

international press correspondence

INPRECOR

historic compromise?



Pietro Ingrao, Political Bureau member; Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary, Italian CP

*EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES... INTO BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS by Pierre Frank *THE ITALIAN CP
& THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE" by Livio Maitan *CARAMANLIS MOVES TOWARD ELECTIONS by G. Vergeat
*SPAIN: REVOLUTIONARY MARXISTS ANSWER SLANDERS *SPAIN: ON THE CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE
*FRANCE: "APPEAL OF THE 100" CHALLENGES THE BOURGEOIS ARMY by O. Milan *TROUBLE AMONG
THE BOLIVIAN GORILLAS by Nestor Alba *CZECH OPPOSITIONISTS IN SOLIDARITY WITH CHILE *INTER-
VIEW WITH A MALAYAN MILITANT *MOZAMBIQUE: SEPTEMBER 7, A STEP TOWARD INDEPENDENCE by
Tony Southall *NEWS OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT AND THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

BI-MENSUEL No.9 October 3, 1974 PRICE: 50 cents U.S. & Canada/20 pence Great Britain/25 Bel. francs

CONTENTS

<u>WEST EUROPE</u>	
The Communist Parties . . . Into Bourgeois Governments? --by Pierre Frank	3
<u>ITALY</u>	
The Communist Party and the "Historic Compromise" -- by Livio Maitan	5
<u>GREECE</u>	
Caramanlis Moves Toward Elections --by G. Vergat	10
<u>SPAIN</u>	
Revolutionary Marxists Answer Slanders	12
On the Call for a General Strike	13
<u>FRANCE</u>	
"Appeal of the 100" Challenges the Bourgeois Army --by O. Milan	17
<u>BOLIVIA</u>	
Trouble Among the Gorillas --by Nestor Alba	19
<u>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</u>	
Oppositionists in Solidarity With Chile	21
<u>MALAYA</u>	
Interview With a Student Militant	24
<u>MOZAMBIQUE</u>	
September 7: A Step Toward Independence --by Tony Southall	29
<u>NEWS OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT</u>	
Mandel Tours Australia	31
Mobilizations for Chile *	31

INPRECOR 12/14 rue de la Buanderie - Brussels 1000 Belgium
 INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORRESPONDENCE
 Fortnightly information organ of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International published in
 English, French, Spanish, and German.

Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of INPRECOR.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: 1 year (25 issues) - US\$10; Can \$10; £4; ¥ 3,000.
 AIR MAIL TO U.S. & CANADA: \$16.00. TO JAPAN: ¥ 5,000. TO AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND: US\$18.
 SPECIAL SIX-ISSUE AIR MAIL INTRODUCTORY SUBSCRIPTION - \$3.50 U.S. & Canada; \$4.50 Australia,
 New Zealand, and Japan.
 TO SUBSCRIBE: TO PAY BY PERSONAL CHECK OR INT'L. BANK MONEY ORDER: Send name and address
 to INPRECOR with check made to the order of GISELA SCHOLTZ.
 TO PAY BY INT'L. POSTAL ORDER: Send name and address to INPRECOR. Send postal order to GISELA
 SCHOLTZ, 127 rue Josse Impens, Brussels 3, Account No. CCP 000-1085001-56

EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES



...into bourgeois governments?

by PIERRE FRANK

The crisis is there for all to see. While certain bourgeois leaders are still trying to take the ostrich-like attitude of reducing the cause of all the current economic difficulties to the rise in oil prices, most are going further. They are no longer harping on the "consumer society" that was supposed to have put an end to the ills of the capitalism of yesteryear. Today they are denouncing a society of "waste" in a world racked by shortage. The singers of the praises of unlimited growth have given way to the advocates of "zero growth," who ignore all those in the world who have never experienced the benefits of the period of prosperity. Two countries in Western Europe -- Britain and Italy -- already stand on the brink of economic collapse. Countries like West Germany and France, which still appear to be getting along rather well, are nevertheless revealing an indubitable tendency toward declining growth rates. Unemployment and prices are on the rise everywhere, although to varying degrees.

For the most part, bourgeois economists pose the future in the form of the dilemma: "unemployment or inflation." In fact, the governments of all capitalist countries, beginning with that of the United States, are at a loss as to how to fight inflation effectively. The new Ford administration has shown itself to be just as paralyzed on this question as the Nixon administration was. Moreover, it appears that all the bourgeois governments fear unemployment much more than they do inflation, because of the reactions unemployment has provoked and will inevitably provoke from the working class. Inflation, on the other hand, rather has the appearance of improving the economic conjuncture. In reality, however, the dilemma confronting capitalism is not "inflation or unemployment." The years of the boom are behind us; the conditions that gave rise to the prolonged prosperity have disappeared; the time of the lean cow is upon us. Capitalism will now experience inflation and unemployment at the same time.

Hence the extremely serious political prospects facing the capitalist regimes. The more or less fascistic forces of reaction and repression that are raising their heads here and there are still insufficient -- although they must not be ignored, despite the fact that they are only in an embryonic stage. At present, the dominant political factor is the revolutionary rise of the

masses and their growing politicization. The upsurge inaugurated in May '68 has experienced moments of hiatus, but in no case has there been an ebb of the tide. The fall of the Portuguese dictatorship and of the Greek colonels strengthens this dominant factor and will not be without consequences, especially in Spain. Shifts to the left are coming out clearly among the British working class and -- in a less developed and slower, but no less certain fashion -- among the West German working class. New forms of struggle are appearing, especially to combat unemployment. The example of Lip is the most spectacular one, but nearly everywhere the occupation of factories that are laying workers off or closing down is becoming common. The idea of self-management, even in the confused forms in which it has been raised, is an expression of growing anti-capitalist tendencies. As for inflation, which is now reaching rates of 15-20 percent a year, it is compelling the workers to seek new forms of struggle, for inflation cannot be countered solely with the sliding scale of wages or with increasingly more frequent strikes.

On the level of politics properly so-called, we have seen that even when the prosperity has only just begun to run down, even before the inflation-unemployment combination has actually arrived, the bourgeoisie, faced by an already perceptible rise of the working class, has in several countries called on the Socialist parties to form governments. This has taken various forms in different countries (the Labour party government in Britain, the coalition in West Germany, the center-left government in Italy, etc.)

But in advance of the difficulties that are approaching, a new phenomenon has arisen among the bourgeoisie and among certain wings of the Social Democracy: the possibility of Communist parties participating in government coalitions is being discussed openly. To be sure, in the period just after the end of the second world war many Communist parties participated in bourgeois governments that helped to reconstruct the capitalist economy and state. Since then, these parties have always claimed to be "government parties" and acted as such during the height of the Cold War. In France the CP has always respected the institutions of the Fifth Republic, which was born of a military show of strength in Algeria, and did not at all at-

EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

tempt to exploit the revolutionary crisis of May 1968. The Spanish CP poses the question of the elimination of the Francoist dictatorship only in peaceful terms with a view to introducing a democratic regime, even if in the framework of a constitutional monarchy. In Finland members of the CP have participated in a governmental coalition for several years; but throughout the capitalist world this is seen as only an exceptional case arising from very specific circumstances, a case that can scarcely serve as an example to be followed.

The situation is different today. It is not a question of the propagandist words, desires, or hopes of a part of the leaderships of the Communist parties. Even in the ranks of the bourgeoisie the question has arisen not as an academic debate, but as a real possibility. The bourgeois spokesmen who have brought this problem up and are discussing it are doing so in a very serious manner, as a means of dealing with political and social difficulties that are on the horizon and with dangers that are mounting; they see it as a means of utilizing the authority that the Communist parties command among the masses (knowing that the CPs have not been revolutionary parties for a long time) in order to block off and push back the rise of the workers. Already, with scarcely any debate, Portuguese capitalism has called on the Portuguese CP and granted it posts in the government in order to assure the least painful transition process after the fall of the dictatorship. And it is a military officer as old and case-hardened as Spínola who caps off this operation with his authority before the Portuguese, and even world, bourgeoisie.

In France the presidential election of last May was notable not only for its numerical result (a difference of less than 1 percent), but also and above all for the failure of the bourgeoisie's operation aimed at agitating around the danger Mitterrand's alliance with the CP represented for him. For years it was said to Mitterrand: You are sitting down to dinner with the devil, and you do not have a very big spoon. Now, after the election campaign, wide layers of the bourgeoisie have accepted the view that the leaders of the French CP could make valuable ministers. In Italy the convulsions of the center-left have become so severe that even among the Christian Democracy there are those (and they are not at all isolated) who look rather favorably at the "historic compromise" proposed by the Berlinguer leadership of the Italian CP. In Spain the Communist party, counting its chickens before the hen has even laid the eggs, has just formed a "democratic council" (*junta democrática*) along with a certain number of bourgeois politicians; it is intended to provide a succession to Franco. It is true that this "council" has run up against another body created by the Socialist party; but it is no less the case that in Spain, as in France and Italy, a tendency of the bourgeoisie envisages a governmental coalition with the Communist party. In Greece it is not clear what will happen in the relatively near future, but the two rival Communist parties have both poured so much water into their wine that it would not at all be surprising if some bourgeois politicians were tempted to conclude some sort of alliance with them in order to deal with the rise of the workers.

In the other countries of Western Europe the Communist parties are so weak that bourgeois or Social Democratic formations and politicians have no need to consider the possibility of having them in coalition governments. Nevertheless, the embryos of "Mitterrand tendencies"* can be discerned in some Social Democratic parties, and it would not be surprising to see Socialist governments appeal to Communist votes should the need arise.

*That is, tendencies favoring alliances between the Socialist and Communist parties in contrast to the old anticommunist positions of the Social Democratic leaders.

Finally, without lending it more importance than it merits, the fact should be noted that for the first time in decades the leaderships of the British trade unions have accepted the presence of a member of the British CP in the Executive Committee of the Trades Union Council.

Let us stress: What we are now seeing is not a theoretical or political innovation on the part of the Communist parties, but rather a very seriously considered possibility being raised by substantial wings of the bourgeoisie. The question that arises is, What would be the difficulties involved in realizing such a possibility? Certainly, it would engender ferocious reactions from those sectors of the bourgeoisie that are preparing for operations of the Pinochet variety. But what is most interesting to us are the difficulties that could come up in negotiations between possible partners in a coalition government. Some answers cannot be given in advance; but what was said during the recent presidential campaign in France can and must be recalled again. When bourgeois politicians and journalists asked Mitterrand or leaders of the CP questions about the composition of a possible Union de la Gauche government, Mitterrand dodged the questions by giving Marchais the floor. Marchais said that the Communist party was demanding neither the post of prime minister nor any other specific ministries (interior or national defense, for example), but simply a number of ministries (about a third of the government) corresponding to its representation in the Union de la Gauche. There is no doubt that this was not an improvised response. Rather, it was the expression of an agreement worked out in advance at the highest levels of the Union de la Gauche. In other words, the CP leadership was playing it with kid gloves, being more concerned, at least for an initial period, with being accepted as a worthwhile governmental partner than with outlining any given policy in any given area. It must not be forgotten that the French CP leaders expressed themselves this way while fully aware that a government arising from the election of Mitterrand would not apply the "common program" even partially. On the level of internal policy, the CP would show and has shown itself very accommodating -- except when it comes to possible measures that would result in unleashing pressures from the "left." Thus, at the present moment an expansion of the Socialist party is being prepared that would bring new forces into the SP, among others, the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié -- United Socialist party, the centrist organization led by Michel Rocard). Rocard would like some good-sounding formulas so as to make this operation go more smoothly. That was enough for the leadership of the CP, which has opened its arms to all sorts of "left Gaullists," to suggest clearly to the SP that it would veto any such formulas.

On the level of foreign policy, the French CP has moved very slowly and with careful steps toward an evolution that allows it to take opportunities to manifest its distance from the Kremlin on questions that are secondary for the Kremlin but important for the "national" necessities of the French CP. Moscow is showing itself "understanding" about such attitudes. Even on the question of the Common Market, there is no longer any real conflict between the French CP and an important sector of French capitalism. The French CP now accepts the Common Market as a "fact"; CP deputies sit in the European parliament in Strasbourg. The unions of the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail -- General Confederation of Labor, the CP-dominated French trade-union federation) are seeking to obtain the recognition of the EEC and to become members of the Confédération Européenne des Syndicats (CES -- European Trade Union Confederation), a step that has already been taken by the Italian CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori -- Italian General Confederation of Workers, dominated by the Italian Communist party). The French CP remains opposed to the EEC becoming a political power, a superstate, which is a point of view widely held among Euro-

pean capitalists as well. Likewise, while it is prepared to accept a "European Europe," as de Gaulle put it, the French CP is against an "Atlantic Europe," which is also the position of broad layers of European capitalists in face of the claims of American capitalism.

While there appear to be no major obstacles in terms of strictly political problems to possible governmental participation by some Communist parties, nevertheless a truly thorny political problem is raised by the timing of such possibilities. Such governmental participation by the CP is envisaged in a grave social and political situation. But the question that comes up is, At what moment must the step be taken? Even for those among the bourgeoisie who accept such participation, it is still regarded as a last resort. So when? To do it too early would be to use the authority of the Communist parties prematurely and thus to risk weakening that authority considerably at the time when the CP's intervention will be decisive. But on the other hand, the bourgeoisie must not play this last trump card too late, either; that is, at a moment when the dynamic of the class struggle would outstrip the ability of the CP leaders to bottle it up. In any case, if the possibility of Communist party governmental participation raises difficult discussions among bourgeois political circles, the realization of such possibilities would really be posed only in the most dangerous situations for the capitalist system.

The present revolutionary upsurge in Europe has not yet attained such a dangerous level for the bourgeoisie. But it is no less important for revolutionary Marxists to understand the meaning of these new tendencies among the bourgeoisie and to envisage what the consequences would be for the Communist parties and for the layers of workers controlled by the CP. It is possible, even probable, that differences or tensions will appear in the future inside the Communist parties because of the contradictions between the pressures coming from the rise of the masses and the inertia of the apparatuses of these parties and the trade unions under their control. These differences or tensions should be used by revolutionary Marxists to weaken the authority of the traditional leaderships over the masses. But it appears to us doubtful that these differences or tensions will develop rapidly enough to challenge the Communist parties' policies of entering the government. For decades these parties have been imbued with a reformist mentality; they recruit and educate their members on a basically reformist basis.

The case of the French CP is a good example. At the moment, this party is suffering unprecedented difficulties; it cannot grow on its left or its right. But its membership more than ever holds to the perspective of electoral victories of the Union de la Gauche. It is thus probable that the moment of truth will begin to sound for the Communist parties in the course of their participation in governments.

The situation today is very much different from the situation just after the second world war. Then, the CP leaders were basking in the aura of the victories of the Soviet army; they were confronted with a working class exhausted by years of unemployment, fascism, and war, a working class that quickly returned to the fold of the traditional leaders. Today, however, the CP leaders face a profoundly rejuvenated working class of growing combativity in whose midst there is a relatively significant vanguard that no longer has confidence in the traditional leaderships and is seeking a revolutionary orientation. The resolution of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International on the building of revolutionary parties in capitalist Europe broadly defined the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in these countries. The tendencies that have recently found expression among wings of the bourgeoisie favorable to Communist party participation in bourgeois governments can only lend a growing urgency to these tasks. It is necessary to contribute toward pushing these parties to take power in their own name, but without any illusions. Thus, nothing is so ridiculous and dangerous as the formulas that are found in the press of the friendly enemies Healy and Lambert asking that the Socialists and Communists take power "on a socialist program," which suggests that these parties could apply such a program. On the contrary, the masses must be warned in advance of the powerlessness of such governments. Thus, the essential task at present is the propagation and, wherever it becomes possible, even in elementary forms, the creation in the course of struggle of bodies of self-leadership for these struggles by the class itself.

At a time when nervous layers of the bourgeoisie are placing their hopes for the survival of their system in their making use of the leaderships of the Communist parties, it becomes more than ever necessary to teach the working class by propaganda and practice to show greater distrust of the leading apparatuses of the traditional formations and to increase the will of the workers to take their fate into their own hands. ■

ITALY

THE CP & THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE"

by LIVIO MAITAN

The insoluble political crisis that has racked the Italian bourgeoisie for the past several years and the pressure of intense workers struggles have led some of the principal capitalist leaders of the country to consider calling the Communist party into the government. The "Historic Compromise" -- CP leader Enrico Berlinguer's response to the Chilean coup -- has placed this question of the participation of workers organizations in bourgeois governments in the center of political debates in Italy. It is essential for revolutionary Marxists to fully grasp the stakes involved in this debate. The following article presents an analysis of the policy of the Italian Communist party and explains the prospects of the Historic Compromise proposed by the CP leadership. Future articles in INPRECOR will deal with the policies of other Communist parties in capitalist Europe on this question. **INPRECOR**

THE CP & THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE"

Born on the eve of the victory of fascism and at a time when the workers movement was already in a stage of retreat, the Italian Communist party (PCI -- Partito Comunista Italiano) was characterized for a short time by a sectarian Bordighist deformation. (1) The "Bolshevization" of the party was to a large extent carried out as a "Stalinization," in spite of the very specific character of the Gramsci leadership. (2) By the time



GRAMSCI

the party emerged as a relatively consolidated organization in terms of its apparatus, it was already suffering from Stalinization and from the absence of solid ties with the masses. It was only during the latter part of the second world war -- especially after 1943 -- and in the years immediately following the war that the PCI was transformed into a party with a very broad mass base having hegemony within the working class.

