


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


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SUMMARY

TO THE READER	4
● THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS TO PROTECT	7
Jacques Bonaldi	
ESCALATION OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION	20
Jane McManus	
ANGOLA IS INDEPENDENT AND "NINGUEM IMPEDIRA A CHUVA"	35
Armando Entralgo	
WHAT THE PEOPLE DON'T KNOW	52
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA	61



The Angolan people's basic task at the present stage is the struggle to maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the country.

Agostinho Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola
Luanda, December 3, 1975

TO THE READER

It would have been very foolish to have believed that after its ignominious defeat in Viet Nam and Indochina, the United States, arms folded, would quietly preside over the dismantling of its empire which it has built with such iniquity, so many dollars, so much blood (of the peoples who have been attacked, obviously). And in the wake of the "defender of the free world," all its minor associates, nostalgically dreaming of the glorious epoch when the people were colonized and decimated. For today these people know they can rise up and they do so.

Angola, or more exactly the People's Republic of Angola, led by the MPLA, is doing so. And the Angolan people, closely linked to their vanguard, are fighting with such faith in the justice of their cause and the importance of their anti-imperialist contribution, that all the combined resources of the great imperialism and the "sub-imperialisms" are unable to avoid, much less prevent, the retreat of their puppets on all military and political fronts. It is very consoling, it is very encouraging (and it is only historic justice) to see that no puppet at the hour of truth has ever helped imperialism at all. What else are the Holden's and Savimbi's! Let them learn of their inexorable destiny from the Van Thieu's, the Lon Nol's and their cohorts! In Africa and elsewhere, there are many others who are beginning to feel their thrones toppling because the peoples they crushed are arising.

It has been some time now since imperialism stopped pretending to be the defender of civilization. And Viet Nam served more than all else in that respect. The cunning sneak attacks are over. In the blaze of high noon there's no place to hide. And so they shamelessly admit their intervention in Angola. At least things are clear: it will be very difficult now to speak weepingly in the voice of tribal struggle or of

civil war. No, it is clearly an imperialist intervention against a legitimately constituted government, or to put it another way, a flagrant violation of international conduct. But we know all too well that imperialism cares nothing about that.

The lecture of the Bulletin will permit an understanding of why Angola is victim of imperialist aggression today and how the whole fascist rot has joined together with one common objective: to prevent the creation and strengthening of a progressive people's government in a region of Africa strategically and economically vital for international reaction.

Yes, perhaps the spokesmen of an obsolete humanism are right: in fact, history repeats itself. Every time people rise up in any part of the world because they ache from having stayed on their knees enslaved so long, it is certain that world imperialism will be there to support the worn-eaten yoke with all its forces. History repeats itself, at least contemporary history, because the logic of the retrograde forces never changes: when the carrot won't work, use the stick. The latest example: the invasion of the people's Democratic Republic of Eastern Timor by Indonesia. Directly or by pulling the strings, United States imperialism is always there, repeating itself.

But only the nearsighted — voluntarily or otherwise — are unaware that, although it repeats itself, history advances. Angola advances, and nothing will prevent the Angolan people from definitively wiping out all this rot that has invaded their land. Actually, if the imperialists learn nothing from history because their logic is obtuse, the people let no occasion pass without enriching their experience. They have learned an unforgettable lesson from the extraordinary struggle of the Vietnamese people: that imperialism is corroded inside and out, that it can still do much damage (and does) but that, in the end, revolutionary morale, the just political and military line, unity, count more than advanced technology, supersonic fighter planes, missiles and sophisticated weapons. For against the union of a people around a just line and the militant solidarity of the socialist and progressive forces of the world, Yankee imperialism and its satellites have lost the race ahead of time. They will gain temporary successes, they will win a battle, but never the war.

The People's Republic of Angola is not alone in this struggle waged since November 11, 1975, and which is to a certain extent the continuation of the guerrilla struggle begun in February, 1961. As of December 5, 35 governments had recognized the young Republic. Some African governments have stated their willingness to send troops to fight alongside the MPLA and various others have energetically condemned the imperialist aggression. Solidarity demonstrations have been held and are being held in various parts of the world.

This militant solidarity with the People's Republic of Angola is more important than ever and must continue to grow. In effect, what is at stake today in Angola is an important part of the future destiny of Africa. A victory of the world forces of the reaction in this southern part of the African continent would mean strengthening the racist and fascist bloc in South Africa, an open door to imperialist maneuvers in the Indian Ocean and a danger to the struggle of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe.

What is basically at stake is the capacity of the progressive forces of Africa to end once and for all the neocolonialism that made it possible for the old colonial powers to safeguard their domination over various African countries. And of course this is what imperialism fears now that classic decolonization has evidenced its bankruptcy. The only solution to Africa's liberation is national and social revolution "which permits basic changes within a political framework of self-determination."

The example of a people liberating themselves from servitude — colonialism or neocolonialism — is contagious and this is the example that imperialism is currently trying to suppress. The government of the People's Republic of Angola is firmly determined to struggle to the end against every attempt to impose the yoke of oppression on it once again. Sooner or later, when the resplendent flag of the new progressive Republic flies over an Angola free of all the scars left by the fascists and racists — simple puppets of foreign powers — history will have taken a step forward, and with it all progressive humanity.

THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS TO PROTECT

JACQUES BONALDI

It is a well-known fact that when a colonial power finds itself forced to decolonize its possessions, the only way it can safeguard its political, economic, financial and cultural interests in that country, is by moving to a different form of domination: neocolonialism. Neocolonialism has been termed by one African leader as the highest stage of imperialism. But the establishment of neocolonialism requires the existence, in the former colonizing power, of a certain number of political-economic conditions, principally a sufficient level of capitalization, to be able to penetrate into the key economic sectors of the dominated country and thereby take over the essential wealth and the future of the former colony.

We also know that Portugal did not have a sufficient level of capitalist development to be able to implant neocolonialism in its colonies. When the liberation wars broke out at the beginning of the '60s (in the case of Angola, in the year 1961 specifically), Portugal, faced with the impossibility of resorting to neocolonialism like other dominant European powers, had to keep three typically colonial wars going for more than ten years. But, despite its inability to take over the wealth of its colonies, it resorted to another measure: the intervention of intermediary foreign powers. The capital that established itself in Angola after 1961 was not Portuguese capital, but foreign capital. And thus, just as we are now witnessing the internationalization of the colonial war, we witnessed a parallel increase in the internationalization of the plunder.

Potentially, Angola was the richest Portuguese colony of Africa. Its resources — known or probable — place it among the richest countries of Africa. Thus it is one of the most coveted. The penetration of foreign capital has reached such an extreme that not one sector of Angola's economy is free of its intervention. This is the importance for imperialism — in addition to the political and geopolitical aspects — of insuring

that Angola not be separated from the "free world" sphere of attraction. Within the brief space this *Bulletin* permits, it is impossible to make an exhaustive analysis of the Angolan economy. So we will take a concrete, if very general, look at the most important sectors, with particular emphasis on the question of the intense penetration of foreign capital which explains why imperialism is always ready to go to any lengths to safeguard its interests. In this sense, the example of Chile is most eloquent. That country demonstrated how vicious a role the multinationals can play in the service of their respective governments. And the number of multinationals in Angola is not small but, on the contrary, very high.

Oil

Several years ago, oil became Angola's most important export sector. When one says oil in Angola, it is equivalent to saying "Cabinda enclave" and to say "Cabinda enclave" is to say Cabinda Gulf Oil. This company is a 100% subsidiary of United States Gulf Oil, which has exclusive rights to the off-shore concessions. Gulf's production in Cabinda has developed to an extraordinary degree. In 1968, it produced a total of 749 514 tons of crude oil; by 1974 it was already producing 7.5 million tons. Cabinda's off-shore reserves amount to an estimated 300 000 000 tons. As for the benefits to Gulf, let's look at two examples: the total foreign exchange the Angolan government obtained from the oil of Cabinda (in taxes, royalties, etc.) during the first months of 1974 is equal to that of all other exports together and seven times greater than during the same period of 1973. Let's take another example:

According to the Portuguese daily *Expresso* for September 13, 1975, Cabinda Gulf paid the national treasury approximately nine million contos (nearly \$36 million), which was equivalent to 42.2% of all ordinary income. During that year, Gulf exported 15 million contos worth which represented 48.8% of total Angolan exports. In 1974, this provided a profit of three million contos, which represents a fantastic profit: nearly 6 000%.

But Gulf is no longer alone in Cabinda, for two other companies have obtained concessions to prospect for oil in the subsoil. They are EXXON and Elf-Total (Compañía Francesa del Petróleo).


There are two concessionaire companies in Angola: PETRANGOL (Compañía de Petróleo de Angola), which is a group 85% controlled by Petrofina of Belgium and in which the Portuguese banking group Espírito Santo has enormous interests, as well as the Federal Mayhau Bank (South Africa). PETRANGOL exploits exclusively in Benfica, Luanda, Cacucuo, Galinda, Tobias and Puaca.

ANGOL (Sociedade Portuguesa de Exploracao de Petróleos) is 40% controlled by Sacor of Portugal. Then comes a tumult of interests which include Total (Compañía Francesa del Petróleo), the Portuguese bank Borges e Irmao, General Mining and Finance Corp. (South Africa). In association with Total of France, ANGOL exploits in Ambriz and eastern Cuanza and with TEXACO in the exterior Congo. It is associated with PETRANGOL in western Cuanza and with PETRANGOL and TEXACO in the interior Congo.

Many other companies exploit Angola's oil or request concessions or make demands. Arco Petroleum Company (Los Angeles, United States) inherited from Gulf at the end of 1973, the monopoly of the entire territory of Cabinda. In 1974, EXXON received a concession of 7 700 square miles off-shore to the north of Angola (it paid \$1.7 million to the firm). The US group Sun Oil Co., Amerada Hesse Corp. and Cities Service Co., received a concession of 3 861 square miles south of Luanda (the group paid \$800 000 to the firm). On February 25, 1974, Seagull Exploration (London) presented a demand for an exclusive concession to Cabinda Ansa Petroleum (a group of South African companies controlled by General Mining which has a concession of 6 000 square kilometers off shore and 7 500 square kilometers on shore in Cuanda).

Challenger Oil and Gas Co. (subsidiary of Global Marine Inc., US) and American Pacific International, Inc. obtained licenses to look for gas and oil in an area of 2.7 million acres off shore to the west of Luanda. Esso (US) has a concession that covers 19 659 km². An international partnership composed of Tesoro Petroleum Corp. (Texas), General Exploitation (Los Angeles) and Geotermie (Paris) presented a demand to engage in prospecting. Kilroy (Houston, Texas) presented a demand for exclusive exploitation of hydrocarbon in two northern regions and on the border between Angola and Namibia.

