


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HEROES'

DAY

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LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM

Voice of the African National Congress
And Umkhonto We Sizwe, the People's Army

Radio Lusaka

Daily 7.00 pm:
Wednesday 10.15-10.45 pm:
Thursday 9.30-10.00 pm:
Friday 10.15-10.45 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9505 KHz
Sunday 8.00-8.45 am:
Short wave 25mb 11880 KHz

Radio Luanda

Monday-Saturday 7.30 pm:
Sunday 8.30 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9535 KHz
and 25 mb

Radio Madagascar

Monday-Saturday 7.00-9.00 pm:
Sunday 7.00-8.00 pm:
Short wave 49mb 6135 KHz

Radio Ethiopia

Daily, 9.30-10.00 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9595 KHz

Radio Tanzania

Monday Wednesday Friday 8.15 pm:
Tuesday Thursday Saturday 6.15 am:
Short wave 31mb 9750 KHz

The above are South African times

EDITORIAL

SANCTIONS AND ARMED STRUGGLE

Recently, it has been reported that South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves declined for the sixth successive month — South Africa is becoming a net exporter of capital at a time when she can least afford it — and that South Africa is not in a position to repay the \$21 billion foreign debt. All this has been caused partly by sanctions.

Sanctions have been having devastating effects on the apartheid economy. The very fact that the racists are so nervous when it comes to advocating sanctions tells the whole story; they intimidate or threaten those who call for sanctions. Theories are propounded: sanctions will hurt Blacks most. This is even said by the racists, and when the racists sympathise with us we get worried.

There are other theories which are propounded and have nothing to do with reality. We are told sanctions are the only means of avoiding armed struggle. Our experience is different. We have never conceived sanctions as an antidote to armed struggle. Sanctions do help to weaken the apartheid regime, and this we regard as an act of solidarity with our struggling people. A struggle against a weakened enemy means less blood flowing in the streets of South Africa, fewer lives lost, and a shorter life span for apartheid.

Sanctions did contribute to the changing political climate in Southern Africa. Today the world's press is talking about the imminent independence of Namibia and the implementation of Resolution 435 — something that was unthinkable a year ago.

This has come about as a result of the military and political defeat of the racist forces in southern Angola — thanks to the bravery, sophistication, and high level of training, of the Angolan and Cuban armed

forces. Their air superiority did the trick. The apartheid forces could not achieve air superiority, partly because of sanctions. Their ageing Mirages were no match for the well-piloted MiG 23s, and they therefore lost their air cover. The crack Cuban regiment, the 50th Mechanised Brigade, moved swiftly down to the Namibian border, and thousands of SADF troops were trapped inside Angola.

In other words, sanctions did contribute to the defeat of the racist forces in southern Angola and to the imminent independence of Namibia. Surely sanctions will contribute to the liberation of South Africa.

But sanctions should not be regarded as a substitute for people's struggle, for armed struggle. The people of South Africa will continue to struggle, using all forms of struggle at their disposal, and this includes armed struggle. This armed struggle, like sanctions, is aimed at removing apartheid, which the United Nations calls a "crime against humanity." It is against this crime that the peoples of the world are united.


When Umkhonto We Sizwe intensified armed struggle this year, it was encouraged by the knowledge that most countries of the world had agreed to apply sanctions and that some were applying them. The result was immediate: the failure of the gun-point elections. This failure of the regime means a victory on our part; it also means that the Botha regime is not able to get out of the crisis.

Let us intensify armed struggle; let us engage our masses in strikes and demonstrations; let the peoples of the world intensify the campaign for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa. We call for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. The results will not be dissimilar from those of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

EROSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS


THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Nyawuza



This year, the international community commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. In South Africa, the apartheid regime was celebrating other things. It celebrated the fourth centenary of the arrival of Bartholomew Diaz on the shores of South Africa, the third centenary of the arrival of the French Huguenots, the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Blood River, the 40th anniversary of the Nationalist Party victory, and the 10th anniversary of P W Botha's becoming a head of state. Surely these were non-events, and had nothing to do with human rights — apartheid itself is a massive violation of human rights.

**IF YOU WANT PUPPETS
YOU HAVE THE 2 OF US**



These elections are taking place at a time of increased diplomatic activity, particularly around the question of the independence of Namibia. The question of the withdrawal of apartheid troops from Angola seems to be less problematic. Pretoria is a problem.

The United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, visited the region and had talks with the parties concerned. It should be remembered that SWAPO was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 as the sole representative

of the Namibian people, and Resolution 435 was adopted by the United Nations Security Council in September 1978. This resolution stated that the South African occupation of Namibia was illegal, and the Security Council therefore devised a plan for a transfer of power to the Namibian people under the auspices of the United Nations. After its defeat in southern Angola, the apartheid regime agreed to withdraw from Namibia, but now it is introducing a new element: the Cuban forces have to leave Angola within a year. The Angolans and Cubans say

within three years. This linkage, which has no justification whatsoever, is also aimed at helping UNITA, which is in disarray.

Inside South Africa

The two-year-old state of emergency, detentions, political trials, the treatment of prisoners and the emergency restrictions on meetings, individuals and organisations have meant an erosion of human rights. An ailing economy, affected by sanctions, lack of foreign investment and political uncertainty — these are some features which characterise apartheid today.

Talks by Botha, bluntly enunciating "total onslaught" against South Africa, "adapt or die," and "power-sharing," show Botha's changing policy to perpetuate apartheid, and simply mean a refusal to accept majority rule.

The tricameral parliamentary elections of September 1984 led to more repression, the state of emergency and the strengthening of the far right. In all honesty, it must be said that the Conservative Party of Andries Treurnicht, founded in 1982, is not a reaction to Botha's reforms (although many say it is). It is a logical progression of apartheid. The same can be said about vigilantes, including Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha. Remove all apartheid and this vermin will disappear. This is all the more so because it serves as a distraction from the real issues. This is the story — not the whole story — behind these elections. This story forms part of the elections.

On 'Election' Day

'Elections' is perhaps the wrong word, because elections are associated with democracy. When an undemocratic regime like the Botha regime talks of 'elections' for the Blacks, there is something wrong somewhere. The Botha regime has been unable to control our people by force alone, and therefore elections are part of this force.

Since the first Black local authority elections in 1978, the Botha regime has been giving us meaningless statistics. This year,

the Bureau of Information told us that nearly 20% of the registered Black voters cast prior votes, and after elections there was the official claim of 24.6%. It is said that 16.5% voted in the Transvaal, compared with 30.8% in the Free State, 20.9% in the Cape and 15.8% in Natal. The total number of eligible voters was 1 464 198, and the provincial breakdown was 968 529 in the Transvaal, 25 679 in the Free State, 264 562 in the Cape and 25 428 in Natal.

These are empty statistics. There are 26 million Blacks in South Africa; 11 million in the 4 'independent' bantustans of Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei and Transkei, and 15 million in the residual republic. Two-thirds are of voting age, and 2.3 million are registered to vote in local elections. Of these, 1.4 million live in the African townships.

On polling day, wards were contested for segregated councils all over South Africa, and the four racial groups voted separately, but on the same day — a deceitful imitation of a countrywide electoral process.

Of the 1.4 million, some 344 000 turned out, though the regime had spent millions of rands on propaganda and repression, and had kept the polling stations open for two weeks. Of the 1839 seats for Black councillors, only 905 were contested, and in 138 wards there were no nominations at all.


What this means is that on election day only 3.44% of adult Africans voted, and if those in the internationally unrecognised bantustans are included, it means 2%.

Armed Struggle and Sanctions

Umkhonto We Sizwe, military wing of the ANC, stepped up its operations during this period. More than 100 bombings have been reported since the beginning of the state of emergency on June 12th 1986 — at times these were at the rate of one bomb a day. The enemy so feared Umkhonto that they cancelled all police leave, and security forces were on standby at four polling stations. The problem here is that Umkhonto operations coincided with elections — otherwise, it was a general offensive. A massive intimidation campaign knew no

26 October
I you
e it happen.

6 October X



'Gunpoint elections'

bounds. The University of the Western Cape, which does not toe the government line, was hardest hit by education cuts.

It is said that the enemy's basic vulnerability is the reason for its aggression. What is this vulnerability?

The London *Times* of November 10th 1988 reported that South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves declined for the sixth successive month in October 1988. They fell by R477 million (£111 million) to R4 600 million, barely enough to cover the cost of six weeks of imports. The paper goes on to say:

"The slump in the reserves, which are now 41% below the level they reached at the end of last year, was caused mainly by huge sales of gold stocks to build up holdings of foreign currency needed to repay foreign debt. According to figures released by the South African Reserve Bank, more than 790 000 ounces of gold were sold in one month, reducing the Bank's gold holding by the end of October to a record low of 3.26 million ounces."

Dr Chris Stals, the Director-General of Finance, has gone on record as saying that international pressure had forced South Africa into becoming a net exporter of capital at a time when the country can least afford it. The net outflow of capital over the past three years he estimated at about R20 000 million.