From the historical angle, the policy of the Italian CP was determined in the final analysis by the combined influence of three factors: the requirements and impetuses of the mass movement; the requirements of the Soviet bureaucracy; and the needs of the "indigenous" bureaucracy, that is, the leadership and

apparatus as a whole (including the apparatuses of the trade unions and cooperatives).

During the 1930s, when the apparatus was under the tight grip of the Stalinized Comintern, the second factor was by far the dominant one. For the most part, this situation continued to last until the death of Stalin. Nevertheless, beginning already in the second half of the 1940s the CP had to start to take account much more than in the past of the necessities of its rank and file, which had since become a very broad mass base. Furthermore, the apparatus was developing widely and a broader and broader "indigenous" bureaucracy was arising (members of the apparatus at all levels, members of the trade-union apparatus, representatives of the CP in the political and administrative institutions, the network of cooperatives giving rise to the traditional reformist network, etc.).

After the death of Stalin, and especially after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in 1956, the transformation became accentuated and caused a more radical change. Insofar as distinctions are legitimate, it was the third factor that then became the dominant one. Fundamentally, the policy of the PCI is determined by the internal requirements of the bureaucracy, by the needs of its policy, strategy, and tactics in the national context. This manifests itself, among other ways, in the abandonment of the classic practice of the 1930s and 1940s of automatically lining up behind any and all positions expressed by the leadership of the Soviet Communist party and in the adoption of a relative autonomy of judgment. Concretely, on various occasions this has meant taking public political positions that differ from those of the leadership of the CPSU.

During the most recent period in the history of the Italian Communist party (that is, from 1968 to the present), the preponderance of the third factor has become even clearer (especially in relation to the second factor, the requirements of the Soviet bureaucracy). Beginning from this reality, the question is posed whether the PCI has been transformed into a typically Social Democratic organization.

Incontestably, steps have been taken in this direction, and the Italian CP's political and organizational practice has closer and closer analogies to that of the classical reformist parties. Moreover, the PCI is seeking alliances with the most powerful European Social Democracies (the German SPD in particular) in the framework of a strategy aiming at the formation of a "democratic" Europe independent of both Moscow and Washington. Nevertheless, the qualitative change that would justify changing the traditional Trotskyist characterization of the Italian CP has not occurred. The fabric that links the bureaucratic apparatus of the PCI to the bureaucracy of the USSR and other bureaucratized workers states has not been broken. Although powerful stimulants and tactical considerations are exerting

centrifugal forces, concrete interests are pushing in the opposite direction. Above all, for the bureaucracy of the PCI, which has a specific origin and a whole history of its own behind it, a bureaucracy for which certain ties have had and still have material as well as political implications, the existence of a country like the Soviet Union (as well as the other bureaucratized workers states) has not ceased to represent an element that in the final analysis is loaded with power and prestige. This is why even at the moments of greatest tension with Moscow, the PCI has always wound up by seeking a compromise solution. And, in spite of its internal transformation, the PCI has maintained an international stance that differs qualitatively from that of the Social Democracy.

During the period from the death of Stalin to 1968 -- a period that broadly corresponds to the period of the prolonged boom of the world capitalist economy -- objective conditions were accelerating the gradual transformation of the PCI. In a context characterized by the absence of great mass mobilizations and a relative stabilization of the system, the 1956-57 polemics, which eventually were to leave very deep traces in the whole Italian workers movement, initially involved mainly the petty-bourgeois and intellectual ranks of the party and the apparatus on various levels. The criticisms against the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism were generally differentiations from the right. Leftist criticism was expressed only in very reduced proportions (on both internal and international questions).

At the same time, the absence of great struggles and the defeats suffered in certain decisive bastions, like Fiat(3), provoked or facilitated changes in the relations between the party and the masses. Even in the most difficult periods, the PCI did maintain its electoral and trade-union influence. But its direct ties to the working class were more and more strained. This was manifested in the decrease in the number of workers among the party membership, in the disappearance, or only ephemeral presence, of the PCI as an organized political force in the factories, and in the retreat, if not destruction, of the rank-and-file union structures in the factories. The price that the PCI and the trade unions were later to pay for all this was to be generally outflanked during the first stages of the new rise of the struggle (1968-69). Considerable room opened up for activity by forces escaping their control. It should go without saying that this hiatus was determined in the final analysis by the contradiction between the nature of the period that was opening up and the nature of the party. But the phenomenon of outflanking and the formation of new vanguards were facilitated by the earlier dissolution of the ties between the PCI (and the trade unions) and the working class.

Capture the movement

The major social and political crisis than opened in 1968 and is still far from having run its course gave rise to powerful pressure from the mass movement on the PCI. It was a primordial necessity for the PCI to defend both its role and strategy and the system of interests into which it is integrated -- so as not to be cut off from or completely bypassed by the mass movement. The tradition of Togliattism and the practice adopted by the PCI at the time of the explosion of the crisis of the international Communist movement had given the PCI leadership a very great flexibility and an incontestable tactical expertise. After some initial manifestations of disarray and some sectarian reactions, the leading group demonstrated its ability to adapt to the new context. Fundamentally, it tried to integrate the new movements into its general political strategy.

More precisely, the PCI sought to make use of the forces that surged forward during the crisis -- the rise of the workers and

the dynamism of the new proletarian generation, the striking force of the student movement and the radicalization of the petty-bourgeoisie -- in order to increase its own weight in the national context and to be in position to propose its project of "democratic" renewal and reformist reconstruction with growing chances of success.

It is no accident that the re-launching of the policy of reforms -- carried out through the vehicle of the trade unions -- was undertaken toward the end of 1969. Italy was in a prerevolutionary situation at the time; the rise of the workers had reached its height and the trade unions had ably conducted their operation of coopting and canalizing the movement. The reformists were able to advance their project both as a response to the exigencies of a mass movement that was demanding general political solutions (which the far left was not in position to give expression to) and as an alternative to the bourgeoisie itself, which wanted to avoid the danger of an even greater, and, in the final analysis, uncontrollable crisis.

In the initial stages of a social and political crisis in the absence of a revolutionary party, a reformist party with roots in the working class can usually gain in strength as new layers of the working class politicize and radicalize. (Concurrently, there will be an increase in the strength of the trade unions.) The PCI did not restrict itself to efforts to boost its numerical membership or to extend its electoral base. It also tried to insert the forces and impetuses that began to develop in 1968 into the parallelogram of its policy.

Thus, the PCI supported trade-union initiatives, at the same time assuring a canalization and an increase in the weight of the delegates councils. In its general theorizing, the PCI included the councils among the forms of "direct" democracy complementing the parliamentary institutions, which for some time had been a *leit motiv* especially in the speeches and articles of the centrist current led by Pietro Ingrao.

The operation proved more difficult in regard to the student movement, for this movement had developed completely outside the influence of the PCI and was therefore more difficult to canalize. But the axis of the orientation of the leaders of the PCI was substantially the same. This new component of the mass movement was supposed to be mobilized in function of the strategy of reforms. The first attempts to implement this strategy ran along the lines of seeking an alliance or convergence with certain sectors of the student movement that were susceptible to being used for this aim -- the Capanna movement in Milan, for example.(4) Later, especially in 1973-74, the PCI again found conditions (partially, at least) in which it could take direct initiatives through its youth organization. At the same time, the spectacular growth of the teachers union affiliated to the CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori -- Italian General Confederation of Workers, the trade-union federation dominated by the PCI) assured the PCI of another important instrument in this work. Finally -- and this is an essential point -- the PCI was able to exploit the aspiration of the student movement for a convergence with the working class and its inclination to accept the hegemony of the working class. The intervention of the trade unions in the whole range of problems of the student movement and its struggles was the concrete means by which this operation was carried out. In the final analysis it was an operation that went in the direction desired by the general reformist outlook of the PCI. One of the consequences was that the far-left groups, in the framework of their centrist retreat, reduced their own platforms for the student movement and, in practice, adopted a tail-endist attitude toward the trade-union bureaucracy.

In conclusion: the powerful and prolonged rise of the working class, the development of the student movement, the radical-

ization of very broad layers of the petty-bourgeoisie, the unprecedented crisis of leadership of the ruling class, and the evolution of the world situation all combined to allow the PCI to extend its influence further and to appear as a force more closely inserted into the real political contest. That is why it has generally retained its hegemony over the working class and why the bourgeoisie is each day more and more forced to define its attitude toward the PCI.

Nevertheless, this elementary observation must not lead us to forget two other essential elements. The first is that although the PCI maintains its substantial hegemony over the working class through the organizations that it leads or has predominant influence over, the ties between the party apparatus and the organized or unorganized base do not absolutely reflect complete adherence to the PCI's conceptions and orientations. The ties persist in spite of rather generalized critical attitudes. On a number of important occasions mass movements have begun and developed outside the grip of the PCI; a broad proletarian vanguard exists that is not under the hegemony of the PCI.

The second element is that in spite of its increased strength, the PCI is to a very great extent paralyzed. This general paralysis flows from a critical contradiction: The PCI is struggling to push through reformist solutions in a period in which the objective room for reformism is non-existent, or nearly so, and the dynamic of the situation demands solutions involving a break with the framework of the system, that is, revolutionary solutions.

The crisis of Italian society is also expressed in this specific crisis of the majority workers party, historically marked by Stalinism and more and more inserted into a reformist logic.

The Historic Compromise

The crushing of the Allende government, which had been held up as a practical verification of the possibility of preparing a transition to socialism by a "democratic" road, provoked critical reflections within the PCI and was the occasion for a re-definition of general strategy. Earlier and more explicitly than the Chilean CP itself, the leading group around Berlinguer asserted that the cause of the Chilean defeat -- apart from tactical errors or mistakes in application of the line -- lay in the failure of the workers parties to realize and consolidate a sufficiently broad front of alliances. More concretely, it would have been necessary to avoid the confrontation by obtaining, right from the beginning, a systematic agreement with the Christian Democracy (or at least with a substantial section of it).

This evaluation was the point of departure for the "theorization" of what is called the Historic Compromise, which was raised by Berlinguer precisely in a series of articles dealing with the balance-sheet of the Chilean defeat.

It should not be assumed that the Historic Compromise represents an absolute innovation for the PCI. Berlinguer can legitimately affirm that it is a logical outgrowth of the whole policy of the party. The formula itself was utilized in 1948 by Togliatti. But what is significant is that such a lesson should be drawn from an experience that ought to lead to the exact opposite conclusion and that it should be brought up with the aim of justifying a policy that proposes to solve the most serious crisis of the past thirty years by forming a political leadership based on the collaboration of Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats; that is, a new edition of the collabora-

tion that was already engaged in at the end of the second world war.

In other words, according to the leaders of the PCI, the crisis of capitalism should not be confronted with the perspective that the proletariat should struggle for power or even that there should be a government of workers parties on the basis of their winning a majority in parliament. No, the perspective must be that of establishing "advanced" democracy, a reformist restructuring of the regime that was first created in 1945 on the basis of systematic collaboration with the most dynamic and "modern" sectors of the bourgeoisie, those that rejected (or at least considered impractical) solutions like fascism, Bonapartism, or military dictatorship. The implied argument (sometimes articulated rather explicitly) is that a major confrontation must be avoided at all costs because it would only lead the working class to a defeat and to the loss of all the gains it has made since the end of the second world war and especially since 1968.

Militants of the workers movement and bourgeois observers alike are asking themselves, Will the Historic Compromise actually be realized?

There is no doubt that all the political conditions for such a solution are more favorable today than they were several years ago. From the international point of view the present context does not involve any absolute obstacle, and the most significant experiences since 1968 (from the French CP's attitude during the revolutionary crisis of May 1968 to the Portuguese CP's entry into the national coalition government) have encouraged important sectors of the bourgeoisie to accept the idea of collaboration with the CP, even at the government level. If the crisis should deepen even further, if the center-left government should be definitively swept away, if no other solution seemed possible, the bourgeoisie would very probably accept the "Historic Compromise" as its last resort, as an extreme solution.

It must be added that the PCI has already given important "guarantees." It has not made the qualitative leap, but it has integrated itself into the game on the parliamentary and administrative levels. On several occasions it has allowed a government to survive, going so far as to proclaim that it had adopted the policy of "opposition of a different type." In July, the question of the government fiscal decrees came up in parliament. These decrees represented a severe blow to the buying power of the working class and of broad layers of the petty-bourgeoisie. The PCI exerted some parliamentary pressure to attain minor changes in the decrees, but it did not adopt the tactic of obstruction, which would have led to the defeat of the decrees and the fall of the government. During the month of June, the PCI had put forward a platform of economic demands that had no major differences with the solutions envisaged by the government.

Nevertheless, the die is not yet cast. In the short term it is probable that the Rubicon will not be crossed. The bourgeoisie and its parties are torn by violent polemics and there are constant fluctuations. During the last meeting of its national council the Christian Democracy rejected the PCI's advances very clearly, and, what is much more significant, a "no" answer was also given by Agnelli, who is director of Fiat and head of the employers' organization. Agnelli had been considered as one of the bourgeois leaders most favorable to the Historic Compromise (among other reasons, because of his excellent relations with the Soviet bureaucracy). The traditional arguments against the Historic Compromise are now being put forward by various politicians. But the real remaining opposition is fundamentally a result of two factors: 1. The bourgeois circles that are favorable to going ahead with it are holding

back out of fear of the reaction of those sectors that would have to bear the costs of the compromise; 2. The Christian Democracy, which is once again in crisis, is afraid to enter a collaboration that the PCI, which is much more solid and homogeneous, could exploit in its favor. In particular, the CD fears -- and not without cause -- that the PCI could win the support of petty-bourgeois layers, and even of small- and middle-sized industrialists. (Such support is already a reality in the so-called Red Regions in the middle of the peninsula.) Such a development could lead to a profound restructuring of political relations, and the bourgeoisie is not yet ready to accept such a perspective, with all the risks it implies.

As for the PCI itself, it is also hesitating and will hesitate some more before taking the decisive step. (Last spring, for example, it adopted a policy of "intransigent opposition" for a few months.) It is concerned first of all with its ties with the masses. This is not an unimportant consideration in a country that has experienced great mobilizations during the past five years, mobilizations during which important outflanking of the PCI has occurred, a country in which the broadest mass vanguard of any country in capitalist Europe exists. In the second place, the PCI does not want to take on responsibilities that, given the present situation, will inevitably be heavy ones without getting some guarantees that it is going to be an operation of some scope. Berlinguer and Company are not prepared to take big risks for some sort of small-time operation. And they have said so explicitly on several occasions.

There remains the question of whether a possible realization of the Historic Compromise with the entry of the PCI into the government could lead to a stabilization. In the short term, the bourgeoisie would probably have a wider margin for maneuver, but the general lines of the answer must be negative. The crisis that Italian society is now experiencing is at the same time structural and conjunctural. The crisis is so extensive and profound that a stabilization in the short or medium term would not be realizable even in the extreme hypothesis that the Historic Compromise were put into effect on the basis of all the economic and social proposals being advanced by the PCI. In the event that a few real reforms were made, the consequences would be a multiplication of social tensions, a prolongation of the conflicts that have been going on since 1968, and even an aggravation of them. The Chilean experience is eloquent on this question too.

Tasks of revolutionaries

Even if it is not realized in the short term, the Historic Compromise poses political and tactical tasks for revolutionaries. In fact, the question is in the center of current debates, and the workers in the factories are discussing it quite a lot. This reflects the persistence of certain illusions, but it also reflects the degree of politicization. The workers are taking account of the fact that the solution must be sought on the general political field and not on the purely economic or defensive level.

Revolutionaries have an indispensable task of propaganda. They must clarify the essential content of the Historic Compromise -- a new form of class collaboration. They must do this on a large scale, systematically, recalling the lessons of the past (especially those of the 1944-47 period). Further, through their agitation axised around transitional slogans linked to the problems of the economic and political crisis (see INPRECOR No.8), they must try to show in practice through the experiences of struggle that compromise with the bourgeoisie is impossible without renouncing defense not only of the historical interests of the working class and the other exploited layers, but even of their immediate vital interests. This action is all the more necessary in that the groups of the far left are sliding into a centrist morass, fostering the most

lamentable confusion and functioning within a clearer and clearer logic of adaptation.

