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**Front Line States
support ANC and SWAPO**

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Froit cover pic: SWAPO President Nujoma
and ANC President Tambo
at the Line States' Summit in Maputo.



EDITORIAL: JUNE 16

It is six years since the Soweto uprising of June 16th, 1976. Many authors write about these incidents in the past tense as if everything is over and yet we know that though the unrest seemed to have been contained by tough police and army action — the Vorsterian spirit of “law and order” — the full price has yet to be paid: external bleeding might have been checked but internal haemorrhaging continues up to today with serious implications.

The irony with Bantu Education is that, instead of making the Africans docile, it has produced the worst kind of frustration, resentment and hatred. This is due to the fact that the philosophy of any educational system cannot be divorced from politics. The philosophy of an educational system is conceived and given expression by politicians and apartheid, by its very nature, provides unequal amenities and those in power arrogate to themselves the best things in life. Bantu Education is inferior and the black man is subjected to academic starvation. But black children have the same aspirations as children of other racial groups and there are no aspirations divinely set aside for one racial group; differentiation is artificial and unacceptable perpetuating servitude. Bantu Education perpetuates tribalism: it is aimed at developing a unique pride in a child's ethnic origin and ethnic future as a member of a unique “seperate nation” and at preventing the African child from emerging from the insular tribal state and becoming a member of the world community in which the entire heritage of the world's past and present is accessible to him.

It was not only the school children who were affected — their teachers as well. It should be remembered that black teachers are themselves products of inferior opportunities and syllabuses offered by Bantu Education. This is not just a question of syllabus and/or an examination.

Education is an entire process, encouraging independent thinking — the emphasis should not be just accumulation of facts but also a development of critical skills. This is exactly what Bantu Education does not provide — there were many incidents of students asking questions and in most cases teachers did not know the answer. Bantu Education is an extension of apartheid policy rather than a process of learning.

What about the parents? Education is very expensive for Blacks. The lack of schools burdens the parents with the extra cost of sending children to homeland boarding schools for advanced education — an expense most cannot afford. This bites deep into the household budget and parents have to dip heavily into their pockets to kept their children at school each year. It was not only the pockets which were hard hit — the whole black community was affected.

Two things need to be said about the struggle of the students and pupils against inferior education:

First Blacks have never wanted the same education as whites as it exists in South Africa today — there are always the dangers of “cultural imperialism”. What Blacks want is the improvement of the content of education, a reflection of black thinking and achievement in the syllabus, a direct say in what is being taught, how much money is being spent and what it is spent on.

Bantu Education is a system designed not by black educationists and black parents but by a white government in which Blacks have no say. Verwoerd's philosophy and motivation — which he enunciated so bluntly — has poisoned the entire system probably beyond repair. Bantu Education is closely linked with black poverty and jobs colour bar.

There is the other equally important question. Adequate finances for black education must be accompanied by 1



Soweto, June 1976

improved conditions in the education system; conditions which will be conducive to an increase in the percentage of students who are prepared and motivated to continue their studies to higher levels of education. The black workers are aware that they cannot get better jobs because they attended Bantu Education schools and they cannot give their children a better education because of the system of apartheid.

Until and unless conditions are improved in the primary schools, thus increasing substantially enrolments in the secondary schools, there can be little hope for a long term solution to the problem of insufficient numbers of qualified teachers. But even this is part of the solution.

Compulsory education for Africans can only be interlinked with the whole question of democracy — it is impossible to think of compulsory education without touching the question of substantially raising the wages of Africans and legislation for higher wages is not likely to come from the apartheid regime whose system is based on cheap, exploited black labour. A vicious circle!

It is our conviction that an oppressed people cannot gain control of its own education without first gaining control over the economy of the country and this depends on the political arrangements in the country. Therefore it becomes clear that any talk about struggle against Bantu Education is essentially about political power because unrest will always erupt as long as the demand for political power is not met. A say in the educational decision-making ultimately means a say in political decision making. That is why the Soweto uprising started off as a reaction to the imposition of the Afrikaans language and developed to be a rejection of the whole system of apartheid.

As for the solutions to these problems they are all there in the Freedom Charter and that is why we regard June 16 as one of those many milestones in the history of our struggle towards national liberation; a half-way station in our long march to freedom; a pointer towards the Freedom Charter which was adopted on June 26, 1955.

MASS REMOVALS

by Shein

Demographic engineering is about determining and controlling where people live and work and how the population is composed. It is a key political and administrative instrument used to achieve policy objectives. Under apartheid it is used by the racist white minority regime as a weapon against the black majority in the bid to achieve their total dispossession.

The creation of ghettos in towns and cities which separate black from white, and confine Indians, 'coloureds' and Africans to separate locations; the 'clearance of black spots and badly sited reserves'; the removal of labour-tenants and 'squatters' off the land and into 'resettlement' camps in the bantustans; the 'consolidation' of the bantustans — in fact the very creation of the bantustans — are all measures designed to determine where black people may live. To achieve the dispossession of 80% of the population and their confinement to less than 13% of the land for all, or most of their lives, has involved and is involving a massive programme of population relocation affecting millions of black South Africans. This programme has a direct effect on population composition — that is, its racial, age and gender structure. For the moment however, our attention will be directed to the question of population relocation, more popularly known as forced removals.

Forced removals are a burning issue for the black oppressed majority as they disrupt millions of people's lives. Population relocation is not something which began with the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, but in South African history. The regime has set out in earnest to enforce the balkanisation of the country.

Whilst there are no comprehensive figures available for the number of people directly affected by removal schemes, calculations based upon official and other sources estimate that between 3 and 6 million people have been involved. The

large difference between the estimates given can be accounted for by a more extensive interpretation of what qualifies as forced removal. Those who put the figure at the 6 million mark take into account, for example, people removed under the Group Areas Act, those subjected to two, three and even more removals and the large-scale effects of 'planning' in the bantustans. The difficulty of calculating the number of people involved is further complicated because different categories of people have been subjected to population relocation at different times or at the same time under different laws and proclamations, in the relentless pursuit of policy objectives.

Removals in the Urban Areas

In the urban areas outside the bantustans, forced removals are carried out under the auspices of the Group Areas Act, the Urban Areas Act, pass laws and influx control regulations. The Group Areas Act applies to Indians and 'coloureds' and is used to systematically proclaim and deproclaim areas in which they are permitted to live. Since its enactment in 1950 to December, 1979 86,633 'coloured' families and 46,228 Indian families were disqualified from living in the areas where they resided and were subjected to or faced removal. By the end of 1979, 110,022 families (a conservative estimate of over 660,000 people) had already been removed. (1)

For some of these communities the threat of removal has hung like a cloud over their heads for more than a decade. In the case of Pageview, for example, proclamation as a white group area was made in 1963. By February this year only 93 of the original 1,200 families remained in rubble-blockaded streets.

Deproclamation has meant the breaking up of old, established communities to make

way for white luxury areas. The cost of changing Pageview from a predominantly Indian community to an all-white residential area is estimated at R55 million and has involved the removal of over 7,000 people, for the sake of 229 white households. (2) In the case of the Kliprug area of the Pasternoster 'coloured' fishing community on the West Coast, people are being uprooted because their presence "breaks the unity of the white-only beaches" that stretch from Pasternoster to Saldanha Bay. (3)

In breaking up these communities the process of racial segregation is made more complete. Many of them were comprised of different racial groups who have lived in racial harmony for decades. On removal they are separated and 'resettled' in areas designated their racial groups by the Pretoria authorities. Removals heighten social and racial tension, deflecting the anger caused by dispossession and over-crowding away from the real perpetrators of the crime and onto the victims. Already over-crowded areas are forced to accommodate newly-dispossessed people, increasing the burden on the grossly strained and inadequate housing and social facilities.

A striking example is the forced removal of the St Wendolins community near Pinetown, Natal. Composed of 1,300 African households, many of whom have freehold rights, it has been declared a 'blackspot' and thus all residents face removal to two townships in KwaZulu. It has also been proclaimed an Indian group area, and thus it is made to appear that Indians are dispossessing Africans.

The acute housing shortage that characterises all black communities has meant that 'coloureds' and Indians have sought refuge in areas designated white, where they live under the constant threat of arrest and removal. More than 7,000 Indians and 'coloureds' are believed to be living illegally in white areas.

For Africans a myriad of laws makes legal residence in urban areas a precarious, knife-edge existence. More than 200,000 Africans are arrested annually under pass laws and influx control regulations, thousands of whom are deported. Since the Riekert Commission reported, enforcement of influx control measures has become more stringent, increasing significantly the number caught in their web.