This means sanctions do work, and sanctions are not an opposite of or an antidote to armed struggle. The two are complementary. If one considers that the total foreign debt is \$21 billion, this means the days when South Africa was dependent on foreign capital to finance domestic investment and current accounts and so on are coming to an end.

In conclusion, we can say that the recent elections in South Africa demonstrate clearly that we are dealing with a wounded beast — wounded by the struggles of our people and the solidarity they get from the international community. The emergence of the right wing, and the swing to the right conservatives in some areas, is the price the Whites are paying for defusing Black opposition. But that price cannot buy Black participation.

What New Nation would have said ...



In an antagonistic class society like South Africa, oppressed classes and strata develop their own mental production under certain conditions. Therefore, the functions, tasks and social effectiveness of journalism cannot be analysed in isolation from the interests of the classes it is serving.

HANDS OFF THE PRESS!

By S Maqetuka

In South Africa, the role of anti-apartheid and democratic journalism is determined by the specific contradictions prevailing. While the main social contradiction is between capital and labour, there is a secondary contradiction between the oppressed Black people and the racist-national oppression of the apartheid regime. The secondary contradiction is at present playing the primary role, and determining the functions and tasks of progressive journalism in South Africa, which are in conformity with the national liberation of the Black oppressed people.

This also explains that the emergence of what has become known as an 'alternative press' is not by chance, not a capricious intervention. At the same time, it refutes the allegation made by the racist Minister of Home Affairs and Communication, Stoffel Botha, when justifying the stifling of communication. He said:

"Press freedom must be looked at in the context of an attempted revolution by such violent organisations as the ANC and its mentor, the SACP ... the leaders of these organisations blatantly admit that they collaborate with the mass media to further their violent struggle for the takeover of South Africa."

The ANC and the SACP (which is of course not the mentor of the ANC) have never claimed to be collaborating with the mass media to further the "violent struggle." What is happening is that the interests of the oppressed and democratic forces, which are served by the alternative press, are not different from the interests of the ANC, that is, the liberation of our people from the inhuman system of apartheid. When the *New Nation* was closed by the racist regime, Gabu Tugwana, the acting editor, put it as follows:

"They banned the New Nation and damned it to silence because it dared to reflect the violence of apartheid. They banned it because it gave a voice to the voteless majority. They banned it because it ar-

ticulated the aspirations of millions of the oppressed people. But the spirit of resistance it was born into remains deeply rooted in a tradition that refuses to die for as long as apartheid lives."

In its last issue, *South* carried the following message:

"This may be your last edition of South ... In our small humble way we have refused to compromise the truth. We have refused to be a willing partner in a conspiracy of silence taking hold in our country. We have exposed injustice, exploitation and brutal repression. We have jealously guarded our independence, to the dismay even of some extra-parliamentary groups. And, recognising the ANC as the force to be reckoned with in South African politics, today we again carry a report on the banned organisation — this time its constitutional plans for a new South Africa."

The scythe of censorship and the suppression of information cuts a very wide swath through society in an attempt to mow down revolutionary forces. It was the censorship provisions under the regulations of the state of emergency, supposedly aimed at the 'revolutionary threat' by the ANC and SACP, that brought a well-known Presbyterian minister in the northern Transvaal, the Rev. Abraham Maja, into court to face charges of possessing and circulating 'subversive' literature. The security policeman investigating the case cited a portion of the Fifth Psalm as evidence of the illegal nature of some of the material he had confiscated from the Rev. Maja. He told the court that, yes, he believed the Bible itself could be subversive in certain contexts.

The Long History Of Progressive Journalism

Gabu Tugwana was quite correct when he said that the spirit of resistance the *New Nation* was born into remains deeply rooted

in a tradition that refuses to die as long as apartheid lives. The history of resistance in the media, articulating the interests of an organised national and workers' movement, is long. It can be traced as far back as 1912, when the first publication of the national liberation movement, *Abantu-Batho*, was formed shortly after the ANC came into existence. In 1915, the International Socialist League, forerunner of the SACP, began publishing its journal, called *The International*. In 1921, when the Communist Party of South Africa was first established, *The International* became its official journal.

The upsurge of political activity from 1984 onwards brought with it a number of independent and more influential weekly papers, local 'community papers,' papers directly attached to anti-apartheid political organisations, trade union publications, religious newspapers opposed to the apartheid system, as well as the independent news agencies, serving both the alternative and the established press.

About 98% of the information media of South Africa is controlled by the state or by the dominant economic forces, which, for a variety of material and political reasons, are downgrading the already limited ability of the publications to reflect reality. At the same time, without the substantial resources required for serious entry into the national media market, the 'alternative' media remain 'alternative.' These 'alternative' organs remain peripheral interventions in their size and distribution, though they have come to exercise an influence considerably larger than their limited resources might promise in different circumstances.

This is shown by the growing reader demand. The *New Nation* started two years ago with an unaudited circulation of 30 000 fortnightly, and had reached 60 000 as a weekly publication when the racist regime closed it. The *Weekly Mail*, which at the time of our going to press is under a banning order, has also doubled its circulation — the latest figure is 21 000. *COSATU News* was launched with an instant circulation of 200 000. *Grassroots*, a paper that people on the Cape Flats call '*ons koerant*' (our newspaper), is run by an editorial collec-

tive which answers to about 70 organisations, mainly affiliated to the UDF, and its print order has increased from 15 000 to 40 000. At a conservative estimate of ten readers per copy, this means that about 400 000 people read *Grassroots*.

Botha Is Nervous

The influence the alternative press exerts, and the fierce loyalty it commands in its readers, emanates from the fact that it serves the interests of the majority. That is why the regime, in spite of all its material advantages in the field of information and propaganda, reacts to it so nervously and brutally.

On December 11th 1986, Botha promulgated regulations designed specifically to restrict the media. These codified and replaced all pre-existing regulations and police orders imposing restrictions on the media during the state of emergency, and created additional and harsher forms of media control. When it brought pressure on the National Press Union to enforce its code of conduct, the regime intended that only the 'alternative' press would be subject to the new regulations.

In the new press regulations, a "subversive statement" was further defined as any statement likely to have the effect of inciting people to exercise power through alternative structures of local government, that is, civic organisations, or inciting people to prosecute and punish by way of people's courts.

A significant aspect of these regulations was the introduction of "publication control," where news or comment in certain categories may be published only with the permission of the regime. Thus, if an editor believes that an article may contravene the provisions of this regulation, but still wishes to proceed with publication of that article, the full text of the article has to be telexed to the Bureau for Information, accompanied by a request for permission to publish. The categories also include a prohibition on publication of any news or comment in connection with any security action, the deployment of security forces or technology, the release of emergency detainees.

Law in the Minister's Hands

In terms of these regulations, Stoffel Botha is empowered to ban future editions of a publication. He has made it clear he will exercise his own "subjective judgment" here, since neither the law nor the media council was adequate to deal with "revolution-mongering propaganda." He has sole discretion in regard to how he will apply the restrictions. The law is, indeed, in his hands. He applied his sole discretion in banning *New Nation* and *South*.

A related prohibition, though not specifically in terms of the regulations, is that on the publication of information on ships entering South African harbours — their origins, destinations, cargoes on board. This is a response to international sanctions, and an attempt to limit information that reveals sanctions-breaking.

Subsequent to the regulations, the state promulgated a number of police orders to fill those few remaining gaps the press has tried to take advantage of. The first set of these orders related to statements by certain organisations concerning specified campaigns, such as "Christmas Against the Emergency," and were directed against specific newspapers, namely the *Weekly Mail*, *Sowetan* and *New Nation*. The second type of order was in response to an advertisement calling for the unbanning of the ANC, placed in a number of newspapers. Here, the regime tried to restrict the publication of any report or advertisement which would throw favourable light on our movement, or which would explain or justify any campaign or action of our organisation in fighting the regime.

Scenes That Journalists May Not Be Witness To

Furthermore, the regulations prevent positive reporting on all forms of popular opposition to the government, violent or non-violent, constitutional or non-constitutional. Journalists are not allowed in sight of "security action" or "unrest," that

is why they may not be where there is:

- An illegal gathering (and virtually all outdoor gatherings have been illegal in South Africa for the past 11 years);
- A physical attack on a policeman, soldier or prison warder, or a family member of any such official, or on his or her property;
- A riot, or behaviour classified as public violence or intimidation;
- Any action by a policeman or soldier to terminate any of the above events or actions, or to 'follow up' on them, or to 'protect' life or property in the above situations;
- Any force used by a policeman or a soldier against persons he believes are endangering public safety or order;
- Action by police and soldiers in which people are arrested on suspicion of committing 'unrest' or are being detained under the state of emergency.

This set of regulations puts even more power in the hands of the police and the army.

