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China

The 23rd Congress

Bantu Education

The Case Against "Pacification"



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The Case Against "Pacification"

BY JOSEPH HANSEN

UPI photo by Kyoichi Sawada. Caption Read: "Dusty Death . . . The body of a Viet Cong soldier, killed in fierce night fighting with U. S. and Australian troops, is dragged behind an armored personnel carrier Feb. 24 as the enemy dead were tallied. . . ."

President Johnson's "pacification program" in Vietnam, which received big publicity at the time of his famous February conference with General Ky in Honolulu and Vice-president Humphrey's subsequent barn-storming tour of Saigon, is pictured as the "positive" side of American intervention in the Vietnamese civil war.

Television films provide documentary evidence of food handouts and rehabilitation projects that are presumably winning the hearts and minds of peasants dislocated by the war. We are shown engaging scenes of the busy market places, the attractive dwellings and even chapels constructed by American troops, who, as everyone knows, are really only adult Boy Scouts, enormously enthusiastic about traveling 10,000 miles to do good for their colored Asian brothers.

Publicity experts, trained in the wholesome arts of Manhattan's advertising agencies, emphasize the need to enlarge the picture of this side of the American intervention in Vietnam to offset the unfortunate nega-

tive image emerging from the napalm burnings, roped prisoners, torture at knife point and other atrocities. The pacification program, we are told, indicates the real purpose of the American intervention which is allegedly to finally bring peace to a country that has been fighting imperialist invaders for a quarter of a century.

The pressing need to ensure the success of the pacification program in order to "win the people" and offset the political lure of "Communism" is one of the arguments advanced for continued escalation of the war. To give the effects of the pacification program a chance to sink in—and who can be against anything as laudable as that!—more troops are needed, more planes, more bombs, more billions of dollars and freedom to engage in "hot pursuit" of the enemy no matter where and no matter what this may lead to.

Exactly what is this "pacification program"? Does it really consist of glorified public-works projects to which the know-how, labor power, goodwill and un-



UPI photo by Kyoichi Sawada. Caption Read: "Dusty Death . . . The body of a Viet Cong soldier, killed in fierce night fighting with U.S. and Australian troops, is dragged behind an armored personnel carrier Feb. 24 as the enemy dead were tallied. . . ."

limited financial resources of the American armed forces have been dedicated? Or does the pleasant-sounding word "pacification" refer to something less praiseworthy?

For an answer to these questions some meaningful clues can be found in an enlightening article by Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the *New York Times* and well-known unofficial spokesman of the Pentagon, which appeared in the February 8 issue of the *New York Times* under the title, "'Enclave' Warfare." The article was obviously intended as a serious contribution to the discussion then going on about the "enclave strategy" or "enclave concept" advocated by General James M. Gavin as an alternative to escalation of the war in Vietnam. Baldwin sought to clarify thinking on the subject by relating it to the "pacification" problem.

"In its various interpretations, the enclave concept is actually as old as military history," Baldwin said. "It involves a recognition, first, that any base of operations must be secure, whether it is called an enclave, a bridgehead, a beachhead or an airhead.

The 'Ink Blot' Theory

"A related concept—the 'ink blot' or 'oil-stain' theory of pacification—is also familiar to military history," continued the *Times* expert. "Marshal Louis Lyautey, the French colonizer, used this concept in establishing French control over Madagascar and Morocco; from firmly secured bases, French troops gradually spread out in pacification campaigns over the country, until—like ink blots or spreading oil stains—the operations from one base overlapped those from another, and gradually the area pacified or conquered covered the country."

We have thus already gained an understanding of the nature of "pacification." From a spokesman of the American military establishment we have learned that "pacified" and "conquered" are synonymous terms and that there is nothing new about either concept—they are as old as military history!

The American effort to conquer Vietnam is a strategic objective that has to be advanced by tactical means, we further learn. In the military dictionary these means can be either "static" or "active." The "search-and-clear" tactic now being followed by U. S. troops in Vietnam is an example of an "active" tactical operation. The "enclave" method may appear to belong to the "static" category. But it is a mistake to consider that real alternatives are involved or that the two are mutually exclusive.

"The differences in the two concepts are shadowy at most," according to Baldwin. "There is virtually unanimous agreement in Vietnam and in Washington that the main-force units, or full-time elements, of the Vietcong must be broken up and crippled and that south Vietnamese civic-action and pacification teams must fill in behind American and South Vietnamese regular troops in area where search-and-clear operations have been conducted.

"Responsible American officers suggest that the static and the active types of defense are complementary and essential, with intensive patrolling to extend con-

trol gradually over wide areas and to spread the 'ink blots,' and far-flung search-and-destroy operations to seek out the Vietcong and above all to destroy their stocks of rice, supplies and ammunition and their base areas.

"Both the Marines and the Army agree that spreading the 'ink blots' and destroying the Vietcong will take several hundred thousand more men than the United States now has in South Vietnam."

The Johnson administration has mobilized the biggest and most vociferous propaganda machine in all history to put across its claims about trying to "bring Hanoi to the conference table," about defending South Vietnam from "Communist aggression from the north," about defending "democracy" and the right of the Vietnamese to self-determination, about "winning the people" with a widespread pacification program. Yet when one of the country's most prominent military experts, who backs Johnson and the Pentagon to the hilt and who openly advocates a great increase in the escalation of the war (as in his article "The Case for Escalation" in the February 27 *New York Times Magazine*)—when this voice of the officer caste chooses to tell us what is really involved, the authority he brings in is no one less than Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey, whom he frankly identifies as "the French colonizer." This tells us a great deal not only about the "pacification program" of the Johnson administration but also about the real aims of the United States in Southeast Asia.

French Colonial Warfare

For material on the central concepts which Johnson and the Pentagon are applying in their war in Vietnam, a readily available source is *Makers of Modern Strategy*,* Chapter 10, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare."

The author of this chapter, Jean Gottmann, a teacher in the Army Specialized Training Program at Princeton when this collection of essays on the development of military theory appeared, tells us by way of introduction:

"Colonial warfare is quite different from what is commonly known as continental warfare. It is generally fought in remote countries over large areas of unknown territory, against a foe superior in number and in his knowledge of the terrain but inferior in material organization and in means of supply from abroad. In colonial wars quality must therefore balance a probable inferiority in quantity, and a colonial war is, by its very nature, fought between adversaries of strikingly different levels of civilization."

By levels of "civilization," the author obviously means levels of technological development. The imperialist organizers of colonial warfare are invariably more barbarous than the peoples they seek to conquer and subjugate. Photographs of the torture applied to cap-

* This book, edited by Edward Mead Earle, was published in 1944 by Princeton University Press. Among other things it contains some interesting appreciations of the contributions of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky in the military field. Some flattery of Stalin is also included, no doubt as a diplomatic gesture toward an ally in World War II.

tured "Vietcong" prisoners, and of the indiscriminate maiming and slaughter of civilians down to babes in arms, offer evidence enough that the war in Vietnam is not different in this respect.

Expounding the theory of colonial warfare, Gottmann notes that "as far as possible," the campaign "must avoid destruction." One reason is "to preserve the productive potential of the theater of operations," but more importantly "because the conquered country is to be integrated immediately after the conquest into the 'imperial' whole, politically as well as economically."

"Preserving" the Enemy

Thus it is "desirable" that "the territory should be in the best possible condition when conquest has been effected. The problem is not so much 'to defeat the enemy in the most decisive manner' as to subordinate him at the lowest cost and in a way to guarantee permanent pacification."

French imperialism learned how to do this in practice before it developed the body of military theory which, as can be seen from the references made by Hanson W. Baldwin, still governs thinking in the domain of colonial conquest.

France's "new colonial expansion" began in June 1830 when an expeditionary force of 37,000 men was landed near Algiers, their purpose being "to avenge an insult to the consul of France by the local ruler, the dey of Algiers." One hundred and thirty-five years later, President Johnson was to utilize a similar excuse for bombing north Vietnam. It was "in response to provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime"; namely, a guerrilla raid on American installations at Pleiku.

The French forces quickly took Algiers but they ran into difficulty in extending their conquest into the interior. "The native forces were at home; their chief weapon was mobility. Gathering suddenly at unexpected points, they attacked columns, raided convoys, set French establishments afire; they attacked columns on the flanks and from the rear, inflicting heavy losses, destroying or stealing equipment. Then they disappeared, melting away into the landscape before the heavy European military machine had a chance to re-form and resume operations."

For ten years the French "generally met disaster," until in 1840 Marshal Thomas Bugeaud was appointed governor general and commander in chief in Algeria. In six years he pacified the country. He discarded the Napoleonic concepts of warfare that had been perfected in Europe and set out to increase the mobility of the French colonial army, converting it into a force proficient in counter guerrilla war.

One of his primary aims was to strike fear in "the natives." "In this and many other respects Bugeaud followed the lines of the ancient Roman strategy in Africa." As with the Romans, Bugeaud took as his principal aim not so much to defeat the indigenous population as to "subdue" them "so that after a defeat they will not attempt to reorganize for battle at another time and place." This required the employment of eco-

nomie and political means as well as the force of arms. We see that the concepts operative in modern colonial war do have a respectable age if they are not so respectable in other ways.

Bugeaud, in Gottmann's opinion, knew how to make his study of history pay off:

"This restoration of the tactics of ancient Rome in the nineteenth century proved wise and successful: Since the epoch of Jugurtha, in defiance of time, neither the terrain nor the tactics of the natives had changed. The methods used by the Romans to conquer the province of Africa was [sic] used by the French with equal success. The thorough training in the classics given in French colleges thus proved an incalculable aid to French generals in Africa.

"Bugeaud, utilizing the Roman battle formation of the square, did not forget the importance of political action in the ancient techniques of empire building. He endeavored to weaken the enemy by internal discord and division, playing on the antagonisms between varied interests, groups, and leaders. Political warfare remained for the French, and for all other expansionist powers, one of the main weapons. Thus Bugeaud laid the foundation of a new school of military thought which developed even more in the following half century. In the ranks of the French armies he was the first soldier of the nineteenth century to renounce Napoleon's teaching as unsuited to every particular environment. He revived old Roman methods which had yielded good results."

Bugeaud's concepts were further developed by Marshal Joseph Galliéni, who became famous among colonial butchers for his skill in "pacification" work in Indochina at the turn of the century, above all in Tonkin, whose capital, Hanoi, is now a familiar name even to children barely old enough to turn on a television switch. Galliéni succeeded in pacifying rebellious Tonkin in four years (1892-96). He was then transferred to Madagascar where his good works gained him even greater renown.

In Indochina Galliéni trained a younger officer from Paris, Louis-Hubert Lyautey, whom he later called to Madagascar for additional experience. Lyautey in time gained an independent niche in the history of imperialist conquest as the pacifier of Morocco. It is mainly to Lyautey that military theory owes the codification of French experience in subduing Indochina, Madagascar and North Africa. In a "brilliant article" published in 1900 Lyautey expounded the concepts that Hanson W. Baldwin refers to in explaining the American effort to pacify Vietnam today.

The first concept is "progressive occupation." Instead of columns thrusting like spears into the countryside, the front should be a "regularly progressing tide" of occupying forces. "There was no intention, of course, of suppressing completely the column of attacking troops: Such an operation is generally indispensable at the outset to impress the enemy with his inferiority to the military force of the colonizing power," Gottmann explains. "But no definite and lasting achievement results from the '*coup de force*' alone, occupation must follow and here we have Lyautey's famous statement: '*Military occupation consists less in mili-*

tary operations that in an organization on the march." [Emphasis in original.]

And what does "an organization on the march" mean? "It is an organization of the conquered territory set up, not behind the active front, but marching step by step with the armies as they advance. This organization must not be simply a new hierarchy imposed on the area but a network covering it, worked out in advance in the most minute detail and with the greatest care."

General Duchemin, an ardent disciple of Gallieni, drew the following vivid analogy in describing how to handle "pirates"—as guerrilla fighters were called in those days by the imperialist bandits:

"The pirate is a plant which grows only on certain grounds . . . The most efficient method is to render the ground unsuitable to him . . . There are no pirates in completely organized countries. To pluck wild plants is not sufficient: One must plough the conquered soil, enclose it, and then sow it with the good grain, which is the only means to make it unsuitable to the tares. The same happens on the land desolated by piracy: Armed occupation, with or without armed combat, ploughs it; the establishment of a military belt encloses and isolates it; finally the reconstitution and equipment of the population, the installation of markets and cultures, the construction of roads, sow the good grain and make the conquered region unsuitable to the pirate, if it is not the latter himself who, transformed, cooperates in this evolutionary process."

The language of this official 1895 report to the governor general of Indochina sounds rather quaint in 1966. However, aside from its elaborate metaphors and its antiquated frankness, it sounds like an extract from some of the current material produced by spokesmen of the Johnson administration concerning the problem of "pacifying" the same territory seventy years later and making it "unsuitable to the tares" of the "Vietcong."

Besides "an organization on the march," a correct political approach is an absolute essential. This was stressed by Gallieni himself in instructions issued May 22, 1898, at Madagascar:

"The best means for achieving pacification in our new colony is provided by combined application of force and politics. It must be remembered that, in the course of colonial struggles, we should turn to destruction only as a last resort and only as a preliminary to better reconstruction. We must always treat the country and its inhabitants with consideration, since the former is destined to receive our future colonial enterprises and the latter will be our main agents and collaborators in the development of our enterprises.

"Every time that the necessities of war force one of our colonial officers to take action against a village or an inhabited center, his first concern, once submission of the inhabitants has been achieved, should be reconstruction of the village, creation of a market, and establishment of a school. It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country and its future organization will be achieved. *Political action is by far the more important.* It derives its greater power

from the organization of the country and its inhabitants." [Emphasis in the original.]

This really has a modern ring! Our first concern must be reconstruction—once submission of the inhabitants has been secured . . . What else but such topics did Johnson discuss with his protégé Ky at Honolulu?

"As pacification gains ground," continued Gallieni, "the country becomes more civilized, markets are re-opened, trade is re-established. The role of the soldier becomes of secondary importance. The activity of the administrator begins. It is necessary, on the one hand, to study and satisfy the social requirements of the subject people and, on the other hand, to promote the development of colonization, which will utilize the natural resources of the soil and open the outlets for European trade."

That should now read "American" trade, of course.

Besides "progressive occupation," and "organization on the march," Lyautey stresses the conversion of the colonial army into an administrative setup in which the police function is relegated to "special troops, the military and civilian police."

From Terror to Reconstruction

In other words, the troops that invade a country marked for imperialist victimization deliberately aim in their first moves to strike the deepest possible fear and terror in the indigenous population by demonstrating an implacability and military superiority that appear absolutely invincible.

Then through a series of transitional stages this same occupation force moves toward reconstruction, toward the conversion of leading indigenous figures into servile agents (the "anti-Communists" of today), and finally toward domination of the country's economy, complete control of its politics, and—in the good old days of imperialism—outright administration.

With this pattern clearly conceived from the very beginning, the imperialist conquerors try to keep their tactics supple so as to facilitate passing over into the successive stages as smoothly as possible. In fact, they seek to combine them where it can be done. "Pacification" is viewed as part and parcel of military action—the positive component of the war of conquest.