As for the refineries, the only one that currently exists is owned by PETRANGOL in Luanda. It has a capacity of a million tons a year. But production of Angolan oil incites creation of new refineries. SACOR has received permission to construct a refinery in the South that will begin to function in 1975 (its projected capacity is two million tons a year). The Ambriz refinery will be completed in 1977 and its capacity will be 700 000 tons of oil at the end of 1978. This is a joint project of the Companhia dos Asfaltos de Angola (which has rights over bitumen and asphalt deposits in the region) and the Riverwood Corporation (US). As for the refinery projected by Angola Energy Ltd. (London and US capital) in Moçamedes, it will be able to refine millions of tons a year in the first stage. An investment of \$100 million is planned over three years.



To complete this chapter on oil, here is the summary the MPLA presents concerning the companies that are trying to establish themselves on Angolan territory (the figures in parenthesis indicate the number of concessions requested): Ashland (14); British Petroleum Development Ltd. (22); Compañía Francesa del Petróleo (32); Companhia de Investimenti no Sul Angola (13); Diversa Internacional de Exploracao de Petróleos Angola (24); Etosha Petroleum Company (15); Ferjoma Importacao Ltda. (17); Gibraltar Angola Minerals Co. (12); Mobil Oil Portuguesa (28); Occidental (30); Oceanic Exploration Co. (26); Place Gas Oil Co. (9); Rimalpi (13); Societa Planet Angola Oil Corp. (18); Sociedad Angol (27); Shell Portuguesa SARL (20); Standard Oil Co. (11); Tenneco Angola Inc. (23); Ultramar Co., Ltd. (10); Victor Manuel R. Velhen a Rebelo (21).

Iron

Iron holds fourth place among exports from Angola (1973), with a value of \$49 million. Just as to say oil is to say Cabinda, to speak of iron one simply mentions Cassinga, in the district of Huila, whose reserves amount to an estimated 350 million tons with a high percentage yield (60-64%); and two billion with a medium percentage (40-50%). The perimeter of land for explorations in Cassinga is an exclusive concession of the Companhia Minera do Lobito, controlled by the West German Krupp enterprise which includes Gregg-Europe (Belgian), Hojgaarde et Schultz (Denmark), Cantieri Navali di Venezia (Italy). It is therefore not so surprising that top officials of Lobito should have declared to the Luanda daily *Comercio* of June 6, 1975, that the company was going bankrupt and that the high level reserves were practically exhausted. What sinister maneuver lies behind these declarations? Because the least that can be said is that the progression of iron extraction has been as phenomenal as that of oil in Cabinda. Judge for yourself: the company extracted 100 000 tons in 1965; a million in 1967; 3 200 000 in 1968; more than five million in 1969; six million in 1973; seven million in 1974. If the forecast was to extract 12 million in 1980, how is it possible that the mines are exhausted? A multinational firm does not invest \$100 million (in 1967 this was the biggest investment made in Angola up to that time) without guaranteeing its rearguard, in other words without being certain of the profits it will receive from its exploitation. Nor do international financial groups authorize loans without being certain of their clients' solvency; however, in 1969 Lobito obtained a loan of 122 000 000 francs financed basically by two West German banking trusts (Deutsche Union Bank of Frankfurt and Hamburgische Landsbank) and by three other banks: the Bankers Trust (GB), Lavoro Bank AG (Switzerland), Monte dei Paschi (Siena, Italy). The chief clients for Cassinga iron are the Federal Republic of Germany (42%),

a year of concentrate from the mines located in the Mavoio Tetabo region (Japanese capital is involved in this enterprise).

In Moçamedes, copper deposits have been discovered which will be exploited by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and by Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (South Africa). In 1973, a French-Portuguese enterprise (the Cobre de Angola and Sociedad Anónima del Cobre enterprise) won concessions in the Mavoio Tetebo region where it made an initial investment of \$15 million.

Bauxite

Angolan bauxite is controlled by the Dutch Company Billington Mastechapping and by Alumínio Português which is nothing more than a front for the French company Péchiney.

But the penetration of foreign capital in the prospecting of the subsoil does not end there. We cite other outstanding cases.


—The Nuclear Energy Board of Portugal, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the General Mining and Finance Corporation (South Africa) established a private corporation to find and exploit existing minerals in two concessions owned by Lobito. The investment projected was 32 000 contos in three years.

Urangesellschaft (FRG), a group that includes Verba, Metallgesellschaft of Frankfurt and Steinhöfen-Elektrometal of Essen signed a contract in March 1970 with the Portuguese Nuclear Agency to prospect for uranium in concessions covering 6 300 km² in Angola and Mozambique. In this same sector the Portuguese Nuclear Energy Agency and the Total-Compagnie Minière et Nucleaire (Compañía Francesa de Petróleos) signed a contract for exploration and exploitation of radioactive minerals.

The Chromalloy American Corporation took over control of the Sociedad Mineira de Huila in 1973 (which had concessions for gold and other minerals in the South), created Chromalloy Angola and invested \$750 000 in a prospecting program.

In Malanje there is a manganese deposit whose proven reserves amount to 65 million tons and which is controlled by the West German firm Luise A. Therese Bermann. The French-United States company Cefremet controls phosphates with reserves estimated at more than 100 millions tons.

Other important deposits have been discovered: caolin in Sales; silicate in Negage; silicate and quartz in Viana; copper in Dundo-Guitola; alabaster in Dundo-Grande (Benguela). Southwest Angola has possibly the largest reserves of titanium in the world. It has been proven that





there is gold, mica, marble, bituminous slate, coal, sulphur, gypsum, anhydride in Angola; apparently cobalt, chrome, tin and lead also exist.

To conclude this chapter on the subsoil, one single figure will demonstrate the interest the multinational companies have in Angola; between 1962 and 1972 the value of subsoil products increased six times over and the rate of growth in the amounts produced averaged 18.5% annually.

Manufactured goods

Although the manufacturing sector is underdeveloped (in 1969 it only occupied 5.8% of the economically active population and accounted for 11% of the GNP) it is developing rapidly, always under the control of foreign capital. Between 1965 and 1972, according to *The Financial Times*, manufacturing production increased 18% annually. Investments rose to \$50 million in 1973, or more than double those of 1969.

We will content ourselves with a summary glance at this sector. Nestlé (Swiss) controls the enterprise Lactifinio de Angola; Italian capital controls Sinaldo (soft drinks); a match factory was opened in Nova Lisboa in January 1975; Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish capital is involved in it. The SEAT (Spanish FIAT), Leyland, Volvo (Swedish) and Ford (British) have proposed establishing assembly plants; Znid-Afrikaansch Haldelshuia (Holland) is trying to establish a television factory in Luanda where there are already four factories: Standard Electric, Angotronics (Hitachi), Aliancia Comercial (Sony), ECREL (Sanyo). The Riverwood Corp. will set up a factory for synthetic products using the deposits from the asphalt that has been granted to them north of Luanda. A British firm named Ward Ashcroft and Parckman has signed a contract for the creation of an industrial zone of 250 hectares in Nova Lisboa. Celangol (Celulosa de Angola), formed by a Portuguese economic group with British financing, will build a factory in Nova Lisboa; the projected investment is \$140 million and its pulp production will be 300 000 tons a year. The Companhia de Celulosa de Ultramar (Banco Espírito Santo) is already working in this sector of paper pulp. As for the chemical sector, it is controlled by Angola African Oxygen (South Africa). Also involved are British American Tobacco, Coca-Cola, General Tire and Rubber (United States); in cement there is the Chamalimaud group (Portuguese), with French, Danish and Belgian capital; vegetable oils are controlled by CUF and Société Générale de Belgique; in the soft drinks sector, in addition to Coca-Cola, there is CUCA which depends on the Português de Atlântico Bank (Portugal), SINALCO (West German capital), NOCAL (Banco Espírito Santo). CUCA is associated with three United States companies (Arbor Acres Farm Inc., Crown Cork and Seal Co. and International Proteins Corp.), Passi Ltd. (Swiss) and

Rhodesian capital in a trust that encompasses the most diverse sectors from animal food to fishing and hotels, including cattle, instant coffee and packaging materials.

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Coffee

In 1973, coffee was the second export product, following oil, with a value of \$206 million (the first four export products: oil, coffee, diamonds and iron accounted for 57% of the value of exports this year). Angola has become the third largest producer, with a production of 220 000 tons in 1974.

Some 15% of the production comes from small farmers while 85% comes for three latifundist companies: the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA), the Companhia Agrícola de Angola and the Companhia Africa de Cazengo, all three controlled by the Rallet bank (France). Exports go through the South African company Inexcafé.

Cotton

Production is some 80 000 tons a year. This crop is controlled by Cotomang, monopoly of the Société Générale de Belgique, which also controls the other companies, Lagos e Irmao, Mota e Irmao. The Belga de Africa bank and the Companhia Algodonera Congoleña are also in this sector.

Sisal

With 80 000 tons a year, Angola is the third largest world producer. Control is in the hands of two British and West German groups, and of SIGA in which CUF has an interest.

Sugarcane (76 073 tons of sugar in 1973) is controlled by the Société Agricole de Cassequel and by Chivera (dependencies of Barton Mayhew, Great Britain), the latter of which is also in *cattle* raising, where we find as well CAPA and the Companhia de Moçamedes (controlled by the Portuguese bank Pinto e Sotta Mayor) and l'Uniao Comercial de Automoveis with United States capital. In the wood industry, which is almost entirely devoted to exports, the Companhia de Cabinda, Jomar et Vitorano Malho, controlled by the CUF and the Banco de Angola, operate. As for fishing (500 000 tons in 1973) and the fishmeal industry, Uniao Comercial de Automoveis, Standard Oil and Banco Portugues do Atlantico are present.

Banking

The penetration of Portuguese capital in the banking sector is most notable for economic reasons that are easy to understand. The Banco de Angola, whose home office is in Lisbon, belongs to the Portuguese government in association with national capital (profits in 1973: \$2 million). The Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial is a subsidiary of the Banco Borges Hermanos (profits in 1973: \$1.4 million). The Banco Totta Standard is controlled by the Standard Bank (Great Britain and South Africa) and by Tota-Alliança (of the CUF group). The Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor, which has 70 offices in Angola, belongs to the Champalimaud group. The Banco Inter-Unido depends on the First National City Bank and the Grupo Espírito Santo. As for the Banco de Lisboa y Africa del Sur, it emerged recently out of the association of the Banco National Ultramarino, the Banco de Angola, the Banco Comercial de Angola and the South Africa Central Mining and Finance Corporation. The sector of insurance is controlled in large part by Portuguese capital. Mundial and Confiança are linked to the Champalimaud group, associated with Venhas and Cupertino. Imperio depends on the CUF. Atlas depends on the Borges Hermanos bank, the Banco de Créditos Marbos and Miguel Quina. Tranquilidad is controlled by Espírito Santo with the participation of the Banco Inter Unido y Cassequel.

