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A Theoretical and Political Magazine of Scientific Socialism

Editor: V. J. Jerome

Statement on Election Policy*

By The Communist Party

SIXTY MILLION AMERICANS will go to the polls this November not only to elect a President, Vice-President and a new Congress. They will vote to help shape the destinies of our nation.

The great mass of Americans are suspicious of the heavily-financed election stunts promoted by Big Business through its controlled press, radio and TV. They are deeply concerned with the crucial issues of peace, security and democracy.

The Suez crisis, H-bomb tests and the draft weigh heavily on the minds of Americans, particularly the mothers and youth of our land. The crushing burden of armaments restricts social welfare expenditures and hits every low-income taxpayer. Economic security is an issue for every wage worker and pensioner; farm prices for every farmer; pressure of the trusts for every small business man; and the cost of living for every working family.

For every democratic-minded American, civil rights is the fore-

most domestic issue of the day. Shall Negro and white children be protected in the right to learn together? Shall the Negro people of the South enjoy the right to vote? Shall the Negro people walk in dignity and equality in jobs, housing and all other aspects of American life? Will not the winning of civil rights for the Negro people advance the economic and political rights of the great masses of America?

These questions remain at the core of American politics in 1956, as does the deep fear that McCarthyism may be revitalized with the reelection of the widely-distrusted Richard Nixon.

It is on these issues that Americans can affect this election.

Concerned as they are with immediate questions, the American people are no less thoughtful about the future. The vistas of a long-term peace, automation and atomic energy have set off widespread discussion about a new era and a New America. Eisenhower, Nixon, Stevenson and Kefauver are speaking much of the future. Deeply aware of the tremendous productive power

* Adopted at National Election Conference of the CP, held Sept. 29-30, 1956.

of our industry and the creative genius of our workers, farmers, scientists and engineers, the people are demanding concrete plans for a better tomorrow. They must not permit the many proposals now being offered by the major candidates to remain simply "campaign oratory."

In 1952 Big Business, concealing its own responsibility, successfully exploited the popular revulsion against the cold-war policies of the Truman Administration and the Korean war to put over its candidate and name its Cadillac Cabinet.

Since 1952, however, there has been a steady shift away from the Republicans. With organized labor taking the lead, the voters have increasingly ousted McCarthyites and other GOP representatives of Big Business and fought the extreme Dixiecrats. There is beginning to emerge in American life the tentative outline of an effective political alliance of labor, the farmers, the Negro people and small business against the common enemy of the American people—the monopolies.

After an uncertain start, labor and its allies are approaching the 1956 elections with new strength and confidence. A newly-united labor movement has placed some of the major domestic issues to the fore. It is moving towards greater independence and is becoming less and less a tail of either major party; on occasion leading voices are heard even projecting a future labor-farmer party. While giving electoral sup-

port on the basis of issues mainly to Democratic candidates, it has begun to display a critical attitude towards the Dixiecrats and other reactionaries in the Democratic Party.

Labor and its allies generally view the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket as the rallying center for the big trusts. Labor clearly fears that the election of the GOP ticket spells the supremacy of the sinister figure of Richard Nixon. Far more than simply a slick political operator, Nixon is widely regarded as serving the most war-minded, anti-democratic, anti-labor sections of Big Business.

Virtually the entire labor movement, as well as large sections of the farmers and small business men, are swinging behind the Stevenson-Ke-fauver ticket. Despite justifiably deep reservations around the issue of civil rights, and insufficient support from labor for Negro representation, wide sections of the Negro people want to maintain a common political front with the labor movement. They are maintaining this alliance, while keeping up a steady pressure for an advance beyond the grossly inadequate Democratic platform plank on civil rights.

With Eisenhower's hold on the electorate declining, new prospects open up for victory of labor-backed Congressional candidates. But victory for labor's choices is endangered by failure of the major Democratic candidates and their leading labor supporters to give more effective voice to widespread senti-

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ment for ending the cold war and implementing the Supreme Court decision on desegregation.

Organized labor and its allies have indicated clearly their objectives: (1) to press vigorously on all candidates a program that meets the needs of the people; (2) to take all practical measures to help defeat the Cadillac Cabinet, and McCarthyite, Dixiecrat and other reactionary Congressmen.

We stand in this election with labor, farmers and the Negro people against the forces of entrenched wealth and reaction. We believe that if the people unite their strength in a powerful coalition, they can hand down a mandate for peace and progress in this election. We believe the people's forces, by taking independent action, can bring pressure to bear on both major parties and compel the candidates to go beyond the convention platforms.

It is well known that the Communists have a viewpoint far in advance of most leaders of organized labor today. We are a party of Socialism. We hold that sooner or later labor and its allies must organize politically with far greater independence if they are to act effectively against the giant monopolies who dominate the life of the nation. Labor will one day not only have to curb the trusts but organize politically so that the trusts become the common property of the people—that is, organize for Socialism.

While the socialist reorganization of our economy is not the issue be-

fore the people of America in the 1956 elections, the fight for peace, freedom and abundance today, and always, is the indispensable pre-condition for fundamental social change in our country.

The chief issues which we feel must be advanced for the national welfare today are:

On peace: End the cold war; adopt a settled policy of peaceful co-existence with socialist and all other nations, excluding war as a method of settling international differences; strengthen the universal character of the United Nations as a peace agency by seating People's China and other nations seeking UN admission; outlaw atomic war, reduce world armaments by agreements, promote world trade, end H-bomb tests and the draft.

On civil rights and civil liberties: Prompt Federal enforcement of the Supreme Court desegregation decision through every channel open to the Executive; firm action against those who advocate and practice force and violence against the Supreme Court decision; a legislative program to guarantee full political and economic rights to the Negro people, North and South; end Senate filibustering by changing Rule 22; replace the seniority system of naming Congressional Chairmen with a democratic system based on merit; end the witch-hunt of the last ten years, with its Congressional inquisitions, loyalty-security programs, and the system of faceless informers; repeal the Taft-Hartley,

McCarran and Smith Acts; end Smith Act prosecutions and extend full amnesty to all political prisoners.

On economic security: A rapid shift from a swollen arms program to a welfare economy, with increased minimum wages, widened social security and a giant school, housing, health and hospital program; legislation to gain farm income parity for the family-type farm and an enlarged program for surplus food distribution at home and abroad; stop the Federal giveaways of our power, agricultural and mineral resources; legislation to attain the shorter work week with no reduction in pay and guarantees against unemployment due to automation; nationalization of the atomic energy industry.

To elect an executive and a Congress more responsive to these needs should be the objective of the growing unity of the working people and their allies. The fight for this program must go forward in the new Congress, whatever the political complexion of the Executive.

In past years Communists have run their own candidates for president and vice-president, but undemocratic laws, whose repeal we demand, have virtually made Communist candidacies impossible in 1956. On various occasions we have given our support to non-Communist candidacies. Thus, in 1944 Communists supported President Roosevelt to help win the war; in 1948 we supported Henry Wallace and in 1952 Vincent Hallinan to help

the fight for peace.

In 1956 the Communist Party is endorsing no presidential candidate. However, it cannot agree with the advice of certain figures in the progressive movement to "sit it out." Despite the good intentions of some individuals who support certain minor party candidacies, the Communist Party does not regard these candidacies as vehicles for labor unity or for furthering peace and civil rights. These present candidacies oppose the necessary steps to build a great anti-monopoly coalition led by labor.

While the Communist Party makes no endorsement of presidential candidates, its members, whether in trade unions or other civic bodies, will associate themselves with the political efforts of their organizations in the struggle against Big Business and its candidates.

Already the growing strength of the labor, Negro and farm movements has won significant commitments from the major candidates. Irrespective of the outcome of the elections, the independent movement of the people will have to wage mighty legislative and political struggles for the needs of the people and eventually effect a new political alignment in the nation.

For, in the last analysis, only struggle, only the unity of labor and its allies on issues—before, during and after election campaigns—can guarantee that peace, security and democracy can be won.

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The Impending Elections*

By Claude Lightfoot

As THE election campaign enters the final stages, the possibility of labor and its allies to defeat the Cadillac Cabinet is becoming more and more favorable. Indeed, the most outstanding development in the 1956 elections, especially for progressive-minded people, is the growth of labor and other popular influence on the campaign. The acceleration of this development will bring into existence a political realignment of all liberal and democratic forces that, regardless of the form it takes, will be capable of moving our nation along the broad highway of peace, abundance and freedom. Our Party's Draft Resolution has already proclaimed the achievement of this goal as the central objective of this period, the achievement of which will open the road toward a Socialist America.

Thus the chief feature of our participation in the 1956 elections is to help labor and allied forces to achieve their aims in this campaign. These will become, objectively, a step in the direction of a people's coalition government. We do not nor will we endorse any Party or candidate. However, we are not unmindful of

the fact that labor and its allies are struggling to oust the Cadillac Cabinet of Eisenhower and Nixon.

We associate ourselves with labor's objective. At the April meeting of the National Committee we said that the defeat of the Cadillac Cabinet could not be achieved unless some changes took place within the Democratic Party. To the extent that some changes have taken place, the opportunities to defeat the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket have improved. To the extent they have not, does the outcome still hang in balance. When we met in April, labor and other forces, and political analysts of all persuasions, including many in the Democratic Party, were extremely doubtful about defeating Eisenhower. Public opinion polls showed Eisenhower with a commanding lead. There was no great interest in the ranks of labor. Many polls showed Eisenhower, a Republican, for the first time in twenty years outpolling the Democrats among the workers. The Negro people were restive under the attacks of the Dixiecrats and were looking with disfavor upon Adlai Stevenson's "moderation" talk.

Today the situation has changed.

* This article is excerpted from a Report made at the National Election Conference of the Communist Party, on Sept. 29, 1956.

Almost all political analysts speak of a close race. Most are still inclined to think that Eisenhower will win, but are no longer absolutely certain.

CAUSES OF THE RECENT CHANGE

What are some of the main factors which have caused this change?

1. The nomination of Stevenson and Kefauver at the Democratic convention; this ticket was without doubt the strongest the Democrats could have named.

2. The Democratic platform on domestic problems confronting labor-farmers-small business people was considerably stronger than the Republicans.

3. Though an inadequate civil rights plank was adopted by the Democratic convention, the Stevenson acceptance speech contained a vigorous statement on the freedom issue. And Stevenson, since the convention, has made stronger statements on this issue, as witness in Arkansas a few days ago.

4. The projection by Stevenson of the New America concept.

5. The President's health and the fear of Nixon on the ticket.

6. The emergence of a number of regional issues in various parts of the country which the Democrats are utilizing.

7. The anti-monopoly character of the campaign which Stevenson and Kefauver are beginning to wage.

8. Some small beginnings of a positive peace approach—such as on H-bomb tests and the ending of the draft.

9. Labor has begun to plunge energetically into the campaign.

All these factors are having a certain impact on the voters. In this connection it can be said that the Democratic Party campaign has undergone some changes from 1952, changes which are making it a much more potent force.

Let us take for example the concept of a "new America". This is a powerful slogan which coincides with the direction in which the whole world is beginning to move.

These moods of the world's people have not escaped the attention of the American people. Our country in the last 15 years has not suffered as much as other nations. But many are aware that the vast American productive machinery, this colossus of economic might, may cave in and bring with it the bread lines of the 'thirties. And they want some built-in safeguards against the effects of an economic crisis. The so-called free enterprise system, which for the past ten years has avoided a deep-going economic crisis, will face some severe tests in the near future. We are entering into a period where the possibility of war is diminishing and an era of peaceful coexistence between capitalism and Socialism is foreseeable. The competition between the two systems will increasingly center around the economic,

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scientific, cultural and democratic aspects of life. The system which proves in practice it can best lead the people to these goals will win their allegiance.

It is clear now that this fact was not lost on Adlai Stevenson. His projection of a "New America" is designed to meet the problem of capitalist superiority in its competition with the world of Socialism. The "New America" of Stevenson calls for 1) an end to poverty; 2) an enduring peace; 3) freedom. These are goals which all progressive Americans can unqualifiedly support, even though we Communists realize that the *full and lasting* attainment of them would require a socialist reorganization of American life.

The new perspectives opened up by the Stevenson campaign reflect the growth of influence of labor, the Negro people and liberal forces. If there has been some changes in the Democratic Party campaign, they can be attributed in large part to the very active and independent course that labor and its allies have pursued. During the pre-convention period labor and the Negro people exerted tremendous pressure on the Democratic Party. This pressure had some effect. Even though the plank on civil rights is weak, the pressures of labor and the Negro people have succeeded in forcing Stevenson to go further than the platform.

The Dixiecrats were not decisively defeated at the convention, but they did suffer certain setbacks. The

ticket of Stevenson and Kefauver and the conditions on which it was nominated constituted a defeat for the Dixiecrats. The strategy of the Johnson-Rayburn forces was to become the balance of power in the selection of the presidential nominee. From this vantage point they had hopes to wrest concessions from Stevenson on the type of campaign that would be waged and the choice of the Vice-Presidential nominee.

This objective was not achieved. Stevenson was nominated without having to make commitments. And Kefauver was nominated over their strong opposition. There are those who underestimated the importance of how Stevenson and Kefauver were nominated. But it is now proving decisive in how the campaign is being conducted around the issues, especially of civil rights. The nomination of Stevenson and Kefauver without commitments to southern reaction was due in large part to the vigorous role played by labor forces, especially those who followed the leadership of the UAW.

The pressures of labor, the Negro people and liberals have not only affected the Democratic Party campaign; it is also affecting the Republican Party. The Republicans and especially Vice-President Nixon have been forced to adopt a new look. This is all to the good. The Republicans are entering into competition with the Democrats on the kind of issues that several years ago would have been unbelievable. Nixon has been forced, in the main,

to discard the McCarthyite type of campaign he waged in 1952 and 1954. He is following Stevenson and Kefauver all over the country and is yelling "me too" to every proposal that would advance the welfare of the people. A campaign based on competition between both parties on vital issues will lay the basis for the people to wrest some concessions, no matter who wins.

The Stevenson-Kefauver ticket in recent months has made some advances toward a more positive approach to peace. The proposals to ban H-bomb tests and a perspective to end the draft, which Stevenson has called for, must be followed with new initiatives. In respect to the issue of peace, the leaders of labor are still not drawing the lessons from the 1952 campaign. I think it can be said categorically that unless they associate themselves with the overwhelming sentiment of the American workers and people to work for the ending of the cold war, all their domestic programs are endangered. The American people want to hear proposals that will end the cold war and not proposals on how to win the cold war. This is the direction labor should be pressing.

Thus the issue of peace is important for the country as a whole; the Cadillac Cabinet cannot be defeated without a more positive approach to this question.

In respect to the more industrial states, the farm question is also very important. The trend of a shift in the vote of farmers in Minnesota,

Iowa, Nebraska, etc., is not yet reflected among farmers in the more industrial states. This is especially true in the state of Illinois. Yet if these states are to be carried to defeat the Cadillac Cabinet, the problems of the farmers must be tackled more vigorously by labor and pro-democratic forces. A program to carry the large industrial states also requires many more incentives to arouse the enthusiasm of the rank and file of labor.

In 1952 Eisenhower made serious inroads into the ranks of labor. Polls taken a few months ago showed that Eisenhower had gained additional support among the rank and file of labor. To my knowledge there has been no assessment of this problem since the campaign has gotten under way. However, I think that Stevenson, in order to arouse the rank and file of labor to greater participation, must spell out more concretely how his program is going to better the living standards of the workers and provide for more job security.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE

Not since the days of the Abolitionist movement and the Civil War has the issue of Negro rights engaged the attention of the nation with such compelling force. The Supreme Court has outlawed segregation in the school system. But in the main it has been left for the Negro people and their children to enforce the decision. The heroism of the Negro people in sending their

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children into schools as mobs gather and burn Negroes in effigy constitutes one of the most heroic chapters in American history. *The problems of enforcing the Supreme Court decisions together with the fight for peace will prove to be the key to victory in the 1956 elections.*

At this crucial point of the electoral struggle, neither Party nor candidates are measuring up to the needs of the hour. What is needed now is not pious declarations, but action by the Federal government. The President is contented to let nature take its course while the Vice-President urges patience. The Negro people are urged to be patient while mobs block the entrances to schools in many places in the South. The Negro people are urged to be patient when any day bodies of little children like Emmett Till may be offered up as sacrificial offerings to the gods of southern reaction.