If the Historic Compromise were realized, a new stage would be opened and it would be necessary for revolutionaries to re-examine their orientation. Very probably, a wide section of the masses would consider the addition of the PCI to the government as a victory and would attain a greater consciousness of their strength and the effectiveness of their struggle. This would mean that revolutionaries would have delicate tactical problems to resolve. But it is not the aim of this article to deal with those problems now. ■



Footnotes:

1. The congress of the unified communist faction of the Italian Socialist party was convened in Imola on November 20, 1920. In attendance were: the central nucleus of former abstentionists (including Luigi Bordiga, who had exerted strong pressure during the second world congress of the Communist International in favor of this unification), the ex-left-maximalists (Bombacci, Gennari, etc.), the former Ordine Nuovo (New Order) group (Gramsci, Togliatti) and the majority of the youth organization of the Italian SP, which was directed by Polano. During the Livorno congress (January 1921), the unified communist faction (known as "the pure communists") received 58,788 votes for their platform out of a total of 172,487 votes cast. The faction then withdrew from the congress and, in the St. Mark Theater, formed the Italian Communist party (PCI). Only one member of the Ordine Nuovo group, Terracini, was placed on the Executive Committee. The other members of the EC were: Bordiga, Fortichiarì, Grieco, and Repossi. Gramsci was a member of the Central Committee. Togliatti was not even a member of the CC; he became one only after the second congress of the PCI (March 1922). The vast movement of workers occupations of factories (especially in Turin, Milan, and Genoa) had by the close of September 1920 ended with a defeat for the working class.
2. In May 1922 Gramsci was designated as a delegate to the International and left for Moscow. From the end of 1922 he worked in the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In 1923 he went to Vienna in order to follow Italian events more closely (the rise of fascism and the arrest of the main cadres of the PCI). Elected as deputy from Venice in 1924, he returned to Italy, enjoying parliamentary immunity. He drafted the theses of the third congress of the PCI, a congress that was held in Lyon, France, in January 1926. Bordiga was in a minority. Gramsci was arrested in November 1926. He later died in the fascist prison.
3. The workers of Fiat -- who have been in the vanguard of the Italian working class since 1943 and demonstrated their exceptional combativity in April 1948, after the attempt to assassinate Togliatti -- were locked in the vise of the PCI's policy of class collaboration. By 1953 the management of Fiat (Valletta had taken over management in 1946) launched a ferocious attack against the organized workers movement and succeeded, thanks to many firings and a policy of systematic repression, in almost completely isolating the FIOM, the metalworkers union attached to the CGIL. It was only in 1962 that the workers movement began to reactivate itself, and it was not until 1968-69 that Fiat again became the most advanced center of Italian workers struggles.
4. Capanna, leader of the Movimento Studentesco (Student Movement), an "organization" that had hegemony in the state university of Milan at the beginning of the 1970s. Of Mao-Stalinist orientation, this "organization" lines up behind and sanctions the policy of the PCI.



CARAMANLIS MOVES TOWARD ELECTIONS

by G. VERGEAT

Prime Minister Caramanlis has held discretionary powers ever since he was called back to power by the bankrupt junta. His regime is not based on any constituent assembly or elected legislative body. The existing judicial framework is none other than the one bequeathed by the past twenty years, during which time anticommunist and repressive laws have been promulgated endlessly. During the past ten years, Greece has been profoundly transformed by an economic evolution whose social consequences are now beginning to come to the fore.

The military dictatorship was undermined by political and social contradictions that it had itself contributed to aggravating. Thus, during the past few years, Greece had begun to extricate itself from the weight of its economic backwardness. The church, unconditional supporter of the military, was the incarnation of the country's political backwardness. What has occurred has been an industrial, commercial, and cultural development whose main result has been the concentration of social classes through the accelerated urbanization of the country and its unprecedented opening to the world market, particularly by the expansion of tourism. A modern working class was born; a commercial petty-bourgeoisie appeared. Inevitably, a modification in the forms of capitalist political rule in Greek society had to be produced as a counterpart to these profound social and economic changes.

A conservative-reformist approach

Caramanlis stands at the intersection of two roads in the political history of postwar Greece. Simultaneously the organizer of the political system that arose after the civil war (and pushed forward by the powerful anticommunist wave of the time) he is also the figure who embodies a return to a form of bourgeois democracy that had never been rooted in the political tradition of the country. It appears contradictory to see Caramanlis play the herald of the reconstruction -- or rather, the construction -- of democracy and simultaneously govern virtually automatically.

Thus, the current problem is the political lining up of the country. All the political operations now going on are aimed at constructing political units, parties, or movements in order to plunge into the elections that are supposed to come soon.

The Greek bourgeoisie, profoundly marked by seven years of dictatorship and arbitrariness, is seeking to endow itself with

a conservative bourgeois reform party whose principal leaders and spokesmen are already on the scene: Mavros, the present vice-prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Averoff, the minister of defense. Caramanlis is a political figure who transcends the stature of a leader of a party; a certain section of the conservative press has already consecrated him in the role of a small-sized de Gaulle.

For the immediate future, no other bourgeois political formation can take the risk of dividing the liberal bourgeois camp. The liberal bourgeoisie's problem is to work out the best conditions for politically confronting the rise of popular mobilizations whose channels of political and electoral expression are already clearly defined: the two Communist parties and, more recently, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement of Andreas Papandreu.

The reestablishment of democracy with the return of Caramanlis was in reality limited to the reactivation of elementary democratic rights. The broader problem remained: the institutionalization of full and complete bourgeois democracy. Because of a still very fragile relationship of forces between himself and the army, Caramanlis, in contradiction with popular demands, carefully refrained from leading a popular mobilization to break the apparatus of the army, with which he freely bound himself. The total uncritical loyalty expressed by each of the Communist parties toward Caramanlis's rule, which was not yet his regime, left him free to act as though there were no political leadership of the popular masses. A leadership could have and should have led them to the conquest of their rights with the aim of creating the preconditions of a favorable political relationship of forces with the reestablished conservative bourgeois regime.

In this manner, the policy of the Communist parties was to tie their own hands, to leave all the initiative in the hands of a bourgeois regime, and thus to allow it to make considerable advances on the field of the political conquest of the broad masses.

The Papandreu operation

It is only now that the Greek workers movement is in position to develop its own legal political organizations. The legalization of the Greek Communist parties, like the emergence of a Social Democratic political formation of very radical colors

tion, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement led by Andreas Papandreou, represents a real change in the country.

Because of its economic poverty and loose social fabric, for decades Greece could be governed by force, by dictatorial Bonapartist regimes blocking the existence of political formations representing the toiling masses or sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Today, the emergence of such legal possibilities is a result of the broader base of the ruling class on the economic level. It is becoming necessary for the ruling class, acting in the framework of reestablishing bourgeois democracy, to utilize reformist workers formations in maintaining the balance of its own system, in order to be able to absorb political radicalization should that become necessary. Both of the Greek Communist parties as well as Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement fall into this framework. Each in its own way.

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement projected itself onto the political scene by immediately placing itself to the left of the Communist parties. The Greek Communist parties left a very important political vacuum on their left by their ultra-opportunist policy. From the time their press began coming out legally, even before they themselves were legalized as organizations, they refused to make the question of purging the apparatus of the military junta a central question -- just as Caramanlis refused to do so. They carried out a chauvinist policy on the Turkish question, echoing a certain anti-Turkish chauvinist wave that had been manipulated by some sections of the bourgeoisie. They put forward no slogan on the rank-and-file reorganization of the workers movement, or especially for the reconstruction of workers trade-unions free from the intervention of the state apparatus. They attached themselves completely to the Caramanlis operation, building up its political credibility among their own ranks and thereby engendering a certain demobilization.

The operation led by Andreas Papandreou derives from a different perception of the political situation. The name of the founder of the organization is bathed in a certain prestige be-

cause of his participation in the resistance to the military regime, although from abroad, "speaking" to the Greek masses. The radical content of the political platform presented by Papandreou during his September 2 press conference announcing the formation of his organization was not simply a measure of demagogy. It really corresponded to the radical character of the political consciousness of Greek worker and student youth. To demand the purge of the state apparatus without at the same time challenging its bourgeois nature is linked to the confused nature of this political consciousness. To demand that the deposed dictators be subjected to trials is already to go further than the new Caramanlis regime and to show some offensive character. To demand that Greece break all U.S. alliances--military, economic, political--is to play on national sentiment ultrasensitized by American manipulations. The problem is that there is no Greek road to socialism, as Papandreou suggests. Even though it still has only a very weak organizational apparatus that lacks unified political functioning and has no tradition of real struggle, Andreas Papandreou's formation is a very powerful pole of attraction for those youth who do not believe in the Communist parties and who want to find ways of expressing their will to struggle.

The coming elections are already the object of serious clashes between a new left and a still incompletely defined conservative right. Caramanlis's aim is to organize the elections without delay, for his political lead, based on his position as head of the state apparatus, which allows him to place his own men in important posts, gives him a knowledge of the situation that other formations have not yet been able to master completely. In addition, the sooner the elections take place, the less likely it is that another conservative bourgeois formation will come forward. It was in this situation that the decree was issued on September 24 legalizing the two Communist parties. This was an event of great importance in the Greek situation; it ended nearly a quarter of a century of bans on the CP.

The CPs, unlike the Andreas Papandreou formation, have not yet had time to get organized. The September 25 issue of the French CP daily, *l'Humanité*, reported a communiqué released by the pro-Moscow faction of the Greek CP protesting against holding elections too quickly. "In a declaration to the press," wrote *l'Humanité*, "the Greek Communist party asserted that hastily held elections are a crime against the nation and will lead to a parliamentary dictatorship, for they would serve the interests only of Caramanlis." It concluded: "Before proceeding to elections, the state of the system of the junta must be purged and the question of the regime must be resolved."

In fact, there is much more behind the two CP's and Papandreou's rejection of holding elections too soon. Although they will present themselves before the electorate as "friendly" enemies, the two CPs will suffer from a confusion that goes against their interests. An electoral agreement with the Papandreou formation is necessary in order to avoid too strong a competition. In this situation, it definitely appears that Caramanlis can come out the winner and thus lend a legal basis to the regime that he will be able to utilize in his own way.

The far-left formations are still too weak and too small to be able to intervene in the sense of politically confronting the left organizations. The recent Chile solidarity demonstrations held in Athens showed how the left formations were intent on isolating them. Members of both CPs and the Papandreou organizations did not hesitate to act as internal police on these demonstrations in order to physically isolate the far-left formations by force. But the only thing achieved in this little game was to create the conditions for greater attention being accorded the far-left formations. The Greek Stalinists in their turn will have to learn this. ■



revolutionary marxists answer slanders

On September 13 a bomb exploded during lunch hour in La Tropical bar in Madrid, near the headquarters of the National Security Police. At least a dozen people were killed in the blast; about seventy were wounded. The Francoist government has blamed the bombing on the Basque liberation movement and has used it as an excuse to intensify the repression, especially in Euzkadi (the Basque country). At the same time, the Spanish bourgeois press has opened a slander campaign seeking to place responsibility for the bombing and for terrorism in general on the Fourth International and its supporters in Spain. The following statement answering this campaign was issued by the comrades of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria-Euzkadi ta Askatasuna VI (LCR-ETA(VI)--Revolutionary Communist League-Basque Nation and Freedom, Sixth Congress), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International on the territory of the Spanish state.

INPRECOR

The attack of last September 13 in Correos de Madrid street has been the occasion for the development of a new propaganda and police campaign by the Francoist dictatorship, the sole and real incarnation of terrorism in this country for the past forty years. The objectives of this campaign are the following:

1. To attempt to justify the assassinations of Basque nationalist militants that the present "manhunt" -- which continues a long and bloody repressive tradition -- is resulting in.
2. To attempt to justify the savage prison sentences that the Public Order Tribunal and the military courts have imposed against revolutionary militants, the most recent examples being the 21- and 12-year terms handed down against Zabarte and Gaztelumendia by a War Council in Burgos.
3. To attempt to justify the legal and budgetary measures that are strengthening the police character of the Francoist state even more: permanent occupation of the popular neighborhoods and of entire villages, increase in the number of troops in the armed police, the civil guard, and the Brigade Politico-Social (Politico-Social Brigade, the secret police), judicial immunity for the police, immunity and encouragement for the fascist bands, etc.
4. To attempt to discredit all the revolutionary organizations, all those struggling for the overthrow of the dictatorship, comparing our methods and objectives to those that produced the attack on Correos street. But in particular, the campaign is an attempt to discredit the methods of direct mass action, the organization of revolutionary violence in face of the attacks of repression, precisely because the dictatorship knows very well that it is these methods -- which have nothing at all to do with the acts of September 13 -- that will permit the working class and the Spanish people to destroy the dictatorship forever.

We think that any revolutionary position on the acts of which we are speaking must begin by denouncing this hypocritical campaign of a dictatorship built and maintained in power by a series of crimes.

But we must also affirm that the attack of September 13 contributed to the unfolding of the campaign and constituted an absurd resort to violence, not only foreign to the struggles of the working class and people in our country but also in contradiction with them.

From a revolutionary point of view, there is not the slightest justification, whether direct or indirect, for the attack at Correos street. That is why we believe that no revolutionary organization is responsible for it.

In the end, we consider this attack as an action contrary to the interests of the struggle against the dictatorship and capitalism. And, from the standpoint of this struggle, which is the standpoint of all who are exploited and oppressed by Francoism, we condemn it absolutely.

In addition to what we have already mentioned, the events of September 13 have given a new impetus to a specific campaign against the Fourth International, a campaign that has been developed throughout the world by the political police for several months -- in collaboration with the most reactionary, if not openly fascist, sectors of the bourgeois press.

This campaign aims at presenting the Fourth International, the world revolutionary organization founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938, as a mélange of anarchist, Stalinist, Castroist, and nationalist organizations having only one thing in common: the fact that they call for "terrorism." In our country in the past few weeks, both the attempted kidnapping of the Count of Barcelona and the Correos street attack have been attributed to the Fourth International. This stupid and incredible list will certainly be continued.

We are determined to denounce these base slanders. The Fourth International is a world organization of Trotskyist militants. Our common denominator is the program of proletarian revolution based on the principles of revolutionary Marxism elaborated by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. Our objective is the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of the world republic of workers councils on the road to communist society, which will realize all the dreams of freedom of the whole history of the human race.

On the road to their economic and political liberation the workers and peoples of the world have always had to and will always have to confront the barbarous resistance of their exploiters. Those who may have forgotten this obvious lesson of history need only to look at Chile. The Fourth International

is fighting so that there will be no more Chiles, so that the masses will be armed with the desire to arm themselves and will thus resist and overthrow their class enemy. That is the communist conception of revolutionary violence around which the work of thousands of militants of dozens of organizations and sections of the Fourth International on all the five continents of the world is oriented.

It is clear that the Fourth International has fundamental theoretical, programmatic, strategic, and tactical differences with organizations that are presented by the bourgeois campaign as belonging to it: in our country, for example, organizations like the MIL, GARI, FRAP, ETA(V)* and others. It is likewise clear that in spite of these differences, we have defended and we will continue unconditionally to defend these organizations, as well as all other revolutionary organizations, against the bourgeoisie, because we think that the actions of these

* MIL: Movimiento Iberico de Liberación (Iberian Liberation Movement). GARI: Grupo Armado Revolucionario Iberico (Iberian Armed Revolutionary Group). FRAP: Frente Revolucionario Armado del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Front of the People). ETA(V): Euzkadi ta Askatasuna V (Basque Nation and Freedom-Fifth Congress).

groups, no matter how erroneous we may believe them to be, are inspired by hatred for the exploiters and devotion to the cause of the exploited. Against bourgeois repression, every revolutionary is always in the right.

The Fourth International is not a terrorist organization. It is a communist organization in the full sense of the word, and the bourgeoisie, along with its police watchdogs, the "theoreticians" of this campaign, know it very well. And it is precisely because they know this that they lie, that they try to slander us. Because they know that in the Fourth International they have an irreconcilable enemy with which it is not possible to sign any pact, an enemy that is growing and organizing throughout the world and that will not cease to struggle until the proletariat has conquered the final capitalist fortress. That is why they try to present a false and distorted image of our organization.

But the Fourth International is constructing its real image in its daily revolutionary action at the side of the workers and peoples of the world. That image is the image of socialist revolution, of the future of humanity. And all the slanders of the bourgeoisie will not succeed in holding back the march toward that future for one single second. ■

September 20, 1974

SPAIN

on the call for a general strike

The following article, which deals with the call issued by the Workers Commissions for a general strike in Spain this autumn, appeared in *Combate*, organ of the LCR-ETA(VI), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain.



