



notes for
history

Fruits of a Struggle

Amilcar Cabral

1971 was a year of structural consolidation and political-military successes for the independence of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

The revolutionary movement has destroyed tribalism, liberated close to two thirds of the 36 125 km² of territory and revealed the demagogy of Portuguese colonialism, which is in virtual socio-economic decomposition.

Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), in an exhaustive analysis, describes the political-military-diplomatic state of the heroic struggle of his people.

DESPITE CERTAIN APPEARANCES and a feeble propaganda which, however, continues with a favorable echo in certain segments of the western press, Portugal's worsening political and economic situation is something the Portuguese authorities themselves, at all levels, are no longer able to hide. This fact, reflected in various areas of Portuguese society, is chiefly the result of the crime of human perversion committed by the government over the last ten years since it unleashed the colonial war in Angola which it then extended to Guinea and Mozambique. This fact — dramatic today but no doubt tragic tomorrow for Portugal — is the result of the policy of absurdity, of irrationality and lies, practiced by the Portuguese ruling class which not only obstinately scorns the rights of the African people and of international legality, but even acts conscientiously against the very interests of the Portuguese people.

It is this reality, most evident over the course of the last two years and particularly during 1971, that explains the bankruptcy of Marcelo Caetano's demagogic policy, the increasing gulf between the ruling class and popular sectors (workers in the city and in the countryside, antifascist students and intellectuals), the increasingly frequent and intense convulsions in Portuguese society and, as an extreme expression of opposition, the revolutionary armed actions that these recent times have produced in Portugal. The limited and irregular character of these actions should fool no one. For a fraction of Portuguese society, however small, despite the inveterate nationalism which is the common characteristic of all Portuguese, to have taken the decision to resort to violent measures of resistance — and this without any reproval by the popular masses — indicates that the Portuguese state of mind in the face of the aggravation of the socioeconomic and political situation has reached limits of desperation.

Pursuing the Salazar policy of a colonial war of genocide against the African peoples, Marcelo Caetano not only deceived those who believed in his "political intelligence." He also lost or is on the way to losing the only opportunity a Portuguese has had since the time of the maritime discoveries, to have his name written down favorably in history. But he cannot understand or refuses to understand the meaning of history, or even the interests of his people, which should surprise no one who knows the process of his ideological formation. Today, after three years in power, the present head of the Portuguese government cannot hide his perplexity and even his confusion in his speeches and public positions, in the face of the socioeconomic and political reality of the complexity of diversities, if not of divergencies,

that he insists on calling the "Portuguese world."

The timid reforms, principally those of an administrative nature, which he has begun and has dared to have included in the new Portuguese Constitution, have convinced no one except those already convinced. These have also disappointed the most important segment — because they are activists — of his so-called "liberals" or less reactionary supporters. This is how the conflict occurred within the so-called Portuguese National Assembly during the recent discussion of the Constitutional revision, a conflict which, if parliamentarianism weren't just a caricature in Portugal, would have ended with the fall of the government.

The unquestionable truth about present-day Portuguese life is the following: while Portugal maintains and accentuates day by day the dubious privilege of being the most backward country in Europe, the Portuguese government deliberately sustains three colonial wars of genocide in Africa and stubbornly keeps the Portuguese people in ignorance and misery, exiled from Europe and the world, isolated from all scientific and technical advances that people everywhere are achieving today. As always, the Portuguese exist without the most elemental rights of man.

The truth, which the Portuguese masses are becoming more aware of all the time, is that galloping inflation as well as population decrease due to emigration and war, the high cost of living and public and international debts, lack of manpower and a stagnant Portuguese economy are the concrete result of the absurd colonial policy of the Portuguese ruling class that Marcelo Caetano is accustomed to serve.

Prisoner of the unfortunate Salazar heritage fiercely defended by the "ultras" of the regime, confused by his own measures, Marcelo Caetano has plenty of reason to shift from perplexity to desperation. Much more so when the resistance of the African peoples and of the Portuguese people themselves to colonial wars is more vigorous and effective every day.

Thus the victimized attitude that the head of the Portuguese government now evidences is quite understandable. And so in his speech of July 23, 1971, explaining the incidents that occurred in the Portuguese National Assembly, after having deplored the fact that "unfortunately" we are not in the position of people who can "demand greater liberty in the name of our immortal forebears," he stated:

On my shoulders weigh the responsibilities of national defense, with military operations in three overseas provinces and a vulnerable rear guard. Not a day passes on the international scene without our adversaries striking a new blow against us, which forces us to give constant attention and permanent efforts to the diplomatic struggle and to clarifying the poisoned opinion of foreign countries.

