

imprecor

international press correspondence

portugal/
THE
RISE OF
STRUGGLE
france
STRUGGLE
IN THE ARMY

fortnightly N°20, February 27, 1975

PRICE: US\$.50, £ .20, FB 25



● contents ●

<u>PORTUGAL:</u>	Government Faces Workers Upsurge — by A. Udry	3
<u>FRANCE:</u>	The Army Becomes a Field of Struggle — by O. Milan	5
<u>CHINA:</u>	Foreign Policy Since 1971: The Great Leap Rightward — by Carlos Rossi	11
<u>YUGOSLAVIA:</u>	Contradictions of States with Socialist Consti- tutions — by Mihailo Markovic	21
<u>BELGIUM:</u>	Glaverbel — An Exemplary Strike	29
<u>ARGENTINA:</u>	Pancho Carricaburu Murdered	31
<u>REVIEW:</u>	South Asian Marxist Review	32

INPRECOR 12/14 rue de la Buanderie - Brussels 1000 Belgium
INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORRESPONDENCE

Fortnightly information organ of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International
published in English, French, Spanish, and German.

Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of INPRECOR.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: 1 year (25 issues) - US\$10; Can\$10; £4; ¥3,000
AIR MAIL TO U.S. & CANADA: \$16.00. TO JAPAN: ¥5,000. TO AUSTRALIA &
NEW ZEALAND: US\$18. SPECIAL SIX-ISSUE AIR MAIL INTRODUCTORY SUB -
\$3.50 U.S. & Canada; \$4.50 Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.

TO SUBSCRIBE: TO PAY BY PERSONAL CHECK OR INT'L BANK MONEY ORDER:

Send name and address to INPRECOR with check made to the order of GISELA SCHOLTZ.

TO PAY BY INT'L POSTAL ORDER: Send name and address to INPRECOR. Send postal
order to GISELA SCHOLTZ, 127 rue Josse Impens, Brussels 3, Acct.No. CCP000-1085001-56.

GOVERNMENT FACES WORKERS UPSURGE

by A. UDRY

In the course of a television speech delivered February 20 General Gonçalves issued a warning "against the spread of extremist tendencies in the working class." Concurrently, he stressed the process of institutionalization of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) and its central role in relation to the new regime, which is supposed to emerge from the elections of April 12.

A deepened crisis

The provisional government, and more especially the AFM and the Junta of National Salvation, must deal with the conjunction of a deepened economic crisis and a proliferation of workers struggles that are the expression of a phase in the class struggle that is new since May 1974.

Unemployment is spreading rapidly. Present figures indicate that the threshold of 200,000 unemployed has been crossed. This unemployment is the result of various factors. First, emigration has slowed considerably. During the first three quarters of 1974 — that is, before the effects of the generalized recession really made themselves felt — emigration was down 36 percent compared with the first three quarters of 1973. To this must be added the return of Portuguese immigrants employed in France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. (Between 1965 and 1973, one million Portuguese workers emigrated.) Second, the return of the colons and the reduction in the size of the army will increase the number of people without employment. Finally, the rapid rise of partial or complete layoffs and the acute crisis in the construction and tourist industries are contributing to swelling the army of unemployed, the official size of which does not include students who cannot get into universities, youth who have not yet gotten their first jobs, and the rural underemployed.

The recession is combining with inflation. The latest figures show that the consumer price index for the city of Lisbon has increased 41 percent in one year. The balance of payments deficit is gigantic. It is

estimated at 45,000 million escudos (1 escudo = US\$0.041). Traditionally, "invisible income" made it possible to offset the deficit in the balance of trade.

Exports to Britain, which is the major export outlet for Portuguese capitalism, have tumbled, and exports to all the Common Market countries have declined. Moreover, exports to the former colonies, although their relative importance had already dropped, have shrunk considerably further.

In view of the new relationship of forces that has been established in the factories (constitution of trade unions and the role of the workers commissions), English, German, Swedish, and even Portuguese capitalists, who had invested in order to profit from the very low "labor costs," are withdrawing their investments or simply freezing them, especially since markets have contracted. Thus, although investment accelerated during 1974, during the first two months of 1975 the gross formation of capital has declined by more than 4 percent compared with 1974.

Faced with such a situation, the provisional government, the AFM, and the junta are counting on a demobilization of the working class and are restricting the right of trade-union activity (through the trade-union law) in order to create the preconditions for the establishment of an emergency economic plan.

Development of workers struggles

Since January 1975 a modification in the activity of the working masses has clearly occurred. The January 14 demonstration in Lisbon for "trade-union unity" reflected this change. Although the Portuguese Communist party and the Trade Union Federation wanted to center the demonstration (which drew 300,000 workers) on support for the AFM and the law on trade-union unity, a good number of the workers present turned it into a mobilization "against capitalist exploitation," for their most important

demands (minimum wages and employment security), and for the unity of the workers in struggle. The February 7 demonstration of the workers commissions, which drew more than 30,000 Lisbon workers from the major enterprises (Efacec-Intel, TAP, Lisnave, Setnave, Plessey, CTT, Timex, etc.), also expressed the development of workers combativity and the maturation of an anticapitalist consciousness among broad vanguard sections of the class. The call for this demonstration, issued by the general assembly of the Efacec-Intel workers, asserted: "Unemployment is the inevitable consequence of the system. It is up to the workers to destroy it and build a new world." It must be stressed that this demonstration assembled 30,000 workers in spite of the boycott and denunciation of it by the Portuguese Communist party and the leadership of the Trade Union Federation. The demonstration gathered in front of the Ministry of Labor, where the soldiers joined the workers in raising the slogan: "Soldiers and sailors are exploited too!"

In combination with this type of mobilization there have been a large number of struggles that are taking such forms as factory occupations, prohibition of employers from entering the factory, etc. There is a rise in active strikes and in workers initiatives against economic sabotage by the employers. The Portuguese workers, almost spontaneously, have assimilated the most advanced forms of struggle of their French, Italian, and Spanish comrades.

In the small and middle-sized enterprises the workers are often turning to their benefit the slogans that the reformists have raised but have not made the axes of struggle. Thus, during the occupations they are immediately demanding nationalization, especially in cases of obvious economic sabotage by the employers. To all this must be added the land occupations in Alentejo, in part with the support of the CP. To be sure, these struggles are still limited. They are not coordinated, and up to now the reformists (the CP) have managed to keep them relatively isolated. But two new factors are emerging. First, solidarity with these struggles is developing widely, and the increased capacity for intervention of centrist currents or of Maoists or of revolutionary Marxists (as was the case during the occupation of Nefil in Porto) is generating a rather wide response to these experiences among the whole working class. Second, an ever broader layer of workers now understands that it was not possible to win the demands advanced during the months of May and June 1974 through the strategy proposed by the reformists. Consequently, with these experiences as the starting point, there exists a possibility of breaking the reformist grip over not inconsiderable sections of the working class. Gonçalves's attack against "left extremists" in the working class must be viewed in this overall context.

Since September 1974 the bourgeoisie has undeniably succeeded in reconstituting a political force in the form of the PPD (Popular Democratic party). Nevertheless, many bourgeois sectors seriously affected by the fall of fascism (sectors of the economy that survived thanks to the protectionism of the corporatist state; the sector linked exclusively to the colonies; the thousands of people who fed off the corporatist state apparatus) can find no alternative in the PPD. Hence, they manifest a certain autonomy with respect to the program of this key party of the bourgeoisie.

The CDS (Democratic and Social Center) includes a part of these forces, which does not mean that various "putschist" currents are not continuing to assert themselves, although in a marginal manner, to be sure. Nevertheless, even if it assembles an electoral majority along with the Socialist party on April 12, the PPD does not command the necessary means to deal with the present crisis and the rise of the working class. Hence, the junta and the AFM are playing and will continue to play a decisive role.

Within the AFM the offensive of the Spinoist nucleus (Fabião) is significant, but the balance between the left and right wings is still unstable. In this sense, the extension of the power of the Junta of National Salvation and the strengthening of the presence of the AFM in the provisional government (the nomination of Ribeiro and Jesuino) seem to be the only immediate ways of getting out of the present impasse. That could even create the groundwork for dealing with a delicate situation after the elections — if they take place — in the event that a PPD-SP electoral majority is not at all in position to effectively push through the economic and political project advocated by these two formations.

Through the economic emergency plan, a document that has just received the total support of the Confederation of Portuguese Industries, the junta and the AFM are seeking to create conditions that on the one hand would compel the CP to collaborate for some time and on the other hand would permit the brakes to be put on the rise of workers struggles by proclaiming the necessity of national reconstruction. Gonçalves's speech asserted this option forcefully.

The capacity of the Portuguese workers to respond resolutely to all encroachments on their trade-union rights and their right to strike, to respond to the police attacks on factories occupied by the workers, and to generalize their struggles will decide the outcome of the present situation and will determine the level of confrontation during coming months. But an external factor, the collapse of the fascist regime in Spain, may soon be added as an important element in Portugal's political evolution. ■

La Caverne

REVUE DE L'ART ET DE LA LITTÉRATURE, FONDÉE EN 1928 PAR ANDRÉ BRETON
 NO 4 (mars-avril) 1975

PROFANE DE MONTROUSSE
 MONTRE DE MONTROUSSE
 4^{ES} ET 5^{ES} BARRIÈRES DE
 MONTROUSSE



the army becomes a field of struggle

by O. MILAN

If you step back a little and take a look at what was making political news during the last half of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, you see very clearly that the army was at the center of political debates and that it was a field of essential struggle.

We have often analyzed this phenomenon somewhat narrowly, limiting ourselves to the burning issues of the struggle of the draftees, without always grasping the more general implications of the movement now going on.

Of course, all the positions that have been taken are explained and determined by the Appeal of the 100, the demonstrations at Draguignan and Karlsruhe, the massive movement of the draftees, and the flourishing of barracks committees.* But in order to work out their orientation today, revolutionary Marxists must try to understand how this movement fits into the general crisis of French society, and in particular, how it can find an expression in workers struggles and in the workers movement.

* The Appeal of the 100 was drafted by enlisted men in the armed forces during the campaign leading up to the presidential elections in May 1974. It asked candidates to state their positions on a series of demands of enlisted men. (See INPRECOR, No. 9, October 3, 1974.) It has since been signed by thousands of soldiers. The demonstrations at Draguignan and Karlsruhe (the latter in West Germany) are the two best known mass actions by French soldiers in support of their demands.

The regime's position

The recent ministerial shakeup that eliminated Soufflet and replaced him with the Bourges-Bigeard team shows how sensitive the regime is, especially Giscard d'Estaing, to the problem of the army; at the same time, it indicates how the regime intends to resolve the problem.

The struggles of the draftees were particularly unwelcome for the government. They raise a challenge to Giscardian "liberalism." Brutal repression would further tarnish the image of a regime that claims, at least in words, to be different from Gaullism in that it is instituting a "less police-like" atmosphere in French society. In reality, the action of the military security services clearly shows what these electoral promises were worth.

Giscard is trapped between the agitation in the barracks and the general crisis. To achieve a "reformist" solution by satisfying the demands of the draftees on some material points (pay increases, free transportation) would require a considerable financial commitment that the regime cannot afford under present conditions. That is why the various reforms that are promised can be only tiny ones in the purest style of the man with the accordion; they will be concessions of an "ideological" type, which cost nothing. And here again, there will be a problem: In the army, even reforms that cost nothing would partially challenge discipline, the hierarchy, and the barracks lifestyle. Even if they are not very im-

portant, they will inevitably appear as concessions to the actions taken by the soldiers and will therefore further encourage such actions.

Under these conditions, it is understandable why Giscard has not yet shared the results of his "week of reflection" on military problems last August. He finds himself in an embarrassing dilemma. This is all the more true because the purest and hardest Gaullists intend to keep the army as their private preserve and to conserve the right to watch over everything that occurs there, through the eyes of Debré, Messmer, and Sanguinetti. The military problem thus emerges as a supplementary cause of friction within the presidential majority.