Inaction of the Federal government in enforcing the rights of the Negro people has always been bipartisan. A combination of forces within both Parties have always prevented Negroes from getting their rights. In this present crisis, where the Executive branch fails to act, the Democratic Party nominees, while having made certain advances, likewise have not yet proven equal to the occasion.

President Eisenhower has proclaimed that the Republican Party is the Party of the future. *But we Communists ask: what will that*

Party of the future do now to array the forces and power of the Federal government behind the efforts of the Negro people and their democratic-minded allies to achieve full citizenship rights?

The Negro voter in 1956 finds himself in quite a dilemma. Neither Party is facing squarely up to the issues of desegregation.

What will be his political course? There are those who are protesting the lack of sufficient action in the Democratic Party by joining in support of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket. They declare that a vote for Stevenson and Kefauver, no matter how well intentioned they may be, is objectively a vote to continue the Eastlands in power in Congress.

Those who think in these terms represent some of the most influential Negro leaders in the country. But despite this sentiment, there is no indication that the bulk of the Negro voters will leave the Democratic Party in 1956. Though dissatisfied with the position of the Democrats on civil rights, other considerations are preventing a mass breakaway. But those Democrats or labor forces who take solace from this fact and do nothing else are not facing up to political reality. Such a do-nothing course can only result in defeat at the polls. Labor's objective to defeat the Cadillac Cabinet cannot be realized without Stevenson and Kefauver going further on this issue than they have gone so far.

Stevenson has progressively improved his position on this question.

But the point from which he had to start was not a good one. His latest statement in Arkansas was the most advanced position taken in this campaign by any of the four candidates. This was a most welcome sign. But in view of the dangers that are involved in the situation and which are becoming more explosive with each passing day, the weak plank adopted at the Democratic Convention, and his own former weak position, he should be called upon to spell out in greater detail what he will do to enforce the Supreme Court decisions if elected President. He should be called upon to elaborate how he proposes to achieve freedom for all, regardless of race, color or creed which he announced in his concept of the "New America." Such a bold pronouncement on his part would make a drastic change in the attitude of Negro voters who are either planning to vote Republican or to stay at home.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

How do these new developments in the election picture effect the outlook for the Congressional elections?

There is no doubt that the labor and people's movement today sees brighter prospects for making gains against the GOP-Dixiecrat Big Business bloc in Congress. They see brighter prospects for electing a Congress more responsible to the people's demands in the new age now beginning to emerge.

Two years ago, Eisenhower's coat-tails were already not long enough

to carry some of the McCarthyite and other Republican reactionaries. In this year's election, with the infamous Nixon waiting to take over from an ailing President, these coat-tails can prove to be still shorter.

Whatever the exact outcome of the Presidential race, labor and the people can defeat some of the worst McCarthyites, like Dirksen, Welker, Butler, Rivercomb — as well as a number of other anti-labor diehards. They can elect an increased number of labor-endorsed candidates to the Senate and House.

These possibilities would have been much greater were it not for the mixed results of the primaries. There were, of course, a number of positive features. In the first place, extreme reaction suffered important setbacks. The out-and-out Dixiecrats were defeated in the Louisiana state elections and the Texas Democratic convention by an alliance between conservatives and the labor, Negro and liberal forces. The McCarthyites Davis (Wisconsin), Lee (Utah), Velde (Illinois) and Clardy (Michigan) were defeated or forced to withdraw. The McCarran Democrat, Sourwine, failed miserably in his try for a Senate seat in Nevada. Particular attention should be called to the success of Manhattan's labor and liberal forces in compelling the Democratic Party machine to withhold endorsement from Representative Donovan, in defeating him in the Democratic primary, and thus paving the way for retiring him from Congress.

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Further, on the plus side, is a modest increase in the number of active trade unionists nominated for Congress, as in Hartford, Chicago and Rochester. The unions were active in the California primary among others, and helped determine the Democratic Senatorial slate in Pennsylvania and Illinois. The farmers, with an assist from labor, greatly influenced the Democratic Senatorial choices in Iowa, the Dakotas and other states.

Two vital features, however, stand out on the minus side. First, while the Dixiecrat reverses in Texas and Louisiana will speed the process of differentiation among Southern Democrats, the active Dixiecrat bloc in Congress remains intact. More than that, it will be strengthened by the addition of Talmadge to the Senate. As for other Democratic reactionaries, they were not challenged except for Donovan in New York. Second, and let us underscore this, *not a single additional Negro has been nominated for Congress by the Democratic Party*, the dominant party in the areas of large Negro population. And this at a time when the Negro freedom movement is reaching a new critical stage and civil rights has become the Number One domestic issue in our nation.

The responsibility lies with the Democratic machines which arrogantly refused the just demands of the Negro people. They did make some concessions at the state legislative level, as in Chicago, Cleveland and Buffalo. But they refused to budge on Congress.

The labor movement, despite its growing support for desegregation and other struggles of the Negro people, failed to put its own pressure on the Democratic party. In fact, in Detroit, the UAW endorsed a white incumbent against Mrs. Cora Brown in the Democratic primary. Had they not done this, Mrs. Brown would probably have won the primary and become the first Negro woman to sit in Congress.

The chief lesson here is that unless labor steps in vigorously, the Democratic machines will continue to prevent a real breakthrough in Negro representation in Congress. Today, labor, in its own interests, needs to develop a new initiative in its political relations with the Negro people. Our prime concern should be to help labor see this.

Meanwhile, as an aftermath of the refusal of the Democrats, the GOP has again named Negro candidates in several predominantly Democratic Congressional districts. But in at least one district this is in no sense a token campaign this year. A united Negro people's movement is supporting the active candidacy of Charles Loeb in the 21st District in Ohio.

These primary results necessarily limit to some degree the possibilities in November, though new developments in the campaigns open up new prospects. The main thing we have to see now is this: The unions and people's organizations have it within their power during the next five weeks to guarantee some very important gains.

They have it in their power to make the labor-endorsed candidates declare themselves not only on economic and social issues, but especially on the questions of peace and civil rights that are so much on the minds of the voters.

They can also, by concentrating their efforts on defeating the most outstanding McCarthyites and other reactionaries, bring about a substantial change in the political temper of the next Congress.

LABOR AND POLITICAL ACTION

This is the first election campaign since the historic AFL-CIO merger. Its effects are beginning to register in the greater impact on the nation of labor's independent political action.

Labor's active role at the Democratic Party convention is a good example. Not only were there many more trade unionists in the state delegations, but the AFL-CIO was able to get many of its chief demands—Taft-Hartley repeal, minimum wage and the like—incorporated in the platform. The AFL-CIO also made a strong plea for a forthright stand on civil rights. Many of the unions, especially the UAW, took a leading part along with the Negro people's organizations and other liberal forces in the unsuccessful fight for a plank implementing the Supreme Court decision on desegregation.

Following the conventions, the unions, with few exceptions, have endorsed the Stevenson-Kefauver

ticket against Nixon and the Cadillac Cabinet. This they have done explicitly on the basis of issues, not parties. A considerable movement has developed in support of the AFL-CIO endorsement of Stevenson and Kefauver, highlighted by the unprecedented UAW Political Action Conference in Detroit two weeks ago.

Meanwhile, labor's united political arm, COPE, is giving major attention to the Congressional elections. It is distributing state by state 15 million copies of the voting records of Congressmen and Senators up for re-election. It is concentrating on registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns, as well as the dollar drive.

There is a more intensive mobilization of the rank and file than before. In addition to the UAW, which has set the pace, the *Daily Worker* gives a picture of the new steps taken here in New York by the ILGWU and the Amalgamated. In Chicago, the LLPE is activating some Congressional district committees. More areas report the beginnings of labor political organization.

All progressive-minded workers will welcome and participate actively in these programs, and especially in the registration and get-out-the-vote drive. At the same time, they will be pondering some of the lessons to be drawn from labor's experience, thus far, particularly its role at the Democratic convention.

First, labor had a great influence on the economic planks. But

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Meany's declarations on foreign policy were contradictory and contained many cold war features echoed in the platform. This will seriously hinder labor's fight against the Nixon ticket.

Second, the convention underscored the need for more *independent* labor political organization. Labor had its greatest influence in the Michigan delegation, and it is in that state that labor has its own strongest district, ward and precinct machinery.

Finally, the civil rights fight at the convention was lost. But the struggle on this issue revealed the vast potential power of a coalition of labor, Negro and other liberal forces. The development of such a coalition on a general programmatic basis will be facilitated by stronger labor political machinery, by closer ties with labor's allies, and by a growing consciousness of the need for an anti-monopoly political realignment led by labor, whatever its eventual political form. Important progress can be made in this direction during this campaign.

OUR PARTY AND THE UNITY OF LEFT

Our Party in this campaign has no candidates of its own. The political repressions under which we still suffer and the discriminatory election laws make this impossible.

Nor do we endorse any candidates or parties. We hold and shall continue to maintain a critical attitude towards all candidates and

parties. But we stand with labor, the Negro people, the farmers, the small businessmen and the professionals. We support their fight for economic and social progress, for peace, for democratic rights and an end to all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Negro people and other minorities.

We are not projecting a new electoral policy at this conference. Last December we undertook to formulate our policy for '56. We corrected certain formulations in the '54 program which foresaw an election situation in which the nation would be confronted by drastic alternatives—an Eisenhower opening the way to McCarthyism versus a labor-supported ticket ready to pick up where the New Deal left off. In rejecting this view we did not go to the other extreme and predict that the country would be faced by no alternatives. Rather we developed a policy that put the main emphasis on movements and coalitions on issues which would be able, regardless of the outcome, to press forward after the elections; on associating ourselves with labor's struggle against the Cadillac Cabinet; on helping weaken the GOP-Dixiecrat grip on Congress; on strengthening the independent political action of labor and its allies, looking towards an anti-monopoly political realignment led by labor.

We stand by that policy today; we believe it has stood the test of time.

We are not unmindful of the fact

that many Left and socialist-minded forces do not see eye to eye with us. We are at all times prepared to discuss differences in a friendly manner, with no fixed idea that we have a monopoly on political wisdom.

More, we are concerned to bring forward the many points of agreement that exist—on projecting the vital issues, on the need to defeat the outstanding McCarthyites and other reactionaries in Congress, on the need to strengthen the independent political action of labor and its allies. And we are confident that in the post-election struggles, there will be possible a much greater movement towards unity and collaboration of Left and socialist forces in the common endeavor to strengthen the struggle for peace, security and democracy, to speed a new political alignment, to enhance socialist participation in the people's movements.

A policy of general abstention from the election campaign can only isolate and thus retard the growth of socialist thinking. We are happy that this view in its extreme form is receding.

The differences among the Left that remain revolve primarily around the presidential elections. Those of the Left who were inclining to support Eisenhower on the peace issue must find it difficult today to extend their support to his heir-apparent Nixon, and as a result this "Left" trend to Eisenhower is declining.

Furthermore, neither ticket today in a time of atomic stalemate espouses a basic rupture with Geneva. But both as yet fail to offer the necessary elements of a forward-looking peace policy, both as yet fail to meet the necessary commitment to a real civil-rights program. Does this mean that a policy of abstention from the presidential elections is therefore the only course?

As for the argument that the best policy is to vote for Socialism by supporting Trotskyist candidates, it is enough to read their denunciation of the policy of peaceful co-existence to see that neither peace nor Socialism would be advanced by such a policy.

Progressives who incline toward the Socialist Party candidates have to consider whether support for this ticket today will not further isolate them and their socialist ideas from the mainstream of labor's political action. We believe it will.

The labor and liberal forces seeking to oust the Cadillac Cabinet are still in a position to exert great influence upon the peace and civil rights policies of the candidates they support. We join with others in urging them to seek commitments on these issues. No feature of the election campaign is more important than this.

Regardless of the precise outcome on November 6th, it is already clear that there will be increased possibilities after the elections for the people to win gains from the next Administration and Congress.

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On the Party Situation

By William Z. Foster

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION has many good features, especially in its program of practical work on this basis, at first, I gave it a conditional "yes" vote; but finally, I have decided to vote against it on the fundamental grounds that it weakens seriously the Party's stand on Marxism-Leninism.

The National Committee Resolution now before the Party for discussion and amendment characterizes as "critical" the present Party situation. This is true, both in the sense that the Party suffered serious losses in members and mass contacts during the Cold War under the heavy attack from the government, and also in that there is in the Party a considerable political disorientation. What has caused this situation?

Throughout the intense persecution which it experienced during the Cold War period the Communist Party, aside from minor internal frictions, displayed a high degree of political unity and fighting morale. The Party maintained this ideological firmness under unprecedented government assault, and it withstood solidly the arrest and jailing of its leaders, deportations, discrimination

in industry, in trade unions, and elsewhere, the pro-fascist hysteria of the McCarthyites, the formal outlawing of the Party, the proscription of many progressive organizations, the government-organized expulsion of the progressive unions from the CIO, large membership loss, and the breaking of many of its mass contacts, and serious "Left" errors by its leadership. That the government, however, was unable to destroy the Party or even to prevent it from functioning publicly, was a real victory for our Party and the working class. Because of its staunch stand during these severe trials, the Communist Party won the admiration of Communists and other fighters all over the world.

The foundation of the Party's strong fighting spirit and political unity was its many years of training in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in the fire of the class struggle. The Party was able to fight along as it did in the face of so many difficulties also because it realized that its main struggle—against the danger of atomic war—was a basic fight in the interest of the working class and the whole

American people. Although the Party felt its losses keenly, it was inspired to sustain them by the consciousness that it was doing its full share as a Leninist organization in the worldwide struggle to preserve world peace and to defeat the war program of American imperialism in its drive for world domination. This correct understanding was the key to the Party's high morale and political unity, which was such a striking feature during these years of trial.

The first serious element of political confusion in the Party began early in 1954, with the agitation of ex-Comrade Starobin and Comrade Clark, successively Foreign Editors of the *Daily Worker*, to the effect that the Party's fight against the war danger was both wrong and fruitless. This was a blow at the very foundations of the hard-pressed Party's morale. They abandoned, too, the Party position that American imperialism was striving for world domination. Significantly, they also resurrected some of Browder's discredited revisionist conceptions. This disruptive agitation, which tended to shield American imperialism from attack and to disintegrate the mass struggle for peace, was not without negative effects in the Party, especially in view of the prominence of the writers concerned.

A second blow against the Party's political unity came in connection with the Party discussion of the Stalin cult of the individual. Naturally, our members were deeply shocked by these revelations. How-

ever, by and large, the extensive Party discussion was sound and healthy, and it brought forth many important lessons which our Party must be alert to absorb. More than a few comrades, however, developed negative attitudes, even verging into liquidationism. These wrong views included bitter attacks upon the Soviet Union, upon our Party, and upon its whole leadership.

Although the situation created by the Stalin revelations presented certain problems, no doubt the Party could have overcome them without great difficulty, absorbing the immediate lessons from the Stalin exposure and studying the long-range implications of this important matter. But a new and heavy blow against Party unity developed. This was during and following the meeting of the National Committee in April 1956. In the report of General Secretary Dennis to this meeting the National Committee, instead of concentrating its attention basically upon the urgent tasks necessary for re-strengthening the weakened Communist Party, drawing all needful lessons from the Stalin discussion and generally from the past, took on the additional task of making a detailed estimate of the work of the Party throughout the entire period of the Cold War. Unfortunately, however, this analysis, conducted in the spirit of the extreme self-criticism characteristic of the Stalin discussion, produced dubious results. Among them were: a) a serious underestimation of the war danger and

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generally of the adverse objective and subjective conditions faced by the Party during the period in question; b) a big underplay of the essentially correct role and of the various achievements of the Party, and c) a great overestimation of the Party's errors and shortcomings.

In his report Comrade Dennis laid but little emphasis upon the gravity of the war danger during the Cold War period, nor did he make a sustained analysis of this danger. He also did not state specifically that the United States had been following a policy of war, directed at winning the mastery of the world. This under-statement of the war danger and of the aggressive role of American imperialism put into question the whole previous political line of the Party, which, in tune with that of the world democratic and Socialist forces, had been to fight against the atomic war threat upon the basis that it was a real danger, and that American policy was warlike and aimed at world domination. Comrade Dennis, it is true, stated that the anti-war policy, as originally worked out by the Party, was in the main correct; but he made such an elaborate secondary criticism of this all-important policy that the implication was created that the policy was Left-sectarian. This also virtually condemned the rest of the Party policy, of which it was the center, and of which Comrade Dennis was also highly critical.