If by this statement the head of the Portuguese government recognizes publicly for the first time the real existence of colonial wars — which he calls "military operations" — it is no less certain that he also seeks to enlighten "the poisoned opinion

of foreign countries," that is to say, he persists in flouting respect for international law.

In the same speech, after having recognized that "in the interior of the country [that is, in Portugal] the enemy finds support [...] and increasingly seeks to infiltrate the schools, the armed forces and the corporate organization," he says:

And while we must face all this, we must first of all consider the real needs of the people, then the struggle against inflation which, like a cancer, eats away the economy of every country today, destroying price stability and facilitating everything from salary demands up to the problems of economic development of a nation that cannot or must not become stagnant nor lose its blood because of the demands of social improvement formulated by a population that wants precisely the broadest perspectives for education and welfare. All this takes money, and God knows how hard it is to find it!

With this Jobian lament, which needs no comment, Marcelo Caetano seeks to justify the fact of not moving "as rapidly" as his "young friends" would like. But if it is true, as he says in his speech in an allusion to the French Revolution, that when a Jacobin was made minister he didn't then become a Jacobin Minister, the policy and the arguments of Marcelo Caetano prove to the hilt that when a Salazarist is made President of the Council, he becomes a Salazarist President of the Council.

In effect, despite shades of originality and liberality, it is precisely the profoundly Salazarist nature of Marcelo Caetano's policy — the obstinacy in perpetuating fascism in Portugal and colonialism in Africa — that explains the very slight, almost nonexistent, results of his three years of government whose balance he explained in his speech of September 27, 1971. In this speech, in which he called upon the "Portuguese worthy of this name" to unite around the "governors elected by them" (sic), he stated:

We try valiantly to face up to national problems. We succeed in maintaining the defense of the overseas provinces against the subversion supported more and more each day by instigation of that incredible organization called the United Nations [sic] [...] and if we are not disheartened in the overseas struggle, neither have we given quarter to those who seek to bring terrorism to the metropolis.

The same terms, the same obstinacy.

But Marcelo Caetano does not deny that facing up to problems does not mean solving them. This is why, after having flashed before the traditionally poor Portuguese people the vision of the "models of development of the traditionally rich part of Europe," he recalls, so that there will be no dreams, that in Portugal "a dangerous mentality is being created of demanding rights and facilities absolutely incompatible with the country's realities and possibilities."

And then comes the traditional lament:

I would be failing in my responsibility to tell the truth to the Portuguese if I did not remind them that we live in very

critical hours, hours in which national problems are aggravated by uncertain conditions in economic and in international policy. Let no one think that we are rich in human and material resources.

Clearly, the people of Portugal who live in misery and see their sons faced with the dilemma of clandestine emigration or death without glory in colonial wars, will doubtless be the judges.

These quotations, perhaps too long, nevertheless have the purpose of demonstrating in the words of the head of the Portuguese government himself, that if it is true that the myths, the tactics, the lies, arguments and objectives of the fascist colonial regime have not changed in the slightest with the disappearance of Salazar, the socioeconomic and political degradation of Portuguese society as a result of the colonial wars is a fact that the laments of Marcelo Caetano cannot hide. To be aware of this is of capital importance within the framework of the perspectives for the development of our struggle.

Still more realistic than Marcelo Caetano is the confidential report of the Portuguese high command drawn up in 1970 under the title, **Report from Psychological Section No. 15**. In this document, which analyzes in detail the action of the liberation movements and of Portuguese means against the colonial war, as well as the methods, action and results of psychosocial warfare the authors reveal:

The proliferation of antigovernmental organizations and the attempt at general agitation lead to the creation of a climate of psychological instability that affects the activity of the students and, therefore, affects the country, which appears upset and does not know what to do to lead its children along the correct path.

After having made a long allusion to the increasingly difficult situation that is wreaking havoc among the colonial troops, with desertions and demands increasing, the report concludes:

The enemy [that is, the liberation movements and the forces against the colonial war] have perfected and increased their efforts on all fronts, internal as well as external.

In the metropolis, in general, the population continues to show little interest in the overseas war and is unaware of the effort expended by the armed forces. The student masses show themselves to be strongly susceptible to the propaganda of peace. The working masses, with no knowledge of great national problems, easily allow themselves to be dragged along by propaganda oriented toward demands for better pay and better social conditions. The most developed groups continue to be the focal points of subversion and the organizations that arise are proof of great efficacy. Overseas, generally, the indigenous populations continue to lean toward subversion, notably when it demonstrates that it has force, or when geographic conditions make the action of our troops difficult or impossible. The aboriginal populations on the periphery of the major urban centers, generally lacking tribalization, continue to evidence great susceptibility to enemy propaganda. The European pop-

ulation continues to demonstrate openly its adherence to the war but does not cooperate against subversion except when its material interests are directly threatened.

