

Fourth International

Trotsky Memorial Issue

10 Years After the GPU Assassination

Leon Trotsky --- A New Vindication

Stalin's Frame-Up System

The Test of Yugoslavia

Downfall of Colonial Empires

July-August 1950

25c

Manager's Column

"I think the latest issue of the FI is splendid. I gave my copy to a friend who was very impressed." This opinion, expressed by J. H. of London, England, seems to sum up the general reaction of our subscribers to the May-June Fourth International which was devoted to "Marxism and the Negro Struggle."

"Please send us 20 more copies," Dixon Woods of San Francisco wrote us. "Last night after the Literature Committee meeting, I sat down and read the new FI from cover to cover. It's really a superb, all-around theoretical and programmatic treatment of the Negro question. Since our headquarters here is in the center of the Negro business district, we expect many new readers and contacts through this issue."

A few days later, Dixon reported that a subscriber told him this is "the first time she has gotten a rounded, theoretical picture of the Negro question, and she especially praised the article 'Equality under the Welfare State' for the way in which it shows the development of the Negro question according to the historical laws of capitalist development. And this after years of 'education' which she had in the Communist Party. In that connection, she thought the article 'Stalinism and Negro Intellectuals' very much to the point."

The Pittsburgh comrades doubled their usual order when they heard about the plans for this issue and then after getting the bundle, Freddie Forrest sent a postcard: "This issue of the FI is going like hot-cakes. Please send us immediately 15 more copies. We think the issue is great and hope it sells that well everywhere."

The Boston branch of the Socialist Workers Party at first thought 35 extra copies of the issue would do. Then after thinking it over, they decided they could do better

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since the NAACP was holding a convention in their city. Here's Sid's report: "We think the sales were phenomenal. The total was 102 copies sold to delegates and five copies in a neighborhood store." That was the score a few days after getting their bundle.

As a starter, Detroit sent for 125 extra copies. "We feel it can be of great aid to us here," Literature Agent Howard

Mason told us. "It's going to receive the widest circulation throughout the city that we can give it."

A few weeks later, Howard wrote again: "It's a very fine issue. All reports are unanimous on this and sales the first week reflected the enthusiasm. One comrade told me he has no trouble selling them. Just shows the cover and asks for the quarter. But the gratifying

thing is that he has had people look him up the next day and comment favorably on the articles they read. I think another order of 75 copies would be a proper amount at this time."

The Philadelphia branch of the SWP took and extra 65 copies to begin with. They expect "to use the issue to good advantage during the election campaign."

Chicago ordered 25 extra copies; Oakland, 9; Flint, 17; and New York, 100.

May we remind our literature agents that we can still fill orders for more copies?

* * *

Although Fourth International is published in the very citadel of world imperialism; its real ties are with the working people everywhere. Our aim is to serve their theoretical needs in the struggle for socialism. Consequently, comments from our readers abroad are particularly welcome, whether critical or otherwise, as they indicate how well we are succeeding in living up to our aim.

Here's a letter from R. S. B. of Ceylon we appreciated: "There is a dog-fight for FIs here. So I will have to request you to increase our bundle by another 25 copies. The members like to take the FI home to chew. Then they file it or try amateur binding. There is not one left of the January-February issue and about five comrades furious with me that I didn't give them copies. Please send 25 more of that issue as well as March-April.

"The FI has kept up a very high standard, especially since last August. We were of course very sorry that it had to become a bi-monthly. We do miss the Arsenal of Marxism. For most, it is the first time Trotsky's articles become available. There are very few who can afford to buy even borrow the big works. They are scarce here. Also I think that a restatement of FI positions, showing how well they have been vindicated by events is important. Do try to get in some of Trotsky's articles. There must be many never before published in English."

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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10 Years After the GPU Assassination

Leon Trotsky --- A New Vindication

By **GEORGE CLARKE**

Ten years after his assassination, the epic struggle of Leon Trotsky to defend the heritage of Leninism against the counter-revolutionary Kremlin bureaucracy, which ordered his death, approaches vindication. The ideas and program of the great theorist and practitioner of the science of Marxism are being tested and confirmed in the crisis of world Stalinism and especially in its most dramatic and positive expression, the Yugoslav revolution.

Trotsky did not—and could not—specifically predict the Yugoslav revolution, nor its collision and rupture with the Soviet bureaucracy. What he foresaw was the dynamics of social forces and the main lines of their development.

Stalinism, he never tired of reiterating, is a transitory phenomenon born out of working class defeats and reaction. It is not a stage of social evolution comparable to slavery, feudalism or capitalism. The bureaucracy is a cancerous growth on Soviet society, sapping its vital powers, obstructing its healthy growth, and not a new class organically tied to the development of the productive forces.

Stalinism in the Soviet Union was and remains a crisis regime. The parasitism and plundering of the privileged ruling caste clashes violently with the needs and interests of the masses. Hence the ruthless, barbaric, totalitarian dictatorship.

The conflict inevitably spread to the world arena where the Soviet bureaucracy ran afoul of the socialist and revolutionary aspirations of the proletarians of other countries. The Communist workers viewed Stalinism as the banner-bearer and inheritor of the October Revolution. But the Kremlin gangsters were neither impressed nor influenced, because to spur the revolution abroad meant digging their own grave in the Soviet Union. They could not permit the workers' movement any other role than that of human merchandise to be traded for machines or treaties in diplomatic haggling with world imperialism. Hence the counter-revolutionary policies of Stalinism which has led to the extension of its crisis far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

Although confirmation of Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism was not lacking in his lifetime, it was largely negative in character. There were the extinction of the political and

social gains of the revolution, the terror against the Bolsheviks and the masses, the monstrous growth of inequality, the Moscow Trials, the purges. There were the capitulation to the British labor fakers and Chiang Kai-shek in the Twenties and to Hitler in the Thirties, the betrayal of the Spanish civil war, the policies of social patriotism, class collaboration, People's Fronts and the Hitler-Stalin alliance. But Trotsky above all had no illusion that this negative corroboration of his ideas would increase their popularity except among a few objective social thinkers—and they were few indeed!—and among the sparse cadres of the new revolutionary internationalists.

Trotsky predicted that in the victory or defeat of the revolutionary upsurge generated by the war the "Russian Question" would be decided. He believed that the bureaucracy spawned in the backwash of capitalist reaction would be consumed in war, the most virulent form of that reaction, and with it would perish the last remaining conquests of October, the socialized property forms. Or, the proletarian revolution resurgent in the West or the East would reinvigorate the Russian masses to restore the workers' state to its robust original health by cutting away the unnatural and hideous growths of Stalinism.

The Conditional Test of the War

The conclusion of the war apparently refuted this prognosis of Trotsky. The proletarian revolution had not triumphed anywhere in the capitalist world. Far from being overthrown, the Kremlin had emerged a mighty military power, extending its control over one-third of Europe and dominating the working class movement on the entire continent. But the refutation was only apparent. Stalinism survived not because of intrinsic strength or stability. It had profited from a temporary conjuncture, from a temporary stalemate between the principal contending classes, neither of which proved able to resolve the social crisis definitively in its favor.

Western imperialism was debilitated by the war; the economic and financial structures of all the great powers but

the United States were in a state of paralysis or collapse; it was shaking from the assault of a great revolutionary upsurge. Immediately after Germany's defeat, Anglo-American imperialism was in no position to join the decisive issue with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the European proletariat, although exhibiting an unprecedented revolutionary consciousness and will, lacked the leadership to bring its struggles to a successful culmination. Stalinism prevented it from dealing a death blow to capitalism throughout Europe, but the working class could not liberate itself from this treacherous parasite without first submitting its illusions about Stalinism to the test of experience.

In awe, fright and consternation before the expanding power of Stalinism, which now appeared omnipotent to them, a great stampede began among the petty-bourgeois empiricists and intellectuals. One section fled toward the Kremlin and another away from it, both sections dropping Marxism by the way like so much encumbering ballast. Both saw in the Soviet bureaucracy a new, powerful and stable anti-capitalist social force. The Stalinophiles in Europe, feeling the pressure of the Kremlin at close hand, considered it a necessary social evil, which despite its crimes and barbaric methods had become the locomotive force of history. They urged the proletariat, whose independent historic mission, they said, had been pre-empted by the Russian bureaucrats, to accommodate themselves to the Soviet ruling caste and await liberation at the hand of its GPU divisions. The Stalinophobes, particularly in the United States, also believed that Stalinism was an evil and the bureaucracy had supplanted the working class as an independent social factor. But they differed from their intellectual counterparts in Europe in wanting to oppose the evil by urging the workers of America and Europe to accommodate themselves to US imperialism for this purpose.

Deutscher's Adroit Apology

The most adroit of the apologists for Stalinism is Isaac Deutscher. In his recent biography of Stalin he more or less follows Trotsky's analysis of the degeneration of the Soviet state. He does not hide the perfidy, brutality and crimes of Stalinism. But he appends to them a new interpretation: they grew out of the general contradictions of all revolutions where the psychological and material heritage of the capitalist past collides with the equalitarianism of the communist future, and out of the particular conditions of Russian backwardness. Therefore, since Stalinism was historically inevitable, it is a necessary, justifiable and progressive force. Moreover, Stalin and his bureaucracy were at the helm during the five-year plans which entitles them to credit for the industrialization of the USSR which Deutscher calls "the second revolution"; the Kremlin successfully defended the Soviet Union during the war; it expanded the revolution into Eastern Europe. Says Deutscher:

Stalin has been both the leader and the exploiter of a tragic, self-contradictory but creative revolution. Like Cromwell, Robespierre, and Napoleon he started as the servant of an insurgent people and made himself its

master. Like Cromwell he embodies the continuity of the revolution through all its phases and metamorphoses, although his role was less prominent in the first phase. Like Robespierre he has bled white his own party; and like Napoleon he has built his half continental empire and carried revolution beyond the frontiers of his country. The better part of Stalin's work is as certain to outlast Stalin himself as the better parts of the works of Cromwell and Napoleon outlasted them. But in order to shape it for the future and to give it its full value, history may yet have to cleanse and reshape Stalin's work as sternly as it once cleansed and reshaped the work of the English revolution after Cromwell and of the French after Napoleon.

Leaving aside the highly questionable value of these analogies (we prefer Trotsky's parallel of Stalin with "Mustapha Kemal Pasha or perhaps Porfirio Diaz" as closer to historical truth and reality), what political conclusions are to be drawn from Deutscher's super-objective historical evaluation? Stalinism, after all, is not a phenomenon of the past but of the present, and very much of the present. The Russian masses must live under its brutal and parasitic despotism. Should they reconcile themselves to it and abandon all hope for its overthrow? Should Tito and the valiant Yugoslav insurgents bend the knee before the Great-Russian overlord? Should the workers of the capitalist world entrust their hopes for liberation to "revolutionary" bureaucrats under the leadership of this modern Robespierre-Napoleon-Cromwell? An affirmative answer logically flows from what Deutscher says.

Laboratory of Eastern Europe

How do matters stand in life? The outcome of the war has provided a great test in Eastern Europe. At first blush it appeared that, with expansion into vast new territories, Stalinism had been enormously strengthened. On one side the frightful plunder and pillage seemed to bear out the Stalinophobe theory of the existence of a new imperialist ruling class in the Soviet Union. On the other side it inspired those like Deutscher who saw "the revolution from below" being replaced by the "revolution from above," i.e., by bureaucratic manipulators and Napoleonic conquerors. Deutscher went so far, in fact, as to elevate Stalin's policy of expediency, maneuvers and deals with imperialism into a grand revolutionary strategy as follows:

Lenin and Trotsky had their eyes fixed on the German, French and British working classes as the main agents of the revolution of the twentieth century; Stalin's eyes were fixed primarily on revolutions in Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade and Prague. To him socialism in one zone, in the Russian zone became the supreme objective of political strategy for a whole historical epoch.

