

NOVEMBER 1988



SECHABA

official organ of the african
national congress south africa



NOVEMBER 1988

SECHABA

ISSN:0037-0509

Volume 22 No 11

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EDITORIAL

NELSON MANDELA AND GATSHA BUTHELEZI

There has been a lot of speculation about the release of Nelson Mandela. The apartheid regime is speaking with many tongues. Millions of people have demanded Mandela's release, thousands and thousands have campaigned for his release. If Nelson Mandela is released it will not be because the racists have had a change of heart. It will be because the voice of the democratic forces throughout the world is so loud that it cannot be ignored.

Gatsha Buthelezi has also gone on record as one of those who demand the release of Nelson Mandela. Can he genuinely be for Mandela's release when his thugs are killing Mandela's followers, when the UDF members are being harassed? Is this his double agenda?

Gatsha Buthelezi has nothing in common with Nelson Mandela. Gatsha boasts of leading six million Zulus; Mandela has never boasted of being a leader of the entire South African population. Even if we assume Gatsha is correct in claiming to be a leader of the six million Zulus, he has no right to rule them with an iron fist. What we see in Natal is that big-tribe chauvinism is not being used against other ethnic groups as such. Ethnicity becomes a useful tool, especially after failing to solve political issues. This does show that there is nothing like a political vacuum. The absence of democratic popular political structures in Natal makes a mockery of Gatsha's call for

the release of Nelson Mandela. The UDF and COSATU, the most democratic structures in the country, are being hounded out of Natal.

If Gatsha wants to be regarded as a genuine campaigner for the release of Nelson Mandela, he must change his image so that it looks like that of Mandela. He must tackle political issues and stop using ethnicity as a substitute. Inkatha, which is not part of the mass democratic movement, needs to be overhauled; UWUSA is a caricature of a trade union. Gatsha's vigilantes are not engaged in armed struggle, but in doing Botha's job.

Another disturbing factor is the announcement by the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, that she intends to go to South Africa. This is said when there is talk about Mandela's release. We already know what she will say when she returns to Britain: sanctions don't work. She is likely to contradict herself: sanctions will hurt Blacks most, and, by implication, they do work.

P W Botha has suddenly become a diplomat, visiting African capitals and pursuing the same old game. Even after they have been defeated in Angola, they have not abandoned the idea of going back there. Now they want to go back via other independent states.

All these developments are not in the spirit of Nelson Mandela, who — we are told — is soon to be released.



THE BATTLE FOR ANGOLA FIDEL CASTRO SPEAKS

On July 26th, the 35th anniversary of the beginning of the uprising that finally ended in the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro made a speech in Santiago di Cuba, where the uprising began. We reproduce here that part of his speech in which he dealt with the internationalist assistance given by Cuba to the Republic of Angola, the military victory at Cuito Cuanavale and the present question of a peace settlement.

Towards the end of last year, a difficult situation was created in Angola ... as a consequence of an enormous military escalation by South Africa, which intervened because of an offensive the Angolan forces were carrying out in a faraway region of south-eastern Angola, against the UNITA forces.

Powerful Angolan forces gathered there, in an area that was far from the extreme of the strategic line that our troops were defending. And the South Africans intervened because of the Angolan military operation, not far from the north-eastern border of Namibia. They intervened with their tanks, infantry, planes and Namibian mercenary forces, and they created a difficult situation, dealt the Angolans military blows, for they had remained without food, fuel or ammunition, south of Longa River.

That was when the Angolan retreat began. The same thing had already happened once before, in 1985, when the South Africans openly intervened. But in 1985, they rejected the Angolan offensive on Angolan territory. Keep in mind that all this is Angolan territory, and the South African military operations were carried out on Angolan territory.

But this time, they pursued the Angolan forces and besieged them at Cuito Cuanavale. There were thousands and thousands of men from Angola's best units, and they were in danger of being wiped out. That would have been disastrous for Angola; it


would have meant the possibility of destroying independence and the revolution in Angola.

Help Was Essential


The Angolans requested our help, and help was essential — essential! — for either the efforts made throughout the years were lost, or the help was given. But, moreover, help was essential, not only to collaborate with Angola to get out of a difficult situation, but also for the security of our own troops. We drew the conclusion that, if South Africa was allowed to carry out that operation, to wipe out the Angolan troops, the situation could become dangerous for our own troops as well. Therefore, without hesitation, the leadership of the Party decided to help the Angolans solve the situation.

But it was impossible to do so without reinforcements. The troops that had been in Angola for years were not enough to guard a long strategic line and also solve the situation that had been created in Cuito Cuanavale. That's why we had to reinforce the troops. But this kind of operation cannot be done only partially. How many troops had to be sent to Angola? All that were needed to solve the situation. They couldn't be small groups of reinforcements, but all those necessary.

POSITION OF CUBAN TROOPS
ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987



REINFORCEMENTS AND ADVANCES
UP TO APRIL 30, 1988



The South African enemy were superior in men; the balance of forces had been favourable for years. The balance of forces had to be changed, and once again our people had to carry out a feat, and they did. I said our people, for our people are really the heart and soul of our Revolutionary Armed Forces.

It was really impressive to see how our soldiers, the reserves, the units, responded; impressive — despite the fact that we've been fulfilling this mission for years, a really admirable fact. An action of this kind does not depend on techniques, on money, on resources, or anything else; it depends on the human factor, and the human factor was decisive ...

It was necessary to be strong, strong enough to avoid defeat; it was necessary to choose the scene of action, not to act where it was most convenient for the enemy, but where it was most convenient for our forces.

The South Africans had chosen Cuito Cuanavale as the scene of action, a faraway place, where logistics becomes extremely difficult. They had chosen that field; we had to draw up another strategy. We had to accept the challenge of Cuito to keep them there, to stop them.

The Enemy Crumbled

We had to get into Cuito to support the Angolan forces and, at their side, wage the historic actions of Cuito Cuanavale, where the enemy was stopped, where it really crumbled against the Angolan-Cuban resistance. I believe that it was really a historic battle of great importance. Some day it will be put down in writing, and much more will be said about it.

But the essence of the Cuban-Angolan strategy was the advance in the western region of the southern front. That way, the Cuban and Angolan forces advanced over 250 kilometres towards the frontier with Namibia, without stopping, creating a new situation.

All that was done in Cuito Cuanavale, as well as in the western part of the southern front, could never have been achieved on a solid basis without the reinforcements sent from Cuba; they were essential. A

powerful force was created. Therefore, the balance of forces changed in southern Angola; it changed in our favour.

I must say that in Cuito Cuanavale, as well as in the western part of the southern front, the Angolan soldiers, who are so accustomed to our company, so closely bound to us, maintained an exemplary conduct, an heroic conduct, an extraordinary conduct. The military situation changed completely.

On advancing over 200 kilometres, our armoured units, which were strongly supported by anti-aircraft weapons, were getting far from our air bases. We had to build an air base as fast as we could, and I can tell you with satisfaction that if there was ever a place where a greater effort than the one we have seen here in our country during the last few days was made, it was there in Cahama.

In a matter of weeks, our troops and construction workers built an airfield 3 500 metres long, and since one wasn't enough, in a matter of weeks a second one was built, with concrete and all — the parts that had to be made of concrete — apart from those made with asphalt; with all the shelters for the planes and all the necessary installations for the base. Yesterday, the southern front military command sent us a telegram saying that, in tribute to July 26th, the second strip had been finished.

So they not only achieved a military feat, but also a construction feat, and our powerful forces, reinforced in anti-aircraft weapons, with air support, began taking all the necessary fortification measures against any type of surprise, against any enemy attack by air or land. Thus the Cuban-Angolan troops advanced until they were near the frontier of Namibia. There, the really experienced, powerful units have gathered, with a tremendously high morale.

Political, Just Solution

But our objective was not to achieve a humiliating and destructive military victory over our enemy. If we had to wage the battle, we had to be ready to do so with all the conditions for success and for victory, which are the conditions that were created there; but we were not looking for military

victory, we were looking for a political, just solution to the conflict. That was the main objective, and that's why the possibilities of negotiation were not discarded, the alternatives for a negotiated political solution were not discarded, and we worked seriously and responsibly to take advantage of the slightest possibility of a solution of the kind.

We had to act calmly and serenely, for when such powerful forces meet, the leaders and those responsible have to be more serene than ever; they must act cold-bloodedly. That's why we also worked in the diplomatic field.

Reaching the objective with no bloody battles was already an extraordinary success. To do so from so far and with a minimum of casualties was a real feat in the political and military field. The precision and efficiency with which our troops advanced on the southern front was really impressive, as was the way they thwarted the enemy's action in Cuito Cuanavale. It was necessary to run risks, and we did, but we are really on the threshold of a political solution.