Almost 9 million Africans have been made aliens inside their own country by the imposition of 'independence' upon the bantustans. In this process they have lost the few rights they had, including residential rights and driven to the reserves which are grossly overcrowded and where unemployment is endemic. The situation in the bantustans is so desperate that people are prepared to risk continued harassment, detention, arrest and deportation in their bid to secure a family life and income.

It has been state policy that family life for urban African workers would be to all intents and purposes a highly restricted privilege. Thus family housing for Africans has been frozen in most major and many minor urban areas for more than 10 years and the restriction of women to the urban areas has been applied throughout the country. They have been most stringently enforced in the Western Cape, hence the bitter battles that have been fought by the predominantly female squatter communities of Crossroads, Nyanga, and many others whose struggles have not reached public attention. In order to establish some sort of family life or in fact to secure a place to sleep, some have been forced to sleep in the single-sex hostels built to house migrant workers. Others sleep in boxes, disused pipes, dug-out holes and even in the open air as bulldozers repeatedly flatten the shelters they have built from the discarded waste of white society.

They are forced to be constantly vigilant and on the move in order to escape detection by the police, administration board officials, gangsters and anyone else who might reveal their presence and ensure their deportation.

Removals inside the Bantustans

Every time a bantustan is created, every time a boundary is redrawn, every new 'capital' city that is forced into existence, every single consolidation scheme implies population relocation. Witness to this is borne by the population increase that is being experienced in all the bantustans. In the Ciskei, for example, the population increased by 80,000 in the 7 years 1973-1980. QwaQwa increased its population by over 500% in the decade 1970-1980 and KwaNdebele increased its population by



Winterveld, outside Pretoria

more than 400% in the same period.

The overwhelming majority of people subjected to population relocation from the towns and cities and the farm lands outside the reserves are being resited in resettlement camps, villages and townships inside the bantustans. Little or no shelter is provided; food, water and fuel supplies are grossly inadequate and the only work available in the majority of these death-traps, is the construction of pit-latrines.

At the same time, within the reserves, people are being pushed off the land under the auspices of implementing 'planning schemes'. The physical replanning of the bantustans entails the division of all the territories into arable, grazing and residential areas. Homesteads lying outside the areas demarcated for residence are demolished and without compensation, their occupiers are forced to resite their homes in the prescribed areas. In this process the population is divided into a small number of people who are deemed to be bone fide farmers

and who are therefore provided with limited access to land, and the majority, who are not, and are robbed of the little access to land that they had.

In addition, communities are being broken up to ensure their correct ethnic location. Some are being given the 'choice' of taking out citizenship of the bantustan in which they live or being removed as they are of the 'wrong' ethnic group. Such a case in point is the Pedi-speaking community in the Ritavi area (Tzaneen) who were living on a Trust farm on which they had title deeds. The farm was incorporated into Gazankulu and they were told to take out 'Gazankulu citizenship' or move out. When they refused they were subjected to midnight raids and detention, and thereafter they were fined R90 or 90 days for 'squatting'. (4) Others have had their pensions stopped until they move out of the area and are subjected to continuous police and administration-board harrassment.



"Welcome Valley" resettlement camp in Natal

The final category of people who are subjected to forced removals that this article will look at are former political prisoners and detainees and their families. On release from prison scores of political activists are banished to the remotest corners of the country, where they know nobody and are deprived of income and occupation. They are subjected to banning orders which deprive them of almost all social contact. After the uprisings of 1976, the regime has also subjected families of those detained to summary forced removal upon release of the detainee. All those condemned to internal political exile are guaranteed a workless future in the rural areas of the reserves.

Removals means force

The violation that this population relocation implies to the communities it is directed against, means that wherever resettlement is undertaken by the authorities, force and violence must accompany it. In the words of the Report of the Native Affairs Commissioner for 1946/7:

"It is all very well for a theorist sitting with a map in front of him to point out high veld areas where the surplus Native population of the Coast can be accommodated. But from a practical point of view there is no way, except by the application of direct force, by which Natives who have grown up under Coast conditions will cheerfully move en bloc to a totally different and distant area." (5)

The removal of 'surplus populations' is carried out by police and paramilitary forces armed with guns, teargas and dogs. Where people are living in permanent structures in 'blackspots' e.g., their homes are first numbered with whitewash paint. Then, on the designated day, government trucks and personnel arrive and carry out the 'voluntary' removal. For former labour tenants and 'squatters' the procedure is similar, except that frequently the farmer is involved in the operation. His tractor is used to demolish people's homes and his truck is used to transport them to the places allocated them in the veld. Squatters in the camps around Cape Town have had their homes bulldozed into the sand on





The demolition of Unibel, Cape Town

repeated occasions. They have been subjected to repeated police raids and have been arrested en masse on many occasions and trucked to the reserves. Others are picked up in saturation raids in the townships.

Apart from direct physical force political and administrative measures are brought to bear. People are forbidden to cultivate their land; livestock is impounded; schools are forcibly closed; clinics are stopped; water supplies are withheld; drought relief is provided on condition of accepting removal; transport services are withdrawn; elected representatives of the people are detained and arrested; and pension and the other meagre benefits, which often are the only or are the major source of income for thousands of families, are withheld.

Resistance

Yet resistance is fierce. People under threat of removal have formed committees to defend themselves, resorting to every action which will help them resist the destruction of their families and homes and source of income. People who have been transported hundreds of miles return on foot, to their former homes. Others simply move off into the bush when the government trucks arrive. Just as fast as bulldozers flatten their plastic and cardboard homes, so new ones are being rebuilt in their wake. In all, the attempt to clear the so-called white areas of the black population is continually being reversed, as people pour back into the towns and cities in the desperate bid to escape the certain destitution and death that awaits them in the grossly overcrowded

camps of resettlement and the imposition of the bantustan solution upon them.

The teeming death-traps that are being created in the rural areas are a deliberate policy being carried out by the Pretoria regime for political, economic and military purposes. The planners of apartheid hope that by these measures the consequences of the system will be deflected away from them and onto the 'independent black states' they have conjured into existence. By these means they hope to achieve the total dispossession of the black majority and the entrenchment of white minority supremacy forever. These are the goals which govern the programme of demo-

graphic engineering under apartheid. That they are deadly earnest, and determined to achieve their ends by fair means or foul is revealed by proposals to introduce legislation to curb reporting on 'homeland consolidation'. (6)

NOTES

- 1) A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa. 1980. SAIRR. Jhb.**
- 2) The SOWETAN. 17.2.82.**
- 3) SOUTH AFRICAN OUTLOOK. Feb. 1981.**
- 4) POST 9.8.79.**
- 5) Report of the Native Affairs Commissioner. 1946/7. UG 15/'49. Pretoria.**
- 6) The STAR. 23.4.82.**

ICSA Appeal

Southern Africa has become a focal point of the divide between war and peace.

The criminal apartheid regime is escalating its undeclared war of aggression, subversion, political and economic destabilization of the Frontline States and peoples – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and other countries in the region.

This extremely grave situation calls for urgent and immediate action by the international community to rally to the defence and in support of the Frontline States and of the peoples of Namibia and of South Africa, victims of the inhuman apartheid system.

Deeply concerned with this dangerous situation for international security and peace representatives of the Frontline States, the National Liberation Movements, the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA), the Afro-Asian

People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and European Anti-Apartheid and Solidarity Movements, the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, the United Nations Council for Namibia and other national and international organizations, met in Lisbon in an International Preparatory Committee to convene an International Conference in Solidarity with the Frontline States, and for National Liberation and Peace in Southern Africa.

The Conference, scheduled for the 16th-18th July 1982, will be held in the city of Lisbon, Portugal.

Such an unprecedented gathering will address itself to mobilizing world public opinion and democratic forces for urgent moral, political and material solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa, for the implementation of all relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the imposition of mandatory sanctions in accordance with the United

Nations Charter and the immediate withdrawal of South Africa's armed forces from the soil of Angola.


The Lisbon Conference is to be a milestone and an historic encounter in the development of cooperation and friendship between the peoples of Africa and Europe and the world at large.

The International Preparatory Committee appeals to Governments, political parties, trade unions, anti-apartheid and solidarity groups, national and international organizations churches and individuals to support

the *objectives* of the Lisbon Conference and work for its success.

The International Preparatory Committee is firmly convinced that the response of the international community to the menacing situation developing in Southern Africa will be positive and guarantee the territorial integrity and national independence of the Frontline States and the ultimate triumph of the forces of liberation and the establishment of a just peace.