(What a colossal distortion of the facts! Was it not Lenin, in conflict even with Trotsky over the receptivity of the Polish workers and peasants, who approved the advance of the Red Army into Poland in 1920? Wasn't it Stalin who dissolved the Polish Communist Party in the late Thirties and agreed to the partition of Poland in 1939 when Hitler took the major portion including Warsaw? Finally didn't Stalin agree to a division of Yugoslavia into spheres of influence on a fifty-fifty basis with Churchill?

The facts do not agree with the theory?—then away with the facts!)

Into this medley of half-baked and preconceived notions, the crisis of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, detonated by the Yugoslav revolt, exploded like a bomb. Purge followed purge in dizzying succession. The staunchest Kremlin agents were suddenly proclaimed heretic and quickly paid for their "deviations" on the gallows like Rajk, Kostov, Xoxi, or by "natural death" like Dimitrov and Kolarov, or by removal from all positions like Gomulka and others. The Communist parties were shaken up and "cleansed" from the lowest to the highest ranks. Government apparatus, police and army came in for sweeping reorganizations. And the end is by no means in sight.

It was simple enough for the Stalinophobes and Stalinophiles to find a facile explanation for the earlier purges of bourgeois politicians like Mikolajcyk in Poland, Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, Nagy in Hungary. This was simply a matter, pontificated the Stalinophobes, of one ruling class supplanting another, a new form of exploitation replacing the old. No, the Stalinophiles countered, the "revolution from above" was being completed. However different in appearance, these explanations were similar in sociological content. But the new crisis which has wracked the Stalinist apparatus itself in all the satellite countries caught both types of theorizers flat-footed. They had not foreseen this development nor could they explain it except by the most sterile and philistine comments.

Crisis in Stalinist Parties

How explain such convulsions in the governing Communist parties which were by definition immutable totalitarian agencies? How explain the conflict between top leaders in these parties and the Kremlin? How explain the extension of this crisis to the Stalinist organizations in the capitalist countries? How explain the parallel eruption of a crisis of culture in the Soviet Union? (We leave aside the Yugoslav development which is dealt with in another article in this issue.) Only Trotsky had allowed for this development in advance. His line of explanation alone has been proved correct. We have only to adapt to current conditions his masterful analysis of the rôle of the Soviet bureaucracy in the territories it occupied in agreement with Hitler in 1939-40, to see that the present crisis has a historic lawfulness that accords with the dialectics of the "Russian Question."

Contrary to Trotsky's expectations, the war against Nazi imperialism did not terminate by an immediate continuation of the military onslaught against the Soviet Union by Anglo-American imperialism but with an agreement between Stalin and Roosevelt-Churchill to divide Europe and Asia into spheres of influence. (How *basically* correct Trotsky was is indicated by the rapid breakup of the war-time coalition and the launching of the "cold war" less than two years after the termination of hostilities.) The "Big Three" agreement was due neither to Roosevelt's "soft-headed" diplomacy, as his present-day Republican opponents contend, nor to Stalin's brilliant strategy of

"socialism in one zone." It was dictated primarily by the revolutionary upsurge of the masses of Western Europe, a mortal danger both sides were determined to overcome. Hence the agreement to recognize Stalin's suzerainty over Eastern Europe in return for his betrayal of the workers' struggle for power in Italy, France and other countries.

The Kremlin's occupation forces in Eastern Europe, while giving a certain impetus to agrarian reform, first carried through directly what its agents were doing indirectly in Western Europe—that is, put down all manifestations of the *proletarian* revolution. It was thus revealed that the counter-revolutionary methods of the Kremlin are inherent in its social character and are not some Machiavelian maneuver to deceive the bourgeoisie.

"Socialism in One Zone"

The second stage was one of unrestrained plunder, the dismantling of factories, the pillage of consumer goods, huge reparations. This piracy was no temporary orgy, no mere lust for revenge. The parasitic bureaucracy's primary concern was to replace the material privileges lost in the war and to add new ones from the more advanced economies of the countries on its western borders. It was impelled with a sense of urgency lest the situation suddenly take an unfavorable turn. This totally irrational economic act indicated that the Kremlin had given no thought to the future and was far from planning integration of Eastern Europe into the economy of the Soviet Union in "a socialism in one zone." The horizons of the Soviet bureaucracy were and remain nationally limited.

The facts of life soon caught up with the Kremlin in the third stage. It was compelled to devise a more permanent economic arrangement in the areas under its control. Its first reformist inclination to collaborate with the native bourgeoisie—and coalition governments were created for this purpose—collided both with the interests of the bourgeoisie and of the bureaucracy. No sooner had the first phase of reconstruction passed, than the bourgeoisie of East Europe sought to link the economic systems of its countries with that of the capitalist West. The projection of the Marshall Plan sent the danger signals flying. Had the bureaucracy yielded, it would have only been a matter of time before Eastern Europe would have slipped out of its orbit economically, politically and militarily.

The Kremlin moved at once, as Trotsky had predicted in September 1939, to "*carry through the statification of the means of production . . . not because the bureaucracy remains true to the socialist program but because it is neither desirous nor capable of sharing the power, and the privileges the latter entails, with the ruling classes in the occupied territories.*" In short order the political representatives of the bourgeoisie were then ejected from the coalition governments and from positions of authority in the state.

But this too happened along the lines Trotsky had traced. The masses were called into the streets for stage-managed demonstrations, in some places like Czechoslovakia in carefully controlled armed "workers' guards," or in giant mass meetings as in Hungary and Bulgaria to overwhelm whatever strength the bourgeoisie still pos-

essed. *"The appeal to independent activity,"* wrote Trotsky, *"to the masses in the new territories—and without such an appeal, even if worded with extreme caution it is impossible to constitute a new regime—will on the morrow undoubtedly be suppressed by ruthless police measures in order to assure the preponderance of the bureaucracy over the awakened revolutionary masses."*

This fourth stage now prevails throughout Eastern Europe. The Kremlin has come into conflict with the elementary needs of the masses, with their aspirations for independence, and even with the highly bureaucratized formations known as Communist parties. Placing its parasitism over all else, the Russian bureaucrats continue to dislocate the economic life of Eastern Europe, to disrupt its progress and plans by the more subtle plundering methods of mixed companies and unequal trade treaties. To meet this tribute, heavy burdens have been placed on the worker and peasant masses who counter these extortions with sullen and continuing resistance.

Resistance from Within

The new factor which has confounded the theories of the revisionists has been the resistance encountered by the Russian Proconsuls within the Communist parties of Eastern Europe. An unexpected phenomenon? Yes, to those who like Shachtman saw in them nothing but a GPU apparatus, "neither worker nor bourgeois" in class character and to all those who saw in the transformations of Eastern Europe merely aspects of totalitarian manipulation. Actually, judged in terms of Trotsky's analysis, this development is not so strange.

The Communist parties had become mass organizations in all the countries of Eastern Europe for the purpose of serving as the agency of struggle against their own bourgeoisies when the post-war coalitions began to founder. Through them the Kremlin channeled its restricted "appeal to the independent activity of the masses." The membership of these parties was closely tied to the entire working class while the leaders, especially those who had spent the war years in their own country and not in Moscow, suddenly found themselves at the head of a mass movement, which despite all bureaucratic controls, prodded the leaders with its pressure, its grievances, its demands and aspirations. These parties had become a new force, vying with the Kremlin for influence over the native Stalinist leadership, which was strongly tempted to strike out on a more independent road. They were also inspired by the Yugoslav example. Dreading the role of GPU puppets, some took the road of secret resistance, others wavered, waiting to see Tito's fate, awaiting a favorable opportunity.

Meanwhile the Kremlin struck. First at the top—in order to behead any mass resistance—then in the ranks purging, expelling and jailing thousands of "Titoists," "Trotskyists" and deviationists in all countries of the Eastern buffer zone. But the Kremlin has won a pyrrhic victory. Now it must resort increasingly to the "Rokossovsky" method with new puppets hitherto unknown to the masses openly assuming the role of Quisling, glorifying everything

Russian and deprecating their own nation, their own culture, their own people.

Dynamite of Nationalism

Thus on top of an explosive social situation the Great-Russian bureaucracy has piled the dynamite of nationalism—just as it has done in the Soviet Union itself. It is true that the accumulation of these combustible materials may provide Western imperialism with a favorable opportunity. But there is also Tito—there is also the trail the Yugoslav Communist Party has blazed in its combined struggle for national independence and socialism, and there are millions of eager feet in Eastern Europe drawn irresistibly to that trail.

In the face of this chronic and deepening crisis of the Soviet bureaucracy—now projected over a new, vast area with more advanced cultures, higher standards of living and more conscious proletarians—only cretins can speak of a new "ruling class" or of a "revolution from above" and "socialism in one zone." Let these ideologues of despair and retrogression show how the post war development of the Soviet bureaucracy has diverged in any main essential from Trotsky's fundamental diagnosis!

True we are offered fatuous explanations of conflicts between different national "bureaucratic collectivist classes." Let us grant for a moment that this could be so. What then accounts for the simultaneous outbreak of a crisis in Communist parties in the capitalist world—varying in scope and degree, to be sure—from Norway to Japan? The theory of "bureaucratic collectivism" excludes the possibility of the Stalinist organizations being workers' organizations and characterizes them as totalitarian GPU adjuncts of the Kremlin, pure and simple. Yet unfortunately for this "theory," these parties, despite Kremlin control and GPU supervision, are beginning to react like other organisms in the workers' movement to revolutionary events and to the betrayals of leadership. They produce splits, internal conflicts and factional struggles even though grossly distorted by the bureaucratic regime in these parties. Beneath this turmoil is the growing consciousness of ever larger numbers of Stalinist workers that the Kremlin is the main impediment to their own revolutionary struggles. Their ferment finds expression, as did that of their forebears against the post-World War I social democracy, in a generally favorable revolutionary climate. Meanwhile, within the USSR itself, the Great-Russian egotism of the bureaucracy has run amok.

Cultural Counter-Revolution in USSR

Drawing his conclusions on the historic role of the Stalin regime, Deutscher says:

It should be remarked that, although Stalin has kept Russia isolated from the contemporary influences of the west, he has encouraged and fostered every interest in what he calls the "cultural heritage" of the west. Perhaps in no other country have the young been imbued with so great a respect and love for the classical literature and art of other nations as in Russia. This is one of the important differences between the educational methods of nazism and Stalinism.

Hardly had Deutscher's book come off the press than the Stalin regime officially plunged the country into a debauch of Russian chauvinism. The cultural and scientific attainments of the West are belittled and denigrated; the history of science, art and literature is subjected to the most ludicrous falsification in order to assert Russian primacy; and the Russian language has even been proclaimed the language of "progress and socialism." Those suspected of fidelity to the cultural heritage of the West are condemned as "homeless cosmopolitans" in a campaign conducted with definite anti-Semitic overtones, much as Hitler warred on the culture of "decadent democracy" as the product of the "international Jew."