We have come a long way ... The bases for a political solution already exist, and progress is being made. Therefore, there is a real possibility of finding a just, dignified and honourable solution for all those concerned, which includes the security of Angola and the independence of Namibia. On the basis of this global solution, Cuba and Angola will be ready, and, in fact, if the agreement is fulfilled, if the agreement is achieved, if the agreement is signed, in common agreement, Cuba and Angola will proceed to gradually and totally withdraw the Cuban internationalist forces from Angola.

The withdrawal cannot be abrupt. There is a minimum of time which is necessary for the Angolans to take over the areas, the installations, the positions, we defend. But, based on the principles and the points included in the agreement, our military presence will no longer be needed in Angola.

We are working seriously, and we will strictly abide by what we should. The fulfilment of this historic and honourable mission as a test of firmness and tenaciousness will soon have lasted 13 years.

Spirit of the People

It was possible, not only because of the merits of our Party, but mainly because of the merits of our people. Such loyalty, such will, is only possible when one can rely on a people like ours. So, when the time comes when our mission is considered complete, we will gladly welcome our troops back; we will gladly welcome those who built our fortifications and military bases; we will gladly welcome our brave army when it returns to our homeland; we will gladly welcome the tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of men who will then take part in this other colossal battle, the battle to develop our country, the battle to strengthen our Revolution.

Perhaps the most outstanding thing about all these years is that they were difficult years, years when very big efforts proved necessary to strengthen the country's defence, when it became necessary to conceive and organise a strategy calling for the war of all the people.

Perhaps no one ever thought that a country directly threatened by imperialism, like Cuba, would remain loyal to the fulfilment of those international obligations; perhaps no one ever thought that a country as threatened as Cuba would be able to ship out the combat gear it shipped to Angola, because that's where many of our anti-aircraft weapons, our most modern anti-aircraft weapons, are.

Now, why were we able to do so? Why were we able to ship out tens of thousands of fighters, hundreds of tanks, guns, etc etc? Why? Because we had the people with us, because our concept of the war of all the people makes us very strong, because the defence of the country is in the hands of the entire people! And only a people with that spirit, with such a concept, could be able to accomplish the feat of remaining faithful to those commitments and shipping out the reinforcements sent over, without fear or hesitation, because, had imperialism wanted opportunistically to take advantage of the situation to attack our country, it would have clashed with our people here, and would have experienced — we're certain of it — another Giron (Bay of Pigs), two Giron, three Giron, 100 Giron.

NEW YORK AGREEMENT

JULY 1988

On July 11th-13th representatives of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States met in New York, with the United States as mediator. The principles for a peaceful solution in south-western Africa were agreed upon. Angola, Cuba and South Africa ratified the agreement in a document dated July 13th. We give the text of the document here.

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa reached agreement on a series of essential principles to lay the foundation for peace in south-western Africa. They all recognise that each of these principles is indispensable for a global agreement.

A. Implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the United Nations Security Council. The parties should indicate and recommend to the United Nations Secretary-General a date for the start of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435/78.

B. The governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa should, in keeping with the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435/78, co-operate with the Secretary-General in order to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and just elections, abstaining from any measure which could block implementation of that resolution.

C. The movement to the north and staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of a PRA-Cuban agreement and the decision of both states to request on-the-spot verification of this withdrawal by the United Nations Security Council.

D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality and independence of states and for territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

F. Abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.

G. Acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states.

H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples in the south-western region of Africa to self-determination, independence and equal rights.

I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from agreements that may be entered into.

J. Undertaking to comply in good faith with obligations assumed under agreements that may be entered into and to resolve differences through negotiations.

K. Recognition of the role of the permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors of the implementation of agreements that may be entered into.

L. Right of each state to peace, development and social progress.

M. African and international co-operation to solve development problems in the south-western region of Africa.

N. Recognition of the mediating role of the United States.

GENEVA AGREEMENT

AUGUST 1988

This is the full text of the statement that came out of the Geneva meeting in August. It was issued simultaneously from Havana, Luanda and Pretoria.

The delegations of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of South Africa and the United States of America met August 2nd to 5th in Geneva, Switzerland, to continue their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in south-western Africa.

Building on the progress made at London, Cairo and New York, the negotiations in Geneva were detailed, positive and productive.

The delegations of Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed on a sequence of steps necessary to prepare the way for the independence of Namibia in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, and to achieve peace in south-western Africa.

They agreed to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Javier Perez de Cuellar) the date of November 1st 1988 for the beginning of implementation of 435.

The parties approved *ad referendum* to their respective governments the text of a tripartite agreement that embodies in binding treaty form the principles negotiated at Governor's Island in New York, and formally approved by governments on July 20th 1988.

On their side, Angola and Cuba reiterated their decision to subscribe to a bilateral accord which will include a timetable acceptable to all parties for the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

The parties have undertaken to reach agreement on this timetable by September 1st 1988.

The parties approved a comprehensive series of practical steps that will enhance mutual confidence, reduce the risk of military confrontation, and create the conditions in the region necessary to conclude the negotiations.

With the approval of these measures, a *de facto* cessation of hostilities is now in effect.

The full effects of these measures will become apparent in the weeks ahead.

The next round of negotiations at the level of senior officials will take place during the week of August 22nd, with the exact date and venue to be established.

All the delegations expressed their appreciation for the superb facilities and support extended by the Government of Switzerland.

ANC STATEMENTS

PRETORIA'S CAMPAIGN TO WIN EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY

The Pretoria regime has launched yet another of its 'peace' offensives. Like previous ones, this offensive is purely for external consumption. At home, the order of the day is suppression and the flow of blood. Outside, it is all smiles and offers of dialogue.

It is surely ironic that the Botha regime has chosen as the prime targets of this offensive the front line states which, from the moment of their birth, have been unendingly destabilised and plundered by Pretoria and its bandit mercenaries. Most of these have already experienced the dubious value of the previous accords, treaties and dialogue with South Africa's rulers.

The current policies of blood and smiles are two sides of the same coin. Botha is once again attempting to achieve through external diplomacy what he has so far failed to achieve at home. By attempting to forge links with Africa he hopes to win the legitimacy and respectability which is denied to him by the overwhelming majority of our people.

Three years of emergency rule accompanied by military and police terror and assault on the little that remained of civil liberties have demonstrably failed to crush the moral and fighting spirit of our oppressed. External solidarity from the world as a whole, and especially from our African brothers, has helped considerably to sustain this spirit of resistance. In addition, escalating sanctions have begun to eat away at some of the economic and social foundations of race rule.

Botha's present diplomatic offensive is therefore designed both to demoralise internal opposition and to relieve the growing siege of the apartheid economy. His ultimate objective is to achieve a 'peace' which will ensure the permanent survival of White supremacy, and provide space for

Pretoria's economic domination of our sub-continent and beyond. Botha will never be forced to abandon these objectives only through the process of negotiation and dialogue. What is needed is increased pressure.

Whatever possibilities exist of a settlement in the on-going negotiations on Angola and Namibia will be the result, in the first place, of struggle, and the serious armed defeats inflicted on the racist army by the combined forces of Angola, Cuba and SWAPO. This contrasts starkly with the previous chronicle of years of talks on Namibia, which South Africa and its friends continually exploited to sabotage the implementation of Resolution 435.

Experience has shown that Botha welcomes any form of external dialogue, particularly with countries on our continent. It helps him break down his very damaging isolation. It enhances his legitimacy, and, what is most important, it gives him the space and time to concentrate on the job at hand, to be left unhampered by the outside world in his attempts to destroy the liberation opposition.

Events have also clearly demonstrated that there is no hope whatsoever of bringing Botha to a table with anything approaching an acceptable negotiating agenda, without an increase in the level of internal and external pressure. Premature initiatives for summits and dialogue with Pretoria, however well-meaning, are actually counter-productive to peace. Such initiatives tend inevitably to postpone or ease the very pressure which is needed to pave the way for meaningful negotiations.

The 19th Summit of the OAU in 1983 declared that, "the sole obstacle to peace in Southern Africa is the apartheid regime and its policies of internal repression," and called upon our whole continent to work

to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. With the passage of time, that call has, if anything, become more imperative. The unprecedented intensification of repression and the defiant resistance of our people demands, more than ever before, the stepping-up of external pressure and isolation.

In these circumstances, we are compelled to voice our deep concern that countries like Zaire have seen fit, not only to receive and play host to the butcher of Soweto, but are also trying to smooth his path towards a summit with Black states.

We say to the whole world that now is not the time to open up to the Pretoria regime. Those who do so are, whatever their intentions might be, postponing the day when Botha will be forced to speak to the real leaders of our people on a real negotiating process towards a democratic South Africa. Until he is prepared to do so, he deserves only to be treated like an outcast by those who are revolted by the apartheid tyranny.

At the moment, the shortest route to peace, with the least blood-letting in our country, is to step up the internal struggle

and to encourage greater external pressure. A contrary course is a signal of legitimacy and respectability to the regime, and one of discouragement to our struggling peoples. As was so clearly stated in the Declaration of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in April 1975, "Vorster's outcries about detente can have one meaning insofar as the situation within South Africa is concerned, and this is that Africa should collude with apartheid and thus acquiesce in the daily humiliation, degradation, deprivation, repression, of the African people in South Africa."