In 1903 Lyautey was sent to western Algeria where Moroccan tribes were giving the French imperialists "trouble." His assignment was to "pacify" Morocco. This took many years, the climax coming after 1912 when he was made the resident general and commander in chief of the country, a post he kept until 1925. In a letter to Gallieni dated November 14, 1903, Lyautey outlined his objectives. Gottmann describes them as follows:

"Two points in particular deserve special comment for they were to remain the bases of Lyautey's Moroccan strategy and policy. 1. In the field of diplomacy he advocated a loyal alliance with the sultan's government and representatives. No action was to be taken in Moroccan territory except in agreement with the official Moroccan authorities and with their help. This '*entente cordiale*' was the basis of the protectorate.

"2. In the field of strategy one paragraph of the letter is fundamental: 'In fact, the final establishment of the system of protection that I project will be accomplished very gradually; it would be impossible for me to assign even an approximate date for its realization, although I incline to believe that the result can be achieved more rapidly than most people think. It will advance not by column, nor by mighty blows, but as a patch of oil spreads, through a step by step progression, playing alternately on all the local elements, utilizing the divisions and rivalries between tribes and between their chiefs.' The strategy of the 'oil patch,' the famous *tâche d'huile*, will take its place in history as the phrase which best characterizes the French penetration and pacification of Morocco."

Lyautey's work in Morocco "is now reputed to be the masterpiece of French colonization," according to Gottmann. In 1912, when Lyautey began final operations, the country was in "complete revolt." In two expeditions Lyautey re-established control of the main cities. "Those were swift and daring blows, frequently studied since and described by colonial and military historians as models. The speed of the initial success was largely due to Lyautey's policy with respect to the natives which was put into effect from the first day. Its ultimate success depended, of course, on the period that followed."

The secret was to combine the military blows with "organization on the march . . . To support the advancing front, a large scale and costly policy of economic development was immediately started in the rear: The hostile tribes had to be convinced of the advantages of French rule. In two years appreciable results were obtained." Lyautey called it the "policy of the smile."

In the final stage the tactic of the "oil patch" was used to conquer the mountain fastnesses where tribes lived that "accepted no rule, not even that of the sultan, and they were determined to fight to death against the foreigners." Lyautey's sophisticated strategy proved sufficient to subdue them – at least for a time.

Technological Advances

Since Lyautey's day, the imperialist military theory of colonial war has made no basic advance. "The principal improvements added to Lyautey's strategy and tactics after 1925," Gottmann notes, "were largely due to the extensive use by his pupils of the newest weapons which advancing military technology put at their disposal: the motor car and the airplane. Both fitted admirably into the Moroccan picture, for the dominant trend of colonial warfare was toward increased mobility. Henceforth the tools were at hand. Motorization of the columns and of the services of supply greatly increased the speed and effectiveness of encircling movements and surprise blows. Bombing from the air robbed the natives of their chief trump card: fire from dominating positions in the mountains. These modern methods were especially employed in the last steps of the Moroccan pacification of 1931-1934."

In his *Instruction Générale*, issued February 19, 1932, General Huré summed up the directives for the

employment of motorized columns. "It shows," says Gottmann, "the application of both Bugeaud's and Lyautey's lessons: Attack is made on large fronts ensuring the safety of the rear; in the mountains, action is through parallel or convergent valley; attack is by surprise from bases carefully prepared in the rear and progressing with rapidity. The terrain is conquered by auxiliary units, artillery and air force, then occupied by the regular troops (native troops have a better knowledge of the terrain and a greater mobility but, as they are unable to hold the area taken, this is done by the regular troops which thus will have to fight only in defensive positions). The terrain must be organized as soon as conquered – shovels and pick axes are as necessary as rifles and guns; every conquered position must be linked to the rear by a road as soon as possible; it is by means of roads that the country is controlled."

How little has been changed in the basic concepts of colonial war since Lyautey's time is indicated by the obeisance paid to the master by Hanson W. Baldwin. It is thus quite natural that in an article published in the May 1, 1966, *New York Times* dealing specifically with the "new weapons, new tactics, new ideas" being tested in the "proving ground" of the war in Vietnam, the same author lists only technological advances.

In Baldwin's opinion, "the most important single development is the extensive use of helicopters to provide tactical mobility for the ground forces."

In addition there are "new types of shallow-water coastal patrol and river craft."

Land war has been improved – how meanings are reversed in this world of carnage! – by such "gadgets" as the Claymore mine, "an electrically controlled, directional mine which when detonated spews out a broadsword of steel pellets mowing down everything in its path." But "unfortunately," as Baldwin sees it, "the Vietcong" have been able to manufacture the mine in a cruder "but effective" form in their "jungle factories."

Warning devices and air reconnaissance have been developed, too.

As for basic operational concepts, these appear to remain unchanged. Baldwin says nothing about the subject in his article dealing with "new ideas." Lyautey's writings still constitute the Pentagon's bible in the general strategy of colonial war.

Will the Pentagon succeed in its "pacification program"? With say 750,000 U.S. troops and a campaign lasting the "five to ten years or more" mentioned by some specialists in Washington as the probable duration of the conflict?

This is highly dubious, to say the least. It is a considerable error to think that in Vietnam what can be expected is a repetition of French experience in conquering Indochina, Algeria, Madagascar and Morocco with American military prowess compensating for the handicaps involved in pacifying "natives" who have already been "pacified" many times.

First of all, there is the continual very grave danger that the war will escalate beyond control, terminating in a nuclear conflagration. Baldwin himself sees Vietnam as "two proving grounds." The one involves

a colonial war of conquest, the other is "like the Spanish civil war of 1936-39" which was a proving ground for World War II. In north Vietnam, he observes, "both sides have utilized some of the same type weapons that might be utilized in modern all-out nuclear war—the latest jet fighters, fighter-bombers and bombers, air-to-air and anti-aircraft missiles, sophisticated radars, robot and other reconnaissance planes, aircraft carriers and specialized aircraft fitted to jam the enemy's electronics systems."

In other words, there is a strong tendency for the war in Vietnam to be superseded by a conflict with China and the Soviet Union that could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. This is widely recognized. Baldwin's allusion is correct. American intervention in Vietnam does resemble the intervention of imperialist Germany and Italy in the Spanish Civil War.

Revolutionary Expertise

Second, the accumulated experience of the Vietnamese people counts heavily in the scales in the conflict with American imperialism. They are no longer the same kind of people as those on whom Galliéni and Lyautey first tested out their concepts. Besides their early experience with French imperialism, the Vietnamese have added the experience of the struggle with the Japanese imperialist invaders and then the invasion mounted by the French once more after World War II.

In each case the imperialist invaders followed the same basic concepts—the concepts of Bugeaud, Galliéni and Lyautey, right down to the "oil spot" technique, the use of economic blandishments and the support of venal types in the national political arena willing to betray their people and serve as puppets. The Vietnamese people know all the schemes and stratagems of "pacification" including such ingenious variants as the construction of "model fortified hamlets"; i.e., concentration camps, protected by belts of barbed wire and guarded by praetorians armed with automatic weapons, into which the peasants were herded like cattle after their own homes and villages were burned and suspected members of the "Vietcong" were shot or disembowled. After these searing experiences, the Vietnamese know by second nature what the "pacification" game of the latest invaders is. They are no longer easily taken in by imperialist lies and economic bait. Nor are they easily overawed or terrorized.

Third, they are conscious of being part of the colonial revolution that has swept through Asia, Africa and Latin America. Despite the defeats suffered in this colossal upsurge, as in Brazil, Indonesia and Ghana, the victories, above all in China, Cuba and Vietnam itself, have left an indelible impression. The Vietnamese people know that whatever the temporary ups and downs the future lies with their cause.

Fourth, however limited it may be, material aid can be obtained from the workers states. The Vietnamese are not isolated as were the Algerians in the forties of the past century or the Moroccans or their own grandparents. Moreover the flow of material aid may greatly increase once it sinks into the heads of the bureau-

crats in Peking and Moscow that their fate, too, is involved in this struggle.

Fifth, the mere existence of workers states like the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and the East European countries serves as a constant reminder that it is possible to pass beyond capitalism and to win at least the forms of socialism which have a power of their own, as life has now proved beyond all doubt. This is an immense sustainer of revolutionary morale among the guerrilla fighters.

Sixth, in north Vietnam itself the Vietnamese have an example of a workers state which they can easily compare with the puppet regime maintained in south Vietnam by American imperialist troops. This constitutes a most powerful incentive for them to continue their struggle. After the murderous Diem family, the Hitler-loving Ky and the whole succession of foul puppet dictators installed in office one after the other by the democracy-preaching Americans as the "government" of south Vietnam, under the overall pacification program, north Vietnam begins to look like a paradise.

Moreover, the perspective for uniting their country and achieving both political and economic freedom from imperialism and indigenous capitalism and landlordism appears highly realistic with a Vietnamese workers state already going. Against the living reality of north Vietnam, the "positive" side of Johnson's "pacification program" has little chance of attracting widespread support.

Seventh, the American invaders themselves inspire fresh revolt with their arrogance, their brutality, their "American Way of Life" publicized with napalm, noxious gases, high explosives and other fiendish instruments of mass murder and immense destruction. This is a prime source of the political developments in south Vietnam that have left Ky nothing in the way of support except the puppet strings he is dangling from.

Finally, the Vietnamese people have been greatly encouraged by the unmistakable signs of the mounting unpopularity of Johnson's escalation of the war among the American people. The antiwar demonstrations, teach-ins and similar actions inside the U. S. itself not only confirm the justness of their cause; they reveal that the would-be imperialist conquerors are politically vulnerable in their own country. The weapon of politics is turning against the disciples of Lyautey!

It is one of the ironies of history that when the fate of French imperialism at Dien Bien-phu is recalled, or its still worse defeat at the hands of the Algerians, the Pentagon spokesmen respond with the reminder that the United States is not France and Americans are not like the French; yet the Pentagon is attempting to conquer Vietnam utilizing concepts developed by the French generals of the France of another day which proved to be outmoded! These concepts belong to a past epoch—the heyday of imperialist conquest. They have lost correspondence with realities in the colonial world particularly on the political side. Vietnam, we may expect, will turn out to be the "proving ground" that will confirm this conclusion in a way that will silence even the most dogmatic of Lyautey's modern disciples.

The Political Crisis in

CHINA

BY GEORGE NOVACK

This article is the substance of a speech given at the Militant Labor Forum in New York City July 1, 1966, representing the view of the Socialist Workers Party. It was the first public talk on this subject by any radical group in the United States.

The front page of the Sunday June 26 *New York Times* carried a report from its diplomatic correspondent in Washington with the following headline: "Titanic Struggle Seen in Red China." This is stated as the opinion of experienced observers in the nation's capital who have much better sources of information on China's internal affairs than the friends of revolutionary China.

This view is altogether different from that presented by official spokesmen of Mao's regime. One editor says that "an excellent situation without parallel" prevails in China and warns the watching world not to be misled by superficial appearances. This was echoed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi who asserted in Peking June 27 that Communist China's enemies would gain nothing from the purge now in progress.

What is the real state of affairs? If we simply take what the Chinese press itself has been saying, and the individuals who have already been disgraced and deposed, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Chinese Communist Party and its rule are passing

through an even more severe political crisis than the liquidation of the Kao Kang group in 1954-1955 and the short-lived "hundred flowers bloom" disturbance in 1957.

Here is how official sources depict the situation. Starting last October and gaining momentum and scope month by month, a massive campaign has been mounted from one end of the country to another against erring intellectuals. According to a *Hsinhua* dispatch from Peking June 11, "the magnitude, intensity and strength of this great proletarian cultural revolution are without precedent in history. The whole of China is a vast scene of seething revolution."

"Hundreds of millions of workers, peasants and soldiers . . . armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought," writes the newspaper *Red Flag*, have been engaged in unmasking the hidden agents of the class enemy. "They have been writing articles, holding discussions, and putting up posters written in big characters to sweep away the ogres of all kinds entrenched in ideological and cultural positions . . . Those who echo the imperialists and the reactionary bourgeois 'specialists,' 'scholars' and 'authorities' have been routed, one group after another, with every bit of their prestige swept into the dust. The reactionary strongholds controlled by members of the sinister anti-party and anti-socialist gangs have been breached one after another."

Their conspiracy extended into every sector of the ideological and cultural front. The "bourgeois representatives wrapped in red flags" had built bases in the fields of philosophy, economics, history, literature and the arts, the drama, movie-making, education, dancing, opera, journalism and publishing.

"The most reactionary and fanatical element in this adverse current," writes *Red Flag*, "was the anti-party 'three family village' gang." This gang consisted of the noted historian Professor Wu Han, deputy mayor of Peking, Teng To, secretary of the Peking Municipal party committee and former chief editor of *Jenmin Jih Pao*, the foremost Communist newspaper, and Liao Mo-sha, former departmental director of the Peking party committee.

These prominent Communists are really "bourgeois rightists" at heart. Such types have been carrying on their nefarious activities in secret for at least the past ten years; some accounts say since 1949. These began, according to *Hsinhua* and *Red Flag*, back in 1957 during the "let a hundred schools of thought contend" days. Temporarily subdued, they renewed their offensive between 1959 and 1962, emboldened by the "temporary difficulties resulting from sabotage by the Khrushchev revisionists and serious natural calamities in China." Interestingly, to preserve Mao's reputation for infallibility, no mention is made of any wrong or reckless decisions made under his leadership in connection with the mishaps of the Great Leap Forward, like the fiasco of making steel in backyard furnaces.

Prof. Wu Han headed the pack of revisionist rascals. He wrote a series of articles and plays between 1959 and 1962 satirizing and criticizing the regime in veiled symbolic terms. He thus "served U.S. imperialism as a cultural servant, posing as a revolutionary cadre while engaged in counterrevolutionary dealings."

Other papers point to Teng To as the leader of "the anti-party, anti-socialist gang of conspirators." Teng wrote in one of his parables: "It is only a wild dream of foolish men to know everything and possess inexhaustible wisdom." Since only one man in Communist China has such omniscience, this is construed as questioning Mao's infallibility. Teng is thus judged guilty of the well-known crime of lese majeste.

A widening range of intellectuals, educators, writers, scholars, journalists in most of the principal cities and educational and cultural institutions, including the author of the regime's national anthem, have been implicated in the ever-expanding dragnet of the purge.

Kuo Mo-jo Recants

The most eminent is Kuo Mo-jo. The 78-year-old Kuo is the country's most prominent scholar, who has been hailed as the "Victor Hugo" of China by *L'Humanité*, the official daily of the French Communist Party. He is president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers and of the China Peace Committee, and holds more than 20 other official positions.

This old man was forced to comply with the pattern of the campaign by making a "self-criticism" last April

to the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress of which he is a vice chairman. There he confessed that all his voluminous writings deserved to be burned because he had not deigned to learn from the workers and peasants and had neglected to apply Mao's teachings correctly.

Mao's regime has not publicly hurled heretical banned books into the bonfire. But to demand that all writings conform to Mao's thought, as evidenced by this obsequious obeisance to Mao's omniscience by China's foremost scholar, demonstrates how stringent is the thought control being enforced by the so-called "cultural revolution."

More significant than the humiliating confession of Kuo Mo-jo is the fact that none of the writers denounced as counterrevolutionary has yet followed his example. For example, Teng To has not recanted his heresies. Last December he held a meeting of students to urge the creation of a hundred flowers atmosphere in which everyone could write "according to our own views". This is, of course, now less permissible and possible than ever.

Fall of Peng Chen

The highest personage thus far involved in the purge is Peking's Mayor, Peng Chen, member of the Politbureau and one of the top ten in the Communist Party hierarchy. Removed with him was a large group of notables located in the capital. Among them were Lu Ping, president of Peking University, and two other leading officials; the entire editorial boards of the *Peking Daily*, the *Peking Evening News*, and the fortnightly magazine *Front Line*; a deputy director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee, Chou Yang, who is well-known as an exponent of the official line in the polemics with Moscow and in philosophy. Chou has served as vice-minister of cultural affairs and vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles since 1951. Lu Ting-yi, director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee and minister of Culture, has not been seen in Peking since the end of February.

