to complain to the Carter administration about the regulations. General Tire has had to suspend a \$1 million per year technical assistance agreement with a South African firm in which it holds a 20 percent interest, because the South African partner sells some tires to the military and police.

The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association is also lobbying for a change, because the current regulations prevent its members from selling to the South African government's central medical supply body which in turn supplies the military. A letter from the State Department to the Association reportedly suggested that a "humanitarian exception" will probably be added to the regulations to allow sale of most pharmaceuticals.

General Motors is also lobbying for a change. Its South African subsidiary has lost some sales of vehicles which contain components exported from the United States.

At the same time that African states at the United Nations are urging new economic sanctions against South Africa as a result of its intransigence on Namibia, the

Carter administration may well be going in the opposite direction. A change in the embargo regulations would be one more sign of the administration's friendlier approach to the South Africa government.

SOUTH AFRICAN PREMIER INVITED TO THE US

President Jimmy Carter has invited the new South African Prime Minister, Pieter Botha, to visit the United States.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance delivered Carter's personal letter to Botha when Western foreign ministers made their pilgrimage to Pretoria in mid-October for that three-day conclave on the sticky and pressing matter of Namibia. Vance disclosed that there was an "exchange of correspondence" between Carter and the South African premier.

This initiative for closer US cooperation with the apartheid regime came just as Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's two week tour of the US came to an end. Smith's sojourn here began with a show of government disapproval and ended with serious and extended conversations at the State Department.

Back in Salisbury, Smith claimed, not without reason, that he has been accorded "de facto" recognition by the United States government.

Johannesburg's *Sunday Express* ascribes the incipient alliance with Pretoria to American fears that Cuban troops will enter the war in Zimbabwe by April. "They [the American leaders] believe that South Africa's role is pivotal throughout the sub-continent. That is why they leaned over backward to accommodate the [South African] government. . . . President Carter will offer South Africa, in return for cooperation in southern Africa, his considerable influence in expanded trade and economic cooperation with the sub-continent."

The *Washington Post* described the new shift as "more carrot and less stick in dealing with Pretoria." According to the *Post*, Carter's letter to Botha "reportedly said that a 'more normal relationship' could be established between Washington and Pretoria if South Africa used its influence constructively, in American eyes, in Namibia and Rhodesia."

CONGRESS CUTS EXIM FINANCING TO SOUTH AFRICA

A one-year public campaign to end financing for exports to South Africa by the government-run Export-Import Bank ended in partial victory October 15, when the Senate adopted compromise language passed by the House in June. Although the campaign yielded a compromise, it was nonetheless significant, in that this is the first time Congress has even taken

economic action against South Africa.

The new provision provides that no financing can be authorized in support of exports to the South African government or its agencies including government-owned para-statal corporations. It also prohibits financing to private companies unless the State Department is satisfied that they are "proceeding toward implementing" the Leon Sullivan code of fair employment practices, including a "willingness to engage in collective bargaining with trade unions." A fight over even this compromise language had been expected in the senate, but it passed without any debate on the last day of the session amid the press of other business.

The State Department is now drafting new operational guidelines to implement the congressional restriction. While some of the financing will continue, the new law will mean a further reduction in the level of US economic support for South Africa. During fiscal year 1978, the Exim Bank authorized \$82.3 million for South Africa.

The campaign to cut Exim support for South Africa united many groups across the country that were working on the bank campaign, corporate divestment, and an end to foreign aid to governments that grossly violate human rights.

SOUTH AFRICAN LOBBYISTS

Until recently the Washington law firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill, Edwards, and Scott was officially registered in the US as a lobbyist for the South African government. Donald de Kieffer, one of the partners, was the man most heavily involved in promoting South African interests.

The South Africans have proved grateful clients. De Kieffer has reportedly earned \$50 an hour for his efforts.

But representing a client like South Africa can be troublesome. Last year, the firm was forced to cancel recruitment interviews at Harvard Law School because of threatened student protests. This September, however, the firm did conduct interviews near campus although students continued to protest its presence.

The firm had prepared a ready answer to inquiries about the South African connection: They no longer represent Pretoria. A new firm, de Kieffer and Associates, handles the South African account. But the three de Kieffer members remain partners in Collier Shannon and have the same offices they occupied before the new firm's founding. Don de Kieffer has said that he and his two partners spend about a third of their time on the new firm, which handles South Africa exclusively.

Given the continuing organizing and activism on South African issues in the US, such apologists for South Africa will likely continue to run into opposition on college campuses in the future. □

New Books This Year

The following is a selection of some of the more useful books on southern Africa that were published this year. Their appearance on this list does not preclude future review.

IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES

John Stockwell
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) \$12.95

Revelations by the former head of the CIA's Angolan task force about the CIA's role in the Angolan civil war. Stockwell contrasts the "sanitized" image of post-Vietnam American foreign policy with the reality of intervention in Angola: the military advisers on the ground, the collaboration with South African military and security forces, and the armaments aid to anti-MPLA forces. (See *Southern Africa*, June/July 1978).