ESCALATION OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

JANE McMANUS

Angola — its people, its land, its economy and its newly independent government — is today the object of "an aggression of such scope and nature that it surpasses any other foreign intervention of the many that have been launched against the African people fighting for their independence," according to a denunciation by the Organization of African Unity's subcommittee on defense.

Mercenaries from throughout the imperialist world have been integrated into the ranks of the so-called "liberation groups" FNLA and UNITA, armed and financed by the imperialist powers for the purpose of destroying the MPLA. "Advisers" from the US war against Viet Nam, Portuguese exiles who were PIDE agents, Belgian mercenaries who fought in the Congo and Nigeria, have been captured by FAPLA fighters or interviewed at bases in South Africa and Zaire. Observers have identified weapons from all the NATO countries: French-made Panhard armored cars; high calibre artillery and mortars from West Germany, Belgium and the United States; missiles and mortars bearing the label Mutual Defense Cooperation and the insignia of two clasped hands wrapped in the US flag. Moreover, official sources in the United States, South Africa and Zaire have admitted their involvement either directly or through the FNLA and UNITA, in the aggression. It is more coordinated than the invasion of the Congo in 1964. It is more clearly evident than the invasion of Biafra in 1968. It is more encompassing than the invasion of Guinea in 1970. But the reasons are the same: to destroy



the bases for true African independence in order to protect imperialist economic hegemony.

In Angola, Portuguese colonialism served this purpose well and was accordingly backed to the hilt by the United States and other NATO powers. But even as early as 1962, the chief world imperialist power expressed its doubts about the future when the Kennedy administration determined that Portugal could not sustain control over her African colonies indefinitely and that contact must be made with future revolutionary leaders," according to CIA revelations printed in *The New York Times* of September 25, 1975.

The "revolutionary leader" the CIA chose to support from that time on was Holden Roberto, a man who had lived outside his country since early childhood and whose tribalist claims to Angolan leadership had already been rejected by the most advanced African leaders — Lumumba, Nkrumah — at the Pan-African Conference held in Accra in 1958. The following year Holden Roberto visited the United States but his permanent residence has been in the former Belgian Congo, Zaire. Zaire President General Mobutu Sese Seko is Holden Roberto's brother-in-law. Zaire has been the direct recipient of massive funds and the conduit for additional sums destined for the groups Washington now seeks to pass off as liberation movements engaged in a fratricidal struggle.

In 1961, shortly after the MPLA launched armed struggle against the Portuguese occupiers in Angola, Holden Roberto's group — then the Union of the People of Angola (UPA) and now the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) — urged members of the Bakongo tribe to demonstrate their superiority by killing Angolans of other tribal, linguistic, ethnic or ideological background. The results according to a former UPA chief of staff, were

a veritable fratricidal war in all respects. About 8 000 Angolans have been savagely massacred by the tribalist elements of the UPA, stupidly armed and extremely undisciplined. This inhuman massacre was a result of blind tribalism. . . .

(Marcos Kassenga at a press conference held in Leopoldville, March 3, 1962.)

And where did the weapons come from? They were not seized from the Portuguese military forces as was true of the MPLA's weapons but rather

. . . observers have noted that almost all the material and financial support for the UPA comes from the United States, or more specifically, from the American Committee on Africa. This financial aid . . . is given on the condition that the UPA does not join forces with the MPLA or with any other front of which the MPLA is a part. (*Courier d'Afrique*, February 5, 1962.)

Washington officials have now corroborated the fact that "from 1962 to about 1969, the CIA supplied money and arms to Roberto but with few results," although actually that aid began even earlier through a CIA conduit, the American Committee on Africa, and continued after 1969, through the good offices of Mobutu in Zaire, until it was allegedly directly resumed in the spring of 1975.

US aid and credits to Zaire have never stopped. Aid for 1975 alone was set at \$20 million, which the State Department has unsuccessfully sought to raise to \$60 million in view of imperialism's crisis in that part of Africa. At the same time, Kissinger adviser Sheldon B. Vance, former US ambassador to Kinshasa and an intimate friend of Mobutu, has been contacting Zaire's creditors in an effort to refinance the millions in debts that will soon be due because that country faces insurmountable economic problems as a result of the general crisis of a dependent capitalist country. Between 1962 and 1974, it received \$430 million from the US, \$50 million of it in military aid alone.

Roberto's 15 000 man army, recruited from reactionary elements — most of them outside Angola — and trained by US Green Berets, did not engage in armed struggle against the Portuguese but rather remained in Zaire across the Angolan border, awaiting the day when it could be



launched against the MPLA to prevent Angola from achieving true political and economic independence.

But as the strength of the liberation movement in all three Portuguese colonies become evident during the '60s, Washington's involvement in defending its imperialist interests on the African continent became deeper. At an important meeting of the National Security Council in December of 1969, that strategic body determined "to preserve a 'balance' in southern Africa." It thus reaffirmed its support of Portugal's colonial war and the white minority racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury.

In February, 1970, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger clarified that decision when he revealed that "the biggest American interests in southern Africa are in Angola." That was before the energy crisis became aggravated. Today, Gulf Oil is extracting some 150 000 barrels a day in Cabinda and plans to double that figure; and this without mentioning diamonds, manganese, nickel, uranium and other metals plus coffee, lumber, etc. in other provinces of that rich country.

The coup that shook Portugal on April 25, 1974, also shook the Nixon administration into escalated actions to safeguard its interests in the Portuguese colonies. It immediately moved on two fronts: 1) to prevent the decolonization process in Africa and 2) to give its friends on the continent increased backing.

The key person in the new situation was to be none other than Antonio de Spínola who, in an exchange of views with US President Nixon two months after the coup, evidenced his complete accord with US goals in Africa and his willingness to pursue those goals.

On September 15, Spínola met with Mobutu on the Isle of Sal in Cape Verde and outlined the inconvenience of dealing with an anti-imperialist liberation group like the MPLA in an area as rich as Angola. Mobutu was to provide a base of operations for rival groups, namely Roberto's FNLA (which now included former MPLA member Daniel Chipenda, suspected of plotting the assassination of Agostinho Neto); and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA, a split-off from the FNLA, had collaborated openly with Portuguese military forces and white settlers and had proclaimed a ceasefire almost immediately after the coup in Portugal. Its leader is from Bie in central Angola and uses the same type of propaganda as the FNLA, and its financial backing presumably came originally from British copper interests in Zambia. More recently Savimbi has received arms and financing directly from South Africa.

Spínola's plan was for the two reconstituted "liberation" groups to launch a series of separate military squirmishes in Angola which would provide them with credibility by at least neutralizing the MPLA, paving the way for a neocolonialist solution in Angola.

As part of that solution, Mobutu would be able to realize his aggrandizement schemes for a sub-imperialism in Africa with Zaire at its head. Cabinda would be annexed, first to protect imperialist interests, particularly the vital oil resources, and secondly to provide Zaire with access to the coveted port of Cabinda and control over the rich agricultural wealth nearby. To this end, the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) was immediately created. But this FLEC No. 1 was soon joined by FLEC No. 2 — FLEC-Gulf and FLEG-Elf as they began to be called openly, to distinguish their multinational creators.

Aggressions against the MPLA were presumably ended by the Alvor accords and the creation of a transitional government which included the three groups and the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement. But when the transitional government was installed in Luanda, only the MPLA came unarmed as was stipulated by the agreement. The FNLA arrival was preceded by heavily-armed soldiers who were installed in bases inside Luanda from which they launched a first attack on the city in March, killing more than 2 000 unarmed civilians. This was followed by a second massacre that took the lives of 10 000. The MPLA was forced to take up arms to prevent further slaughter. Meanwhile, as the overseeing Portuguese forces withdrew, they calmly surrendered their arms to FNLA and UNITA units and watched passively as South Africa attacked Angola with its own and Rhodesian regular army forces, members of Spínola's "Portuguese Liberation Army," US veterans of the war in Viet Nam and other mercenaries.

The escalation of South Africa's aggression

One of the first points of South African penetration into Angola was through Namibia, which it occupies illegally. The South African forces — under the pretext of an obsolete pact signed between the dictatorship of Marcelo Caetano and Vorster — entered Angola for the alleged purpose of defending the dam on the Rio Cunene which supplies water for irrigation in Namibia.

Leaving from an ultra-secret military base established in Grootfontein in Namibia, 100 kilometers from the Angola border, approximately

In Calei, in the Bie district the FNLA has opened the military base of N'gola Kabangy, whose camp, installations included, was made over to the FNLA by the Diamang company. The camp was named after the FNLA's secretary general. According to a spokesman the base was transferred by Diamang to the FNLA not under pressure but as a result of a dialogue.

A Provincia (Angola) June 1, 1975


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

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SOLANA

UMA PERFEITA ASSISTENCIA TECNICA
E DE PEÇAS LEGÍTIMAS
25 Agências através da Província

a thousand soldiers of the South African regular army, supported by tanks, heavy artillery (including artillery-equipped helicopters) crossed the border at the end of August and advanced to occupy the city of Pereira d'Eça, capital of the southern province of Cunene.

The entire civilian population along 250 kilometers of the border between Namibia and Angola (which extends for almost 450 kilometers) was driven out by the racist authorities in order to prevent contact between the MPLA and the people of Namibia and the fortifying of Angolan nationalist forces by members of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), since the groups have carried out joint guerrilla operations in that region for years.

At the same time, the Vorster regime used every tactic to create internal subversion in Angola, financing and arming groups of Portuguese colonists, recruiting mercenaries and former PIDE agents (political police of the Portuguese fascist regime) and providing its direct backing to UNITA and FNLA.


The South African army sought to open a route through the city of Sa Da Bandeira to guarantee communications to the port of Moçamedes, the most important in the South of the country, in order to use it for unloading the ships bringing United States and South African war materials and to open a vital supply line for the FNLA and UNITA forces.

Along with the invading forces there were two battalions of the so-called "Portuguese Liberation Army" (ELP) directed by the fascist ex-General Antonio Spínola, and hundreds of mercenaries with experience of this type who had already participated either in the Biafra war of secession or in Katanga, or who had served more recently in the rapacious United States war against the Indochinese peoples.

The increasing collaboration between the United States and the Republic of South Africa is notable and goes back to the National Security Council decision of December, 1969. Since then the two have quietly—and in violation of UN resolutions—developed a direct military collaboration that includes sharing intelligence and installations.

In January of 1974, South African Minister of Information Cornelius Mulder made an unpublicized trip to Washington where he met with Vice Admiral Peet, head of the Pentagon's International Security Affairs office, responsible both for planning Indian Ocean strategy and for arms sales.