The purge has struck hardest in Peking, the political, intellectual, educational capital of the country. It has been focused on the campus and youth movement there. The purge victims have been accused of using Peking University as a base for attempting to win over the younger generation. They have been charged with seeking to "lead students astray onto the road of revisionism and train them as successors for the bourgeoisie."

The resistance of the older intellectuals and their refusal to recant is connected with the militant temper of the students and their opposition to the regime. Before the president of Peking University was removed, the papers reported struggles between those students who backed the oppositionists and those mobilized by party officials and the government. Reporters were ordered to apply for official permission to visit the university.

What are these student rebels like, what is their mood? Let me cite on this point some testimony in a letter received in June from a veteran Japanese Marxist:

"Last summer," he wrote, "one of my sons, a freshman at a Tokyo university, helped organize a tour in which 130 university students went to China. They visited Canton, Shanghai, Peking and other places. They were welcomed by the young people and university students there with such enthusiasm that they were completely overwhelmed. These encounters were spontaneous and passionate, even though they were organized under official auspices.

"In brief meetings the young people became so friendly that many, almost all, on both sides embraced each other and parted with tears, though few could speak each other's language. Upon their return the Japanese student delegation compiled a booklet of their impressions which, however naive, can by that fact be more trusted in certain respects than those of better-known, more sophisticated people.

"I learned through them that the Chinese students at the leading universities, together with other young men and women, are still in a more or less revolutionary frame of mind. They yearn for something great and true with a common aspiration. They number by the millions, by the tens of millions, in the cities.

"In your *Militant* article you quoted Victor Zorza's words comparing the present situation in Peking with the crisis in the Soviet leadership a few months before the death of Stalin. That may be true so far as the gravity of the conflict in the leadership is concerned.

"But in regard to these tens of millions of young people it rather resembles to some extent the situation in 1927 before Stalin's suppression of the Left Opposition. These intellectuals and young people are not indifferent. They are strikingly bright, burning with intense curiosity and revolutionary zeal.

Lenin is Studied

"Their fiery, non-individualistic rebel spirit makes them different from students in capitalist countries and perhaps also from Soviet Russia. They still live in a pre-Stalin era. They study Lenin's works as well as Mao's, although all the documents of the Comintern are not at their disposal.

"The writings of the figures now accused of counter-revolution are sharply critical of the present leaders. None of the accused, except for the old Kuo Mo-jo, has yet recanted. If the grown-ups can become so critical, then the dissidence of these young people with bright intelligence must be unbearably acute.

"Behind this surprising militancy of the adults is the resistance of these young men and women. We should not forget the existence of many victims of the 'Great Leap Forward' and other affairs. Each of these has involved thousands of young men.

"We know of one prison alone in the suburbs of Peking where hundreds of youthful political prisoners have been doing heavy labor for many years, resolutely refusing release on the condition of recanting. They are not Trotskyists, at least they do not call themselves such. (Many Trotskyists who were arrested in 1949 and later, also remain in prison.) Many Chinese youth and students know of their existence and resistance."

This testimony is confirmed by two recent events. The purge has been extended to the Communist Youth League of Peking whose leading officials were ousted on June 15. The news of their dismissal was reported to have had an "electrifying impact" on the capital. Meanwhile, 6,000 students and intellectuals were ordered back from farms and factories to reinforce the ranks of the party on Peking University's campus. By official decree, no new students will be admitted to the first year of the universities for about six months while the curriculum is being reformed.

What is the regime afraid of? Its spokesmen say that the purge victims were engaged in a counterrevolutionary conspiracy aimed against socialism and directed toward the restoration of capitalism in connivance with Chiang Kai-shek, the native capitalists and landlords, and U. S. imperialism.

Shadow of Hungary

These "unsteady elements in the revolutionary ranks" were plotting to take power. They had two prototypes in view, it is said. One was the "blatant counterrevolutionary molding of public opinion by the Khrushchev revisionist group which, soon after, staged a 'palace' coup and usurped party, military and government power, subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The other was the 1956 Hungarian revolution where "the counterrevolutionaries also prepared public opinion before they took to the streets to create disturbances and stage riots. This counterrevolutionary incident was engineered by imperialism and started by a group of anti-Communist intellectuals of the Petöfi Club. Imre Nagy, who at that time still wore the badge of a Communist, was 'fitted out with a king's robe' and became the chieftain of the counterrevolution."

This parallel between the views of the critics and the Hungarian Communist intellectuals has a tell-tale character. The Petöfi Circle was a debating club formed in Budapest in March 1956 by the Communist youth organization as a response to the liberalization after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet CP. Students, writers, philosophers, economists, scientists, workers and dissident party members used it as a platform for vehement criticism of the crimes, blunders and deficiencies of Rakosi's Stalinist regime. The controversies and revelations in this unofficial parliament played a key role in the ideological preparation for the popular outburst in October that was smashed with the aid of Khrushchev's tanks and the approval of Mao Tse-tung.

In crushing the Hungarian uprising, Khrushchev charged that it was "counterrevolutionary," and he associated it with the bourgeois restorationist currents that also existed in Hungary. Mao agreed. Chou En-lai even toured Eastern Europe to bolster Khrushchev's hand in this counterrevolutionary repression of the socialist aspirations of the Hungarian intellectuals, students and workers. The Hungarian workers, however, clearly demonstrated that what they wanted was proletarian democracy and not a return to capitalism.

The repeated reference to the Petöfi Circle are all the more interesting, since they may indicate the existence of similar left wing ferment in China. This is suggested by references linking Peng Chen with Liu Hsi-ling, the Peking university woman student who was the outstanding spokesman for the revolutionary youth critics of the regime in 1957. By deliberately mixing up a tendency of this kind with the remnants of the "progressive bourgeoisie," whose parties are still represented in the government of the People's Republic of China, Mao would be following the pattern set by Khrushchev, who, of course, was only applying what he learned from Stalin.

Criticism is Silenced

The citation of these political precedents also indicates why the Mao directorate is so adamant against any liberalization of the atmosphere and any relaxation of the strict regimentation of thought. It fears that criticisms voiced by students and intellectuals may, as in Hungary, set off explosions among the masses or, as in the Soviet bloc, stimulate strong demands for debureaucratization.

Any outspoken dissidence tends to unsettle the "cult of the individual" enshrined in the mystique of Mao (who has not published anything of significance since 1957) as the all-wise, infallible, unquestionable leader. The unrestrained adulation of Mao which presently permeates Chinese life surpasses the homage once paid to Stalin. This sickening relapse into backwardness, which is totally incompatible with the scientific spirit of Marxism and the democratic principles of socialism, has become a charter for the uncontrolled rule of the Chinese Communist bureaucracy. They have made the worship of Mao's omniscience mandatory upon all in order to keep a firm grip on the reins of power and beat down all criticism of their actions.

What has called forth such a tension within the leadership and such a breach between Mao's entourage and young and old intellectuals? Four factors appear to have converged from different sources at the same time: the uninterrupted sequence of setbacks which have weakened and worsened China's international position; economic difficulties at home; the growing threat of U. S. military attack; and the possible prospect of Mao's death which raises the problem of his succession.

Let us first discuss the international developments.

The high-water mark of China's influence in the Communist world, after the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute at the beginning of the 1960's, was the Moscow meeting of 19 Communist parties in March 1965. Although Peking and its closest allies boycotted this meeting, the refusal of the participants to concede any of the Kremlin's key demands there was a great gain for Peking.

Soon after that, a sharp turn took place. The new stage began with the demonstrations of Chinese and Vietnamese students before the U. S. embassy in Moscow which was broken up by Soviet police and soldiers. This incident was staged by the Chinese em-

bassy on orders from Peking in protest against the Kremlin's behind-the-scenes negotiations on Vietnam with Washington. This action, however justified by the sluggish Russian reaction to Johnson's bombings of north Vietnam, was widely construed as a provocation and a deliberate widening of the breach between the two powers when greater solidarity was in order.

This feeling was confirmed when the Chinese followed up with vehement accusations that Moscow's guiding line was "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," that his successors were likewise conspiring with Washington to sell out north Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, and that this justified categorical refusal to engage in any united action against U. S. military aggression in Southeast Asia.

Since that time relations between Moscow and Peking have steadily deteriorated until today they stand farther apart than ever with no prospect of reconciliation short of direct American assault upon China's territory.

Meanwhile Peking has suffered an almost uninterrupted series of setbacks in the colonial countries. These began with the postponement of the Asian-African Conference scheduled for Algiers in June 1965 after Ben Bella's overturn by Boumedienne. Peking received two black marks by its indecent haste in recognizing the new military regime and then by the nullification of the conference which it was eagerly promoting with a view to barring Soviet participation.

The intervention of the Chinese in various of the of the newly independent African countries have not met with much success, in part because of the reverses of the revolutionary forces on that continent highlighted by the suppression of the Congo rebels by the U. S.-Belgian-South African mercenaries. Chinese representatives have been expelled from several countries (Burundi, Kenya). By the end of 1965 Peking's influence in Africa had been largely reduced to the Congo Republic and Tanzania—and this June there was a reactionary army rising in Brazzaville.

The biggest blow came at the end of February 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown while on his way to Peking.

In Latin America pro-Peking split-offs have been organized from the Communist parties in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico. Many guerrilla fighters are inspired by the example of the Chinese Revolution, adhere to its ideas of colonial struggle, and look hopefully toward Peking for material aid. But it cannot be said that the Chinese have made sizeable headway at Moscow's expense. Castroism remains the predominant influence within the revolutionary Left in Latin America.

Debacles in Asian Policy

In the past year and a half Peking's influence in Asia has lessened. China won no laurels by its abortive mobilization during the India-Pakistan conflict. It has seen both North Korea and north Vietnam turn from sympathy to neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and attend the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in defiance of Peking's boycott. Even the Japanese CP, irritated by Peking's ultra-leftism and obstinacy in rejecting united action

of the Communist countries against U.S. military escalation in Southeast Asia, is becoming alienated. Its daily newspaper has stopped publishing the broadcast schedules of the Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang radio stations.

The military coup in Indonesia last October was the most severe setback for Communist China on both the diplomatic and party levels. The keystone of Chinese policy in Asia against Washington and Moscow was the close alliance with Sukarno. The shunting aside of the Indonesian head of state and the reorientation of the generals toward the imperialist powers have shattered this strategy and shifted the relation of forces in that part of the world to Peking's disadvantage. Peking is left with no strong and reliable partners in the Afro-Asian bloc.

Indonesian Blood Bath

The bloody crushing of the Communist Party of Indonesia, the largest outside China and the Soviet Union, was a double blow. Though formally neutral, the PKI was actually one of China's firmest allies in the tussle with Moscow. It was also held up as a prize example of the success of Peking's line in "the third World." The repercussions of its total annihilation, so completely unanticipated by everyone from Jakarta to Peking and Moscow, are still resounding throughout the Communist world as well as within the Chinese CP.

After this came Castro's attacks upon Peking and closer alignment with Moscow. From the inception of the debate Havana was tacitly sympathetic with the Chinese positions on the colonial revolution and unbending opposition to U.S. imperialism. However, Peking's sectarian attitude in dealing with the neutrals in the Sino-Soviet conflict, coupled with Cuba's inescapable economic and military dependence upon the Soviet Union, have nullified this sympathy.

For a time neutralist Rumania sought to play the role of honest broker between Moscow and Peking. Now the schism produced by Chou's visit in June, either through the Chinese Premier's intention to make a public denunciation of Moscow or opposing any concession to U.S. imperialism in the Vietnam war, has left Peking virtually alone.

Its only remaining staunch supporters are Albania in Europe and an assortment of smaller Communist parties ranging from Burma, New Zealand and Australia to the Grippa group in Belgium. China can count on only half-hearted backing from north Vietnam and North Korea against Moscow.

This is not much to boast of after five years of bitter ideological struggle. The prospect of improved trade and diplomatic ties with Japan and other capitalist governments does not compensate for the accumulated losses on the world arena.

China's growing isolation within the Communist bloc is all the more troubling in face of the tightening U.S. encirclement and the relentless edging of its military machine toward Chinese territory.

Even a fissureless monolith would tend to crack under such stresses. A realistic view of China's worsened international situation must be one of the prin-

cipal generators of dissension at the top of the CP and its government. Prominent spokesmen have dismissed the reverses as unimportant and asserted that such temporary setbacks are inevitable on the road to complete victory. Such official optimism cannot squash all doubts. Some influential voices must be raising such questions as: How did we land in this plight within a year and a half after Khrushchev's downfall? Can there be some flaws in Mao's omniscience? What must be done to turn the adverse tide and break out of our isolation? Isn't a new course necessary?

Such "dangerous thoughts" in high circles may very well have been major precipitants in the regime's ongoing purge and its stiffening of thought control over the whole range of China's intellectual and political life.

It is not so easy to discern the precise character of the difficulties in the economy and the remedies being proposed for them either by the government or the opposition. Although the worst damages suffered in the "Great Leap Forward" and the famine years have been repaired and the economy is moving ahead slowly, food production is only now approaching the output of 1956, while tens of millions more mouths have to be fed.

Possible Economic Reforms

It has been reported that the government is considering agrarian reforms at the expense of the family income and private plots of the peasants and that there is fierce controversy over the allocation of the national budget for vast prestige projects as against investment in more solid enterprises. Certainly, discontents arising from the vital everyday interests of the great masses of peasants are among the touchiest issues since they are soon transmitted into the armed forces.

On one point there is little doubt. That is the intense yearning for greater intellectual, artistic, scientific, and even political, freedom.

However, the major factor in bringing differences to a head very likely comes from the relentless squeeze being exerted by the steady expansion of American military operations grimly emphasized by the bombing of the oil installations at Hanoi and Haiphong and Johnson's bellicose declaration that his administration is determined at all costs to stop aid to south Vietnam at its source. If the Pentagon so decides, that source can be China as well as Hanoi.

The imperialist strategists included in their calculations of escalation both the division between Moscow and Peking and the internal conflict within the Chinese leadership.

Thus the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Philip Geyelin gave the following as part of the reasoning which lead to the attacks on oil storage depots near Hanoi and Haiphong, in a front page story from Washington, June 30:

"Much more than practical military need was involved in the decision, which has been the subject of intense deliberation for months . . . To the experts, Hanoi looks to be increasingly isolated from its big Red patrons, Russia and Communist China, as these two

concentrate increasingly on their own quarrel and the Chinese are convulsed by purges and internal strains."

Washington knows more about the differences at the top in Peking than it says; for the moment it is being close-mouthed and very prudent in its comments, belligerent as its actions are.

Purge in the Military

There is much speculation that, in view of China's need for aid in the face of the threat of U. S. military assault, certain of its army strategists have been calling for reconsideration of government relations with the Soviet Union and an end to the refusal to enter into a defensive alliance with its leaders. The chief of the general staff, Lo Jui-ching, and some of his subordinates, have been ousted. An editorial in *Liberation Army Daily* said a big struggle took place in the armed forces during which "representatives of the bourgeoisie who had got hold of important posts in the army" were exposed as important members of "the counterrevolutionary, anti-party, anti-socialist clique recently censored by the party." Among those may be the chief of the general political department, Hsiao Hua, and the commander of the navy, Hsiao Ching-kuang.