In this context, the nomination of Bigeard appears more significant than the nomination of Bourges. The regime is going to attack on two fronts: psychological action, so dear to the hearts of the former paratroop colonel and the president, and repression. Bigeard will take his six-kilometer cross-country morning run with the enlisted men of this or that barracks. That's for demagogy. But we will also see his wrath. The press, which nearly unanimously rediscovered its Bonapartist turns of phrase to salute the coming to power of the "general who worked his way up from the ranks," forgot rather quickly that Bigeard is no tenderfoot. The Vietnamese and the Algerians have longer memories than the journalists of *L'Express*. And in the military domain, the signatures on the Appeal of the 100 gave a very exact measure of what his brawny sweet temper meant.

Poniatowski, the current interior minister, came up with worse than Marcellinesque epithets to stigmatize the French Communist party ("Fascist party") and the "bleeding-heart judges." Bigeard will manage to come up with worse than Messmerian epithets to stigmatize "ultraleftist agitation." He has already begun. Before he entered the government he denounced Alain Krivine as personally responsible for the agitation, taking up the theme of his friend Massu. There should be no illusion; the Pretorians have come into power with Bigeard. It is the revenge, hailed by the fascist paper *Minute*, of those who yearn for the old days of French Indochina and French Algeria.

Hesitations of the bourgeois parties

The hesitations and difficulties of the regime on the question of the army reflect those of the bourgeois parties.

The UDR (Union des Démocrates pour la République — Union of Democrats for the Republic, the Gaullist organization) is divided between the traditional Gaullist-Jacobin conception of a strong army whip-

ping the enlisted men into shape (Michel Debré holds this position) and the technocratic conception of a well-oiled professional army. The latter solution is advocated by both Sanguinetti, the ex-secretary general of the UDR and the ex-chief of staff of the navy. Today, the adversaries are reconciled by the economic difficulties, which in no way allow for the establishment of a professional army. (According to the general staff of the armed forces, such an army would cost four times as much as an army of draftees.)

A second polemic, of less immediate importance for us but decisive in the long run, deals with the type of armaments to acquire. Should the stress be put on conventional or nuclear weapons?

The choice that has been made by Giscard, which was made public through his underwater cruise on a nuclear-powered missile-launching submarine, confirms the regime's commitment to a nuclear "deterrent" force and reduces to clownish antics the demonstrations through which Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber thought he could exert pressure "against the bomb." The choice of submarines as the carriers of strategic nuclear-armed missiles also has important consequences. The land army now finds itself effectively deprived of the "noble weapon"; hence the bitterness of the chiefs of staff of the land forces and hence also the army's greater availability for so-called DQT tasks. (DQT stands for *Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire*, Operational Territorial Defense, a system of maintaining order that involves using the army along with the police in case of insurrection, whether or not linked to a "foreign threat.")

Giscard's choice was essentially an "economic" one. He does not have the financial resources to develop a missile-launching submarine fleet, a flotilla of long-distance bombers, and the Albion plateau missile system all at the same time. This economic rationalization has political consequences, notably the acceleration of the transformation of the land forces into an "army of civil war."

These economic difficulties of French capitalism go hand in hand with the rapprochement with NATO and the drift toward Atlanticism. General Stehlin, who was fired for having displayed too much enthusiasm for American combat aircraft, nevertheless must have well expressed the basis of presidential thought when he asserted that France, since it does not have the means to secure its own defense, would have to place itself under somebody else's umbrella. The Americans understood. And from the military point of view, West Europe is only an extension of the United States. The Gaullists, worshippers of the "national idea," cried scandal, but Giscard did not say too much. French vessels participated in the

latest maneuvers of NATO naval forces off the Portuguese coast. Under Pompidou, they only followed at a distance during such maneuvers; there is a subtle difference.

In short, Giscardianism in the military sphere may be summed up like this:

- *A policy of combined demagoguery and force toward the demands of the enlisted men;
- *Preparation for boosting the prestige of career officers.

That is for military personnel. As for the doctrine:

- *Accelerated slide away from Gaullist positions toward the Atlantic fold;
- *Maintenance of priority on nuclear arms, despite the financial difficulties.

Position of the reformists

The reformist workers organizations have had to determine their positions on the problem of the army as a function of varying pressures. First of all, in the directly political sphere, these parties begin from the current debates and discussions on the role of the army in Chile and Portugal and, more generally, on the function of the army under the capitalist system. Second, they have had to offer a response to the decisions and orientations by the regime. Third, they have had to respond to the movement of the draftees.

The Socialist party is trying above all to play out its electoral hand. It is the ardent apostle of an army of "citizen-soldiers" (that is the title of the book by Charles Hernu) in the Jacobin tradition of 1792, as remodeled by Jaurès in the concept of the "new army." According to the SP, it is the task of the citizens to defend the fatherland; they can do it better than the monopolies, as is proven by the defeat of 1940. National defense is too important a thing to be consigned to specialists. The notion of the Fatherland, the Nation, is not questioned at all. The only distinction mentioned relates to the effectiveness of the defense of this fatherland and this nation: citizens in arms are more effective than the mercenaries of Capital. To base national defense on conscription in this manner requires that the draftees be agreeable. It is therefore necessary that they not feel too unhappy in uniform; hence a series of reforms are necessary.

For the rest, the SP determines its position in terms of two objectives:

*Doing nothing that could annoy its potential electoral clientele among the officers and noncommissioned officers. In the last presidential elections nearly half of all career military personnel voted

for Mitterrand; these people are not potential CP voters. Thus, the Socialist party can hope to hold them, especially if it displays some caution in its appreciation of the movement of draftees. Some members of the left wing of the SP think they can turn to their benefit the operation the Portuguese SP carried out with a section of the Armed Forces Movement. This is not an entirely utopian prospect, and Military Security itself is uneasy about the advances the SP is making toward some career personnel.

*Doing nothing that could compromise the authority within the army of a government of the left or of a government in which the SP would participate without the CP. In particular, the SP is determined to distinguish in the movement of draftees between what is the legitimate expression of legitimate demands and what is an intolerable challenging of military discipline. This has given rise to a rather complex moral theology. Charles Hernu, for example, testified in favor of the Draguignan demonstrators in the Marseilles military court; the following Monday, he severely disavowed the Karlsruhe demonstrators. A little is all right; too much is no good.

The French Communist party also refuses to pose the problem of the army in class terms. At the time of the coup in Chile, the CP was hemmed in by the far left's attacks on its conceptions about the army; but now it is triumphantly exploiting the ambiguities of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement: "We now see military democrats coming out of a colonial army formed under a fascist type of regime. Surely we will find many other such democrats in an army like the French army, with its democratic traditions." (sic)

The French CP also entertains illusions about the possibility of a "pure army" within the framework of the capitalist system. It refuses, of course, to analyze the army as one of the pillars of the bourgeois state apparatus that has to be destroyed; instead, like the SP, it views the army as a field for electoral headhunting, the difference being that the CP is seeking the votes of the enlisted men and has consequently taken positions on the movement now under way that are generally more favorable than those of the Socialist party.

The hierarchy and the nco's

We have sometimes made the mistake of analyzing the positions of the military hierarchy in too one-sided a manner. Clique conflicts and interservice rivalries play a great role in the hierarchy and determine hostilities that, while they have a political basis, are nonetheless strongly mediated. Thus, how many unit commanders, even though very reaction-



ary, have hesitated to hand over soldiers to Military Security, either out of the pleasure of "giving the cops a pain in the ass" or in order to get back at people who had poked their nose into their business a bit too much during the Algerian war. This is, of course, an ensemble of features that cannot be exploited by revolutionary Marxists; but their result is that the high command is not at all identical to the régime, even less to the present regime than to the Gaullist one. Old quarrels still fester, there are old accounts to settle, and silent struggles for influence run through the upper officer corps. To be sure, there should be no illusions about the position of these gentlemen in the event of clashes with the workers movement. In general, if they have differences with the government, it is because they believe the government to be too liberal!

The NCOs, however, represent a corps in which a certain form of work is not excluded. Although a not inconsiderable proportion of the NCOs (especially in the land forces) are heading toward fascism at full speed, many of the NCOs are susceptible to joining in the struggles of the enlisted men. Some may even go further. The question of class origin is important. Some of them came out of worker families and joined the army to avoid unemployment (this is especially true of those in the navy and the air force); they do some small technical work to make a living, but they have no enthusiasm for the mili-

tary. It is probably thanks to them that Mitterrand's vote was so high among career personnel.

The ranks

But the decisive thing for us is the political evolution of the ranks of the armed forces. This has been a very differentiated evolution. In their great majority, the ranks do not see any "use" in military service. The country has no potential enemy, and under these conditions, why is it necessary to put up with a year of harassment in a barracks far away from home?

This feeling of uselessness is unanimous. From the political standpoint it is obviously ambiguous. A certain number of those who share it would not feel inconvenienced at all (quite the opposite) in a professional army. But it is the common basis of the feeling of having "had enough."

Today, this unanimous sentiment has not been developed politically. And how could it be otherwise? The youth in uniform are the same as the youth in the high schools, in the factories, or on the farms. Many of them are strongly marked by ruling ideology and conformism, and this can be seen in discussions with them. What counts in life, they say, is a career, professional success, home, family, and children. But even those who are not in the workers move-

ment, who have scarcely ever heard of strikes or are suspicious of them, become enraged when someone talks to them about military service. "It's lost time." "Learning how to lie around." And so on.

This "had enough" sentiment makes it easy to unite the ranks around the most militant elements, around those who have gone through the struggles in the schools, the workers strikes, and the peasant mobilizations of these past years. It is a minimum basis for politicization. It is also remarkable how the social-melting-pot function that the bourgeoisie has assigned to the army ("you have to go there to get to know youth of different backgrounds") is now completely working against the bourgeoisie itself. Crystallization takes place rather easily around the most militant elements, provided, of course, that they know how to act. The shift in the social composition of the far left is not unimportant in this process. The revolutionary student, who had a draft deferment and is often "buried" in an office, does not have a great audience. But the revolutionary worker militant quite naturally continues his militant mass work in his military company.

A quite new phenomenon is the rejection of passivity on a mass scale. People no longer agree to being stuck between parentheses for one year; they no longer consider that it is something they have to do. It is this rejection of resignation that determines the new possibilities for intervention and politicization in this milieu. Even those who for an initial period fight the army on a purely individual basis learn solidarity very rapidly in the struggle. They quickly come to understand what repression is, and beginning from that, what the character of the regime is.

What is changing is the age-old feeling of passivity, the idea that there is nothing that can be done against the army except back down. The success achieved by the demonstrators in Draguignan and Karlsruhe shows that it is possible to struggle and win, even in the army.

The movement very often crystallizes around material questions (wages, leaves) before challenging the dogma of the necessity of national defense, for example. At the beginning, it is often a simple coming to consciousness through experience (among the lower NCOs, for example). But one would have to be a political illiterate to believe that the average consciousness of the ranks could spontaneously coincide with the understanding that revolutionary Marxists have of the army. It must not be overlooked that this means that the army has a small margin for maneuver, that for a time, here and there, the army's image can be polished up by granting some material improvements.

But we think that a co-optation of the movement by the hierarchy is completely excluded. The hierarchy

does not possess the means to grant satisfaction to the draftees' material demands, even if it wanted to do so. And the existence of a movement means rapid politicization and the development of consciousness about the general aspects of the problem. That is why we support moves toward the national organization of soldiers committees, why we warmly salute all the initiatives taken in this direction, like the coordination of the committees in Germany or the coordination meeting that was held in Paris in December. That is why we are ceaselessly popularizing the Appeal of the 100, the demonstrations at Draguignan and Karlsruhe: to give the movement a history, a collective consciousness, and beginning from that, a greater solidarity.

Account must also be taken of the negative fact that the movement has a tendency to "specialize" on the military problem without making any analysis of the general political situation. This is one of its greatest weaknesses at present. For example, some barracks committees are on the point of making mistakes because they judge the general radicalization too much in terms of the climate in the barracks; they consequently propose, for example, to immediately move to a much heightened level of confrontation with the forces of repression — things like occupation and self-defense of military bases. Sometimes they leave themselves open to discouragement of their purely local analysis.