Following the coup in Portugal, South Africa's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Admiral Hugo Bierman made a "private" visit to the United States where he met with Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high administration officials. *The Christian Science Monitor* reported at the time that the South Africans



SHELL ROTELLA OILS

A QUALIDADE E EFICIÊNCIA DOS SHELL ROTELLA OILS, ESTÃO CONFIRMADAS PELA SUA ADOÇÃO COMO LUBRIFICANTES ESPECIAIS PARA MOTORES SUJEITOS A TRABALHOS ÁRDUOS.

were "eager to interest the United States in joint moves to head off the danger to themselves and Rhodesia they sense from Mozambique."

Moreover, the Pretoria government, with the aid of its NATO associates, has continually increased its war potential in recent years in order to firm up the racist regime of oppression. South Africa's military expenses have increased ten times over since 1965 and are currently \$1 300 000 000 in US dollars. At the same time, South Africa had access to the NATO secret codes and acquired complex military communications equipment from several members of that organization. This equipment has been mounted in the Silverhine communications center, near Simonstown, as well as in other areas. NATO also uses it for its own purposes.

With the failure on the part of imperialism and its associates to impose their FNLA-UNITA puppets, preparations were made for direct military intervention against Angola from the North and the South.

MPLA President Agostinho Neto declared last October that the synchronization of the attacks from Zaire and South Africa lead one to believe that there is a single command and a specific plan designed to split the country and impose a neocolonial government.

The South African government wound up by shamelessly admitting its aggression against the People's Republic of Angola

Vorster's Minister of Foreign Affairs Milgard Muller admitted in mid-November, in London, that his country had troops in Angola. The minister made his statement during a joint meeting of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs and the African Royal Society. Muller said that South African forces and equipment, including armored vehicles, reached Angola before the departure of the Portuguese and that

... We had to provide medical attention to some 20 wounded, mostly civilians. These individuals who, to begin with, came from many different ethnic origins and groups, were seized in the streets by members of Holden Roberto's FNLA. Accused of belonging to the MPLA or of having participated in confrontations between the civilian population and the FNLA... they were taken to a place near Caxito where mass executions were carried out. Seeing that some of their victims refused to go along with them, the captors shot wildly at them, which explains how some of them survived....

Testimony of the 12 Portuguese doctors in the Luanda hospital concerning the events of March 22 and 23.

Afrique-Asie, April 21, 1975



this military presence was part of an agreement with the departing Portuguese administration. Portugal later denied any knowledge of this situation in a press communique issued from its United Nations mission. The communique said Portugal had learned of the action when its embassy in Pretoria was informed on August 12. The declaration stated Portugal had protested at that time and added that, later, it had protested again to the South African embassy in Lisbon against new violations of Angola's territorial integrity in the form of incursions from Namibia by mercenaries and other unidentified forces.

Meanwhile, according to the London daily *Financial Times*, South Africa had informed the western powers about that action and had received tacit support for it. In the North, the newspaper declared, the western powers have sent arms for the FNLA, via Zaire. According to a survey made by several journalists from that publication, the white mercenaries recruited in Johannesburg received a thousand rands each (565 pounds sterling) as an advance and a thousand rands a month deposited in South African banks.

Moreover, from Pretoria, official government sources admitted that their country was maintaining troops in Angola based in Calueque, some 30 kilometers from the border and that they would be ready to move more than 300 kilometers into the interior of the country. The source added that "great powers of the free world" are also fighting in Angola although they do not admit it; the phrase is considered an allusion to France, Great Britain, the United States and perhaps Belgium.

The escalation of the aggression was given free reign. At the end of November, the South African government had a military mobilization in which reserves, including special commando units and parachute troops, were called up.

The British weekly *Observer* revealed the existence of an airlift between Silva Porto and the capital of Zaire, with a Viscount plane that

This offensive by the imperialist forces is coordinated at the highest level by Nathaniel Davis, who has just been named US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs. This Davis was the coordinator of Pinochet's coup in Chile. In his record of service also figures the campaign of "pacification" which, between 1968 and 1971, resulted in the assassination of 20 000 persons in Guatemala. In this area, two old associates assist him, also with experience in Latin-American putsches: the new US ambassador to South Africa and the CIA agent, W. G. Browdler.

Politique Hebdo, May 17-23, 1975



LUANDA, DEC. 9 (TASS)— IN THE CAMP OF THE TRAITORS OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE —THE FNLA AND UNITA DIVISIONISTS— QUARRELS FOR THE CONQUEST OF POWER AND INFLUENCE ARE INCREASING WITHIN THE POLITICAL-MILITARY ALLIANCE CREATED FOR THEM. IN THE UNIFIED "GOVERNMENT" OF THE PUPPETS AN ATMOSPHERE OF INTRIGUE AND DISCORD REIGNS. THE NUMEROUS DECLARATIONS OF ONE ORGANIZATION ARE CONSTANTLY DISPUTED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE OTHER. A BITTER DUEL BROKE OUT BETWEEN THE RIVALS OVER THE DIVISION OF LEADERSHIP POSTS IN THE PUPPET "STATE," UNRECOGNIZED BY ANYONE. IN ORDER TO AVOID TOTAL RUPTURE, THEY REACHED THE COMPROMISE OF NAMING TWO "PRESIDENTS" AND TWO "PRIME MINISTERS." NEVERTHELESS, JUDGING FROM EVERYTHING ELSE, THE POWER DIVISION DOESN'T SUIT THE FLAMING "PRESIDENTS": FNLA HEAD HOLDEN ROBERTO AND UNITA LEADER JONAS SAVIMBI. RECENTLY ROBERTO WAS IN UNITA HEADQUARTERS IN NOVA LISBOA AND, SIGNIFICANTLY, DECLINED TO MEET WITH HIS COLLEAGUE. SUCH LACK OF TACT HAS ITS REASONS, SINCE HIS PLANE BARELY ESCAPED A CATASTROPHE WHEN IT LANDED. AT THE AIRPORT, THEY HAD "CASUALLY FORGOTTEN" TO TURN ON THE SIGNAL LIGHTS.

makes a flight a day to supply UNITA with arms and ammunition, and the *Johannesburg Sunday Times* admitted that an airlift was also operating from South Africa to Angola. According to that source, the planes leave Rand airport near Johannesburg for Sa Da Bandeira, in southern Angola, carrying troops and equipment to be incorporated into the FNLA and UNITA. The paper added that the mercenaries were mainly Portuguese, although there were also mercenaries from South Africa and Zaire.

Another South African daily, the *Johannesburg Sunday Express* stated that Carlos Galvao de Melo was expected to arrive there to talk to a group that is recruiting local Portuguese for the war in Angola. Galvao de Melo fled to Brazil after resigning from the military junta when Spínola was dismissed.

In France, the Communist deputy Louis Odru, speaking in the National Assembly, charged that the NATO countries support mercenary forces in South Africa in the struggle against the People's Republic of Angola.

The French magazine *Jeune Afrique* revealed in its final issue of November that South African military troops and United States "advisers" had reinforced the UNITA units because of the high losses Savimbi's forces had suffered in recent weeks from the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola. These mercenary forces —according to the weekly— were transferred to the base of Capolo, near the city of Silva Porto, while other South African contingents together with European and United States military forces, were on the way to Angola.

Jeune Afrique added that some 200 United States military "advisers" were fighting with the FNLA troops, as well as about a thousand Portuguese mercenaries from the so-called "Liberation Army" of Spínola. This last force is organized by ex-Colonel Santos e Castro, former head of the Portuguese commandos in Angola.

Agostinho Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola, stated that the armed aggression against Angola is an international conspiracy with ramifications in Spain, Brazil and Portugal, and elsewhere.

The revolutionary leader also accused the United States, South Africa and Zaire of trying to dismember Angola; and concerning a possible agreement with the FNLA and UNITA, he added

our interests are diametrically opposed. The FNLA is subject to Zaire, tied to the interests of the United States and other imperialist countries. In their aggressivity, they do not hide their desire to establish a dictatorship here, probably of a fascist nature, so that no conciliation with the FNLA and UNITA is possible. I believe that the imperialists' intention is to dominate the entire country. That is why those alliances that might seem strange are explicable only in terms of the attack from Zaire in the North and from South Africa, in Cunene, in the southern part.

President Neto also referred to the possibility of a sharpening of the war of aggression against Angola in the months to come. Neto affirmed that "we may still go through a more intense phase of war in which the situation can be compared to Viet Nam."

Concerning the alliance of the reactionaries, the Angolan head of state said: "our people are very courageous in their struggle and are determined not to permit neocolonialism to be established here" and he added: "we are prepared to conquer our enemy because our people's fighting morale is high and they are mobilized to resist any type of attack...."

In more recent statements, in the speech he made on December first, Pioneer Day, the Angolan revolutionary leader said: "it is true we have difficulties. Part of our country is occupied by Zairean soldiers and another part by South Africans, but our armed forces are fighting so that

we have total liberty and so that all of us, from Cabinda to Cunene, can feel we are Angolans."

Agostinho Neto thanked the progressive forces of the world for their support and solidarity and emphasized that the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola was and is allied with them not only to defend the country but also all Africa.

Commander of the Army of the People's Republic of Angola, Nito Alvas, recently stated that "in Angola the principal contradiction is between the people and reaction and fascism."

It is not a civil war that is being waged on Angolan soil, but rather a struggle of the people against foreign military intervention, an intervention designed to overthrow the legitimate government of the People's Republic of Angola, headed by the MPLA. It is a direct confrontation between the forces of reaction and those of progress and well being.

Latest events show how, once again, world reactionary forces in collusion, seek to prevent a country from following its own destiny according to the interests of its people and portend a possible escalation in foreign aggression against Angola. But the finale of this conflict will be like others in recent history, exemplified by the defeat of imperialism on the Indochina peninsula.

ANGOLA IS INDEPENDENT AND "NINGUEM IMPEDIRA A CHUVA"¹

ARMANDO ENTRALGO

The proclamation of independence by the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975, signifies the death of the classic decolonization and the classic nationalism that appeared in Africa as processes running from the end of World War II to the year 1960: year of the 17 independences.

Without discussing its undeniable importance, that nationalism and its concomitant decolonization entered into bankruptcy with the Congolese crisis of the mid-sixties which dramatically revealed their undeniable limitations. As coincident events, Patricio Lumumba was assassinated in January, 1961, and the attack on the Salazar prisons by the MPLA in Luanda occurred on February 4 of that same year.

Whether or not this was simple coincidence, what was already evident in the crisis of the former Belgian Congo would become a fact in the Angolan conjuncture of 1975: the decadence of the model of formal political independence and of its foreign and native standard bearers. That model is no solution because it frequently winds up in neocolonialism and perpetuates economic dependency. Since the economic structure is "... the real base ..." the only real independence is one that is sought and normally found in the process of national and social revolution which permits basic changes within a political framework of self-determination.

The vanguard of that process will only merit that name to the degree that it rejects classic patterns and injects itself into the new conditions with new methods, fusing past hopes and experiences, without resting on ambiguous laurels. Objectively, historically, that vanguard has existed in Angola within the ranks of the MPLA since February 4, 1961 and continues through November 11, 1975.