All the differences over these issues may be sharpened by the slackening of the aged Mao's hand on the helm, despite the frenzy of the official idolatry.

It must be stressed that the rest of the world is at a loss to know just what the oppositionists stand or speak for, or even what matters are in dispute, because only the obviously distorted version given out by the regime is available.

The Mao leadership has insisted on thorough discussion and clarification of the questions involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Yet they keep everyone in the dark when it comes to the pros and cons of their vital decisions at home.

In this respect, Mao's regime sticks to the accursed tradition of Stalin who instituted the anti-Leninist practice of restricting policy-making powers to a tiny group dominated by the arbitrary will of the unchallengeable individual. Everyone else at home and abroad was obliged to acquiesce in what emanated from the infallible leader.

How things stand in this respect in China is indicated by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has not held a congress since 1958. So far as is known, the Central Committee has not met since September 1962!

Oppositional Program

As a result of this authoritarian secretiveness, outside observers are reduced to "educated guesses" in analyzing and appraising the current political crisis. From the accusations against the dissident intellectuals and other sources, it is possible to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking.

- 1) They doubt the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung.
- 2) They claim to be better Communists than the present leaders.



Macpherson, Toronto Star, April 23, 1966

3) They display "sympathy" for the Khrushchev revisionists; that is, they want to unite the "socialist countries" in face of a possible attack by the United States, heal the breach, and renew the Russian alliance.

4) They have criticized the excesses of the "Great Leap Forward" and such wasteful efforts as attempting to produce steel in backyard furnaces.

5) They seek changes in economic policy and agrarian reforms.

6) They demand more intellectual liberty, freedom of expression and the right to dissent from the official line.

7) They may even have dared to suggest that Mao step down on grounds of health or age.

Taken together, these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program to the policies of the Peking leadership. It thus appears plausible that a serious struggle is being waged in the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party over policy and perspectives and that the intellectuals under fire, and possibly the ousted military men, are tied up with an anti-Mao faction and reflect its views.

The publicly assailed writers, experts and scholars may be surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and the army, embracing those dissidents who are discontented with the results of the foreign and domestic policy in recent years, have voiced opposition to them, and project an alternative course vigorously rejected by Mao and his men.

This surmise is substantiated in the warning given June 4 by an editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, the CCP's central newspaper, that even the oldest and highest leaders would be removed if they opposed Mao's policies. The editorial declared: "Anyone who opposes chairman Mao Tse-tung, opposes Mao Tse-tung's

thoughts, opposes the party's central leadership, opposes the proletariat's dictatorship, opposes the correct way of socialism, whoever that may be, however high may be the position and however old his standing, he will be struck down by the entire party and by the entire people."

The identity of the highly placed "demons" and "monsters" in the party and army against whom these warnings are directed has not been disclosed. There has been considerable speculation in the world press about the shifts of power among the men at the top but no definitive information. The *New York Times* has reported, for example, that Defense Minister Lin Piao is the chief promoter of the purge and has become the "most powerful man in the country." The posters which have been put up coupling his name with Chairman Mao's would seem to bear out this supposition.

On the other hand, Liu Shao-chi, chairman of the Chinese People's Republic and a long-time associate of the purged Peking Mayor Peng, has not been heard from during the current struggle. But the internal struggle is not ended and it remains to be seen who its ultimate targets are and what its outcome will be.

SWP Position on China

To avoid misunderstandings, it is essential to make clear the political attitude of the Socialist Workers Party toward the People's Republic of China. We believe that the Chinese revolution was the greatest blow against capitalism since the October 1917 revolution and that it is a continuation and extension of that first socialist victory. Since 1949, we have been firm partisans of revolutionary China, defenders of its economic foundations and socialist advances against all internal and external enemies.

The Chinese revolution, now 17 years old, has immense achievements to its credit. It converted China from a capitalist-colonialist country to a workers state by overthrowing the Kuomintang dictatorship, ending imperialist domination, unifying the nation under a central government, wiping out provincialism and landlordism, nationalizing the land, banks and major means of industrial production, monopolizing foreign trade, planning the economy, and reorganizing agrarian relations through a series of steps culminating in the People's Communes.

The new regime has taken measures to improve food, clothing and shelter for the masses under extremely adverse conditions. It has stabilized the currency, cleaned up prostitution and beggary, promoted literacy, education and science, expanded public health and medical services, introduced social benefits for the aged and disabled, broken down the patriarchal family, given greater freedom to women, and opened vast vistas to the younger generation. This remarkable progress in so many fields testifies to the enormous popular enthusiasm and energies released by the worker-peasant revolution.

The Socialist Workers Party has demonstrated its solidarity with revolutionary China, not only in words, but in deeds: first in the struggles against Chiang Kai-shek, then by our opposition to the Korean war, by our support to the workers state against Nehru's



Tokyo, Sept. 16, 1965. More than 100,000 Japanese workers demonstrate against U.S. policy in Vietnam. The Japanese Communist Party has criticized both China and the USSR for failure to provide greater military and diplomatic aid to north and south Vietnam.

bourgeois government in the India-China border clash, and now by our opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Our 1964 national election platform favored recognition of China, the end of the blockade, and its admission to the United Nations.

But we also believe that the political system of the People's Republic has been subjected to grave bureaucratic deformations arising from China's poverty and cultural backwardness and reinforced by the Stalinist background, training and methods of the Mao leadership. There exists a workers state but not a workers and peasants democracy in China.

We Trotskyists are not blind followers or cheerleaders for the heads of any of the existing Communist governments: Kosygin, Mao, Tito, or even Fidel Castro, who is by far the best of the lot. We take the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth as our guide. In arriving at our positions, we start from



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the facts analyzed with the methods of Marxism and appraise them from the standpoint of promoting the international revolutionary struggle for socialism.

When any workers government or party is in error and, in our opinion follows a policy injurious to the welfare of the working people and the world revolution, we say so without fear or favor. For instance, we have taken an independent Marxist stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute. We maintain that Peking is in the main right against Moscow on many problems of international politics and especially, in condemning its complicity with Washington to implement the line of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. But we hold that Peking is wrong in exalting Stalin, retaining Stalinist ideas and methods, and characterizing Yugoslavia as a capitalist country.

Opportunist Foreign Policy

Long before the tragic butchery of the Indonesian Communists last October, we stated that the Maoists were wrong in backing up the Indonesian CP's subordination to Sukarno because its leader, Aidit, favored Peking in the dispute with Moscow and Sukarno was a diplomatic ally. Let me quote from our criticism of Peking's position published over three years ago in April 1963:

"Although the Chinese Communists attack political submission to the colonial bourgeoisie, they are not consistent in this regard. For example, they do not object to the craven support given by the Indonesian CP to the government of Sukarno who is Nehru's counterpart in that country. It appears that, even in the colonial sphere, Peking's principles are tailored to fit the momentary needs of its foreign policy." (*Moscow vs. Peking, The Meaning of the Great Debate*, by William F. Warde, Pioneer Publishers, New York, p. 10.)

The Maoist support to the line of class conciliation in Indonesia resulted in a re-edition of the catastrophe suffered in 1925-1927 by the Communist movement itself in China.

Now Peking's stubborn refusal to participate in a united front with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries in defense of Vietnam threatens to give the world a re-edition of the defeat inflicted on the German working class by Hitler in 1933.

What is at stake in the present situation? Washington's war machine has intervened to try to crush the Vietnam revolution and terrorize and pulverize north Vietnam while it threatens to invade China and wipe out its nuclear installations. For its own security, if nothing more, the Chinese leaders should press for the broadest cooperation among the workers states against

the imperialist aggressor, as almost every other Communist government and party has recognized, and as many Chinese Communists must be thinking, if not saying.

Yet Peking scornfully rejects united action with Moscow on the specious ground that its revisionist heads are in collusion with Washington. Because of its timid response to the escalation of U. S. belligerence over the past two years, the limited supply of arms it has sent to north Vietnam, and its refusal to give an unmistakable public pledge of support to China in case of an American attack, the Soviet leadership cannot be absolved from responsibility in encouraging imperialist aggression in Southeast Asia.

But the most effective way Peking could expose and demonstrate any such complicity on Moscow's part would be an unremitting campaign for a united front between the Soviet Union and China which would issue a solemn "cease and desist" warning to the Washington warmakers.

Instead of such a Leninist policy, the Maoists content themselves with denouncing the "modern revisionists" and the "enemies-of-Mao-who-hide-behind-the-thought-of-Mao." The Chinese press exhorts the Vietnamese to fight on valiantly by themselves and, in defiance of the facts, claims that the war is proceeding from one success to another. Johnson and the Pentagon are the sole beneficiaries of this blind attitude.

This sectarian course bears the gravest resemblance to the policy imposed by Stalin on the German Communists during the rise of Hitler. The German CP rejected united action of the Communist and Social Democratic parties and trade unions against the Nazis because it viewed the Socialists as "social-fascist" accomplices of capitalist reaction. Thanks to this suicidal policy the Brown Shirts marched to power through the divided ranks of the German working class and the Third Reich went on to prepare for the Second World War and the assault on the Soviet Union.

What happened on a national level in 1932-3 is now being duplicated on the international level in 1965-6—and the consequences of this disunity for the cause of world socialism can be no less disastrous.

We American socialists who live in the bowels of the imperialist monster which is stepping up its military operations in Southeast Asia and menacing the borders of Communist China have special obligations in the present situation. As the Marxist wing of the antiwar movement, we have to intensify our efforts to oppose and stop Johnson's dirty war in Vietnam with its danger of dragging the American people into a nuclear conflict with China.

At the same time we have a responsibility to the revolutionary Communists, intellectuals, students and youth in China who are being unjustly victimized and slandered for demanding more freedom of thought and expression and the rectification of errors committed by the present leadership. We are on their side in the struggle for greater democracy and a more correct course.

To combine these two tasks into a single policy and to understand their dialectical interrelation is what distinguishes a genuine from a would-be Marxist-Leninist in regard to the current political crisis in China.

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By William F. Warde

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The 23rd Congress of the CPSU

BY ERNEST GERMAIN

The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was not marked by any sensational incidents or revelations. One might conclude, therefore, that it does not merit much attention. Such a conclusion would be mistaken, however.

On the one hand, the gray and monotonous character of the Congress revealed subsurface conflicts and tensions in Soviet society owing to the inability of the Bonapartist leadership of the bureaucracy to settle the controversial questions in the Party and in Soviet society. On the other hand, one can draw conclusions from the data presented to the Congress, notably, in the reports of Brezhnev and Kosygin, and in the few speeches which were not confined to the mere repetition of clichés, which can serve as a basis for a better understanding of the economic and social situation in the USSR and the contradictions which lie hidden within it.

The most important fact emerging from this congress is that the USSR has undergone a serious crisis of slackening economic growth in recent years. I noted this development at the time it was first manifested,⁽¹⁾ but its extent has surely exceeded the estimates made at that time.

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The following figures give a picture of this deceleration: It was decided at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU to increase industrial production two and one half times by 1970 over the base year of 1960. It is now stated that industrial production rose from 100 to 150 between 1960 and 1965 and that it will go from 150 to 225 in 1970; the program adopted at the 22nd Congress set the production of from 900 to 1,000 billion kilowatts of electricity as the goal in 1970; the new five year plan provides for the production of 840-850 billion kilowatts only. Several important industrial objectives set by the seven year plan for 1965 have not been attained: the production of gas was about 129 billion cubic meters instead of the 150 cubic meters promised; the production of chemical fertilizers was 31.3 million tons instead of the 35 million tons promised; the production of consumer goods, which was to rise by 50 per cent, went up only 36 per cent altogether; the productivity of industrial labor which had risen by an average of 6.5 per cent, in the years 1956-60 had an average annual increase of only 4.6 per cent in the period 1961-65 in contrast to the 6.5 per cent provided for by the plan.

Both the national income and the real income of the population rose more slowly than predicted. The national income increased by less than 50 per cent, while the seven year plan had provided for an in-

crease of 62-65 per cent. The real per capita income increased by only 20 per cent between 1960 and 1965, which indicates an annual increase of about 3.5 per cent, a much lower figure than that for the seven preceding years. The increase in the average monthly wages of blue and white collar workers for the entire seven year period 1958-1965 did not exceed 23 per cent (it went from 78 to 95 rubles). Taking into account the more rapid rhythm of growth in 1958, 1959 and 1960, it is probable that there was one year—1963—in which the real income of the Soviet workers even declined.

Economic Slowing Down

In my opinion, the fall of Khrushchev was caused, at least in part, by this decline in economic growth in the USSR and by the quasi-stagnation of the standard of living which resulted from it. This slowing down had three basic causes: the failure of agricultural policy (which was the major failure of Khrushchev's economic policy); the lower than expected productivity of investment in industry realized during the seven year period; and the ever heavier burdens of the arms race and the space race for the Soviet economy.

These three causes of the crisis have evoked three corresponding responses on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy in the attempt to overcome the obstacles to a revival in economic growth: a new agricultural reform, announced by the Plenum of the Party Central Committee in March 1965; the reform of the methods of economic planning and management, of which the so-called Liberman proposals are a part; and the attempt by the bureaucracy to "rationalize" the arms race with American imperialism, notably by means of the Moscow treaty on the cessation of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

The group in power expects to gather the fruits of these three reforms, which are already realized or on the way toward realization (the third has been seriously checked by the imperialist aggression in Vietnam which took the Kremlin by surprise), in the form of a recovery in the economic growth rates, above all, that of the national income and the real incomes of the population. The latter are scheduled to rise by 30 per cent between 1965 and 1970, in contrast to an increase of 20 per cent for the period 1960-65. The efforts toward this end are directed as much toward agriculture as toward the production of goods for industrial use.

It is out of the question, however, for the level of American industrial production to be exceeded by 1970-72 and above all, for the "material and technical bases for communism" to be attained by that time. These Khrushchevite boasts were justly condemned as "voluntarism" and "subjectivism." So much the worst for those who gave credit to them . . .

The failure of the Khrushchevite economic policy was particularly serious in agriculture. Khrushchev had promised 180 million tons of harvested cereals, first by 1960 (the 6th five year plan), and then by 1965 (the seven year plan). They are still far from that! In fact, they are so far removed that the Soviet leaders do not dare to publish precise figures for the

year 1965, but take refuge in the *average* for the years 1961-65. The average for cereals production is about 130 million tons, a figure which was attained and exceeded already in 1958, and the new five year plan provides only for a production of 167 million tons by 1970, that is, a figure below the provision of the plan for . . . 1960.

This failure is also apparent in areas other than that of cereals production. For sugar beets, the seven year plan provided for a production of 76 to 84 million tons in 1965; the average in 1961-65 was 59 million tons. For potatoes, Khrushchev had promised 147 million tons in 1965; the average for 1961-65 was, in fact, 81.5 million tons, or a figure lower than the average production in 1956-60.

The trend was still worse in the case of animal products. At the 21st Congress, Khrushchev had promised to increase the production of meat on the hoof from 8 million tons in 1958 to 16 million tons in 1965. At the 23rd Congress, Kosygin stated that the average meat production for the period 1961-65 was 9.3 million tons, and that it would only reach 11 million tons in 1970, or much less than that promised for 1960 by the seven year plan. In 1958, milk production was about 60 million tons; the seven year plan promised to bring it to 100-105 million tons by 1965; Kosygin put the average for the period 1961-65 at 65 million tons and promised a production of up to 78 million tons only during the new five year period.