Lisbon, April 18th 1982



CANADA CONFERENCE

"Solidarity is not an act of charity but mutual aid between forces fighting for the same objectives". These words of President Machel formed the banner under which five hundred Canadians participated in the first ever truly broad and national conference in solidarity with the liberation struggles of the peoples of Southern Africa held at the University of Ottawa on May 7 - 9, 1982.

The conference was co-sponsored by ANC and SWAPO and was initiated in cooperation with ICSA, International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, as part of the overall worldwide programme of ICSA.

The Hon David MacDonald, a member of the former Conservative Government in Canada, and Mr Robert Gaulin, a trade

union leader in Quebec, were the co-presidents.

"We welcome the liberation movements of Southern Africa: their struggle is our struggle", said George Erasmus, President of the Dene Nation in the NW Territories of Canada in his keynote address. Canadian Indians understand the struggle in Southern Africa. Today's institutions are based on the social, economic and religious institutions that promoted and justified colonialism in the first place. "Getting the vote (which the Indians only got in the sixties) will not finish the work". He drew parallels with the presence of Hudson, Falcon and other Canadian companies in the North West Territories, "Canada's Namibia", and the role these companies play in Southern Africa. He warned that



Prime Minister Robert Mugabe meeting Dr Silas Cerqueira and the ICSA delegation to discuss the proposed FLS Conference

people who support liberation struggles outside their own areas should never forget to do the necessary spadework in their own gardens as well.

Alfred Nzo led the ANC delegation and expressed his pleasure in meeting this other side of Canada which is opposed to the Canada that takes part in maintaining apartheid. The Secretary General gave a thorough analysis of the current situation.

Hidipo Hamutenya, director of publicity and information, was the head of the SWAPO delegation. He brought the audience up to date with the latest manoeuvres engineered by the Contact group of Five, of which Canada is a member.

The conference was an inspiration to all who attended and renewed the commitment to increase solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO, leading the struggles for liberation in South Africa and Namibia.

Canadian Churches, the Nigerian High

Commission in Ottawa, the UN Council for Namibia and many others contributed financially to make this important event possible.

Apartheid South Africa is getting worried. For their mission in Ottawa circulated a letter on a wide scale to many organisations imploring them not to take part in the conference, bringing up the worn-out bogey of a "Communist plot". The participation of so many people from all over Canada and Quebec, representing so many organisations and churches, made clear what the people of Canada think of apartheid.

(For further information see ICSA Bulletin No 19, 30A Danbury Street, London N1, UK)

TOINE EGGENHUIZEN, Administrative Secretary of ICSA.

THE SO-CALLED "MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE" (MNR)

by Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes

This article first appeared in Agencia de Informacao de Mozambique — Supplement to AIM information bulletin No. 69)

To ensure its own survival, South Africa's apartheid regime is determined to maintain its grip over all the independent states in the region. Those independent states, working through the mechanism of the SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference), are equally determined to break the ties of dependence that bind them to Pretoria.

South Africa hectors, threatens and attempts to destabilise its neighbours. Outright military attacks alternate with economic pressure, with funding subversive activities, and with the occasional shot at bribery.

This article looks at the main instrument now in use in efforts to destabilise Mozambique — the so-called "Mozambique National Resistance".

When the leaders of the six Front Line states met in Maputo in early March, they stressed in their final communique that the South African regime was resorting to "the preparation, training and financing of armed bandits to destabilize the independent countries of southern Africa".

The Front Line leaders can hardly not have had in mind the group calling itself the "Mozambique National Resistance", and its increased activities in recent months, directed particularly against Mozambique's transport routes, so vital for the whole project of SADCC (Southern Africa

Development Coordination Conference) to break with the regions dependence on South Africa.

The MNR presents itself to the outside world as a heroic nationalist organisation struggling against a "communist dictatorship". It speaks of a "second war of national liberation", and even misappropriates familiar Frelimo slogans for its own use. Thus its bulletin, duplicated in Lisbon, bears the title A Luta Continua — the struggle continues, the best-known of all Frelimo slogans. This publication is edited by Evo Fernandes, a former agent of the Portuguese fascist secret police, the PIDE. He was a student in Lisbon in the 1950s, where he used to spy on other students from the colonies for the PIDE. Later on, in Mozambique he was closely linked to one of the most powerful figures in the colonial set-up, Jorge Jardim. Jardim sat on the boards of dozens of companies, owned the newspaper Noticias da Beira, set up his own private armies to fight Frelimo, and had a direct link to the highest government circles through the fact of being a godson of the Portuguese dictator Salazar. Under Jardim's patronage, Fernandes rose to the position of business manager of Noticias da Beira. This part of his career came to an abrupt halt in mid-1974, when young journalists on the paper, supporters of Frelimo, took over and kicked him out.

A further link between the MNR and the PIDE is provided by Casimiro Monteiro. Monteiro was a professional assassin

employed by the PIDE. He carried out the murder of Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in 1965, and there are strong indications that he was involved in the assassination of Frelimo's first President, Dr Eduardo Mondlane, killed by a PIDE parcel bomb in February 1969. After the fall of fascism in Portugal, Monteiro disappeared. He was tried in Lisbon in absentia for the murder of Humberto Delgado. Last August the Lisbon courts found him guilty and sentenced him to 18 years imprisonment, but made no attempt to discover his whereabouts. However, an enterprising journalist on the South African Sunday Times tracked Monteiro down to a private house in Johannesburg, where he was closely guarded by members of the MNR.

The PIDE agent most involved with the MNR is Jardim's former private secretary, Orlando Cristina. His connection with the foundation and development of the MNR can now be fairly well traced. Much of the murky history of the group has now come to light. Despite the veil of secrecy drawn by the Rhodesian UDI regime, and later by Pretoria, there are now enough sources available for the history of the MNR to be followed with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Defectors from the MNR have told their story, as have MNR prisoners captured by the Mozambican army (FPLM). Former officials of the Rhodesian Special Branch have now loosened their tongues. Documents captured at the MNR base at Garagua, occupied by the FPLM in December 1981, give fascinating insights into the internal life of the group, and its dependence on South Africa.

Perhaps the most important conclusion about the MNR to be drawn from this evidence is that it has never been a Mozambican organisation in anything but name. It has always been a pliant weapon in the hands of foreign interests.

It was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian secret services, with the knowledge of their South African counterparts. In his book, *Inside BOSS*, the former BOSS agent Gordon Winter gives the credit for forming the MNR to South African military intelligence. This appears to be a substantial exaggeration. Winter's own part in the affair was that of propagandist, writing


articles in the South African government-financed newspaper *The Citizen* in 1976 claiming MNR military successes, before there was any real MNR activity inside Mozambique at all. Fake photos were published, allegedly of "MNR guerrillas inside Mozambique", but in fact of black South African troops in the Transvaal.

The first real sign of MNR activity came when a new radio station first started broadcasting in June 1976 from Gwelo, Fort Victoria and Umtali, calling itself *Voz da Africa Livre* (Voice of Free Africa), it was an obvious reply to the Zimbabwean radio programme *Voice of Zimbabwe*, which was beamed nightly into Rhodesia by Radio Mozambique. *Voz da Africa Livre* broadcast anti-Frelimo propaganda of a very crude nature in defence of the colonial past.

In its initial broadcasts it even used, as a kind of theme song, the notorious 'Mocambique — Terra Portuguesa' (Mozambique — Portuguese Land) by the colonialist songwriter, Joao Maria Tudela. This song contains the memorable line: "Yesterday it belonged to the blacks — today it's Portuguese territory".

But *Voz da Africa Livre* soon abandoned this approach, and adopted a rather more subtle line. The hand of Orlando Cristina seems evident in the new play that *Voz da Africa Livre* and the MNR came to use: they posited an opposition between the original 'real' Frelimo of Eduardo Mondlane, and the 'communist', 'totalitarian' Frelimo of Samora Machel, claiming to be the true inheritors of Mondlane's mantle.

In August and September 1976 the first MNR group received military training at Bindura just north of Salisbury. The operation was set up by the Rhodesian Special Branch, whose former head, Ken Flower, candidly admitted as much after Zimbabwean independence. "It was war," he explained to a Mozambican journalist, "and in war all things are allowed." Mozambique had closed its borders with Rhodesia in March, and provided crucial facilities for Zimbabwean guerrillas, who could use the entire length of the border to cross over into Zimbabwe. The illegal Smith regime considered itself at war with Mozambique, and hit back, not simply at guerrillas, but also at Mozambican economic and civilian targets. In this war, the MNR was used



as convenient fifth column.