"Stalinism and fascism," Trotsky observed, *"in spite of deep differences in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena. In many of their features they show a deadly similarity."*

The Thermidorian counter-revolution in the Soviet Union first tested its spurs in the early Twenties on the backs of the Georgian people and their national rights. For Lenin this outcropping of bureaucratic centralism and Great-Russian chauvinism was the antithesis of socialist internationalism, the undoing of the work of the revolution, and he sought even from his death-bed to launch a show-down struggle with Stalin on this issue. The present chauvinist orgy not only reflects the reactionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy as an impediment to the progress of Soviet society, but is a sign that the Bonapartist regime is approaching its final crisis. The sharp division of the world into two camps places before the Soviet Union the alternatives of international revolution or capitulation to imperialism—and no other.

The Kremlin stands in mortal dread of both. It knows that a section of the bureaucracy is no longer spell-bound by the privileges of their poverty-stricken paradise of "socialism in one country" and looks with longing to the material advantages of the capitalist West. On the other hand, the entire bureaucracy knows, especially from its recent experiences in Eastern Europe, that the triumph of the proletariat in the West will undermine their claim to special rights and advantages as the representative of the only workers' state and thus spur the Soviet masses to struggle against their autocratic rulers.

The Kremlin vainly wrestles with this dilemma. Its only solution is to seal off Russia's borders from the world. This is the meaning and aim of the present cultural counter-revolution. But it will be no more successful than were the Japanese samurai in their self-imposed isolation. Either the guns of imperialism will batter down these walls—or the Soviet proletariat, seeing "the revolutionary dawn in the West or the East," will demolish them itself.

Yugoslavia and Permanent Revolution

The most heartening and gratifying aspect of the rich and varied post war experience has been the positive verification of Trotskyism in the test of the Yugoslav revolution. Here is to be found brilliant confirmation of Trotsky's famous contribution to Marxism, the concept and strategy of the Permanent Revolution. It is not decisive for Marx-

ists that this process is not yet openly recognized by the Yugoslav leaders. The consciousness of men, formed by environment, molded by training, hampered by prejudice and ego, influenced by obscure psychological reflexes—as the history of thought so often reveals—lags notoriously behind events. What is decisive is the actual process itself.

Let us pause for a moment to recapitulate the historic struggle after Lenin's death over "the Permanent Revolution" in order to place the Yugoslav developments in their proper framework. This conflict between Trotskyism and Stalinism was no mere doctrinal dispute—as the philistines allege—but a struggle over the program and strategy of world communism and for the very soul of the Russian Revolution.

The watchword of the Thermidorian bureaucrats, as they rose to power in 1924, was "Down with the Permanent Revolution." A world of meaning was concealed behind this slogan. They were tired of class war. They wanted to elbow the revolutionary proletarians out of their commanding positions in the country. They wanted to enjoy the fruits of the revolution in the form of material privileges for themselves. From this flowed their bitter hatred of the Leninist axiom that the Soviet Union was merely the first outpost of the world revolution and that its fate was inextricably linked to that of the mass movements in the capitalist countries. In essence, although not expressly stated at the beginning, what they sought was indefinite collaboration with the capitalist rulers of the world instead of continued struggle for international socialism.

Subsequently it became impressed upon them, as it does to the most insignificant bureaucrat in a union, that this collaboration could only be obtained by sacrificing the interests of the masses. A new world policy began to take shape in the Third International. In backward countries, such as China, the Stalinists justified their class collaborationism on the theory that the Chiang Kai-sheks were "anti-imperialist." In the West, by the theory that a section of the bourgeoisie was "anti-fascist," and therefore politically progressive. The sharper the class conflicts, the more treacherous was the role the Kremlin had to play. The struggle against the "permanent revolution" was metamorphosed into open counter-revolution.

At Every Stage of Events

In Yugoslavia, the struggle over the "permanent revolution"—often contracted simply to the word "Trotskyism"—has been relived at every stage of the revolutionary process, only this time the movement took a different and progressive direction.

"On April 1, 1942," writes the conservative historian Wayne S. Vucinich,* "after consultation with his military advisors, Prime Minister Jovanovic [of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London], prompted by [General] Mikhailovich's [commander-in-chief of the remnants of the Royalist army operating in Yugoslavia] complaints against the Partisans as international brigands, called their leaders Trotskyites, and urged the Soviets at least to prevent the

*Yugoslavia, edited by Robert J. Kerner. University of Cal. Press, 1949.

Partisans from attacking the Chetnicks [Mikhailovich's forces] even if the former were not willing to accept the united command."

Had the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party at the head of the Partisan forces seen this message they would certainly have rubbed their eyes in amazement. Were they not nursed on anti-Trotskyism, trained in a party which time and again had purged "Trotskyism" from its ranks, written the most venomous attacks against Trotsky into their program and daily propaganda? Were they not correct to a fault in their blind loyalty to Stalin?

Not the Chinese Line

Yet the Royalist Jovanovic, following class instinct, was eminently correct on two counts.

First, Tito and his leading staff, notwithstanding their anti-Trotskyism, were pursuing a policy which had been denounced by Stalin as "Trotskyist permanent revolution" when it appeared in the Chinese revolution of 1925-27. Instead of subordinating themselves to Mikhailovich, as the Comintern had to the Kuomintang, the Yugoslav CP leaders rejected any alliance in the resistance war against Hitler and Mussolini's occupation troops except on terms of equality. Instead of disarming the workers, as the Comintern agent Borodin had done at Shanghai in 1927, Tito created Proletarian Brigades wearing the red star in their army caps. Instead of suppressing the Soviets as had been done in China, the Yugoslav CP sponsored the creation of Peoples' Committees as the sole governmental authority in the territory liberated from the Germans and Italians by the Partisans.

Second, Stalin would not hesitate to sacrifice the Yugoslav Partisans—even though their guerrilla operations were diverting up to a score of Wehrmacht divisions from the Russian front—on the altar of his alliance with Anglo-American imperialism. The inside story is now well known. Jovanovic got speedy satisfaction from Stalin. Moscow gave no aid to the hard-pressed Partisan armies on the pretext of technical obstacles, although at the same time Churchill found it possible to supply Mikhailovich. Stalin entered into secret deals with the Royal Yugoslav Government, raising its Moscow Legation to the status of an embassy at the very moment Mikhailovich, in secret collaboration with the Occupation, was attacking the Partisan army. Stalin urged the Partisans to submit to Mikhailovich's terms and denounced the formation of Red Star Proletarian Brigades and Peoples' Committee as "embarrassing" to his international intrigues.

Crashing headlong into the revolutionary torrent unleashed by the civil war, Stalin's treacherous plotting failed—the first time since he had usurped power. But that did not prevent him from attempting to cheat the Partisans of their victory in the very hour of their triumph. In 1944 an agreement was reached with Churchill in Moscow to divide Yugoslavia into a British-Russian sphere of influence and joint pressure was applied to force the incorporation of Royalist ministers into the new Yugoslav government. For a moment the revolution rolled back. Had it not been

for the firmness of the Yugoslav leaders and the power of the mass movement on which they were based, Yugoslavia might have become another Greece. But within eight months of its creation, the coalition government was smashed. The revolution proceeded to solve the democratic tasks the native bourgeoisie had proved incapable of solving: to abolish the monarchy, to establish equal rights for the various nationalities within the nation's borders, to divide the large landed estates where they still existed.

"We did not want to stop half way: to overthrow the king, abolish the monarchy, to take the authority and then share it with the representatives of the capitalist class who could continue exploiting the working masses of Yugoslavia. Neither the working class nor the large majority of the peoples of Yugoslavia would have this. Therefore we decided to go boldly along the path of complete liquidation in Yugoslavia."

This is Tito reviewing the immediate past in 1948 when he was still singing hosannahs to the "Great Stalin" and would have hotly rejected the observation that he and his associates had pursued the "strategy of permanent revolution."

The Anti-Capitalist Stage

The revolution moved irresistibly forward into its anti-capitalist stage. But as the Yugoslav leaders approached the task of industrializing their country and reorganizing its economy on a planned socialist basis, they again encountered resistance from the Kremlin which considered Yugoslavia a source of raw materials, and therefore of its own privileges, and feared it as an autonomous extension of the socialist revolution. Once again Tito and his Central Committee were to hear the charge of "Trotskyism" hurled against them. This was 1946 and it came from two of Stalin's Yugoslav agents, Zuyovich and Hebrang, members of the Central Committee who occupied key positions in the economic apparatus of the state and urged the CP leadership to abandon its "over-ambitious" plans in the "higher interests of the Soviet Union."

When Zuyovich and Hebrang were defeated and removed, their place was taken by the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia, the Russian military attaches and their GPU staffs who directly took over the work of sabotage and resistance. The sharpening clash rushed to a climax. But before the break became definitive, the Kremlin again warned Tito of the danger of "Trotskyism." On March 27, 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wrote him:

It is worth recalling that Trotsky, when he intended to declare war on the CPSU also began by charging the CPSU with degeneration, nationalism and big-state chauvinism. [The statement had previously accused Djilas, Vukmanovich, Kidric and others of making such criticisms.] Of course, he concealed all this under leftist phrases about world revolution. Still, as is known, Trotsky himself turned out to be a degenerate, and later, after he was exposed, he openly moved over to the camp of the avowed enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that Trotsky's political career is sufficiently illuminating.

Tito, Djilas and other indignantly denied the comparison. "Did we enter the life and death struggle on the side of the Soviet Union in 1941 on the basis of Trotskyist conceptions," Tito asked rhetorically at the 5th Congress of the CPY in 1948, "or because of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism (tumultuous approval and hails of 'Tito-Party!'), a theory that was being realized and is being realized in the USSR under the leadership of Stalin?"

But forces moving toward socialism did not permit them to "stop half-way." The "permanent revolution" of the proletariat was actively at work. Stalin began his attempt to strangle the Yugoslavs economically and thus drive them into the arms of imperialism, or failing that, to make an agreement with imperialism for a free hand to crush Yugoslavia by force. The Kremlin's pressure had its effects, but again not the effects anticipated. Within hearing distance of the firing squads in the countries at its borders, the Yugoslav leaders began to clarify their conceptions of Stalinism in a revolutionary direction and to begin the struggle for workers' democracy in Yugoslavia.

Two years ago Milovan Djilas, Secretary of the CPY, had characterized Trotskyists at the 5th Congress of the CPY, for the benefit of the Kremlin with whom reconciliation was still being sought, as those who "disseminated bourgeois lies and slanders about the Soviet Union, about the supposed bureaucratic authority in the USSR, about the supposed falsification of the trial of the Trotskyist, Zinoviev and Bukharin. . . ." In March 1950, he was to write as follows:

The development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union has reached such a point that they no longer correspond to the methods of management of the productive process itself nor to the manner of the distribution of products. . . .

From these facts [Djilas had listed various aspects of the degeneration of the Soviet state], namely that the

USSR was the only socialist country and moreover a backward one surrounded by capitalism where the consciousness of the masses in the struggle for the building of socialism was relatively weak as were internal and external revolutionary forces, there resulted the creation of a privileged strata of the bureaucracy, bureaucratic centralism and the provisional transformation of the state into a power above society.

Ten years after his death a leader of a formerly Stalinist party holding state power repeats Trotsky's analysis of the Soviet bureaucracy almost word for word! And this, we are supremely confident, is only a first installment of a great historical vindication.

The film of revolutionary progress unwound in reverse direction after Stalin took power in the Soviet Union. The bureaucracy assaulted and crushed workers' democracy. At the same time it turned its back on the revolutionary masses of the world, and finally landed in the camp of counter-revolution.