The regime has three possible means of punishing those who break the above regulations. The least controversial is criminal prosecution with the possibility of a maximum penalty of a R20 000 fine and/or ten years in gaol. The second possibility is the seizure of the publication on the basis of an order issued by the Minister of Home Affairs or the Commissioner of Police; this seizure may occur at any point during production or at the point of sale, and operates beyond the courts and the requirements of natural justice. The third possibility involves ministerial prohibition of further editions of the publication, if the minister is of the opinion that this is "necessary in the interests of the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order or the termination of the state of emergency."

The Orderly Internal Politics Bill, governing foreign funding of anti-apartheid institutions, is a threat insofar as the alternative media reflect a form of ownership and control still heavily reliant on donor funding, often from abroad.

The attack on the media has not only involved the use of explicitly restrictive emergency regulations. Repressive actions have also increased against journalists and



other media workers whose reporting is critical of the regime. The actions range from destruction of journalists' institutions to detention of the personnel. For example, *Grassroots* is battling for survival — in 1985, almost all the staff were detained, a mysterious fire destroyed the offices, and *Grassroots* is now produced whenever and wherever the staff can manage to get together.

New Strategy For Winning Hearts and Minds

Emergency rule is not only about repression and destruction of resistance, popular organisations and embryonic forms of popular power. This was certainly the case during earlier periods, when emergency rule involved even more massive and extensive detentions, security force activity and state-sanctioned intimidation as a means of reasserting control within the townships. While this is still an important facet of emergency rule, the racist regime has moved from the exclusive use of reactive repression to a partial reliance on interventionist restructuring.

The complex network of Joint Management Centres (JMCs) comprising the National Security Management System (NSMS) demonstrates what we mean. There are reports of a booklet entitled, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*, that the State Security Council has distributed to leading racist politicians and state functionaries. It is a detailed strategy for "winning the hearts and minds." Major-General Bert Wandrag of the South African Police Riot Unit summed it up:

*"Drastic action must be taken to eliminate the underlying social and economic factors which have caused unhappiness in the population. The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip the revolution in the bud by ensuring there is no fertile soil in which the seeds of revolution can germinate."**

To begin with, 34 of the 'hottest' townships were identified for special attention after the 1986 state of emergency was declared.

JMC officials call them 'oilspots.' The booklet defines 'oilspots' as strategic bases where effective control over the population in an affected area is regained. The 'oilspots' will then steadily expand and "coalesce into bands of loyal local populations." In such places, JMCs are spending large amounts of money on 'upgrading' projects, establishing new sports, cultural, church and political bodies, and propagating the policy of the regime. During 1987-88, R3.2 billion was spent on 'upgrading' in many of the 34 'oilspots.'

Aimed At Black Readership

It is clear that the strategy of winning hearts and minds is aimed at the Black people, and that is why the recent press regulations were directed at those sections of the media which have a predominantly Black readership. Until the introduction of the regulations it was not a major issue for the regime if White readers read some details about our movement in such reactionary newspapers as the *Citizen*. But, in the terms of the regime, the same information is a danger if published in the columns of newspapers whose readers are mostly Black. In these terms, any reference to the ANC for example, be it historical or contemporary, be it a photograph of an ANC leader or a reference to ANC policy, is unacceptable if it is seen by Black readers.

It must be stated that with the growing polarisation among Whites and the new positive tendency within the White population, it becomes an issue for the regime if Whites are informed about the history, strategy and tactics, principles and so on of our organisations. The *Weekly Mail* does not have a predominantly Black readership; about 95% of its 21 000 buyers are White.

This plan to win hearts and minds is unlikely to succeed. Economic conditions and international sanctions are likely to push economic growth further down, thus severely limiting the funds available for 'upgrading.' Secondly, our people are objectively not interested in being accommodated in the system of apartheid by 'upgradings.' They want to be free from racist-national oppression.

What is of paramount importance is to ensure that the political consciousness of our people is so high that the "seeds of the strategies of the enemy do not find any fertile soil to germinate." The information and propaganda workers of the liberation movement, in its broadest meaning, have perhaps the most important role to play in ensuring the realisation of that task. Progressive journalists belong among those in the forefront of this process.

Progressive Journalists

The possibility for eradicating racist-national oppression also depends on the advance of our people, on what is often called the 'subjective factor.' Our people should be conscious of their role in our society at present, of their own genius and strength, of their weaknesses, of the immediate tasks before them, of the aims and objectives we have set ourselves. They should be aware of the strategies and tactics of the enemy, as well as our own strategies and tactics to counter those of the enemy. These are questions our journalists have to address daily.

It has become imperative for media workers to organise themselves into truly united national and democratic structures. The foremost task of such structures will be to ensure the strengthening and broadening of such campaigns that fight for the freedom of the press, like the "Hands off the Press!" campaign, and the campaign for the release of detained journalists. It would be necessary for media workers to work with the democratic political organisations and the trade union movement. Media training should be seen as a priority, and structures should be set up that will survive the state onslaught in the long term.

We should draw international attention to the campaign to defend the progressive press in South Africa. We shall need strong ties of solidarity between South African media workers and those of the international community. The international community must insist on its right to be informed accurately and objectively about events and the situation in general in South Africa, and to evolve methods to ensure there is a constant flow of information into and out

of the country.

The regime hoped the world would know nothing of events in South Africa except by 'hearsay,' which cannot be printed without police or military clearance. The restrictions are also directed at the international media with journalists accredited in South Africa. Foreign correspondents (if they are allowed in at all) operate according to the rules of the censorship machine. A total of 238 foreign newsmen were refused new or renewed visas for South Africa in the 11 months up to May 31st 1987.

Role of the International Community

The question for the international community is: should it allow the apartheid regime to act like this with impunity? The system in South Africa depends for its maintenance on foreign investment, technology, political and cultural contacts. Perhaps the international community should consider expelling South African press attaches in retaliation.

The debate initiated by UNESCO and the United Nations concerning the New International Information Order is relevant to this question. What is to be done about the apartheid regime and its policy on information and propaganda?

The concept of a New Information Order is closely connected with the concepts of decolonisation and development; and in the light of this the declaration adopted at the 20th session of UNESCO called on the mass media of the world to contribute to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promote human rights and to counter racism, apartheid and incitement to war. Therefore, for the media of the world to counter the racist propaganda of the Pretoria regime, to inform the international community about the situation of the oppressed masses of South Africa, and the daily atrocities committed against them, is not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, but is to act in conformity with international law.

It is established in international law that, in a war of national liberation, the forces of the liberation movement have a protected

status and the struggle itself is protected. In the practice of the United Nations, which is reflected in the law, the national liberation struggle has the right to seek assistance; assistance to the forces seeking to suppress the struggle is forbidden. We should call on the world community to give the alternative media, including that of the ANC, the necessary material, technical and financial support which will help to resist the onslaught of the racist regime.

A Challenge for Us

If there is to be a meaningful challenge to the stifling of the South African media, then it will have to come from the revolutionary illegal movement. The media of the ANC and its allies can fulfil that role. Our Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo, has something to say in that regard:

"An immense amount of propaganda is being written and distributed by the overt organisations at home, but this propaganda cannot take the place of ANC propaganda. The capacity of the overt organisations is limited by their need to function within the bounds of legality, however much they may at times strain those bounds. We, speaking from the underground, and unrestrained by considerations of legality, need to be able to speak directly to the masses, show our presence among the people, and analyse local and specific problems within the national context and the perspective of people's war."

This task represents a magnificent and challenging opportunity to the media workers of the liberation movement and to the movement as a whole. In order to have effective media that can face the challenges, it would be necessary to have a systematic, well-balanced information policy. Just as there can be no revolutionary movement without a sound policy, so there can be no effective media without a well-worked-out information policy. This is necessary if our media are to have a meaningful role. It is a task that must be tackled with the seriousness it deserves.

* *Weekly Mail*, May 20th 1988.



INTERVIEW

WOMEN IN STRUGGLE

Those who were once the 'young lions' of South Africa, the rebels of 1976, have matured in the struggle. Some have given their lives as soldiers, some are now on death row. Others have gone on to organise.

Caesarina kona Mokhoere, who was still at school when she was gaoled for five years in 1977, and has published a book about her time in prison, spoke to Sechaba about the influences that shaped the growth of her political awareness.

Early in life, she was faced with the ine-

quality and injustice of apartheid:

"My mother was a domestic worker, and my father a policeman. My mum used to take us to her place of work. You know, there was a vast difference between my home and the people my mum was working for. For instance, the employers had

two fridges full of food, meat ... their kids had toys, which is something we never saw in the family. And, you know, I used to envy those kids. I remember, not far away from their place, there was a playing ground where these kids, the White kids, had all the playing facilities unheard of in the townships. One day I said to my mum, 'Mama, could I please go and play with those kids?' She said, 'Oh, forget it. They'll arrest you.' At the age of 11 or 12, I had that thing in my mind that I wished to be White, because White kids had almost everything I didn't have. I seriously envied them.