But obviously Flower and his men could not provide the Mozambicans who were needed if the MNR was to take on substance. It was here that Orlando Cristina played a crucial role. His former employer, Jardim, had organised elite military units to fight against Frelimo, units consisting mainly of black troops, better paid than the regular colonial army, and soon gaining an unenviable reputation for brutality and atrocities. These were known as GEs (Special Groups), GMEs (Very Special Groups - used for cladenstine operations in Tanzania and Zambia), and GEPs (Special Paratroop Groups). These units' primary loyalty was to Jardim.

Shortly before Mozambique's independence Cristina disappeared. So did all the files on the special groups. There seems no doubt that these were taken by

Cristina to Salisbury, and formed the basis for the initial recruitment to the MNR. People named in these files received letters threatening exposure if they refused to join the MNR.

For the next four years Cristina was to be based in Salisbury as the eminence grise behind Voz da Africa Livre.

Figureheads were also needed — men who were not too blatantly connected with the colonial regime, and could give a veneer of credibility to the claim that the MNR represented the “real” spirit of Frelimo. So Andre Matsangaiza was elevated to the role of “commander-in-chief” of the MNR. Matsangaiza had been in the FPLM, but after his appointment as a quartermaster in 1975, he had been caught with his hands in the till. Arrested for theft, he was sent to a reeducation centre from which he managed

to escape in 1976. The Rhodesians then groomed him as MNR leader.

The man who took over the job after Matsangaiza's death, Afonso Dhlakama, has a similar history. He joined the FPLM only in October 1974, after all the fighting was over. Prior to 1974 he had been a conscript in the Portuguese army. In 1975 he too was found guilty of theft and dishonourably discharged from the Mozambican army. A year later he was with the infant MNR in Rhodesia.

Initially the MNR acted in the border zones in the Mozambican provinces of Manica, Tete and, to a lesser extent, Gaza. They concentrated on attacking villages and kidnapping civilians, and disrupting commerce. There was never any serious attempt to take on the Mozambican army, much less to bring down the government. The Rhodesians' aims were much less ambitious. They were simply destabilising the zones used as a rearguard by the Zimbabwean guerrillas.

In 1979, as the war escalated, the Rhodesians ordered the MNR to move deeper into Mozambique and set up permanent bases there. These would be supplied by helicopter from Rhodesia. The most important of these was set up in the thick bush of the remote Gorongosa mountains of Sofala province.

Here Matsangaiza formed an alliance with the local 'feiticeiros' (witch-doctors), who provided him with information on the movement of Mozambican troops (information which Matsangaiza then attributed to supernatural forces). But the Gorongosa feiticeiros became fed up with the MNR, due largely to its undisciplined men abusing local women. They took their revenge by feeding Matsangaiza a piece of fatally false information. They told him the town of Gorongosa itself was unguarded and would easily fall to a surprise attack. So several hundreds swept down to loot Gorogosa in October 1979, only to find not simply a strong contingent of Mozambican troops, but also tanks. When the tanks opened fire on the closely-packed MNR, Matsangaiza himself was one of the casualties. Mortally wounded, he was evacuated by helicopter, but died on his way back to Rhodesia.

A few days later the Mozambican army launched a major offensive to clear the MNR out of the Gorongosa region. Their

main base was seized, and in disarray the survivors fled back to the border.

The death of Matsangaiza provoked an enormous crisis within the MNR. Dhlakama later admitted that the group had been "on the way to total destruction". Lacking any ideology, the MNR had been built round the personality cult of Matsangaiza, and once he had gone it all began to fall apart. A bitter power struggle broke out. The Rhodesians, oblivious to the fact that their own regime was in its death throes, tried to solve the problem by suggesting that the MNR be divided into two commands, once under Dhlakama and one under Matsangaiza's second deputy, Lucas M'lhanga.

This was not at all according to Cristina's liking, and he decided to patronise Dhlakama. Stealing a march on the Smith regime, Cristina had photos of Dhlakama published in the South African press, proclaiming him the sole leader of the MNR. Reverting to his former trade as an assassin, Cristina tried to remove M'lhanga from the scene, but bungled the job.

The conflict came to a head at an MNR camp at Chisumbanje in southern Zimbabwe in June 1980. A gun battle erupted in which Dhlakama's followers overpowered M'lhanga's. M'lhanga himself was probably killed in the shoot out. His supporters fled to Mozambique where they handed themselves over to the FPLM.

At about the same time, the MNR's 'political commissar', Henrique Siteo, also defected. He had been appointed to the post a few months earlier by Dhlakama despite the fact that, on his own admission, he knew nothing about politics. Siteo deserted with three others, one of whom described himself as a 'company commander'. The second was a skilled radio operator. These represented heavy losses for the MNR. Speaking at a press conference in Maputo, these defectors said they had no idea what they were fighting for. Being in the MNR was just "waiting for death".

Dhlakama himself confirmed this sorry state of affairs in a speech to his men in November 1980. "In the past year," he said, "many fighters, including commanders and chiefs, have been killed." He feared that the same fate awaited him: "Some people," he said, "are preparing drugs to assassinate me so that they can take over my position."

In early 1980, things were looking extremely bleak for the MNR. On top of their internal problems, they were now faced with the likelihood of losing their base. With the Lancaster House agreement and the resumption of British authority in Salisbury, the MNR was forced to adopt a much lower profile.

The British ordered Voz da Africa Livre to stop broadcasting, and it went off the air in February 1980.

With the overwhelming Zanu victory in the March election, it was clear that the MNR's days in Zimbabwe were numbered. But help was on the way. The Rhodesians had passed Cristina to the South African embassy in Salisbury, and arrangements were quickly made to switch the MNR base from Zimbabwe to the Transvaal.

The South Africans had earlier assisted in training the MNR, and South African personnel had been stationed at the Gorongosa camp in 1979. Now the South Africans took over the entire task of supplying the MNR bands. Boxes of ammunition dropped to the bands in Manica were marked in English and Afrikaans, leaving no room for doubt as to their country of origin.

A transmitter was quickly rigged up in the northern Transvaal, and by the middle of the year Voz da Africa Livre was back in business. The evacuation of the MNR from Zimbabwe took a bit longer but seems to have been completed by October.

Dhlakama's men were accommodated at two camps in the Transvaal, one at Phalaborwa, and the other at Zoabastad. The documents captured at Garagua date from this period of transition. They indicate that a liaison officer from the South African Military Intelligence was allocated to the MNR: he crops up in the documents as 'Colonel Charlie', and on one occasion as 'Colonel van Niekerk'. There is, of course no way of knowing whether this is his real name. Notes from meetings in October and November contain fulsome praise and gratitude by Dhlakama for his South African patrons. "We can't do anything without you," he is on record as saying, "you are like our parents."

Whereas the Rhodesians had kept Voz da Africa Livre organisationally distinct from the MNR, the South Africans preferred to centralise the entire operation. The radio station was integrated in the MNR, and all

was subordinate to Dhlakama who now referred to himself as "Supreme Chief".

The MNR had lost their major base inside Mozambique, in the Sibatonga mountains in Manica, close to the Zimbabwe border, in June 1980. Mozambican artillery moved painstakingly into position over difficult terrain, pounded the hideout into dust. But Sibatonga was soon replaced by a new base, some 300 kilometres further south, at Garagua, near the Save river which forms the boundary between Manica and Gaza provinces.

This base, two kilometres in diameter, included an area set aside for South African 'specialists', and a helicopter landing strip. From the large quantities of aircraft fuel discovered when Mozambican soldiers stormed Garagua in December 1981, it clearly also functioned as a refuelling depot for supply flights to MNR bands further north.

The presence of South African 'specialists' with the MNR inside Mozambique was one of the matters discussed between Dhlakama and 'Colonel Charlie'. The latter promised that South African experts would accompany the MNR to teach the use of heavy weapons and sabotage techniques. These 'specialists' would not simply have a back-seat role, but would participate directly in attacks.

The change in rear base also entailed a change in strategy. The targets to be hit now were no longer those which suited the defunct Smith regime, but ones which fitted in with South Africa's strategy of destabilising the Front Line states. 'Colonel Charlie' gave Dhlakama a list of targets for the MNR's 1981 campaign. These included the Beira-Umtali pipe-line, the railways linking Zimbabwe to Mozambique's ports, and the roads in the centre of the country. The border areas with Zimbabwe had lost their previous importance, and the stress was now laid on disrupting the economies of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe by hitting at their most vulnerable point, their communications.