We call upon the whole world, and more especially our brothers on the African continent, to slam their doors in Botha's face and to intensify all measures for the isolation of Pretoria and everything it stands for. We know that the prime task of defeating this evil system rests with our people led by the ANC, but those in the world who wish us success can play a part in shortening this process by even more resolute actions of solidarity.

**National Executive Committee, ANC (SA)
Lusaka, Zambia, October 10th 1988**

ANC MEETS INDIAN LEADERS

The African National Congress (ANC) had talks with representatives of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and 52 other people from a wide cross-section of the Indian community of South Africa, from October 7th to 9th in Lusaka, Zambia. A further 40 people were to attend the talks, but were unable to do so because of transport difficulties.

The meeting was facilitated by the Indian High Commission in Zambia. This was one of the largest groups of people from within South Africa to have talks with the ANC. The ANC was represented by a large and very senior delegation of its national executive committee, led by Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi. The NIC and TIC delegations were led by Jerry Coovadia and Cassim Saloojee respectively. Many senior members of the two congresses, and other influential leaders in the community,

were unable to attend because of passport difficulties and other restrictions.

The participants from the wider Indian community comprised businessmen, cultural workers, professionals, religious leaders, teachers, trade unionists, welfare persons, sports people, women, youth, students and other sectors. The ANC was very pleased to meet such a large and extensive delegation from the Indian community.

Historically, the NIC and TIC and the broader Indian community have had a very close relationship with the ANC — and at present the ANC has high regard for the two Indian congresses. It views them as an integral part of the wider liberation movement, and believes firmly that the Indian community has a vitally important role to play in the struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa.

The participants from the Indian community were moved by the warm reception given to them by the ANC, and they found the discussions highly stimulating and enlightening.

Among the major issues that emerged from the talks were:

1. Role of the ANC

The participants from the community were convinced that the ANC is indispensable to the process of seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis which faces our country. They therefore called for the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations, the release from detention of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners, and the lifting of the state of emergency. They urged the government to begin negotiations with the ANC, to create a peaceful, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

2. Armed struggle

The ANC explained that, in view of the complete intransigence of the South African government and the persistence of state repression, it has no choice but to escalate the armed struggle. However, it remains firmly opposed to armed attacks on 'soft targets,' and regrets the loss of civilian lives in these attacks. Whereas those present believe in peaceful forms of resistance to apartheid, they expressed their understanding of the reasons why the ANC was obliged to take up arms.

3. The ANC and Communism

It was understood that the ANC is a national liberation movement that includes all classes and strata of the oppressed people and democratically-minded Whites. It is not a communist organisation. As a democratic organisation, it includes all people who are committed to the goals set out in the Freedom Charter. This means that it also has members who are Communist.

4. Post-Apartheid Economy

It was generally agreed that there is a need for economic and political liberation. The ANC seeks to eliminate social inequality based on race. It reaffirmed its commitment to the Freedom Charter and explained its support for a mixed economy, which will include state, co-operative and private sectors.

5. Sanctions and Disinvestment

It was noted that the ANC campaigns for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against apartheid South Africa. It believes sanctions and disinvestment are important non-violent weapons in the struggle against apartheid and will serve to strengthen the capacity of the oppressed people to wage this struggle.

6. Cultural Boycott

The ANC supports the cultural boycott of South Africa. In discussions with the ANC it emerged that it is apartheid South Africa that has to be boycotted, and not the cultural expression of the oppressed people of South Africa. In this context, it was recognised that the cultural and religious needs of the Indian community might be affected by the boycott — and that there is a need for consultation with the democratic movement, so that the matter can be appropriately addressed.

7. Religion

The participants at the meeting were encouraged by the ANC's firm commitment to the fullest expression of freedom of religion. The participants from the Indian community agreed that all religions are fundamentally opposed to the apartheid system, and call upon the Indian community to give practical expression to this.

8. Education

The ANC and the participants from the Indian community are committed to a single, non-racial education system that will prepare people to play their full roles in a democratic and just South Africa.

9. October Municipal Elections

The ANC and participants from the Indian community are completely agreed that the October municipal elections are designed to perpetuate apartheid.

All present are firmly agreed that the Indian community is an integral part of the oppressed people of South Africa, and has a direct interest in the destruction of the apartheid system. They recognised the outstanding role played by the Indian community in the struggle for liberation in the past, and called on the community to reach even greater heights.

The Indian High Commission to Zambia reinforced these views. He strongly urged the Indian community to join with the African and other communities to eliminate apartheid. He explained that India was firmly opposed to apartheid, and gave its fullest support to the ANC and the mass demo-

cratic movement. The participants from the Indian community and the ANC firmly committed themselves to effectively mobilising the Indian community in a struggle for a democratic, peaceful and non-racial South Africa.

Lusaka, Zambia, October 10th 1988

SAVE ISMAIL EBRAHIM!

The National Executive Committee of the ANC appeals to you to campaign for the release of Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim and his comrades.

In a flagrant violation of international law, Ismail Ebrahim, a senior member of the ANC who has served 15 years on Robben Island, was kidnapped by agents of Pretoria from Swaziland in December 1986. Subjected to six months' solitary confinement, interrogation and mental torture, he was ultimately charged with high treason with Comrades Acton Mandla Maseko and Simon Dladla.

We urge you to participate in the campaign and focus on:

■ The Pretoria regime's illegal kidnapping of Ismail Ebrahim from Swaziland, and the demand for his immediate, unconditional return to Swaziland.

■ Publicising this criminal violation of international law, and ensuring the government in your country, the political parties, trade unions, solidarity groups and so on urgently take up this campaign.

We wish to stress the importance and urgency of this campaign, and ask you to act without delay.

We count on your support, and have every confidence that you will respond to our call. The terrorism perpetrated by the Pretoria regime, both inside South Africa and internationally, must be stopped.

Stop Illegal Trials! Return Ebrahim to Swaziland! Stop Fascist Kidnappings! Amandla! Matla!

**Yours in struggle
Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General ANC
September 8th 1988**

ANC INTERNATIONAL

India Refuses British Collaborators

The Asian Mission of the African National Congress issued the following press statement in New Delhi on September 10th. The statement was signed by Comrade Moosa Moolla, Chief Representative in Asia.

"The decision by the Government of India not to issue visas to players of the cricket team of England who have or are likely to have sporting links with South Africa is most welcome, timely and a fitting reply to the South African lobby in Britain.

"The Indian position is in conformity with the Gleneagles Agreement and various UN, OAU and Non-Aligned Movement resolutions calling for the total isolation of South Africa from the sporting world. It is also in keeping with India's principled and consistent stand on the question of apartheid.

"By selecting a band of players with South African links, the Test and County Cricket Board has not only been extremely insensitive to the feelings of our people, of India and of the world at large, but has made a brazen attempt to bail out South African cricket from the mess it is in owing to its continued isolation.

"We thank the people, government and leaders of India for once again expressing in concrete terms their total abhorrence of apartheid, and solidarity with our struggle for human freedom and dignity."

Greek Symposium — Culture Against Apartheid

A symposium on Culture Against Apartheid took place in Athens on September 2nd-4th (Comrade **Khulu Mbatha** reports). It was organised by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid in co-operation with the Greek Ministry of Culture and the Hellenic Association of the United Nations.

The symposium was a great success, though the Pretoria regime issued a statement asking the Greek public not to support it.

Those who attended included Major-General Joseph N Garba, Chairman of the Special Committee, and representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the Hellenic Association. There were invited observers from more than 20 governmental and non-governmental organisations, and other invited guests included about 40 well-known artists — entertainers, actors, film directors, writers, poets, journalists, and other cultural personalities, including the South African writer, Comrade Wally Serote. Others, who could not attend, sent messages.

The ANC delegation was led by Comrade Pallo Jordan of the National Executive Committee, and included Comrade Neo Mnumzana, ANC Chief Representative to the United Nations.

The symposium elected as its president the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri. It proceeded to examine:

- The current situation in Southern Africa;
- The response of the world of culture to apartheid;
- New proposals for positive action by artists and others against apartheid.

The debate was fruitful.

In his concluding address, Major-General Garba spoke of the role that might be played by cultural workers of the world in solidarity against apartheid. He said:

"An apartheid-free South Africa will have much to offer to the world. Let us therefore combine our efforts with those of the valiant, struggling people of South Africa to make South Africa's freedom a reality.

"This symposium has afforded us a unique opportunity to remove ambiguities from our conception of a cultural boycott; to clarify objectives and procedures for strengthening the boycott."