"That thing built up. In 1972 I went to Vlakfontein Technical High School, where I was taught by White and Black teachers, and two-thirds of the teachers there were White. In the South African situation, it's not common for Whites to go and teach Black people, particularly Afrikaans-speaking Whites. So one could see that the people who were brought to our school were the rejects of the apartheid regime, because if they were efficient they could have remained in White schools.

"And they brought with them their racism. For instance, there were two staff rooms, one for Whites, one for Blacks, and the White staff room was properly cared for, cleaned by a Black man who was paid by the school, and the Black staff room was completely ignored — the Black man was not permitted to go and clean it; the teachers themselves were supposed to care for it. And that thing, on its own, really showed the vast difference. There was also one teacher who used to call us 'apes'; we'd complain to the principal, and he'd just dismiss our complaint."

In 1976, she and her schoolfellows turned from silent resentment to open rebellion. Five days after the shooting of Hector Peterson, pupils of the Pretoria district took to the streets as well:

"We felt that we should also show solidarity with the fallen ones, the arrested ones. On June 21st, in Pretoria, we really showed that we were protesting against what was taking place within the country against peaceful demonstrations.

"The education system was meant to domesticate us; we were just channelled

to do one thing — servants for the rest of our lives."

Through the experience of these times, Caesarina came to see the need for armed resistance. She wanted to go for military training, but instead was captured, charged and sentenced for encouraging others to go.

"The main, burning issue was to go and train — to revenge, and that when they shoot, we'd shoot back; that we can't afford to be throwing stones and fighting people who are armed, and ourselves being unarmed. All I wanted was to go out then, go and join for military training, come back and fight, period."

When the ANC was banned in 1960, Caesarina was five years old. We asked her how much she had known about the ANC in 1976, and how she had felt about it. She replied:

"I knew little. All I knew was that Comrade Mandela was the leader of the ANC, and that ANC members were harassed and banned and others were in prison, that the organisation was banned, that Winnie was the wife of Nelson Mandela and they were seriously harassing her. And when the Timol case was in the papers, it gave me some insight; his death really shocked me, though I was still young, and it made me aware of the ANC being there."

Comrades she met in gaol between 1977 and 1982 contributed greatly to her political growth:

"The most important thing I learned is the women's resistance inside the country. I felt proud of people like Mama Dorothy Nyembe, the role they played in the '50s, her involvement in the ANC since she was 17 years old, and the years she has spent in prison, and her militancy. She had all the patience of sitting down with me and relating to me their struggles as mothers. I got educated then. I felt proud. I remember saying to Mama Dorothy, 'We will take over where you have left off.' It was within me that if Mama Dorothy can do such a thing, what about us? It's necessary for us, as the youth, to take the spear and move forward.

"And when I met Thandi Modise, I was very proud of her — here was an MK cadre, a woman, who had gone to the bush — and I was really happy to meet her and to get a lot of knowledge about MK. I remember she decorated a vest for me as a present; I decided to leave the prison with it; it was red; she decorated it, 'Free Me.'"

Soon after she was released from gaol, Caesarina became politically active. She helped to form the Mamelodi Youth Organisation, was on the original ad hoc committee and later was the only woman on the executive.

She also helped organise mothers in Mamelodi into an organisation called Zakheni, which means, 'Stand up and build yourselves.' There were women who had had experience of political campaigns of the '40s, '50s and '60s but who had since grown inactive, and they had to be brought back where they belonged. She also served on the executive of Mamelodi Parents' Association:

"The purpose of Mamelodi Parents' Association was to build a bridge between parents and students. At that stage, many parents in Mamelodi used to think that their kids were wrong by voicing their demands, that COSAS was irresponsible, and all that. So, as mothers, we felt it was necessary for us to come out and stand up for our children's rights, fight with our kids, together. And that linkage between mothers and kids, mothers and students, played a very important role; we saw Mamelodi coming up united."

By that time, she was no longer active in the youth organisation. She became an executive member of the Federation of Transvaal Women, and an organiser:

"Apart from locally, I had a lot of work to do — I had to run around, form women's groups all over the Transvaal, and it was demanding, but at the same time it was inspiring, you know, to meet mothers, educate them about the struggle — I think that's one work I used to enjoy more than any other thing."

This was a period of intense political activity in the townships, and intense repression. In August 1985, Caesarina had to

leave South Africa:

"There was this assassination squad, and they were really seriously assassinating activists in the country. I happened to know that my name was also on the assassination list, and a lot of comrades advised me that this time they will really get rid of me. So I was forced to leave. I had no option."

Three months later, outside the borders of South Africa, Caesarina read reports of the great demonstration in Mamelodi on November 21st, and the massacre that accompanied it:

"More than 12 000 mothers came together, and they called for a stayaway, which had never happened in the history of mothers, you know. Here were 12 000 mothers, just in one township, calling for a stayaway from work, from school, from everything, and the community adhering to the call of mothers. The mothers were calling for rents to be reduced, for soldiers to get out of the township and stop harassing their kids, that the detainees must be released — the ten students must be released, and other comrades.

"On November 21st, people didn't go to work. More than 50 000 people marched from Mamelodi East to Mamelodi West, and the march was led by mothers. Mothers saw the necessity of standing up and saying, 'Enough is enough!' and leading the march, you know.

"And what the apartheid regime did — they answered the march with bullets. We lost mothers aged 65, 64, 62; and even a 60-day-old baby died during the Mamelodi massacre.

"But it was no longer students, it was no longer the youth, no longer the kids whom the mothers used to scold for being irresponsible. It was the mothers themselves."

Speaking of herself today, she explained why she is now a member of the ANC:

"There was nowhere for me to go when I left South Africa, except the ANC. The politics of the ANC are clear. It was important to continue along the same lines as I had with the progressive forces inside the country, fighting for a democratic, non-racial South Africa."



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Demonstration



Zwelakhe Sisulu, editor of the New Nation

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We join the universal condemnation of the banning of the Weekly Mail and the erosion of press freedom in South Africa.

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The closure of publications adversely affects our society's ability to formulate well-informed and considered opinions and decisions.

Civil liberties are indivisible — the curtailment of one diminishes all.



UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE



The office of the New Nation and a media worker in the window



Journalist Montshiwa Moroke, after being attacked by police



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US POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THE REAGAN ERA

By Ben Magubane

Now that the eight-year term of the Reagan administration and its policies are over, an assessment of 'constructive engagement,' and what it meant for the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia, is warranted.

After the Sharpeville massacre on March 21st 1960, the ANC was banned and a state of emergency was declared. As it is doing today, foreign capital was panicking, losing confidence in the regime, leaving the country, and forcing a financial crisis.

It was the intervention of American banks, organised by the New Jersey financier, Engelhard, that rescued the South African economy and brought to South Africa stability which would last a whole decade. During this so-called 'quiet decade,' American companies were allowed to increase their stake in apartheid, while the various US administrations, as they do today, indulged in the effortless virtue of abhorring apartheid, while underwriting it with American capital and making sure nothing was done to destroy it.

The South African economy grew at an unprecedented rate. The size of American corporate stakes increased from a few million dollars at the beginning of the 1960s to almost \$3.68 billion by the end of the decade, and before the present downturn in the South African economy, America's corporate stake in apartheid stood at more than \$15 billion, including direct, indirect and bank loans.

In the meantime, the political, economic and social situation of the Black community worsened as the apartheid regime passed one repressive law on top of another to tighten the screws of oppression and exploitation. The harsh repression imposed on the ANC, the police sweeps that imprisoned thousands, the official silencing of all African opposition, must have been welcomed by both the local business com-

munity and foreign investors.

In 1967 came the first sign that resistance was reviving: clashes in the western part of what was then Rhodesia, between a joint ANC-ZAPU force and the racist forces of Rhodesia and Pretoria. The intensity of these clashes, that went on up to the beginning of 1968, must have alarmed Washington, and a US policy of working more closely with the Pretoria regime was formalised in the Kissinger National Security Study Memorandum 39 of 1969.

Kissinger Policy

The assumptions of the Kissinger Memorandum were self-serving at best. It concluded that White domination in Southern Africa was there to stay for a long time, and the US was hurting itself by trying to pretend otherwise. It is easy to understand why this study was done in the first place; it would provide the US with the excuse to begin the process of bolstering the already weakened Portuguese dictatorship, and the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. The racist South African forces, helping both Portugal and Ian Smith, were being stretched as the struggle escalated in Namibia. In 1972, the US advanced Portugal a loan of \$436 million, which covered almost the entire Portuguese military budget.

In 1974, the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown by the young military officers, who had reached the conclusion that the colonial wars were unwinnable. Washington's response was panic. Kissinger's policy had miscarried badly. To try to

salvage the situation, Kissinger undertook his grand safari of Southern Africa, and, in Lusaka, made a declaration about the inevitability of majority rule in Zimbabwe and the need for reform in South Africa. On his return to the US, he reported to the Foreign Relations Committee:

"We were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalisation which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan..."