During 1981 Dhlakama's men did their best to carry out their new instructions 'Colonel Charlie's' emphasis on sabotage techniques paid off. In October the road and rail bridges over the Pungwe river

were blown up, and effectively isolated Beira.

The expertise with which the road bridge was demolished suggests the presence of South African experts in this operation. Remarkably, the pipeline, which is carried on the bridge supports, was scarcely damaged in the explosion. The rail bridge withstood the blast. But one supporting pillar was damaged and had to be replaced, and thus for six weeks rail traffic from Zimbabwe to Beira was interrupted.

The destruction of marker buoys at the port of Beira in early November clearly had the same target to disrupt a vital outlet to the sea for the land-locked countries of the region, and to intimate to them that it was unwise to try and break their dependence on South Africa.

Although the MNR immediately claimed sabotage of the buoys, there is good reason to believe that this was an exclusively South African operation. The high degree of sophistication required makes it more than likely that the job was carried out by a team of South African frogmen.

Emboldened by the unstinting military support received from Pretoria, the MNR started attacking small towns in early 1982. In accordance with lessons on propaganda which van Niekerk had given Dhlakama a year earlier, such raids were trumpeted abroad as major military victories. In fact, of course, looting isolated and undefended towns, holding them for a few hours and then withdrawing when the FPLM shows up, achieves no military objective at all. Nobody has ever won a war that way. But it does keep the name of the MNR in the world's press, and strengthens the suspicion that Mozambique is 'unstable'. This tactic is clearly aimed at scaring off potential Western investment in Mozambique.

Similar publicity-hunting motives were behind the kidnapping of two foreign workers in the Gorongosa National Park in December 1981. According to the Garagua documents, Cristina had advocated this sort of action. Foreign prisoners, he said, could be used to blackmail their countries of origin. In exchange for freeing them the MNR could "demand a particular sum of money, or material assistance". In the case of one of those captured at Gorongosa, the British ecologist John

Burlison, the MNR employed this type of blackmail. They implied that Burlison would be released, provided his parents had a letter from Dhlakama published in the British press.

Although this was done, Burlison was not released and fears for his safety have mounted. Two days after the kidnapping, two Portuguese technicians travelling from Chimoio to Tete were taken out of their car and shot at point blank range.

A further MNR target has been a power line taking electricity from the giant Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Tete province to South Africa. This appears to have been Cristina's idea: in November 1980 he suggested this in order "to disguise the existence of South African support for the MNR". This would not harm their South African employers, he hastened to add, since only seven per cent of South Africa's electricity comes from Cahora Bassa.

This proved to be a miscalculation. South Africa suffered a particularly severe winter in 1981, and, thanks partly to the MNR putting the Cahora Bassa lines out of action, faced a shortfall in electricity supply. The result was widespread power cuts. The MNR is now reported to have promised the South Africans that they will enjoy "a warm winter" in 1982 — which appears to be a pledge to leave the transmission lines alone.

Throughout the history of the MNR there are certain common features. One is brutality. Wherever the group has been active, it has left behind a trail of death and mutilation. On arrival in an area, an MNR band's first action is to seek out and murder the local Frelimo Party officials. Those not actually in the Party, but are believed to be sympathisers, suffer the lesser penalty of having their ears, noses, lips or, if women, breasts cut off. Defenceless peasants, their lips sliced off are told: "Now you can go and smile at Samora". This cannot be shrugged off as the work of a few individual sadists in the MNR. The reports are so consistent, from all areas where the MNR is or has been active, that it is clearly a matter of mutilation as policy, terror as a deliberate weapon to intimidate the local peasantry.

A second common thread is superstition. In his speech to his men at Zoabastad in October 1980 Dhlakama referred several

times to the "spirits". A bomb had recently exploded in the car of Domingos Arouca, a right wing landowner in colonial Mozambique who chose Portuguese nationality after Mozambique's independence. He had incurred Dhlakama's wrath by using the name of the MNR without permission. Dhlakama gloated over the explosion attributing it to "the spirits of the MNR".

Superstition plays an important role inside MNR camps. Recruits are told that if they desert, then "the spirits" will pursue them, in the shape of lions, and will devour them. Before any military operations, religious ceremonies are held which are supposed to make the participants invulnerable to "communist bullets". "The spirits" are also useful vehicles for Dhlakama's own paranoia. Repeatedly, people accused of being Frelimo spies are assassinated in the MNR camps — the information on which these murders are based is given to Dhlakama in his regular interviews with "the spirits".

For the MNR traditions animist superstition replaces political mobilisation. Terror takes the place of persuasion. Foodstuffs are acquired through straight forward looting. The aims of the MNR are not those of a domestic counter-revolutionary organisation — instead they are imposed on it from outside. It serves the strategies of foreign powers, first Rhodesia, now South Africa.

Does the MNR enjoy any support at all? The answer to this question must be a qualified "yes". Those who lost their old power and privileges when Frelimo came to power are quite prepared to throw in their lot with the MNR. Apart from the "feiticeiros", these include the "regulos" — tribal chiefs usually appointed to their posts by the Portuguese, and regarded as colonial stooges. The MNR wins their support by promising to restore them to their former positions.

Then there are those who attempted to win positions of influence in the new Mozambique, but failed. Both in the elections to the people's assemblies in 1977 and in the Frelimo Party structuring campaign in 1978, candidates had to be submitted to mass meetings in their villages or workplaces. In this process many were rejected. Some of them, particularly in Inhambane, have now gone over to the

MNR.

There have been two main bases for the recruitment to the MNR. One is tribal. The MNR has tried to mobilise the people of Manica on ethnic grounds. Both Matsangaiza and Dhlakama were from that area. The first deputy commander of the MNR, Orlando Macomo, was assassinated by Dhlakama "because he was a southerner". Dhlakama immediately stepped into the murdered man's shoes. The MNR attempts to generate ethnic support by peddling the lie that "Frelimo is controlled by southerners" and discriminates against "the people of the centre and the north".

The other recruitment method is simple coercion. The MNR kidnaps young peasant boys and forces them to undertake military training. They are initiated into banditry at a very early stage, and told that if they surrender to the FPLM, the Mozambican soldiers will slit their throats.

But the attitude of most people in central Mozambique towards the MNR is a mixture of fear, anger and loathing. When, in February 1982, President Samora Machel visited parts of Inhambane province affected by MNR activity, he was greeted everywhere with crowds demanding "guns to fight the bandits" — a demand that will be granted.

The South Africans have always denied their involvement in the MNR, but these protests of innocence are fooling very few people. Pretty well every Western diplomat in Maputo will privately admit they are convinced of the South African connection. Now the mask has slipped even further with MNR statements on *Voz da Africa Livre* that they will accept support from any country "including South Africa". How long before South Africa officially admits its ties with the MNR?

In conclusion, we can report that Afonso Dhlakama has made up for his short-lived and ignominious career in the Mozambican army by his rapid rise in the South African one. According to MNR sources, he is now a full colonel in the South African army. This rank was attributed to him at a ceremony at Phalaborwa in 1981, attended by South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan. Addressing Dhlakama, Malan said: "Your army is part of the South African Defence Force."

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

by H.L.

The protection of apartheid by military means has demanded the full participation of the military in the political arena. The military domination of the state apparatus has been sketched in the March issue of SECHABA.

Concepts such as 'total strategy' and 'total war' are part of an all-embracing dogma called the National Security Doctrine (NSD). This doctrine provides the framework for apartheid strategists. Central to this strategy is the military institution. The primary task of the military is to wage a counter-revolutionary war. This involves using every means at its disposal, such as 'the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry, etc.', and coordinated action in all fields 'military, psychological, economic, political, sociological ...' These mechanisms for political and economic domination and social control are to be reinforced, extended and developed to enable the continued survival of the apartheid system.

The National Security Doctrine provides the rationale for 'changes' to the monopoly capitalist system in South Africa. The 'military state' is an attempt to resolve the crisis facing the apartheid system. Apartheid strategists, faced with the growing strength of the forces of national liberation, realise the need to secure the continued existence of the monopoly capitalist system. They are preparing for the 'managed evolution' of the apartheid system to a conveniently 'respectable' form.

The Military and the NSD

The military have been the primary force and interest in developing the NSD and 'total strategy'. Within the military, the general staff and sections of the senior officer group have provided the impetus.

Other powerful interest groups within the ruling class, such as organised business and commercial interests, academics and researchers etc., have also contributed significantly to the development of a total strategy. These sections of the ruling class have come together with a common objective: that is, to ensure the survival of the 'free enterprise system' and the 'nation'.