In Yugoslavia the film is now being rearranged in its revolutionary perspective. Their irreconcilable conflict with imperialism brought the Yugoslav leaders into opposition to the Kremlin. Forced into struggle with Stalinism, they have turned to their own working class for support, launching a vigorous campaign against bureaucratism, liberating educators, scientists and artists from the stifling ultimatums of the state, and opening the first outlets for free working-class discussion and criticism. At the same time, they are slowly entering the path of Lenin and the October 1917 Revolution on the world arena.

Whatever the outcome of these stirring events—and we have every reason to hope and fight for the most favorable outcome in this resistance against Stalinism and imperialism—the spirit and movement of Trotskyism is clearly on the march. The Old Man should have lived to see it!

Stalin's Frame-Up System

By JOSEPH HANSEN

Editor's Note: By murdering Leon Trotsky ten years ago, Stalin thought to put an end to the Marxist opposition to his dictatorship. He falsely accused his victim of being in league with the Nazis, seeking by such means to destroy Trotsky's ideas along with his brain. But correct ideas, as has been observed before, have a logic of their own. Today the specter of Trotskyism haunts the Kremlin bureaucracy throughout Eastern Europe, as well as in Asia.

Moscow's answer to the mounting opposition of today has been a new dose of frame-up trials like those used to wipe out opposition in the Thirties. Thus the Stalinist bureaucracy itself has once more called public attention to the frame-ups, purges and murders that led up to the killing of Trotsky 10 years ago.

Trotsky's analysis of the Moscow Trials has in this way been given unexpected timeliness. As Joseph Hansen points out below, it is impossible to gain a proper understanding of the current trials in Eastern Europe, and along with them Stalinism as a whole, without knowing the truth about the Moscow Trials of more than a decade ago.

One of the main documents in this connection is the text of Leon Trotsky's speech before the Commission of Inquiry headed by John Dewey which investigated the charges leveled against Trotsky and his son in the Moscow Trials. Long out of print, this important speech has now been reissued by Pioneer Publishers on the tenth anniversary of Trotsky's death. As a foreword to the pamphlet, Comrade Hansen has prepared an analysis of Stalin's frame-up system which brings the record up to date. We are glad to be able to present to our readers the following condensation of this foreword.

Since the end of World War II, a series of sensational trials of former prominent figures in the Stalinist bureaucratic hierarchy have been staged in the East European countries under Moscow rule. Like grade "B" movies these trials follow a rigid pattern. The hero is always Stalin. The criminal inevitably confesses to playing a Jekyll-Hyde role—in public an ostensibly loyal top gov-

ernment official, behind the scenes a spy for an enemy power. He repents, beats his chest in contrition for his traitorous conduct, glorifies the god-like dispenser of justice in the Kremlin and is executed.

Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and the victims themselves collaborate like trained seals. Lack of concrete evidence does not disturb the court. "Proof" boils down to the bare production of "confessions."

Minor departures from the formula used in these trials only emphasize their artificial, theatrical character. An instructive instance is the case of Traicho Kostov, condemned December 14, 1949, for "treason." Kostov had been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1924, Secretary of the party since 1940, General Secretary since 1944, and was second in importance in the government only to Dimitrov until the latter's death. He was charged with having become a stool pigeon upon his arrest by the Bulgarian police in 1942 and of then entering the Anglo-American spy service. Now well launched in his dual career of public hero as spokesman for Stalinism and public enemy as traitor in the pay of the enemy, he went further, according to the prosecution, and plotted with Marshal Tito to assassinate Dimitrov, overthrow the Bulgarian government and amalgamate Bulgaria with Yugoslavia.

Instead of confession according to ritual, Kostov denied guilt. He advanced such convincing arguments of innocence as his resistance to the Bulgarian police under torture and the absence of incriminating evidence in the police files published in 1944. The court thereupon read a "confession" allegedly made by Kostov with police assistance in advance of the trial. The attorney for the defense denounced his client as vigorously as any of the prosecution lawyers. Kostov continued to insist on his innocence. The court, of course, sentenced him to die.

The political objectives of those trials are not difficult to discern. Native Stalinist lieutenants like the Hungarian Rajk, the Bulgarian Kostov and the rest can, despite their long-tested loyalty to Moscow, transmit the pressure of the growing mass resistance in the satellite countries against the Kremlin's totalitarian domination. Their elimination and replacement by figureheads with fewer independent roots is a preventive measure against the possible development of "Titoism" or "Trotskyism" or any form of opposition to the Kremlin bureaucracy.

We must approach the current trials in Eastern Europe not as isolated episodes but as part of a *system* rooted in the consolidation of the Moscow bureaucracy as a privileged ruling caste. To informed observers the parallel between the postwar trials in Eastern Europe and the great frame-up trials of 1936-38 in Moscow is obvious. Thus, in reply to the charges against the Tito regime presented at the trial of Laszlo Rajk in Hungary, Moshe Pyade, a high official of the Yugoslav government, said, according to the September 23, 1949, *New York Times*, "it was reminiscent of the Moscow purge trials of 1936, whose producers, with their experience, could have had a hand in the production of the Budapest trials." Pyade observed that "now such trials have become export articles . . .

a penetration into Europe of the dark methods of the Soviet intelligence service. . . ."

The Moscow Trials

Without knowing the truth about the Moscow purge trials, it is impossible to properly understand the character of the Stalinist regime. The key to those trials also opens the door to a true evaluation of Stalinism on a world scale.

On August 19, 1936, the curtain rose on a scarcely credible scene in a Moscow court room. Among the prisoners sat Gregory Zinoviev, Leon Kamenev, I. N. Smirnov, S. V. Mrachkovsky, G. Yevdokimov, V. Ter-Vaganyan, Ivan Bakayev and Y. Dreitser. They were outstanding figures in Lenin's "general staff" which led the November 1917 revolution in Russia, cofounders of both the Bolshevik Party and the Communist International.

Against them as prosecutor stood Andrei Vyshinsky, a former member of the counter-revolutionary, right-wing Menshevik opposition to Lenin's regime. This representative of Stalin accused Lenin's former comrades-in-arms of murdering Kirov, a top dignitary, more than a year and a half before, although some of them were in prison at the time. Vyshinsky accused them of conspiring with Hitler's Nazi government to prepare "a number of terroristic acts" against Stalin and other high bureaucrats.

Leon Trotsky, the organizer of the Red Army and cofounder with Lenin of the first workers' state in history, was in exile in Norway; but he and his son Leon Sedov were accused of having initiated the conspiracy. Trotsky was charged with sending "instructions" as "far back as 1931" to "kill Stalin, Voroshilov and Kaganovich."

The startled world learned that Zinoviev and Kamenev were putting up no defense. Quite contrary to what might have been expected from men born and bred in revolutionary struggle against absolutism, they were freely—even glibly—confessing "guilt" to all the major charges and vying with the prosecutor in painting the blackest possible picture of their alleged crimes.

The trial ran for only five brief days although a total of 16 defendants faced the prosecutor. On the sixth day the victims were sentenced "all to the supreme penalty—to be shot, and all property personally belonging to them to be confiscated." Within 24 hours the press announced rejection of an appeal for mercy. "The verdict has been carried out," continued the dispatch by way of obituary.

In this way, Stalin staged in Moscow the first of three trials designed to provide juridical justification for the purges that wiped out the leaders of the November 1917 revolution. To most people at the time, they appeared part of a nightmare world. It was simply not credible that a revolutionary like Zinoviev, for example, who had spent ten years as Lenin's collaborator before the Russian Revolution and played a leading part in overthrowing Czarism and establishing the basic foundations for socialism in the USSR could have "arrived at fascism," as he "confessed," and helped set up a center that, according to Vyshinsky, "organized and established secret communications with the German fascists."

But how account for the confessions? The drugged cir-

cle of the "friends" of the Soviet Union claimed that the confessions were freely given and therefore must be accepted at face value. Many people, ignorant of the ways of Stalin's secret political police, were shocked into half-believing that there must be a grain of truth in the trials.

As a whole, however, public opinion never accepted the Stalinist version of the trials. Today there is little mystery about the "confessions" after the many revelations from those who have managed to escape from the GPU (now the MVD) and describe the psychological and physical tortures used to bring a prisoner into court with his will to resist utterly crushed. In the inquisitions of the Middle Ages similar means wrung similar avowals from unhappy wretches whose main profit from pacts with his Satanic Majesty usually turned out to be the star role at a public bonfire.

Investigation of the few tangible "facts" alleged in the trial proved fatal to the frame-up. For example, one of the defendants, Holtzman, testified that in November 1932 he had met Sedov in the "lounge" of the "Hotel Bristol" in Copenhagen and went with him to meet Trotsky and receive terrorist instructions. It was proved conclusively that Holtzman was not among the people who called on Trotsky and his wife, their friends and guards during the short time Trotsky visited Copenhagen to lecture in defense of the Soviet Union. Still more devastating, it was discovered that the Hotel Bristol had been torn down in 1917 and not rebuilt until 1936! From then on the words "Moscow trial" became synonymous with "Stalinist frame-up" for the entire thinking public.

The Second Moscow Trial

On January 23, 1937 a second trial opened in Moscow. Facing the ex-Menshevik prosecutor Vyshinsky and his collaborators on the judges' bench were again figures of heroic stature in the early days of the Soviet Union. Pyatakov, an outstanding leader in the Ukraine, was considered by Lenin one of the most competent administrators in the party. Serebriakov was a former secretary of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Muralov, a famous hero of all three insurrections in Moscow—1905, February and October 1917, served under Lenin as military governor of the city. Sokolnikov, a member of the Central Committee and editor of *Pravda* in 1917, became People's Commissar of Finance, then ambassador to London. Radek was one of the most brilliant journalists the Soviet Union has produced.

These men were accused of conspiring to bring back the capitalism they had helped to overthrow, of plotting to kill Stalin and his favorites and of betraying the workers' state to Japanese and Nazi German imperialism.

They began "confessing." Pyatakov said he had taken an airplane from Berlin to Oslo in the "first half of December 1935" to receive terrorist instructions from Trotsky.

From Mexico, Trotsky demanded that the prosecutor cross-examine Pyatakov on this alleged airplane trip in order to establish some concrete details about this mythical flight. Naturally, Vyshinsky, who was closely adhering to the script prepared by the GPU for the frame-up, made no

response to Trotsky's demand. His job was to conduct the frame-up, not expose it. The press, however, uncovered a most startling fact. No foreign airplane at all had landed at Oslo in the whole month of December!

Virtually every newspaper outside the Soviet Union gave this sensation front-page display. On January 29, the Norwegian newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* proved that no foreign airplane whatsoever had landed at Oslo "from September 1935 to May 1936." Pyatakov's "confession" was thus exposed as a lie while the trial was still going on. The world waited for the Moscow court's response to this hard fact.

Next day the curtain came down. Another 48 hours and Pyatakov was dead. As always, the victims accused of plotting to kill Stalin end up as mute but nonetheless eloquent-enough evidence of Stalin's plot to kill them.

The Third Public Trial

A little more than a year later, March 2-13, 1938, the third great trial took place. Among the victims sat no less than eight former Soviet ministers, not counting Trotsky. "After the death of Lenin," Trotsky told the press, "Rykov was the official head of the government for more than five years. From 1918 Bukharin was the editor of the central organ of the party, *Pravda*, and from 1926 the official head of the Communist International. Later, after his fall into disfavor, he became the editor of *Izvestia*. Rakovsky was the head of the Ukrainian government and later ambassador to London and Paris. Krestinsky, the predecessor of Stalin as secretary of the Central Committee of the party, was afterward ambassador to Berlin for several years. For almost all of the last ten years Yagoda stood at the head of the GPU as Stalin's most trusted henchman and cooked up the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in its entirety. In the list of the accused there are no fewer than six members of the Central government. Of the nine people who were members of the Political Bureau during Lenin's lifetime, i.e., actual rulers of the fate of the USSR, there remains only one unaccused, Stalin."