In the light of these figures, the promises of Khrushchev in the program adopted at the 22nd Congress take on an almost grotesque note. The total volume of agricultural production, which was to increase by 250 per cent from 1958 to 1970, will only increase by 40 per cent at best. The meat production which was to triple (sic) during this period will only increase by 36 per cent; the milk production which was to double in this period, will only increase by just 30 per cent . . .

Even agricultural raw materials for industry, which always enjoyed preference in the Stalinist period, have not been produced in the required quantities; this is true, notably, for wool, cotton, wood and leather. To take only the examples of wool and cotton—for wool, production increased to 320,000 tons in 1958; the seven year plan promised 548,000 tons for 1965. In reality, the average attained for the period 1961-65 was only 361,000 tons and the new five year plan has prudently set a goal for 1970 below that initially set for 1965.

Actual Gains in Production

The seven year plan provided for an increase in cotton production from 4.4 million tons in 1958 to 5.76 million tons in 1965. In reality, production only reached 5 million tons in 1965 (that is an increase of less than 15 per cent in the space of seven years), and the goal initially set for 1965 is now simply reassumed by the new five year plan as a goal for 1970. It goes without saying that light industry suffers from the scarcity of raw materials which results from the lag in agriculture. Here we come upon one of the negative

effects of the unbalanced development of agriculture and industry for industry itself.

I have already pointed out three causes for the slowing down in agricultural production after 1959 in a previous article:⁽²⁾ inadequate investment, irrational use of the available means of production, insufficient interest in increasing production by the kolkhoz peasants. The group which now rules the Soviet bureaucracy and the CPSU seems to want to take on all three of these problems at once. With regard to investment, it is giving as much attention to the increase in the pool of agricultural machinery as to the increase in the production of fertilizer. This constitutes a step forward in comparison with the Khrushchevite attempts to solve the chronic agricultural crisis from which the Soviet Union suffers by successive "campaigns" around a single theme (the cultivation of the virgin lands; corn growing; the elimination of meadow and fallow lands; the development of the production of chemical fertilizers, etc.).

Agricultural Planning

The new five year plan provides for a *considerable increase in investment in agriculture*. While industrial production is to rise only by an average of 50 per cent, the production of agricultural machines and tractors is to increase by 70 per cent, and that of chemical fertilizer is to double. While the production of electricity is to increase by a total of 66 per cent, the supply of electricity to agriculture is to triple. It is true that Brezhnev and Kosygin are silent on the subject of the productivity of this investment. In this regard, the balance sheet of the seven year plan is disastrous. The plan had provided for a total investment of 50 billion rubles in agriculture. Owing to this investment, an increase in production on the order of 70 per cent was to be obtained. In reality, investment in agriculture increased during the seven year period to 56 billion rubles, but the increase in production obtained was only 12 per cent. This time, an increase in production of 25 per cent is promised from an investment of 72 billion rubles.


The picture is even more bleak with regard to the division of investment between the state and the kolkhozes. The seven year plan had provided that the kolkhozes would invest 35 billion rubles and the state would account for 15 billion rubles. In reality, the kolkhozes invested only 26 billion rubles and the state was forced to *double* its investment (30 billion rubles instead of 15 billion), in order to reach the established goal. The decrease in investments by the kolkhozes was not only relative but absolute. The total investment per kolkhoz decreased from 254 rubles in 1959 to 249 rubles per kolkhoz in 1963, and this in spite the fact that the long term credits increased from 41 to 61 rubles per kolkhoz in this same period. The funds then belonging to the kolkhozes which they could have freed for investment therefore actually decreased from 213 rubles to 188 rubles per kolkhoz (*Voprosy Ekonomiki* No. 12, 1965). For the new five year plan, the state will invest 41 billion rubles (nearly 40 per cent more than during the past seven

year period) and the kolkhozes are to invest 31 billions (that is, less than that provided for in the preceding seven year period).

The problems in the utilization of the available means of production in agriculture have by no means been overcome by the sale of tractors and agricultural machines to the kolkhozes themselves. If this reform produced some results and increased the intensity of the utilization of these machines, it also produced opposite effects, as Brezhnev and the Minister of Agriculture Maskevich confessed at the 23rd Congress. Maskevich (*Pravda*, April 1, 1966) even pointed out that production per day per tractor had *declined* in recent years, and that the fund of spare parts had shrunk. It is on this point, above all, that the ruling group seems to want to concentrate its efforts in the years to come. (The speech of the Chairman of Gosplan, Lomako, at the March 1965 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU seems to indicate that since 1958 the productivity per hectare itself has begun to decline for numerous products.

With regard to the raising of "material incentive" in agricultural production for kolkhoz peasants, the 23rd Congress made no fundamental innovations. It promised, it is true, that they would move toward a guaranteed monthly salary for kolkhoz peasants by stages and that kolkhoz peasants would henceforth collect old age pensions. The Congress flashed the perspective of an increase in "kolkhoz democracy." It also emphasized the fact that in the course of the five year plan, the average income of kolkhoz peasants will increase by more than the average income of workers in the state sector (40 per cent in contrast to 20 per cent). But it did not proclaim the radical transformation of the structure of the agricultural economy; it limited itself to defending equally the status of the kolkhozes against the progressive transformation of them into sovkhoses, and the status of the private plots against their progressive elimination, two reforms which Khrushchev had proclaimed as intermediate objectives in his report before the 21st Congress and in the new program adopted at the 22nd Congress.

But on the eve of the Congress, the Soviet press gave considerable attention to a method of dividing up the kolkhozes into sections of from 500 to 3,000 hectares, each one entrusted to a group of four or five families whose incomes would depend directly on the productivity of these fields alone and thus on the productivity



"It is our task to discuss what we will produce yesterday." (Hospodarske Noviny, Prague, Feb. 28, 1966)

of their labor. According to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* of October 15, 1965 (cited in *The Economist* of December 18, 1965), this method would permit an increase in productivity of 250 per cent and reduce by six or seven times the number of kolkhoz peasants necessary to harvest a given quantity of cereals; the income of kolkhoz peasants was to rise by nearly 250 per cent (which is quite another matter from the 40 per cent promised by the 8th five year plan). It goes without saying that such a reform, which would be an important step backward toward private agriculture, is highly controversial in bureaucratic circles. And like many other problems, the 23rd Congress did not care to tackle this question.

Khrushchev's Errors Rebuked

The great majority of the speakers who took the floor at the 23rd Congress were severe in their attitude toward Khrushchev, without naming him, however—reproaching him with taking measures in direct contradiction to the principles of agronomy in agriculture. They emphasized that the virgin lands onto which Khrushchev had wanted to extend the growing of cereals at any cost were, at least in part, dry lands, where cultivation produced disastrous results in speeding erosion. The new five year plan provides for important irrigation measures which, in reality, should have preceded the cultivation of these lands. The attempt to impose the cultivation of corn and leguminous plants in all cases on all kolkhozes (above all, at the expense of the meadow and fallow lands) was equally criticized.

These criticisms are justified in general. I raised them at the time the measures were introduced; many Western critics did the same. But one might ask how these same bureaucrats, who state today that these measures were taken in contradiction to the warnings of specialists, could have voted unanimously for them no more than a few years ago, without making any public references at all to these warnings.

Doesn't this mean that the "habits of the period of the cult of the personality" have been maintained even after the cult was "denounced."

The famous "Liberian reforms" did not play the central role in the 23rd Congress of the CPSU that some seemed inclined to attribute to them. They were duly mentioned since they were inscribed in the decisions of the September 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. But they were mentioned only in passing by almost all the speakers and some limited themselves to just a few words about them or completely passed them by in silence. (This was the case, notably, of Pyotr Shelest, the secretary of the Ukrainian CP, of Rashidov, a member of the Politburo and the secretary of the Uzbek CP, of Snieckus, the secretary of the Lithuanian CP and of Tolstikov, the secretary of the Leningrad CP.)

It was still Kosygin who went most into the causes which, from the point of view of the leading bureaucrats, determine the necessity of profoundly reforming the system of management and planning in industry. The need to accelerate modernization of industrial

plants outmoded by technical progress, the need to assure the rapid introduction of new technical processes already developed by scientists, the need to calculate the relative productivity of various proposed investments in the most precise manner possible—such are the problems which the typical representative of the "technocrat" group at the summit of the Soviet bureaucracy emphasized. He insisted at the same time on the need to combine industrial decentralization based on the individual enterprise with the maintenance and even the reinforcement of central planning, taking careful account of the disruptive tendencies for the plan which might result from more and more daring initiatives on the part of the "plant managers" in the sphere of investment.

The concrete experiments which culminated in the partial adoption of the "Liberian reforms" at the September 1965 Plenum and the concrete experiments made in the application of these reforms since September 1965 were scarcely mentioned at the 23rd Congress. Some speakers, however, made veiled, rather mysterious allusion to them, to be sure. Thus the secretary of the Byelorussian CP, Masherov, indicated that in many cases since September 1965 the relations between the enterprises and the ministries have not only improved but have been "disturbed" (sic). The head of the Gorki CP, Katushov, asked that norms be developed so that "direct material incentives" could be used to economize raw materials.

Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn from the 23rd Congress with regard to the Liberian reforms is that debate on these "reforms" is far from ended in bureaucratic circles. Rather than permitting this debate to unfold in public, the leaders of the bureaucracy decided to suppress it, at least for the moment, and agreed that no one would speak either for or against the reforms at this congress. This explains why the pillorying of the most disastrous consequences of bureaucratic management, which was in vogue in the last four congresses of the CPSU (including the 19th Congress, with Stalin present, notably, in the report of Malenkov), was conspicuously absent from the 23rd Congress.

Material Improvements Promised

On the other hand, one of the predominant features of the 23rd Congress was the promise of a new series of material improvements in the lives of the Soviet workers. Kosygin especially made it one of the central themes of his report and attempted to show, not without reason, that the last four years of the Khrushchev era were marked by a quasi-stagnation, if not a deterioration, in the standard of living (as a result of an increase in the prices of meat and butter, accompanied by a wage freeze).

It is indisputable that the new five year plan promises a much more ample effort in the area of consumer goods than that realized under the Khrushchev seven year plan. While the increase in heavy industrial production had been 58 per cent in the five year period, 1960-65, in contrast to an increase of 36 per cent in



The three suitcases are marked "initiative," "courage," and "sound judgment." "With all that baggage, there won't be room for you in the director's office." (Szpilki, Warsaw, May 29, 1966)

the production of consumer goods, Kosygin promised that in the five year period 1965-70, production in the two sectors will increase in practically the same proportion—49-52 per cent in the sector of the means of production and 43-46 per cent in the consumer goods sector. He promised as well to double the production of machines for the consumer goods industry.

Some promises were spectacular, like the promise to increase the production of television sets from 3.7 million in 1965 to 7.5 million in 1970, of refrigerators from 1.7 million in 1965 to 5.3 million in 1970 and of private automobiles from 201,200 in 1965 to 800,000 in 1970.⁽³⁾

We must conclude that, contrary to the opinions of certain superficial commentators, the new group which succeeded Khrushchev in power has accentuated and not limited the "consumer orientation." This, moreover, is what explains why the mass of Soviet workers have little regret about the removal of Khrushchev. Above all, they have seen the end of the wage freeze and the beginning of a new betterment in their standard of living.

The picture obviously changes if, instead of comparing the *achievements* of the Khrushchev seven year plan to the promises of the new five year plan, one compares the *promises* of yesterday to the promises of today. We are far from some of the boasts of the 22nd Congress; the idea that by 1970 "there will no longer be categories of underpaid workers" has been quietly shelved. The promise that the minimum wages would be increased by 300 per cent during this same period has not been fulfilled either; the minimum wage

of 27 rubles in 1958 rose to a minimum wage of 60 rubles in 1970, or an increase of 222 per cent. As for the promise to reduce the gap between high and low wages, it has been completely abandoned by the new masters of the Kremlin. On the contrary, they are emphasizing the necessity of using the wage rate as "an instrument of material incentive for the workers," which means in practice that the wage spread, and above all, the differential of real incomes, will have a tendency to increase instead of being gradually reduced.

More serious for a regime which proudly proclaims that its plans are always "adopted unanimously" after the "most thorough discussion" is the abandonment of one of the key promises of the program adopted at the 22nd Congress—that of achieving a six-hour day, with one day off per week, or a 34-36 hour week with two days off before 1970. The realization of this promise would have made the work week in the USSR the *shortest in the world*. They are still far from that. The present leaders limit themselves to the promise to extend the five-day week and eight hour day, that is, the 40-hour week, throughout the economy by 1970.

The profoundly bureaucratic and completely remote-controlled character of this "congress" was revealed by the fact that *not one* of the 5,000 delegates asked an accounting from the leaders for the nonrealization of one of the essential promises of the 22nd Congress, *not one* of the 5,000 delegates even raised a question about the former promises.

The Kosygin report promised that during the next five year plan the real per capita income will increase by about 30 per cent, while the volume of retail sales will increase about 43.5 per cent. Taking into account the increase in population which will be on the order of 3.5 per cent, these figures imply a gap of 10 per cent which is difficult to understand. Is Kosygin using the term "volume" in the sense of "turnover at current prices," which would imply a price rise of 10 per cent, or does his hypothesis imply a phenomenon of declining saving (saving which is often a form of hoarding, expressing simply the scarcity of consumer goods on the market which encourages consumers to put off their purchases until better years)?

Price Increases

On this subject, it must be underlined that in his own report Kosygin stated that in the course of the period 1960-65 the average income of blue and white collar workers increased by only 23 per cent while sales of merchandise had increased by 60 per cent. The gap here is too pronounced to be explained by the increase in population and the more than proportional increase in the incomes of certain categories of kolkhoz peasants or old people collecting their pensions for the first time. It is explained without any doubt by the increase in certain prices (particularly, those decreed by Khrushchev for meat and milk products).

On the eve of the Congress, there were fears of an ideological "hardening" of the Soviet bureaucracy even to the point of a "rehabilitation" of Stalin. Frightened by this perspective, diverse forces publicly demonstrated their opposition to such an eventuality: the Italian

CP in a confidential communication which it deliberately made public; the old Bolsheviks, by holding a public demonstration in Red Square in Moscow; leading intellectuals, by sending a letter on this question to the leaders of the CPSU. This "rehabilitation" did not occur. On the contrary, the majority of the speakers explicitly referred to the "general line of the 20th and 22nd Congresses," which they avowed would continue to be respected in the future.

Artists Under Attack

On the other hand, an indisputable "ideological hardening," already evinced in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and in the elimination of two intellectuals considered to be leaders of the moderate "liberal" wing, Tvardovski and Polevoi, from the Congress and from the Central Committee of the Party, definitely occurred at the 23rd Congress. The attacks against "certain writers and artists" multiplied. The inadequacies of "ideological work" were denounced. The head of the Komsomol, Pavlov, figured prominently with his diatribe against a section of the youth and his demand that the work of educating the youth take its inspiration from military principles.

Bodjul, the first secretary of the Moldavian CP launched an attack against the book, *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and distinguished himself by giving this eminently bureaucratic definition of the freedom of artistic creation: "In our country, as we all know, every artist has the right to create [!] freely in accordance with his own tastes and to write without the least restriction. But in the same measure [!] our Party and our State Agencies apply the right to freely choose which works will be printed." To be sure, the Leninist formula in *State and Revolution* is somewhat different. But no delegate in this "communist" congress had the courage to recall this. Need it be added that the question of erecting a monument to the victims of Stalin did not come up? The one who made this proposal, Shelepin, is, just the same, today one of the main secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party.