The psychological situation is precarious, both in the metropolis and overseas.

Thus, the situation becomes increasingly aggravated in every way and one might ask why the Portuguese government, which is conscious of the difficulties it now has and will have to face later, obstinately continues its absurd and criminal policy of perpetuating colonial war and domination over the African peoples. It is not difficult to recognize that the principal reasons for the unaltered continuation of Portuguese colonial policy lie in the following facts:

1) Portugal's chronic and characteristic underdevelopment, its lack of valid economic infrastructures, make it incapable of considering a process of decolonization in which the interests of the Portuguese ruling class would be safeguarded within the framework of a neocolonial situation or of effective competition with other capitalist powers.

2) The inhibiting effects of almost half a century of fascism on a society which, throughout its history, has never really (or to any extent) known the rights of man, liberty and the practice of democracy.

3) The imperial mentality of the Portuguese ruling class and the ignorance, the myths, beliefs, prejudices and narrow nationalism that characterize the culture of major sectors of the Portuguese population which, for centuries, has been subjected to the doctrine of **European superiority** and **African inferiority**, and to the myth of the "civilizing mission" of the Portuguese with respect to the African peoples who are considered to be "savages."

Despite the whims of the Portuguese colonialists as far as the "creation of multiracial societies," this doctrine, to which the fear of "communist subversion" has recently been added, crowns the crystallization of a **primitive racism** often without any evident economic motivation.

The racist character of the Portuguese intervention is amply evidenced in the disregard for Africa's cultural values as well as in the most abject crimes committed by the administration and the Portuguese colonists during the golden era of colonialism. Today it is evident in the cruelty that characterizes the actions of the colonial troops. But there is a tendency at present, in the face of African resistance, for it to manifest itself in the paternalism and false preoccupation with "achieving the social advancement of the African within the framework of the Portuguese nation."

Portuguese racism, which is one of the subjective causes of the continuation of colonial wars, reaches its maximum in the top levels of the ruling class. Thus General Kaulza de Arriaga, one of the most outstanding personalities in Portuguese colonial leadership, commander in chief of the colonial troops in Mozambique and aspirant to the job of President of the Republic, touch-

ing on the Portuguese strategic problem (Volume XII of the *Lessons in Strategy from the Courses of the High Command 1966/67*), states: "Subversion is above all a war of intelligence. One must be highly intelligent to engage in subversion; not everyone is capable. Very well, the black peoples are not highly intelligent, on the contrary, of all the peoples of the world they are the least intelligent." (sic)

In these same lessons, the author, who believes that the "exportation of African slaves to Brazil was a good thing" and that the "tribal state of the black population is favorable to Portuguese strategy," reveals in all its cruelty the principal objective of the present Portuguese colonial policy: **to maintain white domination over black populations.**

After having pointed out that the danger lies in the increase in "evolutionized blacks," Kaulza de Arriaga affirms:

We are not capable of maintaining white domination, a national objective, unless the white population achieves a rhythm that matches and outnumbers, however slightly, the production of evolutionized blacks [sic]. On the contrary, if the whites are outnumbered by the production of evolutionized blacks, then one of two things is bound to occur: either we install apartheid, which would be terrible and in which we would be **unsuccessful**, or we will have black governments with all the consequences that this implies (destruction of the overseas provinces, etc.).

The racist boss then explains the tactic required to avoid such a situation:

The white population does not contemplate the equilibrium of the black demographic potential, it contemplates the equilibrium of evolutionized blacks [...] and thank God, since it is impossible to see that all blacks are evolutionized, it is possible, almost certain, that we will be able to situate there in Africa enough whites to balance the blacks who will become evolutionized.

On this basis, after having stressed that "we will not be too effective in the production of evolutionized blacks; we must promote them, yes, but it's not necessary to exaggerate," the general and presidential aspirant reveals the master line of present Portuguese strategy in Africa: "First an increase in the white population, then a limitation of the black population." In the face of the difficulties of the problem and convinced of the myth of the great fertility of the African, he suggests, although in a negative form, the practice of scientific birth control: "Clearly, it is an extraordinarily difficult problem since we cannot distribute a birth control pill to each black family [...] but what we can do is not overstimulate the increase of the black population."

One of the principal objectives of Portuguese colonial wars in Africa thus becomes most evident: given the immediate impossibility of limiting birth control by insuring the supremacy of the white population, they resort to the physical liquidation of populations by the increasingly intense use of aerial bombardment by napalm and other means of massive destruction of the

African man under the deliberate practice of genocide.