The linkup with the workers movement appears absolutely decisive for us. Under the present conditions of the weakness of the movement, it must be assured of some minimum support from the workers organizations. The movement is not immune to rightist temptations (like taking up only the "corporatist" demands of the draftees). Nor is the movement free of ultra-leftist temptations. Under the present circumstances, armed minority clashes are not excluded in certain barracks (the rifles are never far away), but it is clear that such events would have catastrophic consequences for everyone and that they would absolutely not be understood. The mass criterion of what actions should be engaged in appears as an essential criterion for pressing the movement forward and for assuring solidarity in face of repression.

We are consequently fighting against the tendency of some militants to limit the political consciousness of the soldiers committees purely to the problem of the army, not only because of the prospect of the reintegration of militants into civilian trade-union and political organizations, but also from the standpoint of the interests of work in the army itself.

Many difficulties arise from the fact that the reformists are not fulfilling their responsibilities within the army and are not doing the minimum organizational work there that they carry out in other milieus.

Thus, when the revolutionaries propose an organizational structure or a possibility of struggle, everybody's disparate inclinations tend to seek an outlet through this one opening. Some people come simply to discuss, others, with a viewpoint that is strictly "corporatist" at the outset, come in order to win more frequent leaves; others come to pose directly political questions at a high level. The "soldiers committee" thus plays the role of a circle of politicization, an embryo of a trade union, and an action committee, all at the same time.

How to work out a general orientation for such a multifaceted, flourishing movement? That is the problem posed for revolutionary militants. Even in the high-school movement, the reformists and other political forces are present. In the army, these organizations do not do anything, even though they take positions from the outside. How many comrades have had militants of the CP and the SP come to them to ask advice, to ask for a structure to discuss what should be done! In the workers movement, and even in the student movement, our intervention is worked out partly as a function of the perspectives of other currents of the workers movement, and that helps to construct an intervention. In the army, the comrades are often alone in their political analyses.

A first temptation to avoid is "military corporatism." A one-year term of service is a short time. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for forging a specific mentality that risks restricting the challenging of the army to the question of the organization of military service as it is at the present time, without broaching the question of the role of the army during an insurrection, without broaching the problems of rejecting orders during an intervention against strikers, without posing the question of workers militias, etc. It is absolutely necessary for these problems to be posed in liaison with precise references to the struggles of the working class. It is absolutely necessary that the positions be clear in regard to the rejection of the professional army.

A second temptation to avoid is sectarianism, which would consist of refusing to take into consideration the legitimate demands proper to the army itself (pay, leaves) under the pretext that these demands are politically ambiguous. It is necessary to politically advance the consciousness of the members of a soldiers committee; but at the same time it is necessary to refuse to do anything that could cut the committee off from the masses of enlisted men, anything that could make the committee appear as a church. The framework of the demands of the Appeal of the 100 is still useful for this, for it naturally makes the link between the demands spontaneously felt by the great mass of enlisted men and the demands that fall within a political logic (like dissolution of the Military Security and the military tribu-

nals). The link is natural because it is legitimate to fight against the obstacles and repression that these struggles entail.

As for the forms of organization, new prospects have recently been opened up by the public positions taken by the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail — French Democratic Confederation of Labor, the country's second-largest trade-union federation). The CFDT is calling for the building of a soldiers trade union. Obviously, one must be wary of demagogy, of the declarations of never-applied principles we are used to hearing from the CFDT. But it remains the case that an important workers organization has publicly taken a position: The idea of a trade union for soldiers thus takes on greater credibility and can be advanced in a form that is not simply propagandistic. We are thus in a transitional phase in which the barracks committees are beginning to pose the question of a soldiers trade union affiliated to the workers federations. The solution also (and essentially) depends on the debates and discussions within the workers movement and on the position taken by the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail — General Confederation of Labor, the largest trade-union federation, dominated by the CP), which has been in no hurry to seize the handle extended by the CFDT. There is no question of constructing a trade-union organization that would not be recognized by the workers confederations. We are not in favor of building independent red unions within the working class; still less in the army!

On the other hand, we are in favor of a trade-union organization that would not refrain from speaking politically about the army, that would not refrain from denouncing the strikebreaking army, the colonial army, the army of civil war. Thus, in our minds it would be a trade-union organization that would necessarily have at least a clandestine aspect to it, even though it may be more or less tolerated at certain points depending on the relationship of forces. There is also no question of failing to respond within a trade-union framework to the demands referred to above as "corporatist" or of going to negotiate with the "regimental priest," as the enlisted men justifiably call him. All this means that the trade union of soldiers is not yet immediately on the agenda and that for a certain period the building of committees in the barracks and on a national scale will continue to predominate. Thus, today we will fight for the following orientation:

- *Strengthen the committees, both numerically and politically, with the perspective of eventually constructing a soldiers trade union.
- *Strengthen the links between the struggles of the enlisted men and the struggles of the working class.
- *Preserve and strengthen the mass character of the movement. ■

chinese foreign policy since 1971:



the great leap rightward

by CARLOS ROSSI

Chinese foreign policy has gone through three distinct phases since the end of the Korean war:

1. During the 1950s Peking applied the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" with and support to the supposedly "progressive" bourgeois regimes of the Third World. The Bandung Conference (featuring Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, and Chou En-lai) is the best-known symbol of this strategy, which was not substantially different from that followed by the USSR. During the Geneva Conference on Indochina (1954) the two "socialist" states played a "moderating" role with respect to the Vietnamese revolutionaries. According to the July 15, 1954, London Times, "members of the Viet Minh delegation openly stated that pressure from Chou En-lai and Molotov forced their country to accept less than it could have obtained here." (Quoted by J. Lacouture and P. Devillers, *De la guerre française à la guerre américaine*, Editions du Seuil, p. 334.)

2. During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet polemic and the Cultural Revolution provoked a significant turn to the left. Without abandoning its support to the so-called national-democratic regimes of the Third World — with the catastrophic results of 1965 in Indonesia — China criticized Moscow's capitulations to U.S. imperialism and offered material and

political support to several revolutionary or anti-imperialist movements around the world. In spite of certain negative aspects — the rejection of a united front with the USSR to support the struggle of the Vietnamese (see Che Guevara's critique in the 1967 Letter to the Tricontinental Congress) — this policy had favorable results on an international scale: the breakup of the Stalinist monolith, the creation of an atmosphere more receptive to leftist criticism of the opportunist policy of Moscow, the stimulation of the emergence of new revolutionary vanguards. This leftist course of Chinese foreign policy culminated during the Cultural Revolution. According to Kostas Mavrakis (a professional anti-Trotskyist and "pro-Chinese" apologist), at that time "the leftist 516 group, which had seized the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had uselessly degraded relationships with certain Asian countries. . . . In addition, the ministry directed by the ultraleftists had issued an ultimatum to Great Britain on the subject of repression in Hong Kong." (K. Mavrakis, "La politique internationale de la Chine," in *Tel Quel*, No. 50, summer 1972, p. 63.) It was also at the time of the Cultural Revolution that China supported the May 1968 movement in France, and so on.

3. Toward 1971, after a transition period of a year

or two, the "great leap rightward," whose content and meaning we will examine in some detail, began. By all evidence, this turn coincided with internal changes: the elimination of the "left" from the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist party; first the demotion of Chen Po-ta, president of the Central Group of the Cultural Revolution (now accused of always having been "an anticommunist Koumintang element, an agent of the enemy"), and then of Lin Piao, who probably wanted to continue the orientation of the 1966-69 period, that is, the struggle against American imperialism as the main enemy.

This turn has had colossal consequences on an international scale. It considerably facilitates the game of U.S. imperialism, which cleverly maneuvers within the framework of the new "triangular diplomacy." The world scene nearly resembles the nightmare imagined by George Orwell in his novel 1984: the planet divided among three superpowers, "Eurasia," "Eastasia," and "Oceania," any two of which line up to fight against the third, with the partners changing every ten years. In reality, the entire international relationship of forces was partially shaken by the new Chinese policy, without which, for example, it would have been difficult to imagine the present insolent threats of U.S. imperialism against the Indochinese revolution. Furthermore, this policy has dealt a grave blow to a large number of armed revolutionary movements that had received material aid from China during the 1960s and have been weakened militarily or obliged to secure their supplies exclusively from the USSR, with all the negative consequences of such unilateral dependence (Cameroon, Eritrea, Dhofar, Angola, and so on).

Let us examine, continent by continent, the deeds and misdeeds of Chinese foreign policy. After four years, the time has come to draw an overall, systematic balance-sheet of the "great leap rightward," which has already emerged as one of the key events of the 1970s.

I. ASIA

The first clear sign of the new Chinese line came with the crisis in Pakistan in 1971. During the revolt of the Bengali people, oppressed by the reactionary and proimperialist military regime of Yahya Khan, China unhesitatingly supported the Pakistani government. While government troops were committing unheard-of massacres and atrocities against the worker, peasant, and student revolts in Chittagong, Dacca, and throughout East Bengal, Chou En-lai sent a message to dictator Yahya Khan (published in the Pakistan Times of March 13, 1971) that declared: "Your Excellency and the leaders of the various regions of Pakistan have accomplished great useful work (sic) in preserving the unity of Pakistan and preventing it from drifting toward secession."

During the interbourgeois Indo-Pakistani war that followed the Bengali revolt, the Soviet bureaucracy supported the Indian government and the Chinese bureaucracy supported the Pakistani regime. That was the first time since the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 that China's foreign policy coincided with that of the United States. In fact, Nixon also supported the Pakistani regime (a member of the anticommunist CENTO alliance) and sent a detachment of the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Bengal to intimidate India and the USSR.

It is interesting to add that in a statement issued after the events, the new Pakistani president, the "friend of China" Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, bitterly complained about the insufficiency of the American intervention against the "communist threat" to Pakistan: "The member countries of CENTO and SEATO slept while our country was dismembered by violence. . . . They did not intervene, in spite of the treaties that call for such intervention in the event of communist aggression." (Le Monde, January 27, 1972.) It is obvious that this position of the government of the Peoples Republic of China had absolutely nothing to do with the interests of the popular masses of Bengal, Pakistan, India, or China, or with the struggle against reaction and imperialism. The sole motivation was Chinese "state interest," that is, the alliance of the Peking bureaucracy with Pakistan and against India, which derives from the Sino-Indian border clashes of the 1960s. The fact — brought up by the Maoist epigones in Europe — that the leadership of the Bengali national movement was bourgeois (Mujibur Rehman) in no way justifies the Chinese policy. The task of the Chinese state was to aid Bengali revolutionaries in winning the leadership of the national liberation movement, which was the profound and legitimate expression of the popular masses of Bangladesh. In this way it could have been possible to break the Bengali liberation struggle from the grip of the Indian bourgeoisie.

The events in Ceylon, also in 1971, were even more serious than those in Bengal. In April 1971 in response to a police provocation the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP — People's Liberation Front), a revolutionary youth organization with a solid base among the peasantry, defended itself in the name of socialism against the bourgeois government of Bandaranaike (a government in which the pro-Moscow Communist party and the renegades from Trotskyism of the Lanka Sama Samaja party also participate). The repression was brutal, with massacres and summary executions (8,000 of them, according to René Dumont) and 14,000 arrests. Ceylonese Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Ranatunga, trained at the Sandhurst military academy in Britain, justified the murder of prisoners with the following argument: "We have learned too many lessons from Vietnam and Malaysia.

We have to destroy them completely." (International Herald Tribune, April 20, 1971.)