NUCLEAR AXIS

Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers
(New York: Quadrangle, 1978,) \$12.50

The story of the clandestine collaboration between South Africa and West Germany to develop operational nuclear weapons for South Africa.

LET FREEDOM COME: AFRICA IN MODERN HISTORY

Basil Davidson
(Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1978) \$12.50

An interpretation of modern African history by a writer who helped inaugurate the non-racist approach to African studies in the West. Davidson summarizes developments throughout Africa during the period of white penetration and traces the shape of modern African nation states back to the manner in which indigenous political and cultural forces struggled to combat structures of Western domination. (Reviewed in *Southern Africa*, November 1978).

BIKO

Donald Woods
(New York: Paddington Press, 1978).

The prominent white South African liberal journalist's account of Biko's life. Woods has capitalized on his friendship with the black leader to make Biko's work known to a wide audience, but one senses an unseemly concern with making Woods known to a wide audience as well.

NO. 46: BIKO

Hilda Bernstein
(London: International Defense and Aid, 1978).

After briefly surveying Biko's political life and thought, the book presents summaries, and in many cases transcripts, of evidence given during the inquest by the South African government into Biko's death. The author concludes with a critique of the official version of the events surrounding Biko's murder.

STEVE BIKO

Edited by Millard Arnold
(New York: Random House, 1978) \$12.95.

Edited transcripts of testimony Biko gave when called as a defense witness in the trial of Black Consciousness Movement leaders in 1976. Biko talks at length about the black consciousness movement though naturally he is limited by the courtroom framework and the threat of state violence hanging over the head of the defendants in the trial.

BLACK POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Gail M. Gerhart
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) \$14.50.

Traces the changing political consciousness of the mass of Africans since the Second World War as revealed by changes in the mass-based political organizations. The book emphasizes the increasing influence of black nationalist thought in such organizations as the ANC Youth League, the PAC, and the Black Consciousness Movement, and tries to point to both the strengths and limitations of this orientation in the liberation struggle.

UKUBAMBA AMADOLO, WORKERS STRUGGLES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Bettie du Toit
(London: Onyx Press, 1978).

An account of multi-racial labor organizing in South Africa from the 1930s to the Durban strikes of 1973 and 1974. The author, a working class Afrikaner woman, was a leading participant in many of the struggles which she chronicles.

MAGUBANE'S SOUTH AFRICA

Peter Magubane
(New York: Knopf, 1978) \$7.95.

African social life and suffering under apartheid is depicted in about 100 pages of photographs by one of South Africa's leading photo-journalists. Some of the best shots are of black-white confrontation, but many of the photographs simply capture scenes of African life under the conditions set by apartheid. Few books could introduce someone to South African social reality as quickly or as well.

ANGOLA UNDER THE PORTUGUESE

Gerald D. Bender
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) \$15.00.

A study of social, political and economic relations between blacks and whites during the 500 years of Portuguese colonization in Angola. Bender provides all the evidence necessary to refute the notion that Portuguese whites were less suppressive of the African people than other white settler populations in Africa.

THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION—VOLUME II: EXILE POLITICS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE, 1962-1976

John A. Marcum
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978) \$15.00.

Provides the most comprehensive treatment yet to appear of the liberation struggle in Angola. Marcum includes thorough discussions of the three contending African movements, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, but raises more questions than he answers about United States involvement in the conflict.

SOWING THE FIRST HARVEST: NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN GUINEA-BISSAU

Ole Gjerstad and Chantal Sarrazin
(LSM Information Center, P.O. Box 2077, Oakland, CA. 94904) \$2.95.

An introduction to the problems faced by the Guinea-Bissau people and government since the victory of PAIGC. The book contains interviews and life stories as well as reports on a visit to Guinea-Bissau in early 1975.

PEDAGOGY IN PROCESS: LETTERS TO GUINEA-BISSAU

Paulo Freire
(New York: Seabury Press, 1978) \$8.95.

Reflections by the radical Brazilian educator on Guinea-Bissau's literacy program, in which he has served as a consultant.

book reviews

A Luta Continua: Creating a New Society in Mozambique, by Allen Isaacman, Fernand Braudel Center, SUNY-Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13901, 1978, 131 pp., \$2.

The southern African headlines now focus on Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa. It is less dramatic and more difficult to write about what has happened since liberation movement victories in neighboring Angola and Mozambique. Before 1974, their struggles were virtually ignored in the Western press. Now they appear most often, even in sympathetic publications, primarily in the role of "front-line states" in the continuing struggle against white-minority rule.

This concentration is understandable; indeed, their participation in the wider struggle is of the greatest importance. Yet if we do not pay attention to internal developments as well, the risk is that the caricatures propagated by Angola and Mozambique's enemies will prevail by default, even among many who should know better and who would be sympathetic

if they knew the facts. The implications go beyond the particular case of Angola and Mozambique. "If the results of revolution are so horrible," the train of thought goes, "maybe the white-minority regimes or their 'internal solutions' are not so bad in comparison."