¹ From the poem "Here in prison," by Agostinho Neto, written in a PIDE prison in Luanda, July, 1960. The line means "nothing will prevent the rain."

The well-known "Africanist" description in the capitalist press: "civil war," "tribal conflicts," "fratricidal struggle," cannot hide the reality of that vanguard waging a battle today, to its ultimate consequences, against the reactionary imperialist carrion and its local agents.

There is nothing strange about a bankrupt system like the world imperialist system — defeated in Indochina — playing its con game with the monetary crisis, inflation, unemployment and strikes, nettled by what has been called the energy crisis, "unstabilized" in Africa by the independence of the Portuguese colonies, removing its mask and its makeup to intervene in Angola by every means available. It is not surprising. The logic of the graceful departure from the scene need not be its logic, however near at hand its end appears to be, however evident its death throes: *Its historical logic is aggression.*

The poetic premonition of the president of Angola and head of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, is the only attitude possible in the present and future: from the vast *imbondeiros* of the mayombo forest of Cabinda to the Kalahari desert of southern Angola, from the coffee plantations to the diamond mines, on the mesa, on the coast, in the *kimbo*, in the *muceques*, the only conceivable bitterness would be that of not having acted in time during the day that is passing: because the only promising and lucid struggle is that waged *With Dry Eyes.*²

This revolutionary and poet is not lulled by batuque and kazukuta dances, he has no time — nor poetry — for the sentimentalism of impossible racial anthologies; he does not leave reason in Greece, nor "Africanize" emotion. Because in the area of the relationship poetry-revolution and poet-politician, classic decolonization has moved from bankruptcy to death between 1960 and 1975. Neto's poetry galvanizes people for the national and social revolution, his poetry is the reason of his people, his emotion is the battle.

*"Slow, absurd and cruel the African train"*³

Five centuries of Portugal in Angola? The affirmation is too full. Two commentaries by way of interpretation: first, in the second half of the 20th century, the fact in itself is an anachronism: second, as late as 1964 a book on *Angolan Ethnograph* (Mesquelita de Limak, Luanda) admitted that "there are zones of Angola about which little is known, about which nothing can really be written."

Better then to separate those five centuries of "civilizing mission," and specify that almost four of them were spent along the thousand

² Title of a book of Neto's poems written between 1945 and 1960. The English edition, published in Tanzania, is called *Sacred Hope* (1974).

³ Line from Agostinho Neto's poem, "African Train," (1948).



kilometers of the Atlantic coast in order to take out slaves, and that the other was spent in populating the central mesa, setting up plantations along the "coffee route," snuffing out uprisings until well into the 20th century, and touching the east, the tense and difficult east of the country, without omitting the fact that the long guerrilla struggle of 1961 to 1974 forced them to intensify their plans for population, to increase several times over their budget for defense (sic) and to desperately look for non-Portuguese capital investments in order to try to avoid the inevitable in a country that is five times the size of Great Britain, twice the size of France, one-sixth the area of the United States, and 14 times the size of Portugal itself.

From 1575, Angola was a territory of conquest, to export slaves, minerals and marble, which continued to the end of the 19th century; and since the 20th century, agricultural and mineral products, with the efforts of the "contracted" worker, a euphemism to cover up the forced labor and almost as ridiculous as that other one of "overseas provinces" by which Salazar sought to convince the world of the "Portuguese" nature of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Angola and Mozambique.

When Portugal headed the transatlantic slave trade, there are certain valuable annuals on slave exportation in the 16th and 17th centuries that give an idea of the Angolan role in this foul business of European mercantilism:

16th Century	Congo	Angola
1536	4 000 — 5 000	
1548	6 000 — 7 000	
1576		12 000
1574-78		50 000 (16 000 per year)
1575-1591		52 000 (13 000 per year)
17th Century		
1611		10 000
1631		12 000 — 13 000
1641		15 000
1642		25 000 — 26 000
1643		16 000 — 17 000
1656	5 000 — 6 000	
1654-77	15 000	
1681		8 000 — 10 000

Let us suppose that these debts have expired with the passage of time and that the "original sin" has been expiated by the symphonic "civilizing mission" that the European bourgeoisie operated to justify the occupation of Africa at the end of the 19th century; What plan, for example, does a Marcelo Caetano, Salazar's successor, offer us for "differentiating" the members of the native population of Angola, long after the beginning of this so-called "mission?" The economist Caetano writes of the "New State," emulating Salazar who is also an economist:

- a) According to the cultural level:
 - primitive natives
 - natives in evolution
 - detrribalized natives
 - assimilated
- b) According to the level of development of their needs (sic):
 - primitive natives
 - natives in evolution
 - evolutionized indigens
- c) According to the method of obtaining goods:
 - natives in family or village economy
 - natives in the natural economy and the market economy
 - natives working in the market economy (workers, artisans and detrribalized)

How can this "technical" language be translated into another that is more comprehensible and which permits, in passing, an appreciation of the achievements of the "civilizing mission"? Let us look at

Division of the economically active Angolan population by sectors in 1960

<i>Primary Sector:</i>		94.1%
Agriculture	75.7%	
Extractive Industry	11.2%	
Fishing	7 %	
Cattle	0.2%	
<i>Secondary Sector:</i>		2.5%
Manufacturing Industry	0.4%	
Construction	2.1%	
<i>Tertiary Sector:</i>		3.1%
Communications	2.3%	
Others	0.8%	

Two hypothesis are possible: the Portuguese do not know how "to civilize" the Angolans: or the Angolans do not allow themselves to be "civilized" by the Portuguese. Naturally the problem is simpler and the rhetoric doesn't carry much weight in the face of the statistics. Here no one has set about "civilizing" anyone, not even in comparison with French colonialism's hypocritical policy of assimilation. Angola, which was a colony and not an "overseas province," served Portugal as an economic appendix supplying raw materials and not "black Portuguese" — and a population base for Portuguese with a sufficient spirit of adventure and, fundamentally, with economic difficulties in the mother country. The "lack of enthusiasm" of the Angolans for permitting themselves to be "civilized" is clearly explicable in the following relationship between African and European salaries; and the "lack of enthusiasm" on the part of the Portuguese as well:

Salaries of skilled workers in Angola in 1958 (in dollars)

	<i>Europeans</i>	<i>Africans</i>
Manual printers	157.50	54.60
Machine printers	175.00	42.00
Carpenters	109.20	59.15
Cooks	116.69	17.50
Domestic servants	52.50	15.75
Electricians	109.80	36.05
Brick layers	127.40	54.60

By the way, who are those Portuguese immigrants? When did they arrive? Where did they settle?

That colony is composed of poor Portuguese. . . on arrival semi-skilled peasants and workers with little or no education whose ideas — as Basil Davidson writes⁴ — concerning wealth, comfort and career, are not very different from those of the Africans. "Thus there was a tendency toward tolerance at the base"; and the noted British Africanist adds that it is said they aren't racist, "but there were only 30 000 mestizos in Angola in 1950."

In fact, as the author goes on to say, they are victims of the fascist exploitation of the Salazar-Caetano regime, almost as much victims as

⁴ *In the Eye of the Storm*, B. Davidson, Anchor Books, 1973.

the Angolans themselves. Almost. Although there are eloquent figures in Davidson's analysis, for example, approximately a half million Angolans escaped to Zaire and Zambia, fleeing Portuguese repression, and this figure is more or less the same as the number of Portuguese workers who leave their country for lack of work and emigrate into other western European countries; nevertheless, the Portuguese immigrant in France or the Federal Republic of Germany is not the same as the Portuguese colonist in a Portuguese colony, Angola in this case.

These colonists must "populate Angola" but actually they do not stay in the countryside but rather — with certain exceptions — settle in European cities along the Atlantic coast of Angola. Socially, politically and ideologically, their position is necessarily very wavering. They are not a colony of the upper bourgeoisie, perhaps not even the Portuguese variant of the South Africans and Rhodesians of European stock. The truth is that part of them are poor and that a fraction of that part can react like Angolans — some have done so — and struggle with the African Angolans for independence — they have also done and are doing this. But the concrete situation has to be analyzed case by case, as the anti-racist MPLA has always acted in practice in all situations.

These colonists totalled some 44 000 in 1940, 59 000 in 1959, 200 000 in 1960, a quarter million in 1970 — in that year, Nova Lisboa, Sa da Bandeira and Moçamedes, in the central Southwest of the country, had more whites than blacks. In Luanda, Nova Lisboa, Malange, Lobito and Silva Porto, there were 78 244 Africans and 22 289 Europeans in 1940, and 182 146 Africans and 45 450 Europeans in 1950.

The white population holds in its hands almost exclusively the direction of the work, the financing of the enterprises, and public administration. Faced with that reality, there were 379 000 "contracted" African workers (forced work) and 400 000 volunteers in 1954. Diamang alone, the Angolan diamond enterprise, used 11 000 volunteers and 4 000 forced workers. Only 1.3% of the African population belongs to the "civilized" sector.

Perhaps the picture can be seen more clearly if we divide Angola into three large zones, according to the geography, the economy and the distribution of the population⁵:

First zone: includes the districts of Zaire, Luanda, Moxico, Cuando-Cubango and Moçamedes; with a population density of less than three inhabitants per square kilometer, 52% of the total area of the country, and 15% of the total population: 7.7% of the population

⁵ *La Guerre en Angola — Etude socio-economique*, edited by Francois Maspero, 1971.

is white and 13.8% of the population is African; it includes the extreme North, the East, the Southeast and the extreme South, with the least favorable conditions.

Second zone: includes the districts of Cabinda, Uige, Cuanza-Norte, Cuanza-Sul, Malagne, Bie and Huila; a density of 3 to 10 inhabitants per square kilometer, 30% of the total area and 54% of the population: 33% of the population is white and 27% of the population is African; a region of mesas with the best natural conditions for populating — less so in Uige and Malange where the coffee “does the rest.”

Third zone: includes the districts of Luanda, Begueia and Huambo; population density between 10 and 20 inhabitants per square kilometer; 8.2% of the territory, 29.6% of the total population; 60% of the population is white and 59% of the population is African; regions occupied since the period of the slave trade and used as bases of penetration toward the interior and, therefore, where there is the major colonial presence.

Obviously, it is not a matter of “races” but rather of the role that the European colony (Portuguese) has played in a general sense, in the relations of production in a colonized country like Angola. In the 1975 context, it would be enough to repeat the old formula that the exceptions confirm the rule: the massive exodus of the Angolan Portuguese population is comparable, except for the distance, to the French exodus from Algeria. On the political-ideological level there is affinity between an organization like the OAS and the so-called “Portuguese Liberation Army” of Spínola, recruited from among former PIDE agents and the white colony of Angola.

A “second grade” capitalist-colonialist nation such as Salazar’s Portugal — which ceased to exist in April of 1974 — can only place in movement a dependent colonial economic structure that requires that relief from the colonial museum represented by forced work, and the constant injections by transnationals whose head is not exactly Lisbon.