We find here the echo of profound concerns in Soviet bureaucratic circles. On the one hand, the bureaucrats are worried by the activity and the boldness of a growing number of semi-clandestine or clandestine groups among the youth and intellectuals. On the other hand, they are worried by the "ideological void" that the renunciation of "Stalinism" and the "goulash communism" dear to Khrushchev have created in the youth, a "void" which facilitates, in their opinion, the infiltration of "pro-imperialist" ideas as well as the ideas of the Left Opposition.

The ideological "hardening" with respect to the youth and the intellectuals, that is the two layers of Soviet society which today are most susceptible to the ferment of new ideas, corresponds perfectly to this double concern of the bureaucracy. It serves both as a warning and as a stern reprimand. The real and potential oppositionists were warned that the bureaucracy does not intend to abdicate its power and its privileges and that it will prefer to abandon "innovations" like the rotation of secretaries rather than permit nonconform-

ist forces to win their way to a large public audience.

Some commentators thought that they were able to see a contradiction between the "liberalization" pursued in the area of economics and this ideological "hardening." In reality, there is no contradiction, but rather a logical posture of self-defense by the bureaucracy. A series of economic measures are objectively inevitable in order to prevent stagnation and serious economic crises, which would be contrary to the interests of the bureaucracy.

The concessions to the workers as consumers themselves were necessary to prevent the working masses from beginning to move, an eventuality which the bureaucracy wants to avoid at all costs (strikes against the price increases and the wage freeze without doubt helped to precipitate the fall of Khrushchev). The blows struck against the vanguard of the youth and the intellectuals were blows against the already active centers of the opposition. The sum total of these measures is intended to isolate these centers in order to prevent them from linking up with the broad masses and to maintain a climate of "reformist" hopes in the proletariat. Whether or not this strategy of the bureaucracy will be crowned with success is, obviously, another question.

Does re-establishment of the names "politburo" and "general secretary" indicate a concession to the supporters of a definitive halt to "de-Stalinization?" If it does, in any case, only a minimal concession is involved which would change nothing in the prevailing relationship of forces.

Bureaucracy Strengthens Position

This relationship of forces is such that a return to the methods of the Stalin regime is impossible. But this by no means indicates that the bureaucracy is not ready to defend its power, if necessary, with methods of violent repression. Khrushchev gave an example of this in Hungary and he also led a campaign against the "modernist" artists and writers which surpassed in violence anything seen at the 23rd Congress. His successors will do the same when they are confronted with similar situations. What has changed is that the illusions of a "progressive democratization" of the bureaucratic dictatorship in an evolutionary manner and on initiatives from above have diminished considerably in recent years. This cannot but favor

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the formation of a new revolutionary Marxist vanguard in the USSR in the long run.

The leaders of the bureaucracy were forced to take a somewhat harsher tone toward American imperialism in the face of the escalation of the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. It is not impossible, however, that this hardening reflects less the pressure of the Chinese CP and of the international Communist movement than the pressure of a current in the USSR itself—notably, in the Komsomols—in rebellion against the criminal passivity of the bureaucracy in the face of the multiplication of counterrevolutionary moves by imperialism throughout the world. In this connection, it is obviously necessary to attach considerable importance to the news transmitted from Moscow by *Reuters* on April 12, according to which a young Ukrainian truck driver, 25 years of age, named Nikolai Didyk, committed suicide by setting his clothing on fire in Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow near Lubyanka Prison to protest the fact that the authorities had refused his request to be sent to south Vietnam as a volunteer to fight with the National Liberation Front.

That this hardening with respect to imperialism implies no ideological turn, was shown by the glacial silence with which the 23rd Congress greeted the impassioned speech of Armando Hart, the delegate of the Castroite Cuban CP. The "crime" of Hart had been to call for an international extension of the revolution and to characterize the Latin American revolution as a socialist revolution. Khrushchev's successors remain more than ever faithful to "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" in rejecting this revolutionary orientation in favor of peaceful coexistence and the theory of "revolution by stages." And, with all due deference to the leaders of the Chinese CP, this "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" is only the continuation of the policy of Stalin, inspired by Menshevik concepts to which "communists" abroad continue to cling desperately in spite of disastrous experiences like those of Brazil and Indonesia.

The bureaucratic nature of the CPSU has rarely been revealed with as much clarity and frankness as it was at the 23rd Congress. Rarely have we witnessed a spectacle of the prefabrication of speeches down to the last detail, to the degree exhibited in the 23rd Congress. And rarely have the leaders of the bureaucracy taken so little trouble to conceal the real nature of their party as the successors of Khrushchev did at this congress.

Brezhnev revealed in his report that workers pres-

ently make up only 37.8 per cent of the members of the CPSU and kolkhoz peasants 16.2 per cent. The category discreetly termed, "white collar workers," in reality, the bureaucracy, provides 46 per cent of the members of the CPSU. The party of the bureaucracy is composed in its majority of bureaucrats—this at least puts things straightforwardly. In these conditions, Brezhnev displayed a cynicism bordering on shamelessness when, immediately after having cited these revealing figures, he pronounced the ritual phrase: "The working class must continue [!] to play the leading role in the social make-up of the Party in the future."

Breakdown of Delegates

But Kapitonov's report on the social composition of the delegates to the 23rd Congress was still more eloquent. Of 4,943 delegates, there were 1,205 party functionaries, 1,141 workers, 874 kolkhoz peasants and sovkhoz workers (including the "managers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes"), 704 economic functionaries, 539 state functionaries, 352 members of the armed forces (all officers!), 82 trade union officials and 44 Komsomol functionaries. In other words, there were 1,141 workers, 700 peasants, and the rest, 3,000 delegates, were party, state and economic functionaries or functionaries of various other organizations, that is bureaucrats. The worker delegates constituted only 23 per cent of the Congress; the bureaucrat delegates constituted more than 60 per cent of the delegates. This proportion leaves nothing to be desired as a mirror of the realities in the exercise of power in the USSR . . .

The speech of the Nobel Prize winner in literature, Mikhail Sholokhov, received considerable publicity in the world press for its spiteful attack on the nonconformist Soviet writers and those who dared come to their defense. Certain formulas used by Sholokhov were so manifestly false⁽⁴⁾ to the point where one wonders if they were not deliberately included in the diatribe that the leaders of the bureaucracy required from him in order to warn the public that he didn't believe a word of what he said in this regard.

But the world press gave much less publicity to the second part of Sholokhov's speech, which in a way was a parallel diatribe, but altogether revealing and true, directed against the bureaucrats who rule the Soviet Union today. He cited the example of a factory for the production of dried vegetables constructed in the city of Kaliasin but which could not be supplied with raw materials (vegetables!) and which had to be successively transformed into a factory for the production of soya sauce and factory for the manufacture of milk products, without once being able to commence work. The factory had existed for ten years; it had still not produced a thing. And Sholokhov asked, "what kind of planning is that"? Indeed. . .

He cited the absence of water purification plants on the Volga and the Don which had caused the death of millions of valuable fish. He cited the danger to the natural riches of Lake Baikal and the Sea of Azov caused by the multiplication of chemical plants not accompanied by water purification plants, by the

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systematic cutting down of forests without the planting of new nurseries and new forests, by excessive fishing which does not respect the need to maintain an adequate breeding stock. These examples of the squandering of natural resources, imitated from similar methods of capitalism which Marx denounced with so much vigor constitute a terrible indictment against the leaders of the bureaucracy.

Sholokhov Appeals

And he ended his speech by giving an impressive sketch of the pleas to the ministers in Moscow to which leading officials in the Rostov region had to resort in order to get tractors and roofing tile for stables. Sholokhov himself had to take part in these appeals:

"And when an individual has to beg like this all the time, one notes disagreeable transformations in his character and even his physical posture (applause). Where are the proud bearing of the writer and the military erectness of the soldier of former years? One notes that his spine is humbly bent and that he doesn't even address the minister with the official formula, 'Comrade minister' but that he addresses him flatteringly, 'my dear Ivan Ivanovich.' The corrections in the plan, required by life itself, produce progressively in us certain tendencies to malfeasance, even in the interludes of this congress itself, we go into the corridors, we search out a certain minister with hawk's eye, and we wonder what we might get from him. And when one telephones to ask for an appointment with a minister he does not say that he is a deputy to the Supreme Soviet but rather that he is a writer. The ministers have a more delicate attitude towards writers. In brief, one exploits his position as best he may."

Sholokhov began by pillorying "amoral" writers (Daniel and Sinyavsky). But reread the striking sketch he gives of the "morality" which prevails in the higher spheres of Soviet society; disgraceful squandering of natural resources; writers who must kowtow, all-powerful ministers who distribute boons, deputies to the Supreme Soviet who — "in the country of the Soviets" — are scorned by these same "comrade ministers," communists and military heroes who must "beg" boons from the all powerful bureaucrats. Who are the real defendants in this accusatory brief, two unfortunate writers, or rather a political regime which has nothing in common with the Soviet democracy established by the October Revolution?

This article was already finished and published in French when the London daily, *Morning Star*, (the CP organ which replaces the *Daily Worker*) printed the following story in its May 12 issue, from its Moscow correspondent Peter Tempest, datelined May 11:

"A last-minute plea to save Lake Baikal from pollution and deforestation of its shores was made here today by over 40 leading figures in science and the arts. They call for an immediate dismantling of two huge paper mills nearing completion near the Siberian lake in order to avert a calamity for the national economy in the region. Their letter, published in today's *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, is signed by 20 academicians, including Kapitsa, Berg and Artsimovich,

by sculptor Sergei Kononov, painter Pavel Korin, writer Leonid Leonov and Bolshevik veteran Petrov, who joined the Communist Party in 1896.

"They accuse the State Committee for Forestry and the Timber Industry of remaining deaf to all warnings from competent authorities, and of investing huge sums in the construction without even having approval for the project.

"The committee had deceived the government about the suitability of the site, which lies in an earthquake zone, and about the impossibility of obtaining pure water elsewhere.

"Operation of the mills, say the signatories, will destroy the flora and fauna in the lake, lead to forest degeneration, soil erosion, the drying up of tributaries and disruption of the lake's regime.

"They call for the setting up of a lake conservancy board to control the utilization of its resources on a scientific basis.

"In an editorial footnote, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, which first sounded the alarm five years ago, recalls that Lake Baikal, the world's deepest inland lake, contains one-fifth of the world's stocks of fresh water.

"Its southern stretches alone, which will be polluted first, are worth nearly \$105 million — much more than the investment in the paper mills. . .

"A new inquiry commission is now preparing a final report for Gosplan, the state planning organization, but its chairman Academician Zhavoronkov refused to tell *Komsomolskaya Pravda* anything about its work.

"Why should the work of a body, whose decisions are awaited by thousands, be conducted in such an atmosphere of secrecy, the paper asks, adding that it is high time to end this long-drawn-out affair."

So it appears that Sholokhov's appeal at the 23rd Congress has not failed to get some response after all. But whether the paper mills will disappear remains to be seen. And how many hundreds of millions of rubles the Soviet people will have lost in any case through this single typical example of bureaucratic mismanagement, which could have been prevented by elementary democratic measures of workers and citizens control, will probably never be known . . .

(1) See my political report to the World Reunification Congress (7th World Congress) printed in the November issue of *Quatrieme Internationale*.

(2) See my article, "The Difficulties of Soviet Agriculture," in the December 1962 issue of *Quatrieme Internationale*.

(3) The realization of this goal seems to be dependent on the conclusion of an agreement with the Italian trust FIAT which is to construct a factory producing 600,000 private automobiles per year.

(4) Thus Sholokhov stated: "If these little gentlemen with their bad consciences had lived in the memorable years of the twenties when judges did not hold to the strict letter of the penal code but let themselves be guided by the 'conscience of revolutionary justice,' oh then these renegades would have suffered a much more severe penalty!"

In reality, when there was still real revolutionary justice in the USSR, and even during the early years of the establishment of the bureaucratic regime, in the course of the twenties, no writer was condemned for his ideas for having sent manuscripts abroad. At that time, the group of writers called the "Serapion Brothers," which included poets, novelists and satirists much further away from communism than Daniel and Sinyavsky, were able to publish their works freely in the USSR. It took the establishment of the Stalinist dictatorship for the nonconformist writers to find themselves denied access to print in the Soviet Union.



BANTU EDUCATION

BY FRANZ J.T. LEE

Behind the refusal to allow an African to enter the same public bus, train or taxi, the same park, zoological or botanical garden, or the same concert, theater or church as a white in South Africa, lies a complex system of colonialism, racial discrimination, economic exploitation and oppression.

This system, called *baasskap*, 'separate development,' or *apartheid*, robs the African of his land and produce; it forces him to live in poverty, misery and disease; it denies him modern education, intellectual, philosophic and technical training; it herds him into slums, ghettos, concentration camps, overcrowded reserves and *Bantustans*; it cuts him off from every form of real democratic expression, freedom of speech, press and mobility. The most effective instrument used to achieve these ends is enslavement of the non-white mind.

The present educational system in South Africa has its roots in the Bantu Education plan of Dr. H. F. Verwoerd. It was instituted following the election of the Boer Nationalist Party to power in 1948 under Dr. D. F. Malan. At that time, Verwoerd was Minister for Native Affairs, by far the most important governmental department, and the policy of Bantu Education was Verwoerd's solution to the . . . "native question."

In essence, Bantu Education is nothing more than an artificial resuscitation of outmoded tribalism. Here is how Verwoerd described it in a speech in parliament in 1953: "There is no place for [the native] in the European community," Verwoerd explained, "above the level of certain forms of labor . . . Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze."

In picturing the blacks as animals grazing in fields, Verwoerd is only using the accepted language of the master race. In "Bantu Education, Policy for the Immediate Future" (1954), Verwoerd wrote, [Bantu] education should stand with both feet in the reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society . . . Their education should not clash with Government policy . . . If the native in South Africa today . . . is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake."

J. G. Strijdom, who succeeded Malan as prime minister, described *baasskap* as follows: "Our policy is **Photo: A deskless classroom. Only furniture is blackboard.**

that the Europeans must stand their ground and must remain *Baas* [overlord] in South Africa. If we reject the *Herrenvolk* [master race] idea and the principle that the white man can remain *Baas*, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are given representation and the vote and the non-Europeans are developed on the same basis as the Europeans, how can the Europeans remain *Baas*? Our view is that in every sphere the European must retain the right to rule the country and to keep it white man's country." (Quoted from *African Nationalism* by N. Sithole, 1961.)

Essence of Retribalization

C. R. Swart, who is presently the president of South Africa, stressed the importance of retribalization in the 1953 parliamentary debate, following Verwoerd: "Hon. members have mentioned that the Department of Native Affairs adopts the policy that natives should not be detribalized but should be educated in their own manner and should learn to be good natives as tribal natives, and should not be imitators of the white man." Swart added, "This is the policy which we favor and in my opinion it is the only sound policy."

The Bantu Education Act was passed in 1953, and it began a process designed to reduce 12 million Africans to a state of primitive tribalism which will ensure that they are rightless, voteless and ignorant. It is controlled by the Native Affairs Department, which aspires to direct the thinking, acting, happiness and future development of each and every black. The department controls the supply of cheap African labor—the very backbone of the immensely profitable South African economy—to the farms.

It collects the income, hut, poll and labor taxes from the Africans; and it enforces the various racial laws, especially the most-hated pass laws, which in 1960 led to the massacres at Sharpeville, Langa and Nyanga where 72 unarmed peaceful demonstrators were massacred by machine-gun fire and 200 others were seriously wounded.