The false images—of chaos, repression, rigid and dogmatic Marxism, subservience to Soviet commands, and more—are widespread. To counter them requires more than general slogans. Facts are necessary.

It is for this reason that Allen Isaacman's pamphlet should become a basic resource for those concerned with southern Africa. He has good credentials as a historian and has also spent substantial time in Mozambique since independence. His pamphlet provides details based both on written sources and on his own extensive interviews, not only with government officials but with ordinary people around the country.

A first chapter describes briefly the colonial background and the liberation strug-

gle. The rest of the 130-page pamphlet deals with political organization, the economic changes since independence, and social services such as education, health and housing. (Two aspects less prominent in the pamphlet—cultural developments and foreign relations—are included with other topics in the Spring, 1978 number of *Issue*, published by the African Studies Association and also edited by Isaacman.)

Isaacman's stance towards Mozambique is unabashedly positive. But he also shows a recognition of the many problems the country faces, and stresses that the pamphlet is only a preliminary study. Even those inclined to be more critical and cynical, after they discount his enthusiasm, will still have to reckon with the facts he presents. And all those who already share a concern for solidarity with Mozambique should put this pamphlet on their *must read* list, and give it to friends as well.

—Bill Minter

US Press

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the same look—but it's only the look that's the same. Here they like to compare themselves with the Israelis: a small, superbly trained force, audacious strikes deep into hostile territory, and most important of all, they'll tell you, they're defending their own land."

Despite the genial style of Joshua Nkomo, neither he nor Robert Mugabe could do much to win over a press more terrified of Marxism than of inflation.

The *Washington Post* insisted in an editorial on April 19 that the two "still want a single-party dictatorship on Marxist lines in Rhodesia," while the conservative columnist James Kilpatrick, writing in the same paper on March 21, maintained that "by their refusal to embrace the Rhodesian settlement, Britain and the United States are demonstrating to the whole world how the West will be lost."

South Africa. John Burns of the *New*

York Times is, as I understand it, an Australian. Maybe that accounts for his feeling so uncomfortable around blacks that he rarely interviews one unless the man is seated in an office wearing a coat and tie. As one example of Burn's tendency to sound like a public relations man for the South African government, on November 15 he wrote a story about the appointment of Pieter Koornhof as Minister of the Department of Plural Relations (formerly Bantu Affairs). The very fact that Burns gave no indication that he appreciated the ridiculousness of the name change says something. More serious, however, and more telling, is Burn's treatment of Koornhof's predecessor, Connie Mulder, who recently resigned because of a scandal involving the Ministry of Information, which he formerly headed.

Citing Mulder for his outstanding contributions to the advancement of South African blacks, Burns notes in particular "the establishment of more than 100 community councils in urban black townships envisioned by the government as embryonic local governments." No mention of the fact that the elections were almost totally boycotted by blacks of all political persua-

sions, who saw them as an insulting exercise in powerlessness.

While Burns might easily win an award for the worst continuing coverage of South Africa, June Goodwin of the *Christian Science Monitor* would be a strong contender for an award for the best. One of many good stories she wrote during the year, on January 30, took a hard look at Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the leading black cheerleader for continued foreign investment and head of a black political-cultural group, Inkatha. The US press, which barely knew Steve Biko's name at the time of his death, routinely quotes Buthelezi whenever it needs a comment from a black "leader." Goodwin's piece pointed out, among other things, that Buthelezi's supporters are mostly middle-aged and conservative, and that blacks generally see him as lacking credibility because of his frequent self-serving changes of position.

Special mention is also due the unsung writer of the *New York Times* editorials on Africa, which several times during the year managed an intelligent, if not exactly revolutionary, tone. Of particular significance, given the increasing impor-

tance of the withdrawal issue, was a temperately worded editorial on April 12 which contained, at the end, a (relative) bombshell.

"South Africa is not the only racist nation on earth, certainly not the only oppressive one," the editorial commented "But no other contemporary government—and certainly none that stands for the culture of the West—has dared to define itself as the embodiment of white supremacy. To Americans now, such doctrine is simply unacceptable. Gradually, so that there is time for the message to sink in, Americans should be heading for the exit." □

US Policy

continued from 4

grown his skills. . . he couldn't run an independent Namibia."

As presented by the State Department's traveling road show, the Carter administration's Africa policy has the following main elements:

•**Trade and investment:** Young leads the way in championing the cause of US capitalism in "partnership" with African development. "We do things better than almost anyone on earth," Young boasted, adding that even Marxist governments in Africa would have to turn to the West for sophisticated technology and for markets for their mineral resources. Young said he perceived a less ideological, more pragmatic approach toward US investment throughout Africa, as well as a desire for "joint ventures" with US multinationals. "If they had half a chance to get what we [blacks] have in Atlanta, I think all of Africa would want it," Young exuded.