1. For a total struggle against the dictatorship and capital!

In a June 16, 1974, declaration, the General Coordination of the Workers Commissions issued a call for preparation of a twenty-four-hour general strike. Independently of the content of this call and of the methods of struggle it puts forward, our organization supports the calling of a general struggle and is preparing to act to help bring it about.

The necessity for a united struggle throughout the country becomes more imperative every day, given the economic and political situation the country is going through and given the demands that have been raised this year by the struggles themselves.

(a) Growing workers combativity has given rise to an impressive new rise of struggles. Faced with the rising cost of living,

the workers have overturned the dates and terms of the negotiations for collective contracts and have presented their own demands to the employers and entered into struggle. From one end of the Spanish state to the other, from the most advanced centers of struggle during the past several years (Catalonia, Euzkadi) to the areas with no tradition of struggle (Caceres, Malaga, Huelva, Cadiz) and passing through centers in which the workers movement has undergone a process of recomposition (Madrid, Vigo, Valencia, Valladolid, Sargasso), the slogans of equal wage increases, full pay for sick days, the 40-hour workweek, reintegration of fired workers, etc. have been put forward in the greater part of the workers struggles of recent months.

But at the same time, this broad movement has revealed two fundamental weaknesses: first of all its discontinuity in time. Thus, the dictatorship has found itself in a situation in which it could repress the struggles one at a time without risking getting caught by a vast, general movement. Thus, likewise, in the two most advanced struggles of this year (Pamplona with its struggle at Authi, Baix Llobregat with its struggle at Elsa and Solvay), the solidarity movement and the support movement throughout the country, which could have allowed for a great victory against the employers, was a failure.

The other weakness has been the absence of a mass response to the sentencing of the Carabanchel 10 (the trial of ten leaders of the Workers Commissions, among them the Communist militant Camacho) and to the assassination of Salvador Puig Antich. Nevertheless, the weak mobilization against these attacks of the dictatorship did not represent retreats or the mass movement, as was shown by the relaunching of struggle before and after the 1001 trial (the Carabanchel 10 trial was also called the 1001 trial because the sentences demanded against the defendants totaled 1001 years) and on March 2, the date of the assassination of Puig Antich. It is therefore not in order to speak of defeats, but rather of lost opportunities to develop the political mass struggles that could have made the dictatorship back down as it was forced to do during the Burgos trials in 1970.

(b) Another characteristic of this year's struggles has been the deepening of the struggles of other sectors and the entry into struggle of new layers of the population. As for the first phenomenon, we can stress the struggles of the professors and students (in universities and high schools) against the selection law, which, despite the massive protests it triggered, was approved. This will surely produce further struggles in which the working class, which is most affected by selection, will have to play the same role as it did during the struggle against the capitalist profitization of education. The liberal professions have continued more than ever to reject the framework of the professional colleges and are organizing the struggle outside the limits imposed by the dictatorship. The technicians have joined in the struggles of the workers (as at Standard in Madrid); this represents a new index of the radicalization of this sector.

The interning physicians and public health workers have engaged in struggles (Madrid, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Santiago, Sevilla) against the exploitation to which they are subjected and the bad conditions under which they have to treat the sick.

Among the new sectors that have entered into struggle are the agricultural workers and the small-scale peasant proprietors. This was especially seen in the month-long strike of 12,000 agricultural proletarians in Marco de Jerez. Also significant is the struggle of the small merchants of Madrid, which exemplified the growing loss of support among petty-bourgeois sectors for a regime that appears in the eyes of these layers as the direct supporter of the large landed proprietors, the wholesalers, the central milk producers, etc., directly responsible for the aggravation of the situation of the small merchants and for the increase in the prices of agricultural products on the market.

(c) The basis of all these struggles is found in the economic situation, which is marked by the dizzying rise of the cost of living. The bourgeoisie, which is trying to make the workers suffer the weight of the imperialist economic crisis, will try to overcome its difficulties by laying off thousands of workers. The measures restricting the entry of emigrant labor into countries like France and Germany have now been followed by attacks on employment in our country: discrimination in employment against women and youth; placing of many firms in bankruptcy; increase in unemployment in the construction industry; threat of unemployment by the end of the year in the auto industry, etc.

Thus, to respond to these two effects of the economic crisis of the bourgeoisie it is necessary to lead a vigorous struggle against the cost of living and unemployment in all the sectors hit by capitalist anarchy.

(d) The Francoist dictatorship, which has been the form of



bourgeois rule in Spain for thirty-five years, is now directly confronted with the problem of succession. Its difficulties in this regard stem from the absence of any alternative figure able to play the role of arbiter among the various factions of the bourgeoisie, the role that has been played by Franco. The disappearance of Carrero Blanco effectively meant the disappearance of the only Bonapartist aspirant who had been groomed for that role. In the short term it is impossible to find a political personality capable of filling the vacuum left by the disappearance of the admiral. Arias absolutely cannot be such a personality, and that is why we call his government a provisional one. It is a government for burying the generalissimo, but it is not a post-Franco government.

The impending disappearance of the dictator has posed this problem in the sharpest sense. The absence of an answer that is satisfactory for all sectors of the bourgeoisie (and neither Juan Carlos, nor Arias, nor the two together offer sufficient guarantees) is fostering the aggravation of tensions among the various factions in a way that could lead to the brink of an explosion. We say "to the brink" because it is clear that if Franco should say a word or make a gesture of approval to Arias and his government, the various families and political layers would be much more concerned about having to confront the present government overtly. That is why the life of Franco -- what little may be left of it -- is blocking the explosion of these tensions. That is also why an inevitable biological fact -- like the death of the dictator -- will immediately have very important political consequences in this country.

And all these tensions, difficulties, and differences are not unrelated to the development of the mass movement. For one thing, the power of this movement, which has been manifested since the 1970 Burgos trials, has been based on these difficulties. For another thing, all the intrabourgeois differences act in the direction of weakening the attacks on the working class and its allies.

(e) In such a situation, to advance toward a general strike that regroups and unifies the fragmented struggles and insists on the granting of the demands that have been raised -- release of arrested and imprisoned militants, democratic rights allowing for an increase in the organization and power of the struggle of the proletariat and the other oppressed layers, etc. -- it is necessary not to let any important struggle go by without an active solidarity movement that overcomes the weaknesses we have mentioned. It is also necessary not to allow any repressive attack by the dictatorship to go without a response, no matter whether the attack comes from the police or the special tribunals.

It is necessary to place the struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship, the direct instrument of thirty-five years of exploitation and political oppression, in the center of this general strike, along with all our other demands.

2. The declaration of the General Coordination of the Workers Commissions.

The call issued by the General Coordination of the Workers Commissions presents an analysis of the political situation and perspectives for preparation of the general strike that begins from a point of view that revolutionary Marxists can only criticize. Our support to the specific call for the general strike must not prevent us from making what we believe are necessary criticisms of the document of the General Coordination of the Workers Commissions.

(a) We must stress one thing above all: the total absence of internal democracy within the Workers Commissions; or, what amounts to the same thing, the bureaucratic manipulation of the leadership bodies. Thus, the members of the Workers Commissions are integrated into operations like the Catalonia Assembly and now the Junta Democratica without ever being consulted. The same thing happened in the case of the call for the general strike: Not only was the idea of a total struggle not discussed by the rank and file of the Commissions; in addition, the content of the call -- elaborated by the Spanish Communist party faction in the Workers Commissions -- was not submitted to any discussion. We stress that our criticism does not refer to the fact that the Workers Commissions expressed political opinions -- with this we are in agreement -- but rather to the fact that these opinions were imposed without the slightest possibility of internal discussion and confrontation between the positions of the various political currents that exist within the Workers Commissions.

(b) To this absence of discussion and, in the final analysis, absence of participation of all militants of the Workers Commissions in all the most important decisions, must be added the fact that after the issuing of the call, the coordination of the Commissions took no practical measures to prepare for the general strike by entering into relations with other commissions and organs of struggle in the factories, schools, and countryside or with bodies of struggle of the liberal professions, or with political parties. Nor did it begin to develop an agitational campaign to popularize the idea and objectives of the general strike. If it continues on this road, the coordination of the Commissions will find itself in an irresponsible and suicidal position.

(c) Another characteristic of the call is its insistence on the utilization of all legal possibilities, in particular possibilities within the vertical trade-union: "It is not possible to develop and to have a real influence in the confrontations simply on

the basis of clandestine positions, or still less on the basis of positions that are eternally opposed to the trade-union officials. . . . It is necessary, today more than ever, to utilize more the legal means and instruments, even though our experience proves the correctness of our line."

But the workers struggles of past years, above all since Burgos, have exactly been characterized by a systematic overflowing of the legal channels of the dictatorship. The resort to direct action (work stoppages, strikes, assemblies, demonstrations) has been generalized. Even those struggles for economic demands that initially accepted the mediation of the legal representatives always ended outside the CNS (the corporatist state "union") because of the ineffectiveness of the legal channels for the workers struggles.

We are given two reasons to justify acceptance of the legal channels of the CNS. The first consists of presenting us with statistics of struggles in which the legal representatives played a top-level role, a leadership role. The second claims that the only way to make the struggle of backward sectors move forward is to utilize the trade-union officials, inasmuch as these sectors have not yet directly experienced the trap that the vertical union amounts to.

We do not deny that there are some militant legal representatives. Nor do we believe that the working class of the entire country has already experienced the traitorous character of the CNS. But we believe that there are organizations like the Workers Commissions and other factory bodies (for the unification of which Trotskyist militants are fighting) that are capable of standing at the head of the struggle in all sectors and under all circumstances and that therefore make it absolutely unnecessary to utilize the organs of the vertical union. We believe that the tasks of these militant legal representatives would be much more effectively carried out within the Workers Commissions of their factories and, if they participate in general assemblies, with all the other workers. We think that it is up to the Workers Commissions themselves to help more backward sectors avoid the errors that were committed by the more advanced sectors during the period of recomposition of the workers movement in the 1960s. Their task is to explain the lessons of the advanced struggles, to draw the lessons of past defeats, and so on. This, moreover, is the way that sectors that are just now entering into struggle will be able to move forward, taking significant steps ahead in a short period of time and catching up to the sectors that we consider to be "advanced" today.

To the list of improvements obtained through the mediation of the union representatives we counterpose the list of demands that have won in factories that went beyond the channels of the CNS and developed their struggles through direct action in a democratic way (assemblies, elected and recallable committees, etc.). Furthermore, in most cases, the mediation of the trade-union representatives was based on a relationship of forces that shifted in favor of the employers during the negotiations, because the legal representatives isolated themselves from the mass of workers, a situation that can be avoided only through assemblies that determine demands which are then presented to the employers by an elected committee. The mediation of the legal representatives has also been a weapon used by the leadership of the vertical union to strengthen the CNS. Thus, we are opposed to "utilization" of the vertical union as much for reasons of effectiveness as because it would run counter to the struggle of the workers movement against the vertical union that has been imposed on the workers by the dictatorship.

Furthermore, the Workers Commission declaration affirms that we must "accelerate the process of assemblies, especially in

the work places, but at the same time in the local unions." We agree -- if the following points are added:

(1) That the assemblies be part of the local unions only as a last resort. We believe that the natural place for these assemblies is the factory. Further, it is undeniable that the possibilities of greater control by the union bureaucrats and the police make the leaders of struggles more vulnerable to repression and can prevent open discussions among the workers.

(2) Whether they are formed in the factories, the locals of the CNS, or anywhere else, the assemblies should not be consultative bodies, but rather the sole decision-making center of the struggle. They should be accompanied by elected and revocable committees to deal with the more concrete aspects (like coordination with other factories, organization of economic solidarity, etc.). In their contacts with the employers, the committees should be limited to transmitting what has already been decided in the general assembly.

To lead a total struggle it is necessary to put forward objectives capable of uniting the greatest number of exploited and oppressed sectors and responding to the necessities of the struggle of the moment, both economic and political. This struggle must also be the point of departure for new struggles. That is why the apolitical character of the Workers Commission coordination's call for the general strike reduces the effectiveness of the battle inasmuch as the struggle against the high cost of living by itself does not enable the more backward sectors to become conscious of the necessity for fighting for political objectives.

But this apoliticism is not accidental. It conforms to the interests of the Spanish CP, which does not want to jeopardize its alliances. If it is to be credible to sectors of the bourgeoisie and thus preserve and develop its alliances, the CP must on the one hand prove its ability to mobilize people and at the same time show that it is the only force capable of controlling the movement and avoiding an excessive radicalization and politicization of the struggle, for this would frighten its potential allies.

3. Our proposals.

Here we present the points that we think are capable of grouping together all the sectors that are fighting the Francoist dictatorship.

It is a matter of a struggle against the high cost of living, against selection in education, and against repression and the dictatorship. On this basis the LCR-ETA(VI) thinks that the platform below is the one that best corresponds to the needs of the current struggle.

1. Against the high cost of living:
 - minimum salary of 600 pesetas a day,
 - equal increases of 6,000 pesetas a month for all wage-earners and retirees,
 - sliding scale of wages for workers, unemployed, and retirees, according to a cost-of-living index evaluated every three months,
 - sliding scale of hours, that is, division of the available working hours among all able-bodied workers, with no reduction in pay,
 - full payment of wages in the event of illness, accident, unemployment, and retirement,
 - social security paid by the factory,
 - solidarity with the struggles of the workers of the countryside, the small farmers and merchants. For the creation of price-watch committees composed of representatives of the

various popular sectors.

2. Against selection in education:
 - down with the selection law,
 - against the capitalist profitization of education,
 - for compulsory, rounded, secular, and free education up to 16 years of age,
 - support to the demands of instructors and professors,
 - elimination of all sanctions taken against instructors, students, and professors.
3. Against repression and the dictatorship:
 - stop the assassinations of worker and student militants and nationalist militants,
 - dissolution of the repressive corps and institutions. Abrogation of all repressive legislation,
 - prosecution of those responsible for the crimes of Francoism,
 - freedom for political prisoners; freedom for all political exiles to return,
 - freedom of association, meeting, the press, strikes, and demonstration,
 - self-determination for national minorities,
 - immediate and unconditional independence for "Spanish" Sahara in order that the people of the Sahara may choose their future freely; down with Spanish colonialism in Africa,
 - down with the dictatorship,
 - down with the Francoist monarchy.

4. How to organize the general strike.

1. The first task is to develop a vast campaign of propaganda and agitation around the objectives of the general strike. For that, the Workers Commissions must fix a date for the general strike that permits all the bodies of struggle and all the political organizations to prepare it. The necessity for each organ of struggle and each organization beginning this work of agitation now must not prevent the search for all possibilities of united agreements.
2. Let us stimulate struggles in the work places and schools for the demands that have been raised; solidarity with the struggles going on and with the militants hit by repression; let us organize meetings of the vanguard and general assemblies to prepare the general strike.
3. Let us push the battles forward by direct action: form assemblies as leadership bodies for the struggles; the assemblies should name elected and revocable committees charged with transmitting the demands approved by the assemblies and with establishing coordination with the other centers of struggle. Against the dictatorship's attempts to isolate struggles, let us form pickets to extend them and generalize the struggle. Against repression let us organize self-defense pickets to protect the assemblies, demonstrations, and militants who are in the forefront.
4. The broadest unity in action among bodies and organizations under the leadership of the Workers Commissions will be possible only if contacts are immediately made among all these various forces. All parties that represent sectors of the bourgeoisie must be excluded from this coordination and all workers political parties must be convoked with consultative voice but not the right to vote, this being reserved for the representatives of the struggle organs of the various sectors.
5. But the reformists will try to arrive at agreements with representatives of sectors of the bourgeoisie and will consequently

try to subordinate the objectives and methods of the struggle to their policy of alliances. It is for this reason -- and with the aim of creating a framework capable of attracting the maximum number of militants, including those influenced by the reformists -- that we call for unity in action of all the organizations that defend a line of class independence in regard to the objectives, tactics, and forms and methods of organization in order to counterpose a class alternative to the reformist orientation. This will also be a means of forcing the reformists to

choose between their working-class origins and base and their present submission to the bourgeoisie through the medium of their policy of alliances. This must not be understood as a rejection of unity in action with the reformist parties. We defend this unity in action in all the bodies of struggle and we struggle to realize it among the political organizations; but we accept no alliance with bourgeois parties and we demand that the reformists break their ties with the bourgeoisie. That is the only means of realizing a broad Workers United Front. ■

FRANCE



"APPEAL OF THE 100" CHALLENGES THE BOURGEOIS ARMY

by O. MILAN

Launched during the electoral campaign, the Appeal of the 100 -- a statement drawn up by enlisted men in the French armed forces -- asked candidates to state their position on a series of demands of enlisted men, in particular:

- Freedom to choose date of induction.
- Elimination of drafting outside the borders of the country.
- Elimination of hazing.
- Salary equal to the guaranteed minimum income.
- Freedom of expression, information, and organization in the barracks.
- Abolition of military courts.
- Elimination of Military Security.