"The interdependence of America and its allies with Africa is increasingly obvious. Africa is a continent of vast resources. We depend on Africa for many key products: cobalt, chrome, oil, cocoa, manganese, platinum, diamonds, aluminium, and others ... The reliance of Europe and Japan on Africa for key raw materials is even greater than ours."

Stability in Africa, the US thought, would ensure uninterrupted flow of strategic minerals and would open the region for US investment. The US and its allies would work hard to seek ways, on their own and through their client regimes in Africa, to undermine the ANC and SWAPO, which would not settle for anything less than complete self-determination for their people. In Kissinger's testimony, the policy of 'constructive engagement' is already contained in outline.

Vague Concept

'Constructive engagement' — the words are identified with the Reagan administration, but their substance denotes a certain frame of mind towards the struggle for justice.

As a concept, 'constructive engagement' is inexact, and its political value lies precisely in its vagueness. Its virtue is its ambiguity. It is capable of a range of possible interpretations. Where one is addressing many audiences with contradictory expectations, one's intentions themselves must be made as vague and ambiguous as possible. This inexact world of ambiguity and half-truths, of manipulation and decep-

tion, of creating dreams and illusion, is not wholly without pattern and consistency. For it is in this very ambiguity of words that concrete objectives are realised, rules established, values asserted and strategic goals achieved.

"Ideally, the West would like to see a controlled and orderly progression towards multi-racial democracy, but if the choice is between revolutionary change and no change at all, then the West will, and must, come to terms with the latter rather than risk aiding or abetting the former."

— Peregrine Worsthorne in the
Sunday Telegraph June 20th 1976

The policy of 'constructive engagement' was not about helping the Black population of South Africa rid itself of the oppressive and exploitative White minority regime, but how to remove the worst aspects of this regime in order to incorporate it as a respected member of the western defence system in the struggle against 'Soviet expansionism.' The policy of 'constructive engagement' meant continuing to align even more openly US interests with the racist regime, under the pretext that this was the only way this notorious regime would be nudged (the word is commonly used) to reform itself. Even more, it would be argued that economic disengagement, instead of weakening the regime, would make it more intransigent.

Role of Apartheid in Africa

Through the so-called 'Contact Group,' the Carter administration made the White minority a central player in the solution of the Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts. The inclusion of the Pretoria regime in these discussions were intended to create the myth that, with the right persuasion, the apartheid regime would be amenable to reform. If African countries could be persuaded about the legitimacy of Pretoria, the struggle of the ANC against the White

minority regime would be devalued and reduced to a civil rights, and not a national liberation, struggle.

Under the Reagan administration, the White minority was made a partner in resolving a regional question, with a dangerous goal — that of attempting to reverse the recent history of Southern Africa. In pursuit of this goal, Reagan assembled a team of diehard anti-communists, including his first Foreign Secretary, General Haig, whose racial attitudes, according to Claudia Wright, "put him in the same clubroom with the South African military." A member of the National Security staff in the Nixon administration, Roger Harris, had observed the "pall of racism" at meetings, at which, "to the amusement of Kissinger and his colleagues, Colonel Haig would quietly pretend to beat drums on the tables as African affairs were brought up." (*New Statesman*, April 3rd 1981, p.10)

Two Impulses

US policy on South Africa has vacillated between two impulses. One urges outright support of the Botha regime, to enable it to reassert its hegemonic claims in the region, while encouraging it to effect such reforms as would make it a credible partner of the US in the global war against 'communism.' The other is doubtful about the long-range implications of such a policy, especially given the racism of the White minority, "that rules a largely Black nation" in an African continent, according to the report of the Study Commission on US Policy Towards Southern Africa. If the US maintained friendly ties with the present regime in South Africa, the report went on:

"... we will ensure the enmity of the Black government that ... will some day assume power there. The way to block the spread of Communist influence ... is to give strong backing now to the forces for change in South Africa. Moreover ... American economic and political relations with the Black states that occupy most of the African continent will hinge increasingly on the stand we take on South Africa. If we fail to oppose apartheid at every turn ... we will

lose friends in the rest of Africa. We will also run the risk of losing access to Black Africa's resources." (p.xviii)

Soon after his election, in an interview with Walter Cronkite on CBS, Reagan openly declared the South African regime a "strategic ally." Of all US administrations after World War II, the Reagan administration was the only one to ally itself openly with the racist regime, without feeling any embarrassment. It had been elected without any of the Black support that had gone to the Carter administration. It is not surprising, therefore, that, at the height of the 1984-86 uprising, and when Congress was debating the issue of sanctions more seriously in 1986, the Reverend Falwell was despatched to South Africa in August.

Emissary of Washington

Falwell, whatever his other spiritual qualities may be, is above all a right-wing advocate of reaction and counter-revolution in the world, and his record in the area of civil rights has nothing to recommend it. And this is the man who was sent to South Africa and who came back to launch a million-dollar campaign to correct "misconceptions about the South African regime." His campaign included two week-ends of special television broadcasts presenting "the other side of the story in South Africa" as told by the White rulers of South Africa, whose hands are soiled with the blood of murdered school children. Falwell went out of his way to insult Bishop Tutu, calling him a "phony" and not a representative of Black opinion.

What was the Reagan administration's response to Falwell's trip and insult to Bishop Tutu — a man supposedly looked upon by the administration as a hope for 'moderation'? Not even a cursory rebuke, but rather a deafening silence that indicated wholehearted approval of Falwell's message. What's more, on the very day that Falwell wined and dined with Botha, the US government publicly rebuked Tutu for not joining a group of church figures who had met with Botha. If a country's foreign policy is a reflection of the domestic agenda, the sending of Falwell to South Africa could not

have been a better symbol of the attitude of the Reagan administration towards its own Black community.

"The United States, and the rest of the Western world, have to work out a policy for what is going to be the central issue in Africa by the mid-1980s and into the early 1990s ... That central issue is the future of South Africa."

— Editorial in the London Economist
April 24th 1976

Falwell and those like him were used to airing and propagating sentiments that the Reagan administration found it undiplomatic to say in public. Viguerie, Falwell's 'new right' fellow traveller, arguing in defence of the Pretoria regime, wrote in the *New York Times* in 1986:

"None of us conservatives support apartheid. The question is not whether they will have a White ruler or a Black ruler in South Africa. They'll have White rulers for the foreseeable future — the question is whether that White ruler will be South African or Soviet. The alternative to the current government is a Communist regime. If South Africa falls, freedom is not likely to prevail in the rest of the world for long."

In mid-March 1981, Lt-Gen P van der Westhuizen, chief of South African military intelligence, and Commander Willem du Plessis, chief of naval intelligence, visited Washington, causing some embarrassment. The visit revealed that the Reagan administration had taken a decision to restore the military intelligence links between the US and Pretoria that the Carter administration had severed.

Attacks on Front Line States

It was in the context of the policy of 'constructive engagement' that South Africa began not only attacking ANC houses in the Front Line States, but also at-

tempting to bludgeon these countries into submission. On January 30th 1981, when South African soldiers attacked an ANC house in Maputo, the government of Mozambique alleged that US intelligence had been given to Pretoria, pinpointing the targets. The Reagan administration replied by cutting off food aid to Mozambique at a time of devastating natural disasters. In 1986, the Reagan administration cut the \$225 million aid to Zimbabwe by half after a Zimbabwean cabinet minister had criticised US policy in Southern Africa at a July 4th celebration that was attended by President Carter; this aid was recently restored.

As part of its policy, the Reagan administration did not hide its antipathy for the ANC, worked hard to isolate it, and demean its long struggle. On July 23rd 1986, a story in the *New York Times* disclosed that US and British intelligence had been exchanging information with their counterparts in Pretoria about the activities of the ANC throughout the crisis of the regime. The exchange, according to the report, had been systematic and regular. Information was swapped about:

"political activities, ANC bombing targets and the movement of leaders like Oliver Tambo, in return for South African data on Soviet and Cuban military and political involvement throughout Southern Africa."

In a speech on July 22nd 1986 (Reagan's only comprehensive statement on the subject during his eight-year administration), the president accused the ANC of "calculated terror," and said:

"... the South African government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organisation that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics to achieve it."

The administration became impatient with the United Democratic Front for opposing the Botha 'reform' overtures.

Another aspect of the US response to the crisis involved attempts to build up pro-US elements hostile to the ANC among the oppositional forces — building the so-called 'third force.' Chief Gatsha Buthelezi served as a crucial link in this strategy; while belittling the ANC as an exile organisation,

he constantly accused the UDF and COSATU of being fronts for the ANC.

Secret Agenda Against Angola

In early 1981, Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, held a secret meeting in Pretoria with the South African foreign and defence ministers. A US government memorandum on the meeting was leaked to an anti-apartheid organisation a short time later. According to this document, Crocker told the South African officials:

"Top US priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. US wants to work with the South African government, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia."