Such an economic structure reveals its particular weakness on the level of internal differentiation. The selective assimilation of Angolans (the strait jacket of an ideology of primitive capitalism), the multiple superstructural anachronisms, basically the weakness of investments, even within the traditional framework of metropolis-colony “complement,” objectively retard the development of the productive forces to such a degree that the principal contradiction colonialist — colonized is so *principal* that it appears to be the only one. To delay its eruption or absorb the shock, the favorite weapon in such circumstances must be, once more in African history, that of so-called “tribal conflicts”; natu-

rally with the appropriate “rejuvenating” support — slow, discrete, even dull — of Portuguese colonialism in collaboration with (really *dependent upon*) the investment of capital that the real capitalist powers: United States, the Federal Republic of Germany Great Britain, France . . . and South African “sub-imperialism” deign or wish to make.

In short: “tribal-nationalism” will take the place of a native bourgeois class capable of “Africanizing” *the government* without affecting *power*; and lacking a powerful metropolitan center, neocolonialism projects itself openly as internationalized or “transnationalized” from the beginning. The Salazar-Caetano-Spínola policy led in that direction after the armed struggle of the Angolan people for their national liberation was begun on February 4, 1961.

With Spínola out and the reaction within the Lisbon government too unpredictable in its behavior due to the sharp class struggle going on in Portugal, the remaining “elements” involved took the only course possible: counterrevolutionary violence, with “tribal-nationalist” music in the background, in order to prevent or sabotage the People’s Republic that the MPLA would proclaim on November 11, 1975.

Who are the enemies of the people?

1) “Tribal-nationalism.”

Richard Gibson,⁶ not precisely an ally of the Angolan cause, can serve to clarify a little for us the question of tribes and “tribalism” in Angola.


There are nearly 100 tribes, a high number, out of which numerous “tribalisms” and an even greater number of “tribal conflicts” could be fabricated. But then Gibson himself says that there are four large ethnolinguistic groups which include 70% of the African population of Angola:

- the Ovimbundu, who speak umbundu, 1 500 000 in the central mesa around Nova Lisboa and other “favored” spots of the colony;
- the Mbundu, who speak kimbundu, 1 200 000 around Luanda and Cuanza;
- the Bakongo, who speak kikongo, some 300 000 in the North and about the same number of exiles in Zaire;
- the Chokwe Lunda, some 300 000 in the Northeast.

There are also some 100 000 Cuanhamas in the South, of the family of the Ovambos of Namibia; the Khoisan (bushmen) etc.

Gibson also says: almost 100 years of war, since 1575, against the Portuguese invaders, have produced alliances between the Bakongo and

⁶ *African Liberation Movements*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1972.



the Mbundu, and alliances of other tribal confederations against the common enemy; and the Cuanhama resistance up to 1915; and the Avimbundu resistance from the second half of the 19th century to 1940. Against whom? Against the common enemy. Between parenthesis, according to Douglas L. Wheeler,⁷ some 2 000 Portuguese using as cannon fodder 5 000 to 20 000 natives, fought these wars between 1575 and 1925. And 90% of Angola's budget is devoted to "defense expenses."

So that, without leaving Gibson, there are four main groups, there are multi-tribal alliances against the invader, and there is the resistance of centuries against the common enemy. We add a quote from Basil Davidson, from the same source: "many traditional inter-group relationships of tolerance and common culture, among neighboring linguistic groups, are obscured by a lack of European comprehension and to benefit the recurring false panorama of past rivalry." In conclusion, it seems that

- a) multitribal unity has not been any "accident," but rather a concrete historical fact, precisely achieved against the invader, and at the same time the *motor of Angolan nationality*;
- b) that unity is also possible because "practically all the people of Angola basically share... common origins and cultures and speak similar languages..."⁸
- c) As a phenomenon, tribalism in Angola has been, in common, the result of Portuguese interference and pressures over five centuries of domination, in order to torpedo the development of national unity against colonialism.

Then, in the last 14 years of Angola's history, wasn't it possible, desirable and useful to oppose the MPLA guerrilla uprising with one or more "tribal-nationalisms?" And thinking of the Angolan people, their vanguard and their allies throughout the world now, doesn't Angola's past history demonstrate that its vanguard, the MPLA, can destroy the obstacle of these "tribal-nationalisms," armed and teledirected from abroad and from their own territory, and march forward toward the consolidation of national unity and independence?

Let's analyze a couple of "tribal-nationalisms."

UPNA - UPA - FNLA - GRAE

In 1878, the London Baptist Missionary Society opened a mission, with the authorization of the Portuguese colonial government, in Sao Salvador,

⁷ "The Portuguese Army in Angola." *Modern African Studies*, 1969.

⁸ B. Davidson, *op. cit.*

today the capital of the province of Zaire in the North of Angola, and traditional capital of the Bakongo ethnic group. When the Congo Free State — Belgian Congo after 1908 — was created in 1885, that ethnic group was divided in two (or more), thanks to the efforts and the grace of colonization. That is: Protestant and Catholic mission *plus* partition among imperialist powers *equals* division of the Bakongo *equals* Bakongo tribalism.

In 1955 Portugal imposed a Catholic tribal chief in Sao Salvador and the Protestant Bakongos emigrated to Leopoldville in what was then the Belgian Congo. When the "Portuguese-Catholic" Bakongo chief died in 1957, the "Portuguese-Belgian-Protestant-Bakongos" of Leopoldville organized. Not to liberate Angola nor to liberate the Belgian Congo, but to mount the throne of Sao Salvador; and in November of that year they founded the Union of the People of the *North* of Angola (UPNA), whose president, Manuel Barros Necana, is Holden Roberto's uncle and a friend of the Rev. George Hauser, director of the American Committee on Africa.

In 1958, Holden eliminated an N and converted the UPNA into the Union of the People of Angola (UPA), in order not to be out of tune with the decolonizing avalanche that was approaching. All this took place in Leopoldville, today Kinshasa. Since moreover, between 1957 and 1962 there was no Portuguese decision concerning the Bakongo throne of Sao Salvador, and in 1961 the attack by the MPLA on the Luanda prisons took place, and Holden had friends in Zaire like Cyrille Adoula and Joseph Desiree Mobutu (or Mobutu Sese Seko), the UPA went through a "metamorphosis" and became the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA), basing itself on the prestige of the first three letters of its new name in Africa and in the world in order to later — of course — form a "Government in Exile" (GRAE), demand the support of the Organization of African Unity, cross the Angolan border from Zaire from time to time, issue communiques, and — with special emphasis — wage a permanent gangster-type campaign of sabotage against the patriotic struggle of the MPLA. That is how this "tribal-nationalism" lived in Kinshasa, losing favor and credibility inside and outside the OAU, until in the years 1974 and 1975, with Zaire's support, it launched itself against the Angolan population in several areas of the country, committing abominable crimes and trying to detain the advance of the FAPLA, fighting arm of the MPLA.

UNITA

The other case arises to a certain degree from the former: in 1964 a native of Bie (central Angola), named Jonas Savimbi, Holden Roberto's "minister of foreign relations," accused his chief of "having been created

by the United States in 1961 in order to divide Angolan nationalism" (sic) and renounced his post. Between 1964 and 1966 he tried to sell his services to the best buyer, until in March of 1966 he announced the formation of the "National Union for the Total Independence of Angola" (UNITA). Support? Private funds. Objective? The opening of a guerrilla focus in the Angolan central East to fight against the "number one enemy," the MPLA. An he did it with such "good will" that the Portuguese army of occupation found in him its number one ally in the struggle against the MPLA.

Documentary proof of the close Savimbi-Portugal collaboration was published long ago in the magazine *Afrique-Asie* but Savimbi has been unable to refute it.

In spite of the fact that Savimbi and his UNITA have made common cause with Holden Roberto and his FNLA, frequently Savimbi's "treason" of 1964 becomes an obstacle in the cooperation between the two "tribal-nationalisms."

II. The "magalas"⁹ aren't enough

A country which in 1960 could include the following products among its exports:

coffee, diamonds, sisal, corn, iron, cotton, sugar, fishmeal, wood, dry fish, palm oil, fuel oil, manganese, fish oil, coconuts, wax, copper, peanuts, canned fish, tobacco, leather, bagasse, peanut oil, rice, salt, coconut oil. . .

is a country of economic promise.

Precisely after 1964, three years following the Luanda uprising and at the same time the MPLA guerrilla movement began in Cabinda, imperialist plans for economic penetration intensified; because although there were more and more "magalas," they weren't enough to win in Angola.

The economic boom of 1964-1974 so often mentioned in the capitalist press, is the theme of all those interested in the "Angolan miracle," a theme that seeks to hide two extremely powerful realities:

- 1) The MPLA guerrillas have made considerable progress in spite of all the difficulties.
- 2) The Angolan people have scarcely entered into the much-vaunted "miracle": no real change in education, less in its content and objectives (the Lisbon government devoted 5.6 times more resources to transport-

⁹ Name given by the people to the Portuguese soldiers of occupation.

tation and communications than to public health and education. When the agricultural workers along the coast and on the mesa, in the coffee-growing North, the miners of Diamang, those in the more than poor villages of the Southeast, got word of the "economic miracle" it appeared to them to be simply black humor.

Is not the relationship of those interested participants in the "boom" identical to those interested participants in the aggression against the people of Angola in 1974 and 1975, following the guerrilla successes in the former Portuguese colonies and the change of government in Portugal itself (April, 1974) which led to the independence of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde? With the flesh and garb of mercenaries and "tribal-nationalists," aren't they the same interested participants in the aggression against the People's Republic of Angola since its independence last November 11? Where else do the arms and financing for the mercenaries of the "Portuguese Liberation Army," the FNLA, UNITA come from?

The Third Africa

In the very center of operations, is the South African regime. "South Africa," one reads in a document circulated in the United Nations in 1970, "proposes a program of diplomatic and economic cooperation with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Malawi and later Zambia (and Zaire). This "third Africa," as they call it, would have an area of 5 200 000 km² and a population of 45 million inhabitants; in reality it is a sphere of influence that South Africa intends to transform into a kind of "neocolonial fief."

Some who saw a "conciliating" Vorster pressuring Ian Smith to hold conversations with the Zimbabwe patriots; a Vorster speaking of self-determination for Namibia — even though, of course, on the basis of loyal chiefs; a Vorster announcing through the mouth of Buthelezi "independence for the Bantustans of the Transvaal in 1976; a Vorster inviting delegations to "dialogue," to see how now there isn't so much "apartheid" or at least it isn't so visible — delegations that will not see what they must not see, nor insist on seeing it, since after all they come to prepare future trade agreements and negotiate future loans —; will they now think this is a regression, to the South Africa of the "hawk," and no longer of the "dove?" In no way is this true: there is one sole South African regime which is perfectly consistent, with all the tactics that are necessary — those mentioned above and as many others as are feasible and possible — and one single strategy: to destroy by any means any kind of danger sign, any kind of internal manifestation by the South African population which lives — and dies — in "apartheid"; any de-

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
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velopment of national liberation in its sphere of influence, such as the proclamation of the People's Republic of Angola, for example.