Young and his associates also claim that, despite the exploitative record of US corporations in South Africa, the multinationals can become a force for changing the apartheid system. This has been Carter's position all along.

Young, McHenry and the others oppose withdrawal of US investment and a cut-off of US bank loans as a way to pressure the South African regime. But they know that this position will become increasingly untenable if the Carter administration wants to continue building close political ties with Nigeria and other African countries.

•**Soviet/Cuban role:** Unlike Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the State Department "Africanists" tend to play down the Soviet-Cuban "threat." Distinguishing between Moscow and Havana, they are less critical, and occasionally even positive, about the Cuban role in Africa. "There is no question the Soviets love to fish in troubled waters," McHenry

said. "As long as there are underlying problems in southern Africa, we can expect the Soviets to try to take advantage of them. But they simply do not have staying power. Their influence did not last in Kenya, Zaire, Guinea, or even Somalia."

Anthony Lake, the director of the State Department's policy planning staff, went so far as to say in a workshop that "even if Cubans and Russians intervene on the side of blacks in South Africa, we would not intervene on the side of whites." Under questioning from an irate anti-communist in the audience, Lake amended his sweeping statement to say that the US might provide weapons to "threatened" regimes in southern Africa. He did not say whether this included South Africa.

Lake's waffling called to mind a simple fact-of-life in Washington that State Department liberals are reluctant to admit: the Youngs and Lakes share decision-making with many others, including the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the CIA. During the fighting in Zaire, for instance, it became obvious that the State Department's views on the Soviets in Africa were quickly overruled by the more traditional Cold War, interventionist outlook of policymakers such as Brzezinski. The administration was not above inventing Cuban involvement to justify its intervention. As yet—despite State Department assurances—there is no indication the US will respond any differently the next time an African "hot spot" explodes.

•**Rhodesia:** The State Department maintains that an all-party conference is still the best way to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the war although it has clearly not put sufficient pressure on Smith to make him attend such a conference. Richard Moose insisted in an interview that "it's never been our policy to split the Patriotic Front. . . because to exclude ZANU's Robert Mugabe would simply be a formula for civil war." Moose revealed that the US knew in advance of the secret Joshua Nkomo-Smith talks last August but claimed that Washington understood that Mugabe was to be brought into subsequent meetings.

At the conference, Young described Smith's regime as "neo-fascist." He also noted that many Zimbabweans had been educated in the United States and that Rhodesia's "well-developed black middle class" could be expected to "work cooperatively" with the US after independence.

Responding to a question about US mercenaries in Rhodesia, Young remarked cavalierly, "We've got people all over the world doing their own thing." Later he acknowledged that "politically, they are very embarrassing," but he claimed it was almost impossible for the government to stop mercenary recruiting despite the laws against it.

•**South Africa:** Although Young in particular has developed a reputation for militant opposition to the apartheid regime, it is clear that, for now, the pressure is off South Africa. They don't like to admit it, but State Department officials have reverted to the old Kissinger strategy: cooperation with South Africa in exchange for acceptable settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia.

It is this "diplomacy" that galls African leaders such as Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. Aside from reluctant US support for the mandatory UN arms embargo against South Africa—which came far too late to have any real impact on a regime already armed to the teeth by the West—the Carter administration has taken little concrete action to back up its rhetoric.

Now even the rhetoric is subdued. Vice President Mondale's claim that the US favors "one man, one vote," has been pared down to Secretary of State Vance's hesitant assertion that the US would like to see South Africa make progress toward ending apartheid. Vance hastens to add, "We do not seek to impose either a timetable or a blueprint for this progress." □

Mozambique

continued from 16

with other front-line states during 1978. Joint Tanzanian-Mozambican commissions were functioning, and trade rose substantially. A joint institute for the training of the two countries' diplomats began operations in Dar es Salaam, on the premises of the former Mozambique Institute. In mid-September Angolan President Agostinho Neto visited Mozambique, solidifying the already close ties between the two countries. A visit to Mozambique by Lesotho Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan resulted in an air agreement whereby Mozambique's DETA airlines would provide weekly service to the Lesotho capital, Maseru. Previously, Lesotho's air connections were all through South Africa, which surrounds the small country.

The August FRELIMO Central Committee meeting confirmed the party's established international policy, which has long entailed close relations with the socialist countries, the nonaligned countries, and, in the West, with Scandinavia. The Central Committee also forcefully reaffirmed Mozambique's refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict, or in other disputes between socialist countries. Mozambique's international policy was reflected in President Machel's state visits, which took him to many front-line state capitals throughout the year, to the United Nations, Cuba, Jamaica and Guyana in late 1977, and to North Korea, China, Mongolia, and Hungary. □

Namibia

continued from 8

The special session at the UN finished its session May 2 by calling for economic sanctions against South Africa for its continued defiant occupation of Namibia. The Western powers now concentrated on SWAPO in an attempt to persuade the movement to compromise further and accept the proposals. SWAPO was expressing four main objections to the plan at this point: South African residual troops were to be based in the North, while SWAPO wanted them in the South; the relationship between the UN representative and the South African administrator was left vague, and SWAPO wanted UN superiority clearly spelled out; the South African police were left in control during the transitional period, while SWAPO wanted its status as a Namibian territory explicitly defined. By most accounts SWAPO came under heavy pressure from the West, from African countries, and even from the front-line states. Talks went on into the first week of May.