For other nonwhite sections of the population—the two million Coloureds, 500,000 Indians, 50,000 Malays and 5,000 Chinese—similar departments have been formed or are in the process of being formed. In the last analysis, every nonwhite must be robbed of modern education and forced to join the "Commonwealth of Poverty" in South Africa.

The pressure on Verwoerd to hasten the black population through the mills of Bantu Education has

increased in recent years rather than decreased. This is because a large portion of South Africa's labor comes from other African states, mainly from the former British protectorates, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and Malawi. Each year literally hundreds of thousands of black men are imported from these countries to be pressed into South African industries.

However, the revolts which are presently rising in many of these neighboring states clearly threaten to cut off this supply of cheap labor—and this fear is haunting Verwoerd and his ministers. And not only this, but the fact is the South African masses themselves are becoming more and more organized in their resistance to the regime of apartheid.

The Sabotage and 90-Day Laws, and Proclamation 400 in the reserves, have become absolute necessities. These allow any policeman to arrest any nonwhite and hold him for an indefinite period of time without warrant and without trial. The South African jails are filled with thousands of political prisoners.

Briefly, I want to show the following:

1) that at the primary, as well as the university level of education, Bantu Education is a fraud, in spite of the boasts and propaganda of the racist government;

2) that compared to white education, Bantu Education has nothing to do with modern education at all—it is designed to retribalize the African, to form him as a potential cheap laborer, to enslave his mind, and to kill every sign or spark of revolutionary fire in him; and,

3) that Bantu Education has already caused considerable harm to African youth in the last decade.

The idea of separate education in South Africa was not new in 1953. Since 1910, there had been a loose form of discrimination in the schools. The syllabuses, text-books, libraries, and examinations, however, were the same for the various sections of the population. The teaching media had been mainly English and Afrikaans, and to some extent, in the reserves, Xhosa also, a language spoken by nearly half of the African population.

Hitler Was Inspiration

The United Party, which represents the interests of British and other foreign capitalists in South Africa, then had a somewhat more liberal policy than it does today. While in power, it did not see the danger coming. It did not realize that the modern industrialized African "noble savage" was beginning to deslave his mind, to grasp and grapple with his social, political and economic fetters. Only after World War II, when Dr. Verwoerd returned from his studies in Nazi Germany, and when his own Nationalist Party was in power, could Bantu Education be initiated. After Hitler, Verwoerd believed: "If you want to control a people you must get hold of their education.

At the beginning of the '50s, the South African educational system was roughly comparable to the American: The first two years were also known as the kindergarten period, being standard A and B

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respectively, and together called the "sub-standards." The next five years at school were the primary level, Standards I, II, III, IV, and V.

However, even in those days only about one in every 200 African students actually completed Standard V. The rest were material *par excellence* for the mines. They could just about read a few simple sentences, count to 1000, sign their names, and understand the main orders of their white masters.

The next three years comprised secondary education: Standards VI to VIII. Only at this level did students get certificates of the Department of Education, Arts and Science, which were the same for all sections of the population. Very few pupils reached this tenth year of education."

Higher Education

The following two years allowed a pupil to take either the matriculation course, giving him a certificate for study in a university, or Standards IX and X, which provided him with the National Senior Certificate. This did not admit him to a university, but to other vocational schools or government service. After 12 years of education an African student could study for a Bachelor's degree at any one of the "open" (multi-racial) universities.

Primary and secondary education were compulsory for the white youth but not for the nonwhite. On the average, the state paid \$180 per year for the education of a white pupil, and about one tenth of that for the education of a nonwhite. Due to poverty and the inability to pay school fees, or to buy clothes and books, the vast majority of African children could not attend school.

That was in the 1950s: of the 200,000 children of an African population of about 11 million who actually attended primary classes in 1950, only 968 reached the fifth grade, and only 362 the level of matriculation.

At that time, nevertheless, the teachers were respected and loved by the pupils and their parents. The schools had five-hour sessions each day, and English was the widely accepted teaching medium. Many Africans joined the teaching profession, and there was one teacher for two or three classes, who gave lessons in all subjects and knew the interests and weaknesses of his students. These teachers belonged to the liberation movements of the time.

Today, all of them are dead, under house arrest, in jail under the Anti-Communist, Sabotage or 90-Day Acts, in Robben Island concentration camp—or fired, jobless, possibly active in the underground, or have fled from the country. Dummy teachers, indoctrinated, government-friendly Quislings, have taken their places. They have nothing in common with the deepest aspirations of the masses; quite obviously, they are hated by the pupils and their parents.

After 1953, the situation had changed: The teacher in the reserves was no longer a servant of the Department of Education. He is by and large controlled by a "tribal authority"—a black chief of his "Bantu Community." This chief sees to the local management

of the schools. His inability to master the ABCs does not disqualify him. He can simply put a cross on an official document, the contents of which he does not understand, so long as it is countersigned by one of the teachers he appointed.

The chiefs are being used to oppress and exploit their own kith and kin. This is the process of retribalization.

In the primary and secondary schools, an inordinate time is given to religious instruction—the "opium" most fitted to keeping the slave docile, contented with his lot, meek and humble. The longest teaching time is given to manual training—and there is plenty of practice. The pupil has to learn how to use a broom, pick or shovel scientifically, for these are the instruments he will use the greater part of his adult life.

Special text-books are used for the African pupil, written in a pseudo-African language called a "vernacular." At present, six such languages are being developed in the offices of the Native Affairs Department. No longer is language the product of a people, brought into existence over decades and decades, but it is being manufactured by civil servants. English and Afrikaans are more and more being eradicated from the school curriculum—and it hardly need be said that an African with a Bantu Education Matriculation Certificate in Xhosa, for example, would be hard put to study at a white university in Cape Town or to pursue his studies in a foreign country.

Furthermore, all international scientific text-books are forbidden in these schools. About 20,000 international books, some of classical "Western Culture," are banned in South Africa, not to speak of the literature of scientific socialism. It is a criminal offense to read these: the public libraries have come under the axe of apartheid.

While the number of pupils in the first five classes has increased ten times in the last decade, the number of schools and the number of teachers has remained about the same. Pupils now only attend school for two-and-a-half hours daily.

In 1962, for example the 3.3 million whites had 2,600 primary, secondary and high schools, including 34 special schools for "abnormal" children. There were 718,620 pupils in attendance of which 48,000 attended 222 private schools. In 1964, the 12 million blacks had only 7,000 schools, although to call them schools, of course, is an exaggeration, since they consist mainly of big dark halls, tents and old shaky buildings—anything that is, with a roof over it.

Verwoerd's Results

Of these, only 169 were state schools, while the rest were partially subsidized by the state. About 28,000 teachers, of whom 500 were white, had to attend to 1.5 million pupils. Each class had approximately 60 students.

What was the result? The figures speak for themselves, and they were published by—the English press: The Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail* reported April 10, 1965, that 0.1 per cent of the pupils who started schools in the sub-standards reached matriculation level. Another Transvaal newspaper, the

Sunday Times, gave an even lower figure May 23, 1965: 0.06 per cent. That means that out of 10,000 pupils who started the Bantu Education program in the kindergarten class of 1953, only 6 reached the matriculation class of 1965.

How many of those then passed the examination allowing them to enter college? Figures for that year are not available, but the following table, based on data published in the *Johannesburg Star*, February 26, 1965, allows us to make an educated guess:

Per cent of successful African matriculation

| Year | candidates who took the examination |
|------|-------------------------------------|
| 1953 | 47.3 per cent |
| 1954 | 44.7 |
| 1955 | 38.7 |
| 1956 | 46.1 |
| 1957 | 39.2 |
| 1958 | 37.6 |
| 1959 | 18.8 |
| 1960 | 17.9 |
| 1961 | 25.2 |

From these figures it is evident that:

1) the highest examination pass-rates were achieved in the years immediately after the Bantu Education Act was passed in 1953, before its venomous influence had been felt throughout the school system;

2) following the institution of the Bantu Education program, there was a noticeable decline in pass-rates, holding more and more Africans away from university education; and,

3) since 1953 half of the candidates who took the examination failed, and in 1959, and 1960, at the time of Sharpeville, less than one-fifth passed.

Clearly, a student does not pass the matriculation examination according to intellectual capability or merit. He passes according to percentages fixed by the Native Affairs Department—and only if *he* is chosen by the Department.

The Separate University Education Act of 1960 made it impossible for nonwhites to attend the open universities anymore, that is, the universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand and Durban. Five extra "tribal universities," or as the students call them, "bush colleges," were founded. What happened in these institutions of higher learning can be seen from these facts about one of them, Fort Hare:

In 1959, the faculty of this university consisted of 38 teachers, 11 of whom were Africans, including two nonwhite professors. Many of them were progressive persons, interested in furthering the aspirations of the African youth. With the change-over in 1960, most non-white teachers were fired or forced to resign.

The student population of Fort Hare declined from 374 in 1954 to 274 in 1964. From an average of 60 BA awards, the graduating class dropped to 13 per year. There were 24 white professors, mainly Boers, and only one African professor. There were 37 white lecturers and 10 Africans. The top pay for a nonwhite professor was lower than the average salary of a white senior lecturer.

In the May 23, 1965, article cited earlier, L. F. Wood, a United Party representative in parliament, gave further statistics on South African university education. Out of a population of 3.4 million whites, he noted that 33,526 attended universities. Out of the population of 12 million Africans—946 attended tribal universities: *one per cent of the white population and .0008 per cent of the African.*

But Will It Work?

Even from this brief presentation, it should be apparent that Bantu Education is a direct product and important component of apartheid. It is intended to retribalize the African, to enslave his mind, to suppress every form of democratic organization, and thereby to establish a permanent force of cheap black labor. In its 13-year-long existence Bantu Education has clearly worsened the situation of the African.

But will it work in the long run? Will it accomplish the dreams of its white supremacist fathers? That is another question.


An educational system that is successful must be acceptable to those for whom it is designed. It must be seen by the African people themselves as beneficial for them, and not dictated to them against their better interest. In fact, an educational system should be the product of the people themselves, embodying their aspirations and needs. It has to be in accordance and in keeping with the general social, economic, political and cultural trends of the time, towards a better world, a more hopeful, peaceful, happier and freer future for all mankind . . .

These ingredients are the quintessence of education. They are totally absent from the Bantu Education plan of the South African *Herrenvolk*. Not a single section of the nonwhite population had a say in its formation; none accept it, none see it as beneficial; it does not express their real wishes and aspirations; it is an absurd anachronism.

From one end of the country to the other, Bantu Education must be bolstered up with police force, with machine-guns, with an army and with a galaxy of oppressive racial laws. The whole concept of apartheid is an outrage to human intelligence, dignity and worth.

Seven Years ago, Isaac B. Tabata, one of the greatest opponents of Bantu Education, wrote the following sentence: "It is our belief that the people of South Africa, both white and nonwhite, will one day jerk themselves out of their complacent smugness and prostration, wake up to their responsibilities and seek to wipe out from the book of history this chapter of degradation, misery and moral destitution." (*Education for Barbarism.*)

This day has come nearer than ever, but the South African oppressed and exploited need the help and support, spiritual and material, of all human beings who are against oppression, who want the "damned of this earth" to become free, who see the "Formed Society" and the "Great Society" as dangers for humanity as a whole.



LEON TROTSKY

Letter to South African Revolutionaries

(The following letter written by Leon Trotsky, April 20, 1933, was addressed to South African revolutionaries of the Workers Party. The present text was taken from a reprint of the letter in the "Workers' Voice" of November, 1944, at that time the theoretical organ of the Fourth International organization of South Africa.)

The theses are clearly written on the basis of a serious study of both the economic and political conditions of South Africa, as well as of the literature of Marxism and Leninism, particularly that of the Bolshevik-Leninists. A serious scientific approach to all questions is one of the most important conditions for the success of a revolutionary organization.

The example of our South African friends again confirms the fact that in the present epoch only the Bolshevik-Leninists, that is, the consistent proletarian revolutionaries, take a serious attitude to theory, analyze the realities, and are learning themselves before they teach others. The Stalinist bureaucracy has long ago substituted a combination of ignorance and impudence for Marxism.


In the following lines I wish to make certain remarks

in regard to the draft theses which will serve as a program for the Workers' Party of South Africa. Under no circumstances do I make these remarks in opposition to the text of the theses. I am too insufficiently acquainted with the South African conditions to pretend to a full conclusive opinion on a series of practical questions.

Only in certain places am I obliged to express my disagreement with certain aspects of the draft theses. But here also, insofar as I can judge from afar, we have *no differences in principles* with the authors of the theses. It is rather a matter of certain polemical *exaggerations* arising from the struggle with the pernicious national policy of Stalinism.

But it is in the interest of the cause not to smooth over even slight inaccuracies in presentation, but, on the contrary, to expose them for open deliberations in order to arrive at the most clear and blameless text. Such is the aim of the following lines dictated by the desire to give some assistance to our South African Bolshevik-Leninists in this great and responsible work to which they have set themselves.

The South African possessions of Great Britain form



a dominion only from the point of view of the white minority. From the point of the black majority, South Africa is a slave colony.

No social upheaval (in the first instance, an agrarian revolution) is thinkable with the retention of British imperialism in the South African dominion. The overthrow of British imperialism in South Africa is just as indispensable for the triumph of socialism in South Africa as it is for Great Britain itself. The struggle for the expulsion of British imperialism, its tools and agents, thus enters as an indispensable part of the program of the South African proletarian party.

A Black Republic?

The overthrow of the hegemony of British imperialism in South Africa can come about as the result of a military defeat of Great Britain and the disintegration of the Empire. In this case, the South African whites could still for a certain period—hardly a considerable one—retain their domination over the blacks.

Another possibility, which in practice could be connected with the first, is a revolution in Great Britain and her possessions. Three-quarters of the population of South Africa (almost six million of the almost eight million total) is composed of non-Europeans. A victorious revolution is unthinkable without the awakening of the native masses. In its turn, that will give them what they are so lacking today—confidence in their strength, a heightened personal consciousness, a cultural growth.

Under these conditions the South African Republic will emerge first of all as a "black" republic; this does not exclude, of course, either full equality for the whites, or brotherly relations between the two races—depending mainly on the conduct of the whites. But it is entirely obvious that the predominant majority of the population, liberated from slavish dependence, will put a certain imprint on the state.

Insofar as a victorious revolution will radically change not only the relation between the classes, but also between the races, and will assure to the blacks that place in the state which corresponds to their numbers, insofar will the *social* revolution in South Africa also have a *national* character.

We have not the slightest reason to close our eyes to this side of the question or to diminish its significance. On the contrary, the proletarian party should in words and in deeds openly and boldly take the solution of the national (racial) problem in its hands.

Nevertheless, the proletarian party can and must solve the national problem by *its own* methods.

The historical weapon of national liberation can be only the *class struggle*. The Comintern, beginning in 1924, transformed the program of national liberation of colonial people into an empty democratic abstraction which is elevated above the reality of class relations. In the struggle against national oppression different classes liberate themselves (temporarily) from material interests and become simple "anti-imperialist" forces.

In order that the spiritual "forces" bravely fulfill the task assigned to them by the Comintern, they are promised, as a reward, a spiritual "national-demo-

cratic" state—with the unavoidable reference to Lenin's formula: "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."

The thesis points out that in 1917 Lenin openly and once and for all discarded the slogan of "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" as if it were a necessary condition for the solution of the agrarian question.* This is entirely correct.

But to avoid misunderstanding, it should be added: a) Lenin always spoke of a revolutionary *bourgeois* democratic dictatorship, and not about a spiritual "people's" state; b) in the struggle for a *bourgeois* democratic dictatorship he offered not a bloc of all "anti-czarist forces," but carried out an independent class policy of the proletariat.