There is no contradiction between the aggression of the South African regime against the Angolan people and the disposition of the South African regime to "dialogue" with neighbors and clients. The Pretoria regime, we repeat, is perfectly consistent with itself and with its imperialist allies.

Therefore, the question is not one of surprise nor of a diplomacy that requires explanation. It exists only at the level that the People's Republic of Angola and its political-military vanguard, the MPLA, have placed it.

"He who has struggled has not lost" (Neto)

The evolution of the Angolan people's anti-colonial movement culminated with the creation of the Angolan People's Liberation Movement (MPLA) on December 10, 1956.

Its closest antecedents were the Angolan Cultural Society, 1943; the Association of Angolan Natives (ANANGOLA), 1948, radical wing of the old African National League; and the Party for the United Struggle of the Africans of Angola (PLUA), founded clandestinely in 1953. In 1957 the Movement for the National Independence of Angola (MINA) joined the MPLA. Since 1962, Agostinho Neto has headed the organization, following several periods in prison at the hands of Portuguese colonialism during the '50s.

But the anti-colonial movement has deep roots in Angola. In chronological order, the following should be mentioned

—the struggles of Ngola Kiluauje and Ginga Mbandi in the 16th and 17th centuries

—the long series of uprisings between 1575 and 1925

—the names of José de Fontes Pereira, Cordeiro de Matta and other intellectuals at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, in originating Angolan literature

—the Angolan League (1913), the African League (1919), the African National Party (1921) and the African National League (1929) with a reformist nationalism.

Within the context of the struggle in Portugal's African territories, the ties that now bind MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC and the Sao Tome and Principe liberation movement (MLSTP) in an indestructible way, began to be forged in such institutions as the Center for African Studies (Lis-

bon), the Cultural Society of Luanda, the House of the Students of the Empire, publications such as *Cultura* and *Mensagem*: which culminated in 1961 in the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). The histories of men like Amilcar Cabral, Agostinho Neto, Marcelino Dos Santos and many others, came to identify themselves little by little with a great anti-colonial current that shook the Portuguese empire in Africa between 1961 and 1975:

- 1961, beginning of armed struggle by the MPLA in Angola
- 1962, beginning of armed struggle by PAIGC in Guinea Bissau
- 1964, beginning of armed struggle by FRELIMO in Mozambique
- 1973, independence of Guinea Bissau during armed struggle
- 1975, independence of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Angola.

The MPLA's guerrilla struggle between 1961 and 1974, perhaps the longest and most difficult, can be summarized in the following dates:

- February 4, 1961, attack on the Luanda prisons — the rebels withdraw to the mountains of Dembos and Nambuangongo, 200 km from Luanda, and establish the MPLA's first guerrilla region
- 1964, opening of the second guerrilla region in Cabinda
- 1966, opening of the third guerrilla region in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango
- 1967, opening of the fourth guerrilla region in Luanda and Malange
- 1969, opening of the fifth guerrilla region in Bie and Huambo
- 1970-74, consolidation of the guerrilla fronts and generalization of the war, under very difficult conditions
- November 11, 1975, proclamation of the People's Republic of Angola by the MPLA, in the midst of aggression by South Africa, the so-called "Portuguese Liberation Army" and the counter-revolutionary FNLA units supported by Zaire, and by UNITA. All of them operating with arms, mercenaries and military advisers from the United States and other NATO countries.

In "Reconquest," Neto writes: "We advance *with all humanity* to conquer *our world* and *our peace*. With the support of progressive African governments and the socialist countries, the Angolan people are advancing under the flag of the MPLA, toward the liberation of their invaded homeland.

"Nothing will prevent the rain," because "in men boils the desire to make the supreme effort."¹⁰

¹⁰ Neto, poem "Saturday in the *muceques*," (1948).

WHAT THE PEOPLE DON'T KNOW

Major Jujú, member of the political command of the General Staff of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) held a press conference in Luanda on November 16 in which he presented enemy prisoners and made an extensive analysis of the Angolan political process during the "so-called period of decolonization or transition"; he said that from April 25, 1974 on, a distinction could be made between two approaches: what is known and has been made public through press, radio and other mass media; and what happens behind the scenes, the secret high-level plots unknown to the general public. The following is a summary of Major Jujú's remarks:

What has been made public

Among the main public information there is: April 25, 1974; the proliferation of pseudonationalist political organizations (UNA, APA, FUA); efforts by Spínola (agreements with Mobutu on the Isle of Sal) to eliminate the MPLA and perpetuate colonialism; territorial occupation by the so-called "three liberation movements"; the Alvor Agreement; the Transition Government; the period of war and peace; struggle between MPLA on the one hand and FNLA and UNITA on the other; defeat of the FNLA and UNITA on all fronts; and the current phase: the imperialist war of aggression and generalized popular resistance.

What the people don't know

Since July, 1974, and the recognition of the Angolan people's right to independence, the idea of federation with Portugal has crumbled.

In July, 1974, Silvano Silverio Marques, ex-governor of Angola, along with other individuals of whom we will also speak today, planned a *golpe de estado* and the unilateral proclamation of independence. The group that promoted the idea was initially composed of three people: Nuno Cardoso da Silva, Wenceslau Pompilio da Cruz, and Dr. Moreira

o Monteiro, who made up the initial nucleus of the FRA (Front of Angolan Resistance). Nuno Cardoso da Silva is an old monarchist, personal secretary of Silvino Silverio Marques; Pompilio da Cruz is an old and traditional opponent of the Salazar government, but a defender of white supremacy in Angola; and Dr. Moreira o Monteiro, former second lieutenant, is a person closely linked to the Second Office (information) of the General Headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola.

Santos Castro's Plan

On October 23, 1974, an important modification occurred in the national situation. Attempts to overthrow the government were discovered, arrests were made and the FRA, ESINA and PCDA disintegrated. The overwhelming majority of the members of those anti-nationalist organizations fled to South Africa where they began to make plans for the future. That is when Colonel Santos e Castro appeared with a proposal for a Rhodesian-type independence, with the proclamation of independence by the whites. The initial financial support was sent from Angola by Nuno Cardoso da Silva. At that time, certain names appeared in connection with that plot prepared from South Africa: Piet Ferreira, head of the Boss (South African secret police in Ovambolandia); Dr. Ferronha — PCDA; Rui Correia de Freitas, editor of *A Provincia de Angola*, Colonel Santos e Castro, Tony Rodrigues and his cousin and Eduardo Beltrao. Although at this point Tony Rodrigues had already left the group, he continued to maintain close contacts with the Second Office of the General Headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola. Tony Rodrigues had been General Costa Gomes' interpreter and had knowledge of many secret matters such as the military agreements with Vorster.

A United States general...

The General Staff of the FAPLA has in its possession a great quantity of secret and ultra-secret documents from the Second Office of the General Headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola found in Tony Rodrigues' house. Among them is the original draft manuscript of the agreement made aboard Mobutu's yacht on the River Zaire, between the Portuguese government and the FNLA.

Tony Rodrigues' contact with the FRA was made in order to transmit the proposal of a United States general involved in arms sales, who was ready to provide financial and material support to the FRA's project for a Rhodesian-type white independence. The proposal was presented by Beltrao whose father-in-law — a retired army colonel — was the liaison with that US general.

UNITA

When those anti-nationalist organizations were dismantled or sunk, UNITA began to appear more and more as the basis for the salvation of white reaction in general, along with the FNLA.

The recognition of just three organizations (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) as the only ones to confer with the Portuguese government necessarily meant the regrouping of the dispersed forces around them. That is why at Alvor, the three movements were given equality and the transition government was installed.

After January 31, amnesty was granted to those expelled and exiled and they began to return to Angola. They came from South Africa and other areas. Thus, in mid-March of 1975, Tony Rodrigues brought out an information bulletin titled *Messangano*. That publication and the very name selected for it were part of a military plan drawn up by Santos e Castro who, arriving from South Africa with his men, was to attempt to seize power by force.

Ambriz

At one moment —August 1975— after the FNLA's departure from Barrio de Saneamento, in Luanda, various groups and individuals converged in Ambriz, which became the General Headquarters of Colonel Santos e Castro. Carlos Avila's group was there, Tony Rodrigues' group and, as will be seen later, the firemen's group and other individuals.

A special company was being formed in Ambriz, trained by mercenaries from South Africa commanded by Mayor Alves Cardoso. Carlos Avila's group began to organize the troops that came from Zaire, under the command of Xavier, former PIDE sub-inspector in Caxito.

On that trip to Ambriz, Carlos Las Heras, among the prisoners present here, contacted various figures, among them Colonel Santos e Castro, who outlined the following plan:

We have the support of Germany, France, England, the United States and South Africa. Ships will arrive at Matadi to unload heavy arms and armored vehicles. More highly trained men must come from South Africa to reinforce the front lines. You have to speed up actions in Luanda and other places to disorganize the MPLA. The broadcasting station must be destroyed and attacks against the Portuguese troops must be carried out (in order to create opposition between the Portuguese armed forces and the MPLA). Fulfillment of these assignments was left to Tony Rodrigues and Lamas de Oliveira.



The general staff of the FAPLA has in its hands the plan for the attack on the official radio station of Angola, made on a piece of cardboard.

Later, in a private conversation, Colonel Santos e Castro explained the following to the prisoner Carlos Las Heras:

For you I have special missions that will have to be carried out: one is to go to Nova Lisboa and, with the personnel we have there and what you take with you, open up a front with UNITA in Alto Hama, a highway crossroads that must not fall into MPLA hands. Then go to Mussende and Calucinga where, also in collaboration with UNITA, you will try to stop the advance of the MPLA in that region. Another mission that you will be personally in charge of will be in Puerto Alexandre and Moçamedes, since the Americans have asked us to hold on to those ports because, according to them, they are strategic points. The contact for that mission will be Engineer Mitra who is the liaison with South Africa.

Engineer Mitra is head of organization in the South and liaison for ELP-FNLA-UNITA-South Africa.

In Luanda, Carlos las Heras also had to contact General Diego Neto, who was removed from the Air Force, in order to go to Spain to attend the meeting of the "Portuguese Liberation Army."

The Firemen

Among the principal figures in this group are Garrido, Antonio Monteiro, José Ferreira Gil. Their activities are well known. The people were informed when weapons were found buried in the firemen's headquarters and it is also known that the firemen gave logistics support to the FNLA both during the confrontations in Luanda and in the period when they were located in Barrio de Saneamiento and Sao Pedro da Barra.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to point out certain details: José F. Gil was an official in Angolan Television (TVA) from 1973 to 1975, where he knew Paulo Cardoso, the administrator. D. Zilda, the latter's wife, was private secretary to the high commissioner at that time, General Silva Cardoso.