Cassinga Attack

Then—on May 4—the South African Defence Force launched an airborne attack on a Namibian refugee camp in southern Angola. Four thousand men, women and children, who had recently fled South African terror in their own country, had been assembled by SWAPO at Cassinga 150 miles from the border, a site made available by the People's Republic of Angola. After heavy bombings, paratroopers, supported by French fighter aircraft and transported by American C-130 Hercules planes, wiped out the small SWAPO security contingent and spent the day killing people. A shocked and angry Sam Nujoma in New York broke off the talks and flew to Angola to bury his dead, numbering over 600.

The Western Five's leading negotiator, US ambassador Donald McHenry, hastened off to South Africa, and contacts were re-established with SWAPO with the help of the front line states. In July there was a meeting in Angola between SWAPO officials (two of whom were released from detention in Namibia— at Washington's insistence—and then reimprisoned upon returning to Windhoek), the Western Five and the front-line states. On July 12, after two days of intense discussion, a terse announcement said "the parties agreed to proceed to the Security Council as soon as possible."

South African Internal Settlement

Pretoria all the while was pressing on with its own scheme to hold unilateral elections—completely apart from the electoral process contemplated by the UN. Registration was begun in late June, an effort that the administrator-general claimed by Oc-

tober to be virtually inclusive of Namibia's 440,000 voting age population. The intimidation and harassment of SWAPO and other dissidents went on. Neutral but critical observers on the scene were simply deported: Early in July Father Edward Morrow, the Anglican vicar general; his wife, Lauren; and Gather Hunke, whose book on torture had been banned, were abruptly expelled by the administrator.

Namibians in exile who were not inimical to Pretoria's rule were allowed to return in a conscious effort to further undermine SWAPO's strength. Yet all objective independent accounts estimated that at this point support for SWAPO ranged from majority to overwhelming.

Security Council Empowers UNTAG

On July 27, the Security Council adopted two resolutions. Number 431 initiated the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group, (UNTAG) and requested the Secretary-General to report back on implementation plans. Resolution 432 declared that Walvis Bay must be reintegrated into Namibia and warned South Africa not to use the port and settlement "in any manner prejudicial to the independence of Namibia or the viability of its economy."

Pretoria howled about any mention of Walvis and a long week went by as the South African cabinet delayed acceptance of any UNTAG visit to Namibia. On August 5, however, the UN special representative, Commissioner for Namibia Martti Ahtisaari, and a 50-person civilian and military team flew out of New York in a US air force cargo plane. The Ahtisaari group spent half of August in Namibia. Its determinations were issued as the Secretary-General's report on August 29. Ahtisaari extended the UN role to the outermost permissible limits. UNTAG would consist of 7,500 troops and a 1,200-person civilian component, including 360 seasoned police officers to monitor the South African police. The UN's year-long operation covering the entire pre-election and election campaign period up to establishment of a Namibian government was estimated to cost up to \$300 million.

On September 20, as plans were being laid for another Security Council meeting to approve the Secretary-General's report, Prime Minister Vorster announced Pretoria's rejection of the plan (he also declared he was stepping down from his post as South Africa's head of government). The administrator-general immediately proclaimed that South Africa's unilateral elections would be held, and on the same day, September 20th, the South Africans published detailed regulations for the conduct of the elections. The dates, December 4-8, were announced shortly thereafter. On September 29 the Security Council resolved formally to establish UN-

TAG, welcomed SWAPO's acceptance and willingness to sign a cease-fire with South Africa, called on Pretoria to cooperate and pronounced all "unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void."

The leaders of the six major churches in Namibia issued an open letter to the new South Africa prime minister, Pieter W. Botha (who urged the 1975 South African invasion of Angola; he is still Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister), calling on Pretoria to accept the UN settlement plan. They stated: "As the registration has not been fair and free, the elections cannot be fair and free," and they warned that if he rejected the UN's presence "you will be held responsible worldwide for the escalation of an avoidable, terrible and tragic war in this country."

Still Playing Games

The Western group had for several years been holding off any serious international action against South Africa, on the basis of promises about Pretoria's willingness to settle peacefully in Namibia. Now Pretoria had made its intentions quite clear. It was not interested in any settlement that involved real liberation; this it was determined to exclude the liberation movement—SWAPO—from any future government.

This should have been the signal to the West that it was now time to act against South Africa with an immediate imposition of Security Council sanctions.