The 'free enterprise system' is a euphemism for a superficially modified or 'restructured' apartheid system, and the protection of the 'white nation' remains central to this doctrine. So the national oppression and economic super-exploitation of the majority, essential to the apartheid system, will continue to be essential, too, to the 'total strategy'. According to the Prime Minister P.W. Botha, in his statement made in 1977, 'the principle of the right of self-determination of the white nation must not be regarded as being negotiable. Military strategy forms part of a broader national strategy to ensure this.'

According to Professor Lombard, a member of the Prime Minister's Planning Advisory Council, 'the National Security Doctrine specifies ... time to allow the "evolution" of the domestic order in the direction of a system of association among all its peoples which is also internationally recognised ... In future the time needed for the internal evolution will have to be bought by means of military operations.' Lombard advocates a 'restructuring' with the aim of defending the essence of apartheid, and at the same time appeasing 'international' interest.

The imperialist countries need to 'stabilize' South Africa and Southern Africa, for the continued exploitation of the people and their resources. In order to secure their immense investment and the continued operations of the large multi-national corporations, they are concerned about the


development of the liberation struggle, armed actions, strikes, riots, rebellions and with the general social 'instability.' The imperialists have therefore applied a policy of pressure and intervention in an attempt to force the apartheid system to 'modernise' itself, to give it a new face.

Lombard 'theory'

Lombard envisages a slow move away from race discrimination; however, he emphasises the continuation of the existing apartheid system of exploitation and the continued rule and dominance of the present ruling class; 'the replacement of colour discrimination by classical norms of competition and democracy in the production and distribution of goods and services, both in the private and public sector, does not automatically imply the subjugation of the sovereignty of the state as such, to the whims of simple majorities in the total population on the so-called Westminster pattern. Quite the contrary: a clear distinction must be drawn between the welfare functions in the economy on the one hand, and the other functions of the state over that economy, on the other'.

Professor Lombard makes a distinction between the maintenance of political and economic power, and the need to be more concerned with the 'welfare' of its people. Here he is referring to the need to provide all South Africans with a material stake in defending South Africa. Apartheid strategists argue that it is necessary to expand the base of their counter-revolutionary alliance. For people to 'defend South Africa against attack', they need to have a 'stake in the existing system'.

This tactic is failing and will continue to fail. Economic incentives aimed at sections of the oppressed people, in order to lure them into an alliance with the apartheid rulers, do not and cannot succeed. The oppressed people will refuse to become mercenaries and instruments of their own oppression. The fascists fail to recognise their moral isolation from the majority of the people. Legitimacy cannot be bought from the oppressed people by mere economic incentives within the framework of national oppression and economic super-exploitation.



South Africa uses napalm in its war against the Angolan people

We cannot take seriously any 'structural' tampering with the apartheid fascist system. The essential nature of apartheid will be maintained. The oppressed majority, the black workers, the migrant and contract workers, the peasant subsistence farmers, the unemployed, those endorsed out to the bantustans, are eliminated from that body of individuals included in the fascist concept of the 'nation'. It is ridiculous for the racists to believe that oppressed people will rally to the flag of the fascists and their toy 'nations'. The Matanzimas, the Sebe's, the Mangope's etc., are the only people provided with a 'material stake in defending' apartheid.

Suppressing the 'internal enemy'

The military state will continue the apartheid policy of wholesale import-export of populations, the forced exile of opponents, internal populations transfers within 'national' territories, which ensure the partitioning and disorganisation of possible centres of 'subversion' in an attempt to 'sterilize' the people. These are all part of the 'total strategy' design for suppressing the 'internal enemy'. The present Bantustan policy will thus serve a military purpose as well as continuing to provide cheap labour to the white industrial areas via a streamlined labour bureau system.

Economic aspects of the NSD

An important aspect of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) is now being played out in South Africa where the military and monopoly capitalist interests have converged, and a joint 'total strategy' is being formulated at the highest level under the overall guidance of the military and the NSD. The State Security Council effectively the supreme decision-making body in South Africa, involves the heads of industry who sit on its sub-committees. This effectively incorporates the so-called

'private sector', under the leadership of monopoly capital, into the total strategy approach. This alliance between the state and monopoly capitalism has been developed by the close contacts between the military and monopoly capital, especially in the field of arms and munitions manufacture.

'Paratus', the SADF official mouthpiece, argues that a strong military would guarantee sound economic development and vice versa: 'The shifting of a significantly larger proportion of the country's resources into defence may not be particularly good for the growth of private consumption in the short term. Heavy spending on defence is rarely popular with the public even in wartime ... This however can be regarded as an insurance policy for long-term benefits such as security, higher standards of living, and, above all, a guarantee for the system of free enterprise.'

The nature of the cooperation between the state and the monopoly capitalists involves three main points and objectives: 1) the consultation and cooperation in achieving 'common national objectives', 2) limiting state involvement in economic activities to a level more in line with a 'free enterprise economy', and 3) greater monopoly capitalist responsibility in shaping and maintaining the 'socio-economic environment'.

These points are illustrated in the following view of the South African economy. The militarisation of the state has included an enormous expansion of the domestic military industrial complex. At least 90,000 workers are involved, either directly or indirectly, in the manufacture of a broad range of military requirements. The state arms manufacturer, 'Armcor', is one of South Africa's biggest industrial undertakings, and is currently headed by a manager on secondment from a private firm, Barlow Rand. The private sector has been drawn into close collaboration in this operation. Over 800 companies are involved





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in contracts or sub-contracts in the military industry. A highly influential body, the Defence Advisory Council, has been expanded and is playing a central role in the formulation of economic policy. Several major South African industrial enterprises have at least one director serving on this committee.

There are a number of other ways in which the private sector of the economy has become more closely integrated with the Government and the military. Agencies such as the National Development and Management Foundation have played a role in bringing together industrialists, government, and the military, through seminars. Agencies like the Rural and Urban Founda-

tions have brought private finance into areas formerly occupied by public funds only. More recently, the Small Business Development Corporation and the Development Bank have provided financial institutions through which both public and private funds will be used to further the policies of the regime.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The 1977 Defence White Paper calls for a 'resolution of a conflict'. This is a call for the escalation and precipitation of war — a counter-revolutionary war.



This war is to be waged, and is being waged, against the oppressed majority in South Africa and Namibia — against the liberation movements, the ANC and SWAPO, who lead and embody the revolutionary aspirations of the oppressed people. This war is being waged against the neighbouring states who support the liberation struggle against the fascist apartheid system. The war is also aimed at destabilising the revolutionary governments of socialist-oriented countries such as Angola and Mozambique, in accordance with imperialist strategy which demands neo-colonial solutions.

The National Security Doctrine provides account internal aggression, manifested through infiltration, ideological subversion, and guerilla movements.'

This exposes the NSD as a convenient legal framework, to provide justification for the use of the military institution to reinforce and uphold the exploitative imperialist system. South African fascist theoreticians place an equal emphasis on 'foreign aggression' — their own aggression against the 'foreign' frontline states.

According to M.H. Louw, ex-director of ISSUP, 'National Security Doctrine deals with war, and war as a brand of politics ... which must have a philosophical basis for its punitive intent, violence and extermination of life.' Louw emphasises the offensive nature of the doctrine; 'taking the initiative to intensify the conflict for achieving set political results ... a defensive position cannot lead to a political solution.'

What is proposed is an aggressive

offensive against the frontline states, to be carried out with the effect of bludgeoning them into a position of surrendering to the demands of the apartheid regime. Louw explains: 'National Security Doctrine is a trilogy of foreign policy, military policy and domestic policy ... We must mobilize through its mechanisms and resources a capability (power, leverage or violence) for effective resistance ... this means a capacity to withstand challenges to our own territorial integrity and political and socio-economic order as well as to exert pressure on other, mostly weaker states, to make their behaviour consonant with our interests.'

Root Causes of Oppression

In order to ensure that the apartheid fascists survive, the imperialists provide information as to how to combat national liberation struggles. US 'counter-insurgency research' specialists and 'psychological operations' specialists, Colonels Katz and Barber (see SECHABA, March 1982), attended the ISSUP conference in 1974 and brought with them their experience of fighting 'communism and national liberation wars.' These individuals are merely examples of a significant exchange process of counter-revolutionary material. Colonel Barber of the US Marines provides the apartheid strategists with an insight into the methods mechanics and operations of the NSD as implemented in the US, but with particular emphasis on the fight against 'terrorism' related to wars of national liberation. According to Barber, "The Soviets and their partners have become skilled in the export of terrorism ... Your (SA) experience in Angola, and ours in Vietnam provide recent example of this and also demonstrate the difficulties and frustrations in countering Marxist-sponsored wars of liberation.'