The symposium issued a statement, supporting the campaign to isolate racist South Africa, noting the increased impact of all forms of pressure in the international campaign so far, and endorsing the achievements of the boycott. It also:

- Noted the increased repression in South Africa, the increased resistance, and the growth of a culture of liberation;
- Expressed support for the United Nations in its efforts to promote the isolation of apartheid South Africa;
- Appealed to cultural workers in the international community to refuse to perform in South Africa or to have their works performed there, and to strengthen structures that will ensure the broad-based support and monitoring of the boycott;
- Gave recognition to the fact that certain cultural contacts undermine apartheid, and that, in consultation with the national liberation movements of South Africa, these should be supported.

The statement said:

"We, artists and writers meeting here in Athens, a place that has given the world an enduring legacy of freedom, democracy and culture ... recognise that the further development of the culture of resistance urgently requires positive support from the international community, and we call on that community to intensify its efforts on behalf of the struggle for freedom in South Africa."

There was also a call for the release of all South African political prisoners, and a call for the world to support the liberation movement in its boycott of the October elections.



Greek Towns Honour Mandela

The town of Levkada in Greece holds two simultaneous festivals in August each year — 'Speech and Art' and 'International Folklore.' By tradition, a Medal of Peace is conferred at the opening of the festivities.

Last year, the medal was awarded to Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and now President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Other recipients have included the International Organisation of Doctors Against Nuclear War.

The people of Greece know what oppression means. They still retain memories of the Nazi invasion of their country during World War II, their own bitter fight for freedom at that time, and the heroes and heroines of that struggle. This year, the people of Levkada awarded the Medal of Peace to Nelson Mandela.

At the ceremony where the medal was conferred, the Mayor of Levkada said:

"In our times, it has become an urgent necessity for wars to stop, for violence to be eliminated and for world peace, independence and human dignity to be established.

"In this way, the African National Congress has led a very hard and long struggle against the racist regime of South Africa, and has demanded the release of its leader and symbol of the anti-racist struggle, Nelson Mandela."

On one side of the medal is Pegasus, the winged horse of ancient Greek legend, the emblem of Levkada and a symbol of freedom. On the other side is a dove, the symbol of peace.

Honorary citizenship has been conferred on Nelson Mandela by nine municipalities in Greece — Egaleo, Ellenikon, Glyfada, Il-ioupolis, Kaissariani, New Filadelfia, Nikaea, Preveza and Zogrofu.



LØB MOD APARTHEID

1988

FOR ANC OG SWAPO

TIRSDAG DEN 23. AUGUST

NØRRE VOLDGADE 21A, 1358 KBH. K, Tlf. 01 12 21 08



Danes Run Against Apartheid

In spite of heavy rain, over 1 500 runners filled the streets of Copenhagen on August 23rd (reports Comrade **Arnold Selby**, who took part). It was a sponsored run of five or ten kilometres, organised by the Copenhagen Committee on Southern Africa, to promote understanding of, and support for, the campaigning of the South African Council of Sport and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee.

At the beginning of the run, Aaron Mnisi, ANC Chief Representative in Denmark, and Leaka Hangala of SWAPO both addressed the assembled crowd, and Copenhagen town councillor, Tom Ahlberg, fired the starting pistol. The Afro-rock group, *Drums Across*, did its best to cheer the wet and exhausted runners.

All profits were divided equally between ANC and SWAPO.

Amandla! Cultural Group Tours Zimbabwe

The tenth birthday of *Amandla!* the cultural giants of the African National Congress was celebrated in the province of Gweru, during a tour of Zimbabwe (writes Comrade **Zoot Gaitsiwe**).

The arrival of the group in Zimbabwe coincided with the meeting of the heads of state of the Organisation of African Unity, and so, all in all, it was an honour for the *Amandla!* cultural ensemble to be in Zimbabwe at this time. Their first show was in Harare, and was attended by a host of dignitaries. President Tambo of the ANC and the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Nathan Shamuyarira, both made speeches.

During all performances in Zimbabwe, *Amandla!* opened with the national anthem, *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*. Almost all the

countries of sub-Saharan Africa have endorsed this anthem, because they realise that the whole continent of Africa can never be free if South Africa is not yet free.

The *Amandla!* cultural ensemble is a creation of the vanguard liberation movement of South Africa, the result of a spectacular affirmation that culture is part of the political struggle. The members of the group are young people who come from different parts of our country and from different backgrounds, but they share with the ANC the vision of a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

They showed the type of life that our people used to lead in South Africa before the arrival of the colonisers; they showed township life today, with starvation, hungry children, children sleeping on the pavements, theft and murder. This is the time when poetry, with all its skills, comes on stage, explaining the dirty results of capitalism, which breeds thugs and robbers.

The people who came to the shows heard a wide variety of music, from township music to the revolutionary songs that show the determination of the people of South Africa to fight and march forward to freedom. There is one piece that everybody liked — *Temporary Inconvenience*, a composition of Jonas Gwangwa, director of *Amandla!*; and this is where you see all the instruments on stage: Bra Skulu on drums; Drum on the bass guitar; Bra Mike on the lead guitar; Joe on the keyboard; Bra Wel on trumpet; Bra Dennis Mpale, nicknamed 'Kratyaza.'

Going to Masvingo, during the tour, you could see that the members of the group were gaining more and more vigour because one could breathe the air of the Limpopo, and when I put my head out of the window and listened, it seemed as if there were voices whispering to me, "Come home, come home!"

The stay of the group in Zimbabwe shook the apartheid tyranny of Pretoria. In the mind of the tyrant, P W Botha, all those instruments — guitars, trumpets, saxophones, trombones, drums and others — were AK-47 guns. The people of Zimbabwe showed their solidarity with the struggling masses of our mother country, led by the African National Congress.

Letters Received

These are two of the many letters of support we have received in the offices of our external missions. The first is from Japan:

9.6.88

I've been interested in the apartheid problem since I saw a movie four years ago. But I thought the situation would be better because of public opinion inside and outside of South Africa. I also thought there was nothing for me — a mere housewife — to do.

But according to the news the situation is getting harder and harder. I wonder why people (I mean the White government) can be so cruel.

I've made up my mind to quit being the onlooker. Your new office in Tokyo will help me to get information. What can I do?

Last Friday I went to the lecture of Abolish Apartheid Now! The speech of the representative of ANC in Japan gave us a deep impression.

Unfortunately, there are many Japanese companies that are only in the pursuit of profits. I heard that Black children begin crying when they see police cars that unfortunately are made by Toyota. Somehow we must stop Japanese companies supporting the White government. It's time for Japanese to take action for anti-apartheid movements.

I enclose a statement of remittance. Will you send the ANC News Briefing for one year? Because of my mistake, I sent five pounds more. I will be very happy if it is used for your activities. I'm really looking forward to reading ANC News Briefings.

*Sincerely yours
Maki Imai*

The other letter came from Doncaster in Yorkshire in the north of England:

I am worried about how the Black children are being treated in South Africa. Can you tell them that they have got a friend and I hope that one day we will all be the same.

*Love from
Rebecca Edwards*

I am 7 and a ½ years old.

SOUTH AFRICAN INDIANS IN THE STRUGGLE

The South African Indian community has a tradition of resistance which goes back to the 19th century. During the first part of this century, they contributed to the strengthening of the liberation struggle. In 1947, the Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker pact was signed,

and this laid a foundation for co-operation between the ANC and

the Indian Congresses.
The Defiance Campaign of 1952

and the Treason Trial of 1956 cemented the relations between the African and Indian people, and the struggles of the 1980s, under the umbrella of the UDF and COSATU are a continuation of this tradition of co-operation in the struggle for democracy in South Africa.

1988: Cassim Saloojee
leader of the Transvaal Indian Congress



1988: leaders of the Natal Indian Congress Jerry Coovadia and Zac Yacoob



1947: (left to right) Dr G M Naicker, President of the Natal Indian Congress;

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THE BALANCE OF POWER SOUTH AFRICA 1988


By Harold Wolpe

The following is an extract from a paper prepared by the writer.

It is, of course, generally agreed that the mass challenge to the regime reached its highest point in the period 1984 to mid-1986, and that the orchestrated coercive measures, under the umbrella of the emergency powers implemented by the regime, were designed to turn back this challenge.

The discussion of whether or not the state has succeeded in its manifest aim has been confined, on the whole, to an assessment of the extent to which the organisations of the national liberation and mass democratic movement have been damaged or destroyed by state measures. Though this is too restricted an approach to the analysis of the contemporary situation, nevertheless the question of the organisational state of the mass opposition is undoubtedly crucial.

There is broad agreement that the coercive powers exercised by the state have disrupted, to a degree, the organisations which comprise the mass democratic movement and through which the challenge to the apartheid system was directly mounted. Beyond this, the debate focuses on two related issues: first, to what degree



has the organisation basis of opposition been rendered ineffectual, and, second, what are the strategic implications?

Tom Lodge Contradicts Himself

Tom Lodge's *State Power and the Politics of Resistance in Work in Progress*, 50-51, 1987, exemplifies one view which is premised on a conception of the unconditional power of the South African state. Lodge argues that the regime has succeeded in fragmenting and demoralising the "substructure of local organisation" to such effect, it is implied, that it is virtually of no significance in the present situation.