An "anti-czarist" bloc was the idea of the Russian Social-Revolutionaries and the Left Cadets, that is, the parties of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Against these parties the Bolsheviks always waged an irreconcilable struggle.

When the thesis says that the slogan of a "Black Republic" is *equally* harmful for the revolutionary cause as is the slogan of a "South Africa for the Whites," then we cannot agree with the form of the statement. Whereas in the latter there is the case of supporting complete oppression, in the former there is the case of taking the first steps toward liberation.

We must accept decisively and without any reservations the complete and unconditional right of the blacks to independence. Only on the basis of a mutual struggle against the domination of the white exploiters can the solidarity of black and white toilers be cultivated and strengthened.

The Choice is Theirs

It is possible that *after victory* the blacks will find it unnecessary to form a separate black state in South Africa. Certainly we will not *force them* to establish a separate state. But let them make this decision freely, on the basis of their own experience, and not forced by the *sjambok* [whip] of the white oppressors. The proletarian revolutionaries must never forget the right of the oppressed nationalities to self-determination, including full separation, and the duty of the proletariat of the oppressing nation to defend this right with arms in hand if necessary.

The thesis quite correctly underlines the fact that the solution to the national question in Russia was brought about by the October Revolution. National democratic movements by themselves were powerless to cope with the national oppression of czarism. Only because of the fact that the movement of the oppressed nationalities, as well as the agrarian movement of the peasantry, gave the proletariat the possibility of seizing power and establishing its dictatorship, did the national question as well as the agrarian find a bold and decisive solution.

But the very conjuncture of the national movements with the struggle of the proletariat for power was made politically possible only thanks to the fact that the Bolsheviks during the whole of their history carried on an irreconcilable struggle with the Great Russian

*The meaning of the original text is unclear at this point—Ed.

oppressors, supporting always and without reservations the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, including separation from Russia.

The policy of Lenin in regard to the oppressed nations did not, however, have anything in common with the policy of the epigones. The Bolshevik Party defended the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination *with the methods of proletarian class struggle*, entirely rejecting the charlatan "anti-imperialist" blocs with the numerous petty-bourgeois "national" parties of czarist Russia (PPS, the party of Pilsudski is czarist Poland, Dashnaki in Armenia, the Ukrainian nationalist, the Jewish Zionists, etc., etc.).

Temporary Alliances

The Bolsheviks have always mercilessly unmasked these parties, as well as the Russian Social-Revolutionaries, their vacillations and adventurism, but especially their ideological lie of being above the class struggle. Lenin did not stop his intransigent criticism even when circumstances forced upon him this or that episodic, strictly practical, agreement with them.

There could be no question of any permanent alliance with them under the banner of "anti-czarism." Only thanks to its *irreconcilable* class policy was Bolshevism able to succeed in the time of the Revolution to throw aside the Mensheviks, the Social-Revolutionaries, the national petty-bourgeois parties, and gather around the proletariat the masses of the peasantry and the oppressed nationalities.

"We must not," says the thesis, "compete with the African National Congress in nationalist slogans in order to win the native masses." The idea is in itself correct, but it requires concrete amplification. Being insufficiently acquainted with the activities of the National Congress, I can only outline our policy concerning it on the basis of analogies, stating beforehand my readiness to supplement my recommendations with all the necessary modifications.

1) The Bolshevik-Leninists put themselves in defense of the Congress, in all cases when it is being attacked by the white oppressors and their chauvinistic agents in the ranks of the workers' organizations.

2) The Bolshevik-Leninists place the progressive over the reactionary tendencies in the program of the Congress.

3) The Bolshevik-Leninists unmask before the native masses the inability of the Congress to achieve the realization of even its own demands, because of its superficial, conciliatory policy. In contradistinction to the Congress, the Bolshevik-Leninists develop a program of revolutionary class struggle.

4) Separate episodic agreements with the Congress, if they are forced by circumstances, are permissible only within the framework of strictly defined practical tasks, with the retention of full and complete independence of our own organization and freedom of political criticism.

The thesis brings out as the main political slogan not a "national democratic state," but a South African "October." The thesis proves, and proves convincingly:

a) that the national and agrarian question in South Africa coincide in their bases;

b) that both these questions can be solved only in a revolutionary way;

c) that the revolutionary solution of these questions leads inevitably to the dictatorship of the proletariat which guides the native peasant masses; and,

d) that the dictatorship of the proletariat will open an era of a soviet regime and socialist reconstruction. This conclusion is the cornerstone of the whole structure of the program. Here we are in complete agreement.

But the masses must be brought to this general "strategic" formula through the medium of a series of tactical slogans. It is possible to work out these slogans, at every given stage, only on the basis of an analysis of the concrete circumstances of the life and struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry and the whole internal and international situation. Without going deeply into this matter, I would like briefly to deal with the mutual relations of the national and agrarian slogans.

The thesis several times underlines that the agrarian and not the national demands must be put in the first place. This is a very important question which deserves serious attention. To push aside or to weaken the national slogans with the object of not antagonizing the white chauvinists in the ranks of the working class would be, of course, criminal opportunism, which is absolutely alien to the authors and supporters of the thesis. This flows quite clearly from the text of the thesis which is permeated with the spirit of revolutionary internationalism.

The thesis admirably says of those "socialists" who are fighting for the privileges of the whites that "we must recognize them as the greatest enemies of the revolution." Thus we must seek for another explanation, which is briefly indicated in the text itself: The backward native peasant masses directly feel the agrarian oppression much more than they do the national oppression.

It is quite possible. The majority of the natives are peasants; the bulk of the land is in the hands of a white minority. The Russian peasants during their struggle for land put their faith in the Czar for a long time and stubbornly refused to draw political conclusions.

From the revolutionary intelligentsia's traditional

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slogan, "Land and Liberty," the peasant for a long time only accepted the first part. It required decades of agrarian unrest and the influence and action of the town workers to enable the peasantry to connect both slogans.

The poor enslaved Bantu hardly entertains more hope in the British King or in Macdonald. But this extreme political backwardness is also expressed in his lack of self-consciousness. At the same time, he feels very sharply the land and fiscal bondage. Given these conditions, propaganda can and must first of all flow from the slogans of the agrarian revolution, in order that, step by step, and on the basis of the experience of the struggle, the peasantry may be brought to the necessary *political and national* conclusions.

Role of Advanced Workers

If these hypothetical considerations are correct, then we are not concerned with the program itself, but rather with the ways and means of carrying the program to the consciousness of the native masses.

Considering the small numbers of the revolutionary cadres and the extreme diffusion of the peasantry, it will be possible to influence the peasantry, at least in the immediate future, mainly if not exclusively, *through the medium of the advanced workers*. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to train advanced workers in the spirit of a clear understanding of the significance of the agrarian revolution for the historical fate of South Africa.

The proletariat of the country consists of backward black pariahs and a privileged, arrogant caste of whites. In this lies the greatest difficulty of the whole situation. As the thesis correctly states, the economic convulsions of rotting capitalism must strongly shake the old barriers and facilitate the work of revolutionary coalescence.

In any case, the worst crime on the part of the revolutionaries would be to give the smallest concessions to the privileges and prejudices of the whites. Whoever gives his little finger to the devil of chauvinism is lost.

The revolutionary party must put before every white worker the following alternative: either with British imperialism and with the white bourgeoisie of South Africa, or with the black workers and peasants against the white feudalists and slave-owners and their agents in the ranks of the working class.

The overthrow of the British domination over the black population of South Africa will not, of course, mean an economic and cultural break with the previous mother-country, if the latter will liberate itself from the oppression of its imperialist plunderers.* A Soviet England will be able to exercise a powerful economic and cultural influence on South Africa through the medium of those whites who in deed, in actual struggle, have bound up their fate with that of the present colonial slaves. This influence will be based not on domination, but on proletarian mutual cooperation.

But more important in all probability will be the

*The meaning of the original text is unclear at this point. — Ed.

influence which a Soviet South Africa will exercise over the whole of the black continent. To help the Negroes catch up with the white race, in order to ascend hand in hand with them to new cultural heights, this will be one of the grand and noble tasks of a victorious socialism.

In conclusion, I want to say a few words on the question of a legal and illegal organization, concerning the constitution of the party.

The thesis correctly underlines the inseparable connection between organization and revolutionary tasks, supplementing the legal apparatus with an illegal one. Nobody, of course, is proposing to create an illegal apparatus for such functions as in the given conditions can be executed by legal ones.

But in the conditions of an approaching political crisis, there must be created special illegal nuclei of the party apparatus, which will develop as need arises. A certain part, and by the way, a very important part, of the work cannot under any circumstances be carried out openly, that is, before the eyes of the class enemies.

Nevertheless, for the given period, the most important form of the illegal or semi-legal work of revolutionaries is the work in mass organizations, particularly in the trade unions. The leaders of the trade unions are the unofficial police of capitalism; they conduct a merciless struggle against revolutionaries.

We must have the ability to work in mass organizations, not falling under the blows of the reactionary apparatus. This is a very important—for the given period, most important—part of the illegal work. A revolutionary group in a trade union which has learned in practice all the necessary rules of conspiracy will be able to transform its work to an illegal status when circumstances require this.

BRIEF REVIEWS

CONFESSIONS OF AN IRISH REBEL: The Sequel to *Borstal Boy* by Brendan Behan. Bernard Geis Associates. 245 pp. \$4.95.

Confessions of an Irish Rebel does not compare with its predecessor, *Borstal Boy*. The latter book told of Behan's experiences in an English jail where he was sentenced for terrorist activities at the age of 16. This new book starts with his trip to Ireland after three years in Borstal.

The trouble is *Confessions* is not really written by Behan. It is a recording of conversations he had with Rae Jeffs, an editor from his London publishers. Although the characterizations are interesting, they lack the depth which distinguished the earlier book. Behan is sent to prison again, this time for fighting the police in defense of IRA leaders, who have come out from underground to commemorate the Easter Uprising. The police surround them in the cemetery. Behan is sentenced for 14 years. But his account of his flight and capture are as sketchy as his prison stay.

As the Irish revolution subsided, so did Behan become more and more Bohemian. His craving for excitement and alcohol dominated his life and brought about his early death at the age of 41.

In spite of its shortcomings, there are some fascin-

ating anecdotes with which he must have delighted his audiences in the pubs where he was lionized by both workers and intellectuals. He was always a class-conscious participant in life, with a gift for articulating the struggles of the poor, especially the soldiers and workers whose lives are held so cheap by the civil authorities.

He was immensely proud of his heritage—his parents who worked actively in the IRA, his uncle who wrote the Irish national anthem and the Irish revolutionary tradition of which he felt himself an integral part.

Constance Weissman

FREEDOM SUMMER by Sally Belfrage. Fawcett World Library. 256 pp. \$.75 paper.

This is a vivid account of the Southern struggle as it was in the summer of 1964. Miss Belfrage, a fine and sensitive writer, outlines the fears and motivations which lay behind hers and others' reasons for volunteering to go to Mississippi to participate in a Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee summer project.

She tells of the "movement's" encounters with the federal government and of the total lack of response from the Justice Department. These experiences shed light on SNCC's subsequent evolution toward the concept of Black Power.

The debate between proponents of self-defense and philosophical pacifists continually pops up in the book. In the beginning, it occurs in a rather abstract way, in a workshop on nonviolence which the author dismisses, saying that "the meeting ended early so that a more relevant lesson could be conducted." Later on, in Greenwood, Miss., where white people were on a shooting rampage, an explosive situation creates a timely debate on the subject between several SNCC leaders, including Staughton Lynd.

Another figure referred to often is Stokely Carmichael, the present SNCC chairman. Miss Belfrage describes him as a leader, and one who had some very definite ideas on self-defense. As he put it then, "We're not going to stick with this nonviolence forever. We didn't go shooting up *their* houses. It's not *us* who does that . . ."

Toby Rice

STALIN ed. by T. H. Rigby. Prentice-Hall. 182 pp. \$1.95 paper.

This is a collection of materials about Stalin which provides a valuable outline of his career. It includes selections by Trotsky, Lenin, Deutscher, E. H. Carr and others. The articles by Robert H. McNeal and Robert C. Tucker are of more dubious value.

They attempt to magnify Stalin's individual importance in order to point out the alleged dangers "inherent" in all socialist revolutions. And this is the viewpoint of Rigby's book as a whole. It concentrates on Stalin's personality and individual methods in such a way as to give the impression that Stalin rose to tyrannical heights on the basis of "greatness" alone.

What is omitted is an analysis of the historical conditions surrounding Stalin's rise, and above all the development of the Soviet bureaucracy itself. "Stalin-

ism," Trotsky wrote in *My Life*, "is above all else the automatic work of the impersonal apparatus on the decline of the revolution."

Arthur Maglin

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT by Marc Raeff. Prentice-Hall. 180pp. \$2.95 paper.

NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A Documentary History ed. by Staughton Lynd. Bobbs-Merrill. 535pp. \$3.45 paper.

REPORT ON THE U. S. SENATE HEARINGS: The Truth About Vietnam ed. by Frank M. Robinson and Earl Kemp. Greenleaf Classics. 414pp. \$1.75 paper.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-64 by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths. M. I. T. Press. 338pp. \$10.00.

PICKETS AT THE GATES by Estelle Fuchs. Free Press. 205pp. \$2.95 paper.

LABOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA ed. by William Haber. Basic Books. 341pp. \$5.95.

A GUIDE TO MARXISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOVIET DEVELOPMENT by P. H. Vigor. Humanities Press. 235pp. \$6.00.

NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality by Karl W. Deutsch. M. I. T. Press. 345pp. \$3.95 paper.

CHINESE COMMUNISM by Robert C. North. World University Library. 256pp. \$4.95.

RED CHINA TODAY by Hugo Portisch. Quadrangle Books. 385pp. \$6.95.

INQUEST: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth by Edward Jay Epstein. Viking Press.

WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY: Their Role in Economic, Scientific, and Technical Development by Norton T. Dodge. Johns Hopkins Press. 331pp. \$10.

LETTERS FROM MISSISSIPPI ed. by Elizabeth Sutherland. Signet. 214pp. \$.75 paper.

STANKEVICH AND HIS MOSCOW CIRCLE, 1830-1840 by Edward J. Brown. Stanford University Press. 149pp. \$5.00.

JACK LONDON by Charles Child Walcutt. University of Minnesota Press. 48pp. \$.65 paper.

LATIN AMERICA by Tad Szulc. Atheneum. 185pp. \$1.65 paper.

BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A History of the Negro in America, 1619-1964 by Lerone Bennett, Jr. Penguin Books. 435pp. \$2.45 paper.

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell. University of Kentucky Press. 438pp. \$7.50.

MEXICAN MARXIST: Vicente Lombardo Toledano by Robert Paul Millon. University of North Carolina Press. 222pp. \$6.00.

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER: 1966 ed. by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. 320pp. \$3.45.

WHITEWASH: The Report on the Warren Report by Harold Weisberg. Published by Harold Weisberg, Hyattstown, Md., 20734. 222pp. \$4.95 paper.

AMBIGUOUS AFRICA: Culture in Collision by George Balandier. Pantheon Books. 276pp. \$5.95.

ESSAYS ON ECONOMETRICS AND PLANNING ed. by C. R. Rao. Pergamon Press. 354pp. \$15.00.

ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECONOMETRICS: Essays in Honour of Oskar Lange. Pergamon Press. 661pp. \$16.80.

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