Instead, the Five went off to talk to the new prime minister in Pretoria. They came back with empty hands—South Africa, they were told, would go ahead with its elections; nothing would stop it. Afterwards, according to Pretoria, it was possible that the newly elected black leaders would be prepared to hold another election, under UN supervision. In a giant exercise of hypocrisy, the West accepted that as the basis for "keeping the door open."

When in November African nations in private discussions urged that sanctions be imposed on South Africa, it was made clear to them that such a move would be vetoed.

On November 13th the Security Council adopted a weak resolution of warning, 10-0 with all five Western members abstaining. The resolution simply warned South Africa that sanctions would be imposed if it did not agree to UN supervised elections.

SWAPO had pressed strongly for the imposition of sanctions; a SWAPO spokesman told *Southern Africa* that the movement saw this as simply another delaying tactic, buying more time for South Africa.

SWAPO has never given in to the pressures that urged it to cease fire while the

diplomats talked. This year proved the value of this decision.

The people of Namibia have been constantly betrayed in the international arena. Only SWAPO's capacity to wrest power away from South Africa can guarantee their future liberation. []

Zimbabwe *continued from 10*

tlement, Smith, hoping that he could hold onto power with the help of his new black colleagues, had refused to commit himself to the all-party conference. By the time he came to the US, it was clear that he was losing ground fast; official US coolness also indicated the need for some "concession." A few days into his tour he announced his willingness to enter into all-party talks with no pre-conditions.

State Department officials were greatly encouraged. But almost simultaneously with the Smith announcement in late October, Salisbury launched what was probably its most dramatic raid across its borders since the start of the war. Raids into Mozambique, of course, continued throughout 1978 after they were stepped up dramatically late last year. But late in October, Rhodesian security forces staged their first two-front offensive, striking some 12 ZAPU camps in Zambia and four ZANU positions in Mozambique. As so often in the past, the raids included strikes against refugee camps, some of which had large concentrations of women and children.

White Collapse

Aside from abruptly scuttling chances for a negotiated settlement, however slim that possibility was, Smith's raids seemed to demonstrate the increasing desperation of the Salisbury government. Indeed, this year's military and economic toll has been the greatest since the war was escalated some six years ago. Emigration is thought to have run to 1,500 or more in some months, which aggravated the government's dire shortage of manpower. By year's end, among the petty reforms initiated by the administration that Bishop Muzorewa claimed represented majority rule was a proposal to launch a military draft system for black Africans.

The pinch was strongly felt in the economy, and after the internal settlement was signed, a good deal of Salisbury's efforts were devoted to winning enough Western sympathy to have international economic sanctions lifted. The search for economic support was one of the announced purposes of Smith's visit to Washington.

At home, the struggle for survival was far uglier. There was a marked increase in the number of civilian and missionary deaths this year—many used by the Salisbury government to display the supposed savagery of the "terrorist" Patriotic Front.

Where evidence has emerged, however, it has shown that murders in Rhodesia have been committed by the elite Selous Scouts of the Rhodesian army while masquerading as guerrillas—and then used to win Western sympathy, and Western support.

Judging by the response of conservative US congressmen, the efforts achieved at least a limited success. The congressional measure passed last summer provided for an end to economic sanctions if elections were held in Rhodesia by the end of this year. That possibility has now evaporated but the significance of the measure as a demonstration of pressure on US policy cannot be overlooked.

The time, though, for such support to be effective may fast be running out. By year's end, significant areas of the country

were apparently under the control of either ZANU or ZAPU cadres. Unification talks between the two groups, meanwhile, were in progress throughout the year. And in some areas of Rhodesia still under Salisbury's control, the situation had become desperate enough to warrant the declaration of martial law.

Indeed, if a major trend can be assigned to developments in Zimbabwe in 1978, it was the clear outpacing of Western diplomatic efforts by the events on the ground—the increased war, and the embarrassment of Smith's internal settlement. Washington and London, which had once appeared ready to assume a commanding role in the Rhodesia conflict, were forced into a more and more reactive policy this year. []

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SOUTH AFRICA'S INFAMOUS

Bureau of State Security, better known as BOSS, recently had its name changed. It is now officially the Department of National Security or DONS—a less sinister title, perhaps, but no less a vicious purpose.

Although atrocities in South Africa jails continue against the African population, they usually go unremarked. But recently several policemen were charged with torturing six black prisoners who had been arrested after a burglary on a farm. According to evidence at the trial, the men were stripped naked, chained and hung by their wrists, and beaten and tortured with electric shocks. One of the six died a week later.

Similar treatment undoubtedly led to the deaths of many of the 337 people reported to have died while awaiting trial in South African jails between 1974 and 1977. This figure was released in Geneva in a report to a UN conference on racial discrimination held in August. The report, compiled by a group of experts on southern Africa working under the UN Commission on Human Rights, indicated that the list of deaths was still growing. The information had been gathered from first-hand reports in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam and London.