An unprecedented international "holy alliance" was formed around the bourgeois government of Ceylon in its war of extermination against the young revolutionaries: Supporting Bandaranaike and her army with helicopters, planes, ammunition, weapons, and money were the governments of the United States, the USSR, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, . . . and China. (See Fred Halliday, "L'insurrection cinghalaise," in *Les Temps Modernes*, No. 306, January 1972. See also the article "Wijeweera Sentenced to Life Imprisonment," *INPRECOR*, No. 18, January 31, 1975.) At the end of April 1971 the government of People's China granted the Ceylonese government a no-interest loan of \$25 million. In order to make explicit the political meaning of this gesture, Chou En-lai sent Bandaranaike a letter stating: "We are happy to observe that thanks to the efforts of Your Excellency and the Ceylonese government, the chaotic situation provoked by a handful of individuals calling themselves 'Guevarists,' whose ranks have been infiltrated by foreign spies, has been mastered. . . . In the interest of friendship between China and Ceylon, and taking into consideration the needs of the Ceylonese government, the Chinese government has agreed to furnish a long-term, no-interest loan of 150 million rupees in convertible foreign currency. . . . As for any further material aid, please let us know if you are in need." (Published by the Ceylon Daily News, May 27, 1971.) With this gesture, a new step was taken in the turn of Chinese policy: For the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, it actively supported a bourgeois government in the repression of a revolutionary movement.

It is interesting to study the "justifications" offered by pro-Chinese scribblers in regard to this astonishing affair. According to K. Mavrakis, the JVP was a "Blanquist and adventurist" organization that did not merit the support of China. "It is not by accident that they claim allegiance to Guevara." (Mavrakis, "La politique internationale de la Chine," *Tel Quel*, summer 1972, p. 72.) Unfortunately, this does not explain why the People's Republic of China not only refrained from supporting the JVP, but also actively supported the bourgeois government in its efforts to crush the rebellion. According to the "logic" of Mavrakis, the People's Republic of China could have just as well supported the Barrientos government in Bolivia in 1967 against the "Guevarist adventurer" Ernesto Che Guevara. In Mavrakis's defense it must be added that in spite of his great will to accept any insult of Chinese origin, he cannot refrain from making a slight gesture of repugnance toward Chou En-lai's letter (the authenticity of which he does not contest): "Although the

message was basically correct, one may wonder about how opportune it was, in view of the exploitation to which it was put." (Ibid., p. 73.)

On the field of unconditional servility Mavrakis is beaten by André Pommier, of the Stalino-Mao review *Communisme*, who offers, among other things, the following argument: "After the insurrection, a swarm of vultures descended on the island, at the head of which stood the Russians, eager for influence and bases in the Indian Ocean. It was crucially important for all the peoples of the region to act to prevent them from nesting there. If China undertook to establish good relations with the government of Bandaranaike, it was because it preserved the neutrality of this much-coveted island." (A. Pommier, "La politique extérieure chinoise," *Communisme*, No. 2, January-February 1973, p. 92.)

The interesting thing about this thesis is that it probably corresponds to the truth. One of the motives of the Chinese intervention was to counter Soviet influence and to prevent Moscow from "nesting." By itself becoming a vulture, Peking wrenched the carrion monopoly from the Kremlin birds of prey. This was important, and beginning in 1971 it would become one of the central axes of Chinese policy: try to counter Soviet influence everywhere and at any price. This reasoning would inevitably push the diplomacy of the People's Republic of China toward a more and more openly pro-American orientation, the three most striking examples in Asia being Chinese policy toward Japan, Thailand, and Iran.

In the course of conversations with Takeo Kimura, an important personality of the conservative governmental party in Japan, and later with M. Nakasone, Japanese minister of industry, Chou En-lai insisted that in the present situation the maintenance of the Japanese-American security treaty was "inevitable" for Japan. He also declared that the American nuclear umbrella was necessary for Japan, not for defense against China, but for defense against the Soviet Union. (*Le Monde*, April 11, 1973.) It is needless to add that this Chinese maneuver, as *Le Monde's* Tokyo correspondent stressed, "seriously disconcerted" the opposition left parties in Japan, which were preparing to launch a hard offensive against the security treaty. It is also needless to add that U.S. imperialism, for which the treaty with Japan guarantees the principal bases of its air and naval potential in the Pacific, much appreciated this unexpected support.

The case of Thailand is more serious in that it closely affects problems of the Indochinese revolution. In a telegram to Bangkok the minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam denounced the American presence in Thailand, and particularly the utilization of bases for the supply of arms to Saigon and Phnom Penh and the resupply of foreign

mercenaries in Laos. In January 1975 Chou En-lai, receiving General Choohaven, the Thai minister of foreign affairs, declared that China wanted the United States to maintain military strength in Thailand . . . because the USSR might step up its activities in the Indian Ocean! (Declaration, not denied, of the spokesman of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Le Monde*, January 16, 1975.) Moreover, the National Student Center of Thailand protested against "the Chinese support to the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Thailand under the pretext of containing Russian military expansion in the region." (*Voice of the Nation*, Bangkok, January 20, 1975.) It would be difficult to demonstrate greater indifference to the Indochinese revolution, whose vital interests have been sacrificed on the altar of the anti-Soviet obsession of Chinese diplomacy.

The "coincidence" with American policy is equally striking in the case of Iran. The regime of the shah is one of the most barbaric dictatorships in the world. SAVAK, its political police, organized and trained by American specialists, systematically arrests and tortures oppositionists. There are thousands of political prisoners, more than 200 of whom have been shot on orders from the shah. (On the atrocious torture of revolutionary militants, both male and female, see *Pétrole et violence, terreur blanche et résistance en Iran*, Editions Anthropos, 1974.) The shah's foreign policy is that of gendarme of imperialism in charge of maintaining order in the region of the Gulf.

In fact, the shah proclaims this very explicitly and proudly. In an interview with *Newsweek* in May 1973, for example, His Imperial Majesty declared: "West Europe, the United States, and Japan consider the Persian Gulf as integral to their security, but they are not in position to guarantee this security. We do it for them." The same tone was struck by the Iranian prime minister in an interview with Eric Rouleau: "This maritime route is very important for you Westerners. . . . In your interest and ours, we have offered our neighbors our support in case they should want to suppress subversive movements directed from abroad. At its request, the sultanate of Oman has extensively benefited from our military aid in repressing the rebellion in Dhofar." (*Le Monde*, October 7, 1973.)

In reality, the position of "guardian and protector" of the Gulf that the shah has arrogated to himself fits into Kissinger's new strategy of establishing "subimperialisms" as regional relays for U.S. imperialism: Iran in the Middle East, Brazil in Latin America, and so on. These are well-known facts, but they must be recalled briefly in order to examine how Chinese policy has reacted to them.

A spectacular Sino-Iranian rapprochement began in 1971. In August 1971 a joint communiqué was published that declared: "The government of the People's Republic of China firmly supports the just struggle of the imperial government of Iran to safeguard its national independence and sovereignty and to protect its natural resources." (*Le Monde*, December 2, 1971.) During a banquet held in Tehran on June 16, 1973, Chi Peng-fei, then Chinese minister of foreign affairs, praised the "policy of independence" of the Iranian monarch and judged "necessary and understandable" the strengthening of Iranian military potential, which was destined, he said, to combat "subversion" and "expansionism" by the superpowers. Chi Peng-fei is said to have assured his interlocutors in private that Peking approved of Iran's membership in the imperialist CENTO pact. (*Le Monde*, October 7, 1973.)

It is in this light that one must read a rather incredible little piece published in the magazine *Pékin Information* under the title: "Iran: un sujet d'inquiétude: l'influence soviétique au Moyen Orient" (Iran: A Source of Uneasiness: Soviet Influence in the Middle East). Here are some passages from that article: "During his visit to the United States the shah of Iran confirmed in a press conference last July 25 that Iran still wanted to acquire fighter-bombers from the United States in order to deal with the new models of Soviet Migs. . . . The shah declared at his press conference that Iran was prepared to come to the aid of the countries of the Persian Gulf and to Pakistan's aid as well, if they were attacked. The night before, at a welcoming ceremony at the White House opened by Nixon, the president of the United States, the shah said in his responding speech that his country was determined to make itself the guardian of peace and equilibrium in the vast region located between the Middle East and South Asia. He stressed that Iran wanted to preserve its independence and sovereignty." (*Pékin Information*, No. 31, August 6, 1973, p. 20.)

Marvels of "triangular diplomacy": China and the United States both support the shah's role as "guardian of peace and equilibrium" as well as his struggle against "Soviet influence." It is needless to stress the concrete meaning of this "pacifying" role: The sending of thousands of Iranian soldiers, along with tanks and planes (bought from the United States) to defend the sultan of Oman against the red guerrillas of Dhofar.

It is important to observe that on the part of the Chinese bureaucracy this is not simply a matter of declarations dictated by considerations of protocol and intended purely for diplomatic use. According to all the information we possess, this turn has extremely concrete practical consequences: the halting of military and material support to the Front for

the Liberation of Occupied Oman. According to Eric Rouleau, Chi Peng-fei declared during his trip to Tehran in 1973 that China was no longer supplying the rebels in Dhofar. (Le Monde, October 7, 1973.) Moreover, this is confirmed by an interview with the shah himself, in which he proclaimed with satisfaction that China had "completely" ceased aiding the Liberation Front. (Interview conducted by A. Fontaine, Le Monde, June 25, 1974.)

Are the motives for this opportunist and counterrevolutionary policy of the Chinese bureaucracy toward Iran economic in nature? Is it a question of absorbing the shah's fabulous billions of petrodollars? It is true that in November 1974 a Chinese economic delegation led by Li Chiang, the minister of foreign trade, visited Iran to negotiate about Iranian investments in the Chinese oil and petrochemical industry. (Le Monde, December 3, 1974.) But that said, it seems to us that the main motivation for the policy of the Chinese bureaucracy does not lie at such a "vulgar materialist" level. We will return to this point further on.

Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, the spectacular manifestation of a rapprochement that was actually already visible in 1971, fit into this overall framework. It is difficult to evaluate precisely the political consequences of this operation, but it is obvious that it contributed to Nixon's electoral victory in 1972.

Some elements of the former radical anti-imperialist orientation still remain in Chinese foreign policy in Asia. Cambodia and Korea provide the notable examples. Chinese aid to the FUNK in Cambodia has undoubtedly contributed decisively to the struggle of the revolutionary Khmers and this should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, one is entitled to wonder uneasily whether these progressive aspects of Chinese policy will be preserved in the future as the "great leap rightward" accelerates. Even now it can be said that Chinese support to the American presence in Thailand has extremely negative consequences for the revolutionary struggle in Cambodia in that the U.S. bases in Thailand are one of the principal sources of supply for Lon Nol's puppet army.

II. AFRICA

In Africa during the 1960s People's China supported "left nationalist" regimes like those of Tanzania, Somalia, etc. It also aided guerrilla movements against the proimperialist puppet regimes: Mulele's movement in the Congo, the UPC in the Cameroons, etc. Finally, in Angola it supported the most progressive anticolonial movement, the MPLA.

The 1970s brought a radical change. On the govern-

ment level, the Chinese bureaucracy did not abandon its regular clientele. But it considerably "enlarged" its list. There was the surprising reconciliation with Mobutu, the murderer of Lumumba and Mulele and U.S. imperialism's main man in Africa. In a welcoming speech delivered on the occasion of Mobutu's visit to Peking, Teng Hsiao-ping saluted the contribution of the president of Zaire "to the united struggle of the Third World against hegemonism" as well as his courage in "defying the despotism of the superpowers." (Peking Information, No. 51, December 23, 1974.)

As for Ahmadou Ahido, faithful instrument of French neocolonialism and assassin of Ouandié and thousands of revolutionaries in the Cameroons, he was also received triumphally in Peking by Chairman Mao and by Chou En-lai, who declared: "The Chinese people and government feel admiration for the success obtained by the government of the Cameroons in both foreign and domestic political matters." (Peking Information, No. 13, April 2, 1973.)

Finally, again in 1971, Mao received the Emperor Haile Selassie, the feudal despot of a bygone age, since deposed. The Chinese CP daily Renmin Ribao saluted the contribution of His Majesty "to the promotion of the cause of anti-imperialist unity in Asia and Africa." (Peking Information, No. 42, October 20, 1971.) As if the now departed emperor of Ethiopia were not one of the surest allies of American imperialism in Africa. In all three cases it was once again not simply a matter of empty words and diplomatic bows. All Chinese political, material, and military support to the UPC in the Cameroons and to the Eritrean Liberation Front was cut off beginning in 1971. (On the halting of support to the Eritrean fighters, see Le Monde, June 23, 1972.)