So according to the imperialists, people fighting fascist oppression are automatically 'terrorists', directly linked to Moscow. The imperialists fail to realise that they are the root cause of oppression together with their fascist allies. The oppressed people cannot fail to realise that the Soviet Union a fascist legitimisation for militarization and the consequent pursual of war as a policy. This war doctrine identifies friendly and enemy camps and elaborates from this identification a war strategy. On a global


level this identification centres around the 'fundamental East-West conflict', an uncompromising conflict between 'Christian Western' world and 'Communist Eastern' world. The fascist theoreticians reduce everything to simplistic notions: 'them and us', 'freedom' versus 'communism'. They place themselves clearly in the camp of the 'western free world', while often pretending for convenience to be some kind of 'original' third force, having 'transcended the capitalist-communist dilemma'. This device is often used to explain their position when gestures of disapproval are directed towards them by their US and European allies.

On a national level, counter-revolutionary war involves a multi-faceted and comprehensive assault against the oppressed people and the national liberation movement. 'Total war' abolishes the previously clear distinction between the civilian and the military spheres. The whole of society now becomes a battleground, and every individual is involved in the conflict, either for or against. It is a total war because the battlefields and weapons used relate to all

individual and community life. This war allows no escape from the conflict. The weapons are very diverse: political, economic, psychological, and military. They also include diplomatic negotiations, alliances and counter-alliances, agreements or treaties with public or secret clauses, commercial sanctions, loans, capital investment, embargoes, boycotts and dumping, as well as propaganda and counter-propaganda, suggestive slogans for internal and external use, means of persuasion, blackmail, threats, and terrorism. This is 'total war' because the distinction between wartime and peace time is gone: war is now permanent.

Absurd definitions

The Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP) played an important role in launching the National Security Doctrine. Its first symposium held in 1974 provides an insight into the thinking of the fascist strategists and their imperialist sponsors who are keen to provide



the apartheid regime with strategic and tactical experience gained from their own counter-revolutionary wars, particularly Vietnam.

A Brazilian general provides a definition of National Security: 'The traditional concept of national defence places the accent upon the military aspects of security, and consequently emphasises the problems of foreign aggression. The concept of National Security is much more complete. It includes global defence of institutions, and takes into consideration psycho-social aspects, preservation of development, and internal political stability. In addition, the concept of security is much more explicit than that of defence, takes into represents progressive humanity, and will continue to champion the struggles for national liberation against imperialism, colonialism and racism.

Colonel Katz provides South Africa with a mechanical analysis of 'communist organisation', 'revolution', and 'people's war'. According to him, the 'political' work of national liberation movements is equivalent to psychological operations (PSYOP) which he defined as 'the planned or programmed use of propaganda and other actions to influence both attitudes and actions of friendly neutral and enemy populations important to military commanders.' So now the imperialists advocate the systematic indoctrination of the oppressed population. The most virulent advocates of this policy were US officers captured during the Vietnam war, where they underwent re-education courses. So being unnerved by the militant practices of their adversaries, they try to use the enemy tactics for other purposes.

'Enemy is difficult to define'

In the 1950s the US Defence Department, foreseeing the rise of national liberation wars, recommended that officers read guerilla war classics so as to be better able to combat this kind of war. For the Americans the French experience in Algeria and Indo-China was invaluable. The French military, based on its colonial war experience, was the first to formulate a theory on the struggles against 'insurgency' and 'subversion', the revolutionary war.

Subversion is defined in the following

terms: 'an ensemble of actions of every possible nature (political, economic, psychological, armed, etc ...) which aim both at taking power and replacing the established system by another.'

The new enemies were to be defined thus:

'In modern era, the enemy is especially difficult to define. There is no physical barrier or frontier separating the two camps; the line between friends and enemies is drawn within the same nation, within the same village, and sometimes even within the same family. It is often an ideological, immaterial frontier, but which must necessarily be established if we are to be sure of overtaking and vanquishing our adversary.'

This war had new requirements: 'an essential element of modern warfare is the inhabitant ... Control of the masses by a strict hierarchy, or often even by several parallel hierarchies, is the master weapon of modern war'.

The US in Vietnam adopted two primary approaches:

- a) the conventional, generally supported by the establishment; and
- b) the unconventional, or 'liberal' supported by liberal reformists.

The conventional approach has a preference for conventional ground and air operations requiring large deployments of troops. Search and destroy missions (mop up operations), the tactics of encirclement and attrition which involve on the one hand the establishment of large military fortifications (bases, enclosures), connected by mobile battalions: and on the other hand, the massive displacement of a civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones. The conventionalists prefer setpiece battles, and apply political and institutional pressures toward forcing, or luring the guerrillas into conventional showdowns. The results are sustained aerial bombardments and invasions of guerilla 'sanctuaries' across national frontiers of conflict.


The unconventional approach, which in the US and French situations emanated from a liberal-reformist political position, in practice demands the creation of counter-guerilla guerillas (special forces such as the

Recce's), and the stress on irregular tactics, the unity of civilian and military roles, maximum use of mercenaries, psychological warfare, counter-terror, and 'pacification'.

'Pacification' is a term borrowed by US theoreticians from the French, and involves a military as well as a civil process: (1) it sets out to 'protect' or 'sterilize' the rural population, thereby depriving guerillas of their popular base; (2) it attempts to generate support for the central government by reviving a sense of rural administration and providing economic incentives, and establishing essential services such as medical and educational — as well as 'policing'. The military aspects of pacification involve the 'neutralisation' of guerillas. It entails irregular tactics, small-unit deployment, efficiently and relentlessly executed punitive measures against people suspected of aiding guerillas, systematic use of torture murder of prisoners, and the institution of total control over the population.

So if the masses are to be rallied to the counter-revolutionary cause how are they to be taken? Psychological operations, which

is part of the pacification process, is aimed at carrying out this task. It is defined as 'a supplement of the physical weapons used against the enemy. It seeks to reduce the enemy's will and ability to work and fight, by creating new attitudes which destroy his morale. It represents persuasion by non-violent means, the use of propaganda'. Propaganda is defined as 'the systematically organised use of any communication designed to affect the feelings, thoughts, and actions of a group in a definite direction and for a given purpose.' A distinction is made between five different kinds of propaganda: overt propaganda (when source is recognised); covert propaganda (when the source is not revealed, and disguised in such a way that one believes it comes from the enemy); strategic propaganda (when the objectives are of a general, long-term nature, and attempt to reach the entire population); tactical propaganda (which is destined for a particular group of individuals and has a definite, specific objective), and counter-propaganda (which combats and neutralises the effect of the enemy's propaganda).




The Nazis were the first to use a 'modern approach' to psychological warfare. It was applied to their own people, in order to develop conformist attitudes. Hitler referred to it as 'the war with intellectual weapons': which brings us to another weapon in the fascist armoury — torture as an 'information gathering technique'. The NSD systematises the use of torture in a theory of information. Torture is not only considered as a means for obtaining information on clandestine networks, at any price, but also as a means for destroying every individual who is captured, as well as his or her sense of solidarity with an organisation or community.

Another weapon advocated in the war against the people is the computer. This is no stranger to South Africa, but this is how Colonel Katz sees its military role: 'to institutionalise PSYOPS. intelligence the US military designed and developed a computer-oriented system — PYSOP Automated Management Information System — to provide the spectrum of information needed to support PSYOP organisations for planning and evaluation,

to enforce the 'methods' of information gathering programmes, and to provide a data-processing system for analysis and use of gathered data.'

The counter-revolutionary strategists insist on viewing revolutions as conspiracies, which results in a grossly distorted interpretation of the revolutionary process. Revolutionary war is considered to be a technical problem. Because of the pre-occupation with techniques, the conduct of counter-revolutionary war is seen as an exercise in the strategy and tactics of 'pacification' (PSYOPS) and military warfare. Managerial and military experiments are seen as part of the 'total war'. The military advantages of the freedom fighters are studied, and 'counter measures' are developed.

But it is heartening to recognise that all these tactics developed for fighting national liberation wars around the world have been unsuccessful. We can only be spurred resolutely into action against the fascist enemy, who is using this vast array of weapons, which will ultimately ensure the defeat of the fascist apartheid regime.



BOOK REVIEW: FORCED LABOUR SYSTEM

"Working for Boroko: The Origins of a Forced Labour System in South Africa". By Marian Lacey, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981.