Despite near universal condemnation of South Africa's bantustan development schemes, some Western sources—with one conservative African state among them—are reportedly investing in at least one of these black reserves.

During the past two years, the *Financial Mail* reports, 33 industries have been established in Transkei with an additional 20 underway. Some 20 percent of total investment is coming from overseas, primarily from West Germany and Italy with negotiations underway with industrialists from Britain, Taiwan, Australia and Austria.

In July the South African *Star* reported the first known visit of any Western government official to the Transkei. An Austrian official was reportedly "secretly visiting Transkei" as a prelude to a major investment undertaking by one of Austria's largest industrial complexes, Steyr-Daimler-Puch.

This visit was followed by the first known state visit of an African representative to a South African bantustan. Officials from the Ivory Coast visited the Transkei in late September, according to South African press reports. The delegation was headed by Vice President A.B. Clement.

Of an estimated 1.25 million people permanently residing in South Africa but considered Transkeians by Pretoria, only 57 blacks have applied for citizenship in the Transkei bantustan. This news follows the expiration in October of a two-year grace period for South African "Transkeians" during which they were expected to sign up for "citizenship." The grace period has been extended to October 1980.

Most of the 57 who have applied thus far own either businesses or property in the Transkeian wastelands.



IN NAMIBIA, SIX CHURCHES

that are critical of the South African administration of the territory have founded a council of churches.

On October 4, the leaders of these churches issued a statement of support for the UN-backed plan for Namibian independence. It called on the new South African Prime Minister, Pieter Botha, "to accept this opportunity for peace under the guarantees provided by the United Nations."

The church leaders criticized South African plans to hold internal elections in place of previously agreed upon UN-supervised elections. "We feel compelled to caution that should your government not make use of this opportunity," they wrote in a letter to Botha, "you will be held responsible worldwide for the escalation of an avoidable, terrible and tragic war in this country."

Members of the newly formed council include the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia, the German Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Anglican Church, the Congregational Church and the African Methodist Episcopal Church.



ANGOLA IS PLANNING TO

send an official delegation to Zaire to inspect the controversial rocket launching OTRAG facilities in Shaba province. The agreement, reached during President Mobutu's visit to Angola in October, will also look into charges that the facilities, operated by a West German missile company, pose a threat to the revolutionary movements and states of southern Africa.

Pointing to NATO intervention in Shaba this year, critics contend that the OTRAG site could be used by NATO and the minority regimes of the region as a military base in the heart of Africa.

Mobutu claims that OTRAG is only commissioned to carry out peaceful missile testing and satellite launchings within its huge area of operations, approximately equal to the size of East Germany. However, critics insist that OTRAG is large enough to hide a large military staging area and, given the well-documented West German nuclear collusion with South Africa, it could conceal nuclear-armed missiles aimed at African urban centers.

The Angolan inspectors will also be looking into charges that Mobutu has sold or given complete control of the region and its local population to its West German operators.



RHODESIAN POLICE AR-

rested 266 young black men and women in Bulawayo in mid-November as they marched against the planned draft of Africans into the Rhodesian anti-guerrilla forces.

The march followed earlier demonstrations by draft-age African youth throughout the country. In late October, nearly all of the more than 1,000 African university students in the country signed a petition refusing to serve in the armed forces. Many were arrested in the demonstrations that followed.

Recent press reports reveal plans by the International Red Cross to evacuate 100,000 whites, or approximately half of the remaining white population, from war-torn Zimbabwe "should the guerrilla war make life untenable for whites." No reference was made to any major plans to assist any of the seven million Africans in the country.

The effort might involve the international agency in sanctions-breaking activity because it plans to provide travel papers to the fleeing settlers. Because of UN sanctions, Rhodesian travel papers are not recognized except by South Africa.

According to Jacques Pelichet, a Geneva lawyer and trouble-shooter for the Red Cross, "If they were issued with Red Cross travel documents, their acceptance would be far more general."

He added that Australia and New Zealand had told the agency that they would open their doors to a sudden influx of whites driven out of Rhodesia.

The Red Cross staff in Rhodesia has been recently increased to 25—the largest field group for the agency anywhere in the world.

SHOOTING DOWN THE "WILD GEESE"

Opposition to the new Allied Artists release, "The Wild Geese," is building as the film about white mercenaries in Africa tours the US. After its early November opening in 600 locations across the country, the film has met with leafletting by groups and individuals incensed by its arrogant racist and pro-Western content.

In New York several groups, including the American Committee on Africa, the Black United Front, Concerned Citizens' Committee on Africa, South Africa Military Refugee Fund, and the Columbia Committee Against Investments in South Africa, called for a boycott of the film.

"The Wild Geese" is dedicated to the late Moise Tshombe, whom Euan Lloyd, the film's producer, has called "the voice of reconciliation in Africa." It traces the fictional exploits of a band of white mercenaries who rescue a Tshombe-like African leader on behalf of British economic interests. The film is loosely based on the CIA-backed adventures of Colonel "Mad Mike" Hoare who, during the early 60's, supported Tshombe's secessionist plots against the newly independent Congo.