This objective, whose realization clashes with the effective armed resistance of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies supported by African and international solidarity, nevertheless reveals the full extent of the criminal character of the moral, political and material support that Portugal receives from its allies through NATO and on a bilateral basis. In reality it is no secret to anyone today that without the aid of its western and racist allies, the Portuguese government would in no way be able to continue the colonial wars in Africa and repress the legitimate aspirations of the people of Portugal for peace and progress.

It is with full consciousness of the situation of the enemy of our people and of the internal and external factors and circumstances that made possible and condition its criminal attitude, that we must analyze the situation of our struggle and the perspectives for its evolution at each moment.

The political-military action of the Portuguese colonialists in our country continues to have as its fundamental objectives:

- a) to defend and consolidate the positions they still occupy in the urban centers and in some zones that are still not liberated;
- b) to demobilize the populations in the liberated regions;
- c) to perpetrate the violent destruction of the human and material means that serve as the base of the victorious development of our struggle;
- d) to maintain war for the sake of war, to make Africans fight against Africans;
- e) to maintain at all price, the presence of colonial troops in the principal strategic points with the hope that our political-military organization, in the long run, will enter into crisis and wind up in disintegration;
- f) to withdraw from our people the fraternal solidarity and logistic support we have in neighboring countries, by means of open aggression or armed provocation against these neighboring countries.

In its efforts to apply these objectives, the enemy continues to practice the policy of attack and deceit, making a certain number of concessions of a social nature to the population it still controls and fiercely repressing all those who, individually and collectively, are suspected of nationalism or of concrete support to our party. The enemy, who acts with the conviction that the African peoples are "the least intelligent in the world," has not, however, attained the hoped-for results and his desperation in the face of failure is becoming more evident each day.

In urban centers and other zones still occupied (some coastal areas, the islands of Guinea and the Archipelago of Cape Verde), the enemy's position is less secure all the time. This is the result, on the one hand, of the most vigorous daily attitude of our armed forces and, on the other hand, of the development of clandestine work by our party in the urban centers of the continent and in the islands.

In Guinea, the enemy continues his policy of lies, demagogic

concessions, promises of promotion of Africans, even of a "social revolution" (sic) which, if it were the case, would not only carry out the socioeconomic program of our party, but would also give our people a much more advanced standard of living than that of the people of Portugal. To complete the farce, the present head of the Portuguese colonialists — the sinister General Spínola — now promises to "give the people self-determination under the Portuguese banner." Fervently clinging to the theories of General Kaulza de Arriaga, who considers the black to be an unintelligent person, the military government of Guinea seeks to live the fable of the wise man who had promised the king he would be able to teach an ass to read. Like the man in the fable, he is doubtless convinced that in the long run either the ass or the king will die; or perhaps he will die.

Having almost reached the end of the four-year mandate during which our struggle, that he had sworn to liquidate, has developed, intensified and consolidated itself on all fronts and levels, General Spínola is beginning to demonstrate his confusion, ever greater because of the growing support that the populations of the urban centers themselves give to our party.

Thus, after the attacks against Bissau and Bafata, and faced with a broad and favorable reaction by the populations of these cities, the military governor issued a menacing declaration on July 25 over Radio Bissau, and dropped his paternalistic and reformist mask, revealing his true nature.

It is worth quoting certain passages from this declaration which, like the attacks against Bissau and Bafata, marks the beginning of a new stage in the conflict that opposes us to the government of Portugal. It affirmed:

With all the circumstances this province has gone through, it should surprise no one that rumors — sometimes fantastic — should circulate, since this is a constant matter everywhere at all times, which we cannot pretend to avoid totally [...]. Nevertheless, the volume and nature of the rumors that have recently circulated have unfortunately found a certain receptivity among the most timorous. This has caused a climate of unjustified apprehension in the capital of the province. But it is necessary to demand that an unequivocal position be taken that returns the situation to normal so that no one can harm anyone whose serene capacity to judge is upset by fear.

After having noted that "adequate measures have been taken to insure peace and security at all times," it threatens the most severe repression:

It is also important that there be no illusions concerning the firmness that the government will use to guarantee the peace, order and security of citizens. Any attempt against individual or collective security will consequently be considered an act of betrayal against the people of Guinea. Proceedings against the authors will be inexorably applied in the name of respect for the principles of the liberty and equality we defend and to which all good Guineans so correctly aspire. And any breach of civil discipline that can disturb the normal complicity, an

act of betrayal of the people will, as such, be repressed without the slightest contemplation and with all the severity merited by the enemy, as well as all those who support his interests, which have nothing in common with Portuguese Guinea.