Today, the electoral context in which the appeal had been issued has been forgotten. The very large number of signatures obtained on the appeal so far (3,000), the positions taken on it by the military hierarchy, the repression that has hit those signing it, the support for it from a section of the workers movement, and the embarrassed attitude of the reformists have all combined to make the Appeal of the 100 an important political

event that has already forced the government into beating a few retreats. It is an event that all political forces have had to take a position on. Even though recent events have shown that the level reached by the Appeal of the 100 has been transcended in part today (the demonstration of 200 soldiers in Draguignan, for example), it is still necessary to make a correct evaluation of the possibilities opened up by this action.

Reasons for the mass response

The response received by the Appeal of the 100 shows that real mass work is possible in the army today, contrary to what was claimed not so long ago by many militants of the far left. The appeal served to reveal the state of tension, even of turbulence, that prevails among the draftees in the French army. It showed that as a consequence of this mood, it was possible to go beyond the stage of propagandistic affirmation of principles ("Down with the army of civil war!") and move to a new practical level of organization and action.

Everyone sees that the enlisted men are less and less prepared to tolerate the arrogance and hazing of the military hierarchy. They are seeking in a confused way to organize themselves for struggle. Only stupid policemen imagine that this is the result of an "extremist plot." The real reasons for the explosion of discontent are many and profound.

Perhaps the most important one is the existing contradiction between the necessities of educating and training youth in present-day society and the retrograde structures of the French army. The army is still organized to receive tens of thousands of young peasants supposedly prepared for a docile acceptance of humiliation and slaughter. Instead, it is getting youth all of whom have been to school until the age of sixteen and many of whom have received a professional education and have some social experience, even an experience in struggle much more developed than their predecessors.

The elimination of the long draft deferments, which, according to the calculations of the hierarchy was supposed to result in more disciplined ranks, had the opposite effect in reality. The commanders can no longer play on the opposition between the "manuals" and the "intellectual shirkers." It would be false to say that youth today presents a united front against the military hierarchy; the differences in class origins are extremely important in evaluating the varying reactions of the ranks. But it is clear that a number of factors have converged in recent years in a unifying direction.

The youth who are presently in the army have often had experiences in important mobilizations in the high schools and technical schools during the past few years, and the acquisitions of these struggles are naturally again taken up to press the movement in the barracks forward. The organization of soldiers' committees on a sections or barracks basis recalls the youth mobilizations of the past few years in the concern for democracy and, at the same time, results in a considerable increase in the effectiveness and staying power of the struggles in the army, given the conditions under which they take place. After the school of general assemblies, there is now the school of clandestine work in the barracks. The employers who in the future will take this ferment of workers and technicians into their factories will have a hardened force to deal with.

Those who denigrate the Appeal of the 100 on the grounds that it is only a simple petition forget to take this aspect of the movement into consideration. In order better to parry the blows of repression and to avoid the traps set by the Military Security in its search for "ring-leaders" and to respond to any blows in a collective manner, the signers of the Appeal of the 100 were necessarily organized on a barrack-by-barrack, regiment-by-regiment basis. The Appeal of the 100 is a step in the development of consciousness of the role of the bourgeois army. It is also a step in the political maturation of many militants who got their first experience in illegal work through the appeal.

The repression

The military hierarchy reacted to the massive number of signatures for the Appeal of the 100 by resorting to repression: varying prison terms ranging up to eighty days for signers who were considered leaders. Even though Minister of the Army Soufflet was obliged to defuse the situation by authorizing soldiers to receive the press of some left organizations (L'Humanité in particular) and by promising to grant more frequent leaves, the repression did not abate, and many soldiers are still getting significant prison terms that are often accompanied by increasingly arduous conditions.

The government and the ministry tried their usual operation. They tried to make people believe that they considered the Appeal of the 100 harmless and they took advantage of the fact that public opinion had been directed elsewhere in order to strike harder at certain of the signers. That is why it is more than ever necessary for civilian antimilitarists, the Committee to Defend Draftees, the antimilitarist committees, and the unions that took positions in support of the Appeal of the 100 to continue to publicize the cases of repression and to continue to extend their support.

But the attitude of the draftees toward the repression changed, and this was also an important sign of growing determination. Although the reports of the Military Security during the past few years indicate that fear of military prison was a weapon of dissuasion sufficiently powerful to avoid movements of great breadth, the militants -- without adventurism and without at all underestimating the disagreeable features of a stay in "the hole" -- were completely determined to run that risk if it proved useful for the movement.

The Appeal of the 100 & the workers movement

It is not only inside the army that the Appeal of the 100 received a broad response. Many motions of solidarity with signers who had been repressed offered the opportunity to pose the problem of "antimilitarism" within the trade unions.

In certain cases the trade-union bureaucracies were obliged to go beyond the traditional framework of motions demanding the "democratization of the army" and a "democratic status for the soldier" and to take positions on the concrete cases of repression. They were thus compelled by the facts themselves and by the pressure of the rank and file to give their approval to antimilitarist work within the army itself, even though such work is illegal.

In many trade-union locals the problem came up of taking charge of youth who were leaving for the army; they were always working youth, members of the union, and it was therefore up to the trade-union local to give them material aid, defend them against repression, and even to propose an orientation of struggle to them.

These debates in the local unions allowed discussions on the role of the army, which had come up last year around the analysis of the repression in Chile, to be taken up again in a very concrete way. How to act concretely to avoid a military coup against a rise of the workers movement? For that it is necessary for the workers organizations themselves to take in charge the work of disintegrating the bourgeois army and organizing the workers in uniform.

Obviously, the reformist and Stalinist bureaucrats were not convinced, but it was demonstrated before the workers that it was not only vital but also possible to act in this way.

The French Communist party itself was forced to go rather far. In fact, it went so far as to publish its own Appeal of the 200 (signed by 200 soldiers of the infantry regiment in Montléry in Chad). The demands differed significantly from those raised in the Appeal of the 100, for they remained within the framework of the proposals of the Common Program (the reformist program of the Union de la Gauche -- Union of the Left -- the electoral alliance of the CP, the SP, and a handful of bourgeois politicians). Nevertheless, we salute this initiative, the first illegal action to be taken by the CP in a long time.

(Later, the petition was called an act of disobedience and was severely repressed.) This initiative can only help to open up debates among the enlisted men and the workers organizations. We confidently await the reformists on this terrain.

The Appeal of the 200 allows us to measure the pressure that we have been able to bring to bear on certain sectors of the Communist Youth, to whom the CP is forced to give somewhat of a freer reign out of fear of losing them. It is significant that the CP abandoned its SP and left radical allies in this affair. They were afraid to do anything at all in this area.

Today we must go further

Far from being a "harmless" act, the Appeal of the 100 showed the force of the movement of enlisted men. They felt that they were not isolated in their barracks, that many others analysed the military repression and structure in the same way they did.

This movement must now be developed and consolidated through other initiatives, so that the committees that now exist in many barracks can organize the struggle on this or that precise point (against hazing, against racism, for more leaves, etc.) and so that it can be organized better and be renewed.

In the committees it must be shown that the simple struggle against military oppression must be transformed into consciousness about what the French army represents more and more: an army of civil war, an army increasingly being prepared to be used to repress popular movements.

The mobilizations of the draftees take on their full meaning only through this conjunction with the fundamental interests of the working class and its actions. This is the meaning of the demonstration of the 200 soldiers in Draguignan who marched with fists raised, singing the Internationale. This is the conjunction that the militants of the Front des Marins, Soldats, et Aviateurs Révolutionnaires (Front of Revolutionary Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen) is working toward. The Appeal of the 100 is continuing. But the Appeal of the 100 is only a beginning. ■

BOLIVIA

TROUBLE AMONG THE GORILLAS

by NESTOR ALBA

Barely nine days after having celebrated its accession to power, the Bolivian military dictatorship was shaken by serious conflicts that led to the resignation of General Hugo Banzer Suarez, thus in turn aggravating the crisis within the dictatorship and bringing the crisis to the brink of explosion. (A state of alert was declared for the police and the army and the dictatorship's ever more rare supporters were mobilized.)

Banzer presented his resignation to the United Armed Forces at 8 o'clock in the morning on August 30, 1974. It was then discussed during a joint meeting of the High Command and the military cabinet. The resignation was finally withdrawn on the afternoon of the same day at a press conference during which General Carlos Alcoreza, president of the High Command, read a communiqué from the armed forces and Banzer himself explained his position.

While military circles, the leaderships of the government parties, and the state bureaucrats were shaken by this crisis and felt the whole structure of the dictatorship tremble, the people, the popular masses, showed themselves indifferent and considered the crisis a farce.

Causes of the resignation

The High Command communiqué gave this as the reason for the resignation: "the difficulties encountered in uniting the parties that form the Frente Popular Nacionalista (FNP -- Nationalist Popular Front) on a solid basis into a great political formation," a task in whose accomplishment Banzer was "held back, bothered, and misunderstood." The dictator, who suffers from nervous depression when his decisions are discussed (his physician had to give him a sedative in order that the meeting could continue), declared in announcing the withdrawal of

his resignation, which the armed forces had declined to accept: "I found myself obliged to take this decision because I was overwhelmed by lack of understanding. I hope that this will push the politicians, as well as the armed forces and the Bolivian police, to reflect somewhat."

Outside of official speeches and declarations, government circles accused Mario Gutierrez* of having provoked the crisis by his statements on elections, which were judged disloyal. What, in fact, did this ex-chancellor of the dictatorship declare? On August 24 the "L" cell of the FSB in La Paz published a resolution signed by FSB regional secretary Alfonso Guzman Ampuero presenting Mario Gutierrez as a candidate for president in the next elections. On August 29 the Santa Cruz cell stated its agreement with this proposal, asserting that this was the right of the FSB but adding the following proposals:

- elections to be held in May or June 1975,
- a broad political amnesty without restrictions,
- the candidate winning the election to be installed in power on August 6, 1975, coinciding with the sesquicentennial of the founding of the Republic of Bolivia (1825).

Mario Gutierrez asserted these propositions, adding some comments about how sure he was of winning the elections and on the fact that he would ask to run along with the leader of the MNR, a party with which it was necessary to reach an agreement similar to the one that exists between the conservatives and liberals in Colombia, which has assured seventeen years

*Head of the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB -- Bolivian Socialist Phalange), which participates in the government along with the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR -- Revolutionary Nationalist Movement).

BOLIVIA

of stability in that country. Finally, Gutierrez declared his recognition of Victor Paz Estensoro and Ciro Humboldt as chief and vice-chief of the MNR because they had been elected at a national congress.

These statements opened a debate on elections and caused a real scandal among official sectors, which came forward united around the military government.

Gutierrez's proposals attacked the political line adopted by the military cabinet after the abortive coup last June 5 (fomented by Colonel Lopez Mayor Gary Prado). Banzer, as he had already done in the past, had agreed to hold general elections. But this time he divided the process into two stages: First, there would be a referendum aimed at getting approval for a new political constitution, a law on political parties, an electoral law, a new administrative regime, and so on, all of which would provide the features of a new, modern state. Toward this end he created the Consejo Nacional de Reformas Estructurales (CONARE -- National Council of Structural Reforms), which included the most obscure and servile personalities of the dictatorship. Then, there were the elections themselves, the second stage, subordinated to the work of the CONARE and to the referendum. In principle, it was estimated that the elections could take place in December 1975, with the government changing in 1976.

It would appear that Gutierrez doubted that the electoral timetable would be held to, so he called for immediate elections, launched his own candidacy for president, and in practice started campaigning, presenting himself as the candidate most in favor of a broad and unrestricted amnesty. He acknowledged the rights of what he calls the "far left," which he says should not be feared. This position is aimed at influencing the masses and simultaneously establishing certain points of coincidence with the bourgeois opposition to the CONARE and the referendum.

But when he declared support to Paz Estensoro and Ciro Humboldt, Gutierrez attacked both the repressive methods used by the dictatorship in the very ranks of the parties that support it and the manipulations of the leaderships of these parties, which are carried out to cover up differences and internal contradictions. Paz Estensoro, a leader of the MNR, was arrested and expelled from the country in December 1973; Ciro Humboldt, accused of having fomented the conspiracy of last June 5, was also expelled but returned to the country clandestinely and is being sought by the police. This support of the leaders of the persecuted MNR represented an indirect defense of the FSB and its leadership, which could also be divided by the government the way the MNR was. The brutal repression against the left has created a method of leadership that tends to be extended to the civilian supporters of the regime. Driven to distraction by its own contradictions, the beast has started devouring its own children.

The elections and the army

While the statements of the head of the Phalange repudiated certain aspects of the policy of the dictatorship that the Phalange itself has been supporting in the recent past, thus apparently breaking the unity of the official front, they were nevertheless not the principal or determining cause of the August 30 crisis.

We must take note on the one hand of the audacity of Gutierrez, hitherto a docile supporter of Banzer, and, on the other hand, of the promptness with which Banzer reacted by renouncing the presidency.

After Banzer's retraction, the head of the FSB repeated his proposals during a personal interview with the dictator. Moreover, he proudly declared: "I cannot have any sympathy for any military figure in the present circumstances, but I would vote if it were a question of General Bernardino Bilbao Rioja or any other hero of the Chaco war." He finds that there are no heroes of that war in the current military hierarchy, which means that he would not vote for any of the present chiefs.

The reality is that the contradictions within the armed forces are constantly intensifying. The rebellion last June 5 was an expression of this situation. At that time, the dictatorship was able to pull through by making some concessions: the promise of elections, the military cabinet, pay increases for all officers, etc. But the crisis continued, and the promise of elections intensified it. The audacity of Gutierrez is based on these contradictions and on his links with the agro-industrial bourgeoisie and Yankee imperialism.

The Armed Forces High Command does not want elections; it is suspicious of them. Conspiracies and plans for coups are being hatched within the armed forces; but they have gone nowhere because the various tendencies have not managed to reach agreement. Gutierrez demands immediate elections because he believes this is the way to reabsorb the government's internal crisis and win the support of the opposition. But in spite of the declarations it is obliged to make because of the pressures being manifested in its own ranks and the hostile activity of the masses, the army seeks only to maintain its own power and assure its position. The army will thus accept elections if it is assured of a military candidate. That is why the hasty candidacy of Gutierrez and his statements caused such a scandal. The armed forces have no confidence in their civilian allies and therefore have decided to keep control of the regime by replacing Banzer with another gorilla. The supposed constitutionalization is nothing but the legalization of the dictatorship.

In the course of this crisis and in response to Gutierrez, the so-called Barrientoist group, led by Edwin Tapa, a member of the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR -- Revolutionary Left party), hastened to declare: "The candidates ought to have no past record of opposition to the armed forces." The PIR is a Stalinist party founded in 1940 whose chief, Ricardo Anaya, was later the Bolivian gorillas' ambassador to the USSR. At the same time, the government-controlled bureaucracy of the peasant movement hastened to declare General Lechín Suarez as a presidential candidate. He is the current minister of coordination in the military cabinet, a very close friend of the Yankees, a man who held a post and resided in New York until the crisis of last June 5.

If it opts for elections, the military high command will utilize the Barrientoist group and the peasant bureaucracy to present and impose its official candidate.

Electoral farce or military coup

Such are the choices facing the military dictatorship. But no option will assure stability. The Bolivian people, the worker and peasant masses, are turning their backs on these maneuvers and are continuing to strengthen and assert their political and trade-union class organizations. The dictatorship of the gorillas is rotten to the core and will soon be overthrown by the revolutionary rise of the masses. ■

OPPOSITIONISTS IN SOLIDARITY WITH CHILE

When the military junta seized power in Chile on September 11, 1973, expressions of solidarity with the resistance from opposition circles in Eastern Europe were seemingly few and far between. It appeared as though the Chilean masses had few friends among opposition circles in the bureaucratized workers states. Those voices of the opposition that were heard were akin to Sakharov's mild and muddled statement of concern for "violations of legality" or Solzhenitsyn's virtual support of the military coup. If comment on the Chilean events seemed to be monopolized by either confused or right-wing elements of the opposition in Eastern Europe, it was because the left in those countries was silenced by a double muzzle: the muzzle of the "official" press and that of the bourgeois mass media in the West, which chose to pass in silence over expressions of solidarity by left-wing currents in Eastern Europe. When the Yugoslav students, for example, organized actions against the putsch (holding, among other things, a demonstration carrying the slogans "Arm the Proletariat" and "Down with the Junta -- All Power to the Soviets" through the streets of Belgrade) not a word of this appeared in the Yugoslav or the bourgeois press. To help break this wall of silence we are reproducing the two documents below. Both are from Czechoslovakia.