These exaggerations of Party er-

rors and shortcomings were seized upon by the strong Right tendencies in the Party, which proceeded to inflate them still further, for their own liquidationist purposes. They added a whole new batch of "errors" to the already over-long list, most of these additional ones being of their own manufacture. They also reduced Party achievements, as well as the objective difficulties faced by the Party, almost to the vanishing point. In their opinion, likewise, the war danger had amounted to little and, of course, the Party's policy towards it was Left-sectarian and wrong. In reality, the Party had more than enough errors, sectarianism, and bureaucracy to admit; but such hyper-criticism as this was laying it on too thick. It was reckless and suicidal for the Party.

The general result of this Right exaggeration, which flooded the Party press, was to cultivate a widespread impression that the whole political line of the Party during the decade of the Cold War had been Left-sectarian. The Party was belittled by the one-sided stress upon its "errors" and its entire leadership was discredited. The Party's membership losses and other setbacks were ascribed almost completely to its own mistakes, and the crippling effects of the government attack were practically lost sight of. This gross over-estimation of Party shortcomings and under-estimation of Party achievements by the Right, with its consequent discrediting of the Party and its leadership served the pur-

pose of preparations for shoving the Party far to the Right. The whole business, highly liquidatory, raised havoc with the rank and file, spreading pessimism and defeatism far and wide.

The Right also seized upon Comrade Dennis' proposal at the April meeting of the National Committee to the effect that the Party should look forward to the eventual formation of a "new mass party of Socialism" through a merger of the Communist Party and other Left groups in this country. Obviously, such an expectation could be only a long-range perspective, the other Left organizations in the United States being much smaller than the Communist Party and in no mood to consolidate with it. The Rights, by giving the whole project an air of immediate possibility, also used this slogan in a liquidationist manner. For there would be no point in rebuilding the Communist Party if it were soon to be replaced by a new and glittering mass party. The Comrades on the Right had thus set up, on the one hand, a fetish—extreme charges of Left-sectarianism—which discredited the previous decade of Party policy and leadership, and on the other hand, a panacea—the slogan of the projected new mass party of Socialism—which was to eliminate the Communist Party, and to show the way for the so-called "Marxist" party.

These negative tendencies were given a strong impetus in the report of Comrade Schrank, made right

after the April meeting of the National Committee to the New York State Committee, which represents over half of the Party's national membership. Together with heaping up Party "mistakes", most of which never happened, discounting Party successes, reducing the war danger to practically nothing, and playing upon the shibboleth of the "mass party of Socialism", Comrade Schrank's report also incorporated that Browder element which has become a feature of the Right tendency in the Party. This it expressed by sweeping characterizations of past Party policy as Left-sectarian—which tended to justify the Browder thesis to the effect that when the Party defeated his revisionism in 1945, it by this act embarked necessarily upon a course of Left-sectarianism. Schrank further declared that the Party was wrong in expelling Browder and he demanded that the latter's work be re-studied. The report was overwhelmingly adopted.

It is, of course, fundamentally necessary for the development of the Party and its mass struggle that it war relentlessly against Left-sectarianism, which has been the traditional main weakness of our Party. But to bring this point home to the Party—and few there are who would oppose it—such a gross exaggeration of Party errors and playdown of Party achievements was not at all necessary, nor could it help. On the contrary, it was all very demoralizing to the Party membership. This

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was particularly the case with the reduction of the Party's heroic and correct fight against the war danger to the status of a costly Left-sectarian blunder. And the opportunist misuse of the slogan "for a new mass party of Socialism" only made the situation worse. The general effect was to lower seriously the Party's prestige and to undermine its morale. Particularly was this the case because the Party was already disturbed over the Stalin revelations. Consequently, open demands were made for the dissolution of the Communist Party, with numerous Comrades declaring that, "We have wasted ten years of our political life". The *Daily Worker* freely carried this defeatist and liquidationist stuff. A far cry, indeed, all this pessimism and political confusion from the splendid political unity and fighting morale that had characterized the Party during the hard persecution years of the Cold War.

The bad situation was worsened by the fact that the National Committee, itself disunited, did not combat the Right-inspired campaign of liquidationism that was running rife through the Party. As for myself personally, I wrote several articles on the situation, but in the hope that the present Resolution, then being prepared, would bring about more political clarity and unity in the Party, I agreed to hold up the publication of my articles.

SHALL WE BUILD A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY?

The most decisive question thrust

up by the current debate in the Party is whether or not we shall go ahead with the building of a Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States? The Party's answer to this elementary question must be a categorical affirmative. However, the strong Right tendency in the Party takes an opposite view. It looks upon Leninism as being Left-sectarian so far as the United States is concerned. It is trying to downgrade Lenin theoretically in general. It is striving to transform the Communist Party into an amorphous "Marxist" party, or into some sort of an educational organization, without Leninism in its program. Some comrades would pattern their projected new party after Browder's erstwhile Communist Political Association, leaving the word "Communist" out of its title. And some would abandon altogether the idea of the Left having a party of its own. Here, again, the situation was made much worse by the failure of the National Committee (itself split on the question) to refute the widespread and long-continued attack being made in the Party against Marxism-Leninism.

The Draft Resolution now before the Party for discussion takes an incorrect position in this whole vital matter. The NC categorically rejected a specific proposal for an endorsement of Marxism-Leninism as our theoretical base in the Resolution and instead made the qualification that we would endorse Marxism-Leninism only in the sense that

it is "interpreted" by the CPUSA. While, obviously, the Party must interpret Marxism-Leninism to the masses, it cannot take the position that its acceptance is limited to such an interpretation. This stand would imply the end of Marxism-Leninism as embodying the principles of Scientific Socialism. Of course, we must read not only Lenin, but all other Communist writers, with a close regard to the adaptability or non-adaptability of their specific formulations to the American situation. This, however, does not contradict the elementary fact that we should also accept the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the very foundation of our Socialist outlook, and that we must say so. The failure of the Resolution to do this caused me to vote against it. As the Resolution now stands our Party ceases to be specifically a Marxist-Leninist Party.

Marxism-Leninism is the general body of proletarian philosophy, theory, and action of the world movement for Socialism. Towards it, the Communist parties: a) endorse it *en bloc* as a basic guide to their action, but not as a dogma, and b) they adopt it in their practical policies in accordance with its applicability to their respective national situations. Our Resolution, however, departs basically from this correct Communist procedure. By rejecting (through NC action) a general endorsement of Marxism-Leninism and by accepting only those parts

of it which it interprets favorably it tends to destroy the international character of Marxism-Leninism and to reduce it to the status of a Russian Socialist philosophy, subject to a maze of national "interpretations" before adoption. It also attempts to drive a wedge between Marxism and Leninism by assuming that the former has a universal application, whereas the latter has not.

The Resolution also involves the deletion of the term "Marxism-Leninism" from the Party Preamble which I think is a mistake. If we were just forming our Party the question of whether or not we should put the words "Marxism-Leninism" into the Preamble would not be a too important tactical matter; but to take them out of the document, while Leninism is under such heavy fire both within and without the Party, will be understood only as a major ideological retreat. Significantly, the Right tendency voted for the Preamble deletion, as well as for the limitation upon our endorsement of Marxism-Leninism. Leninist democratic centralism is also dropped by this Resolution.

The Communist Party of the United States cannot be some vague "Marxist" party, without a real theoretical basis. It must be founded solidly upon the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, skillfully adapted to the American situation. This is doubly necessary because the perspective ahead for the working class and its allies in this country

is one of sharp struggle. Although our Party firmly subscribes to the possibility of achieving Socialism in the United States peacefully and along parliamentary lines, this is no contradiction to the fact that it also foresees for the broad labor movement and for itself a perspective of intense political struggle against powerful, predatory, and militant American imperialism. Any other outlook would be nonsense, especially when one speaks in terms of the eventual establishment of Socialism in this country. For the American working class a Marxist-Leninist Party is indispensable to enable it to face up to the hard struggles ahead.

The Communist Party must be based upon Marxism-Leninism, but upon a newly invigorated Leninism, cleansed from Stalinist bureaucratic hangovers and fully adapted and applied to the American situation. The Party membership have said clearly in the debate that they want their Party to be more democratic, less dogmatic, and better able to stand up to American imperialism and the many complex problems and struggles which this implies. All this is very correct. Marxism-Leninism has proved that it is flexible enough to meet all these requirements far better than any other conceivable form of theory or party. In line with the many good points made in the Party discussion, American Marxism-Leninism must combat the false charge that the Party is an agent of the USSR by pursuing a course of

political independence, within the framework of international proletarian solidarity. The Party must also cultivate more initiative theoretically, make war upon all forms of dogmatism, and break decisively with its long-time habit of waiting for others to speak out first upon theoretical questions. It must likewise develop new and better concepts of Party democracy, collective leadership, and international criticism, and apply the principles of democratic centralism as Lenin understood and practiced them. It must war endlessly against bureaucracy, and its fight against Left-sectarianism must be at the very heart of all its work.

In working out its political policies, the Party must pay decisive attention to specific American conditions without, however, falling into the swamp of "American exceptionalism," which is based upon the arbitrary assumption that capitalism in the United States, supposedly cut from a special fabric, is not subject to the general laws of the growth and decline of capitalism on a world scale. The Party must especially tie in its policies with American democratic traditions and realities, including a firm advocacy of the possibility of arriving at Socialism in the United States along legal and relatively peaceful channels. As it has proved in the greatest revolutions in the history of the world, Marxism-Leninism is quite flexible enough to encompass the situation in every country, while still maintaining its

Socialist objective, its discipline, and its fighting spirit. If we have failed to adapt the principles of Lenin more effectively in the American class struggle, this has been our fault, not that of Marxism-Leninism, which has proved its full adaptability in countries as diverse economically and politically as Czechoslovakia and China.

To the end of unifying, democratizing, and Americanizing our Party, in line with the new national and world situations, its Program, to be formulated following our scheduled national convention, should deal thoroughly, along with these general tasks, with such specifically American issues as, a) the new relationships of our Party with the Communist parties and workers' organizations in the rest of the world; b) the predatory international role of American imperialism; c) the general crisis of world capitalism, especially with regard to its effects upon the United States; d) the perspective of cyclical crises in this country; e) the status of Keynesism and its "managed economy" in the policies of the United States Government; f) an analysis of the living standards of the American working class, with special regard to the amount and significance of recent increases in real wages in various categories; g) a thorough handling of the question of "American exceptionalism" and the difference between this concept and that of specific American conditions; h) the status of class collaboration be-

tween the conservative trade-union leaders and the monopoly capitalists, and our attitude towards these leaders of the workers; i) a clear statement of the status of the national question among the Negro people; j) a full consideration of the special problems of American youth regarding jobs, education, military service, delinquency, etc.; k) the role of women in this country and period; l) special American election problems and tactics; m) the perspectives for a mass labor-farmer party in this country; n) the application of the principles of democratic centralism in the United States; o) the relation of Socialism to American democratic conditions; p) a thorough review of the war-fascist danger during the cold war years and the struggle of the world's people against this danger; q) the status of the war danger at the present time; r) the question of the parliamentary road to Socialism in the United States and the role of our Party in formulating this proposition; s) the specific qualities of and perspectives for Socialism in the United States; t) a survey of Communist Party achievements and experiences during the past decade; u) an analysis of American Social Democracy, etc.

The question of Americanizing our Party is fundamental, but this must not lead to a weakening of proletarian internationalism on our part. Undoubtedly, there are strong Right trends in this respect in the Party. The Draft Resolution also shows some signs of yielding in this

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direction: such as the elimination of the vital question of world democratic influence upon the American Negro struggle, the consideration of United States economic conditions without mentioning the international economic situation or the general crisis of world capitalism, the tentative handling of world Communist relationships, the failure even to refer to the international trade union movement, the underplay on the role of the Socialist sector of the world, etc.

At the present time, as the basic result of the discussion of the Stalin cult of the individual, Communist parties all over the world are re-emphasizing the indispensability of Marxism-Leninism, in carrying forward the workers' struggle. They are not only improving their inner democracy and their international relationships, but they are also undertaking to overcome the theoretical lag which developed during recent years under Stalin's blighting influence. In their time, Marx and Lenin brought the world labor movement fully abreast of international economic and political developments and gave it a long and clear look ahead; but under Stalin much of this analytical initiative was lost, despite notable early theoretical achievements by him. But the initiative is now being regained. The big steps forward in the sphere of theory taken by the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are proof positive of this. Instead of abandoning Leninism, as

the comrades on the Right want our Party to do, the workers of the world are correctly strengthening their advocacy and application of it. With Marxism-Leninism, the world's workers and their allies have won one-third of the globe for Socialism and they have set the balance of the capitalist system a-totter. With the same great instrument they will also eventually complete the rest of their historical task of establishing Socialism all over the world.

There is every reason why the Communist Party, USA should follow the same general course as the Communist parties in all other parts of the world, in maintaining, strengthening, and adapting Marxism-Leninism to our national conditions. We must stand firm upon the basis of the tried and demonstrated principles of Marxism-Leninism, which are far better fitted to the particular needs of the American situation than any other conceivable theory. Otherwise, we would be a Party without a theory. We must not lose our general political bearings in the present uncertainty prevailing in the Party. For us to repudiate Marxism-Leninism—and this is what "dropping" Leninism from our Program would eventually come to—would be an impermissible ideological retreat, a far-reaching surrender to American exceptionalism. It would introduce endless confusion into our ranks and it would also be hailed by the arrogant capitalists of this country as proof-positive that there is no room

in their so-called "people's capitalism" for a Communist Party or for Socialism. It would put us in the untenable position of saying that Marxism-Leninism does not apply in the greatest of all capitalist countries. Wall Street would blazen forth its victory everywhere and would try to use it against Communist parties in all other countries. The CPUSA must not hand such a vital victory to the main enemies of the workers of the world, the American monopoly capitalists. On this vital point the Resolution must be strengthened and leadership waverings should cease.

For almost four decades now we have been striving to build a strong Communist Party under the especially difficult conditions prevailing in the United States, the heartland of world capitalism. No Communist Party in the capitalist world has a more difficult task than ours. In this long and devoted struggle, endless effort, hardship, and sacrifices have been expended; many comrades have spent long years in prison in carrying on this historic work, and not a few have given up their lives. Now we are at one of the most critical periods in this long and hard struggle. It is a time that demands calm heads and a firm adherence to the tried principles of Marxism-Leninism. While boldly taking every step necessary to broaden out, democratize, and Americanize our Party, we must beware of all those "shortcut" proposals that would divorce us from our basic principles

and eventually land us in far greater difficulties than those we now face.

Although the government's drive against the Party has not ceased (witness the recent convictions of our comrades in New York and elsewhere under the Smith Act) and although world tension has dangerous features in it (as evidenced by the sharp crisis over the Suez Canal), nevertheless there has been a definite improvement in the national and international situations over that of only a couple of years ago. With the workers, the Negro people, and other democratic strata developing more political initiative and now going into a crucial election struggle, the opportunity is here for the Party to better definitely its general position and to begin to recoup the losses suffered by it during the great struggle of the world's peoples in blocking the war drive of American imperialism—in which the Party, acting truly as the vanguard Party of the American people, played such an honorable part.

Were we counting our successes as well as our failures, we could well register as an important victory for civil liberties the successful defense of the Party's life and open existence in the face of the bitter attack from the government. For this we have also to thank the democratic forces both here and abroad for their pressure against the reactionary U.S. government. Although the Party is now in a position of semi-legality and is hedged about by many reactionary laws, it can and must cut its

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way out of this maze of restrictions, by building itself up from the mass of surrounding sympathizers, by improving its grass roots mass work, by strengthening its alliances with other democratic forces, and by developing a tireless campaign to amnesty our prisoners and to annul or to render inoperative the various fascist-like laws spawned by the Cold War reaction.

Our Party has faced very difficult situations before and emerged from them. For example, in 1925 the Party, torn for years with a destructive faction fight, had only a small fraction of the 60,000 members that it started out with a few years before. At this critical juncture, the head of the Comintern, Bukharin, advised our Party (with arguments very similar to those now being heard) to transform itself into merely an educational organization. But the Party, on the basis of its Marxist-Leninist spirit, rejected this opportunist advice, and in the ensuing years it went on to lead many important mass struggles and to build up its membership tenfold. In this general respect, history will repeat itself, with our Party getting out of its present difficulties and becoming a real force in the class struggle.