It is true that no one should have any doubt as to the fact that the normal rhythm of life in the city will be preserved at all costs and under all circumstances. Whatever measures are necessary will be used, and their effectiveness will be doubted only by those who do not yet know the firmness and determination of the governor of the province.

If it is true that this declaration confirms the fact that the populations in the urban centers, in particular in Bissau, support the struggle (as the secret report of the Portuguese high command notes), there is no doubt that this is also the confession of the failure of the so-called policy of "better Guinea," as well as of all the attempts made by the colonialists to consolidate their present positions.

Faced with the patriotic resistance of the people in the liberated regions who are increasingly aware of the realities and objectives of the struggle and are better off because of party organization, the Portuguese colonialists have intensified bombings and acts of terrorism during 1971. They could do this because they have received new airplanes and helicopters from their allies, but nevertheless, they have not achieved their objectives. The organization of self-defense among the population is very efficient, both with respect to bombardments and to terroristic attacks and attempts to burn our crops in order to conquer us by hunger. What they succeeded in destroying during the first months of 1971 is not sufficiently significant to upset the victorious advance of our struggle. On the other hand, in the absence of an effective antiaerial defense, the measures of civil defense generally adopted by the people have contributed to a significant drop in the number of victims of barbarous actions by the Portuguese airmen.

The attempt to maintain war for the sake of war, and involve Africans — most of them recruited by force — in fighting against Africans, is a pressing need for the colonialists because of the heightened resistance and conflicts within the colonial troops. But it is doomed to failure, especially after the shameful defeat suffered by the colonialists during the imperialist aggression against the Republic of Guinea. In Conakry as in Koundara and in Gaoual, the Portuguese, along with the European militarists and the mercenaries from the Republic of Guinea, were responsible for a certain number of the so-called "African units" the overwhelming majority of whom did not return to Bissau because they were dead or imprisoned. This fact, which caused protests by the victims' relatives in Bissau and in other urban centers, is a tragic lesson for the Africans who still allow themselves to be enrolled in the Portuguese colonial army. On the other hand, the liquidation, in the course of this year, of certain of their leaders such as "Captains" Joao Bacar Djalo and Guela Baldé, and "Lieutenant" Loro Bamba, has upset the sinister plans of the

colonialists. And so they face growing difficulties even in the recruitment of mercenaries and right-wing common prisoners, and desertion mounts within their supposed "African companies."

As for the enemy's positions, we attacked all of them during the first months of 1971, including the capital, Bissau. Today, the colonial troops know they are not safe in any part of our country. Meanwhile, civilians in the urban centers, particularly the Portuguese, currently live in a permanent state of alert and scarcely conceal their fear. The majority of the officers are sending their families back to Portugal. Not only has the enemy seen the security of his troops diminished but he has also had to recognize that our party's solidity has increased and that our armed forces are stronger than ever. Taking into account the disparity of material and human resources between the enemy and our forces, this fact represents a great defeat for the Portuguese colonialists.

In desperation, the enemy has multiplied armed provocations and criminal acts against neighboring countries despite the condemnation of the United Nations and world opinion. There have been various aggressions against the population of Casamance (Senegal) and the frontier zone with the Republic of Guinea. In their dream of freeing themselves from the weight of our struggle, the Portuguese colonialists, with the support of their allies, are preparing a new imperialist aggression against this latter country. As with the preceding one, such aggression will have as its objective the overthrow of the regime of President Sékou Touré and replacing him with a government favorable to Portuguese domination of our country.

The Portuguese colonialists are also doomed to failure on this level: our relations with the governments and peoples of the neighboring countries are better all the time and no aggression against the Republic of Guinea could deter the advance of our struggle. An eventual aggression in any form will contribute to strengthening still further the ties that join our people to those of the Republic of Guinea and will reinforce African and international solidarity with our struggle.

The modifications introduced in the structure and functioning of the directive organ of the party by the meeting of the broadened Political Bureau held in April 1970, have permitted a great improvement in the work of militants and those responsible for various levels of our activity. The political work of the local commissaries and Political Action Brigades (PAB) has shown itself to be much more effective in the organization and leadership of people in the liberated zones as well as in the realization of new initiatives determined by the top leadership of the party. Despite certain difficulties in starting the work of the National Committees of the Liberated Regions (NCLR), the regional committees (RC), the zonal committees (ZC) and the village committees (VC) have worked at a normal rhythm and have been highly productive.