As in the previous trials, the GPU trade-mark was not long in showing up. Bessonov confessed he got a letter "written in December, 1936, by Krestinsky to Trotsky." This letter, according to Bessonov, "was passed on by me. In a few days I received a reply from Trotsky." Naturally this "reply" was not produced in court any more than the other "letters" mentioned in the trials.

Bessonov's "confession" was shown to be a lie in short order. The Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet* checked with the Norwegian authorities. From September to December 19, Trotsky had been held incommunicado by the Norwegian police in response to Moscow wire-pulling. They had censored every item sent to Trotsky, even holding up the manuscript of his book, *The Revolution Betrayed*. On December 19, the Norwegian police put him on a tanker and a police officer accompanied the exile and his wife to Mexico. This officer, who was chief of police by the time of the Bukharin trial, declared that Trotsky could not possibly have received any communication from Bessonov or replied to it.

Comparable to the non-existent Hotel Bristol of the

first trial and Pyatakoff's ghostly airplane of the second was Krestinsky's "confession" that "Trotsky came to Merano (Italy) about October 10 (1933) together with Sedov" for a conspirative meeting. It had been publicly established some time before that Trotsky was at Bagnères-de-Bigorre, in the Pyrenees, on October 9. Apparently the GPU got mixed up in its geography and put the Pyrenees Mountains between France and Italy instead of their actual location between France and Spain. So the GPU claimed Trotsky was in Italy precisely when he was more than 600 miles away! Exposure of this GPU boner of course did not save Krestinsky from execution.

These trials provided only the most spectacular public incidents in the periodic blood purges that swept the Soviet Union from 1935 on.

The Mass Blood Purges

The slave labor armies of the GPU swelled to unknown size. Some estimates of their number go as high as fifteen, twenty million, and even more. Scarcely a family in the Soviet Union remained unscathed by this dread political scourge.

The Red Army was decimated. Principal victims were the veterans of Trotsky's time who defeated the imperialist armies sent to crush the young workers' republic after the First World War. In 1937 the entire leading staff from Marshal Tukhachevsky down were shot without the pretense of an open trial.

Managers and officials of factories, the transportation system, the collective farms, the apparatus of the federated republics were collected like sheep and either butchered or sent to the white hell of the frozen Siberian wastelands.

The educational system, the arts and sciences were not exempt. Celebrated educators, scientists, scholars, engineers, doctors, musicians, playwrights, novelists and journalists were condemned, imprisoned without trial, died of mysterious causes or simply disappeared, never to be seen again by their friends and families.

Great masses of workers most capable of militant struggle were crammed into box cars for deportation to the slave labor camps. Husbands were separated from wives, children torn from parents. Whole towns and entire districts were thus uprooted and dispersed.

Even the summits of the bureaucracy were not exempt. Officials throughout the government perished. The Communist Party in the USSR was shaken to its foundations as the nation-wide witch-hunt tracked down all those whose "loyalty" might be suspect because of an active political role in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, association with revolutionaries of the early days, or simply because of poisonous denunciations.

The terror was not confined to the Soviet Union. Political opponents of Stalin's regime were hunted down by his assassins throughout the world. In Switzerland, for example, Ignace Reiss, who broke from the GPU and revealed Stalin's decision to employ "all methods" against revolutionary opponents abroad, fell on September 4, 1937, before a blast of machine-gun fire. The Swiss police caught some of the gunmen. The court established that these GPU

killers murdered Reiss on direct orders from the Kremlin. Trotsky's son, Leon Sedov, was killed in a Paris hospital on February 16, 1938. Rudolph Klement, Secretary of the Fourth International, was kidnapped in Paris on July 12, 1938. Later his decapitated body was found floating in the Seine.

Opponents of Stalinism fighting with the workers in Spain against General Franco's fascist bid for power were systematically murdered by the GPU. An outstanding victim was Andrés Nin, leader of the POUM (Workers Party of Marxist Unification). Trotsky's former Secretary, Erwin Wolfe, was kidnapped in Spain by the GPU and never seen again. A similar fate befell Marc Rhein, son of the well-known Russian Menshevik leader, Raphaël Abramovitch, a member of the Executive Committee of the Second International.

In Mexico a band of Communist Party members and sympathizers raided Trotsky's Coyoacán home in the dead of night on May 24, 1940. Disguised in police uniforms, these GPU killers machine-gunned the bedroom of the old revolutionary couple. Trotsky and his wife managed to escape by rolling out of the line of fire. The Stalinists then kidnapped an American guard on duty, Robert Sheldon Harte. In a lonely cabin in the mountains they put one bullet through his temple, another through the base of his brain, and buried his body in a shallow grave of lime where it was later discovered by the Mexican police.

The culminating crime was the murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico on August 20, 1940. On that day, an agent of Stalin's secret police brought the Moscow trials to their climax by sinking a pick-axe into the brain of the man who had done more than any other individual to expose the true character of the Moscow bureaucracy.

Why the Trials Were Staged

The long duration of these monstrous purges as well as their depth of penetration in Soviet society proves that something quite different from treasonous conspiracies on the part of the victims was involved in the Moscow trials. The purges began on a major scale at the time of the assassination of Kirov in 1934. They did not pause until well after the armies of German imperialism had invaded a Soviet Union bled white by the unending work of Stalin's executioners. Since the war's end, new vast purges have occurred, although the main charge now is no longer "Trotskyism" but "cosmopolitanism" or "concessions to western bourgeois ideology."

The principal accusation leveled by the prosecution against Trotsky and the defendants on trial was making a pact with Hitler and the Mikado. The hypocrisy of this charge is evident enough from the fact that Stalin topped off the trials by signing on Hitler's dotted line himself and becoming supply sergeant for the Nazis in the opening period of World War II.

The trials served to cover the debacle of Stalinist foreign policy which paved the way for Hitler's seizure of power in Germany. At the same time, they prepared the ground for official pacts with both Hitler and the Mikado. This was Stalin's method of getting ready for the on-

coming World War II. But he succeeded only in enormously weakening the Soviet Union and facilitating the invasion by German imperialism.

Another central aim of the trials was to try to compromise Trotsky's program for the democratic rehabilitation of the Soviet regime and return to international revolutionary socialism as practiced in Lenin's day. Stalin hoped to smear Trotsky and his followers with the Nazi brush. Trotsky was singled out for this attention because, as the leading exponent of Lenin's program, he represented the tradition of genuine Marxism.

The execution of all former companions of Lenin who enjoyed independent standing removed possible contenders for power. Such figures might become centers of mass opposition to the dictatorial regime even though, they were not actually followers of Trotsky at all and had kept high positions, many of them, only in return for slander and vilification of Trotsky. Stalin's method is simple. He usurped power through step-by-step elimination of leaders in his road. He retains power by eliminating anyone who impresses him as a possible opponent. All questions concerning his tenure in office are decided with a bullet. Where an area of possible independent thought forms, even in so remote a field as music, genetics or astronomy, Stalin moves as ruthlessly against it as against a full-fledged political opposition.

Inasmuch as Stalin claims that socialism has been achieved in the Soviet Union, he can hardly acknowledge such sordid aims. The blame must be placed upon his victims. As a warning to others, they must be converted into criminals, slandered as well as liquidated. That is why frame-ups have become a characteristic method deliberately developed by this Cain into an integral part of his system of rule.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to hold Stalin alone responsible for these abominations. Stalin, no matter what his personal guilt, is a political figure representing social forces. He could do nothing unless a powerful segment of Soviet society stood behind him. This segment is the bureaucracy that spreads its devouring cells throughout the USSR like a deadly cancer. It is this bureaucracy, estimated by Trotsky to embrace millions of upper-bracket personages, that found it necessary in pursuit of power, prestige and special privilege to liquidate Lenin's regime of workers' democracy.

The Dewey Commission of Inquiry

Credit for the definitive exposure of the Moscow frame-ups goes to the "Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials." This impartial body was headed by John Dewey, the eminent philosopher and teacher and one of the veterans of American liberalism.

The Dewey Commission took nine months to complete its work. The evidence assembled by the Dewey Commission from a number of countries is cited in its official report, *Not Guilty*. This volume of 422 pages, published in 1938 by Harper & Brothers, established beyond doubt

the complete innocence of Stalin's victims and proved the trials to be the greatest frame-ups in history.

As part of the inquiry, a sub-commission was sent to Coyoacan, Mexico, to hear Trotsky's defense, to question him and to study the evidence at his disposal. Invitations to participate in the hearing were sent to the American Communist Party, to Joseph R. Brodsky, leading American Stalinist attorney, to Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, to the Communist Party of Mexico and the leading Stalinist trade union spokesman in Mexico, Vicent Lombardo Toledano. All of them refused to take advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine Leon Trotsky or to submit any evidence that might help bolster the Kremlin's charges. The verbatim transcript of the proceedings at Coyoacan was published in a book of 617 pages by Harper & Brothers in 1937 as *The Case of Leon Trotsky*.

The prestige of Stalinism never recovered from the moral blow dealt it by the findings of the Dewey Commission.

If there were an iota of truth in the Moscow trials, the Stalinist prosecution enjoyed a priceless opportunity for vindication at the Nuremberg trial of German war criminals which opened on November 20, 1945. The main accusation level at Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin and the rest was making a treasonous deal with the Nazis. One of the prisoners at Nuremberg was Rudolph Hess, named in the Moscow trials as an alleged contact man who had conducted "lengthy negotiations" between Trotsky and Hitler. He could easily be questioned about this charge. The secret Nazi archives were open to the Stalinist attorneys at Nuremberg. Whatever facts they contained could be made public. What better chance to rehabilitate Vyshinsky and Stalin?

The Nuremberg Trial and the Moscow Frame-ups

However, the Stalinists at Nuremberg, prosecuting the Nazis as war plotters, maintained a studied silence about the Moscow trials and the main charge that the old Bolsheviks in those sensational cases had acted as Fifth Columnists for the Nazis.

In January 1946 the Revolutionary Communist Party, British section of the Fourth International, reminded the Nuremberg court of the slanderous charges in the Moscow trials. Well-known political and literary figures in Britain and the United States requested investigation of the alleged complicity of Trotsky and the other Bolshevik leaders with the Nazis in the preparation of a war against the Soviet Union. The court did not answer.

Trotsky's widow held that the findings of the Dewey Commission were conclusive; but for the benefit of those still doubtful was "perfectly willing to have the Nazi defendants, especially Hess, examined and to ask the governments now in control of Germany to search the Nazi archives for any documents dealing with the alleged conspiracy."

The Stalinists were not so willing. Washington, London and Paris acquiesced in Moscow's reluctance, finding no

difficulty in forming a united front with Stalin's secret police on this question. The court never broke its silence. Hess and the other leading Nazis were sentenced without a whisper from the Stalinist prosecution about the monstrous charges used as an excuse to slaughter tens of thousands and send millions to the slave labor camps.

"The Great Conspiracy"

Afraid of touching the Moscow frame-ups in any court that is not completely a GPU puppet show the Stalinists in their own inimitable manner sought to escape from the public pillory. They could not avoid doing something in view of the widespread expectations of their rank and file that the findings of the Dewey Commission would at long last be answered at Nuremberg. The complete lack of evidence at Nuremberg of conspiracy between Trotsky and the Nazis made it all the more imperative to again slander the Trotskyist movement and attempt to justify Stalin's assassinations, particularly his murder of Leon Trotsky.