But the events most revealing of the Chinese turn in Africa were those in the Sudan in 1971. Let us briefly recall what happened: In July 1971 there was an attempted coup by the left wing of the army, supported by the Sudanese CP (one of the most powerful CPs in Africa). The reactionary General Nimeiry (with the aid of Sadat's Egypt) succeeded in crushing the rebellion. Hundreds of communists were arrested and massacred. The principal leaders of the CP, among them General Secretary Mahgoub and Shafei el-Sheikh, general secretary of the Sudanese trade-union federation, were hanged in an atmosphere of white terror and witch-hunt.

The Chinese bureaucracy unconditionally supported the Nimeiry regime, denouncing the abortive July coup as a maneuver undertaken by the USSR "through the intermediary of its agents in the Sudan." (Le Monde, December 25, 1973.) During his visit to China in December 1971 General Hassan Abbas, vice-president of the Sudanese military regime,

warmly thanked the Chinese government for its "economic and military support." (Le Monde, December 20, 1971.) Nimeiry's staunch anticommunism quickly paid off. During 1971 Washington extended a credit of \$18 million to the Sudanese government, Britain provided a credit of \$25 million, the International Monetary Fund (controlled by the United States) gave \$40 million, . . . and People's China gave a credit of \$80 million. (Le Monde, February 18, 1972.)

In reality, Mahgoub was far from being an "agent of Moscow." On several occasions he had demonstrated his (relative) independence of the bureaucratic Soviet leadership, refusing to dissolve the Sudanese CP (as the Egyptian CP was dissolved at Kremlin urging), criticizing the USSR's economic aid to the reactionary Abboud regime, etc. (On this subject, see Eric Rouleau, "Soudan: Les colonels sans les camarades," Le Monde, February 18, 1972, and "Zum Lage im Sudan," in Rote Press Korrespondenz, 1971, 5 Jg., p. 8-10.) But for Chinese policy, this was a "secondary" feature. In face of the "Soviet danger," Peking rallied to the support of the butchers of Sudanese communism.

It is extremely enlightening to examine the embarrassed justifications offered by European Maoist ideologues to explain this sinister incident. For Kostas Mavrikis, "the victory of the putschists would have meant simply that the Sudan would have fallen under the grip of social imperialism. The Chinese manifestly preferred the faction of the army that wanted to safeguard the country's independence." (Mavrikis, op. cit., p. 71.) At the same time, Mavrikis is compelled to recognize that "Nimeiry took advantage of his victory to extend repression among the masses." The conclusion that follows with Cartesian necessity is the following: The Chinese "manifestly preferred" a bloody regime that oppresses the masses, on the sole condition that it oppose "social imperialism," that is, the USSR. There could be no more explicit ignoring of the interests of the masses and of the class criterion in a policy that claims to be "Marxist" and "Leninist."

The most recent example of the Sino-American "objective convergence" in Africa is provided by Angola. The future of the ex-colony of Portugal is in process of being decided at this very moment. The least that can be said is that China is very effectively collaborating in establishing a pro-American solution. After supporting (together with the USSR) the left wing of Angolan nationalism, the MPLA, during the 1960s, China gradually changed its line, first aiding the UNITA of Jonas Savimbi, and then the Angola NLF of Holden Roberto. Holden, an intimate friend of Mobutu, has had close relations with U.S. imperialism since the beginning of the 1960s. "American advisers" have been discovered



*«present foreign
decided behind
the chinese mas*



*policy has been
the backs of
ses»*

in his ranks, including officers who served in South Vietnam. Moreover, in a statement to a French journalist in 1970, he denounced the MPLA as "communist" and complained that "the Western countries" had "fallen into the trap" of this movement. (See Basil Davidson, *L'Angola au coeur des tempêtes*, Maspero, 1972, p. 222 and 236.)

In December 1973 Holden Roberto was invited to China. Upon his return to Kinshasa he declared that a "cooperation agreement between the Chinese authorities and the Angola NLF has been established." (*Le Monde*, December 26, 1973.) Toward the end of 1974 some 200 Chinese instructors arrived in Zaire to train the ANLF's reserve army, stationed in Zaire, thus contributing to strengthening this pro-imperialist movement and placing an obstacle before the "Soviet influence" allegedly embodied in the MPLA. If Angola becomes a semicolony of U.S. imperialism, which is avidly interested in the country's fabulous mining wealth, Kissinger will be able to thank Mao the Helmsman for his precious aid extended in a difficult situation.

III. LATIN AMERICA

Latin America occupies a lesser place in Peking's politico-diplomatic concerns than do Africa and Asia. But the fundamental tendency is the same. Here, for example, is an item that appeared in *Pékin Information* in 1973: "On September 5 Western news agencies citing disclosures made by a spokesman of the U.S. Defense Department reported that a Soviet flotilla composed of a destroyer, a cruiser, a nuclear submarine, and a supply ship have undertaken activities in the Caribbean Sea. . . . The presence in the Western hemisphere of Soviet air and naval forces bearing nuclear arms, as well as their utilization of military bases in this region, constitutes a threat to peace and security in Latin America." (*Pékin Information*, September 24, 1973.) It is regrettable that this article, including its final commentary, looks as if it were directly extracted from a propaganda pamphlet of the United States Information Service: the "Soviet threat" to Latin America, etc. What military bases in the region are at issue? That is a transparent reference to Cuba. Is People's China prepared to support U.S. imperialism against Cuba, the bastion of Russian "social-imperialist influence" in the Western hemisphere?

The ambiguity of Peking's foreign policy in Latin America was strikingly manifested at the time of the overthrow of Allende in Chile. While denouncing the Pinochet coup (Chou En-lai's letter to Mrs. Allende, etc.), China, along with Rumania, was the only workers state that did not break diplomatic relations with the new regime. The Chinese authorities coldly discharged Allende's ambassador in China,

"after receiving a note from the new government divesting him of his functions." (Le Monde, October 12, 1973.) Let us add that it is not one of Peking's principles to maintain diplomatic relations with any country regardless of its government. For example, it did not have diplomatic relations with Portugal before 1974 because of Lisbon's colonial policy, and now, it seems, because of the presence of the Portuguese CP in the government. Furthermore, the Chinese Embassy in Santiago closed its doors and generally refused to admit persecuted militants seeking refuge.

But there is more. In October 1973, several weeks after the military coup and the barbarous repression that had fallen on the Chilean people, the Executive Committee of UNESCO unanimously adopted a resolution expressing its profound concern about the events in Chile. Two countries abstained on the vote on this resolution: the United States . . . and China. (Le Monde, October 16, 1973.) In addition, it should be noted that the first commentary published in the Chinese press after the coup discussed the "reactionary forces inside and outside the country," but carefully refrained from mentioning the role of U.S. imperialism in the affair. It was only in January 1974 that Renmin Ribao, breaking a silence of several months on Chile, revealed to its readers "the interference of imperialism" in the overthrow of Allende. Nevertheless, the article immediately stressed that U.S. imperialism was rapidly losing ground in Latin America and that the main danger now comes from the USSR! (Le Monde, January 21, 1974.)

IV. EUROPE

In 1971 China began to develop the theme of a united (capitalist) Europe opposed to the "superpowers." Nevertheless, we are now seeing a more and more pronounced drift toward the doctrine of a united Europe associated to the United States against "Russian social imperialism." In 1972 the Chinese leaders discreetly advised their European interlocutors to support the maintenance of American troops on the continent. Peking Information published without comment the "Atlanticist" declarations of a reactionary English lord: "Lord Chalfont criticized the idea that all military threat to Western Europe had disappeared and that consequently all the American troops could be withdrawn and NATO dismantled." (Peking Information, August 6, 1973, p. 21.)

Concurrently, Peking is developing its ties with certain regimes that are, let us say, not very democratic but do offer serious guarantees as to anti-Sovietism. In May 1973 Makarezos, vice-president of the Greece of the fascist colonels, visited China. During the classic diplomatic banquet, Li Hsien-nien, Chinese vice prime minister, greeted this

visit, which had "increased our mutual understanding and our friendship." (Le Monde, May 25, 1973.) What was the meeting ground for this "friendship" and "mutual understanding"? According to Alain Bouc, Le Monde's "Sinophile" correspondent in Peking, "it is obvious that Greece occupies an unequaled strategic position to observe, and even to control, Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean." Is it for this same "strategic" reason that China established diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain? Whether it is the case or not, on March 11, 1973, when these relations were established, Renmin Ribao published a historical sketch of Spain that "forgot" to mention the fascist character of the regime and even the civil war of 1936-39! Madrid-Peking relations are so cordial that when Carrero Blanco was executed by Basque revolutionaries, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei went to the Spanish Embassy in Peking to "express his sympathies" to the Francoist authorities! (Le Monde, December 24, 1973.)

The most recent episodes in Peking's "European line" were the invitations to China of Edward Heath, then head of the British Tory party, and later of Franz-Josef Strauss, the revanchist German nationalist, champion of the cold war, frenzied anticommunist, and advocate of "getting tough" with striking workers and dissident students. Received with full honors by Mao and Chou En-lai, Strauss listened with pleasure to Chinese generals who explained that "the security of West Europe can be assured only by the military support of the United States." (Le Monde, January 15, 1975.) This was the comment of K. S. Karol, a slightly disappointed friend of China: "One can only be astonished at the unconcern of the Chinese about the repercussions that their accolades to Franz-Josef Strauss and his ilk will have on the European workers movement." (Nouvel Observateur, February 10, 1975.)

It is also important to examine the "applications" of the Chinese orientation by Peking's faithful disciples in Europe. A recent pamphlet published by Humanité Rouge, the main Maoist sect in France, denounces the French bourgeoisie because it is tending toward capitulation to the USSR! Here are some extracts from this remarkable text: "The imperialist bourgeoisie will not resist through to the end. . . . Already on several occasions it has not reacted when there were Soviet submarine incursions into territorial waters (which happened again a month ago near Brest). . . . To be sure, there is a tendency toward compromise with social imperialism on the part of the French bourgeoisie. . . ." ("Vigilance contre le danger social-impérialiste soviétique en Europe," Humanité Rouge, p. 27, emphasis in the original.) The same pamphlet also denounces the acts within the French army of "the modern revisionists and their Trotskyist henchmen, who are using the movement of the draftees . . . to spread illusions

about the détente, to push our country toward submission before Soviet social-imperialism." (Ibid., p. 29.) See also the pamphlet significantly entitled: "Le social-impérialisme, danger principal en Europe" (Social Imperialism: Main Danger in Europe), published by Humanité Rouge in 1974, p. 19: "The Trotskyist leaders propagate dangerous pacifist ideas, particularly when they encourage conscientious objection and other antimilitarist positions, apparently justified by the struggle against the bourgeois army, in order to fool young intellectuals." Let us add by way of comment that this delirious Stalino-Maoist grouplet enjoys the total political support of People's China, as is shown by the articles from Humanité Rouge that are regularly published in Pékin Information (the latest in the issue of January 13, 1975).



What is the logic and meaning of the "great leap rightward"?

At the beginning of the process, it could have been thought that it was essentially only a diplomatic turn aimed at gaining Chinese access to the United Nations. Nevertheless, events since then clearly show that the phenomenon had other deeper and more serious implications going well beyond the requirements of UN-oriented diplomacy.