After the work was begun toward the end of 1970, the party secretary-general held many reunions with delegates from the

base committees (close to 200 delegates, a third of whom were women). These meetings, really seminars, were enthusiastically welcomed by the village committees and by the people, and have had visible results in the militant spirit and actions at the base. This is an initiative that we must continue to develop with great attention.

The results of the school year have been encouraging, both with respect to the schools in the liberated regions (despite the terroristic action of the enemy) and in the Friendship Institute. Close to a hundred boys and girls have been selected this year to continue their studies in friendly countries, and have already left.

In health, where there is still a certain amount of confusion and a certain inefficiency in the work of the intermediary cadres, particularly the nurses, there has been an overall improvement in administering medicine and in assistance to the population. The vaccination campaigns, particularly against cholera, have allowed us to avoid serious problems. However, despite the return to the country of a number of doctors trained during the course of the struggle, we have run into certain difficulties in this area. A large number of the foreign doctors who came to give us their assistance became ill and had to interrupt their activities.

Despite insufficient rain during the agricultural year 1970-71, general production covered the needs of the population and there was enough for the basic nourishment of the fighters. The return to the country of various technical cadres in agriculture (agronomists, technical agents and other specialists) trained abroad will permit a considerable improvement in assistance to the peasants, but above all will permit certain limited projects to be carried out and certain experiments to be made that will serve as the basis for agricultural development, which is the principal factor in our economy.

The people's stores have been greatly improved with respect to the articles placed at the disposal of the people, principally cloth, thanks to international solidarity.

On the Cape Verde Islands, conscious of the progress our party has made over the course of recent years, which is reflected in the strengthening of our clandestine organization and the growth of a nationalists spirit within the population, the Portuguese colonialists are reinforcing their vigilance and repression everywhere. Fourteen fellow countrymen were arrested and accused of belonging to PAIGC and of an attempt to detour a trading ship toward Dakar. Nevertheless, under pressure of public opinion, the Portuguese colonialists found themselves forced to absolve another four fellow countrymen on trial in San Vicente who were part of a previously arrested group.

As a result of a criminal policy of abandoning the people of the archipelago to natural contingencies, the people are still suffering hunger after three years of drought. The colonialists have tried to take advantage of this circumstance to destroy the bases of our struggle's advancement in the islands, and have resorted to the exportation of workers to São Tomé and Portugal where some

10 000 Cape Verde natives have been sent.

Our party's denunciation in April 1971 of the starvation situation, forced the colonialists — who refused to accept the humanitarian aid of international solidarity — to take certain measures to "combat the crisis." But these measures did not succeed in deceiving our people who, aware of the necessity to free themselves from colonial domination in order to get rid of misery and hunger, increasingly support our party's activities. The reality of the increase in party activity in the islands and of the support it has there is recognized by the enemy himself. For example, in the secret report by the Portuguese High Command the enemy states:

Over this period there have been two subversive appeals directed to military officers, sergeants and soldiers of Cape Verde. On the night of December 31, pamphlets were distributed on three islands; in May, packages with PAIGC pamphlets destined for the islands were intercepted in Lisbon.

Actually, on December 31, pamphlets were distributed simultaneously on all the populated islands.

During the first months of 1971, conflicts between segments of the population and the colonialist troops increased significantly on the main islands. The colonial, civil and military administration is more isolated every day. An abyss between the colonial class and the people, between the servants of colonialism and the patriots, is progressively widening.

During the meeting of the Higher Council for Struggle (CSL) held in August 1971, which made a deep study of the principal problems of our life and our struggle, important decisions were taken with the aim of strengthening and improving political works, consolidating the structures for our development, and intensifying and broadening of our armed action. Among the decisions, it is important to single out the creation of the first National Assembly of the people of Guinea, which will be selected at the appropriate time and will give our people an essential organ of sovereignty that will open new perspectives for our political action, in our own country and abroad. It is equally appropriate to mention in particular the decisions related to strengthening the armed struggle, the development of the struggle on the Cape Verde Islands and, on the human level, the creation of the Red Cross of Guinea and Cape Verde. With the permission of Radio Senegal (three times a week) and Radio Mauritania (once a week) — which have joined the programs already being broadcast over the Voice of the Revolution (in the Republic of Guinea, four times a week) — we have greatly amplified the possibilities of reaching our people and those of Africa.

On the African level, our relations with independent countries have been broadened and consolidated over the course of the first months of 1971. In addition to the consolidation of our relations with neighboring countries — among them the Republic of Senegal, which evidences increasing interest in giving us all possible help — countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunis, Libya, and other states have expressed a desire to extend bilateral aid such as others are now doing.