The sop to the rank and file was a bedtime spine-chiller, *The Great Conspiracy*, by Sayers and Kahn. The blurb on the jacket advertises it as "more strange and startling than the most sensational spy fiction." It is difficult to find another statement in the book as true as that.

Since the main task was to remedy the failure of Moscow's representatives to produce any evidence at Nuremberg confirming the charges on which Lenin's generation of revolutionaries was murdered, *The Great Conspiracy* includes an impressive bibliography that mentions even works of Trotsky. The aim is to create the impression that this fiction is an objective "history" containing "carefully documented evidence" that "sets the record straight."

The authors must be credited with a certain amount of sly calculation such as pickpockets often exhibit in plying their trade. How many readers, particularly indoctrinated Stalinists, will check the assertions of the highly praised authors against their alleged sources in the formidable list of books they cite? The one in ten thousand who does can be chalked up to overhead cost—he would no doubt go over to Trotskyism sooner or later anyway. Still, the two fiction writers refrained from including in their bibliography the book definitively establishing the falsity of the Moscow trials, *Not Guilty*, the official report of the Dewey Commission. Perhaps there's something to the old adage about not mentioning the rope in the house of the hanged.

One fact alone exposes the fraudulence of the bibliography: the principal source of documentary "evidence" is the transcript of the Moscow trials; that is, the "confessions" proved by the Dewey Commission to be a tissue of lies!

As for the other sources actually cited, an example from two pages (16 and 17) of the first chapter of *The Great Conspiracy* will indicate how light-fingered is the touch of these historians in fitting facts to the needs of the GPU. They quote from *Raymond Robins' Own Story*, a personal account published in 1920 by the unofficial representative of the Woodrow Wilson administration to the young workers' republic. Since most of Robins' dealings with the Soviet government came under Trotsky's purview as Peo-

ple's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Trotsky occupies a proportionately large space of Robins' memoirs. The then unknown Stalin is not mentioned once.

Sayers and Kahn meet these unpleasant facts by simply crossing out Trotsky's name in their quotations, substituting the name of *Lenin*, garbling the quotations (see *Raymond Robins' Own Story*, pp. 55-6), and adding by way of insult to Lenin that the founder of the Bolshevik Party "took an immediate liking" to this emissary of American imperialism and avowed enemy of socialism. They weave in Stalin's name, associating him with Lenin, by quoting a letter which they say Raymond Robins wrote them in 1943, almost a quarter of a century after he first set down his impressions of the Bolshevik regime. Yet the flyleaf of the book coolly proclaims, "None of the incidents, or dialogue in *The Great Conspiracy* has been invented by the authors."

Thanks to Sayers and Kahn, American students of politics thus have an example of the GPU way of handling history that can easily be checked in any public library in the United States possessing both *The Great Conspiracy* and *Raymond Robins' Own Story*. This instructive example indicates how difficult it is for representatives of Stalinism to touch any page in history, no matter how minor, without responding to the compulsion to deface it. The lie has been elevated into a system that now shapes the thinking of the lowest hack on the payroll. On such a foundation rests the deification of Stalin!

Petty Forgers at Work

With this small forgery of their own as the keynote of their book, the authors go on to the "more strange and startling" episodes in their spy fiction. They repeat the tale about Pyatakov flying from Berlin to Oslo for an alleged meeting with Trotsky. Nine years after the exposure of this lie, Sayers and Kahn "document" it by referring to the "confession" of Pyatakov, the very "confession" that was exploded while Stalin's victim was still on the stand!

They repeat the lie that "Leon Trotsky, accompanied by his son, Sedov, crossed the Franco-Italian border on a false passport and met Krestinsky at the Hotel Bavaria in Merano" Italy. As already mentioned, Trotsky was at Bagneres-de-Bigorre on the indicated date, but Sayers and Kahn explain in a footnote that "Trotsky was then living at St. Palais, a small village at the foot of the Pyrenees in the South of France." Far from being at the foot of the Pyrenees, St. Palais is near Royan, France, not less than 170 miles north of the Pyrenees, while Merano is near the Italian-German border east of Switzerland. The facts of geography disturb these popularizers of GPU frame-ups no more than they did the master minds who originated this strange and startling detail.

The famous Hotel Bristol, however, is left out of *The Great Conspiracy*. Even the GPU, it seems, has been forced to permit the central pillar of the first big Moscow trial to lay in rubble, after taking Yagoda's head for the costly slip-up.

Among the other items left out of this book which pretends to be "exhaustive" is the May 24, 1940, machine gun assault on Leon and Natalia Trotsky. Is this because the

machine-gun gang, after apprehension by the Mexican police, proved to be members or sympathizers of the Mexican Stalinist Party? Leader of this band who kidnapped and murdered Robert Sheldon Harte was David Alfaro Siqueiros, the well-known Mexican Stalinist painter. The authors of *The Great Conspiracy* apparently felt that the machine-gun slugs imbedded in the walls of Trotsky's home, Siqueiros' admission of the assault, and the conviction of leading Mexican Stalinists, so clearly pinned the guilt on Stalin as the real plotter of assassination that not even they were expert enough liars to maintain the original Stalinist version of this attempt on the lives of Leon and Natalia Trotsky as a "self-assault" organized by Trotsky himself.

However, they could scarcely avoid mentioning the slaying of Trotsky. They present the version of the GPU assassin, Jacson, "documenting" their story of the murder with judiciously selected quotations from the murderer. They leave out, of course, the damning facts established by the Mexican court pointing to the real organizer of the crime in the Kremlin. Such court records, not written under the

auspices of the GPU, are anathema to "historians" of the Sayers and Kahn type.

How well has *The Great Conspiracy* served the Kremlin bureaucracy? Outside of Stalinist circles it has met with the derision that was to be expected. The book did not raise the prestige of Moscow's secret political police. Among Stalinist rank and file its use as a text is effective only until they encounter people acquainted with the real history of the Russian Revolution and the facts of the Moscow frame-ups. Then the book crumbles in their minds as did the frame-ups themselves at the touch of truth.

In the long run, history and mankind cannot be cheated, not even by the most strenuous efforts of the most totalitarian regime. Crushed into the mud, truth stirs nevertheless, rises again and in the final analysis shows itself more powerful than the enthroned lie. This has happened in the case of the Moscow trials. Stalin stands convicted before informed world public opinion as the real plotter against socialism and the murderer of its outstanding spokesman, Leon Trotsky. That is the verdict of history which no rehash of old falsifications can set aside.

Downfall of Colonial Empires

By DAVID ADAM

The great significance of the changes that have taken place since the war in Asia, Latin America and Africa is only being fully realized today. In vast areas of the colonial and semi-colonial world the hold of imperialism has been shaken, and this has acted to undermine the economic structure of Western Europe. The problems of European recovery are so intimately bound up with the question of a new "equilibrium" for the capitalist world that such events as the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's China, the anti-imperialist struggles in southeast Asia, the African awakening, the industrialization in parts of South America, and even the measure of independence achieved by the Indian subcontinent and by Indonesia, may be viewed as threatening the very basis of the capitalist system as a whole.

Colonial and semi-colonial areas are an integral part of the capitalist system, even though property relations there frequently remain in the feudal or even more primitive stages of human development. These areas are integrated in the economic structures of advanced capitalist countries as sources of food and raw materials, markets for manufactured goods, and fields for investment.

It would require careful analysis of detailed information of foreign investments and other economic data, very often unavailable, to reveal the full extent of the benefits derived by the economies of the colonial powers—quite apart from the individual monopolies—from the exploitation of colonies and semi-colonies. Nobody can dispute, however, that owing to this exploitation the standard of living in Western Europe generally was higher than would have otherwise been possible; it accounts, to a large extent, for the benefits the capitalist class was able to pass to the

working class, or at least to some privileged layers. Events are now pointing up dramatically the fact, so accurately formulated by Lenin, that imperialism gave a handful of very rich countries "the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism."

Thanks to income from foreign investments, as well as shipping earnings, commissions, insurance, etc. Western Europe was able to import far more than it exported, since payment is, in fact, made by debtor countries through export of their products, either directly to the "mother countries" or, for their benefit, to third countries. Interests, dividends, and services amounted before the war to staggering figures. They were estimated by a League of Nations study (*Europe's Trade*, Geneva 1941) at \$6,400 million in 1928, and \$2,790 million in 1935. Britain alone imported in 1938 £377 million more than it exported. This trade deficit, however, was virtually covered by so-called "invisible exports," of which £200 million were income from overseas investments, and there was no disequilibrium in the balance of payments. In Britain "the rapid and material enhancement of the standard of life," concedes an authoritative British journal (*The World Today*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 1948), was to an important degree due to the fact that the investment of British capital in Latin America "opened up markets for manufactured products and skilled services in return for cheap and abundant supplies of raw materials and food." The same holds true, essentially, for investments in Asia.

Britain's privileged status enabled it prior to the war

to import from Europe some \$600 million more than it exported to the old continent—the trade deficit being covered by earnings made elsewhere. Now, however, due to its precarious payments position, Britain has been forced to cut to the bone its trade with the continent despite the complaints of such countries as France, some of whose luxury industries formerly relied on this market.

France, Holland and Belgium all profited handsomely from their colonies. The Netherlands drew from the Indonesian islands from 10 to 16 percent of its national income, and the conservative London financial authority *The Economist* concluded (September 2, 1949) that “without the vast Dutch investments and trading interests in Java and the surrounding islands, the Netherlands standard of living would be cut at least by ten and perhaps by twenty-five percent.” Belgium’s trade deficit—10 percent of its imports—was covered before the war by income from foreign investments and services. The Belgian Congo is not only a source of dollars as a supplier of radioactive materials to the US; its raw materials such as cotton, copper and zinc furnish the bases for important Belgian export trades.

Until barriers to remittances in the 30’s forced a measure of change, investments in colonies and semi-colonies were, generally speaking, not made in industrial enterprises destined to fill the needs of the native markets, but rather in plantations, mines, communications, etc., which would directly or indirectly facilitate the export of cheap food and raw materials while opening the country as a market for highly priced imported manufactured goods.

Colonies and semi-colonies also served, so to speak, as a bridge linking Europe to the Western Hemisphere. For it is erroneous to believe that Western Europe’s trade deficit with the United States is something new. It existed before the war. Only then Western Europe “earned” dollars especially in Asia and South America, which used to enjoy trade surpluses with the US. Rubber, tin, etc., from southeast Asia, for instance, were sold to the US and the dollars ultimately pocketed by Britain. As a United Nations world survey (January 1948) stated, “the typical under-developed countries—at least outside Europe—were normally net exporters to the US and frequently net importers from Europe (particularly from the United Kingdom).”

Decline of Europe

World War II precipitated the breakdown of the old “equilibrium” between the old imperialist powers and the colonial and semi-colonial world. Western Europe emerged from the war weakened on three fronts—at home through heavy war damage which posed difficult problems of reconstruction; overseas through “disinvestment” and indebtedness; and in relation to the US.

With regard to the disequilibrium between the US and virtually the rest of the world, the recent war is obviously not to blame, though it greatly speeded up and deepened the process. The roots of the disequilibrium must be sought in the developments which led to the substitution of the US for Britain as the principal capitalist country.

After World War II America’s capitalist supremacy became overwhelming; and this country has very little need

for anything—save a few strategic raw materials and secondary foodstuffs—from abroad. Thus, no two-way stream of trade—with numerous secondary and tertiary effects—such as Britain’s smallness and relative barrenness had imposed, is now possible. Food and raw materials can hardly be exchanged for US manufactured and capital goods. This is why the world “dollar shortage” must continue to defy solution.