The first document, the "Letter of 30 ex-political prisoners," is a remarkable example of the current political thought of the Left in Eastern Europe. The letter is an unequivocal expression of solidarity with the struggle of the Chilean masses for democracy and socialism. Written as an answer to the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists, it upbraids these "gentlemen" for the hypocritical character of their expression of concern for the fate of the victims of the junta's repression. The letter informs these "gentlemen" that it is not they who are the real friends in Czechoslovakia of the Chilean resistance but rather those who stand for socialist democracy and who have been repressed by the regime for having acted in accord with this conviction.

The second document, entitled "Chile and Us," is taken from the October 1973 issue of *Narodni Noviny* (The National Gazette), a clandestine journal that circulates in Czechoslovakia. The authors of this document address themselves to an important political task in Czechoslovakia: convincing the Czechoslovak population that they ought to oppose the military coup in Chile. That such convincing is necessary in a supposedly socialist country needs some explanation.

One of the consequences of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was to sow profound political disarray among the population. Few people, even the most hardened anticommunists, would have maintained before the invasion that there were any serious antisocialist or anti-Soviet attitudes among the population. The invasion changed this. Hatred of the Husák regime, which identifies itself with "genuine socialism," and of the Soviet Union, which installed this regime, has blurred the political judgment of many ordinary Czechs and Slovaks. The population knows only too well that the official press is packed with lies about the domestic situation. They are thus extremely skeptical about anything the regime says about the international situation. Things have gone so far that some people in Czechoslovakia rejoiced to learn that Communists friendly to the Husák regime, people like the Chilean CPers who endorsed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, had suffered a monumental defeat. The situation was not helped by the repeated comparisons made by the official Czechoslovak press between the Chilean military junta and the Prague Spring reformers, claiming that it was precisely to prevent a Chile-type coup that the Soviet troops intervened.

The document "Chile and Us" must be read with this in mind. The authors of this document were addressing themselves to the "ordinary" citizens, trying to restore political sanity to their judgments, pointing out that they should not be prevented by the regime's propaganda from seeing that the hopes that died in Chile were their own hopes and that their natural allies are not the junta, but the Chilean socialists -- even if these include men who endorsed the 1968 invasion. The parallels drawn between Chile and Czechoslovakia in the document are made with this heuristic purpose in mind.

We have serious disagreements with many of the political formulations of this document. But we solidarize wholeheartedly with the political project that this document represents: to explain to the Czechoslovak masses that both they and the Chilean masses are fighting for socialism and that they should help and support one another.

It is a sad commentary on the Czechoslovak regime that the authors of both documents risk a stiff prison sentence for this "unofficial" expression of solidarity.

INPRECOR

LETTER OF THE 30

On June 14 the Czechoslovak press published a petition of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists protesting the events in Chile. This document affirmed that the Association of Jurists had followed with grave concern the news about violations of legality and mounting terror against the progressive and patriotic forces in the country. The Association condemned the persecution, torture, and widespread execution of Chilean patriots. In its resolution it demanded the reestablishment of constitutional and democratic rights and observed that the representatives of the Chilean people have been completely deprived of their civic rights and judicial protection. The Association of Czechoslovak Jurists demanded the right to attend the trial of Luis Corvalán, as well as those of other patriots, in order to participate in their defense.

It is our view that it is the task of all progressives in the world to do everything in their power to extend total material and moral support to the Chilean revolutionaries and democrats in their battle for a democratic society and for socialism. If it is only today that we express ourselves on this point, it is because many of us have not had the possibility of doing so before. We therefore now declare that we are in complete solidarity with the struggle of the progressive forces in Chile and that we unequivocally condemn the acts of the fascist junta.

Furthermore, we believe that we are fully entitled to express this solidarity, for common ideas, objectives, and, often, common fates unite us with progressive Chileans. But, gentlemen of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists, we deny you this right. For we know of not one single case in which your association has acted to defend the rights of man, civil liberties, or respect for legality in our own country, in Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps you think that it is correct from the standpoint of the law and its social function that during the past few years tens of thousands of our co-citizens have had to leave their jobs and have been forced to work at jobs in which they have not the slightest possibility of expressing their abilities and training?

Do you think it is just that children of supposedly "bad" fathers and mothers should be denied the right to attend secondary schools and universities? Do you think it is just that many of our citizens have been slandered in the press for their recent political activity without having any possibility of defending themselves against these slander campaigns? Are you convinced, gentlemen of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists, that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting and assembly, the right to travel, including the right to leave the country with the possibility of returning, and freedom of scientific research are guaranteed in our country?

From the standpoint of the penal code and its social function, do you think it is correct that people should be liable to the death penalty if they conduct "activity especially dangerous to the foundations of the republic . . . if it results in very serious consequences" -- when it is known from experience that any political activity not pleasing to the present leading group can be defined as hostile to the regime of the republic?

From the standpoint of the function of the penal code, is it correct that 47 communists and socialists should have been sentenced in 1972 to long prison terms (up to six and a half years) on the basis of a rather broadly interpreted law, among them Milan Hubl, the former director of the Communist party cadre school, university professors Jaroslav Mezník and Antonín

Rusek, regional CP secretaries Alfred Cerný, Jaroslav Sabata, and Jaroslav Litera, the historian Jan Tesař, the student leader Jiří Müller, and others? Are you convinced that these trials were conducted in conformity with the penal code, that no psychological pressure or physical torture was brought to bear on the defendants during the preliminary investigations conducted by the STB (the secret police)?

Do you think that the rules calling for public tribunals were respected during these trials? Are you sure that of the hundreds of trials conducted between 1969 and 1974 lawyers from democratic organizations of jurists did not ask to be present at a few? And if they perhaps did make such requests, was it made possible for them to attend? Are you sure that the conditions of detention of the sentenced communists and socialists correspond to the laws on such matters (in spite of the changes made in the laws last year permitting a broader latitude to the jailors)? Are you sure that the political prisoners are not subjected to a much more severe regimen than the regular criminals, that they are adequately fed, that they are not suffering from vitamin deficiencies, that they receive satisfactory medical care, that their basic needs are provided for, and that nobody is trying to get them out of the way by provoking psychic troubles through subjecting them to hermetically sealed isolation?

We all live in the same country and we all know the real state of affairs. While some responsibility for the current state of things may devolve on each of us, your responsibility is much greater, for you are better informed and are much closer to things. Your responsibility is much greater in that you have more possibility of changing or attenuating the existing state of affairs. Furthermore, we are convinced on the basis of many personal experiences that your organization clearly lacks representativeness in terms of the totality of jurists in Czechoslovakia.

Your resolution in support of civil rights in Chile and against the fascist junta is hypocritical. Your claims can only ring false. We, political prisoners who have been imprisoned in Czechoslovakia during the first half of the 1970s, we are united by close bonds of friendship, solidarity, and agreement or kinship of ideas and action with the Chilean socialists, communists, revolutionary Marxists, Christians, and other democratic Chileans, according to our different convictions. But you, nothing unites you with them, and no hypocritical words can hide this fact. Your role consists solely of maintaining through propaganda the state of affairs that currently prevails in our country, a state of affairs that is characterized, among other things, by the dynamism of trade between Czechoslovakia and the fascist Chilean junta and by the refusal of Czechoslovakia to grant asylum to Chilean refugees.

We are convinced that the just struggle of our comrades, friends, and brothers in Chile against fascism and terror, their struggle for democracy, liberty, and socialism, will triumph. We would be happy if they could learn that they have many authentic allies in Czechoslovakia. Prague, June 18-July 8, 1974

Copies sent to:

1. Miroslav Mác, editor in chief of Rudé Pravo (the CP newspaper), which on June 14 published the resolution of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists. We ask Mr. Mác that our letter likewise be published in Rudé Pravo.
 2. Gustáv Husák, for his information.
 3. J. Němec, the minister of justice, for his information.
 4. The Union of Chilean Students in Czechoslovakia, for their information.
- Signed: 30 Czechoslovaks, political prisoners between 1969 and 1974.

"CHILE AND US"

NARODNI NOVINY (The National Gazette)

Published by the Czech nation itself, duplicated by the readers themselves. Distributed among reliable and trustworthy friends only. Any mistake can result in prosecution. The journal is published regularly and is not for sale.

Since 11 September a fascist terror has raged in Chile. All the traditional trappings are there too: executions, arrests, killings "while attempting to escape," destruction of basic civic freedoms, return of land to landowners and of nationalized enterprises to capitalist owners. This kind of violence is denounced the world over. Even in Czechoslovak newspapers space is obligingly granted to protesting voices (with certain exceptions, such as Pavel Kohout, of course. He announced his criticism in a letter to the Minister of Culture, Klusak, and also explained why his protest had been published abroad). Those who are delighted that someone somewhere managed to kick the communists around are short-sighted. For one thing it is not only the communists who are being kicked around in Chile at present, and for another, no true democrat can be really delighted when freedom is strangled somewhere.

Undoubtedly, there were more democratic rights and freedoms in Chile under President Allende than under the military junta simply because Allende had ruled in a democratic fashion. Because he had responded to his opposition without violence and according to the law, Allende had greatly helped the military insurgents to carry out their plans. Mistakes, perhaps even serious ones, were undoubtedly made. The Unidad Popular government certainly failed to deal with some of the fundamental needs of the people during the three years of its existence. However, nothing can change the fact that as a government it was more representative of the people than is the junta.

The basic supply problems (which arose when the transport workers declared their destructive strike) could have been solved with aid from the socialist countries -- had they been willing to grant it. A loan of twenty Antonovs, transport aircraft, could have been arranged in a few hours even if they would have had to follow a complicated route. (After all, the USSR managed this very well when transporting military equipment to Egypt.) The aircraft, together with a supply of lorries, could have greatly helped to solve a problem which ultimately led to national indifference to the fate of Allende's regime. The socialist countries did not grant this kind of aid, though they were probably willing to help in certain other spheres (the running of state security, etc.).

No matter how paradoxical it sounds, the USSR was in fact satisfied, despite its formal protests over the fate of Chile (so was the USA of course). The meticulous preservation of democratic processes in the construction of a socialist society were a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet Union. They were frightened that yet another socialism, a Chilean one -- with a human face -- would be added to the four already existing (Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, and Cuban -- not to speak of what the Italian or Spanish communists imagine socialism to be). Soon the Moscow center would no longer be a center but just one of the provinces as, after all, Lenin predicted. Brezhnev could never support such a course. It would have been difficult for the countries of the Warsaw Pact to invade Chile, but others took care of that.

President Allende, the Chilean analogy of Dubcek, is dead,

and the Soviets can sigh with relief. But what follows his death is -- except for the killings (but that is something that Soviet armies contributed to in our country as well) -- so similar to the fate of Czechoslovakia that the parallel is obvious. The methods of the insurgents are the same, no matter whether they came from a Russian Steppe or South America.

Not long ago (October 23, 1973) Rudé Pravo was upset when a West German CDU deputy spoke of the putsch as a hindrance -- as if one could mention in Czechoslovakia the word invasion or occupation; these can be mentioned only as an "entry" or better still "brotherly international aid." By the way, Chile is yet another proof that the USSR does not grant aid where it is needed.

Let us see what else upsets the normalized Czechoslovak press:

1. Local committees were broken up (as were workers' committees in our country);
2. The junta banned lessons in Marxism at universities (in our country all departments of Marxism-Leninism were liquidated after August);
3. Freedom of assembly, association, written and oral expression no longer exists (just try a meeting of the Club of Committed Non-Communists, or call a demonstration in any of the smaller squares in Prague or try to write what you think into a newspaper. Such a notion is ludicrous in present-day Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet Union they lock people up in a lunatic asylums for similar demands);
4. In Chile, just as under Hitler, the junta burns books which are inconvenient or written by authors who they do not appreciate (in our country they are not burned publicly but if you know someone who works in a public library just ask him to show you the list of books which have been thrown away, taken out of circulation, or destroyed. The number of titles goes into thousands);
5. In Chile infringements of privacy are commonplace (yet how many Czech homes were broken into by the STB (secret police) agents without a court order, how many of our flats are fitted with bugging devices such as the one which Professor Kaline mentions in his appeal against his two-year sentence);
6. "Thousands of Chileans, from ordinary people to well known personalities such as Dr. Asenjo, the 1973 Nobel Prize winner, were expelled from their place of work, their only 'crime' being that they supported progressive ideas." (In this respect, the junta has been acting clumsily. Where else but in Czechoslovakia were hundreds of thousands -- from artists of international repute to journalists, students, and ordinary workers -- expelled from their positions for the same thing?);
7. The "new rulers introduced complete control over television and radio" (and what is it like in our country? Just compare what the television and radio were like in 1968 and 1969 with what they are like now);
8. The junta ordered "national work shifts" (an analogy so perfect that even the title corresponds);
9. It banned the left-wing press. (A long list of journals were banned under Husák. Let us remember three which stood out: Zitrek, Reporter, and even the communist Politika);
10. It interferes with trade-union rights (perhaps it would be worth while to ask Karel Hoffman, this "noted representative of the working class" who never worked in a factory, to name somewhere the rights of our trade unionists. A few seconds would suffice).

Oh yes, we must agree with our press that what is happening in Chile is indeed fascism. However fascism is still fascism, wherever it takes place and whatever jargon disguises it.

Fascism is simply fascism, no matter under which label it operates, whether it rages in Chile or Czechoslovakia. That is why we are at one with the Chilean people and that is why we should protest, not only against the threat to life of Louis Corvalán (who by the way praised the occupation of our country in 1968), but against the threats to the lives of hundreds more people. We should also protest against the dismissal of

people from work, against censorship, against infringements of privacy, against the ban on association, against the removal of books, against the interference with trade-union rights -- all that must appear in our protests. We should underline that we are against it no matter where in the world it is happening. We should also be against it in reality and we should fight it. ■

MALAYA

INTERVIEW WITH A MILITANT

On August 24 the "National Front," the coalition of ruling parties, won a crushing majority of the votes cast in the elections in Malaysia. Malaysia is the only Southeast Asian country that has preserved a tradition of bourgeois parliamentarism. It was also the first country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Nevertheless, behind this facade there lurks a repressive police state integrated into the regional system of imperialist domination and founded on the basis of the crushing of the communist guerrillas and the partisan movement in the countryside during the 1950s.

The recent developments in Southeast Asia, marked by the awakening of the urban struggle, the crisis of the military regimes, the diplomatic realignments, the new place of Japanese imperialism in the region, and the impact of the Indochinese revolution underline the importance of this region in the future of the Asian revolu-

tion. In this context, it is especially important to affirm our solidarity with the struggle being waged by the militants of these countries, a struggle that is not very well known in the rest of the world. To try to begin to compensate for the lack of information about these struggles, we are publishing an interview conducted at the beginning of August by K. Muraki, a member of the secretariat of the '74 Asian Youth Conference (see INPRECOR No. 8 for a report on the conference) with a leader of the Malayan student movement. The student militant, a member of a Malayan student political organization, the Socialist Club, must remain anonymous. At the time the interview was taken it was not yet known when -- or for that matter, if -- the elections would take place. The Malayan militant has not had the opportunity to edit the text before its publication.

INPRECOR

Question. What is the general situation in the country today, in terms of the government party, the opposition, and so on?

Answer. It is now the beginning of August. New elections are supposed to take place soon. The alliance that is presently in power is called Precatan in Malayan. Its three component parties are the UMNO (United Malaysian National Organization), the MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress), and the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association). But the Precatan has decided to form a new enlarged bloc, the "National Front," which includes nearly all the parties that were in opposition during the last elections, held in 1969. (The new bloc includes ten parties, among them those that compose the Precatan -- INPRECOR.) In the National Front we find, for example, the Gerakan, which controls the island of Pinang in the North, the PPP (Peoples Progressive party), based in Perak, the powerful PAS (Pan Islamic party), strong along the east coast, and the main parties of Sabak and Sarawak (the two "Malaysian" provinces of the island of Borneo -- INPRECOR).

The only parties remaining outside this "National Front" are the Pekamas party (Social Justice party), the DAP (Democratic Action party), the KITA (Kaum Insaf Tanah Air), and the Par-

tai Socialist Rakyat (PSR -- Peoples Socialist party). Except for the PSR, all these parties were formed for the purpose of the elections, the Pekamas and Kita, for example. The DAP came out of a split in the Peoples Action party of Singapore, based among the Chinese community.

The PSR is the only one of these parties that has existed for a long time, and it is also the only one to openly defend a leftist, socialist orientation in Malaya.

In fact, the "National Front" should win nearly all the seats. The alliance, or more precisely the UMNO, controls all the mass media. It began its campaign well before the election period was officially declared. It is likely that it will call the elections precipitously, with two weeks notice at the most, so as to make it impossible for the other parties to organize any real campaign. Such is the situation.