The Conference of Chiefs of State held in June of 1971 in Addis Ababa was an important victory for the African liberation movement, in particular for our party. Once more, we were designated unanimously as the voice of the liberation movements at the conference. The decision to increase aid to the liberty fighters and the creation of a Special Commission of the OAU for western Africa whose subdirector is a member of the leadership of our party permits us to anticipate a considerable increase in African solidarity with our struggle. The Liberation Committee unsparingly continues to give us all possible aid. In fulfillment of the decisions of the Special Conference of Lagos (December 1970), the committee gave our party special financial aid which was extremely useful.

We must stress that during the course of the conversations we have held with various African chiefs of state in Addis Ababa, Conakry or in their own countries, as well as with the Secretary-General of the OAU and the members of the Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee, we have always encountered the greatest concern for our struggle and an enthusiastic desire to aid our party. It is a great stimulus for our people and for all the fighters of our organization.

On the international plane, where the enemy himself recognizes that he is more strongly accused, condemned and morally isolated despite the political and material support of NATO and other allies, we have achieved considerable progress in the first months of 1971.

Relations of solidarity with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are increasingly useful to our struggle. They are translated concretely into important aid in articles of primary necessity and in other materials we have already received this year. In the western countries, the Support Committees in general have intensified their information activities and their collections of gifts of solidarity. Sweden has decided to double the aid it gave us last year; Norway and other Scandinavian countries also seem disposed to aid us. It is important here to mention especially the valiant attitude of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Relations during the last meeting of the NATO Council in Lisbon where he denounced Portuguese policy and colonial wars as contrary to the interests of humanity and incompatible with the principles enumerated in the Charter of the organization.

In Portugal the people are evidencing increasing awareness of the fact that the colonial war is a crime against their own interests. Each day there are more demonstrations against colonial policy and the actions carried out by the brave Portuguese patriots of Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA) represent important victories in the common struggle against the colonial war and a guarantee of friendship and solidarity on the part of the Portuguese people that our people wish to maintain, develop, consolidate.

On the military level, the action of the Portuguese colonialists continues to be dominated by this truth, frequently recognized publicly by the colonial authorities themselves: they cannot win the war they are waging against our African people. This results not only from the growing combativity of our armed forces and

the victories achieved on the battlefields, but also from the constant elevation of the level of our people's political consciousness. Aware of this fact, the colonialists try by every means possible to commit the most barbarous crimes against our people, to kill our cattle, burn our crops, in a word, to develop and intensify their criminal and terroristic activity, which gives the lie to their pretensions of social-economic and political promotion of our people.

For this reason, the action of the enemy during the first months of 1971 was characterized by intense and continuous aerial bombardments, mainly with napalm, and by airborne troop assaults aimed at the destruction of villages, crop burning and cattle killing. As we said, having been provided by their allies with new and better planes and helicopters, the colonists have augmented their bombardments and terrorist actions. Nevertheless, in the face of the valiant resistance of the people and fighters, they have seldom achieved their objectives. The regions most affected by these criminal acts are precisely the most populous and those in which the party organization is most developed: Cubisseco, Cubucare, Balana-frontier zone (in the south), Oio and Saara (in the north).

Dozens of villages were destroyed, an appreciable amount of rice was burned in the regions of Unal, Tombali and Como and some 200 head of cattle were killed. Fortunately, the loss in human lives is far below the criminal intentions of the enemy who attacks hospitals and schools by preference and takes his principal victims from among the elderly and the children.

The action of our armed forces during the first semester of 1971, in the dry season, achieved a breadth and vigor never before equalled. It is a fact known to the Portuguese colonialists themselves that in order to sustain the impression created by its war communiqués — although these are never quite true — they have tried to make believe that the intensification and development of our armed struggle was due to the presence of foreign specialists, chiefly Cubans, within our armed forces. This lie, like so many other, has convinced no one who isn't already convinced, and has only served to improve once again the capacity and high level of initiative of our fighters who unsparingly sacrifice to put into practice the slogans of our party's War Council.

Restructured into various army corps and drawn in part from the defense forces of the liberated regions, thanks to the creation and strengthening of the Local Armed Forces, our National Armed Forces have developed and intensified their action on all fronts; by doubling the initiative, we have completely disoriented the enemy who sees his plans condemned to failure. We have carried out 86 attacks against Portuguese positions (at the rate of three attacks a day); we have laid eight fatal ambushes and put out of combat more than 250 soldiers and officers of the colonial army, among them 158 established dead. Among the operations we have carried out, we should note particularly the campaign successfully led by the army corps on the Kinara front (from April to June), where all enemy positions were attacked on various occasions and suffered great human and material losses; the actions that took place on the Catio front, where the city of the same name was attacked twice by our combatants causing great destruction; the

actions on the eastern front where, on three occasions, the city of Gabu was the object of assault by our forces, which, in addition, laid the most damaging ambushes suffered by the enemy during the course of the struggle. In one of these ambushes, the garrison commander of Pitche was killed; ten trucks, a tank and various cannons were destroyed; finally, the no less important, intensive and continuous operations directed against Portuguese positions all along the Senegal border.