The second report on the Marshall Plan issued by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (February 1950) points out that Western Europe’s share in American imports has dropped from close to 50 percent in 1900-13 to little over 10 percent today. American imports from Western Europe, 40 years ago, constituted 2 percent of the US gross national product, as against less than 0.5 percent today.

The OEEC, even after making wholly utopian assumptions, such as that “the maintenance of the present high level of business activity in the US, a concerted and successful European export drive to America and the drawing in of third markets by competitive trade and investment,” still concedes that Western Europe’s deficit will amount to one billion dollars in 1952. The deficit at present totals some four billion dollars.

The disequilibrium between the US and the rest of the world can be overcome only if the US imports far more, particularly from Western Europe. But as the maturing crisis unfolds in the US, it will not only be increasingly unable to accept any products that may compete with its own, but will be forced to struggle with Europe for foreign markets.

Economic losses due to the war were heavy all over Western Europe and especially in Britain, where damage to property alone was estimated at £1,450 million; shipping losses at £700 million, and depreciation and obsolescence not made good during the war period at £900 million. A total of £3,050 million.

France’s capital losses on account of war damage and depreciation amounted to 1,200 billion francs; the full meaning of this figure is better grasped when one bears in mind that in the decade prior to the war, France’s productive apparatus was nearing decay. The age of its industrial capital equipment, as a whole, was 25 years in 1939, while in Great Britain it was 7-9 and in the US 5-7 years.

While Western Europe’s productive apparatus was thus declining, Germany was meanwhile being obliterated as an independent capitalist rival.

As a result of the reduction in income from overseas investments and other so-called “invisible exports,” the Economic Commission for Europe estimated that Europe’s earnings were lower than before the war by some \$2,000 million. Also the process of “disinvestment” was especially drastic in Britain’s case. To finance World War I Britain had been forced to sell about £350-400 million of overseas investments. In World War II, British total overseas investments, estimated at £5,000 million in 1943, were reduced by £1,118 million, while its foreign liabilities—sterling balances and overseas loans—reached the enormous figure of some £3,000 million.

Due to these developments—to which we should add the growth in Europe's population which makes wartime losses in industrial and agricultural production even heavier *per capita*—Western Europe became more “export conscious” than ever before. And this in the following framework.

Trade with Eastern Europe, formerly very substantial, is at a standstill due to US pressure. Even if this should change, East-West trade cannot return to the former pattern. Eastern Europe would be a market for capital goods but most probably not for light manufactures.

Countries which had been markets for manufactured goods in exchange for food and raw materials have developed their own industries which they now defend to the detriment of the old industrial powers.

Together with their industrial development, formerly dependent countries have made efforts—which are continuing—to develop merchant fleets in order to save shipping expenses. For example, India and Argentina are trying to become first-rate maritime nations. The US meantime continues to protect American shipping by demanding that 50% of Marshall Plan and other cargoes be carried in American bottoms. This naturally tends to deteriorate even further the position of countries for whom shipping has been a very important source of “invisible” earnings.

Only Belgium—we don't include Switzerland in this survey—enjoyed after the war a period of relative prosperity, because of a set of unusual circumstances. First, the war damage was slight. Second, Belgium didn't spend its foreign investments during the war; third, lend-lease consisted of normal exports delivered after the “liberation.” Consequently from the outbreak of the war until 1947, Belgium imported about £400 million more than it exported without a reduction in the country's gold balances or foreign investments.

Despite the postwar recovery in production, French visible exports amounted in 1948 to only 50% of France's imports. In 1949 France exported some \$1,400 million while the authorities of the *Plan Monet* estimate that it must import \$1,900 million to keep its productive apparatus rolling at full speed. Since this trade deficit is mostly with the dollar area and will have to be covered as soon as the Marshall Plan ends, just how France is going to succeed in such an export drive is more than difficult to envisage.

But it is particularly in Britain that a sharp drop in living standards is unavoidable if British exports are not increased to the point where they will compensate for the drastic loss in “invisible” income. A measure of success has been achieved in this connection by the British. This success, however, must be viewed in its actual context. The rise in exports was achieved under most favorable world conditions which are rapidly drawing to a close. The sellers' market is becoming a thing of the past, while powerful rivals, Germany and Japan, are staging a comeback, naturally with American consent. Moreover, although Britain made progress, however temporary, toward bridging the “overall” trade gap, the red ink in the dollar account is harder to erase. In 1949 the dollar deficit re-

mained virtually the same as in 1948 (£275 in 1949, £280 in 1948).

In the memorandum submitted by the British Government to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on plans for the last two Marshall Plan years, some hopes are pinned on a further reduction of dollar imports—which will unquestionably meet the most determined American opposition—but especially on an increase in dollar earnings by the sterling colonial areas. But the sale of these products—rubber, cocoa, jute, wool, tin—hinges on a continued high-gear activity of the American economy. Let us recall that as soon as demand for metals fell in the US in 1949 the Munition Board was directed “to exhaust every possibility of obtaining minerals and materials in the US before making foreign purchases” for the American stockpile. This is a preview of things to come.

Changes in the Colonial World

Western Europe's enfeeblement makes it all the more important that colonies and semi-colonies be made to play their traditional role. But how?

In South America, Western Europe was dealt heavy blows both by American encroachment and by the industrialization encouraged by war shortages. Also as a supplier of cheap food, as an investment field, and a source of “invisible” income, Latin America's importance has diminished. Argentina, great exporter of grains and meat, demands—and obtains—higher prices for its products. Rising anti-imperialist feelings, fostered by young national bourgeoisies defending their newly won positions, result in an unfavorable climate for the import of capital. Several South American countries applied the war-accumulated balances of sterling to buy back British owned utilities, especially railroads, one of the main investment items, while obstacles to the remittance of dividends and interests were not removed. Industrialization was not restricted to Latin America. It also occurred in certain countries of Asia. In order to wage the war against its German and Japanese rivals, Britain was forced to encourage industrial development especially in India, while its inability to supply the colonial market as heretofore, opened up new opportunities for home industries.

Though some industrialization did take place, the great bulk of the population in Asia are still peasants—landless plantation peasants or “independent” peasants crushed under the weight of debt and tenancy.

The October Revolution removed from the capitalist system one-sixth of the world. This objective reality of unexampled importance is not affected by the entire subsequent degeneration of the Soviet regime. The removal of China, the most important semi-colonial country, from the imperialist fold constitutes a new and shattering blow to the world capitalist system. “In China before the war,” reads a UN report, “foreign investments controlled practically all the railways, two-thirds of the shipping industry, most of the iron mines and over half of the coal production,” (*Salient Features of the World Economic Situation, 1945-47*, Lake Success, January 1948, p. 77.) This chapter in the history of China has come to a close. Trade relations

between China and the West, even if restored, would now be of an altogether different nature.

India's New Status

India has now become a republican member of the British Commonwealth. To be sure, British "interests" have been assured respectful treatment. Yet the fact that political independence was obtained shows that the relationship between the British imperialists and the native capitalists had changed in favor of the latter. India was for long Britain's best customer and supplied the rank and file of the Indian army which 'dominated the whole area from Suez to Hong Kong for decades.' Real independence, however, is far from having been achieved. India's membership in the Commonwealth doesn't imply the sharing of advantages. Quite the contrary. The Indian *Eastern Economist* (November 25, 1949) discussing the recent devaluation of the pound, in a revealing editorial which merits quoting at length, asserts:

We pay higher prices for petroleum, kerosene, wheat and cotton, possibly totaling Rs.30 crores more altogether. . . . We have gained from the sterling area through the higher prices of jute goods, tea, manganese ore, cotton textiles, hides and skins, vegetable oils and oilseeds and black pepper, apart from lesser things. But it is doubtful if we have gained from the sterling area alone more than Rs.15 crores under all heads. . . . Hitherto largely because of the relatively stronger bargaining position of Britain and Australia we have been playing a losing hand. But we should not allow ourselves to get the raw end of every deal. . . . The way things are going against India at the present time makes us seriously wonder whether we are now deriving any benefit from staying in the sterling area. The Government of India must see that constant surrender on every point will discredit it thoroughly. It must find means to use its bargaining power in the sterling area to compel reasonable compromise. . . . The point which must be resisted is unfair dealing inside the sterling area, that is, the strong exploiting the weak.

Independence, on the other hand, has not brought economic benefits to the masses. Most Indians eke out their living by working the land. The population is rising and agricultural output is unable to keep the pace without radical agrarian reform and industrialization. Thus, India, which before the war exported food, is now forced to import from three to four million tons of grain every year. To face its growing payments deficit, India must increase its exports. Its main export item, however, jute, has been steadily losing ground, especially in the US, to substitutes. On top of that India's terms of trade have been becoming increasingly unfavorable. While in 1939 one hundred tons of tea bought one ton of imported food, today three hundred tons of tea are needed. India's industrial development has been substantial, though not so when compared to the needs of the country. Just as elsewhere in Asia, since the population continues to grow while industry and agriculture lag behind—and they can't help but lag behind until the road to socialism is entered—the standard of living of the masses is bound to fall.

In southeast Asia Indonesia is the largest and most populated country. For three centuries Holland exploited this territory ten times as large as its own. Prior to the

war the Dutch were the most important investors in the islands. Their share was 75% of the £350 million total. The remaining 25% was mostly British and American.

Indonesia's independence is quite relative and more political than economic. Foreign privileges have been maintained. Yet the mere fact that the country is no longer at the complete mercy of the Dutch monopolists is a substantial achievement and still another proof of the loosening of the imperialist vise.

Before the war over one-third of the world's rubber, one-fourth of its copra and palm oil and fifteen percent of its tin were produced in the Indonesian islands. They are also very rich in oil. This will suffice to give an idea of the loss suffered by Holland.

Disturbances in Malaya—a very important dollar earner—threaten Britain's efforts at recovery and at the same time deal a blow at the attempts to restore a capitalist economic equilibrium. In Malaya British forces number some 150 thousand and still they are unable to crush the guerrillas. The civil war in Burma, since the country achieved its formal independence, has had the same effect.

In Indo-China, which has been called the key to south-east Asia, France is making desperate efforts to re-establish its rule, with no success to date. The Viet-Nam forces control most of the country and the French puppet, the former Emperor Bao Dai, is unable to start playing his role. France is keeping an army of some 125 thousand men in Indo-China. And the cost of this war runs annually into hundreds of millions of dollars.

Africa

Since the European powers are steadily losing ground in Latin America and Asia, they are being urged to "rejuvenate" themselves through the "development" of their Black African territories. 'It is to Africa,' writes an apologist of imperialism, "that Britain must look for that field for investment, source of raw materials and expanding market which she needs in order to survive, and she must win it quickly from the swamps and forest and highveld of the last continent to be pioneered." (*British Aims in Africa*, by Elspeth Huxley, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1949.)

At present, gold and coal are mined in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; copper in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo, tin in Nigeria, gold and diamonds in the Gold Coast. As for agricultural production, the colonial powers have fostered export crops, some of which—palm oil, raw material for soap and cocoa—play a role in world economy.

How are these crops raised? The plantation system predominates in the Belgian Congo. *Unilever*, the great soap monopoly, produces there palm oil, rubber, cotton, coffee, and tea. Sisal is grown in plantations in Tanganyika and Kenya. In British West Africa, on the other hand, cocoa is raised by Africans on individual farms. Usually this only changes the form of exploitation.