It is to be noted, however, that Lodge's conception of state power, which underpins his analysis, actually more or less obliterates the political significance of the organised mass democratic movement, even in the pre-emergency period. In making his analysis, he concentrates on the immediately observable deployment of instruments of coercion, and infers that the regime has virtually unassailable power to control the political situation. He writes:

"Government's limited tolerance of radical dissent is over; it is replacing through



repression the short-lived attempt to rule on the basis of legitimation. And, when it comes to coercion, the state's resources are still far greater than those which can be marshalled by the forces of popular resistance. There is no stalemate, and the state can still tear apart the body of organised political activity."

There is a definite voluntarism in this formulation — the state simply shifts from rule by consent to rule by coercion, as its tolerance becomes exhausted — and it can do this because it has power. Put in this way, the state always has the capacity to act in whatever way it chooses — as much as when it "created a legal space for the open mobilisation of resistance to apartheid," (p.4) as when it shuts down that space. The inference is that because the regime has power, it can 'freely' decide what to do — the organisational strength of the opposition is, it seems irrelevant. The underlying assumption is that the state has total power, while the opposition possesses no power. At work here is what has been termed a zero-sum concept of power.

The problem with this is that it fails to take account of the conditions which circumscribe political action — conditions which may preclude, constrain or facilitate specific strategies. Lodge's focus on state power as such leads him into a contradiction. Thus, because the state has power, it can

close the political spaces for resistance and yet, as Lodge remarks, there is a "culture of Black political radicalism" and "it would be a mistake to ... write off the gains achieved by the politics of popular mobilisation."

Strength of the Mass Democratic Movement

Unfortunately, the reference to these conditions is purely gestural; no analysis is made of either their possible effects on state strategies or, for that matter, the effects of any other conditions. It is as if the state has the capacity to act in whatever way it will by definition — it possesses power. In this sense, the strategic initiative is always with the state.

A second, opposing assessment of the current political situation recognises the switch of the regime's policy towards ever-increasing coercion, but nonetheless holds the view that the power of the state continues to be constrained and limited in the present period by the strength of the mass democratic opposition. The ANC statement of January 8th 1988, *United Action for People's Power*, expresses the flavour of this position.

The statement notes that the organisational structures "affected" by the extreme repression have to be rebuilt, but asserts that at the same time the regime has utterly failed "to destroy the will and determination of the people to liberate themselves." It also states that:

"Organisationally, that enhanced level of unity has found expression in the growth of ... the Congress of South African Trade Unions and its affiliates ...

"Central to the process of the strengthening of the organised base of the mass democratic movement has also been the emergence of such organisations as the SAYCO, the UDF Women's Congress, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers."

From this assessment of the continuity of the mass democratic organisational base, the conclusion is drawn that the initiative remains with the masses. Guy Berger, in

Work in Progress, 55, 1988, puts it this way:

"While the government has a crisis management programme, it has no workable strategy to move out of the impasse. Instead, the political initiative remains with the broad liberation movement."

Similarly, Mac Maharaj, in his paper, *Internal Determinants of Pretoria's Foreign Policy*, asserts that:

"... the apartheid regime has lost the strategic initiative and entered a phase of profound and irreversible decline."

It seems clear that, although the difference between the position argued by Lodge *et al* and that argued by Berger *et al* is framed by reference to empirical assessments of the organisational strength of the mass democratic movement and the state, the issue cannot be resolved simply by an empirical account of the former or a description of the measures taken by the latter. The reason for this is that the different evaluations of the situation are rooted in different theoretical conceptions of state power, although this may not be explicit.

On the other hand, the notion that the masses hold the initiative suggests an alternative approach, which avoids the trap of a zero-sum conception of power into which Lodge falls. The contention is that, on the one hand, the regime has lost the political initiative but retains state power, and that, on the other hand, the mass movement holds the initiative but does not have state power. This immediately problematises a simple distributional conception of state power. It poses issues concerning the range of conditions and structures which mediate and structure the struggle between the contending forces. It implies that the capacity to act is *not* to be found *only* in the organisational strength and material resources available to the opposing groups as politically organised entities, important as these are.

Boycott Versus Participation

The point in issue may be clarified through a consideration of the debate which has

arisen inside South Africa concerning participation in or boycott of the October Black local authority elections. The controversy between Berger and Sarakinsky in *Work in Progress* (52 and 55) over this question provides a convenient basis for the discussion.

The basis of Sarakinsky's argument is the implicit assumption that the only path to change in South Africa is through negotiation. But, to negotiate successfully, the democratic movement must secure a power base. Thus:

"To negotiate without an institutionalised or any other power base means negotiations occur directly on the state's terrain." (p.51, my emphasis)

Since, he argues, the other power base, the organisational structure of the mass democratic movement, has been emasculated, the alternative is to develop an institutionalised power base. As he puts it:

"There is no reason for the state to negotiate in good faith, unless national and community-based organisations have institutionalised bargaining power through their strategic intervention in state structures." (p.51)

He goes on to argue that this could be done by:

"... putting candidates forward for tri-cameral and local authority elections." (p.51)

Berger (p.27) draws out the contradiction in Sarakinsky's argument — the democratic movement must develop a power base to avoid negotiating directly on the state's terrain, yet he proposes that power base must be developed through the institutional order which defines that very terrain! The point is well taken, but the analysis needs to be taken further, particularly as one of the main grounds on which Berger rejects participation is by a brief and unanalysed reference to the experience of some other countries.

Sarakinsky contends that:

"... the state determines the arena in which the extra-parliamentary opposition

operates, and can use negotiations to achieve its own particular objectives." (p.51, my emphasis)

Berger points out that participation and negotiation need not be coupled — the tri-cameral parliament, for example, may be boycotted and negotiations for a political settlement still pursued. But there is a more general issue relating to the proposition that the state determines the arena. Putting it in this way, Sarakinsky comes close to Lodge's zero-sum conception of state power.

Does State Strategy Succeed?

The state's *attempt* to define the terrain of politics has to be distinguished from its success or failure to implement that definition. In other words, it does not follow from the fact that the state adopts legislation and pursues a strategy that the legislation or strategy is thereby implemented. The point seems obvious, but functionalist assumptions continue to be extremely pervasive.

Once, however, it is recognised that the definition of the political terrain is the outcome of contestation, under determinate conditions (and this is the crux of my argument), then two further considerations arise. First, the formulation by the state, in legislation or policy, of arenas of politics (Black local government structures, tri-cameral parliament, industrial relations legislation and so on) may or may not be followed by the substantial operation of those arenas. Thus the boycott of local authority elections and the political conflicts which followed resulted in the failure of the state to implement its definition of an institutional terrain of local politics.

Further, once a set of institutions actually defines a terrain of political practice, what becomes relevant are the objectives of action, of struggle, within that arena. An institutional order defines both a specific arena of relations and, in addition, definition limits and goals of social action. (Compare Althusser's notion of ideological apparatuses as the materialisation of ideology.) But the effectiveness of these is always problematic because the specific institutional arena will be subject both to

contradictory 'external' pressures and to 'internal' struggles. Thus, to illustrate, the attempt of the regime, both in terms of the law and in terms of practice, to exclude national liberation politics from the Black trade unions was contested and brushed aside by the unions.

It follows from this that two interrelated but separable sets of questions are posed by the boycott/participation debate.

The first set relates to the character of the proposed institutional structure, and crucial here is its place in the overall social context at a particular conjuncture. The second set relates to the limits of action proscribed within it and to the internal/external conditions of conflict. These two aspects are not unrelated, but nor are they identical, as the trade union debates about whether the Black unions should register under the relevant act show — the debate focused largely on the second aspect: would the constraints in the legislation depoliticise and bureaucratised the unions, or permit them to flourish? The establishment of an institutional structure in the industrial sphere giving a place to Black trade unions was not itself in question.

Unstable Equilibrium

In the sphere of local government and the tri-cameral parliament, both elements were and are in issue — the acceptability of the institutional structure as such, as well as the constraints which would be imposed on action within that order.

As against Sarakinsky and others, Berger contends:

"The advocates of participation ... have misunderstood the present balance of forces and social context, and are badly mistaken about the nature and transformational possibilities of participating in the October elections." (p.27)

More specifically, Berger rejects the view that the regime unequivocally holds the balance of power. He contends, rather, that the period is characterised by an unstable equilibrium. What stamps the present period is the structural problems of the economy, the collapse of the front line cor-

don sanitaire and the emergence of the mass organisational semi-insurrectionary struggles. As against this, the regime has had some success in regional destabilisation and in dislocating the mass opposition. Berger then reduces this complex (though incomplete) array of conditions into the following summary statement:

"The unstable equilibrium is characterised by the relative military and economic power of the government, on the one hand, and its considerable political weakness on the other. This weakness is characterised by its lack of a broad and viable support base and the absence of popular legitimacy."