THE QUESTION OF A "NEW MASS PARTY OF SOCIALISM"

At the April meeting of the National Committee, Comrade Dennis put out the slogan "For a new mass party of Socialism", to be achieved

eventually by a merger of the Communist Party with other Left groupings. In the succeeding months the way this slogan has been mishandled has added greatly to the political uncertainty and liquidationism in the Party. It is not incorrect in principle that our Party should contemplate the possibility of an eventual unified party of Socialism and to keep this in mind in its work. But in view of the weakness in general of the Left groups in the United States—the CP is by far the largest of them—the slogan must not be put forth in an immediate sense; because, if so, it will act as a definitely liquidating force. For, clearly, the embattled Communist Party will not be rebuilt if it is shortly to be replaced by another and a broader Party. Obviously, therefore, our overwhelming attention now must be devoted to the building up of the Communist Party and its mass contacts, instead of running after the will o' the wisp of a new party.

The Right tendency in the Communist Party, which wants to dispose of the Party as it is now constituted, promptly seized upon the conception of the new mass party of Socialism. Following the April N.C. meeting, it made such a party look like an immediate possibility. This tended greatly to disorient our Party, especially in a liquidationist sense. The slogan has been further a confusing one because the proposed new party has been put forth as a "Marxist" party, a formulation which undermines the adherence of

the Communist Party to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

One of the many weak spots in the Draft Resolution for the coming National Party Convention is that it plays into the hands of the Right by laying altogether too much stress upon the slogan of the new mass party of Socialism. Thus, the sum-up of four long pages regarding the road to Socialism is an advocacy of the new party. Despite the warning of the Resolution itself that this slogan cannot be "advanced by any tendency to weaken or dissolve the C.P.", nevertheless, this is precisely the effect of the incorrect handling of the question in the Resolution. The slogan, therefore, should be de-emphasized in the Resolution by making it very clear that, at most, it represents only a long-range objective, and by concentrating every practical effort upon building the Communist Party. If this is not done, the slogan, as heretofore, will operate as a strong liquidationist influence in our Party.

Almost certainly in the United States the fight for Socialism will be made not by the Communist Party alone, but by a combination of economic and political groupings among which the Communist Party must be a decisive leader. The present immediate path as the workers proceed to the building of a mass Socialist movement in this country, therefore, is the strengthening of the Communist Party upon the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the development of broad united front mass

struggles. Towards other Left groups, our attitude at this time should be one primarily of active cooperation. If and when an opportunity develops to combine with such groups, the CP should do so upon essentially a Marxist-Leninist basis. Meanwhile, we should proceed upon our general ultimate pattern of a broad labor-farmer party of the masses and a strong Communist Party for the vanguard—it is wrong of the Resolution virtually to abandon the historic labor-farmer party slogan.

We must beware of "political shortcuts" and of being rushed into drastically changing the name, structure, and basic principles of the Communist Party. Such hasty and ill-thought-out devices, instead of affording the Party better legal protection and a broader access to the masses, would only discredit it and weaken its forces organizationally and ideologically.

THE RIGHT TENDENCY IN THE PARTY

During the sharp Party discussion of the past several months, strong Right tendencies, for the first time in a decade, have shown themselves in the Party. As yet, these have not crystallized into a definite program, but some of the widely expressed ideas are: a) the cultivation of a sharply critical attitude towards the Soviet Union; b) a big underplay of the role of the Socialist sector of the world; c) a weak

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spirit of internationalism, shading into bourgeois nationalism; d) a feeble Party discipline, patterned mostly after Social Democratic models; e) a soft-pedal upon the Negro question; f) the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice as Left-sectarian; g) to see no danger whatever of war now and very little of such danger during the intense periods of the cold war; h) a surrender of the century-long struggle of Marxists against "American exceptionalism", the bourgeois theory that American capitalism is not really capitalism at all, that American workers are not actual proletarians, etc.; i) a giving up of the theory of the general crisis of world capitalism, at least as far as United States is concerned; j) a play-down in general of the significance of proletarian theory; k) a tacit acceptance of Keynesian theories of "progressive capitalism" and the "managed economy"; l) an abandonment of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat; m) a tagging after the conservative trade-union bureaucracy, with little or no criticism; n) a big under-play of the aggressive foreign role of American imperialism; o) the relegation of Socialism for the United States to the background as a sort of museum piece, and above all, p) the transformation of the Communist Party into some sort of non-Leninist "Marxist" organization.

Obviously, many of the foregoing ideas and plans dovetail with the former revisionist, class collabora-

tion system of Earl Browder, who was expelled ten years ago. There is definitely a new Browderism developing in the Party. Some comrades, while repudiating Browder's crassest forms of bourgeois reformism and his ultimate renegacy from Communism, would resurrect what was "good" in his system. They look back nostalgically to the late 1930's, when the Party was making substantial progress, overlooking the vastly more favorable situation then existing, when the Party was going along freely in harmony with the general mood of the working class and under a not hostile government, in the fight against Hitlerism and for the trade-union organization of the basic industries; in contrast to the harsh persecutions suffered by the Party during the cold war years and its considerable conflict with the general mood of the working class regarding the origin of the war threat.

Other comrades, however, are prepared to accept Browderism hook, line, and sinker, justifying his whole revisionist system, and they are running extensive Browderite material in our Party press. They argue that if we had stuck to Browder's line the Party would have avoided the bitter persecution of the cold war period and the attendant losses in membership and mass contacts. They put Browder forth as an original exponent of peaceful co-existence.

In reply to such Browderite arguments, it is well to point out that

at the end of World War II the basic world situation was that two great and militant forces confronted each other; the one revolutionary and the other counter-revolutionary. The first of these elementary forces was the vast post-war revolutionary and democratic wave which swept over much of the world, as expressed by the developments in the Baltic countries, in the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, in the victory of People's China, in the revolutions in the colonial countries, and in the immense growth of the trade unions, workers' parties, and other democratic organizations in all parts of the world. The second big and militant force at the end of World War II was that of American imperialism — reactionary, powerful, ruthless, and resolved upon dominating the world, even at the cost of a horrifying atomic war—a power which ultimately expressed itself in a wide militarization, in atomic bomb diplomacy, in several predatory wars, and in creating the looming threat of a world war.

To suppose, as Browder did, that these two vast, antagonistic forces could have quietly composed their differences along the lines of friendly international collaboration under the leadership of "progressive" American imperialism, was fantastic. The basic tasks of the world's peoples in this historic situation were twofold: first, to see to it that Socialism and democracy were extended as widely as possible, and second, to checkmate the war pro-

gram of American imperialism and to preserve world peace. The broad growth of Socialism and democracy after the war and the preservation of peace were proof positive that the peoples succeeded generally in carrying out the two-pronged task thrust upon them by history at the end of the war. If, today, peaceful co-existence has become a highly practical policy, this is because the war drive of American imperialism has been checked, if not defeated outright. In view of all this, the CPUSA, like Communist parties all over the world, was fundamentally correct in foreseeing a post-war perspective of struggle and in joining with the progressive forces everywhere in supporting the revolutionary peoples of the world and in blocking the war program of Wall Street, and while doing this, in throwing pro-imperialist Browderism into the ashcan of history, where we should keep it. The claims that the Browder line would have avoided the Cold War struggle and led straight to peaceful co-existence, are opportunist nonsense.

Concentrating exclusively upon the fight against Left-sectarianism, the national Party leadership for several months paid no attention to the developing Right tendency, denying that it even existed. The result was that the latter, of whom Comrade Gates is one of the outstanding spokesmen, had a free hand and it grew rapidly in the uncertain Party situation. It entrenched itself in the *Daily Worker* and in

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the New York State Committee, and it also secured a following in various districts. A sharp factional attack was developed by the Gates tendency upon the Dennis Party leadership. At the August meeting, however, this open fight subsided when the National Committee cut the term "Marxism-Leninism" from the Party's Preamble and also made conditional our support of Marxism-Leninism in the Resolution. The Gates forces voted for all this obviously in the expectation that it constituted steps towards the eventual elimination of Marxism-Leninism from our Party life. They also urged and supported the Resolution's serious exaggeration of Party errors, its overstress upon the slogan for a new party of Socialism, and its abandonment of democratic centralism. The strong Right pressure of the Gates group has resulted in seriously undermining the Party's position on Marxism-Leninism. The Resolution, however, finally recognizes, although inadequately, that there is a Right danger in the Party, as well as the major "Left" danger.

PARTY MISTAKES AND THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION

Now let us return to a more detailed examination of the important question regarding the errors made by the Party during the cold war period. As we have seen, the vast over-estimation of the Party's mistakes (along with an underplay of its achievements and an under-

statement of the Party's difficulties in the struggle) has played a very vital role in disorienting the Party. It is the main source of the present pest of liquidationism in the Party, and it has caused many disputes in the NC. This whole matter must be cleared up as a basic necessity for reestablishing the health of the Party. First, let us consider the key role of objective conditions in relation to the Party's errors.

It is elementary Marxism that the objective situation determines the character of the Party's deviations at a given time. This does not mean that the objective conditions foreordain that certain mistakes must inevitably be made—skillful Marxist leadership can avoid them. But it does mean that the objective situation sets up a powerful predisposition towards making a given type of mistake. Thus, for example, the notorious Bernstein revisionism of pre-World War I years was definitely a product of the rise of world imperialism, plus an opportunist leadership.

By the same token, Earl Browder did not invent or pull out of thin air his Teheran revisionism of 1943. This notorious deviation was spawned by the current objective situation and by his surrendering to it. During World War II, the USSR and the western capitalist powers had gone through a great war in military alliance together, and it was very easy to conclude therefrom that this cooperation would continue on over into the peace. It was pre-

cisely because Browder's revisionism was thus rooted in the objective situation and, in fact, grew out of it, that not only our Party but almost every other Communist party in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention Communist parties in other parts of the world, accepted Browder's opportunist thesis enthusiastically, almost without discussion.

On the same principle, the characteristic deviation produced by the cold war situation was that of Left-sectarianism. This was because, under the fierce attacks of the Government upon the Party—in the courts, industries, trade unions, schools, housing, etc.—there was generated an elementary tendency for our relatively weak Party, both in its lower units and upper organs, to retreat in the face of its powerful antagonist, American imperialism, and very frequently to cover this retreat with radical phrases and other pretexts. So marked was this trend towards such Leftism, produced by the extreme pressure of the objective situation, that there were very few Right deviations made in the Party during the entire Cold War decade. Of course, to the extent that there were lingering Leftist tendencies in the Party, this helped to produce Left-sectarian deviations. But this is a very different thing from saying that the Party had a Leftist leadership and line.

The Draft Resolution, however, almost completely ignores the objective situation in analyzing mistakes made by the Party during the

Cold War period. It reduces the whole matter practically to a subjective basis. The errors are simply blamed offhand upon the Party, as though it conjured them out of the air, or rather, out of a basically incorrect, Left-sectarian policy. In fact, some Comrades declare that even to mention the objective factor means to cover up the Party's mistakes.

The consequence of this systematic ignoring of objective conditions as a basic factor in the making of political mistakes, has been to discredit needlessly the Party and its leadership for having followed a Left-sectarian line, which is just what the Right wants accomplished. The record, however, shows clearly that the Party resisted such mistakes and eventually corrected most of them. The Resolution, thus distorting the line of the Party during the Cold War period, greatly exaggerates the number and the character of the mistakes made, and it also largely ignores the elementary struggle conducted by the Party during these hard years to combat the strong tendency towards Left-sectarianism generated by the specific character of the objective situation. Consequently, the Resolution, in this section, besides stimulating defeatism, pessimism, and the Right tendency, is almost valueless in indicating the line of the Party during the Cold War. The same is true of its lessons for the future in this respect, for in all probability we shall confront a very different objective situation.

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A REVIEW OF THE PARTY'S ERRORS

Before touching specifically upon the distortions and exaggerations of the Party's line and errors, caused by the failure of the Resolution to take into consideration the objective situation in these respects, let us first see just what the Party's more important errors really were during the Cold War.

The fundamental cause of the Party's losses in membership and in mass contacts during the Cold War years was, of course, the long and fierce attack by the government of American imperialism upon our Party. Too often, however, in our eager search for "mistakes" to admit, we lose sight of this elementary fact. Of course, the present degree of our isolation was not pre-ordained, even under the hard conditions that the Party faced—the Party losses were much accentuated by its own preventable errors. However, in fighting against the war-fascist menace and in colliding with American imperialism, the most powerful and ruthless capitalist force in the world, anyone who thinks that a Party the size of ours and in our situation could have avoided suffering severe losses is living in a dream world. Many other Communist parties, facing similar forces upon other occasions, have experienced even greater injuries than we have. As it was, in the struggle for peace during the Cold War, our Party had to contend with more difficult conditions than al-

most any other Communist Party.

Regarding Party errors during the cold war, there were three elementary trends which should be noted: First, the most serious errors were made directly under especially heavy blows from the government—as at the outset of the Cold War itself, during the Korean war, and in the critical situations created by the fascist-like McCarran and Communist Control Acts. Second, as the Party, with the passage of time, learned better how to live under the current repression, it committed fewer mistakes, and the deviations that were made were almost always the faults of individual comrades or of groups, rather than of the Party as such. And third, as the struggle wore on, not only did the Party make fewer errors, but it also undertook, with much success, to correct mistakes that had been made earlier.

The three worst mistakes made by the Party during the Cold War period were: a) the support given to the Progressive Party in 1948 as a third party—an action which cut deeply into our mass contacts and which also served as one of the secondary excuses for expelling the eleven progressive unions from the CIO in 1949; b) the failure of the Party, in the court trial of the eleven National Board members in 1949-50, to put forward definitely the possibility for a parliamentary advance to Socialism in the United States, which had been proposed—it was left out of the lawyers' opening and

closing speeches and also out of the appeals to the higher courts. This Leftist error greatly weakened the position of the Party in the courts and before the masses, in the face of the government's false main charge against the Party that it advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government; and c) the approach taken to security measures to protect the Party. The latter was the worst error of the whole Cold War period. It did our Party great injury in losses of members and mass contacts, and in shoving the Party generally too far to the Left. Significantly, these three mistakes, the most damaging of the Cold War years, were all made by the Party's most experienced leaders, before the National Board members went to prison in 1951. These leaders were not Left sectarian. If they made the above mistakes it goes to indicate the compelling power of the objective situation during these crucial years of persecution. Of course, lingering Leftist trends in the Party operated to provoke and to worsen such errors.

There were also some important mistakes made by the Party in the latter stages of the Cold War, the most serious of which was the failure of the Communists to play a more active part in the merger of the AFL and CIO. This was sheer sectarian neglect, a hangover from 20 years of relative inactivity in the conservative unions. Of course, it is no excuse to say that these unions had practically outlawed Commu-

nists. A lesser mistake, stressed in the Resolution, was the Party's formulation that, regarding war, the American big capitalists were divided into two tendencies: the "war now" and the "war when we are ready" groups. Clearly, this was a too narrow conception; for although open capitalist opposition to the war program of the Truman and Eisenhower governments was distinguished chiefly for its insignificant size and general voicelessness, nevertheless it did exist to some small extent. The Party would have done better to stick to the three-group analysis that it started out with. The Party, however, always stood firm upon its basic proposition that the overwhelming mass of the American people were opposed to war.

There were errors, too, in connection with the Stalin cult of the individual, especially manifested by the Party's uncritical attitude towards negative developments in the USSR. These mistakes, however, were international in scope, not merely those of the CPUSA. They spread out over 20 years, and they were particularly damaging during the years of the Cold War. Inasmuch as they have been widely discussed in our Party, there is no need for me to dwell upon them here.

During the Cold War years the Party was also much handicapped by bureaucratism and lack of inner democracy, which crippled the initiative of the Party. In assessing this situation, however, it is necessary to take into consideration the ex-

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tremely difficult conditions amid which the Party was functioning under the prevailing war hysteria and persecution. The normal holding of full club gatherings, general local membership meetings, district conferences upon a broad scale, public mass demonstrations, and national conventions, was practically excluded. Too little attention has been given to this aspect in the sharp discussion of the question. Criticism of bureaucracy is very much in order, as Lenin used to insist endlessly. But although Stalin's cult of the individual had definite reflections in the CPUSA, as elsewhere, it is untrue to say that we have had an American cult of the individual during the post-war years. We had, however, a big dose of such poison during the Browder regime.