Finally, the document summed up the meeting:

"Crocker addressed Botha's fears and concerns by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But US believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where US can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa within our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open south/central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The ideas US has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujoma wins or not."

In this conversation, several key elements of 'constructive engagement' appeared:

■ The Reagan administration considered and dealt with the apartheid regime as its main ally and base in Southern Africa. Apart from its important investment and trade links, the USA under the Reagan administration would use South Africa as a base to extend its imperialist interests to dominate the whole region, and to ensure that no fundamental anti-imperialist transformation would take place. Therefore, in the interests of world imperialism,

'constructive engagement' would make sure that South Africa remained a fortress of the imperialist camp, with the domination of the White minority assured.

■ 'Constructive engagement' would see to it that the 'security' of South Africa was not a negotiable item in any deals it made with the Front Line States.

■ US political and diplomatic manoeuvres for the 'independence' of Namibia would be linked not only to the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola, but also to the inclusion of Savimbi in a coalition government, by hook or by crook.

■ The Reagan administration would work tirelessly to 'clean up' the apartheid regime and to make it a respectable part of the western 'security framework.' Walvis Bay, the South African naval base on the South Atlantic coast of Namibia, was described by the Reagan officials as "unquestionably South African territory," and if they worked out an acceptable formula for independence in Namibia, they would make sure that it remained in the hands of Pretoria.

■ Finally, the Reagan administration, through 'constructive engagement,' gave the Botha regime a free hand to bludgeon its neighbours into submission. It was confident that the Front Line States that supported the ANC military struggle from bases in these states would crumble under direct attack from South Africa, and indirect economic pressure from the United States. Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho became an example of what could happen to those who supported the ANC. The economic part of the strategy was intended to demonstrate, according to Richard Burt, the State Department director of politico-military affairs, that it "pays to be an American friend."

In 1981, when the Namibia settlement was in place, the Reagan administration took power, and the first thing it did was to introduce the issue of 'linkage.' That is, Namibian independence should be conditional on Cuban withdrawal from Angola. In the meantime, the Reagan administration would turn a blind eye as South Africa launched one campaign after another into Angola. Throughout, the US used its diplomatic leverage and power of veto to prevent South Africa from being condemn-

ed and punished by the United Nations Security Council.

Reagan Threatens Nyerere

In August 1982, when South Africa launched the Askari campaign to cut a swath of territory that it could hand over to UNITA to administer as a buffer to protect Northern Namibia, President Reagan, according to the journal *Jeune Afrique* of October 27th 1982, sent a letter classified 'secret' to President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, then chairman of the Front Line States, urging him to accept 'linkage.' Reagan suggested that if 'linkage' were not accepted soon, the US would cease to press for implementation of the UN plan for Namibia.

The Reagan administration pressed hard for repeal of the Clark Amendment, initiating what eventually became a dangerous opening for US intervention in Angola — the supply of Stinger missiles to UNITA, and financial aid worth \$5 million dollars in 1985. It is now obvious that, in the last eight years, the Reagan administration and the Pretoria regime have been on an extremely ambitious and dangerous exercise to reverse the gains made by the peoples of Southern Africa. In 1983, according to Louis Wiznitzer in the *Christian Science Monitor* of March 31st 1983, Western diplomats at the UN were reported to be speaking of:

"... the determination on the part of the Reagan administration and South Africa to gradually rid Southern Africa of Marxist regimes."

From 1984, the struggle against apartheid intensified within South Africa. The revolutionary upsurge among the oppressed sent an unmistakable message — if we win this struggle we shall remember those who, in our hour of need, wined and dined with our oppressor. In the struggles of 1984-86, the people of South Africa destroyed one of the key assumptions of 'constructive engagement:' that if South Africa had to reform, then Whites, not Blacks, would reform it. That dream, on which Crocker built his reputation, came crashing to the ground in the lengthening list of Black township revolts.

Shultz' Assessment

It was in the context of these momentous developments that the Shultz-Tambo meeting took place.

June 16th 1986 was the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, and it was marked in South Africa by a strike of at least three million workers. I have already referred to Reagan's speech of July 22nd. On the 23rd, Shultz gave testimony before Congress.

He began by reviewing the situation in South Africa and its implications for the White minority. He discussed with remarkable candour the problem of South Africa's siege economy, plagued by flight of capital, high structural unemployment among Black and White workers, the dwindling rand that had lost two-thirds of its value against the dollar, sickening poverty in the bantustans and urban townships, the most savage form of crisis that the country had faced since the turn of the century, and unparalleled levels of military spending. He didn't shrink from raising the fundamental question of what a post-apartheid government would inherit. As he put it:

"Skilled manpower is fleeing the country. Domestically generated capital is bleeding away."

Shultz specifically mentioned apartheid as the cause of these troubles.

The most important part of his testimony was his oblique mention of the need for the apartheid regime to communicate with all parties in South Africa. He went on:

"It makes sense for the United States to do the same, and we will. Like our allies, we intend to raise the level and frequency of our contact with the South African government's Black opposition — among others the African National Congress."

He expressed his reservations about

"the ultimate objectives of the ANC as well as about the role of the inner circles of the Soviet-controlled South African Communist Party."

Bid for Credibility

This testimony, and Reagan's speech of the

22nd, must be understood as desperate attempts to regain credibility. The Reagan administration was on the verge of being isolated. The impact on Black America of developments in South Africa was already considerable. The struggle against apartheid had become a national issue among college students; there were the Trans-Africa demonstrations, and various church-related demands for divestment. Jesse Jackson had made the struggle against apartheid a key test of the morality of American foreign policy. As 1986 drew to a close, business people, church leaders, students and various organisations were visiting Lusaka to talk to the ANC. The Thatcher government in Britain had finally decided to open talks with the ANC. Much of the debate in the US itself now focused on how to relate to the ANC.

In one way or another, the argument would boil down to the best strategy for preventing the oppressed in South Africa from being alienated from the West, and thus creating the possibility of a future government in South Africa being permanently severed as a sphere of influence in the capitalist world. There is a belief among some that the ANC itself could still be neutralised by exploiting differences between so-called nationalists and Communists.

Anti-Apartheid Act

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 effectively repudiated the policy of 'constructive engagement' in South Africa. In Section 4, its principal purpose is set out:

"... a comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment of a non-racial democratic government."

The Act, according to Nogan,* reflected a widely-held perception among policy-makers within Congress that White minority control, in spite of almost six years of trying to establish its hegemony in Southern Africa, was no nearer to its goal; and in

South Africa itself its ability to rule over the Black majority was slipping and could not be maintained indefinitely. The striking thing about the Act, writes Nogan, is that it mirrored the survival of the "national phobia" of anti-communism:

"A pervasive concern of the Act is fear that the national liberation movement of South Africa is controlled, or might be controlled, by elites with communistic ideological affiliations. Indeed, a leitmotif of the Act is the fear that liberation in South Africa will ultimately be a victory for international communism." (p.360)

The Act reveals deep-seated suspicions about the ANC, especially its alliance with the Communists. In Shultz' speech and in the Act there are hints that if the ANC could repudiate its alliance with the Communists, it could be acceptable as a negotiating power. But if Communists are a significant force in the ANC, what guarantee would the West have that they would not subvert a future ANC-led government?

US-Pretoria Security Co-operation

Besides giving the president discretionary powers to implement the Act, an Act which supposedly repudiates his policy, another glaring loophole in the Act is that it leaves in place and legitimises the co-operation between the US security forces and those of the White minority. Nogan underlines this obvious contradiction:

"Therefore, as a matter of public policy, and in unprecedented fashion, intelligence collaboration with the South African government has been legitimised. South Africa is keenly interested in the deployment of ANC operatives as well as the strategic and tactical thinking of the ANC leadership. Since the prime object of the South African security system is to monitor and destroy the liberation movements, especially the ANC, there is a serious question whether mutual trust can be established between the liberation movement and the US government, in light of this intelligence collaboration. It cannot

be forgotten that Nelson Mandela was an early casualty of CIA collaboration and betrayal to the South African security policy." (pp.363-4)

As the Reagan presidency prepared for what, to the people of Southern Africa, is a welcome and graceless departure from history, Chester Crocker, architect of the failed policy of 'constructive engagement,' embarked on diplomatic activity to bring about the departure of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola, the withdrawal from Angola of the defeated and dispirited South African Defence Force, and to bring about the independence of Namibia.

Military Policy

In February 1988, Chester Crocker visited Luanda for talks. He went there in his capacity as a mediator between Angola and South Africa. To coincide with the visit, South African forces had begun what they called the final assault on Cuito Cuanavale. It was believed this would add muscle to the US negotiations.

Crocker's initiative in February raised questions about US strategy. Was it connected to the military initiatives of Pretoria? Or were the US and South Africa operating a twin-track strategy of applying armed force to impose concessions on Luanda?