The official Chinese doctrine that serves as ideological justification for Peking's foreign policy is that of the "three worlds": the "superpowers" (the United States and the Soviet Union), the "socialist camp" (China and Albania), and the "intermediary zones" (Europe and the Third World), or, in its new version as explained by Teng Hsiao-ping, "hegemonism" (USA and USSR), the developed countries (Europe and Japan), and the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (For a Marxist critique of this theory, see Pierre Rousset, "The Three Worlds of Teng Hsiao-ping," in INPRECOR, No. 2, June 20, 1974.) Nevertheless, this doctrine does not at all correspond to the real Chinese policy. Coherence can be given to the Chinese international orientation, in our view, only with another conception, a bipolar one, in which there is "social imperialism" (that is, the USSR) on one side as the main enemy and the rest of the world (including the United States) on the other side. It is only from this dualist "vision of the world," more and more openly expressed by Chinese leaders, that the unity of the Chinese policy in Africa, Europe, and Asia can be grasped.

"The social-imperialist (or social-fascist) USSR is the main enemy." This formula is not without unfortunate similarities to the formulas of the Stalinist Comintern during the "third period" (1929-33). The Social Democracy, defined as "social-fascist," was

the main enemy, while the pure and simple Nazis and fascists were considered negligible, less dangerous, or "secondary." And with the remarkable results that are so well known: the triumph of Hitlerism in Germany and the Nazi aggression against the USSR after Hitler was able to monopolize the war industry of the whole European continent. The difference is that the Stalinist policy of the "third period" corresponded to a "bureaucratic left" turn, while the Chinese version of the 1970s fits into the framework of an accelerated "turn to the right."

For whom is the USSR the "main enemy"? For the Vietnamese people? For the Chilean masses? For the workers of Portugal? The history of the past thirty years has shown that American imperialism is the most powerful and most barbarous adversary that the international proletariat has had to confront since the fall of the fascist regimes, the force that is responsible for the immense "bloodbath archipelago" of which J.P. Faye speaks in his introduction to Noam Chomsky's book on the bloodbaths "made in the USA." This evidence can be denied only from a standpoint other than that of the international proletariat. This other standpoint is that of Chinese "reasons of state" as they are conceived by the Peking bureaucracy. For them, the USSR is the main enemy of the Chinese state, for it is Moscow that threatens China with military intervention. It is on the basis of this narrow nationalist view that they determine a foreign policy that has very little to do with the problems of the world class struggle.

Is the threat of the Soviet bureaucracy against People's China real or imaginary? There is no doubt that Soviet policy toward China during the 1970s (and before!) has been just as opportunist, right-wing, and counterrevolutionary as that of the Chinese leadership. The Soviet bureaucracy unconditionally supported the Indian bourgeoisie against People's China. It also made overtures to Taiwan. An article distributed by the bulletin produced by the Novosti Press Agency (No. 44, October 1973) underlined with complacency "the stability of the economic and political situation of Taiwan" and "the considerable strengthening of the international positions of the island as an independent unit." (Le Monde, January 2-3, 1973.) Finally, for a long time the USSR has refused to support the FUNK in Cambodia because of Sihanouk's pro-Chinese sympathies. Up to now, the Kremlin has maintained its ambassador to the rotten puppet regime of Lon Nol. Further, the Kremlin has massed troops near the Chinese border and has issued bellicose threats about the territorial differences between the two countries. There is therefore a "rational kernel" in the Chinese fears, but everything indicates that these fears are immeasurably inflated by the Maoist bureaucracy. It is improbable that the Soviet bureau-

cracy would engage in the suicidal adventure that a war with China would constitute.

Nevertheless, whether the "Soviet danger" is real or imaginary, it has been the basic postulate of Chinese foreign policy since 1971. This total subordination of the interests of the international proletariat to the "reasons of state" of a country that is supposed to be the "fatherland of socialism" is not a new phenomenon. It has always been the essence of the policy of the Stalinist USSR. The present orientations of the Chinese bureaucracy and the Soviet bureaucracy logically flow from the doctrine of "socialism in one country." In both cases "national interest" — as understood by the bureaucracy — is the sole criterion for determining foreign policy.

Sincere revolutionary militants of the colonial and semicolonial countries and of the imperialist metropolises who, while criticizing the present foreign orientation of China, continue to sympathize with the "Chinese road to socialism" or with the "thought of

Mao Tse-tung must draw all the conclusions. The revolution is an indivisible whole. You cannot be a Marxist-Leninist before the Chinese masses and an opportunist or counterrevolutionary before the Bengali, Ceylonese, and Sudanese proletariats, that is, before the international proletariat. It is obvious that Peking's present foreign policy has been decided behind the backs of the Chinese masses. It coincides with the return to power of the "rightist" elements that had been eliminated during the Cultural Revolution under the pressure of the Red Guards: Teng Hsiao-ping and company. It is the expression of the interests and conceptions of a bureaucratic layer, still less crystallized as a parasitic caste than that of the USSR, but whose orientation is outside any real democratic control by the Chinese workers. The Cultural Revolution demonstrated the difference of the Chinese leadership from the degenerated Soviet bureaucracy. Peking's foreign policy of the 1970s is now in process of demonstrating the limitations of this difference. ■

NEW LEFT REVIEW

Double issue 87/88 September-December 1974
90 pence (overseas £1.00, \$2.90)

Robin Blackburn
Jon Halliday
Ernest Mandel/ Bill Warren
Göran Therborn
Roy Medvedev
Theodor Adorno
John Berger

No. 89 January-February 1975
75 pence (overseas £1.00, \$2.90)

Includes a major study by Norman Geras of Rosa Luxemburg and the debate with Lenin, Trotsky, and others on the nature of the coming Russian revolution; two articles on domestic labor under capitalism and the relation between women's liberation and proletarian revolution; articles on the political and economic realities of People's China, including a revealing agricultural case study.

NEW LEFT REVIEW
7 Carlisle Street
London W1V 6NL

The Test in Portugal
Hong Kong: Britain's Chinese Colony
Debating the World Recession
Theorists of Ascendant Capital
What Lies Ahead for Us?
Commitment: Sartre and Brecht
Migrations Into Hell

Annual subscription:
£4.00 (overseas £6.00, \$16.00)



YUGOSLAVIA

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF STATES WITH SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS

by Mihailo Markovic

an introductory note

The document we are reprinting below originally appeared in Vienna in the winter issue of the review *Europäische Rundschau*. Its author, Professor Markovic, is probably the best known, both in Yugoslavia and abroad, of the eight professors of the University of Belgrade whose expulsion from the philosophy faculty had been demanded since the end of 1973 for "political and moral unfitness in the execution of teaching functions." A broad movement of solidarity developed around the eight professors, which for a long time prevented their expulsion; finally, the assembly of the Serbian Socialist Republic had to intervene to "dispose of" the "undesirables."

If Mihailo Markovic is the best known of the Yugoslav professors who have just been hit by this repression, it is especially because he was one of the most prominent authors criticizing Stalinist philosophical positions, even in the columns of the official review *Socialist Thought and Practice*, whose pages were generally open to him until the beginning of the 1960s. After that, he was one of the mainsprings of the review *Praxis* (created in Zagreb in autumn 1964). Markovic was not only one of those who provided the "philosophical" underpinnings for self-managed socialism; he was also, along with Ljubo Tadic and Gajo Petrovic, his comrades on *Praxis*, one of those who succeeded in developing Marxist thought to a high level in a country in

which philosophical traditions and Marxism itself have been characterized by a certain poverty.

The article below is an important document for an essential reason. It has the aspect of a "political manifesto" of the Yugoslav intellectual left, even if only a "temporary" or "transitory" one. In fact, most of the political documents of the philosophers of the Praxis school, while they presented criticisms of the bureaucracy, generally placed these criticisms within the framework of a critique of "statism," a critique that was itself inherited from, or more exactly developed from, the critique that the League of Yugoslav Communists made of the situation in the USSR and the "people's democracies" during the 1950s. A good example was provided by the book of Svetozar Stojanovic, "*Critique et Avenir du Socialisme*" (*Critique and Future of Socialism*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1971), which deals with the relationships that are allegedly "inevitably" instituted after a revolution and then are perpetuated and degenerate into a *sui generis* system. This book has the demerit of remaining extremely vague about the nature of the society and the character of the state. (Is it, for example, a third type of state side by side with the bourgeois state and the workers state?)

Mihailo Markovic's document thus represents a new stage in comparison with these positions. Its title

indicates great caution in characterizing the states and social forms prevailing in the countries of the East. As the author himself says, he is pointing to the contradiction that exists between the letter of the constitutional documents (which proclaim that socialism has been "realized") and reality. The point is that the situation is not so simple and that these societies pose obvious problems.

Is the "transitional society" really a step toward socialism or can it mark a stage of stagnation and then regression? Has capitalism been restored in most of the countries of East Europe, as the Chinese CP proclaims? Is it a question of a state capitalist system, as part of the far left in West Europe and North America asserts? Mihailo Markovic's document marks a stage in the resolution of these problems, but only a stage.

He explicitly rejects the two extreme theses that these societies are "socialist" or "capitalist." He also rejects the thesis, accepted today by many members of the Western Communist parties (in Italy, for example), that the relations of production are socialist (the "base" is socialist) while the institutions are not (the thesis of the contradiction between the "base" and the "superstructure"). Further, he clearly asserts that the program of the social revolution in the Marxist sense (the radical overturn of the relations of production) is very far from having been completed in these countries. Finally, on very important questions he shares the analyses that have been made by revolutionary Marxism.

Professor Markovic's document is a very clear denunciation of the bureaucratic layer that dominates these societies, among which Yugoslavia, despite its peculiarities, is no exception. He concludes that it is only by vanquishing the bureaucracy that the contradictions of postcapitalist society can be overcome, thus indicating very sharply the bureaucratic regime's character as an "obstacle." This conclusion may appear to be rather general. But obviously, we should not lose sight of the fact that

Markovic has previously published other documents in which he has defined the program of such a fight. (See especially *L'Homme et la Société*, No. 19, January-March 1971, p. 42-46.)

We must also emphasize the unfortunately current applicability of the remarks made in Markovic's article about the three subgroups of the intelligentsia; the apologists, the experts, and the critics. We are seeing in Yugoslavia today the rise of a swarm of sad gentlemen who are trying to win their stripes and gain favor with the regime by slogging away at their Praxis colleagues. Among this swarm we may simply mention Stipe Suvar, a not unintelligent sociologist, who partially owes his appointment last July as Croatia Republic secretary (that is, minister) of culture and education to his anti-Praxis enthusiasm. At the other extreme, there is Fuad Muhic, a lumpenphilosopher, this one totally devoid of intelligence, who is trying through the meanest sorts of attacks to become an important "figure" not only in his native Bosnia, but throughout the Yugoslav federation as well. (It was mainly he who attacked the philosophers of Praxis during the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.)

Where Markovic's text refers to the "charismatic" personality of Fidel Castro, one must also read, it seems to us, ". . . and Josip Broz Tito." This observation points to the "Bonapartist" aspects of certain "socialist" regimes and is reminiscent of some very penetrating notes on "Caesarism" by Antonio Gramsci.

Finally, let us end by mentioning an inaccuracy in Markovic's text when it brings up the "Menshevik" government of Mdivani. In fact, Boudou Mdivani was a Georgian Bolshevik with whom Lenin and Trotsky made a bloc against the brutal national policies of Stalin and Ordjonikidze. (See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Harvard University Press, 1964.)

The expression "states with socialist constitutions" implies that we are dealing with social forms that are not easily classified. These states have undergone deep political and economic transformations, whether as a result of socialist revolutions or as a result of outside military interventions by states in which the socialist revolution had occurred earlier.

The essential characteristics of this transformation are: the elimination of private property in the means of production and the institution of a state-controlled economic system; the destruction of the

political power of the bourgeoisie and the replacement of a parliamentary pluralism in which wealth played a considerable role by a one-party system in which political status is the sole source of power. The constitutions of these states are socialist; in them we find the expression of the long-sought goals of the socialist revolution: abolition of exploitation and all class differences; remuneration on the basis of the principle "to each according to his work"; assignment of the determining role in society's decisions to the workers; and considerable extension of human rights, with freedom of labor, social se-

curity, free education, and control of the factories being added to the bourgeois-democratic rights.

But in all these countries there is a wide discrepancy between the socialist principles of the constitution and the reality of society, in which much social inequality, tyranny, and oppression that are characteristic of class societies continue to exist. This discrepancy is a consequence of the fact that in none of these countries has the socialist revolution been carried through to the end.