Bureaucracy is a disease afflicting more or less all organizations, not the least, working class bodies of every sort. Unfortunately Communist parties are not exempt from this pest. But it is safe to say, nevertheless, that the CPUSA, despite its shortcomings, has more inner-democracy than any trade union or other workers' organization in the United States, not to mention bourgeois organizations. In the period ahead of us the fight against bureaucracy must be carried on far more energetically than ever before. This does not mean, however, that we should fly to the other extreme of nihilistic practices of anti-leadership, of which there are now many expressions in the Party. We must

have strong and energetic leaders, but they must be kept within the bounds of Party inspiration, instruction, and control.

The most serious shortcoming of the Party, however, during the Cold War years was its marked weakness in carrying to the masses its generally correct main line of policy. This failure was due to many causes, both objective and subjective. Among these were: a) a certain tactical rigidity—although the Party necessarily spoke out clearly upon the war danger and associated policies, the tactical carrying of its line to the masses, in accordance with long-time practice, was supposed to take into account specific local conditions, a basic consideration which, however, was very frequently violated; b) sectarian conceptions to the effect that the masses were too deeply saturated with imperialist propaganda to put up a real fight for peace; c) the semi-outlawing of the Communists in the trade unions and other mass organizations; d) the violent anti-Communist attitude of the trade-union bureaucracy; e) the greatly weakened and immobilized forces of the Party, including a chronic leadership crisis; f) bureaucratic practices among Party leaders; g) the strong anti-Communist, anti-Soviet moods among the masses, of whom the overwhelming majority, influenced by bourgeois propaganda, held the USSR and the Communists in general responsible for the war danger. With this adverse mass mood the Party was vastly worse off during the

Cold War years than, say, during the World War II period, when it was in general harmony with the masses in the fight against Hitlerism, and when broad united front movements, next to impossible during the cold war, were readily organizable. Notwithstanding all these subjective and objective difficulties, however, the Party beyond question, should have done a far better job than it did in carrying its line to the masses. On the firing line of the class struggle, where the pressure of objective conditions was greatest, the characteristic tendencies of the Party in this period towards Left-sectarian mistakes were more in evidence than in the shaping of general policy.

THE EXAGGERATION OF PARTY ERRORS

The foregoing listed Party errors and shortcomings are far too many and they cast no credit upon us, even though they were spread out over ten years. But the Draft Resolution makes the situation appear much worse than it was, citing literally shoals of additional "errors." The Resolution, written under strong Right pressure, obviously does not make an objective analysis in this respect, but seems to set out to "convict" the Party of as many errors as possible, and to reduce its credits to a minimum. The idea appears to be that the more "mistakes" the Party confesses to, the better will be its standing among the masses, which

is absurd. The effect of such exaggeration, a product of divorcing the analysis from objective conditions, is to discredit the Party, to weaken its morale, to demolish the standing of its entire leadership and to feed the Right tendency in the Party. While, of course, the fight against Left-sectarianism is basically important, and we must also freely admit our errors and learn from them, we do not have to cut our Party to pieces in order to do this. Such an exaggeration of mistakes as we have had in our Party during recent months would not be tolerated in the Communist Parties of the USSR, People's China, Italy, etc. It is not constructive criticism, much of it, but a form of self-destruction for the Party. It definitely originates in and feeds the plague of pessimism and liquidationism now afflicting the Party. The Resolution still reflects much of this harmful stuff; hence the section dealing with Party errors should be re-drafted in accordance with Party policy and experience during the Cold War years.

The following examples of such exaggeration, even the manufacture of "errors," by no means cover all such cases, but merely give an indication of the trend. If it were desired to liquidate our Party no more effective means could be used to this end than the current discrediting of the Party and its leadership by thus ascribing to them endless "errors," many of which never happened. It all fits in with the Right policy to undermine the leadership

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of the Party and prepare the ground for pushing the Party to the Right, as is now being done.

The Resolution, for example, reiterates the charge that the Party overestimated the war danger, and especially that it considered war to be inevitable. This is flatly false. Actually, a central policy of the Party was to combat the persistent campaign of the warmongers to make the people believe that war was inevitable and that the people could do nothing to halt it. The Party's stand, militantly against war's inevitability, was expressed in innumerable articles. Among the masses, who were deluged with imperialist war propaganda, there was a widespread conviction that war was inevitable, but the Communist Party stood like a rock against it. One of the Party's biggest accomplishments during the Cold War was precisely its firm stand that war was not inevitable and that the people could block it, as they eventually did. For this position the Party deserves credit, not censure.

The Resolution also incorrectly asserts that the Party's "estimates excluded the possibility of the peaceful settlement of differences, except through a major change in the relation of class forces." That this is a serious misrepresentation of Party policy is to be found, among many other examples, in the fact that, toward the end of the Korean war, as the truce negotiations had been stalled for months over the thorny issue of returning the war prisoners

to the respective sides before the armistice was signed, the CPUSA came forward with the proposal that first the cease-fire should be signed and then the prisoners-of-war question should be taken up later. As it turned out, it was along this line that the war was finally settled. All through the Cold War years the Party took a similar practical and realistic position, laying every possible stress upon the policy of negotiation and upon the ultimate perspective of the peaceful co-existence of all powers. Why not credit the Party with this major achievement?

As for the Resolution's statement that the Party did not understand before-hand the significance nor possibilities of the Geneva Conference, let me cite a paragraph from an article of mine (*Daily Worker*, July 14, 1955), which reflected the Party's current thinking:

The Big Four conference scheduled for Geneva on July 18th is the center of unprecedented attention. This is because the overwhelming mass of humanity, alarmed at the menacing atomic war, are looking to the conference to end the nightmare situation, taking steps to end the Cold War and to establish peace in the world. This is a realizable hope on the part of the peace-loving masses throughout the world.

This is a correct statement, which will bear favorable comparison with any made in the United States or anywhere else. Why condemn our Party for such a sound stand?

The Resolution also charges the Party with overestimating the danger of fascism. This, too, is altogether contradicted by the facts. If the Party is entitled to any credit whatever in its fight during these hard years, it is precisely for its resolute struggle against McCarthyism and for its limitless confidence that the people could and would overcome this fascist menace. Members here and there doubtless overestimated fascism, but proof that the Party as such did not do so was furnished by its reaction to the passage of the notorious Communist Control Act in 1954, which caused a very critical situation. This vicious law formally outlawed the Communist Party. Many comrades became alarmed that this law, on top of all the other reactionary legislation, meant the beginning of actual fascism in the United States. But the hard-pressed Party did not lose its head in the face of this new menace. Instead, it published in *Political Affairs* of November 1954, the article entitled, "Is the United States in the Early Stages of Fascism?", in which it declared that although the Bill of Rights had been seriously infringed upon, nevertheless it could not be said that there was fascism in the United States, "early stages or otherwise," and the Party called upon the workers and the people generally to fight and defeat McCarthyism. This sane analysis of the situation in the United States was cited far and wide in other countries, which were also disturbed by the growth of McCar-

thyism in this country. Instead of being condemned for its stand regarding fascism, the Party deserves credit for its steadiness and clear-headedness in those times of severe trial. Typically, however, the Resolution ignores this whole vital incident. In view of the facts, the Resolution's statement that the Party "tended to equate the attempted outlawing of the Party with fascism" is harmful nonsense useful only to the Right tendency in its attempt to discredit the Party's past policy.

There are many in our Party who believe that actually there was little or no real war danger, and they imply that, somehow or other, the Party could have avoided the severe issue of the anti-war struggle. But this is only an illusion. As a Leninist party, particularly the one in the home country of the main aggressive power, our Party had no alternative other than to follow the policy that it did. It would have been impossible for the Party as such to have tried to take refuge from the storm in a policy of neutrality or of soft-peddling the war danger, as some now indicate it should have done. This would have meant a cowardly retreat in the face of the offensive of American imperialism, and it would also have marked the end of the Communist Party as the fighting party of the working class. With the mass organizations, however, there was greater latitude of action.

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CPUSA was true to itself, to the working class, to the American people, and to the world struggle for peace. It acted, in fact, as the workers' vanguard party had to act. Its fight during the Cold War against the fascists and warmakers constitutes one of the most glorious pages, not only in the life of our Party, but also of the American working class. We should be proud of it, instead of apologizing for it, and trying to make it look as though the whole long and bitter struggle was just a Leftist blunder. Let us not, with one-sided, ill-grounded criticism, rob our Party of its well-won share of the great peace victory of the world's peoples. The price of such folly, as we can see now in our Party, is demoralization, liquidationism, and Right opportunism.

Let me cite only a few more of the many exaggerations of Party "errors" in the Draft Resolution. Among others, there is the repeated implication that the expulsion of the eleven progressive unions from the CIO in 1949 was due to Left-sectarianism on the part of the forces of the Left. Here, again, we have a characteristic misrepresentation, in which the Party is given the worst of it, and thus we have another manufactured "error" to confess. While, obviously, there were some Left-sectarian trends in CIO unions (which, incidentally, the Party systematically fought against), these had little or nothing to do with the 1949 split. The split, in fact, was organized by the U.S. State Department and

its labor agents, as a basic move to overcome American and world labor opposition to Wall Street's war program. The split encompassed not only the American labor movement, but also those in Italy, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Latin America, and many other countries. It likewise split the World Federation of Trade Unions. The progressives, both in the United States and abroad, did everything possible to avoid the rupture, but in vain. Also the break-up generally of the "Left-center" coalition in the CIO, for which the Party is also unjustly blamed, was deliberately engineered by Murray, Reuther, Curran, Quill, *et al*, who had become committed to the aggressive foreign policy of the State Department, and for them, consequently, a break with the "Left" was a "must."

The Resolution also asserts that some (meaning me, among others) held the opinion "that the (AFL-CIO) merger was being consummated upon the initiative of the State Department." What I actually said, however, was:

The conservative Meany group, which has come to the top of the merged organization, hopes thus to be able to tighten still further its grip upon the labor movement and also to tie the working class to the imperialist anti-Soviet program of the State Department, of which they are the most militant supporters and instigators. Generally, this consolidation is a big step forward for the American working class, but a millstone around its

neck are the ultra-conservative bureaucrats who dominate it (*History of the World Trade-Union Movement*, p. 541).

That statement, I still think, was in accordance basically with the facts.

The Resolution flatly declares, in connection with the basic error of 1951, that this "led to the introduction of a system of leadership which virtually abandoned the fight for legality and tended to accept a status of illegality. . . ." This is a basically incorrect interpretation of the actual situation. The fact was that the National and Administrative Committees, immediately after the 1951 security error, developed a sharpened orientation for maintaining the legal existence of the Party. Strong features of this fight were the many months' long trials in defense of the Party leaders, the maintenance of open Party headquarters in spite of the police persecutions, the continued circulation of the Party press, and the carrying on of various other public activities, notwithstanding the sharp government attacks. Doubtless, more could have been done. However, the Party's defeat of the government's attempt to break it up or to drive it underground should be hailed as a real victory for civil liberties, instead of being condemned as a mistake and a defeat for the Party.

Finally, let us mention only a few more of the typical exaggerations of Party "errors." Thus, the Resolu-

tion literally slashes to pieces the Party's post-war economic analyses, because these made the same mistakes as Communist and bourgeois economists all over the world, in foreseeing a sharper economic depression than actually took place. In reality, however, despite this error, which was world-wide, our Party now has a better group of economists — Allen, Bittelman, Lumer, Strack, and others—and they are doing better work, than ever before in the Party's history. Also, in line with the characteristic overstress on Party weaknesses, the Resolution simply wipes us out on the theoretical field, although here our Party also very distinctly has to its credit some notable achievements, which must not be ignored or belittled. Likewise, the Resolution gives no credit whatever to the many, often inexperienced, comrades who had to bear the burdens of leadership during these severe years, and who generally did so with credit to themselves and the Party.

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The tendency of the Resolution to see Left-sectarianism and failure in every feature and phase of the Party's work during the Cold War period, even in disregard of the plain facts to the contrary, is one of the many signs of the strong Right influence in the writing of the Resolution. The Right tendency to belittle the Party and its work during the period is just so much preparation for pushing the Party as far as possible to the Right.

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THE PARTY'S FIGHT AGAINST
LEFT-SECTARIANISM

Many comrades believe that the sharp attack by Comrade Dennis against Left-sectarianism at the April meeting of the National Committee represented a complete turnabout in policy for the Party; but this was not so. Instead, it constituted the sharpening up, under much more favorable circumstances, of an already definitely established and correct trend to combat the sectarian mistakes and tendencies that had been stimulated by the government's attack. Such a correct tendency, which, of course, could have been more actively expressed, had become well-marked in the latter Cold War years. This fact was proof that neither the Party itself nor its leadership was Left-sectarian, nor were they deliberately carrying on a Left-sectarian line. But the Resolution, typically, gives the Party very little credit in this general direction.

At its national convention in 1945, when Browder revisionism was defeated, the Party, basing itself upon continuing and strengthening the old Roosevelt coalition, warned sharply of the danger, after such a battle against the Right, of the Party swinging too far to the Left. As it was said at the time, we did not overthrow Browder's reformism, in order to fall into the swamp of Left-sectarianism. The Party, in line with this conception, also refused to make "a clean sweep" of the leaders under the Browder regime, as was

widely demanded at the time. As a result of the Party adopting these essentially correct policies, Leftist groups in various parts of the country, led by Darcy, Dunne, Smith, and others, split away from the Party, alleging that the new leadership was centrist. During the conventions, conferences, and other gatherings in the several Cold War years following, the successive reports of Comrades Dennis, Hall, Stevens, Gannett, Perry, and many others, reiterated the Party's timely 1945 warnings against the danger of Left-sectarianism. That various "Left" mistakes were made, nevertheless, go to indicate mainly the compelling power in this direction of the government attack upon the Party.

During the April meeting of the National Committee, in an effort to show a "Left" orientation by the Party during the Cold War, much was made of the fact that Foster had said in 1948 that the main danger was the Right danger. It might have been added that all the other leaders then said the same thing. But, even so, this would not have proved the point in mind. Because, in determining whence came the main danger it was all pretty much a matter of definition. If, for example, the criterion taken was the labor movement itself, as was usually the case, then the answer, considering the role of the conservative trade-union leadership, was that the main danger came from the Right. But if the criterion taken was the Party itself, the answer should be

that the main danger came from the "Left." The basic thing, however, was that the Party, all through this trying period, fought, and generally correctly, all the obstacles that were weakening the fighting unity of the working class and the people, regardless of whether it called them Right or "Left" dangers. The simple fact is that, under the heavy blows of the government attack, there was practically no Right danger within the Party; the danger being almost entirely from Leftist mistakes, and it was against these naturally that the Party had to, and did, fight.

In the article, "Left Sectarianism in the Fight for Negro Rights and against White Chauvinism," written by myself and discussed at length before publication by the Administrative Committee (*Political Affairs*, July 1953) it was pointed out clearly that the main danger confronting the Party, not only in Negro work, but also in the fields of trade unionism, peace, Party defense, etc., was Left-sectarianism. The article stated: "The sectarian trends in our Party's Negro work are part of this general pattern of Leftist errors characteristic of this period of severe governmental repression." The allegation that the Party "balanced off" Right and "Left" errors and fought them both equally, does not make sense, precisely because, as pointed out previously, there were very few Right errors made during the Cold War period, the characteristic mistakes in these times, under the blows of the government, being

of a Leftist character.

Further proofs that the Party had no general sectarian line, as the Right charges, were to be found in the many examples of its fighting not only to prevent wrong tendencies from developing into serious errors, but also to correct errors that had been made previously. Take, for instance, the Party Program of 1954. This document, written mostly by the National Committee, climaxed a long process of criticism of the Progressive Party mistake of 1948. Not only did the Program finally correct this mistake, but it also definitely registered a solid advance in general for the Party in its electoral work.