The failure of the racist forces to capture Cuito Cuanavale became one of those watersheds by which history is demarcated. The US began a process of weaning UNITA from Pretoria; the Botha regime moved from confident assurance to uncertainty and defensiveness, especially when it lost its command of the skies.

On August 8th 1988, speaking at a summit of leaders of the Front Line States, President Kaunda explained the reason for the ceasefire that had been signed between Angola and South Africa. He explained that it was the military blows dealt to the invasion forces by the Angolan army and its Cuban allies that had brought South Africa to the negotiating table, and won a pullout agreement from Pretoria. After a decade of trying to impose a military solution on Angola, South Africa had failed.

On July 7th 1988, Jim Hoagland of the

Washington Post summed up the frustration of the South African regime:

"Once viewed as a regional superpower that would be able to march easily to Luanda if it chose to do so, South Africa has been reduced to intervening periodically to rescue from destruction the UNITA rebel forces. That is a costly exercise with limited effect. To have achieved so little must be disheartening. More importantly, the White minority government in Pretoria must now evaluate its Angola policy in the closing months of the Reagan presidency, the friendliest that Pretoria and Savimbi are likely to ever see in Washington. They must know they will never get a better deal under future US leaders."

So it has been in the interests of South Africa and the Reagan administration to settle outstanding accounts. Two of these accounts are what to do about the ANC and what to do about the Cubans.

Pretoria Makes Demands

Following the London talks, the aims of South Africa and the Reagan administration with regard to the ANC began to emerge. According to the London *Independent* of May 1st 1988, South Africa demanded, as part of the settlement, superpower guarantees that the ANC guerrillas be removed from Angola, and not be allowed into an independent Namibia. According to the same article:

"If the Angolans and their Cuban and Russian backers agree, the chief prize for Pretoria may not be the removal of Cuban troops from Angola but the collapse of the ANC's military campaign, and the delivery of the ANC to the negotiating table. There have been serious doubts that South Africa has any intention of ending its 68-year-old rule of Namibia. The prospect that the ANC would be forced to negotiate might be the ultimate prize which could persuade them to give up the territory."

The question might therefore be legitimately raised — are we seeing another linkage being made again to stall South Africa's departure from Namibia? Alternatively, is

South Africa trying to win at the negotiating table what it has lost in the battle for the control of Cuito Cuanavale? The demand for the presence of Umkhonto We Sizwe to be removed from Angola would coincide with the undeclared policy of the Reagan Administration.

Chester Crocker has said that the US will continue its support for UNITA as long as the Soviet Union continues to give aid to MPLA. Crocker's linkage plan and Pretoria's demand regarding the ANC is not simply a deal to give Namibia its independence and guarantee peace in the region. The small print would change the face of Southern Africa. The London *Independent* quoted a State Department source as saying the deal would secure:

- The removal of Cuban troops from Angola within one year.
- The independence of Namibia under UN Resolution 435.
- If SWAPO is elected government in Windhoek, it will be forced to sign a non-aggression pact with Pretoria.
- No foreign troops, including ANC guerrillas, on Namibian soil.
- Namibia will remain within the South African sphere of influence. Walvis Bay, Namibia's only port, would remain in the hands of the apartheid regime. It was not part of the former German colony, and Resolution 435 merely says that an independent Namibian government will negotiate with Pretoria over its future.
- Pretoria will drop its support for UNITA. The many betrayals of previous agreements by Pretoria and the unwillingness of the US and its allies to punish Pretoria for its intransigence raises many questions. How can the SADF be prevented from marching back into Namibia and Angola after the departure of the Cuban forces? Indeed, can the White minority regime really pull out of Namibia? They have just discovered oil in the Kudu field off the Namibian coast, and have also invested millions in military installations in Namibia.

We need to keep these questions in mind. Some time ago the London *New Africa* magazine wrote:

"When the Portuguese left, UNITA was simply taken over by the South Africans ...

UNITA'S military importance without South African help can reliably be counted as nil."

Over the past eight years, South Africa not only armed and trained Savimbi's bands, but went into Angola several times to save him. Does Reagan want to force the future administration to do in Angola what South Africa couldn't do? The past record of Congress is worrying. It not only removed the Clark Amendment, which prevented giving aid to UNITA, it included anti-ANC clauses in the divestment bill, and raised the anti-communist bogey to new levels.

Pretoria Guards Strategic Minerals

One of the central strategies of Pretoria is to convince the United States and its western allies that it is the only sure guarantee against the spread of the 'red menace' in the dark continent, and that the ANC is a mere bit player, a front for communism. Indeed, in 1950, the White minority regime passed the Anti-Communism Act to discredit the demand for equality and extension of the franchise to Africans.

It seems that all Botha and his regime have to do is to show good intentions by 'reforming' apartheid, and the US and the western countries will bail it out rather than see South Africa and its mineral wealth being lost to 'hostile' forces. Previous US policies, especially during the Reagan years, served to convince the White minority in South Africa that the US, acting in concert with Britain, will accept neo-apartheid as the lesser evil, because in South Africa the real issue is western security.

What, then, does the future hold? Everybody today accepts one thing — that the White community cannot hold power for ever in South Africa. The US and others can ignore this at their own peril. Vietnam, Iran, Chile and other places should be lessons for those who formulate US policy.

* Winston P Nogan, *An Appraisal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*, *Journal of Law and Religion*, No 2 1987, pp 327-365.

ANC INTERNATIONAL



This postage stamp was issued in the USSR to mark Nelson Mandela's 70th birthday earlier this year.

Portugal

In October, at the invitation of the International Centre for Trade Union Rights, a sub-committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions based in Prague, the ANC and SACTU went to Lisbon to attend the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. More than 250 people attended. The ANC was represented by Comrade Francis Meli, and SACTU by Comrade Ilva MacKay.

This international meeting took place when our people in South Africa are fighting for basic human rights; when the apartheid regime oppresses Blacks in virtually every aspect of our daily lives and circumscribes the lives of Blacks so heavily that we are prisoners in our own land.

The seminar was inspired by the fighting will of our people. Our delegates told the gathering that our people, in their turn are

inspired by the selfless convictions of Nelson Mandela, who is cherished by the vast majority in our country, and by the peoples of the world, as the embodiment of our dreams and aspirations. The courage of our people is also demonstrated by the 78-year-old partially blind and semi-paralysed trade union and community leader, Oscar Mpetha, who is sentenced to five years. What about the 67-year-old railway worker, Harry Gwala, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1976? Gwala is suffering from a terminal motor neuron disease, one of his arms is paralysed and the other is partially paralysed. Our delegates said that all this is part of the price we in South Africa are paying for human rights.

The message of the ANC and SACTU was well received, and the last session of this international gathering was dedicated to Comrade Nelson Mandela. That session was a massive demonstration of solidarity with our people.

BOOK REVIEW

FIGHTING FOR APARTHEID:

A JOB FOR LIFE

European Citizens in the South African Defence Force

By Alman Metten, MEP and Dr. Paul Goodison

In cooperation with *Tous Geerlings of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Netherlands (AABN) in Amsterdam*
and the *Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) in London*

Alman Metten and Paul Goodison, *Fighting for Apartheid: A Job for Life*, AABN/COSAWR, 1988, ISBN 70-70367-10-6, 72 pages, paperback, £3.00.

The Committee on South African War Resisters (COSAWR) and the Netherlands Anti-Apartheid Movement (AABN) have laid down a formidable challenge to the structures of liaison and co-operation which are now emerging between the Anti-Apartheid Movements of the European Community. Their latest publication, by Alman Metten, member of the European Parliament, and Dr Paul Goodison, sketches out a campaign which, if successful, could significantly undermine the military strength of the Pretoria regime.

The booklet examines the composition of the South African Defence Force, including its professional full-time soldiers, full-time and part-time conscripts, and part-time commando volunteers. Even to those well versed in campaigning against western military collaboration with apartheid,

the facts in the book make startling reading.

Not only is the European Community the largest investor in South Africa, and its major trading partner; it is the largest supplier of White manpower for its war machine as well. *One-third* of the Whites of South Africa either hold an EC passport or have a right to acquire one. Because the regime has recently extended compulsory military service, in response to the growth of popular resistance and the armed struggle, EC-South African nationals now constitute *one-third* of Pretoria's armed forces.

If the EC governments could dissuade or prohibit these EC nationals from fulfilling their military commitments in South Africa, the impact would clearly be very considerable indeed.

The three largest groups of European citizens in the White population of South Africa are the Portuguese (600 000 people), the British (500 000), and the West Germans (100 000). All in all, over 35% of South African Whites have a citizenship link with these three countries. According to the

British government, up to one million people now living in South Africa would be entitled to claim British citizenship if they chose to.

The remaining groups of European citizens in South Africa are Greek (80 000), Italian (50 000), Dutch (40 000, but with 200 000 eligible for Dutch citizenship if they wish), Belgian (25 000), French (8 000) and Irish (2 400, with 75 000 eligible). Denmark is the one EC country with a negligible number of its citizens resident in South Africa. Overall, 1 138 000 South African Whites are already holding, or are entitled to hold, a European passport.