In the Marxist sense, socialist revolution is the radical transformation of the relations of production. Connected to this is the elimination of all social structures that permit one social group to control the labor of another and to appropriate a considerable portion of surplus-value. According to Marx, the political seizure of power is the beginning of the process of the transformation of all existing social relations.

A further explanation for the gap between ideology and reality is the fact that the political phase of the socialist revolution took place in backward societies in which the liberating forces of enlightenment and of the bourgeois-democratic revolution had not come to fruition. These societies had typical backward feudal institutions and models of social relations that had never been transformed; they were marked by privilege, inequality before the law, subordination of legislative and judicial systems to the executive power, recognition of the political leader by the public as an absolute ruler, transformation of the citizenry into ingenuous, obsequious vassals prepared to bow to any official policy dictated from above. Under these conditions, the vanguard of the revolutionary movement very soon became a new ruling elite. What had previously been unequal political status became unequal participation in power. Once hierarchical and authoritarian structures were fully developed, they led inevitably to typical class differentiations. To be sure, the means of production were nationalized. But they were never really social property: They are alienated from the producers and are under the complete control of the new ruling elite. To be sure, profit as the classical capitalist form of appropriation of surplus-value has disappeared; but many more or less hidden forms of exploitation live on and have gained much ground in recent years.

Thus, these systems cannot simply be classified as socialist or state capitalist; they are special mixtures of varying elements — and while they present the appearance of great stability, many sharp latent conflicts and contradictions smolder under the surface.

One of the fundamental weaknesses of these systems

is that they have yet to sufficiently develop strategies for resolving conflicts democratically and non-violently. This is not only because of the lack of democratic traditions derived from an original progressive-liberal bourgeois era, which never existed for these societies. An additional explanation can be sought in the character of the revolutionary movements before they took power.

Given the colossal superiority of the ruling regime, the movement had a chance to bring down the regime only through the development of monolithic unity, the strictest discipline, and an uncompromising militant spirit. Under these conditions, formed over decades, the adherents of this movement looked for the enemy everywhere, even when he was nowhere in sight, and it was always easy to manipulate the movement so that it saw in every dissident opinion a veiled form of the class enemy and reacted accordingly. Where differences and conflicts of interest cannot be tolerated and handled flexibly, two other forms of reaction are possible: occasional violent collisions, which are always presented as destruction of dangerous conspiracies, or suppression of conflict whereby the facade of unity is preserved and, at the same time, a desperate attempt is made to mobilize all inner forces against a dramatic, very exaggerated danger. The sharper the inner conflicts, and the less confident the ruling elite is of being able to eliminate them, the more warlike the incantations against the "class enemy" become. This mechanism explains at least partially both the increasing repression within each country and the occasional sharp increase in aggressiveness among states.

Three basic contradictions

Although there are many differences among the various societies of the type we are considering, without exception they suffer from the following three basic contradictions:

*Permanent, although most often latent, conflict between the ruling bureaucracy and the powerless working people.

*Constant warfare among the various layers and factions of the bureaucracy.

*Finally, despite the great efforts of the central powers to establish full control over the leading groups in the national republics and in the regional and local areas, these other groups are continually trying to broaden their own autonomy and power in their own domains; this produces divisive tendencies and particularist orientations on the one side and centralist countermeasures on the other side: orches-

trated campaigns against national minorities, purges, and military interventions that take on a clearly imperialist character on the international arena.

Politics and bureaucracy

The most important concepts with which this analysis is concerned are politics and bureaucracy. According to Max Weber, politics is the totality of efforts that are undertaken in order to participate in power or to have influence in the sharing of power, either among states or among various groups within a single state. Second, this activity is fundamentally the domain of states; and third, the state is a power relationship of people over other people, sustained by the resources of legitimized violence. In this sense, politics in comparison with praxis was defined by Marx as a province of alienation. Political activity becomes praxis under the following conditions:

*Application of the rule of men over men becomes the rule of men over things. Political praxis is in essence self-administration, conscious and rational coordination and mastery of social processes without any professional rulers.

*The criterion of the worth of various alternatives in this process is the satisfaction of real human needs, not the increase and preservation of power.

*Therefore, political praxis has universal significance and concerns every person.

*Political praxis is not unconnected to other forms of creative activity, nor is it inconsistent with them; it contains within it elements of philosophical understanding, scientific knowledge, and even beauty; it must not violate moral norms.

*Such activity — without subjugation, tutelage, and fear — is especially attractive and offers all people a chance for common control and for the development of an important dimension of their social being.

Politics is a province of alienation when it becomes an activity monopolized by an established group of professional rulers. That sort of politics reduces men to things, to passive and apathetic objects of manipulation; it serves the special interests of a privileged social group; it is conducted behind closed doors, becomes pragmatic, irrational, and immoral, and develops various meaningless rituals aimed at stirring up primitive aggressive passion as a means of binding its practitioners together.

While the concept of political praxis expresses an optimal historical opportunity of our epoch, the con-

cept of politics managed by professionals clearly expresses a negative moment. It implies that an essential limitation exists that can and must be overcome.

Viewed in this way, the bureaucracy is not merely a group of officials, experts, and managers; under given conditions charismatic leaders also belong to it, the shapers of politics whose positions are connected not simply to their abilities and expert knowledge, but also to their rewards in the past. In spite of all the differences between these two groups of professional politicians in postcapitalist society, both belong to the privileged elite that holds a virtual monopoly on political and economic power and consequently plays the role of subject in history. This elite consists not only of influential functionaries of the party and state apparatus, but also includes the top managers, the leading personalities of the mass media and cultural institutions, and, definitely, the military leaders. The overwhelming majority of these people were appointed or "elected" to their posts because they held high status in the party; or in some cases they achieved their high positions thanks to specialized knowledge and were then co-opted by the party and became responsible and accountable to it.

The interests of the bureaucracy obviously come into conflict with the fundamental aspirations of all other social layers, all of which are ruled-over and more or less exploited.

The peasants' opposition

The peasants were the first to rebel, and to a high degree they are still a foreign body for the bureaucracy, and even for socialism as such. To some extent this derives from their class position. They are individual producers, small proprietors who are naturally interested in the survival of the market economy and the extension of their own property.

During the early phases of the revolution, they were always ready to take part actively, so long as the revolution was associated with agrarian reform, resistance to foreign rule, the war of national liberation, and the elimination of gross inequality in the distribution of goods. The opposition of the peasants to the new revolutionary regime during later stages was the inevitable result of a certain development: The shortage of capital meant that the limited industrialization could be carried out only through an immense draining of the resources of the rural economy. The policy of compulsory delivery of agrarian produce at fixed prices, the expropriations, the high tax burdens, forced collectivization — all these things repelled the peasants and led, especially in the USSR, where the pressure was strongest,



**«the interests of the
bureaucracy come into
conflict with the
aspirations of all other
social layers»**

to dozens of armed uprisings that never had a chance of success.

The reason why the peasant resistance was condemned to failure from the outset lay in its mistaken historical perspective: A society of small landholders using primitive technology belongs to the past. (It would have a future only in the event of the total breakdown of contemporary industrial society.) On the other hand, the state cannot industrialize the rural economy overnight and must reach a *modus vivendi* with the peasantry over a period of decades. The solution that has been generally adopted today satisfies no one: Provided that he accommodates himself to the compulsory model of the collective economy in which his rights are extremely narrow, the peasant may own a tiny plot of land which he works as an individual producer. His social existence is thus divided; he lives in two worlds: in a private one in which he is free but remains subject to the

fetters of the precapitalist past, and in a public one, extolled to him as the form of the new life, in which he feels powerless and alienated. The peasants are eliminated from the political stage; they are treated as second-class citizens. They react to this with low productivity and passive resistance.

The Chinese communes and the Yugoslav rural-industrial self-managed enterprises seem to offer a better solution. The only way out of the conflict is the loosening of state control and the creation of technologically well-equipped and relatively independent enterprises and local communities in which the peasants become workers, collective producers with the right to participate in decision-making and control.

What the workers were promised

During the early stages of the postrevolutionary development, the new state enjoyed the unlimited support of the workers. It was the duty of the new state to free the workers, and it really did free them from capitalist rule. It spoke and ruled in their name. It offered them considerable social security, better chances for development, a higher standard of living. All these improvements in the social position of the workers clouded the picture of social reality and resulted in the workers' not yet seeing through the real character of the bureaucracy, even when the objective interests of the bureaucracy had long since come into conflict with those of the workers.

The revolutionary vanguard promised to free the workers from exploitation and to give them full command of the surplus-value of their labor. Only later did the workers learn that a large part of this surplus-value would be appropriated by the state and would flow mainly into the pockets of their former leaders. The enormous material privileges that these leaders command, much more than their high salaries, become a new form of exploitation.

The workers were also told that after the revolution they would rule the country. Afterwards, it turned out that in the best of cases they were granted some say in the factories; in the worst of cases the workers remain completely under the thumb of the managers even here. The only area in which initiative can develop is production; it is permissible to increase it. In all other things, all that is expected of the worker is that he follow the party directives, obey the orders of the state, and contribute his physical strength to the attainment of the various five-year plans handed down from above.

The workers were also promised the highest level of democracy that had ever existed in history: socialist

democracy. But the bureaucracy, acting in the name of socialism, has robbed the workers of many of their traditional rights: the right to organize, to agitate freely, to have their own press, to assemble with others and express their critical opinions freely, to fight for the improvement of their working and living conditions, to demonstrate, to strike. Most of these rights are guaranteed in the constitution; in real life they exist only on paper.

The gap between the theoretical and actual status of the worker is truly vast. If the workers became conscious of all the possibilities opened up by the new historical situation after the elimination of the capitalist class, their open conflict with the bureaucracy, which prevents the realization of these possibilities, would be inevitable and would take the form of a class war.

The bureaucracy successfully utilizes a whole range of means to prevent the development and maturing of this consciousness. The bureaucracy makes use of all possible symbols of the revolution in order to feign an unbroken continuity between the former revolutionary vanguard and itself. It develops an ideology that justifies social inequality and lays heavy stress on law, order, economic growth, and efficiency — typical values of all contemporary ideologies based on maintaining the status quo. It diverts all workers demands for organization and participation through the cynical assertion ad absurdum that the workers already have their organization, which is the party, that they already participate in controlling society indirectly through their leadership, and that in any case the right of the workers to demonstrate and strike — against themselves — is unnecessary. Any attempt at self-organization or expression of public criticism is punished as a political crime. Comparisons with other social systems are prevented because traveling abroad is prohibited or at least made very difficult. Finally, one of the bureaucracy's most important methods in maintaining control is the constant discovery of new enemies. The omnipresent, ever lurking and scheming enemy, like the old Christian devil, plays a unifying and mobilizing role, leads errant lambs back to the path of righteousness, re-establishes order, and keeps the regime on its feet.

But when the living conditions of the workers worsen beyond certain limits, all these smokescreen maneuvers prove useless, as is shown by the well-known and bloody workers revolts in Berlin (1953), Poznan and Budapest (1956), and Gdansk (1970). The bureaucracy is determined to drown such rebellions in blood; after that, preparations are made to improve the elementary living conditions of the workers.

The fact that these conditions are gradually improv-

ing and that a considerable section of the bureaucracy actually does possess a revolutionary past and has erected a mythology around its person confuses most of the workers and conceals their real position in society. Only an adequate new revolutionary theory can bring greater clarity to their consciousness.

Apologists, Experts, Critics

That is the reason why those intellectuals who devote themselves to developing a theory under the new conditions immediately become targets of bureaucratic repression. It is not simply a conflict between intellectuals and politicians, between pragmatism on the one side and idealism on the other. As a social group the intelligentsia can be divided into at least three subgroups: apologists, who are prepared to serve, defend, and prettify any social order; experts, who, operating from a position of pure, neutral knowledge, have no desire to commit themselves to anything; and critics, who analyze the limits of the given social form and seek possibilities for building a freer, more just and human structure of society.