The same corrective trend was also to be seen in the Negro work. In this vital field two groups of Comrades developed serious Leftist deviations, with roots running far back into Party history. They were both futile efforts to explain and correct the Party's diminished influence among the Negro people at the time. One deviation tended to overstress the value of "Left centers" and the obsolete slogan of self-determination; while the other, more subtle and dangerous, vastly overestimated the degree of crippling white chauvinism in the Party. The common result of both deviations was to substitute intense inner-Party discussion for mass work among the Negro people. The Party fought both of these serious sectarian deviations actively and, in the main, liquidated them

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ideologically. In doing this, the Party held one of its most profound discussions on the Negro question and it assembled materials for a greatly improved program in this field. The Resolution, however, with its usual one-sided treatment of Party errors, completely ignores these basic facts.

Among other similar corrections of previously made errors may also be cited the efforts to overcome the effects of wrong security measures. The new Party leadership re-opened district headquarters, resumed public activities, encouraged similar action by the youth, and generally stimulated and strengthened the Party's fight for a legal existence in the face of sharp governmental assault. These steps to utilize all legal opportunities for Party work, were of the most vital consequence. During these hard years the Party also broadened out politically and in a mass sense the various succeeding Smith Act trials of Party leaders. In the field of economics, too, notwithstanding all the sharp criticism of the Resolution in this field, the embattled Party found it possible to register some progress in lessening the sectarianism which for many years had hampered it. Especially this was done by taking up seriously the questions of Keynesism and its "managed economy," basic economic matters which for many years had been virtually ignored by the Party as such. Even in the extremely difficult sphere of the application of the Party's policies among the masses, some progress

was also made. This was notably the case in the distribution, during an intense mass discussion, of almost one million copies of the Party Program, an achievement which would have been hailed as important in any period of our Party's life.

The Party's efforts to combat sectarianism were also particularly demonstrated in cases of very heavy attacks by reaction upon the Bill of Rights and upon the Party. Thus, the passage of the notorious McCarran act, which provides concentration camps for Communists and demands that our Party register with the government as an alien agent, caused leading comrades, upon three different occasions, to make certain unwarranted proposals, as a counter measure against the law. However, the National and Administrative Committees correctly rejected them all as liquidatory.

The passage of the Communist Control Act, which formally outlawed the Party, also set afoot active fears throughout the Party to the effect that the passage of this law marked the beginning of fascism in the United States; but, as we have seen earlier, the Party promptly and effectively overcame these sectarian alarms. This most vital action has also escaped the attention of the Resolution. In the same spirit and during the most difficult period of the Cold War, the Party also set actively about correcting the serious sectarian error made by some in respect to the perspective of winning Socialism in the United States by parliamentary

means. As a result of this corrective trend and despite a continuing top leadership opposition, the proposition was written clearly into the Party History and into the election program of 1954. It was also made a central feature of the trial of Comrades Flynn, Gannett, Perry, Bittelman, Weinstone, and the others. For the first time, too, this basic proposition was incorporated in our appeals to the higher courts. It was also included in our defense in later Smith Act trials. This adoption of the definite perspective of a parliamentary road to Socialism in the United States, done during the most intense period of the Cold War, constituted one of the greatest steps away from sectarianism and towards a broad mass policy ever taken in the entire history of our Communist Party. In this sense the Resolution should record this very important development.

Significantly, Earl Browder, who then still called himself a Communist and who is now being boosted in our Party as a super-mass worker, saw fit to intervene in this situation. He took definitely a dogmatic and sectarian position. Late in 1949, he wrote a 70-page pamphlet, entitled "In Defense of Communism Against Wm. Z. Foster's 'New Route to Socialism'." It was an all-out attack against my pamphlet, published earlier in that year, called "In Defense of the Communist Party and the Indicted Leaders," which contained the pioneer presentation of the parliamentary ad-

vance to Socialism in the United States. Browder denounced my writing as the crassest revisionism and "an attempt to reshape the fundamental theories of Marxism." Indignantly, he declared that, "The repudiation of the 'New Route to Socialism' is the first step necessary to restore a Party of Marxism in America." He also forecast that it would not be long before "Foster's 'New Route to Socialism' (is) rejected by Communists all over the world as a major departure from Marxism-Leninism." Obviously, by this big pitch Browder was making a bid to regain the leadership of the Communist Party. But it did not work. As we all know, his prophecies came to nought. These facts, incidentally, may help dispose of the newspaper lies to the effect that we split with Browder because he advocated a peaceful road to Socialism while we insisted upon a violent one.

From all the above, it should be obvious that although the Party suffered much from damaging Left-sectarianism during the Cold War period, which kept cropping out under the hard pressure of the government attack upon the Party, the Party leadership in no sense cultivated or reconciled itself to such errors. On the contrary, it fought against them, and in various instances, successfully. In short, in this crucial situation, despite the Party's traditional sectarian weaknesses, the Party did not have a sectarian leadership or line. This elementary fact should be made clear in the Resolution as a

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basic measure to combat the strong Right tendency in the Party.

STRENGTHEN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Resolution should be changed to take a correct stand upon the vital question of Marxism-Leninism. First, it should give a general endorsement to Marxism-Leninism and then deal with questions of its applicability to the American situation in specific cases. We must be alert to defend the Marxist-Leninist basis of the Party and not permit the Right in the Party to downgrade Lenin theoretically. The Resolution should also de-emphasize the slogan for a new mass party of Socialism from its present implications of immediacy to the status of a possible long-range objective. Otherwise, the slogan, as it has done up until now, will exert a liquidatory influence. Necessary also is a proper placing of the historic mass slogan for a labor-farmer party, which is unduly played down in the Resolution. Especially important, too, is it to strengthen in the Resolution the vital element of proletarian internationalism, which is but weakly developed.

The Resolution presents a good program of practical work for the Party in various fields—elections, trade union, Negro, etc., and this should be put into effect actively and at once, even as the discussion proceeds upon the general Resolution. Without an all-out stress upon mass

work, all other methods to improve the Party's difficult situation would prove sterile. The developing favorable political situation is offering the Party opportunities for broad united front work to establish the people's anti-monopoly coalition. The Party must meet this situation in a flexible spirit. This, among other things, implies less reckless criticism of labor leaders than we have made in the past. But needful criticism of labor reactionaries is always in order and is no bar to broad united front policies. In this general respect the Resolution could also be strengthened.

In the crucially important matter of the estimate of the Party's policies during the Cold War, the present Draft Resolution, as a result of the broad Party debate, including intense discussion in the National Committee, represents a considerable improvement over the April meeting of the NC. Thus, it contains a recognition of the seriousness of the war danger during the Cold War; it states definitely that the United States was following a war policy aimed at securing world domination; it gives a better analysis of the harsh objective difficulties faced by the Party during the Cold War, and it makes at least a start at estimating the Party's achievements during the period—in all of which matters the April NC meeting was seriously lacking. However, the extreme exaggeration of Party errors, which has already wrought such confusion in our Party during the past months, still

persists in the Resolution. This can only help the Right tendency to push the Party to the Right by unjustly discrediting the Party and its leadership. The situation should be corrected by re-writing this section of the Resolution upon the basis of the actual experience of the Party during the period in question. This is a fundamental necessity for the restoration of the Party's prestige, to raise the morale of the membership, and to make it possible to recruit again workers who may have quit the Party under the severe pressures of the Cold War attack upon the Party. It is inconceivable that such a one-sided and harmful body of criticism should be allowed to stand.

The Resolution should also be strengthened by stressing much more the importance of an active political initiative by our Party. Such initiative has been a striking characteristic of all our important struggles of the past, the amalgamation and farmer-labor movements of the early 1920's and the strike activities of the same general period; the Party's strong leadership among the Negro people at this time; the big unemployed struggles during 1929-33; the huge union organization drives of the 1930's; the immense youth movement of the same period; the people's front struggle against fascism and war all through these years; the Party's active support of World War II; the hard battle against an atomic war during the Cold War period, etc. In all these memorable struggles our Party's policies and ac-

tivities always bore an advance-guard character. Although small in size, the Party gave definite leadership to great masses. This Leninist leading principle must be retained by us, applying it skillfully in the light of changed conditions. A Communist Party can amount to but little if it merely keeps abreast politically of the mass organizations, or, worse yet, if it simply tags along after them. Incidentally, practically all the above notable struggles were good examples of fitting the Party's program to specific American conditions.

In the time-tested Leninist method, the Party must fight ideologically on two fronts, with the main emphasis against Leftism. Its major struggle should be directed to eliminate all manifestations of Left-sectarianism from our thinking and action. This is indispensable for the development of the Party. At the same time, the Party should combat the vigorous Right tendency which has so suddenly sprung up within its ranks during the recent period, including its pro-Browder manifestations. This Right tendency is now menacing the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the Party.

The coming national convention of the Party must unify and strengthen our organization for the big struggles ahead. Every Communist who understands the fundamental importance of our Party for the working class will work to this end. From its present critical situation the Party can and will emerge safely, all the

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stronger and the more steeled because of the many difficulties it has been passing through. During the world struggle against Wall Street's war threat, our Party proved, as it had done on many other occasions, that it is made of the same fighting stuff

as the great and victorious Marxist-Leninist parties which are now changing the world by winning it for Socialism; and once again it is being called upon to demonstrate these Communist fighting qualities. It will not fail in the test.

It has been necessary to postpone for one month the publication of the concluding installment of W. Z. Foster's article, "Marxism-Leninism in a Changing World," the first half of which appeared in our September issue—ed.

Towards the Party Convention*

By Eugene Dennis

It is appropriate that our outlook for the convention be discussed in relation to the two urgent questions which have occupied us at this nation conference—the national elections and the Marxist press.

Our objectives in the elections have been well stated: to make a maximum contribution towards clarifying the major issues, to promote labor-Negro-farmer cooperation and alliances, and to help defeat the most reactionary enemies of the labor movement and the Negro people—the most rabid opponents of the national welfare and peace.

It is true that only five weeks remain until the November elections. As our deliberations have indicated, although the time is short our efforts, mass activity and initiative can have a modest, yet a positive bearing on the final phase of the election campaign.

Moreover, irrespective of the outcome of the elections itself, we can facilitate, now and after the elections, improved relations between the Left and other sectors of the labor movement. We can help advance the common action of labor and its allies for the big struggles that will

unfold after November, thereby promoting the trend towards an anti-monopoly coalition.

Our discussion on the Marxist press grows out of the pressing situation that has arisen and that threatens the very existence of the Marxist daily newspapers in our country. Our great concern to preserve these publications does not stem solely from our deep attachment to them.

For these papers have been, and most become even more, a most powerful instrument for voicing the needs and interests of the working class, the Negro people, and their democratic allies—a mightier and a more popular tribune for peace, democracy and Socialism.

As we make the fight of our lives for putting these papers on a solid financial foundation, increasing their circulation, and broadening their base and appeal, we must be increasingly conscious of the fact that these papers are key weapons in the battle of ideas, a battle in which their sharpest edge must be directed against the policies and the ideas of monopoly.

While the Marxist press cannot even begin to compete in size, news coverage, and special features with the giant corporate press combines

* Speech at the National Election Campaign Conference of the Communist Party, New York City, Sept. 30, 1956.

that cover our country, they can more than hold their own in this battle of ideas. Our success in furthering the goals set by this conference will in no small degree depend on our ability, and the ability of the papers themselves, to imbue their readers with the utmost confidence in our cause and in our basic Communist ideology.

What we do on these two questions before and after the elections will leave its imprint on our national convention and the course of coming events.

* * *

As we all know, at the end of the election campaign we will officially open our pre-convention discussion. This discussion period will take place at a time of new advances in the world-wide struggle for peace, national liberation, and social progress.

Within the country, the prospects are for a considerable sharpening of economic and political struggles. Masses of people are in a mood to offer more effective resistance to the attacks of monopoly. The struggle for desegregation and civil rights is bound soon to enter a new phase. And regardless of the complexion of the new Administration and Congress, tens of millions of working people are determined to press forward to realize *now* some of the election promises for peace and prosperity, for a "new era" and a "new America."

This—in a nutshell—will be the

atmosphere in which our pre-convention discussion opens. It is bound to be vigorous and, at times, extremely sharp, with many clashing ideas and estimates. For we are in the process of collectively assessing the perilous period of cold war and witchhunts from which we are beginning to emerge, and during which reaction took such a heavy toll.

Our task is doubly complex because we are not merely examining the past, rectifying our previous errors, and beginning to overcome our relative isolation. We are doing all this at the same time as we enter a period of great change; a period which is prompting us, as well as the Marxists of all countries, to review our work and policies, and to develop further the theory of Marxism-Leninism to meet changing conditions and the challenge of new developments.

How well is our Party prepared to face this most challenging period in its history? Is our Party capable of coming through this crucial test in a way that will enable it to more effectively discharge its responsibilities to the working class and people of our country?

My own answer to these questions is an unequivocal: YES. Starting with the approach to the April plenum of our National Committee, we have begun a critical review of the past, and a searching consideration of the problems ahead. With the active participation of our member-

ship we are engaging in an extensive debate and democratic exchange of opinions, which are already beginning to effect positive changes in our policies, thinking, and methods of work. We have also weighed the lessons of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Some of the main conclusions drawn from this past period of collective probing, and from the initial steps forward that have been taken, are embodied in the Draft Resolution adopted by the overwhelming majority of the National Committee as a basis for the pre-convention discussion.

In my judgment this Draft Resolution is basically correct. It provides a sound political direction for our Party.

What are the central propositions upon which this judgment is based? Stated in capsule form these include:

1) The Resolution makes a sound estimate of the new and important changes that have taken place, and are taking place, in the world—particularly the historic significance of the emergence of Socialism as a world system, the consequent disintegration of the old colonial empires and the new trends towards working-class unity—changes which open new perspectives of peaceful co-existence, national freedom and social progress.

Yet, as the Resolution points out, the dominant world trend towards peaceful co-existence does not advance spontaneously. As the events around the Suez affair graphically

demonstrate, while imperialism continues to try to impose its will by armed force, the threat of force and violence and other pressure, the new relationships of forces in the world are such that war is no longer inevitable. At the same time, these events also underscore that the road to peace continues to be the road of struggle and requires the constant vigilance, intervention, and solidarity of the peoples, not the least, of the American people.

2) The Resolution correctly estimates some of the new and favorable developments in our country: the growth of popular sentiment for peaceful negotiations between the East and West; the broadening movement for civil rights and for the restoration of the Bill of Rights: the forward steps of organized labor to achieve effective unity, security and greater participation in the political life of the country.

The Resolution takes special note of the enormous significance for the welfare and future of our country of the rising Negro liberation movement in the South and the growing nationwide struggle for civil rights. It recognizes that the struggle to win full equality for the Negro people in the South and to achieve the organization of the South on the firm foundation of Negro and white unity constitute the Number One democratic task for our country. This is a central struggle to uphold the Constitution and to expand democracy in America.

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3) While noting certain favorable developments in our country, the Resolution does not minimize the difficulties ahead. It points out that the monopolists have grown bigger and their grip on the government has increased since the advent of the Cadillac Cabinet. It emphasizes that the main enemy of the American people, as well as the main danger to world peace, are the vested corporate interests, the predatory monopolies.

There can be no doubt that in the immediate period ahead American monopoly capital will make every effort to intensify its exploitation of the home market, to step up its offensive against the living standards, rights, and organizations of the working people—including the NAACP, the trade unions, and our Party.

But the Resolution also stresses that wider sections of the labor movement and its allies are moving in the direction of greater cooperation and concerted action to resist the offensive of the trusts. It emphasizes that the path to a "New America" lies through curbing and eventually breaking the power of the monopolies.

This is why the Resolution places in a *new way* the necessity *and* the *new possibilities* for the development of a people's anti-monopoly coalition and a corresponding political realignment. It places this objective, culminating in the election of a government based on such a

labor-farmer-Negro alliance, as the strategic task before the American working class and its allies in the period ahead.

4) The Resolution strongly reaffirms, and in a number of respects develops further, the position of our Party in advocating and striving for the transition to Socialism by democratic and constitutional means. We first raised this perspective for the future in the late '40s—even as the dangers of the cold war and reaction were growing sharper. Now, however, with the new elements in the world situation, the possibilities of a peaceful, constitutional transition become clearer.

As the Resolution points out, the establishment of an anti-monopoly alliance and government led by the working class would make possible the realization of the immediate program of labor and the popular forces. But, more than this, it could also open the door to further democratic and social advance. It could pave the way to fundamental social changes, including the transition to Socialism, under conditions where the people could move forward by constitutional means.