The firemen provided their first services at the request of D. Zilda, by supplying water to the home of Mr. Agola Kabangu, in Barrio de Saneamiento.

Also, José Gil's safe conduct, given to him by the high commissioner on June 5, 1975, was gotten with the help of D. Zilda. With the safe

conduct the firemen's group moved through the city with impunity, transporting material for the FNLA. Not only was it transported in ambulances but also by ship to the fort of Sao Pedro da Barra.

That group of firemen was also the one that transferred the TVA equipment to the home of Mr. Paulo Cardoso who then sent it to Brazil. D. Zilda and her husband followed later.

It should be added that this group left by plane for Ambriz, for the purpose of studying the signal combinations for the Luanda-Ambriz-Luanda liaison. They also placed at the disposal of the FNLA the yacht "Nord II" property of Mr. Rui Correia de Freitas and the warehouse in Bungo to which they were going to transport the arms the FNLA had purchased from the Portuguese Army through Mario Manuel da Rocha Baptista (now a prisoner), an operation which turned out to be a trick and a fraud by a group of individuals who are also in jail.

We also have here three other prisoners: Mario Manuel da Rocha Baptista, who has been mentioned; José Pena Monteiro and Mario Rui Monteiro da Silva.

Mario Rui Monteiro da Silva. He moved to Ambriz on August 22, 1975 with a commercial mission. A certain Silva —ex PIDE— asked him to do some work for the FNLA. But it seems he wasn't able to do it because he was more interested in *fuba* (corn flour) for Ambriz or in arranging for small boats to transport coffee.

José Pena Monteiro. Friend of Carlos Avila, he was contacted to supply arms. That's how he knew Rocha Baptista. They held conversations with Barreiros, FNLA major, and according to Rocha Baptista, the whole thing was a fraud in which they tried to sell material worth 70 000 contos (a conto = 1 000 escudos or about \$35.) The transaction is not confirmed but that isn't the most important point either.

Nelson Lima. He is another prisoner we would like to present. His activities while the FNLA was in Luanda, were diverse: he served as aide on various projects such as the transportation of FNLA men from one place to another, as Tony Silva's assistant in contacting the various FNLA bases in Luanda, in transporting men and material, in logistics transportation of food for the FNLA bases and the purchase of champagne and whiskey, fur jackets and expensive clothes for FNLA leaders.

Lamas Oliveira. The last person in this case is Lamas de Oliveira, ex-Portuguese commando linked to the FNLA since April-May, 1975. He did espionage work for FNLA security. His first mission was to recruit from among his former friends a group of about 100 men to organize and raise the military level of the FNLA for the confrontations in Luanda. It should be noted that this Lamas has also acquired certain weapons

for the FNLA and, along with Tony Rodrigues, was in charge of the programming of the official Angolan radio station.

Sousa Teles. After the operations in Barrio de Saueamiento, contact was made —through an individual who came from Ambriz on behalf of Santos e Castro— with Sousa Teles, a retired colonel and administrator for the Angolan Sugar Company and owner of *Tentativa* farm. After the FNLA took Caxito, when Sousa Teles went to the farm lodge, he was told that Holden Roberto wanted to get in touch with him since his enterprise was of interest to him.

Colonel Sousa Teles went to Ambriz to talk to Roberto. But he also made contact with Colonel Santos e Castro and Major Alvez Cardoso, as well as with Tony Rodrigues. In statements made by Colonial Sousa Teles, he says that Santos e Castro explained to him the strategic importance of Angola, which gave him the impression that Santos e Castro was the most influential person in the organization. Santos e Castro told him he would be going to Madrid and he didn't know whether he would stay in Europe or return to Angola.

The Anti-Communist League

Lamas de Oliveira, also a prisoner, explained to Colonel Sousa Teles the panorama of the situation in Angola after the FNLA left Luanda.

Up until then the FNLA and UNITA had used its resources, but now the international anti-communist organization decided to enter into open support of the FNLA and UNITA. In order to do this, there were contacts between Giscard d'Estaing and Holden Roberto and Mobutu in Zaire and the League sent its own official, the technician Gilberto Santos e Castro. His recent trip to Spain was precisely in order to define his personal position with respect to the League.

As for Savimbi, according to Sousa Teles, he had initially rejected outside aid, except for a small amount of G-3 arms from the United States. After recent accords, he has agreed to accept total aid from the League, thus entering into the general plan directed by Santos e Castro and commanded by the Anti-Communist International League, a fascist organization of capitalist financial groups that pulls the strings linking Pretoria-Windhoek-Kinshasa-Nova Lisboa-Uige. Recently, through the plan prepared and activated in South Africa, he invaded Angolan territory.

The people will judge them

In conclusion, Major Jujú stated:

The objective of this press conference was to present to the people that group of enemies of the people who, because of their actions,



are criminals. Through the social security work carried out by MPLA security services, those individuals were neutralized. They will be handed over to the people who will try and judge them when the competent legal bodies are created.

Another aspect that the present case brings to light is the extreme vulnerability of the Portuguese authorities operating in Angola. On certain occasions it has even been a matter of conniving with the enemies of the people. The amount of secret documentation seized and the nature of some of those documents proves this.

In summary, note: Silvino Silverio Marques' attempted *golpe*; Spínola's agreements on the Isle of Sal; the conversation between the FNLA

and the Portuguese authorities aboard Mobutu's yacht, from which, as we have already said, the FAPLA general staff has the manuscript; the close links between the Second Office of the Portuguese Armed Forces General Headquarters and the terrorist organizations; the action of the Portuguese Armed Forces who, by remaining in territory liberated by the MPLA and abandoning the areas occupied by the FNLA-UNITA, have made control and defense of MPLA areas difficult and facilitated liberty of action for the enemies of the people.

UNITA and the FNLA are used in different areas as vehicles for the neocolonization of our people and have proved themselves to be inoperative and incapable of solving by themselves the problems imperialism has assigned to them.

The first determination of the Angolan people, their struggles led by their vanguard the MPLA, smashed all plans for a Rhodesian-type "independence," for territorial separatism, for tribal isolation. The attempts at a *golpe de estado*, the attempts to neocolonize the country, had no success.

Imperialism used all its financial, military and human resources and prepared the plan of which we are currently victims: the invasion from the southern part of Angolan territory and the reinforcement of the northern front.

Like all the others, this plan will also fail. On our side we have reason and the determination of all our people and the solidarity of all oppressed peoples in the world. That is the invincible force against which the enemies of the people will clash.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

The Constitutional law of the People's Republic of Angola, (RPA) headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto, is based on the following principles:

Article 1 — The People's Republic of Angola is a sovereign, independent and democratic State, whose first objective is the total liberation of the Angolan people from the vestiges of colonialism and the domination and aggression of imperialism, and the construction of a prosperous and democratic country, completely free from any form of man's exploitation by man, realizing the aspirations of the masses.

Article 2 — All sovereignty rests with the Angolan people, but the MPLA — their legitimate representative, composed of a broad front in which all the patriotic forces involved in the anti-imperialist struggle are included — is in charge of the political, economic and social leadership of the nation.

Article 3 — The masses are guaranteed broad and effective participation in the exercise of political power through consolidation, extension and evolution of the organizing forces of people's power.

Article 4 — The People's Republic of Angola is a single and indivisible State whose inviolable and inalienable territory is that defined by the present geographic limits of Angola, and it energetically fights any separatist attempt to dismember its territory.

Article 5 — Economic, social and cultural solidarity among all regions of the RPA will be promoted by common development of the entire Angolan nation and elimination of the results of regionalism and tribalism.

Article 6 — The People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), the people's fighting arm, under the leadership of the MPLA and with its President as their Comander-in-Chief, are institutionalized as the National Army of the RPA in charge of defending the territorial integrity of the homeland and participating in production and therefore in national reconstruction, alongside the people. The Comander-in-Chief

of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) appoints and removes the top level military leaders.

Article 7 — The People's Republic of Angola is a lay State in which there is complete separation between the State, the church and religious institutions. All religions will be respected and the State will provide protection for churches, religious places and objects, providing they obey state laws.

Article 8 — The People's Republic of Angola considers agriculture as a base and industry as a decisive factor in its development.

The State directs and plans the national economy for the purpose of systematically and harmoniously developing all natural and human resources and utilizing the wealth for the benefit of the people.

Article 9 — The RPA will promote the establishment of just social relations in all sectors of production, stimulating and developing the public sector and increasing cooperative methods. The RPA will be very particularly concerned with solving the land problem in the interest of the peasant masses.

Article 10 — The RPA recognizes, protects and guarantees private property, including that of foreigners, provided these favor the economy of the country and the interests of the Angolan people.

Article 11 — All natural resources of the soil and subsoil, territorial waters, continental platform and air space are the property of the State which shall determine the conditions under which they are exploited and used.

Article 12 — The fiscal system shall be guided by the principle of progressive payment of direct taxes with no fiscal privileges of any kind being permitted.

Article 13 — The RPA energetically fights illiteracy and ignorance and promotes the development of education at the service of the people and of a true national culture enriched by the revolutionary cultural conquests of other peoples.

Article 14 — The RPA respects and applies the principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of the OAU and will establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all states on the basis of principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of each country and reciprocity of benefits.

Article 15 — The RPA supports and expresses solidarity with the people's struggle for their national liberation and will establish relations



of friendship and cooperation with all the democratic and progressive forces of the world.

Article 16 — The RPA will belong to no international military organization, nor permit the installation of foreign military bases on its national territory.

In the Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola it states that its President shall be the President of the MPLA, who as Chief of State shall represent the Angolan nation. The People's Assembly is also created as the highest body of the State of the RPA, and a special law will determine its composition and system of election and operation.

The Constitution also states that as long as Angolan territory is not totally liberated and the conditions for the installation of the People's Assembly do not exist, the highest State body shall be the Council of the Revolution composed of the members of the MPLA Political Bureau, the members of the General Staff of the FAPLA, the provincial commissioners, and members of the government named for this purpose. The Council of the Revolution shall be presided over by the President of the RPA and its purpose is to exercise legislative power; define and guide the country's domestic and foreign policy; approve the general State budget; name the Prime Minister; name the provincial commissioners; authorize the president to declare war and peace; decree a state of siege or emergency and authorize amnesties.

The new government of the People's Republic of Angola shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the State Ministers and Secretaries, and shall be presided over by the Prime Minister.

The People's Republic of Angola is divided administratively into provinces, councils, communes, circles, neighborhoods and settlements.

The symbols of the RPA are the flag, the insignia and the anthem.



ANGOLA :
MUERTE AL AGRESOR
MORTE AO AGRESSOR
KILL THE ASSAULTER
MORT A L'AGRESSEUR