This juxtaposition and opposition of military and economic power and political weakness both oversimplifies and misleads. The main problem is that it attributes political weakness to a single source — absence of a support base and popular legitimacy — and fails to incorporate the main features into an analysis of the social context.

Weakness of the Debate

One reason for this is that, in his anxiety to reject the argument that *state power/mass weakness necessitates participation in the elections*, and to replace it with *state weakness/mass strength necessitates boycott*, Berger becomes preoccupied with the political source of what he labels the political weakness of the regime. He makes the point that the ruling group is politically weak, and that:

"This weakness is related directly to the government's inability to stabilise the collaborative structures it has constructed (bantustans, tricameral parliament, community councils/Black local authorities), and thus its inability to stabilise a reliable and relatively extensive bloc of Black support. The principal reason for this has been the wholesale rejection and boycotting of these structures."

This is a compelling reason in support of a policy of boycott of the elections. But does the validity of this argument turn on

the present relative strength of the opposing forces? Berger places himself on the same terrain as those he is criticising — he simply reverses his assessment of power. Surely, the strength of the opposition may constitute an important basis for participation or for boycott, depending upon a range of concrete circumstances?

Local Authorities Reproduce Apartheid

In fact, Berger's argument for boycott rests on the consideration that to participate in the elections would be a victory for the regime because it would end its failure to implement a political structure, the workings of which are aimed at the stabilisation of the political sphere under apartheid. It is for this reason, because of its place in the overall social context, that this particular institutional order has been repudiated.

Clearly, if the boycott succeeds, then the regime will be left with the political impasse to which Berger referred, and in this sense the ability (the power) of the mass democratic movement to implement a boycott is relevant. But does this mean that if the power of the mass movement is thought to be insufficient to implement the boycott then, therefore, participation would be the correct policy? Presumably not, on Berger's argument, for the institution as such reproduces the apartheid system.

This returns us to the question of the limitations on political action inherent in the local authority structure. I do not intend canvassing this issue here, except to refer to the analysis in Berger's paper, which convincingly draws out the severe limitations on the possibilities of transformational politics within the local authority structures — limitations on action which do not stem simply from the structure of the institutions but are also imposed by other, internal/external constraints.

These other constraints need further consideration. In Berger's argument, the failure of the collaborative structures accounts for the political weakness of the regime, but there is a more complex configuration of conditions which need to be discussed in a systematic way.

AIDS AND THE IMPERIALIST CONNECTION

By Mzala

Several theories have been put forward about the origin of the AIDS virus (HIV). In an article in the October 1988 issue of *Sechaba*, we discussed one of these theories, showed its origins in scientific literature, and demonstrated the dangers it has created in the racist world.

The problem with reports about AIDS is that they start at the end of the story, not at the beginning. No serious and informed attempt has yet been made to question why such a deadly virus could suddenly spring from 'nowhere' and infect millions of people within such a relatively short time.

Yet this question is crucial in many respects — where was the virus all the time? Was it there among human beings or certain animals, but lying dormant until it was triggered off by something? If so, why did the animal kingdom (including human beings) not develop antibodies to it during its latent stage? How did the virus get into the blood of its first victim? If it was only in the blood of certain animals, how did it cross the species barrier and infect human beings? And why have scientists and medical researchers not found any animal infected with HIV? Is the problem, perhaps, located in our changing environment, in nuclear radiation? Yet how does such radiation, if it is the cause, create such viruses among human beings? And why should it begin with certain specific human groups (homosexuals, for example) and not

affect the whole population simultaneously? Does the 'mysterious' development of the AIDS virus indicate that humankind is now living in an era of uncontrolled and inexplicable health hazards?

Many Questions, Few Answers

Answers to these questions are important because, if a common reservoir of these viruses exists, it should be found before more viruses emerge, and it might hold the clue to ways of combating the AIDS virus, perhaps with vaccines. This is not to suggest that doctors should stop combating the epidemic and merely stand around wondering where the virus came from. The point is that all branches of human knowledge and activity, not least political activists, should search for clues and suggest areas of focus.

Perhaps political analysts are attempting to take too much into their hands when they dismiss the link that some medical scientists have observed between AIDS and the

African green monkey. For was it not the eminent medical scholars themselves, in laboratory conditions, who first made this observation? Furthermore, medical practitioners like Drs A J Nahmias and J Weiss¹ have claimed that human blood samples collected in Africa as early as 1959 contained antibodies against the virus. Their theory is based on one positive specimen of blood taken from a sample of 672 people from four African countries. Of course, many doctors practising in African hospitals and clinics have stated categorically that if AIDS had existed there before the 1980s, they would have recognised it as a clinical entity. Moreover, most of the tests conducted on African blood have been admitted to give false positive, as well as false negative, results.²

Military Projects

Yet the story of the African green monkey has something to tell us. Virologists have discovered that there is a monkey virus called the simian T-cell leukaemia virus (STLV) or simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV), which is closely related to HIV. As early as January 1960, Newberne and Robinson³ revealed that, at the Medical Research Laboratory of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), based in Bangkok, Thailand, experimenters were surprised by two epidemics of leukaemia (cancer) in gibbons when they attempted to produce cancer in monkeys.⁴ SEATO is a military alliance closely allied to NATO.

The SEATO laboratory work involved the infection of gibbons with human malaria, and the subsequent transmission of that malaria within the primate colony. According to de Paoli *et al*,⁵ the experimental procedures involved infected human blood or immature malaria parasites from mosquitoes being injected into one gibbon, then blood from that gibbon being injected into others and so on. All nine gibbons that developed leukaemia had been injected with blood from two of the human patients. Of the nine, two had had their spleens removed to lower their immunity.

By 1967, the entire colony of gibbons had suffered human herpes.

The Monkey Business

Some researchers⁶ have pointed out that there was, at this period, "a massive trade in monkeys," including from Africa, that went mainly to the United States. A condition known as AIDS was recorded as having broken out for the first time among monkeys at the California Primate Research Centre in Davis, California, in 1969, and it was called simian AIDS. The similarities between the disease of these monkeys and human AIDS is striking: diseased lymph nodes, enlarged spleen, fever, diarrhoea, weight loss, infection with micro-organisms such as staphylococcus aureus, pseudomonas and shingella species.

This information is corroborated by a report published by researchers at another military project of the United States in San Francisco in 1973, which reported the condition of "three gibbons (that) were available to us for clinical studies."⁷ These gibbons, the report continued, had shown irregular leucocyte counts since 1968-69, and in 1970 one of them had died. In January 1971, two young gibbons were injected with bone marrow from the dead animal, and what was thought to be a new retrovirus was found in the two gibbons. According to T G Kawakami *et al*,⁸ it was known by December 1971 that the virus could infect human tissue grown in culture.

Immune Deficiency

Another case of malignant lymphoma (cancer), seen for the first time in over 11 000 monkeys housed at the California Primate Research Centre, was diagnosed on February 23rd 1969. Stowell and Smith⁹ admit that, though these monkeys had not been exposed to any known cancer agent, but had instead simply been injected with malaria parasites of the monkey type (*plasmodium cynomolgi*), they subsequently developed cancer of the blood, whose clinical symptoms resemble those of present-day AIDS. The discovery of this cancer, Stowell reported, caused much excitement among scientists conducting the experiments, because of, "its astonishing incidence, its similarity to some lymphomas in man, and the possibility that the

study of this model of human lymphoma may help in our understanding and preventing similar types of human cancer."

Most of the monkeys kept at this centre (at least between January 1969 and December 1977) had a history of weight loss, lethargy, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, disease of the lymph nodes, and vomiting during the last few weeks of illness. Several factors suggested that the immune systems of the monkeys had been weakened, especially those parts dependent upon certain blood cells known as lymphocytes. Because of the high incidence of viral or bacterial infection affecting them, it became clear that the development of lymphoma, as well as other infections, was secondary to the deficiency in their immunity. Was it a mere coincidence, once again, that the clinical picture in these monkeys resembled what later was to develop in human AIDS patients? Maybe.

Less Than Noble Motives

The import of monkeys from Asia and Africa by the United States and other major imperialist powers has not, of course, been only for experimenting in their military laboratories. It is a well-known fact that some medicines used for human purposes have been extracted from certain parts of the monkeys, as from other animals. For example, much of the polio vaccine used throughout the world is produced on cultures of kidney cells from African green monkeys. This point, however, does not dismiss as impossible or impractical that other, less noble, motives have been behind the experimentation with animals from the wild forests of Africa and Asia.

HIV is related to the monkey virus only to the extent that both of them belong to the type of virus called 'retrovirus.' The word, 'retro' means 'backward,' and retroviruses are so called because the virus pervades the host cell to convert viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) back into deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), contrary to the normal method of operation of the cell, which involves making RNA from DNA. DNA is the blueprint of life; it carries the genetic information unique to the organism. RNA contains

the information the cell needs for making proteins. Generally, retroviruses have been known to cause leukaemias.