5) Of exceptional and far-reaching importance are the conclusions drawn in Section IV of the Resolution dealing with the Party. Taking into account not only the lessons of our past errors and weaknesses, but, above all, the profound changes in the new world period in which we are now living, the Resolution pro-

poses changes in our structure and methods of work, in strengthening inner-Party democracy, and in how we apply our science. It goes further than we were able to last April, going deeper into the sources of our recent errors and of our long-standing Left-sectarianism.

In the light of this re-examination and the important changes proposed, we stress the basic concept of our Party as an American working-class organization—democratic, unified, militant—based on the principles of Scientific Socialism, on our scientific application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.

While pointing towards the future and our endeavor to help create the conditions for the emergence of a broad, mass party of Socialism in our country, based on Marxist principles, the Resolution stresses the historic role of our Party, pride in its past achievements, and confidence in its ability to overcome its weaknesses and past errors. It expresses the determination that our Party can effect the necessary changes and can be built and strengthened so that it will be in a position to measure up to its great responsibilities.

* * *

In stressing the most significant features of the Draft Resolution, I do not wish to imply that the Resolution is a model of perfection or is devoid of serious shortcomings—some of which we noted in the covering letter to our membership. This

is particularly true in respect to the inadequate analysis of some of the new developments and problems confronting the labor movement, the specific role of the Party in this connection and how we exercise our vanguard role. There are also a number of ambiguous or faulty formulations in the Draft which certainly need improvement and which on a future occasion I intend to discuss.

Moreover, the Resolution does not attempt to answer all questions, some of which will have to be probed and discussed over a much longer period than what remains until the convention.

Nonetheless, it is my belief that the main political line of the Resolution is sound. Its shortcomings will be corrected and it will be strengthened in the course of the discussion and in the final action of the convention.

* * *

Of course, some do not share this point of view. Within the limits of the short time at my disposal, let me touch briefly on some of these viewpoints.

Some say the Resolution is a "compromise." By that they do not refer to this or that particular formulation. They mean that the document conciliates contradictory trends and major differences—and resolves nothing. But this is not so. The Resolution points in a definite and basically correct direction. In the course of the debates, many ques-

to the questions were studied, many differences of the resolved. Obviously, certain view-points and proposals were rejected, and various shadings of opinion and emphasis are still held by individual comrades. Various differences which also arose in the deliberations—especially since none of you have had an opportunity to read the forthcoming article by Comrade Foster in which he explains his "no" vote—are being reported by the National Committee to the state organizations and will be dealt with extensively in forthcoming articles. But the fact remains that on all central questions the Resolution represents the political position and collective thinking of the majority of the National Committee.

* * *

The charge has also been made that the Resolution departs from the science of Marxism-Leninism. But an objective examination of the Resolution shows that this charge is without foundation. Like the Marxist-Leninists of other lands, we have taken into account the profound changes in the world situation which require a further development of our theory and the modification of certain theoretical propositions.

Secondly, we re-affirm that it is we American Communists who must interpret and apply the theory of Marxism in accord with the conditions of our country and the experiences of the American working class.

Thirdly, we recognize that some

of our past errors arose from a doctrinaire interpretation of certain Marxist-Leninist propositions, from attempts to apply mechanically some of the experiences of Marxists of other lands and from an unscientific approach to some of their views.

We are convinced that this Resolution will help the Party to fight effectively against both dogmatism and the distortion or abandonment of Marxist-Leninist theory. It will aid our Party to unite the universal truth of Marxism with the experiences and practices of the struggles of the American working class and people.

* * *

Some contend that although the Party's past errors were largely Left-sectarian, the Right danger is the main danger now. It is necessary to note that the Resolution calls upon the Party to vigilantly combat Right-opportunist tendencies which undoubtedly will grow as we make the necessary turn. Further, the Resolution condemns and rejects liquidationism. But the Resolution does this within the context of recognizing that to overcome our relative isolation and establish broader ties with the labor and people's movements, our main struggle nationally must be against Left-sectarianism.

Who can deny that we are only beginning to overcome our longstanding deeprooted sectarianism? Who can deny that we are only beginning to develop a flexible and united front policy, taking into ac-

count the new developments and trends within the merged labor movement and the great Negro liberation struggles? The fact is that to thoroughly overcome Left-sectarianism in our thinking, our habits, and our policies, will require a protracted struggle going far beyond our coming convention.

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On the perspective for a new united party of Socialism—some reject it entirely as negating the role of our own Party today. Others distort this perspective and present it as something that can be brought about “in a hurry” as a substitute for our Party and as an escape from our present difficulties. Still others, such as Starobin, invite us to “disband,” “fade away,” and thus allegedly “facilitate the emergence of a new party of Socialism.”

To reject the perspective for a new united party of Socialism would weaken the possibilities of unity of action of all socialist-minded forces in the coming period, as well as our ability to influence in a Marxist-Leninist direction existing currents of socialist thinking and those which we believe will develop in the period ahead, especially in the labor movement.

On the other hand, to attempt to realize this perspective immediately would be to abort it, to create a sectarian caricature of what it should be, and to disperse our ranks and negate our vital role.

We view the perspective of a new

united party of Socialism as a worthwhile objective, which in any case will require time and struggle to realize. We consider that this orientation will help strengthen the socialist component of the developing anti-monopoly people's coalition, and that it will also prove fruitful for promoting the unity of socialist forces in this country on a working class, Marxist basis.

* * *

Some say that the Resolution exaggerates the errors of the Party and deprecates its signal achievements. But the fact is that the Resolution speaks with legitimate pride of the achievements of the Party and the noteworthy contributions which it has made in the past difficult and trying years, especially in the struggle against the dangers of war and fascism. Moreover, we express the utmost confidence in the future of our Party and the historic role it will yet play.

Our confidence has increased because at long last we are drawing the profound lessons of our errors over the past decade, and of some of the weaknesses that have plagued us since the earliest years of our organization. We realize that our recent mistakes, as well as our losses, were influenced by objective factors. But we realize, too, that subjective factors played an important role. If we deal extensively with these, especially with the nature, roots, and consequences, of our mistakes—it is because we understand these are the

factors that *we can change*.

As we all know, one of the tests of a genuine Marxist party is whether it can self-critically learn from its own mistakes and make the necessary changes and corrections. In this respect, the Resolution makes a signal contribution.

* * *

Some comrades think that the Resolution does not go far enough in the recommendations made for changes in the form and structure of the Party. As you know, the Resolution rejects as a matter of principle any proposal to liquidate our Party or to convert it into a non-Marxist, non-working-class organization.

On a different basis, it disagrees with certain other proposals, which do not necessarily involve matters of principle, as for example to transform the Party into a Marxist political action association engaging in fundamental Marxist ideological, political and economic activity—proposals which in our judgment are not warranted under present political alignments and conditions.

As for the suggestion that the Party change its name, the National Committee makes no recommendation at this time. Whatever the pros and cons of the argument on such recommendations, it should be borne in mind that such proposals, in and of themselves, offer no magic formula for coping with legal difficulties, or for resolving the cardinal problems of developing mass ties and

mass movements. While this is the collective judgment of the National Committee, obviously on this, as on all other questions, it will be up to the membership and the convention to make the final decisions.

* * *

As we enter the final pre-convention period, all of us are cognizant of the democratic and stimulating discussions that have developed in our ranks since our April plenum. We have all benefitted by the constructive criticism and the many fruitful contributions that have been made by our membership. At the same time, we are not unmindful of certain negative aspects of the discussion; some of which were aggravated by the inadequate participation of the National Committee members in the discussion. Nor can we close our eyes to certain anti-Marxist views and factional overtones which have been expressed and need to be resolutely combated.

We are heartened by the fact that even in these past turbulent and searching months some headway has been made in a number of areas in breaking down old barriers, in renewing or cementing new ties with non-Communist workers, progressives, and liberals, and in developing greater political and organizing initiative in some field of mass work.

And here let me add that we must find special ways and means to guarantee that all in our ranks most directly responsible for effecting

such changes—particularly our comrades in the unions and other mass organizations who are now prevented from fully participating in many of our deliberations—shall be enabled to effectively register their views and vote in all the forthcoming conventions, county, state and national.

At the same time, we should also note that a number of comrades seem to feel that the pre-convention discussion requires them to call a "moratorium" on mass work. They claim that nothing can be done until all internal questions of the Party are settled. But it is impossible to resolve Party questions in the vacuum that results from the absence of mass activity. Certainly one of the biggest contributions that we can make to our discussion and convention is to revitalize and develop our mass work now.

Other comrades have adopted a "watchful waiting" attitude. They are somewhat skeptical of whether our Party will be able to effect the necessary changes. They have decided to "wait and see" what the convention will do. Meanwhile they stand on the sidelines. We urge these comrades to assume their individual and collective responsibilities and help the Party to make the turn, and we should do everything to facilitate their participation.

As the pre-convention period opens, all of us should be more conscious of the vital need of making our criticism and proposals con-

structive, of strengthening our ties of comradeship, and of reinforcing the unity of the Party. Let us not forget that Party unity is a fundamental pre-requisite for enabling our Party to surmount objective, as well as internal difficulties.

We cannot forget that our pre-convention discussion takes place in the midst of an unprecedented political and ideological offensive by monopoly capital. Especially since the State Department's publication of the Khrushchev special report, a colossal effort has been underway to discredit Marxism, to undermine the confidence of progressive humanity in the lands of Socialism, to weaken proletarian internationalism, and to disorient and divide our party.

While the corporate interests will not succeed in their main objective, nevertheless it is a fact that on the home-front their anti-Communist and anti-socialist campaigns have had a certain effect, including here and there in our own ranks. It must be admitted that certain tendencies have proved harmful: to underrate the historical liberating role of socialist society, to deprecate our Party's role and contributions, as well as to carry on inner-party criticism completely oblivious to the external situation. Such tendencies have been used by our adversaries in their ideological attack on Marxism, on Socialism, and as means of impairing the unity of our Party. To ignore these facts is to do a great disservice

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to our Party and to the American working class.

The unity of our Party and its singleness of purpose is dictated by reasons far beyond the vital advantage this brings to the Party itself. For Party unity is essential in order to help unite wider sections of labor and its allies in concerted action against the common enemy—monopoly capital.

By Party unity we mean, of course, that unity which is based on our common ideology—the principles of Scientific Socialism; on our understanding of the historic role of the American working class and its Marxist vanguard; on our uncompromising devotion to the struggle for equal rights and freedom for the Negro people; on our appreciation of the epochal achievements and liberating role of the lands of Socialism; on our fraternal solidarity with the working peoples of all countries.

This does not mean that we should blur over important differences that arise within our ranks, nor limit debate or the right of dissent. But this, in turn, does not mean that these differences need to harden into crystallized trends and fixed positions. The truth is that Party unity is more precious today than ever before.

The progress which the National Committee has made in the past three months in probing into a number of major controversial questions and in arriving at a collective position which we believe to be

basically sound, indicates that the give-and-take of collective discussion and inquiry can bring about a common outlook which reinforces the unity of the Party on a basis of principle.

The initial steps forward which the Party is making now, prior to the convention, in strengthening collective leadership, expanding inner-party democracy, digging deeper into all questions, in learning from one another, in beginning to move forward and outwards—these should be our guide in consolidating Party unity, in establishing in our Party an atmosphere of creative thinking and constructive criticism, of persuasion and mutual help, and in developing mass activity—including now in the midst of our pre-convention discussion.

The National Committee harbors no illusions. We do not minimize the severity of the political struggles and the many obstacles ahead. Nor do we underestimate the gravity of the internal situation in our Party and the stubborn efforts and time required to fully effect the many changes that the situation requires.

But we believe we are on the correct track. We know that we are on the threshold of big events and face new opportunities as well as new difficulties. And we are confident that at this juncture—which coincides with the 37th anniversary of the CPUSA—our Party will make the turn and enhance its indispensable contributions to the American working class and people.

Partisanship and Science

By Ann Levine and Paul Robertson

Marxists maintain that science cannot be neutral; all scientific work is partisan in terms of some class. It is further contended that working class partisanship leads to the fullest recognition of truth and the greatest development of science because the working class, unlike the bourgeoisie, has no reason for manipulating or hiding the truth as its aim is to abolish all exploitation.

Moreover, Marxists have developed a tool of social analysis which makes it possible to demonstrate how bourgeois class factors enter into and distort social science and natural science at various points.

While this view has merit, and has been of enormous assistance in the early development of the science of Marxism, we feel it is in need of modification. *Class factors are not the only variables which may lead to the distortion of science.* As we shall endeavor to demonstrate, malpractices in science stemming from *expediency, sectarianism and lack of democracy* may also affect the development of knowledge by the working-class movement, by Marxists.

The traditional presentation of

Marxist partisanship makes the implicit assumption that democracy will be an inevitable concomitant of Socialism and consequently this issue never arose.

In essence our thesis is that Marxists have failed to recognize how extra-scientific factors, other than class ideology, may affect scientific work and have therefore failed to apply Marxist social analysis (Sociology of Knowledge) to their own practice.

Let us now cite a few examples of malpractices arising from expediency and sectarianism.

EXPEDIENCY OR PRAGMATISM

If an idea or theory was found to have negative implications for some aspect of working class or progressive development, the pragmatic tendency of the Left has often been to attack this idea as a *whole*, ignoring other elements in it and furthermore searching for "scientific" support for this attack.

There is little question that psychoanalysis, for example, has had adverse effects on numerous progressives, and many elements of its overall philosophy are reactionary,

but the phenomena the system refers to and the concepts it has developed cannot simply be rejected on these grounds. The data have to be carefully examined empirically and cannot simply be attacked because some of its consequences are anti-progressive.

Because the concept of "race" is used by reactionaries in connection with supremacist arguments, many progressives in the United States tended to reject the concept in its entirety and sought scientific evidence to substantiate their position. This view reached its culmination five years ago in Doxey Wilkerson's explicit rejection of the concept of race. Fortunately, an excellent discussion ensued and shortly afterward Wilkerson retracted his position (*Political Affairs*, Aug. 1952). However, while the discussion around Wilkerson's position was substantively excellent, there was, we feel, insufficient recognition of how this error arose, not so much with Wilkerson, as in the Left generally. Our point is that the concept of race tended to be rejected in the scientific sphere because of its misuse by reactionaries in the political arena. Scientific thinking was implicitly directed by tactics.

On the economic front there has been the tendency in Left circles (until about a year ago) to constantly predict crises and depressions, focusing on every weakness in the U.S. economy and typically overlooking any sign of resiliency or

maneuverability of capitalism. Thus scientific thinking was made subordinate to the pragmatic line of the Left. Instead of the tactical position being based on a scientific analysis of current trends in capitalism, the political line was developed first and then scientific evidence was sought to support it.

In a significant pioneering article in *Political Affairs* (June, 1956) Arnold Berman documents in detail the erroneous economic predictions made in the Left from 1946 to 1954. He states that:

Instead of an objective consideration of all the available facts, we tended to carry on an assiduous search for those data which would support our a priori expectations of imminent crisis, while ignoring or 'explaining away' contrary data. Instead of an open-minded materialist seeking of *all* the sources of the economic expansion we could not ignore, we fastened on the war economy as nearly the only, as well as the ever-present source. (p. 46)

POOR SCHOLARSHIP

This abuse, as we have already seen, is a corollary of the pragmatic error although it has other sources as well. In an effort to buttress arguments for a position essentially directed by expediency, Marxists have often overlooked other viewpoints and contradictory data. For example, Joseph Furst has written a book entitled *The Neurotic*, (Citadel Press, N.Y., 1954) which has as one of its objectives the annihilation of

all psychoanalytic conceptions, including those developed by the neo-Freudians, Horney, Fromm, *et al.* While Furst does an excellent job of criticizing some of the key weaknesses of these neo-Freudians, he fails completely to give them credit for their criticism of capitalism.