The bureaucracy cannot rule without the ideological and technical services of the apologists and the experts. On the other hand, their rule would be seriously threatened by the free development of critical social thought and the consequent higher political consciousness among workers and youth, especially students. This sort of thought threatens and demystifies the bureaucracy's authority. The deep crises of the system in 1956 and 1968 were brought about through conditions the basis for which had been prepared by the critical ideas of philosophers, social scientists, and writers. The bureaucracy has since resolved not to take any broader risks and is presently utilizing the full arsenal of repressive measures — from bans on publications to arrests and expulsions of dangerous intellectuals.

During the period in which the opposition between the bureaucracy and the outside world is pushed to the background, is in a lull, or is well under control, the internal contradictions of the bureaucracy burst to the surface: The history of the countries that call themselves "socialist" is in large part a history of struggles within the established elite.

The major role that interests us here is that played by the highest state functionaries, the party leaders, the factory and bank managers, the top experts of the regime, the highest leaders of the army and security services, and the leading personalities of the mass media and the cultural establishment.

The status of these layers varies. It is characteristic of the so-called socialist societies that the highest

status, and with it the greatest power, is linked to the commanding positions of the party. Under this system, even the highest state functionaries, generals, and top officials of the security services can be only second-rank figures. The status of the technocrats is even lower; they do not belong to the inner circle that makes the most important decisions. The bureaucrats of the mass media and the cultural and educational system fulfill the function of transmission belt prepared to serve and contribute the necessary decorum, but in periods of acute struggle between the separate factions their support can have great significance.

Hard-liners and liberals

As far as the line-up goes, the spectrum is broad, ranging from the hard-liners—champions of order, monolithic unity, and centralized leadership—to the liberals, who press for greater multiplicity and for local autonomy within limits. The struggle between the hard-liners and the liberals represents at bottom the contradiction between the advocates of two different political and economic models, both allegedly "socialist." The classic example of the first model is the system built by Stalin: tightly planned economy, unchallenged rule by the party bodies over all social life, total centralization of decision-making, ruthless oppression of any intellectual opposition, special stress on extensive economic growth.

The liberal model, the goal of many attempts at reform after the death of Stalin, recommends to a certain degree the principles of the market economy and attempts to combine planning with competition and profitability; it favors the loosening of party control over the economy and culture and allows some room for decentralized decision-making. Finally, it wants to replace hard administrative measures against unwanted tendencies with more subtle methods, namely, elimination and political counter-offensive. The Yugoslav model, with its original forms of self-management and its wide-ranging decentralization, goes even further in this direction, although it likewise reestablishes under altered forms and conditions the conflict between the party of order and the liberal faction.

This struggle is waged essentially in the central bodies of the party, although no Communist party allows formal factions. But their social roles predestine many groups to adhere to one or the other faction. Thus, as a rule the highest leaders of the army and the security services support the party of order, while general sympathy for the liberal faction can be expected from the technostructure and the top functionaries in cultural spheres. The situation is additionally complicated by personal rela-

tionships and loyalties and by the fact that principles and convictions play a much less important role in this struggle than considerations of utility and effectiveness. The existence of a charismatic leader complicates the entire situation still further. Himself undecided as to which solution is best, he chooses sides from time to time in the vague feeling that he can strengthen his own power in this way, and he thus contributes to the victory of this or that side in a manner that is unpredictable. Castro's behavior during the 1960s provides a good example of this.

Chances for new development

This sort of struggle may go on for a long time behind closed doors, deep beneath the surface of public life. The evolution of society will normally not be seriously influenced by its results.

Nonetheless, it does happen that conflicts within the bureaucracy are resolved in some manner that actually opens up the broader development on a new field. One of the necessary conditions for this is that there be a solid core within the liberal faction, personalities who actually think democratically and have not lost their revolutionary character. This character may sometimes be submerged in the attempt to accommodate the new way of life. But it can reappear again as soon as conditions permit. A more important precondition is the existence of a more or less spontaneous movement, or at least a need among the masses for greater changes in society. These are the preconditions for the evolution of these social systems. The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Dubcek era in Czechoslovakia after January 1968 are two striking examples.

There are other, less favorable alternatives. One is the freezing of conflicts on the basis of the formation of a strong bureaucratic center, which can only perpetuate the stagnation of the system. Another unfavorable, retrogressive development would be the altering of the character of the contradiction: In place of the unresolved social conflicts, their surrogate, the national conflict, comes to the fore.

From the standpoint of Marxist theory national conflicts are unthinkable after a victorious proletarian revolution. Only capitalists have an interest in the exploitation of the people: the workers are interested only in liberation, and the road to liberation passes through the elimination of all forms of exploitation.

Lenin proposed that within a state with many peoples the workers of the ruling nation should fight for the right of all nations to full self-determination, including separation, while the workers of the oppressed nation should fight to remain within the

multinational society. This principle was put into practice in 1918; Lenin delegated his young co-worker Stalin to go to the first congress of the Finnish Social Democratic party, where in the name of the Russian Council of Peoples Commissars he was to explain that the Finnish proletariat was free to choose whether to live together in the same state with the Russian proletariat or to separate from it. The Finnish Social Democracy wanted state unity, but the Finnish bourgeoisie was of another opinion and launched a bloody civil war with Russia. When a similar situation later developed in Georgia, where the Mdivani brothers set up a separate Menshevik regime, Stalin sent his army and annihilated the separatists physically. Since then, the socialist world has been haunted by national conflicts.

The roots of this conflict are manifold. Historical traditions, injustices committed, and uneven levels of development inherited from the past certainly play an important role. But the factor that is relevant for us is the role of the bureaucracy in the generation of nationalist tension in multinational federations.

The bureaucrats of the federation, like those in the national units, are responsible for the rise of nationalist forces: the central bureaucracy because it usually insists on centralism, unity, and a uniform, undifferentiated treatment of all the national units and on the right of the central power to intervene; the national bureaucracy because it wants to be the master on its own turf and toward this end exaggerates differences with other nations.

The national bureaucracies condemn nationalism, but at the same time they are inclined to foster it. The reasons for this attitude are important. The first is that it is the only possibility the national bureaucracy commands to free itself from the tute-

lage of the central bureaucracy. Second, the national bureaucracy seeks to strengthen its own material position, for which it requires the redistribution of national wealth. It is quite characteristic that in its struggle against such centers of alienated economic power as investment funds, right of control over the banks and the big import-export firms of the federation, only the question of redistribution comes up, not the question of real socialization. Third, the national bureaucracies seek through mobilizing indigenous forces for declared national goals to awaken the political interest of the apathetic workers and peasants, to place a veil of forgetfulness over the real social problems, and to elevate itself to the leading power of a real mass movement.

The usual strategy in building a nationalist movement lies on the one hand in stirring up hatred for another nation, the "main oppressor," and on the other hand in fostering self-sympathy for one's own nation, the "main victim." Once the initiative is taken by the bureaucracy, a whole army of national-minded economists, statisticians, historians, and journalists takes up the task of digging up corresponding data and opinions and hammers them into people's heads.

In order to compensate for the damage done by this, a vast conscious effort is required. The central bureaucracy does not bother about such fine points. Its strategy in fighting nationalism (as in fighting anything else) consists in simply defining it as a conspiracy of the class enemy and crushing it as such.

The bureaucracy is not capable of resolving all these conflicts. The fundamental contradictions of post-capitalist society can be eliminated only through the elimination of the bureaucracy itself. ■

news of the
workers movement
& the
international



BELGIUM



Comrade André Henry, leader of Glaverbel strikers, confronts BSN director Riboud during occupation of BSN Paris headquarters Feb. 17.

glaverbel: an exemplary strike

Since January 16, 1975, some 600 workers of the Glaverbel glass factory in Gilly (Charleroi) have been on strike, occupying the factory in struggle against the threat to close it down that had been announced by the owners: the French multinational trust BSN which, along with the French trust Saint-Gobain and the British trust Pilkington, controls the entire European glass industry.

This tenacious strike, which is now in its fifth week and opposes 600 workers to a superpowerful trust that exploits a total of 73,000 wage workers and salaried employees, has been exemplary in several respects:

*It is led democratically by the workers themselves. They have elected a strike committee that includes two or three strikers elected by the workers of each sector, recallable at any time by rank-and-file assemblies and regularly accountable before general assemblies.

*It has combined the broadest workers democracy with concern for preserving the permanent trade-union structures. The leader of the strike committee, Comrade André Henry, is also a main delegate to

the FGTB (Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Belges — General Federation of Belgian Workers, the major trade-union federation).

*It has succeeded in touching off a vast movement of solidarity encompassing the whole trade-union movement in the Charleroi region. On January 21 a special intertrades congress of the FGTB of Charleroi, which assembled 500 delegates representing tens of thousands of workers, agreed under pressure from the rank and file to make nonclosure of Glaverbel-Gilly a precondition for any intertrades negotiations with the employers and decided to organize solidarity demonstrations. The other trade-union federation, the CSC (Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens — Confederation of Christian Trade Unions), is also associated with the movement of solidarity.

*The organization of solidarity has not been left solely to the trade-union leaderships. Solidarity committees have been formed in many Belgian cities; contacts have been established among workers in many factories; and active solidarity has been forged with the workers of another factory who have risen up against the threat of closure, the workers

The question of the necessity for armed struggle in Argentina was posed among broad sectors of the vanguard and radicalized sections of the working class and the student movement with the outbreak of the mass struggle in an explosive, semi-insurreccional form during the Cordobazo. It was around this question that Pancho broke with Palabra Obrera in 1970. During that year he continued his militant activity as a student, and then as a professor, in assemblies against the dictatorship, in street demonstrations, and in the political economy department of the university; this led to his second arrest. His political and intellectual capacities led him to form a group of Marxist professors, which succeeded in pushing through a Marxist study program in the political economy department; this allowed for the politicization of an important nucleus of students who adhered to the organizations of the revolutionary left.

At the end of 1972 Comrade Pancho joined the nascent revolutionary Marxist opposition current that was later to give rise first to the Fracción Roja of

the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Workers party), and later to the Liga Comunista Revolucionario. His solid Trotskyist training led him to play an important role and to assume various leadership responsibilities in our organization.

Fifteen years of militant revolutionary activity represents an exemplary path of development for a revolutionary intellectual integrated into the struggle of the working class. For our organization, this path of development is representative of a process of recomposition of the vanguard in the course of which there will emerge the elements and opportunities that will permit the formation of a revolutionary Marxist party.

Comrade Pancho, we will continue the struggle for workers power and for socialism, for the Fourth International!

HASTA LA VICTORIA SIEMPRE!

SOUTH ASIAN MARXIST REVIEW

Revolutionaries from various countries of the Indian subcontinent have undertaken publication of a new Marxist theoretical review devoted to problems of the South Asian revolution. The magazine is called *South Asia Marxist Review* and sells for 25 British pence (1 rupee, 75 US cents plus postal costs for overseas copies). Subscriptions and correspondence should be directed to Upali Cooray, 182 Pentonville Road, London N.1, England.

The editorial committee is composed of comrades Tariq Ali, Upali Cooray, Brian Davey, S. Kumar, Acca Llanerole, Meg Mansfield, A. Suja, and Prit Sappal.

Two issues have appeared so far. The contents have been:

No.1: Upali Cooray: Perspectives of the Revolu-

tion in the Indian Subcontinent; Statements of the Fourth International on Chile; Prit Sappal: A Marxist Critique of Indian Stalinism.

No.2: Editorial: Let Them Eat Atomic Bombs!; Brian Davey: Modes of Production and Socioeconomic Formations; A. Llanerole and M. Mansfield: Ceylon, Repression and Aftermath; Alan Adler: The Struggle in the Arab World; Werner Olle and Ulf Walter: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Technocracy; Prit Sappal: The Naxalites and the Indian Revolution.

We strongly urge all comrades who are interested in the Indian revolution and want to support it to buy and distribute this magazine which will play an important role in the formation of new revolutionary Marxist cadres among the various nationalities of the Indian subcontinent.