Fighting for Apartheid describes the contribution to apartheid South African war machinery which the White adult males of this group are now required to make in return for their privileged life in the sun. It explains how critical this contribution has become as the regime struggles to keep the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa 'under control.' And it makes clear, as Dr Beyers Naude points out in his introduction, that, "the violence in South Africa has equally become the responsibility of the governments in the countries of the European Community."

And here lies the central paradox, exposing 'the utter hypocrisy of European governments which for years have condemned violence in Southern Africa while persistently refusing to take the non-violent actions against it which lie clearly within their power.

The incorporation of large numbers of European citizens into the SADF, notably as a result of the extension of military conscription in 1982 and 1984, has made it 'possible for the regime to sustain its war against the Front Line States, as well as within Namibia and South Africa itself. In so doing, its forces have attacked development projects funded by the very government whose own nationals are implicated in the destruction. Yet no EC government, it appears, feels responsible for the behaviour of its citizens or is prepared to take action against them.

This 'none of our business' attitude contrasts sharply with the reception — lukewarm at best, and frequently hostile — given to South African war resisters seek-

ing asylum in EC countries, Metten and Goodison point out, and is also at odds with the declared self-interest of EC governments in a political solution to the problems of Southern Africa rather than a military one.

The fact that over two million White South Africans are entitled to an EC passport, and undoubtedly, in a large number of cases, view this as a valuable insurance policy in the event of escalating conflict in the region, puts the EC in a powerful bargaining position. The particular ways in which it ought to be using this leverage are clearly set out by the authors.

The EC, they argue, should make enlistment in the SADF incompatible with the retention of an EC citizenship, through legal measures to prevent the return of EC nationals who have fulfilled South African military service requirements. European companies with South African branches should be prohibited from making voluntary supplementary payments to their employees who fulfil military service, and EC governments should demand disinvestment should these supplementary payments be made compulsory by the South African regime.

Positive measures should include clear policy declarations welcoming South African war resisters into the European Community as an integral part of its stated anti-apartheid policy.

Since the publication of *Fighting for Apartheid* in October 1988, the issues it raises have been debated in the Dutch parliament, and are being taken up by the media in several European countries. At a press conference in Strasbourg on October 13th, the Anti-Apartheid Movements of the Community jointly urged their governments to act along the lines set out by the authors.

Britain, whose Foreign and Commonwealth Office declined to be interviewed on the matter for a Dutch TV programme, will almost certainly prove the most recalcitrant. What is needed now is concerted pressure from grassroots public opinion throughout the European Community to force it to end this blatant, but until now little understood, collaboration.

ML



SELLO MOETI (MICHAEL LEBESE)

Sello Moeti was born on December 1st 1953, in Waggendrif (Cullinan), about 45 km east of Pretoria, the seventh child in a family of nine children.

The family moved to Mamelodi in 1961. Sello began school at Morotele Lower Primary, moved to Mogale Higher Primary, and then to Mamelodi High School, where he obtained a first class pass in the Junior Certificate in 1974.

Even in Form One of high school, his resistance to the hated Bantu Education was evident. Sello loved debate, and engaged in intense discussions with family and friends. Highly perceptive and politicised from his early years, he had a strong awareness of oppression and degradation.

He was in one of the earliest groups to join the ANC following the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique. A few months before the 1976 Soweto uprising, he left South Africa and went to Mozambique, where, through FRELIMO officials, he sought contact with the ANC. Talking to a friend about this experience, he said that he had been inspired by the victory of the Mozambican revolutionary war, and greatly influenced by the political programmes from Radio Mozambique, which he used to monitor regularly with his close friends in Mamelodi.

He arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, while the Soweto uprising was still at its height.

Reflecting the impatience of that generation, Sello demanded that he, together with others, should quickly be given military training in order to go back and meet the challenge of the fascist apartheid regime. This group was undeniably motivated by the most militant of revolutionary spirits, but they also reflected the immaturity of their generation at that time. They had a limited perception of the problems then confronting the ANC. Anger against the Boers had to be reinforced by the analytical ability to situate the Soweto uprising in the context of the overall struggle, and not only the

armed struggle.

Sensing this analytical deficiency in the Soweto generation, the ANC leadership organised political classes to be conducted for them. It was in those political classes that Sello distinguished himself in his grasp of the political problems in South Africa. His ability to make objective assessments increased, and his contributions in the class tended to be less emotional, and more calm and reasoned.

Here, Sello developed his own personality, and developed a partisanship to the ANC that reflected his depth of understanding of the problems that made it impossible for the armed struggle to grow at the rate he demanded. Observing his political qualities, the ANC leadership selected him to join a small group sent to the Soviet Union to study political propaganda. What had inspired Sello in Radio Mozambique was now to be expected from him when he came back from his training to broadcast on Radio Freedom.

The strategic thinking in the leadership at that time was that the ANC needed to develop cadres who would be responsible for the Radio Freedom stations all over Southern Africa, since that phase of our struggle depended, almost exclusively, on the successful conduct of political education and propaganda among the oppressed people. Sello's group was the first-ever group after the Soweto uprising to leave Dar-es-Salaam to acquire training and skills, and also the first from the Soweto generation to train in skills of that kind.

Sello found a particular interest in political propaganda. Political training did not change, but only developed, his personality. He liked argument, but not for its own sake. Highly principled and incorruptible, he demanded from others what he demanded from himself. He judged people by their innermost qualities. When he detested people, it was for their lack of principle, sloppiness and inattentiveness to the problems of the people. It mattered little to him what position a person held in

the ANC; as long as there was a point to challenge, he did it with the tenacity that did not augur well with those few who always expected praises in the assessment of their work. This characteristic was with him throughout the period of his work in the ANC.

In Luanda, he was made deputy head of the Radio Freedom unit, working closely with a group of comrades who subsequently became his close friends. Careful in selecting his friends, and also difficult to make friends with, Sello carved for himself a unique and at times controversial character. For those who were far from him, he was simply an arrogant young man, but for those who were happy enough to have his confidence and be close to him, he was a sensitive and highly cultured human person. He was forthright and straightforward almost to a fault. His hatred for corruption was not only directed against others, but was an important index of his own moral standing in the organisation.

If anybody thought that Sello would abandon these qualities over the years, they were proved wrong. Fortunately, the ANC was able to read in them the potential for an uncompromising young revolutionary, who was soon made head of the Radio Freedom unit in Dar-es-Salaam.

Dar-es-Salaam, however, was to be a place where Sello's health would seriously deteriorate, as he got repeated malaria attacks which inevitably contributed to the lowering of his general resistance and immunity to disease.

So frequent and devastatingly severe were these attacks that, when he arrived in London from Dar-es-Salaam, the doctors told him his white blood count was very low and that therefore his resistance to infection was also low. Even on this score, the fault can be laid on the lap of imperialism, which has deprived countries like Tanzania of the means to acquire medicines to combat some of the diseases that have become non-issues in other parts of the world. Also, some of the drugs that are dumped in Africa, at times offered as aid, turn out to be banned from use in their countries of origin. Hundreds of people in Africa, for example, are still treated with *Fansidar*, an anti-malarial drug banned in Britain because of its side effects.

Such things contribute to the general state of health of people on the receiving end of this malpractice.

Sello's health was never to be the same again; where others would normally take the full stress and strain of work, Sello's response became that of a nervously wrecked, and at times highly explosive, personality. And this ate up the very intellectual engine that nature had endowed with extraordinary reasoning powers, and a uniquely solid and forthright personality.

One of Sello's closest interests was the development of armed struggle in South Africa. His skills, however, took him to a battlefield of a different type, and required him to employ a different weapon in the same fight — his pen. He wrote skilfully, using the sharp language that derived partly from his political anger, but also partly from his own cultural background among the militant BaPedi people of King Sekhukhune, whose reputation at one time was to rout the Boer invaders so mercilessly that they fled to Pretoria.

Sello left unfinished work. He was working on a book on the struggle of the women of South Africa, having selected as his focus of study Lilian Ngoyi and Elizabeth Mafekeng. He also left the unfinished manuscript of a novel, which he began in Dar-es-Salaam, but could not complete because, according to him, people would "expect a perfect work from a mind as critical as myself."

Towards the end of his life, he was studying the counter-revolutionary strategy of the Pretoria regime.

Sello strongly suspected that he might die, but faced this possibility with extraordinary courage. Those who went to see him in either Homerton Hospital or St Mary's, intending to give him inspiration, came back themselves inspired by him. He died in the early hours of October 27th 1988, and was buried in Highgate Cemetery. Sello's mother was there during her son's last days, and was also present at the funeral, which was conducted in a fitting, political manner.

As Sello liked to say: Uyadela Wena Osulapho! (Happy are you, who are already grappling with the enemy!)

Lala Ngoxolo, ndoda Yama dodda!

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
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
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