Q. What are all these parties based on? What are their policies?

A. Most of these parties are based on chauvinism. (The Malayan population is about 48% Malayan and 42% Chinese; most of the remainder is of Indian origin -- INPRECOR.) The UMNO is based on Malayan chauvinism, while the MCA is controlled by the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie and is Chinese chauvinist. The Pan Islamic party bases itself on the Malayan Muslim population, as does the PPP. The Gerakan is also based on the Chinese community. They all exist on the racial question.

The real opposition to the regime, as explained by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak himself, comes from three sources: militant communism (which operates underground), the PSR, and the "extremists" (this most likely being a reference to the far-right, ultrachauvinist Malayan forces).

Q. The racial problem, then, occupies a central place in the political life of the country?

A. Yes, absolutely. The alliance in power divides the population by means of the racial question. It was for this reason that there were violent riots in the center of Kuala Lumpur just after the 1969 elections.

The project of the ruling group is to try to create a new Malayan middle class. Currently, more than 60% of the economy is controlled by Anglo-American capital, about 20% by Chinese compradors, about 2% by the Malayan bureaucratic compradors, and about 1% by the Indian community. (The rest is under the control of the state or of Malayan or other ethnic groups -- INPRECOR.) The program of the UMNO, which has declared a "new economic policy," is aimed at achieving a redistribution so that by 1990, 30% of the country will be controlled by Malaysians, 30% by non-Bumiputra (non-Malayan) groups, and 30% by foreign capital.

The non-Malayan races are badly discriminated against because of this policy. And this fosters misunderstandings. The Malaysians believe that economic power is held by the Chinese. The Indians believe that the Malaysians, who hold the political power, now want to capture economic power as well. The Chinese believe that the Malaysians want to take away that they themselves now possess. All this nurtures racial antagonism, while in fact the real problem -- the control of the economy by Anglo-American and Japanese capital -- is never raised for discussion among the population. That problem is hidden by the racial antagonisms. That is why our principal objective today is to show who is really carrying away the riches of the country.

I am sure that when the population begins to understand who the real, common enemy is, our task of exposing the ruling parties will become easy. The new ruling parties are the ones that cooperate with the British, Americans, and Japanese in exploiting the riches of the country. And I have confidence that in the future the new generation will begin to question foreign domination and foreign investment.

Q. The bourgeois press tells us that Malaysia is the only country in the region that has preserved a parliamentary system, that it is a democracy. But this does not seem to be the case in reality. Could you tell us something about the repression the opposition suffers?

A. Malaysia is in fact an interesting case, for it is the only

country in the area that formally retains a so-called democratic and representative regime. But for us, the Tun Abdul Razak regime is not different in character from the Suharto regime in Indonesia or the Marcos regime in the Philippines. In my country we find the same fascist repression against the people.

For example, in 1969 the leftist opposition was quite strong, with the Labor party having some 50,000 members and the PSR being very large. The Labor party called for a boycott to the 1969 elections, explaining that it was impossible for it to participate in the campaign in view of the fact that a large number of its cadres and local members had been arrested. As for the PSR, many of its members and sympathizers are likewise in prison. In 1969 two of the PSR's candidates were elected to the state assembly. They were then arrested and held without trial! One was released after two or three years; the other remains in jail to this day!

The number of political prisoners in Malaysia is very high. There is a law, called the Internal Security Act, that allows the ministry of the interior to imprison any person for two years without trial. And, if a person is held for two years, the case is then reviewed and the internment can be extended -- still with no trial. Besides the Internal Security Act, there is something called "banishment." A person is picked up and is "permitted" to emigrate to the country of his choice. If no country chooses to accept him, he is remanded to prison, where he remains until some country decides to let him in! "Banishment" can therefore easily amount to a life sentence in jail.

Recently, the government carried out mass arrests among the members of cultural organizations that wanted to promote a popular culture in the cities. A man named Ku Iliam, formerly a student in New Zealand, was arrested. He had been active in the movement against the Indochina war and was in charge of the international work of the Union of New Zealand Students. Three years ago, when he returned to Malaysia (he is of Malayan nationality), he was immediately arrested and detained for one week. He was then released in custody of his family. But now, three years later, he has been arrested again and sent to a concentration camp on the charge of having tried to join the Malayan liberation movement. In fact, we do not know the real reason for his arrest. This is but one example. In reality, there is no way to tell how many people are under detention or where they are being held. The government operates discreetly, arresting people in predawn hours.

As for the Labor party and the PSR, before 1969 they were the main opposition parties and formed a real parliamentary opposition called the Socialist Front. But since 1969, after the repression they have suffered, the Labor party has publicly recognized that elections are not the road.

Q. Could you go back a little over the history of the opposition, the real opposition, that is, in Malaya?

A. To retrace this history you have to keep in mind that Singapore was once part of Malaya. In fact, it was the main city during the period of direct colonial rule by imperialism.

During the 1930s and 1940s the opposition was very strong and demanded real independence. At that time, the influence of Indonesian nationalism was quite strong, especially among the students of the SITC college. Indonesian leaders like Ali Min, Sukarno, and Tan Malaka were in contact with these students, particularly with Ibrahim Iako, who was later banished from Malaya for "communism." The SITC was located on mainland Malaya. But in Singapore also, the Chinese popula-

tion was demanding real independence. To counter all this, the British created an elite school for the instruction of children of the aristocracy, the bureaucracy, and the feudalists. Most of the members of the group now in power are graduates of this British school, which was called the "Eton of the East."

In 1941 the Japanese invaded Malaya. The left parties were then reorganized and formed the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). This was a real united front of all nationalities, all races, with people of all walks of life, trade-unionists, peasants, and so on, struggling together. At the time, the Malayan Communist party had a clear line of being the spearhead of the MPAJA; the British furnished arms in order to drive the Japanese out. After the defeat of the Japanese, the Malayan CP did not hand in its arms, but kept them in the jungle. The British returned to take over the country. In 1948 the Malayan CP called for armed struggle to liberate Malaya from the British. The CP had a mass influence then. Its leadership was active in the trade unions and the rubber estates. The struggle was then clearly for independence and it unified all the left parties.

But in 1957 the Malayan CP suffered a setback when the British granted purely formal independence. The masses of people believed independence was real. But in fact, the regime was formed of lackeys of British imperialism, mostly feudalists. At the same time, Singapore was separated from Malaya. Singapore has great strategic importance in Southeast Asia and throughout all Asia. Several British bases are located there.

But even after 1957, the opposition remained quite strong. In Singapore the left party, the Barisan Socialists, were very powerful, while on mainland Malaya the PSR and the Labor party refused to accept the sham independence. The socialists continued to coordinate their activity, and the national movement continued. The British consequently intensified their repressive policy. In 1963 the imperialists decided to create the Malaysian federation, rejoining Singapore to mainland Malaya and adding Sabak, Sarawak, and Brunei (situated on the northern part of the island of Borneo). Before 1963 there had been broad opposition to the British plan. At the time, the Sukarno government in Indonesia initiated the policy of "Confrontation" with the Malaysian federation. The British policy was essentially based on opposing Indonesian nationalism.

In Singapore in 1963 hundreds of leftist militants were arrested in a sweep known as Operation Cold Storage. Some of them are still in jail. In mainland Malaya, the Labor party and the PSR called for the reunification of Malaya and Singapore but were opposed to the inclusion of Sabak and Sarawak in the federation. Nevertheless, the imperialist plan succeeded.

In 1966, however, Singapore broke with the Malaysian federation and formed a so-called independent state. And Lee Kuan Yew crushed all forms of political opposition, creating a one-party state around his Peoples Action party, transforming Singapore into a real police state.

Such is the history of the two periods, that of direct colonial rule and that of neocolonialism.

But progressive militants of Singapore and Malaya continue to consider themselves as belonging to the same country and call for reunification. The ruling parties refuse to tolerate this. For example, my university is called the University of Malaya. They wanted to change the name. They do not want people to remember that Malaya was once a single country and that "Malaysia" today is no longer Malaya. The government does not allow the PSR to call itself the PSR of Malaya and does not let progressive militants open their meetings with the words "Malayan people." The very idea of Malaya, of Singapore as

part of Malaya, must be eliminated, because the real history of Malaya is the history of the left. The UMNO was created only to be handed power by the British. Malaya stands for the independence struggle that was waged both in Singapore and on mainland Malaya up until the setback of 1957.



Q. We understand the history of the struggle waged by the people of Malaya against the artificial creation that British imperialism called the Malaysian federation. But today it is not only Anglo-American imperialism that dominates Malaya. Japanese capital is now invading the country at a rapid pace. We have heard that the Malayan student movement has been in the vanguard of the struggle against Japanese penetration. What has been the role of the student movement?

A. I think the Malayan student movement has played a direct and important role throughout the period of transition from colonial to neocolonial rule. Many students gave their lives in the struggle against direct colonialism, and many have been imprisoned since then.

Now that the government has formed the "National Front" to eliminate all opposition, what remains? Simply the voice of the students. The tendency taking root among the students now is to become conscious of foreign domination. Most of the demands of the students today deal with the necessity of nationalizing all foreign capital without compensation. This demand arose after the waves of nationalization in Algeria and other third world countries and after the Lahore conference of Islamic countries, which called for such nationalizations.

There is no doubt that the government and the university administration will continue to justify reliance on foreign capital as necessary for developing the country. But we will answer this government propaganda by showing how foreign capital leads not to development but to backwardness. I think that this question is becoming clear among students and youth today.

This struggle against foreign domination can develop in two counterposed directions -- a patriotic one or a chauvinist one. But you can be sure that when we demand nationalization, for us it is not a matter of doing it within the present social structure of the country. It must be carried out in another context, within a different social structure. We use this demand to expose the real nature of the system and the alliance between the ruling parties and the foreign investors in their efforts to plunder the riches of the country. But we cannot nationalize today. If that were done, most likely the Malayan bourgeoisie would take control of the foreign capital. That would be to jump out of the mouth of the tiger only to fall into the jaws of the crocodile!

As for the Japanese, after the mass boycott of Japanese products organized in Thailand by the National Student Center, the mobilization of the population around this problem spread to Singapore and Malaysia. A whole propaganda campaign was organized, with many mass meetings, to explain how Japanese investors were trying to gain control over the country. And during the 1973 trip of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka through Southeast Asia, the union of students at the University of Malaya, along with other student organizations, protested against the visit, demanding explanations from Tanaka about his policy of export of capital.

For its part, the Socialist Club of the University of Malaya demonstrated at the Kuala Lumpur airport and condemned Tanaka's visit as a symbol of the economic aggression of Japanese imperialism.

We want to be very clear about one point. In struggling against Japanese imperialism we are not ignoring American and British imperialism. The American and British imperialists would be only too happy if we were content simply to attack their Japanese competitors and left them alone! We are struggling against all imperialisms, but we concentrated our action on the problem of Japan because of Tanaka's visit.

Q. Could you explain a little about the Socialist Club?

A. I am a member of the Socialist Club. It is a legally registered political organization. Its aim is to propagate the ideas of socialism on the campus of the University of Malaya, where it was formed in 1968. An earlier Socialist Club had been formed at the University of Singapore. Some of its members are now in prison. Others have disappeared. The whole history of the struggle for real independence in Singapore has been marked by the imprint of the Socialist Club.

Our aim is to develop a broad patriotic sentiment against foreign domination and to hold discussions on political perspectives with a more restricted milieu. Within the Socialist Club itself, we study what socialism is, the theory of socialism, and why we defend the socialist alternative to the present system.

In other universities in Kuala Lumpur and Pinang there are two additional clubs of the same nature, although they are not called by the same name. Because of the activities of these three groups, we are now playing a leading role in the student movement in Malaya. The leadership of the Malayan Student Union is composed of members of these three groups.

But as to the real breadth of our influence, this is more difficult to measure. To be sure, we can be proud of the fact that our militants were elected by majority vote to positions of responsibility. But we cannot ignore the problem of those that did not vote, those who said neither "yes" or "no." We are not completely sure of the situation. That is why we always consider the question, Do we really have the support of the students or are we only a leadership without a real solid base? That is the problem we are always discussing.

As a political organization oriented to the left we have many enemies: the chauvinist groups, reactionary groups, the government. All these forces are able to unite to fight against us. That was the case during the last elections at the University of Malaya, in which they campaigned against us not only on the campus but in the national press as well, denouncing the left movement and especially the Socialist Club. We know that in the future things will not be any easier for us; in fact, they will be more difficult because of the growing American investment here. We are all aware of this. That is why we want to strengthen our political understanding and our implantation on the campus. That is why we must deepen our understanding of socialism in order to comprehend why we are being attacked this way. For us, the youth of the country who are fighting for our mother country, Malaya, this is a responsibility that is at the same time heavy and very honorable.

Q. As leaders of the Malayan student movement, you have participated in various international activities, notably in the Asian Student Association (ASA). This group held one conference in Bangkok. Just recently, a second conference was held in Australia. What can you tell us about this group?

A. The Asian Student Association was formed only recently. We must first of all take a look at the stages of its creation. Earlier, there had been the International Student Conference (ISC), which sought to organize the student movements in Asia and link them to the Western bloc. In 1968 it was revealed that this organization was being financed by the CIA. The scandal broke out first in France, where articles showed that certain American and British organizations had been funded by the CIA. Then the scandal spread and we learned that the same was true of the ISC. It was very embarrassing for the world student movement and the ISC was dissolved. At that time the National Union of Malayan Students (PKPM) was controlled by progressive students, and it initiated the formation of the ASA.

The first conference was held in Kuala Lumpur. The first secretariat of the ASA was also located there. But in 1970 the government refused to register the organization or to allow it to keep its offices open. For this reason, after the Bombay conference of 1972, the seat of the secretariat was transferred to Hong Kong. The association coordinates all the various national student unions, such as the PKPM, the National Student Center of Thailand, the Australian Union of Students, the National Council of Indian Students, the Federation of Students of Hong Kong, as well as the student unions in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

The principal goal of the ASA is to exchange information and coordinate the various national unions in such a way that each union understands what is happening in the other countries and all the unions can support one another.

For example, during the recent "economic" conference in Bangkok (held on the eve of Tanaka's visit to Southeast Asia -- INPRECOR), Japanese and American domination was discussed. I think this was the first attempt to really discuss foreign domination in many countries. The annual conference was held a bit later (July 1974 -- INPRECOR) in Melbourne, Australia.

The students at this conference represented very varied currents of opinion. The student movements of the Fiji islands and Papua New Guinea, for example, were formed very recently and did not thoroughly grasp the tendencies of the 1970s, that is, the struggle of peoples against imperialism. As for India and Bangladesh, probably because of the economic situations in these countries, their representatives also did not really understand the dynamics of world development today. Others, such as the Hong Kong Student Federation, the Australian Union of Students, the associations of Pakistan and Lebanon, the General Union of Palestinian Students, and the Malayan PKPM generally had a common outlook. The struggle against imperialism and the understanding of the role of the conference was the same, based on the necessity of struggling against foreign domination. And this took very concrete forms. The association created an economic committee, the Asian Student Economic Commission, based in Thailand and directed by the NSCT. It will centralize the information sent to all the student associations on the means of foreign domination in each country.

Second, the conference formed a committee on educational reform, the Asian Education Committee, which is based in Australia and will discuss and demand changes in the bourgeois educational system, which functions in the service of the capitalist system. Third, a commission on repression was set up, the Student Political Suppression Committee, which will deal with the repression that is becoming a trend today, for example in South Korea and Malaysia. Unfortunately, the student associations lack precise information on the situation in South

Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia. That is why this commission was formed, with the aim of putting out an information bulletin.

The ASA discussed all these things during its conference. There was also a project to turn toward the countryside to try to understand the problems of the rural population. This will probably be taken in charge by the NSCT.

There were, unfortunately, many unproductive discussions, because of the varying degrees of political understanding. Asian students as such do not yet have a common political orientation. Many things depend on who will be in the leadership of the association. Will it be the far right? The bourgeois democrats? So far as we are concerned, we will try to endow the ASA with the spirit of the Asian third world, that is, to make sure that a progressive group directs the ASA and makes it into a united front of all Asian students against imperialism.

But in view of the size of the association, the problem of how to implement the resolutions adopted will be especially difficult to resolve. That has always been one of the problems of international student associations. This problem is aggravated by the fact that the student movement lacks a coherent political orientation. As the years go by the leadership changes. One year an organization can be led by a progressive group and the next year by far rightists or reactionaries who will not apply the resolutions. These difficulties are inevitable if the ASA is to represent all the national associations. It is different from a politically homogeneous grouping of student movements.

Q. What do you think will be the orientation of the ASA in the near future?

A. I think that during the two coming years the ASA will be directed by a student of Malayan origin who was active for a long time in the Australian Union of Students. I think he is a representative type of the AUS, a democrat by nature. He will not take a very offensive attitude and will be tied to the whole student movement, but he will not make reactionary or right-wing decisions. That was, I think, the general tendency during the latest conference of the ASA; it was a generally favorable tendency.