But the first semester of 1971 will go down in the history of our struggle as the period in which, for the first time, we have been capable of attacking all the urban centers still occupied by the enemy, including the capital Bissau, and Bafata, the country's second most important city. The attacks against the colonial positions of Bissau and Bafata mark a new stage in the political-military evolution of our struggle. If such were necessary, they are a new and clear refutation of the allegation that serves as a pretext for the criminal aggressions against our country, namely that we are acting from neighboring countries.

It is a fact that the attack against Bissau was more of a warning to the population of the capital, and that to carry it out we had to attack seven enemy garrisons of logistic support. Thus the human and material losses to the enemy were not great, but the psychological and political effect of the action surpasses all others so far undertaken. In Bafata, where our infantry entered and remained for some time without enemy response, our fighters destroyed four garrisons, the meteorological station, the airport control tower and various buildings of the military and administrative infrastructure, and several sections of the colonial troops were put out of combat. Our fighters also carried out 75 arrests of suspicious individuals in order to interrogate them, following which 58 were released.

During the period January-August 1971, we carried out 508 important actions:

- 369 attacks against garrisons in urban centers;
- 102 ambushes and other operations on the highways;
- 15 very important mining actions;
- 14 actions against river transportation; and
- 8 operations by commandos in urban centers.

Our forces put out of combat 480 dead, 735 soldiers and enemy agents, confirmed. The confirmed number of wounded (255) is far from corresponding to the real total. In effect, information from Lisbon and Bissau indicates that the military hospitals in these cities have never had as many wounded as they have this year. On the material level, we have destroyed or damaged 90 military vehicles, sunk 28 ships and coast guard craft in the rivers, shot down two planes and three helicopters. Our forces, which have expelled the enemy from three battlefields and have demolished several encampments such as that in Umaru Cosse on the eastern front, seized an important supply of war materials, principally G-3 machine guns, Mausers, American bazookas and telecommunication apparatuses.

While it is true that this does not represent the victorious end

of our armed liberation struggle, nevertheless there is no doubt that, for eight months of action, it is the best in our eight and a half years of struggle and represents a decisive contribution to the certain victory of our liberation battle. It is this result and all the victories achieved that explain the growing desperation of the Portuguese colonialists, the increasingly ferocity and savagery of their colonial war.

In order to try to justify their criminal obstinacy against our progress in the struggle, the Portuguese colonialists resort to every type of argument, such as that presented by General Kaulza de Arriaga, for instance, who stated in the **Strategic Lessons of the Course of the High Command**:

Naturally, when our troops die in Guinea and we are spending a great deal of money there, we do not take these losses into consideration nor think that this money is spent only for the defense of Guinea. If this were the case, it would not really be reasonable; but a man who dies in Guinea indirectly defends Angola and Mozambique.

If this affirmation reveals to the fullest the miserable nature, the cynicism and the scorn of the Portuguese colonial leaders for human beings — for the Portuguese man himself — it has the merit of recording the community of the struggle and the interests that unite our people with the brother peoples of Angola and Mozambique. It clearly shows the degree of our responsibilities in the united struggle for the total liquidation of the Portuguese colonial presence in Africa.

To draw the best out of victories our people have achieved, and the successes already won this year, to meet the level of our responsibilities, we must make 1971 one of the most decisive periods in our long and rich struggle. We must constantly strengthen our awareness of realities and not forget that we face a desperate and unscrupulous enemy, be ready to make greater efforts and sacrifices, to overcome all difficulties, progressively correct our errors and deficiencies, continuously improve our individual and collective behavior and our action in political and military areas, as in all other branches of the new life we have begun to build.

At the same time that we intensify our armed action and blunt the enemy's claws, we must pay greater attention to political work in our own country, in Africa and internationally. One of the principal forces, if not the main one, of the Portuguese colonies is the political and material aid of their allies. We must draw all the lessons from this reality, both for the present and for the future, develop and consolidate friendship and solidarity with all anti-imperialist and anticolonial forces, tighten our links with the Africans and non-Africans who are aiding us in this difficult struggle and are giving us true proof of their friendship.

No maneuver, no crime of the Portuguese colonialists, no force in the world will be able to prevent the inevitable victory of our African people on the road of national liberation and the construction of peace and progress to which they are entitled.