Written by a Rhodesian settler who fights with the armed forces against Patriotic Front fighters, the movie "is nothing more than an entertaining excuse for white supremacy and meddling throughout Africa," according to the Concerned Citizens-Columbia Committee leaflet.

"Geese" was filmed in South Africa. "The South African government, specifically the Defense Force and the police, directly collaborated in its production," adds the American Committee. "Proceeds from its world premier in Johannesburg were contributed to the South African Defense Fund [which] devotes the bulk of its money toward improving base facilities in illegally occupied Namibia. The film has also been widely used among white audiences in South Africa to boost sales of South African defense bonds."

Not incidentally, one of the "heroes" of the film is a white South African who dies "nobly" while protecting the African leader.

"Mad Mike" Hoare, who served as technical adviser on the film, also figured

prominently in its publicity. Hoare spoke to the press in New York and Washington prior to the opening.

He told one interviewer that if a "black" government, growing out of the present "internal settlement" in Zimbabwe, were faced with a continued threat from Patriotic Front forces, he would fight to defend that government.


And why not? It'd be just like old times in the Congo. Several reports in the press, including the London *Observer*, *Tanzania Daily News* and *Southern Africa*, have warned of such a desperate rescue attempt by Western allies of Smith and company.

As the Concerned Citizens-Columbia Committee notes, "'The Wild Geese' threatens to mold public opinion on this

critical issue. Can the American people afford to take their cues from Hollywood?"

CAMPUS ACTIONS. . . Students have undertaken a broad range of actions this fall to consolidate and push ahead with the anti-apartheid movement on campus. Meetings with and demonstrations against trustees and school corporations have continued, but some new targets and tactics have recently emerged.

At Harvard University, more than 800 demonstrated in late October against the naming of the new Kennedy School of



California billboard: protesting pro-mercenary, racist film.

Government after Charles Engelhard, the mining magnate who made millions from apartheid investments.

Princeton's People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa sponsored a "jogathon for freedom" in mid-November that saw 130 people jog 11 miles, the distance from Soweto to Johannesburg. The event raised several thousand dollars.

Anti-recruiting campaigns hit at familiar targets. IBM in particular drew considerable fire, highlighted in October by a picket line of Vassar students at the corporation's large Poughkeepsie plant. Several campuses protested IBM recruiters, including Brown, Columbia, Tufts, the University of Massachusetts, and Yale. Other apartheid-related recruiters were taunted at Amherst and Harvard.

Trustee demonstrations drew more than 2100 students at some 14 schools across the Northeast. Brown and Cornell each turned out more than 500 demonstrators while 300 students massed at an Amherst College trustee meeting.

Other schools with trustee actions include Columbia University, Dartmouth College, M.I.T., Mount Holyoke College, New York University, Princeton University, Rutgers University, Tufts University, Vassar College, Yale University, and Wellesley College.

At the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, four black students were reportedly arrested after demanding divestment at a trustees meeting in October.

Successful Divestments. The Co-op system at Berkeley has withdrawn an account totaling \$4 million from the Bank of America. The Student Council for the whole California university system has called on all 120,000 students to withdraw their holdings from the bank.

Vassar's trustees voted to sell \$2.25 million in stocks and bonds it holds in five banks lending to South Africa—Bank of America, Export-Import Bank, First National Bank of Chicago, Charter New York (Irving Trust), and Manufacturers Hanover Trust.

Major Conferences were held in the Midwest at Northwestern University in Illinois, in the Southeast at Duke University in North Carolina, and in the Northeast at New York University.

New anti-apartheid committees began work this fall at Boston College, Boston College of Law, Boston University, New York University, Morgan State, SUNY Albany, Rutgers/Newark, and the University of Pittsburgh among others.

THE BANK CAMPAIGN. . . An association of 13 midwestern colleges recently voted to withdraw \$1.6 million from Continental Bank of Chicago. The mid-October action by the Associated Colleges of the Midwest (ACM) follows another major withdrawal from Continental. In September, the National Council of Churches pulled out an \$8 million account because of the bank's apartheid lending.


Members of ACM include Beloit, Carleton, Lawrence, St. Olaf, Ripon, Coe, Cornell, Lake Forest, Macalester, Grinnel, Knox, Monmouth, and Colorado Colleges.

A major California student organization pulled out about one-quarter of a million dollars from the Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Lloyds recently. The Sacramento Associated Student Foundation, a student organization of the State University, will be moving the funds to community banks.

Also in Sacramento, the Rapid Transit District is moving funds out of Bank of America into local institutions. The district is also selling all its Kodak common stock.

The city of Davis, California is moving \$7 million in idle funds to institutions not making apartheid loans.

In New York state, Oneonta College is withdrawing revenue from the Wilbur National Bank because of that bank's ties to apartheid-lending Chase Manhattan. □



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