Human Retroviruses Appear

As recently as 1979, scientific literature acknowledged that, "our current knowledge of retroviruses does not suggest that they should be of practical importance to the human clinician, in contrast to the veterinarian."¹⁰ But this was precisely the error that some scientists were making, since they ignored the possibility for the creation of new viruses in laboratory conditions. New 'human' retroviruses were discovered in the 1980s, for example, HTLV I and HTLV II. Tests showed that these viruses were not genetically related to any known monkey viruses, although there was a close similarity with SIV. Virologists say that HTLV and SIV share at least 95% of their genetic structure. The degree of genetic similarity between SIV and HIV is less than 75%, which suggests that the monkey virus could not have been directly — **directly!** — transmitted to man in the recent past. This does not dismiss, however, possibilities of cross-species transmission.

Suggestions that African green monkeys could have passed on their virus to human beings, either when people ate them (and admittedly monkey meat is regarded as a delicacy in some African cultures) or through an accidental bite, are genetically uninformed. Attempts to infect non-human primates with human HIV have generally been unsuccessful, except in the case of chimpanzees. While they can be experimentally infected with HIV, even they do not develop clinical AIDS, except for a stubborn disease of the lymph nodes which was noticed in one animal.

HIV a Laboratory Product?

HIV is structurally so distinct from the other, similar, type of retroviruses that its origin is 'new' in the sense that it never existed in its present form in any other species before. HIV has a cylindrical, bar-shaped nucleoid containing the genetic material,

whereas other, similar, types of viruses have round, central nucleoids.¹¹ In fact, HIV is said to be rather more closely related to a visna virus found in Icelandic sheep, though there are other distinctions.

However, as has already been said, there is evidence to suggest that two different viruses can be genetically combined to create a new one, a process known in genetic engineering as phenotypic mixing (swapping of genes). The newly-created virus may take some properties from both parents and possess infecting capabilities in a far wider range of species than the individual parents. An example often cited to demonstrate this possibility is that of the mixing of Rous sarcoma virus (RSV), which normally infects chickens, and the mouse sarcoma virus (MSV) which normally infects mice. The resultant virus can infect rats, mink, mice and human beings.¹²

In the London *Sunday Express* of October 26th 1986, some scientists expressed the opinion that more than one virus may have combined to give rise to human AIDS. In 1982, some virologists and immunologists suggested that AIDS could be linked with known viruses. The main question, then, is — was this accidental or a deliberate laboratory procedure?

CIA and Germ Warfare

It is common knowledge among politically conscious people that in the 1970s the Cuban government alleged, on the basis of its successful infiltration of the CIA, that the United States government was planning to infect Cuban pigs with African swine fever, in the hope that the Cuban population would eat contaminated pork. Various leaders of the Cuban government and Party revealed this, particularly Fidel Castro.

It is also a known fact in medical history that when the first retrovirus was discovered (the maedi-visna), which is a natural virus in sheep and goats, there was much excitement among the military branches of SEATO because of the clinical observations on the sheep that were suffering from a disease called *scrapie*.¹³ The visna virus, which can be transmitted from animal to animal in saliva and respiratory excretions,

destroys the outer coating of the nerve cells in the central nervous system, causing irritability, loss of balance and grinding of teeth. The affected animal rubs away its wool against a fixed object, loses weight and dies within months.

Interestingly, during the mid-1970s, after this discovery, the Fore tribe in a remote valley of Papua New Guinea was found to be suddenly infected with a disease causing brain damage, with loss of balance and a shiver-like tremor that progressed to complete paralysis and death in less than a year from onset. The virus said to be causing this condition was very rare, and though it was admitted to be related to the visna virus, it was a new virus. Was this a result of experiments on human beings by those keen to develop germ warfare? If not, why was this virus uniquely attacking the Fore tribe? The disease came to be known as *kuru*.

Where Death Is 'Success'

Other diseases, similar to *kuru*, have since developed in the world, such as Cruetzfeld-Jakob Disease and Alzheimer's Disease, all of which are caused by unusual viruses, resistant to ultra-violet light as well as to radiation. Whatever and wherever these viruses are manufactured, it seems most clear they are meant to resist all cure!

At the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, USA, viruses obtained from the *kuru* disease have been injected, in combination with other diseases, into brains and blood of chimpanzees, gibbons and the African green monkey. According to Dr C L Masters,¹⁴ this laboratory used no less than 54 chimpanzees in *kuru* research alone. Dr B A Kakulas,¹⁵ on the other hand, writes of a total of over 300 primates that had already been used by 1976 in what was described as a "continuing project." Months later, some of these primates died of pneumonia, a quite untypical disease for *kuru*, yet quite typical for AIDS.

In 1980, it was published¹⁶ that in the Bethesda laboratories the viruses of *kuru* and Cruetzfeld-Jakob Disease had been grown in cultures of African green monkey cells mixed with foetal bovine serum and

ten other animal viruses. At these laboratories, a combination of the viruses were injected into goats, guinea pigs, hamsters, voles, mice, ferrets, mink, sheep, raccoon and rats "with varying degrees of success in each species."

What was not revealed was the purpose of this wide range of experimentation. Why was there a trial on all these animals?

Biological Bomb?

In 1980, Y M Cripps¹⁷ revealed that, at the US Army Biological Warfare Establishment in Fort Detrick, 423 human cases of serious infection and three deaths had occurred over a period of 25 years, because of contamination with germs at the laboratory. This was despite the fact that this is regarded as the most secure of US Defence Ministry laboratories. Obviously, these figures do not give precise information, because such establishments are hidden from the public eye, and are also protected by laws governing official secrets.

No laboratory can guarantee the absolute security of its work in germ experimentation. The Marburg virus incident is an illustrious example. Around August or September 1976, laboratory workers in Marburg and Frankfurt in the Federal Republic of Germany contracted a disease from their working environment and developed high fever, slow heart rate, headaches, stomach aches and inflammation of the eyes. Some of the workers died, and it was later diagnosed that they had been exposed to the tissues or cell cultures of African green monkeys, recently imported from Uganda via London. The virus got its name from that incident. In 1970, a report said that those infected had been exposed to an "unusually virulent strain of the virus" that normally has the monkey as its host.¹⁸

Unnecessary Danger

Ecological disruption and human invasion of the animal environment has given rise to previously unknown infections. Some viruses, carried quite safely by animals, begin to be fatal only when they have been

transferred to human beings. Lassa fever is an example, being spread by rodents, but without seeming to harm them. Animals certainly have a reservoir of viruses not yet discovered by human beings.

At times, sheer mishandling of the material for experimentation exposes human beings to great danger. The following letter to *The Lancet* from Drs Simpson and Zuckermann of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine mentions dangers involved:

"Research and teaching in this school are necessarily concerned with exotic diseases ... it is only natural that we regularly receive material from all over the world for diagnoses and identification. We are happy to provide such assistance, and where we cannot do so ourselves we forward the specimen to someone who can. It is probably not generally known that Lassa fever serology is now being carried out at the Microbiology Research Establishment, Porton Down, Wiltshire.

"The condition in which many of the specimens arrive causes us extreme concern. Our most recent examples have been badly smashed blood samples sent by post from overseas for hepatitis and Lassa fever studies. These samples were potentially highly infectious, but were so badly packed that serum was leaking freely through the outer paper. There is no need to stress the hazard to postal workers or to those who have to open the package ..." (my emphasis)¹⁹

From bubonic plague to malaria, many human disease epidemics have been traced back to infectious organisms carried by animals. A series of new diseases has come about because of the experiments with animals described above, but also more specifically because of the work on germ warfare that goes on within military establishments and laboratories.

In 1986, three scientists from the German Democratic Republic, J Segal, L Segal and R Dehmlow, produced an 80-page paper in which they argued that the AIDS virus was a product of United States military conspiracy. Their case may have been overstated, but there are basic facts to follow on this thesis. This is despite the fact that, in

July 1987, the US State Department published a report denying the involvement of the Fort Detrick Military Establishment in the production of the AIDS virus.

Military-Industrial Secrets

On the basis of some of the stated positions in this article, it seems most reasonable that, when investigations are conducted on the origins and development of HIV, laboratories of the military-industrial complex should not be excluded. Public attention has been drawn to the danger of nuclear weapons — the visible missile silos that threaten to explode the earth into a rubble of uninhabitable matter — but little or no attention has been given to the development of deadly viruses in the secrecy of the laboratories of many imperialist countries. Yet these germs are no less lethal than nuclear weapons. Campaigns for signing of peace treaties should cover them also.

Imperialism is aggressive, and respects no human values. Militarism is its most dangerous doctrine, since it proceeds from the assumption that mankind can be disposed of, if only for the use of the products of military-industrial enterprises.