Even more disturbing is the fact that as a central thesis of his own book, Furst presents a theory of the social causes of neurosis which is remarkably similar to that of Karen Horney, while never mentioning her position. Horney indicated that one of the basic conflicts of our society decisively affecting the development of neurosis is the contradiction between cooperation and competition. To quote Horney:

The first contradiction to be mentioned is that between competition and success on the one hand, and brotherly love and humility on the other. (*Neurotic Personality of Our Time*: (Norton, N. Y., 1937, p. 288)

Compare this with Furst's thesis: In terms of human relations . . . we participate, sometimes without realizing it, in a huge number of cooperative activities together. At the same time, we engage very intensively in another set of competitive activities together. . . . These conflicting activities are inevitably reflected, within our consciousness, in the shape of conflicting ideas, value judgements, motivations and emotions. They are the true source of the conflicts in 'human nature' as we ourselves experience it. (p. 16)

Furst spends a good deal of time

discussing "The Unconscious," "unconscious mental activity," but completely neglects to mention a classic non-Marxist book entitled *Unconsciousness*, by J. G. Miller (J. Wiley N. Y., 1942) which summarizes the enormous experimental and clinical literature on unconscious activity.

Herbert Aptheker, generally one of the most serious of scholars, appears somewhat careless at one point in reviewing Riesman's work (*Masses and Mainstream*, Jan. 1955). He mentions Riesman's three personality types: tradition-directed, inner-directed and other-directed, and then states that, "The really progressive ones are those who understand the qualitative change, appreciate the 'revolution,' adjust to it, and are 'other-directed.'" (p. 6) Clearly implied is that this statement represents Riesman's views. This conclusion is misleading. Riesman is attempting to show that the "other directed" personality type is a negative product of modern society and that the other-directed *negatively* affects creativity and enjoyment. Aptheker may interpret Riesman differently and believe that underlying his explicit criticism of the other-directed person, Riesman actually favors this type, not the autonomous man. However, if this is the case it is not clear from the review and it would seem incumbent upon Aptheker to give his reasons for not accepting Riesman's avowed criticisms of the other-directed conformist. Non-Marxists reading Aptheker's

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review were disturbed at what seemed to be a complete misunderstanding of Riesman's oft-stated explicit position on this matter.

Harry K. Wells,* in attempting to show that Progressive Education was developed from its inception as a tool of monopoly capital overlooks: 1) Dewey's earlier pro-Soviet position; 2) the progressive stands on academic freedom and many other questions taken by the Progressive Education movement in the 1930's; 3) the stress on cooperation, group study, thinking and understanding so characteristic of this school of thought. Another striking illustration of Wells' careless scholarship as well as a highly sectarian approach is to be found in his use of quotations from the Soviet writer Goncharov on "American Education." Wells notes (in the index) that George Counts wrote a pamphlet answering Goncharov and, in fact, reprinted Goncharov's arguments in full! *The Counts article raises many serious questions concerning the scholarship and accuracy of Goncharov's position.* Wells makes no mention of these arguments and in no way answers them. He merely refers to the anti-Soviet slanders of Counts. While Counts' article contains a typically anti-Soviet position, it still raises questions which should be dealt with. Counts'

* Harry K. Wells, *Pragmatism, Philosophy of Imperialism*, Ch. VI, (International Publishers, N. Y., 1954). For a fairly comprehensive documentation of some of the progressive stands of the Progressive Education movement see Frederick Rolfe's article in *Nation*, Oct. 8, 1955.

assertions have to be answered on their own ground, by critical scholarship. (cf. George Counts, *American Education Through the Soviet Looking Glass*, Teachers College, 1951.)

It should be unnecessary to state it, but nevertheless, in order to be certain there is no misunderstanding we will affirm *that our criticisms of Furst, Aptheker, and Wells, of course, do not imply agreement with the neo-Freudians, Riesman or Progressive Education.* Only the negative history of Left criticism makes such a statement necessary.

SECTARIANISM, DOGMATISM AND RIGIDITY

These abuses are expressed in a number of ways: failure to utilize work of non-Marxist scholars; inability to criticize, expand and revise Marxism; asserting positions rather than demonstrating them (phrase-mongering).

Many leading Marxist writers fail to utilize developments of modern non-Marxist sciences sufficiently. The same criticism can be levelled at Soviet scientists, and in fact this criticism has been made recently in the Soviet Union. Soviet psychology, for example, is predominantly Pavlovian and there seems to have been little awareness of developments in other areas of psychology. The rapid unquestioned acceptance of Pavlovian concepts by American Marxists is illustrated by the articles of Joseph Clayton and Milton Howard, ap-

pearing in Marxist publications. Despite the positive features of Pavlovian theory, it would seem that its possible mechanistic and somatic reductionistic overtones require some discussion.

Another illustration of sectarianism was the failure of most Marxist scientists—an outstanding exception was J. B. S. Haldane—to publicly question the work of Lysenko, even though no "bourgeois" or Marxist scientist was able to duplicate his experiments with the same results. It is noteworthy that many Marxist scientists privately disagreed with the Lysenko position, but were strongly discouraged from publicly voicing their questions.

(Again let us be clear: we are not challenging some of the excellent theoretical conceptions concerning relations of environment and heredity implicit in Michurin-Lysenko thinking. We are stating that these conceptions should be subjected to scientific verification and not accepted simply because they appear to "fit" a Dialectical Materialist outlook.)

While there have been some excellent studies by Marxists in a number of areas, such as Aptheker's work on Negro history, Marxist science as a whole has remained relatively static over the past 30 years (since Lenin). With the exception of Stalin's *untested* theory of maximum profits, practically no significant developments have taken place in economic *theory* to account for the special phenomena of monopoly capi-

talism. Traditional Marxist doctrines such as the absolute impoverishment of the working class, which appears on the surface to be contradicted in the U.S., have not been thoroughly reexamined.

In the field of Dialectics, except for Mao Tse-tung's work, there has been surprisingly little development of new concepts. Some years ago *Science & Society* conducted a discussion in which McGill, Parry, Wells and Selsam participated, concerning the relationship of dialectics and logic. This type of discussion seems extremely necessary in order to clarify many questions and lead to the further development of dialectics. (Unfortunately many readers felt that the articles were quite obscure and overly complicated, a difficulty which frequently seems to beset discussions of dialectics.)

When we speak of *development* of dialectics we do not merely mean clarification or illumination. *Development implies new concepts and new propositions.* A good deal of Marxist scientific work, not only in the field of dialectics, consists in applying traditional Marxist theory to new situations or illuminating traditional Marxist concepts. But very little work indeed has been done in terms of developing new concepts and theory.

Perhaps even more crucial is the tendency to reject an *entire* system because it has idealist elements. By contrast it is interesting to note that Marx and Engels utilized concep-

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tions taken from mechanists, idealists, and bourgeois theoreticians of all kinds: the labor theory of value from classical economics, dialectics from Hegel, Socialism from the Utopian Socialists.

CAUSES OF MALPRACTICES

There are many reasons for the limitations of Marxist scientific work which we can only touch upon here. It is possible that Marxism, functioning at its best, is not sufficiently developed to handle many problems arising in natural science and psychology.

Another factor which probably played a role in inhibiting Marxist scientific practice is the class-conflict ridden world atmosphere. In a world which is not fully socialist, special conflicts are likely to erupt, as science is not unrelated to the "struggle for men's minds." This problem is strikingly illustrated in the Lysenko controversy which was certainly not treated in a thoroughly scientific democratic manner in socialist or capitalist sectors. To admit scientific error became ideological defeat.

We have already indicated that one of the most important causes of Marxists' inadequate work in science has been the failure to critically appraise the somewhat oversimplified notion of Marxist partisanship. Marxists have searched for the weaknesses in bourgeois science by analyzing class biases, but too often have been prone to assume that ex-

tra-scientific variables could not be affecting Marxist science negatively. Consequently there was a failure to be alert to factors which might limit the Marxist scientist.

Another crucial reason for the limitations of Marxist scientific work is the undemocratic climate in which it has been practiced. Marxists indicated that lack of democracy under capitalism inhibited the growth of science but they never questioned the existence of democracy in the Left. However, one must raise the question: Could the abuses of dogmatism, sectarianism, and pragmatism, have had such an all-pervasive influence in a democratic climate? No, they could not. How then, did this undemocratic atmosphere express itself?

Was there not a strong tendency to reject articles submitted to the major Left journals if they raised critical questions which were not in line with the existing "doctrinaire" approach? To those who are disposed to answer 'no' we must ask: Why then did so few articles of this type appear before the 20th Congress? Why then did the letters with fresh questions and criticism appearing in the *Daily Worker* not appear before the 20th Congress? If it is because these things were never thought of (and in some cases this may be true) then we must ask a further question: Why? Perhaps it was due to a powerful self-censorship imposed on our own thinking. If we ask, Why the self-censorship?, we are led back

to our first criticism—that original, critical thinking was discouraged, not encouraged.

This leads to a deeper question: Why should a movement oriented toward change, with its eyes on the future, discourage original critical thinking? We do not pretend to have a pat answer. We do suggest however (as one possible factor) that perhaps the fact that the Left, surrounded as it is by forces oriented toward its destruction, became overly afraid of being divided. Anything which threatened division was interpreted as a direct threat to the very existence of the Left movement. In so doing, the dependence of growth on conflict, on contradiction if you like, was overlooked.

The notion that criticism and self-criticism*, said to be the basic law of socialist development, would automatically operate to correct errors arising in scientific as well as other areas of practice, is naive. Criticism and self-criticism themselves do not function in a vacuum. Basic *structural assurances* as well as traditions must be available before people even *think* about criticism, let alone actually submit criticisms.

Self-censorship has flourished in the socialist world not only because of the bureaucratic and undemocratic practices which have been predominant, but also because of the lack of institutional forms encourag-

* Marxist concepts of criticism have not typically emphasized *external* criticism, that is criticism from non-Marxist scientists.

ing and guaranteeing participation, including critical participation.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Considerable discussion is needed with regard to the possible strength and weaknesses of Marxist partisanship. *The partisan orientation of Marx and Lenin seems to have played a valuable role in the development of the science of Marxism.* How did this operate? How did it differ from modern partisanship which appears pragmatic, narrow, and stultifying? Is partisanship applicable in the same way in the physical and natural sciences as in the social sciences? Can partisanship be useful in guiding Marxist research or is it largely restricted to uncovering weaknesses in bourgeois science? Is a dialectical materialist approach entirely partisan or can it be used, to some degree, by non-Marxists? If a theory has negative implications for the working class or the Negro people, does partisanship require that we reject this theory? These are some of the questions which we feel Marxists should consider anew, not quickly accepting traditional ready answers which we know all too well.

It is of some interest to note that Marx and Lenin *combined* scientific and political leadership. Perhaps when the two types of leadership are separated, difficulties are more likely to arise. In the modern world this separation seems more likely

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however. Thus we may not be able to generalize too easily from Marx' and Lenin's experience with partisanship.

2. The history of science should to reexamined in order to comprehend its contributions in terms of methods and traditions which must be absorbed by Marxists, and perhaps united with the valuable features of partisanship and dialectical materialism. The significance of democracy and open criticism in the development of science has to be thoroughly understood. It is probably no accident that philosophers like Locke, Hume, and Mill, who were so much concerned with problems of political democracy, were also influential in the development of scientific method. The thinking of these men should be carefully examined in order to shed more light on the connection between democracy and science.

3. As we have seen, Marxist partisanship is strongly bound up with a social analysis of knowledge (currently called the sociology of knowledge). Marx showed how class factors influenced various bourgeois ideologists and entered into science. This view enables us to be conscious of how extra-scientific variables affect science. It contradicts the bourgeois notion that the development of science proceeds largely from within, or from the creativity of individual scientists. However, partisanship has failed to recognize how social factors affect Marxists and

their scientific endeavors, other than to state very abstractly that because the working class aims to exploit no one it has nothing to hide or distort. As we have seen this is vastly oversimplified.

What Marxists can learn from the Marxist sociology of knowledge, is to be constantly self conscious concerning the ways in which various factors in society are affecting them, not only the bourgeois scientists. This self awareness can be a first step to necessary correctives, thus limiting Marxist distortions and abuses of partisanship.

4. We shall simply repeat here once more what has been stressed throughout the article, namely, the absolute necessity of re-appraising many aspects of Marxism in the light of current situations and findings. Marxism must be creatively developed and if necessary revised, even though this word has an unfortunate historic connotation. (Actually it should not be necessary to qualify the term "revision." The history of science is marked by constant change and revision as the theories of science come to approximate truth better and better.) The reappraisal must apply to Marx, Engels and Lenin, not merely to Stalin, which is the present vogue. Particularly in need of discussion are two mainstays of traditional Marxism: Dialectics and Democratic Centralism, the latter a key formulation of Lenin, not Stalin.

5. Together with the need to reap-

praise certain concepts in traditional Marxism, and perhaps prerequisite to it, is the need for an intensive re-examination of Marxist positions on a wide range of current issues including, logical positivism, pragmatism, psychoanalysis, progressive education, scientific ethics, modern art, the National and Negro Questions, Woman Question, role of the middle class, the intellectual. We do not mean to imply that Marxist views on these questions are necessarily invalid. Rather our point is that many aspects of these positions have been incorrectly arrived at, have not really been thought through scientifically and democratically. In some cases they have been philosophically deduced rather than empirically investigated.

Marxists must be prepared to learn from non-Marxists and even anti-Marxists. As they reappraise their views on the questions indicated above, Marxists will come back more into the mainstream of science (and art), will make meaningful contributions in these areas which many non-Marxists will find it impossible to ignore, and finally will enrich Marxism itself through interpenetration with life.

6. The type of research needed by the Marxist movement today may be termed *programmatic* as contrasted to pragmatic research. It goes beyond the immediate tactical problem to deal with basic issues. As we have pointed out, this has not been done sufficiently. For example,

in dealing with two of the key issues of the current period—Keynesianism and Freudianism—the expedient tendency has been to attack them as a whole and to search for ‘scientific’ support for these attacks. In the case of economics, what is needed is a deep, long-range analysis perhaps beginning with the problems thrown up by Keynesism and turning to the development of Marxist economics for the analysis of the stage of monopoly capitalism. The theory of crisis should be developed, and Stalin’s theory of maximum profits should be analyzed carefully and tested empirically. Criticism of Keynesism provides at best only a starting point for Marxist economists; it is clearly not their only function and should be seen as part of the larger picture of developing Marxist economic theory.

The picture is similar with psychoanalysis. The basic search should be to develop a science of psychology, a necessity for Marxist thought. A pragmatically dictated attack on Freudianism does not do this, especially when it overlooks data which can not be currently explained by *general* Marxist philosophy.* The absence of effective Marxist psychological theory is a tremendous lack which cannot be overcome by criticism at the philosophic level.

The development of science also depends on research being done on

* See Albert Starr’s trenchant criticism in *Science & Society*, Summer, 1955, “The Nature of Scientific Proof.”

key problems imminent in, that is, demanded by, the particular scientific discipline. At times it is necessary that the selection of problems be directed by the specific character and stage of a science *rather than by partisan considerations functioning at their best.*

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show that Marxists have made serious errors in applying and developing Marxism as a science. Our scientific thinking has often been influenced by tactical considerations, there has been a limited use of non-Marxist work, criticism of non-Marxist scholars has often been careless and non-empirical, Marxism itself has failed to develop new concepts and propositions and has not sufficiently been applied to new problems, and there has been a lack of public discussion of Soviet scientific work.

We have further endeavored to demonstrate that the failure to critically analyze the Marxist concept of partisanship in science has been an important contributing factor to these inadequacies in Marxist scientific practice.

Briefly stated, Marxist partisanship in science avowedly maintains a "bias" toward the class of the future, the working class, and the solution of the future, Socialism.

Heretofore, Marxists have somewhat naively assumed that extra-

scientific factors led to distortions *only in "bourgeois science."* We have attempted to show how such factors as sectarianism, pragmatism, and an undemocratic atmosphere, among other things, have led to serious weaknesses in Marxists' contributions to science, and in their failure to creatively develop Marxism itself. In essence Marxists have failed to recognize how factors in the world situation may affect their own scientific work negatively.

We feel that as Marxists apply the Marxist sociology of knowledge to themselves they will be taking a very important first step in developing their scientific work.

Finally we have attempted to point out that Marxist partisanship has certain positive features. *Reevaluation does not mean rejection.* The contributions of Marx, Engels and Lenin directed as they were by explicit partisanship, call attention to its potential value. While Marxists have much to learn from the traditions and practices of science, we feel that they also have at least three significant contributions to make to the further development of science: 1) Dialectical Materialism; 2) Working-Class partisanship; 3) The Sociology of Knowledge.

All three of these potential contributions need *considerable* clarification and development before their effectiveness can be fully appreciated.

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