Q. Nevertheless, in Thailand there has been an accelerated polarization of the student movement. The NSCT is now supporting the Sanya government (formed after the overthrow of the military dictatorship last October -- INPRECOR) and the police forces. It has been transformed into a sort of pressure group on the government. On the other hand, the FIST (Federation of Independent Students of Thailand) and others are struggling against this tendency. Such polarization may be manifested in other countries too. What do you think of this?

A. We in Malaya have always been conscious of this problem. That is why the Socialist Club and other such groups were formed: to make our orientation more clear and to avoid having our action be dependent on control of the student union. We want to be able to continue under any and all circumstances. The case of the Philippines is a good illustration. After the mass demonstrations, Marcos declared martial law and most of the students had to go underground. Such situations will exist elsewhere, my country included.

We want to aid the development of massive struggles against the regime so that the masses of students understand what the alternatives are. We know that the students by themselves will not provide any alternative. In the Philippines they demonstrated massively, sang songs in the streets, and threw Molotov cocktails. Marcos, however, remains in power. What we want is for the maximum number of students to understand through mobilizations what the real alternative is. This has not happened yet in Thailand or Malaya. We hope that this tendency will manifest itself.

Splits in the student movement are common things. We cannot hope to always be united around the same objectives of struggle. If that were true the struggle would be very easy. We think that the splits are necessary, because not everybody holds the same perspectives. In Thailand, for example, the FIST did not exist before the October 1973 uprising. But the problem was already posed and after the uprising there was the split between the FIST and the NSCT. The FIST has its own orientation. The NSCT, lacking a correct orientation, is buffeted back and forth from left to right. The same thing can be seen in Malaya. The Union of Malayan Students changes as its leadership varies. But our organization remains with a constant policy. At any moment we could be ejected from the leadership of the union. But we will continue with our own movement!

Q. In relation to this, we have the ASA on the one hand, which is coordinating the various student unions. But if the political situation heats up, a very clear political orientation will be needed, which the ASA cannot provide. To strengthen our anti-imperialist struggle we will need a solidarity organization on an Asian scale capable of fighting for such a clear orientation. We are just now beginning discussions, and we will have to continue them. What is your view of the necessity of creating a movement of youth and students that will be able to fulfill this function?

A. We have already thought about this problem, for we are convinced of the necessity for a clear orientation to continue the struggle. I think that the '74 Asian Youth Conference is a concrete example of calling upon Asian students to come together to discuss and think about what will be the next step in the organization of Asian students on a clearly and directly anti-imperialist line. We must be capable of continuing the struggle until the liberation of our country. And after this liberation, we must continue to affirm our solidarity with the other anti-imperialist struggles. ■

september 7: a step toward independence

by TONY SOUTHALL

The agreement signed on September 7 in Lusaka between FRELIMO representatives led by Samora Machel and a Portuguese government delegation headed by Foreign Minister Mario Soares is a landmark in the development of the struggle to liberate the entire African continent from the rule of colonialism and racism. On September 25 the guerrilla movement founded ten years ago to fight Portuguese control of Mozambique will assume two thirds of the posts in and provide the prime minister for a government which is to preside over a transition period to the full independence slated for June 25, 1975.

Three months ago the Portuguese government leader Spínola gave out a formula which sought to frustrate the process of decolonization through the maneuvers embodied in his "blueprint" for the advance to self-rule. A direct handing over of power to the liberation movements was to be avoided by "self-determination based on the full functioning of a democratic system" which was to follow a cease-fire. The aim was first to disarm the freedom fighters and then to encourage the emergence of groups -- particularly from among the African petty-bourgeoisie -- willing to make concessions to Portuguese and international imperialism. These groups would compete in the "democratic arena" with the liberation movements.

A maneuver fails

Now, this formula has been completely junked for Mozambique. Prime responsibility for its defeat rests with the leadership of FRELIMO who, instead of falling for Spínola's ploy, responded by stepping up the war. A new front was opened in the crucial Zambezi province, which incorporates some of Mozambique's main strategic communications and was the chief area for the

vast white settlement projected after the successful completion of the Cabora Bassa dam project. Rail communications with the dam site, with the Moatize coal mines, and with Rhodesia were continually disrupted by a series of detonations. In Lourenço Marques and Beira, FRELIMO demonstrations mushroomed, clearly showing that the movement whose main focus of military activity had been the rural areas of the north and west had not neglected the necessary political preparations among the urban African proletariat.

In face of this onslaught, the maneuvers projected by Spínola never got off the ground. In August COREMO, a group led by ex-members of FRELIMO who seceded during the internal crisis of 1969-70, announced the formation of an alternative coalition consisting of five small parties with tenuous roots in the urban African petty-bourgeoisie. Nothing more has been heard of this grouping, while FRELIMO has been capable of organizing rallies numbering thousands of people in the urban areas.

Moreover, significant sections of the quarter million strong white population, notably the students and members of the Mozambique Democrats, aligned themselves publicly with FRELIMO. In this situation Spínola had no alternative but to negotiate directly with the liberation fighters who were gaining such strength throughout the territory.

The announcement of the Lusaka agreement was greeted by a last-ditch backlash among sections of the white population centered in Lourenço Marques. The news brought an immediate occupation of Mozambique's main radio station by whites terming themselves the "Movement for a Free Mozambique." Their aim was a declaration of the independence of the territory

FRELIMO President Samora Machel speaks to people in a liberated village.



"without FRELIMO." But two things led to the total collapse of this movement by the middle of the following week. First, it met with no response whatsoever from whites outside of Lourenço Marques. Second, the reaction of the black population of that city was immediate and violent, making it impossible for the whites to consider control even of the port a possibility.

The battle of Lourenço Marques cost 100 lives, mainly of Africans. But it demonstrated unequivocally to Mozambique's whites that a Rhodesian-type solution is an unattainable dream. There should be no surprise if the thousand or so "refugees" who have already arrived in Johannesburg are the source of as many horror stories for the world's press in the coming months as emerged ten years ago from what was then the Congo. But there can be no doubt that there will be no comeback for the small group of white racists now scurrying out of Mozambique.

Prospects for the future

What are the longer term prospects for FRELIMO rule in the new state?

The first crucial question for the new government will be its relations with the white racist states of Rhodesia and South Africa. If total economic sanctions were applied to Rhodesia, this would immediately block the outlet via Beira for 90 percent of Rhodesia's trade. The Smith regime, however, has just announced the completion of the rail link via Beit Bridge with South Africa which should enable it to somewhat reduce its dependence on the Mozambique route.

South Africa is also dependent on Mozambique in a number of ways. The port of Lourenço Marques carries a large part of the trade for the Transvaal industrial heartland of the Republic. The gold mines of South Africa are dependent on Mozambique for about 100,000 contract laborers every year, which constitute 25 percent of their total workforce. The Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi in Tete province is to be linked by high level cables to the South African power system to which it will export a large part of its output. The problem for FRELIMO is that this dependence works both ways. Undoubtedly the loss of income involved in the simultaneous severing of all these

links would have grave temporary economic effects on the new state. It remains one of the clearest indictments of the leaderships of the African states further to the north that they cannot be relied upon to compensate adequately for the losses involved in such actions.

The second big question mark hangs over the class nature of the new regime. Undoubtedly the FRELIMO leadership and fighting units have represented, especially since the split in 1969-70, one of the most explicitly anti-imperialist and popularly based movements on the continent. FRELIMO has consistently outmaneuvered the forces based among the aspiring African petty-bourgeoisie and has built a firm base among the urban proletariat and rural peasantry of the country. Nevertheless, one disturbing feature of the statements following the Lusaka talks has been the lack of any firm commitment by FRELIMO to thoroughgoing change of the social and economic system. There is no doubt that the peace agreement will be the signal for an all-out offensive by imperialist interests to ensure their continuing stake in the territory. This will take many subtle forms and will constitute a severe test of the FRELIMO leadership's ability and willingness to live up to the socialist phraseology which it has increasingly utilized in recent years.

The extensive degree of mass mobilization which FRELIMO has encouraged during the course of the struggle will act as an important factor in the situation. The imposition of a simple neocolonialist solution will be by no means easy in a territory whose population has such a long history of struggle. In this respect the advent of independence for Mozambique stands in marked contrast to the experience of the majority of African territories to its north.

Nor is it possible to ignore the effect which this event will have on blacks in Rhodesia and South Africa. Already in Rhodesia the ZAPU-ZANU guerrilla alliance has scored some notable advances in the northwestern part of the territory. In South Africa the wave of strikes by the black proletariat which began in early 1973 and continues unabated to the present day marks the revival of the movement temporarily squashed after Sharpeville and the severe repressions of the early 1960s. The impending independence of Mozambique will undoubtedly act as a rallying point for the masses of southern Africa as a whole. Perhaps the most important result of FRELIMO's victory will be the stimulus it provides to the unfolding struggle against the remaining white racist regimes of southern Africa. ■



news of the workers movement and the fourth international

AUSTRALIA

mandel tours australia

Comrade Ernest Mandel, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, made a public speaking tour of Australia September 10-20. The trip was made possible by the Labour government's lifting of the travel ban that had been decreed against Mandel four years earlier by the Conservative government then in power.

The tour, jointly organized by the Socialist Workers League and the Communist League, Australian sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International, was a considerable success. A total of 8,000 persons attended four public meetings organized by the SWL and CL on the topic "Can Capitalism Survive?" and meetings held at seven universities around the country on the topic, "What Is the Soviet Union and Where

Is It Going?"

The two most successful meetings were in Sydney (1,000 persons) and Melbourne (1,200). In Brisbane fascists attempted to prevent the meeting by telephoning a bomb threat to the police. The hall was evacuated and the entire audience continued the meeting in the open air outside the assembly hall.

In addition to public meetings, comrade Mandel was interviewed by television, radio, and several daily newspapers. He also was able to participate in a televised debate about inflation. Other participants included leaders of trade unions, employers organizations, and the head of the Australian Communist party.

mobilizations for chile

Many demonstrations in solidarity with the struggle of the Chilean people against Pinochet's military junta took place in Europe between September 11 and September 20. At the end of August, the various Chile solidarity committees met in Italy and launched a joint appeal for mobilizations in all countries on the occasion of the first anniversary of the military coup.

The mobilization in Europe was very broad. The main slogans of the demonstrations stressed support to the resistance, demanding release of the political prisoners and reestablishment of democratic rights and calling for a boycott of all trade with Pinochet's junta.

Tens of thousands of people took part in these demonstrations, which in most countries were organized essentially by solidarity movements led by revolutionary organizations. In fact, the "discretion" of the reformist organizations, which refused to join in the campaign, was striking.

In London more than 10,000 people marched, despite the last minute withdrawal of the Labour party and the TUC from the campaign. In Italy several dozen thousand people participated in demonstrations in Rome and Milan, with soldiers in uniform marching in the contingents for the first time. In Paris 10,000 to 15,000 demonstrated in response to a call from the Committee to Support the Revolutionary Struggle of the Chilean People. Some 3,000 people marched in Zurich at the call of the Chile committees.

In Germany a national demonstration in Frankfurt called by the Chile committees drew more than 30,000. This demonstration was supported by, among others, our comrades of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group, West

German section of the Fourth International) and militants of the KBD. In Brussels the demonstration of the Chile committees on September 22 attracted about 4,000 people; about 2,500 had participated in a "six hours for Chile" program held September 14 at the University of Brussels.

Below we give a more detailed account of the solidarity actions in Sweden and Denmark as well as of the courageous action organized by our comrades in Sri Lanka.

One year after the military coup, and after many months of uninterrupted mobilizations, the European movement of solidarity with the Chilean people has once again showed its strength and vitality. During their August meeting in Italy the European Chile solidarity organizations decided to meet again after the September mobilizations in order to work out perspectives for a future European-wide united initiative. The solidarity movement will not demobilize!

SWEDEN

The Swedish Chile committees called for demonstrations throughout the country on September 11. A massive propaganda campaign with posters and leaflets was conducted in all the cities in which the committees have branches. Special efforts were made to reach important layers of workers, particularly those of the new harbor workers union.

The demonstrations were successful. In Stockholm more than 5,000 people marched under the slogans "total support to the Chilean resistance," "free all political prisoners," and "boycott all copper trade with the junta." The demonstrations in

Umeå, Malmö, and Göteborg attracted 400 persons, 1,000, and 800 respectively.

The most important result of the work of the committees was the response from the Hamnarbetarförbundet. This is a union that was created when the bureaucrats of the Transport Union expelled many workers for refusing to organize larger, more bureaucratic branches. It now includes the majority of the harbor workers. These harbor workers have decided to refuse to unload all copper from Chile between September 11 and October 10. In response, the bureaucrats of the Transport Union decided on a token two-day boycott. The Chile committees have answered by calling on the Transport Union to extend their boycott to coincide with that of the Harbor Union.

DENMARK

The Chile solidarity movement in Denmark was split when the Communist party decided to leave the united committees and organize along a pacifist and reformist line endorsing the policy followed by the Allende government before the coup. There were thus two demonstrations in Copenhagen, one called by the Chile committees and one by the CP. Each mobilized about 2, - 500 people. The slogans of the Chile committee demonstration were "support the struggle against the junta -- for socialism," "free all the political prisoners," and "boycott all trade with the junta." The two demonstrations did have a common conclusion, however. The main speeches at the common rally were made by representatives of the Chilean SP and the MIR. Demonstrations also took place in many provincial towns, with 300 in Odense, 200 in Aarhus, and 150 in Helsingør.

The CP, which has significant influence among the transport and harbor workers, declined to use that influence to call for boycotts of Chilean trade, thus preventing the workers from taking the sorts of actions taken by their Swedish counterparts.

SRI LANKA

On the occasion of the September 11 international day of solidarity with Chile, the Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU), the class-struggle union led by our comrades of the Revolutionary Marxist party, Sri Lanka section of the Fourth International, organized a one-hour strike and demonstration. The General Council of the CMU had voted unanimously to organize the strike and demonstration; it was prepared by a several-weeks-long campaign (banners extended across the streets, leaflets, and so on). At 11:00 a.m. on September 11 the militants of the CMU stopped work and assembled in front of their factories. They then began to march. Contingents--some with several hundred workers--marched through many of the popular neighborhoods of Colombo.

The slogans of the demonstrators demanded:

- an end to the internal state of war against the people,
- elimination of the military tribunals,
- freedom for the political prisoners and the unions,
- respect for democratic and trade-union rights.

That evening, a meeting was held at which comrade Bala Tampoe, secretary general of the CMU, drew the lessons of the Chile coup. On the evening of September 12 a second meeting was held, sponsored by the CMU and a number of other trade-union organizations, among them the Ceylon Workers Congress and the Ceylon Democratic Congress, which are strong among the Tamil plantation workers.

All the other unions, however, refused to participate in the September 11 strikes and demonstrations, for in Sri Lanka to mobilize workers actively against the Chilean junta has certain immediate implications. It involves making accusations against the so-called United Front government, whose hands have been

stained with the blood of the Ceylonese rural proletariat and youth ever since April 1971 when it launched its repression against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. It involves struggling for the release of thousands of revolutionaries who are still being held in prison, for the release of Rohan Wijeweera and the other JVP leaders now being tried, for the reestablishment of the right to strike, abolished by the state of emergency decreed three years ago. All this involves a mortal danger for the corrupt trade-union bureaucrats tied to the ruling coalition.

But the mobilization organized by the CMU had a very profound impact on the workers. The ruling parties--Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom party, the Lanka Sama Samaja party, and the Communist party--were forced to react. Thus, at the last minute, the youth organizations of these three ruling parties organized a meeting for September 10, trying in this way to recover the initiative. The trade unions tied to the ruling coalition did the same thing, calling a meeting on September 13 at which N.M. Perera and Colvin R. Da Silva, ex-Trotskyists and now ministers in the repressive government, denounced "the atrocities committed against the Chilean workers." The controlled press, the Ceylon Daily News in the lead, also shed crocodile tears. In its editorial of September 13 this newspaper declared its association with the international protest campaign on the grounds that "brutal suppression of democratic rights wherever it occurs is cause for moral concern(!)" It then revealed its real motives. The United Front government in Ceylon and the Unidad Popular government in Chile, the newspaper claimed, were "two elected governments whose common aspiration was to construct socialism on a democratic basis." The Ceylon workers should therefore support their government firmly if they want to avoid suffering the fate of their Chilean brothers!

In spite of these diversionary maneuvers by the government, the mobilizations organized by the CMU represent an important gain for the future in several respects:

* For the first time in the history of the Ceylonese trade-union movement a strike was held with the objective of affirming international workers solidarity.

* For the first time since April 1971 and the imposition of the state of emergency, a workers demonstration was held having a clear political and antigovernment character.



Chiledemonstration | Uppsala 14/9