There is no conclusive statement here that HIV was developed in the laboratories of the United States military establishment, but an argument has certainly been advanced, backed by facts, that AIDS-like viruses were being created through genetic engineering within these establishments. And it might also be sheer coincidence that the laboratory where the first claim was made for the discovery of the AIDS virus, in Bethesda, Maryland, is actually the laboratory that has been involved in experimentation with animal viruses as described above. Our task is not to make wild and irresponsible statements, even if they are against the class forces that are hostile to us. Serious analysts, we believe, should not be alarmists. But, on the basis of facts, we can proclaim that the international community needs to develop a sensitive awareness of the proceedings within military laboratories, as well as within those civilian laboratories where dangerous germs are being created.

In countries like the United States, where prisons are owned by private companies or individuals, prisoners can be vulnerable members of society when it comes to the need to experiment on human beings to prove the effectiveness of these germs.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

HEALTH CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Critical Health, Johannesburg, August 1988 issue.

The health services at present provided in South Africa are hopelessly inadequate and continually deteriorating. Health care suffers severely from the low priority given it by the regime. The sick in the Black community are treated with utter contempt by the authorities. The letter signed last October by 100 doctors, complaining of the squalor and gross overcrowding at Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto has not received any positive response. Major problems facing the health services include lack of primary health care, staff shortages in the hospitals, cutbacks in expenditure on drugs and increases in hospital fees.

In spite of the constraints on publication, the Johannesburg journal, *Critical Health*, has worked for some years now to expose the political and economic causes of ill-health in South Africa. The August issue of this year deals with the crisis in South African hospitals, and defines the role progressive organisations will need to play in order to transform the health services.

Baragwanath Is Bad News

The underpaid nurses at Baragwanath Hospital report that they are overwhelmed by the number of patients. What happens is that, for want of money, patients delay going to the hospital. When they eventually do go, their condition has become worse. Where it may have been possible to treat them as out-patients in the first instance, they must now be admitted to the wards, unnecessarily swelling the numbers of in-patients. This adds to the frustration felt by the staff.

They have to cope with the usual 100 patients in a ward housing 40 beds, with the other 60 patients scattered all over the floor of the ward, including under the beds. No wonder they did not put the ailing Nelson Mandela in such a place, with the eyes of the world focused on him!

For Soweto's population of two million, there is not a single psychiatric in-patient bed. A ward is being built at Baragwanath to accommodate 24 of the daily average of 100 psychiatric in-patients. Once again, the remaining 76 patients have to be squeezed into wards somehow, bulging at the seams as they are.

Consequently, the nurses and doctors work under a great deal of stress; they are constantly tired and irritable, and this in itself is a source of further stress. Nurses living out with their families see little of their children. Older children have to help out by taking care of the younger. Alternatively, a nurse drops her child with the child-minder before setting off for the hospital. That means the nurse must leave home at five-thirty in the morning to be at work by seven.

Hospital Tariffs Campaign

The Health Workers' Organisation (HWO) of Natal draws attention to the recent iniquitous imposition of increased hospital charges at Natal Provincial and KwaZulu hospitals. There is no free treatment to be had. Hospital staff, who previously received free treatment, now have to pay. Pensioners and the unemployed are expected to conjure up money somehow to meet the minimum charge. The onus is placed on all other categories to prove they do not have money to pay for health care, if they are to

escape higher charges.

The most vicious of the new regulations apply to patients seeking treatment after hours — that is, at week-ends, on public holidays, and after four in the afternoon on week-days. All comers at these times are liable for the maximum charge, be they employed or not. This applies in spite of the fact that most patients in full employment are forced to go to hospital at these times, through the fear of dismissal should they miss a day's work.

The HWO convened a workshop last May to set up a 'Hospital Tariffs Campaign.' The campaign has put health on the agenda of community organisations, has popularised the slogan, 'Health Is Our Right,' and it has challenged the authorities. It is felt that the campaign can force the authorities to change some of their decisions. It can show progressive organisations that health is no less important than issues such as rent, housing and education. It can show community organisations that they have the most important role to play in achieving health for all, and that the central and provincial governments of South Africa are incapable of providing adequate, appropriate, equal and accessible health care. There is an urgent need for community health committees to be set up.

Starvation in Urban Areas

No matter what steps are taken, the hospital crisis will no doubt persist for as long as the living conditions of the people are so appalling and the people are ravaged by disease. In the urban areas, starvation has reached critical proportions, and is now worse than in the drought-stricken rural homelands.

Pensioners, with their tiny handouts, were becoming the main source of income for many urban families, and it was not uncommon to find as many as ten people dependent on a single pensioner. 1988 has brought the harsh reality of increasing poverty throughout South Africa, particularly in urban areas, where more and more

breadwinners are losing their jobs as a result of retrenchment or dismissal.

"It is shocking how, in the past year, requests for aid from the urban areas have overtaken those from rural areas such as KwaZulu,"

states Mr Mashinini of Operation Hunger.

The need to sweep the old order away is urgent — literally a matter of life and death. Diliza Mji, president of the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA), told its national conference in April that the political situation in the country continued to be the single most important cause of ill-health and disease.

A Guide for the Future

The most important contribution to this issue of *Critical Health* must be the article from the Health Workers' Organisation, *The Crisis and the Struggle for Change*.

The HWO states that the crisis in the health services is a reflection of the problems that exist in the larger society, and relates to the fact that the health services are run along racial and class lines. These health services primarily serve the Whites and other urban populations, in spite of the highest incidence of disease occurring amongst rural Blacks. Disease, however, is also rife amongst urban Blacks. The incidence of rheumatic heart disease is the highest in the world amongst the school children of Soweto. The response of the regime is to abandon its responsibility of providing health care in favour of privatisation, but the majority of the community live below the breadline, and are in no position to pay for medical treatment.

Not only does the HWO indicate where health fits into the political framework of the country, but it also provides a clear guide as to what form a Health Charter for the future should take. We present this guide here, and it should be widely disseminated for discussion. It is an important document.

— Percy Cohen

THE HEALTH CHARTER

Good health is the right of all who live in South Africa.

1. Health Care Shall Serve the People —

a. Health care should not be a commodity, available only to the affluent few, but must be placed in the hands of the people to serve the people.

b. The monopoly of knowledge on health must be taken away from the professionals and must be disseminated amongst the people. In this way, health must be demystified.

c. Health workers must work under the control of, and in the interests of, the people and not for their own status and wealth. Mass community participation and understanding of health issues must be encouraged.

2. All health workers shall be equal —

a. A health worker would include any person formally employed in the health sector (nurses, doctors, laboratory technicians, radiographers, physiotherapists, cleaners, etc) or any person from the community committed to working for better health.

b. All health workers should be equal, irrespective of race, colour, class or sex.

c. The strong hierarchy in health must be overcome, and all barriers broken down. At present, the better-educated health workers occupy the administrative positions, where they, in turn, suppress the aspirations of ordinary health workers. This stratification denies ordinary health workers a voice in the administration of health.

3. The emphasis shall be on preventive medicine —

Although the importance of curative care is recognised, emphasis must be on preventive medicine.

4. Health workers shall learn from the people —

a. Health workers need to shed their professional arrogance. They must be prepared to learn from, and teach, the people in the community.

b. Health education should not be left to the professionals. These ideas should be incorporated into the health workers' training.

5. There shall be accountability and control —

a. Health workers and community organisations and their programmes must be firmly placed in the communities in which they work. These communities must be part of the informed, democratic decision-making process.

b. Health workers must be accountable to those whom they serve, and not only to those in authority and power. Democratic alternative structures must be created and strengthened to fight for and defend the interests of the poorer communities.

6. The health system shall be people-centred —

Community health workers, together with parents, school children, workers, educators and others, shall play the leading role in health care. Medical professionals should become mere auxiliaries. The largest and most important unit of health workers are the community health workers. More time and money must be spent on training them, rather than doctors. We must ensure that they are selected by, and are representatives of, the poorer, more oppressed, members of the community. They must be accountable to their community.

7. Primary health care shall be the main function of the health service —

This would ensure better accessibility of care. More financial and material resources must be distributed to the primary health care clinics. Hospitals will be needed as referral centres and support systems.

8. There shall be equal distribution of resources —

Health care services need to be coordinated by one health department, but the service must be decentralised and made easily accessible to all people. There

should be an equal distribution of resources, based on the needs of the various communities, irrespective of race, colour, class, creed or sex. A re-allocation of human and material resources to rural areas is necessary to overcome the urban emphasis and rural neglect under the present system.

9. Health workers shall be selected by their community —

Selection criteria of students need to be reviewed. Future health workers must be selected by their community, and should return to serve the same community that chose them. Students need to be trained in

new values as opposed to the profit-orientated, status-seeking, individualistic, purely academic, high-tech orientation of the present system. Health education and research need to be much more relevant to the problems, illnesses and needs of the majority of people.

10. Conclusion —

The struggle for a free society needs to be reinforced by interlocking the various struggles, such as housing, sporting, education, etc. What needs to be emphasised are adequate living wages, more educational and employment opportunities and more effective participation by the community in decision-making processes.



Hospital ward, South Africa

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