The central theme of this book is about the struggles between different interests within the white ruling class to secure for themselves cheap, highly exploitable, black labour power. Lacey analyses the period of the Hertzog administration (1924-1932). Its value lies not in the 'discovery' that apartheid had historical antecedents, but rather lies in the examination of the conflicts within the ruling class, providing insights into the contradictions which characterise white minority rule, in its bid to retain economic as well as political power.

Lacey argues that the conflict between agrarian and mining capital interests centred around how best to secure a labour reserve and reduce competition for labour between the two primary sectors; how to fight against actual and potential competition from black agriculture and at the same time resist the pressures for higher wages, better working conditions and stabilised, urbanised labour which the onset of secondary industrialisation inevitably brought with it. Whilst mining capital wished to secure its labour supply by establishing a labour system based on permanently oscillating labour, migrating between the reserves and the mines, land-based agrarian capital argued that any access to land severely inhibited their labour supplies. And thus the argument raged about the amount of 'quota' land to be added to that already scheduled in the 1913 Land Act.

Mining interests preferred slightly more

land, to secure, so their rationale is argued, sufficient to ensure that the subsistence base of migrant labour could be maintained, without enabling the worker and his family to subsist and thereby resist working in the mines.

Landed interests wanted as little land as possible allocated for African occupation. This debate over how small to make the land allocation is documented by the successive proposals put before parliament in the period 1916-1936, with each reducing the amount suggested in the former proposal.

The 1913 Land Act had successfully restricted African access to land in 3 of the four provinces. Land interests were calling for the extension of this restriction to the Cape. This extension required the withdrawal of the limited franchise which Africans enjoyed in that Province, since it was based on a land qualification. Whilst Hertzog was determined to couple the vote and land questions, Lacey rejects the analysis popular in liberal theory (and not only) that the shadow of the vote was substituted by the substance of the land. Her argument rejects any notion of exchange, which is used rather as a justification than an explanation. Rather, she contends that the drive was to reduce all Africans, throughout the Union to the common status of what she describes as super-exploitability. Contemporary African opinion recognised that the withdrawal of the limited franchise represented a further erosion of the few remaining rights left them.

The other area of contention between mining and industrial capital was the issue of 'squatters'. Mining capital with landed interests used their farms as labour pools, drawing labour into the mines on 6 months

contract and allowing their families and the workers to cultivate the land for the remaining 6 months, on payment of rent. Farmers bitterly opposed this, arguing that such access to land attracted labour off the farms. They also resented labour pools developing in the industrial centres, and called for the redistribution of 'squatters' and 'excess labour' amongst the farmers. They called for stricter legislative and administrative measures to prevent farm workers from leaving the farms to find employment in the industrial centres, wishing to bind farm labour to the farmer, so long as he needed them. Their opposition to enlargement of the reserves also related to the 'squatter' issue, since they felt that if 'squatters' could find alternative land in the reserves they would be able to resist farm labour. The outcome of this was the provision in the 1936 Land Act on the systematic abolition of squatting.

Thus, Lacey argues, labour policy was shaped by the struggle between the interests of mining and agrarian capital. By the end of the Hertzog Administration the major differences between them had been resolved and they were set to go as a united force to achieve their common goals. It is in this period that she dates the origins of the apartheid system, declaring that it was neither a product of the peculiarity of the Afrikaners nor a system which came into being in 1948, as if by magic. It is salutary to add, however, that whilst the roots of apartheid were well sown prior to 1948, the coming to power of the Nationalist Party and the economic, political and social doctrines it has pursued were neither predetermined nor inevitable, but were themselves the outcome of class and national struggles.

Which brings me to one of the major weaknesses of the book. Although Lacey declares a wish to put the record straight concerning the contribution that the black working class has made to creating the enormous wealth that the white minority has appropriated for itself, she in no way achieves this. Her explanation as to why the white ruling class approached the white

and black sectors of the working class differently is neither satisfactory nor enlightening. She tends to regard the oppressed African majority as a passive, hopeless and albeit fated body. None of the dynamism of struggle enlightens the conflicts between the ruling class and the working class. She fails to pose the national question, which, with the primary forum of class struggle — i.e. between the ruling and working classes — integrally determines the ensuing social and class relations that have come to characterise the South African social system.

The book remains, worthwhile reading as Lacey has attempted to clarify issues



which previous interpretations have clouded, whilst at the same time raising issues which themselves need further research and interpretation.

S.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Comrade Editor,

As ANC activists we would like to comment on some of the issues raised by the writers from the Western Cape in their reply (Sechaba, January 1982) to G.J.'s letter in Sechaba of April 1981. It is not that we feel G.J.'s letter should be defended, or that the Western Cape writers need to be contradicted, but that the writers raise serious questions about the meaning of our call 'Unity in Action'. These questions need to be answered not just officially, but also by the rank and file of our movement who must daily seek the means of implementing this most basic call of our revolutionary strategy at this time.

What does 'Unity in Action' mean? Does it mean the unity of the PAC, ANC, the Unity Movement and whatever other groupings may exist amongst the oppressed people? Does it mean that every grouping should have equality on every campaign platform, in every campaign newsletter and on every campaign committee? Does it mean we must not argue steadfastly the ANC's political position but rather refrain from arguing our point 'in the interest of unity'? In answering these questions, dear comrades, let us not fall into the pit of liberalism, of 'laissez-faire' and of political shortsightedness.

'Unity in Action' would seem to mean: firstly, the unity in everyday struggle of all the organs of mass mobilisation -- the unions, civic organisations, student organisations and women's organisations; secondly, the unity of the levels of struggle -- the unity in action of mass struggle, clandestine struggle and military struggle; thirdly, the unity in active resistance of all democratic South Africans, -- black, white, christian, muslim hindu, jew, atheist, socialist and black nationalist; fourthly, and most importantly, the unity in revolutionary struggle of every sector of our population -- workers peasants, intellectuals, students, urban and rural dwellers from the Limpopo to Cape Agulhas, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. This could reasonably be seen

as the basis of our call 'Unity in Action', not the formalistic idea of a unity between certain organisations, this latter unity is only meaningful if it comes out of the former and arises from everyday struggle.

In practical terms this means that we, as activists of the ANC, must seek to broaden the areas of mobilisation, increase the numbers of people mobilised into revolutionary structures and increase and make more specific the campaigns around which we fight. It is the number of people mobilised into the struggle which will determine whether our victory is sooner or later, not the number of organisations represented 'equally' on the campaign committee. If our 'revolutionary unity based on equality' is to mean that every organisation in an area has equal voice in determining the direction of campaigns we will quickly find our struggle usurped by those who have no popular base, but who by virtue of radical rhetoric feel they have a right to guide the revolution

This in no way justifies sectarianism on our own part towards genuinely popular based democratic organisations whose policy and out look may differ from our own. To these we should extend a comradely hand and seek areas of mutuality around which we can campaign as partners. But in proffering our hand we need not hide our own policies behind our backs or pretend that we have come over to their way of thinking. Rather we should offer our hand with our views clearly stated and while campaigning together seek to convince them and all involved, of the correctness of our policy in a spirit of comradely debate, as far as that is possible in a revolutionary situation. Ultimately, of course, the people will judge whose policy is correct and meaningful to the struggle for national liberation.

In this regard our comrades from the Western Cape are entirely correct when they distinguish between 'genuine fighters and loud mouthed slogan shouters' by asking 31

the questions; 'who do they direct their main blows against? Do they direct their blows, their venom and their anger at the oppressors and the regime or do they direct it at the oppressed people even if they don't agree 100% with you?' An excellent distinction! But let us not be naive by believing that the enemy is always dressed in police uniform or always drives a GG car. Besides the agents of the Botha/Malan regime who may infiltrate the people's ranks, the forces of imperialism (particularly the United States and West Germany) are keen to subvert our democratic struggle by injecting amongst us provocateurs and those who would lead us away from popular based action. Our blows, our venom and our anger must also, at times, be turned against these agents of the broader enemy. In doing so, of course, we must be absolutely sure that their actions of subverting our struggle are exposed to the people.

Finally we feel it is necessary to raise a point with our comrade editor. In your comment opening up this debate you seek to find common ground between the writers of these two letters by making a distinction between internal and external issues. This certainly is a shallow distinction at this point when our struggle has reached a point when the unity of internal and external wings of our movement and the unity of internal and external issues is stronger than it has ever been since the ANC was forced into exile in the 1960s. Furthermore why is it necessary to seek this common ground when by their very contribution to Sechaba the two writers have exhibited, beside all their differences, a more solid and fundamental common ground a commitment to a free and democratic South Africa.

an ANC unit — Western Cape.

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