We have mentioned the dislocation in Western Europe's food trade. British optimists expect Africa to take over the role formerly played by the countries of the New

World. A substantial volume of the fats and meat Britain needs could be produced in Africa eventually. But with the exception of its southernmost tip, Africa lacks the preconditions for immediate large-scale investment not only in industry but also in agriculture. Roads, water, urban facilities, etc., etc., are yet to be provided. The Labor government has attempted to use public funds to start colonial schemes. The Overseas Food Corporation has spent \$25 million in an East African peanut raising scheme, which, incidentally, appears to be a failure. Nor will the development of an African market be an easy task; the standard of living of the native population is too low and imperialism, itself, is the main obstacle to raising it.

Still another barrier blocks the attempts to "open up" Africa, and it is proving to be the most formidable—the new spirit of the African masses. To understand it we must recall some features of imperialist rule on the continent.

The map of Africa shows nothing but the wishes of the imperialist masters and the balance of power between them. Nigeria, Nyasaland, Gold Coast, Kenya and so forth, are merely names of "prefabricated" countries. Their frontiers are arbitrarily drawn, cutting across tribes, languages and customs. Natives have been prevented from earning a living by tilling the soil. Incidents were provoked whenever necessary and punitive expeditions sent to expel them from their land. They have been herded into the so-called reserves while the rest of the land has been set aside for white settlers or mining companies. To cite one example, in 1930, Southern Rhodesia's Africans, who constitute over 95% of the population—1,600,000 out of 1,682,000—were granted by the Land Apportionment Act only 30.3% of the total area of the country.

In 1935 it was officially disclosed that in Northern Rhodesia there were villages with 50% of the adult males normally absent, and as a result a local famine had taken place. It is illegal for an African to leave the mine without permission. While he works in the mine—and sometimes he is forced to work ten months out of a year or more—he needs a pass even to move around. If he stays away from the mine longer than he is allowed to, he may be forced to come back and punished. The aim is always the same—to make cheap African labor available for the European.

Colonial Enslavement

Contrary to the claims of the bearers of the "white man's burden," the standard of living of the African masses didn't improve with the arrival of the whites. The places they live in are from any point of view unfit for a human being, and have become worse since the arrival of the whites and not better. "The typical African hut of mud or straw is easily destroyed and renewed," remarks a candid defender of British imperialism, "and in older days sanitation was maintained by frequent hut-burning. In South Africa both materials for hut-building and labor are now scarce. Overcrowding and landlessness have compelled the southern peoples to live in worse conditions than they once enjoyed." (*Africa Emergent*, by W. M. Macmillan)

The record of the hypocritical imperialist barbarians has been written with blood, with Negro blood, on every inch of the African country. But they have had to pay a price—the destruction of the tribal society, which formerly rendered the natives docile.

Now the colonial powers are doing their best to prevent the "westernization" of the African people. To this end British officials have even fostered local languages, the Swahili and Hausa, instead of the more "dangerous" English, among tribes which are not familiar with them. But you can't have "western" exploitation without "westernization" of the exploited.

The continent the imperialists are turning to is quite different from what they expected. Unions are being formed in mines and factories. A new restless *intelligentsia* has arisen. The masses are outgrowing their tribal loyalties, or what is left of them, and are beginning to develop a national consciousness. A native press has been born which cannot help but reflect the grievances of the exploited.

The foreign imperialists have tried to build a basis of support among the natives. The oppression is so rampant, however, that no African can speak with "understanding" of the European rulers without disqualifying himself forth with as a leader. The British created a new elite "educated in western fashion to be schoolmasters, doctors, lawyers, engineers, traders, clerks, civil servants—and politicians. The assumption was . . . that from the white man's point of view they would be cooperators, not opponents," writes Elspeth Huxley. The assumption, however, regrets the same Huxley, has been "exploded."

Tension is growing in South Africa and Nigeria; in the Gold Coast and Kenya; in Uganda and Tanganyika. British bombers had to be sent over Kenya. In Nigeria, where the anti-imperialist moods are very developed, as a result of a mine strike, in November 1949 the government declared a local state of emergency after the police had killed 19 persons. A new constitution—the second in three years—is meanwhile being discussed. In 1949 railway workers in Nigeria struck after rejecting the awards of an arbitration tribunal.

In the Gold Coast the proposed new constitution is being discussed amid a civil disobedience campaign, strikes and even a boycott of British goods. Under mass pressure, the Gold Coast authorities have promised to replace rapidly most of the Englishmen in high Civil Service jobs with Africans.

The British government tries to hold back the tide by offering the natives fictions of democratic rule. But even the Anglican Bishop of Nyasaland, was reported recently as criticizing the Legislative Council in which he has served six years as "an ornamental democratic facade" for the "essentially oligarchic" rule of the government officials. Incidentally, Nigeria as well as the Gold Coast have elected African majorities in their powerless legislatures. On the other hand, the British colonial authorities have been clamping down on the African press. The British have suspended the *Accra Evening News*. (January 1950) and arrested its editor in the course of new disturbances.

Although some industrial development has taken place in the copper belt and Southern Rhodesia, it is in South Africa—itself not a colony—where it has really become substantial. This has led to a new and momentous fact—the birth of an African industrial proletariat.

The drift to the cities, which has been taking place for the past 30 years, is proceeding apace. Between 1921 and 1946 the number of natives in the urban areas has increased threefold, from 500,000 to 1,750,000. Thus, the old tribal structure has disappeared in large areas.

As a consequence of the African awakening, the hypocritical policies of Smuts have been replaced with open and brutal repressions by the government of Malan. But it is not only in South Africa that racial theories find a ready echo. In the colonies the policies of the Malan government are looked upon with favor. Dr. Malan believes “that Europeans in every part of Africa should combine together for their own protection.”

In turn, the policies of *apartheid* (segregation) imposed by the new government are increasing the discontent of the Africans. In the Johannesburg area, over six outbreaks have taken place in the last six months. Mrs. Margaret Ballinger, one of three whites representing the Negroes in the House of Assembly, was reported to have said: “The riots are not an episode but a symptom; not the end but only the beginning.”

Apartheid's avowed aim is to concentrate the Negroes in their reserves where their tribal life would be “restored.” But this is impossible for South Africa's industry which depends on African labor. The imperialists and the white

supremacists face their old dilemma: they need the African labor force to staff their factories, farms and mines; they dread the consequences of the urbanization and proletarianization of the black masses.

The opportunities of Western European imperialism to “rejuvenate” itself at the expense of the African masses do not appear much brighter than in the rest of the colonial and semi-colonial world.

To sum up. The time when Western Europe, generally speaking, was able to enjoy a higher standard of life thanks to the exploitation of dependent peoples is beginning to draw to a close, opening up a new era, not alone in the history of the colonial peoples but also for the masses in Europe. The class struggle, blunted, for decades, especially in Britain, is bound to become sharpened.

Moreover, West European countries are themselves faced with the prospect of becoming dependencies of the United States, a situation by no means unknown in history. Portugal, with its colonies, for example, has been playing this role, in a different context, with regard to Britain. And so, the West European countries while continuing to exploit colonies which remain in their possession, the profits thus obtained would end up in American pockets as dividends or payment of interest and principal on loans. At all events, Western Europe's new status in relation to the U.S. will impel the European bourgeoisies to intensify the exploitation of the masses at home. Thus the collapse of the colonial system has tremendous repercussions in the homelands of the decaying imperialist powers.

The Test of Yugoslavia

By GERARD BLOCH

The article which appears below has been translated from the March-April issue of *Quatrieme Internationale*. Owing to pressure of space we had to omit a section dealing with the attitude of the POUM toward the Yugoslav evolution.—Ed.

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For the future historian the greatest merit of the Fourth International may well be in this, that it was the only one among all the tendencies of world public opinion to understand the profound meaning—the class content—of the open break between Tito and the Cominform; and was more than a year in advance of any other tendency in the labor movement to firmly declare its unconditional support of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav Communist Party against the Cominform.

The adoption of this position, whose correctness is being confirmed more and more by events, was not due to chance or to some particular political sixth sense of the Trotskyists. If we saw clearly it was because our powerful ideological armament enabled us to orient ourselves quickly and correctly in the face of this new situation. The evolution of Yugoslavia provides the most striking verification of the theory elaborated by Leon Trotsky concerning the nature

of the USSR and of Stalinism and, at the same time, it signalizes the irretrievable bankruptcy of all the revisionist theories.

As opposed to the Trotskyist theory of the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers' state, all the revisionist theories have, as is well known, their common denominator in the definition of the Soviet regime—and by extension, in the buffer countries—as a new system of class society baptized differently by the various authors as bureaucratic collectivism, or state capitalism, or according to the latest gospel preached by Saint Chaulieu, bureaucratic capitalism. The Stalinist bureaucracy thus becomes a class, in the Marxist sense of the term, and is elevated in the USSR and in the buffer zone to the status of a ruling and exploiting class that bases itself upon stateized property.

Incidentally, in this latest version Chaulieu speaks of the bureaucracy as a “parasitic class, strictly speaking outside of production” (!) (*Socialisme et Barbarie*, No. 4, p. 61). He apparently is unaware that this amounts to a denial that the bureaucracy plays the role of a *class* in the Marxist sense, for Marxist theory defines classes by their role in the

process of production, by the position they occupy in the mode of social division of labor.

But for historical materialism, the "guiding thread, which permits the discovery of existing laws... in the apparent maze and chaos (of history)... is the theory of the class struggle." (Lenin, "Karl Marx and His Doctrine.") In other words, Marxism views the contradictions between classes and their conflicting class interests as the main-spring of history. The contradictions between the various sections of any one class, notably between sections belonging to different countries, no matter how important they may be, always remain subordinated to the main class conflicts. That is why all of feudal Europe made a bloc against the French Revolution; that is why Bismarck supported Thiers against the Paris Commune; that is why the victorious Allies in World War I supplied the Weimar Republic with the necessary means to combat the German proletariat; that is why the world bourgeoisie threw a "cordon sanitaire" around the October Revolution, and so on.

What then are the problems which are posed for the revisionists by the Stalin-Tito conflict which, according to them, is a conflict between one bureaucracy which is the ruling class of the USSR and another bureaucracy which is the ruling class of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the selfsame social relations? Stalin at first tried to force Yugoslavia, by means of an economic blockade, to grant such concessions to Wall Street as would make inevitable the reestablishment of "free enterprise" in Yugoslavia. These plans failed and the Yugoslavs, in the face of mounting US pressure, have categorically affirmed their intention to make no concessions whatever affecting the structure of their regime. Now Stalin is trying, as he has before, to strike a bargain with Truman against Yugoslavia, even at the cost of important concessions. In a word, Stalin is behaving as though he considers Tito as the main enemy. Is the bureaucracy which is the ruling class in the USSR thus prepared to make a deal with the American bourgeoisie against the bureaucracy which is the ruling class of Yugoslavia, even at the cost of destroying the existing property relations in Yugoslavia which are identical to those upon which the Russian bureaucracy bases its exploitation of the proletariat?

Herein lies a contradiction which is fatal for those theories which convert the bureaucracy into a class. And most curious of all is the fact that the holders of these theories do not seem to be aware of it. The evolution of Yugoslavia, and more generally of the crisis of Stalinism, will oblige them to abandon their theories or to give up the fundamental concepts of Marxist sociology.

We propose to devote this article by and large to a study of the positions taken on the Tito-Stalin conflict by the Shachtman group in the US. The growing estrangement of these comrades not only from Marxist methodology but

also from reality itself is manifested here in a most glaring manner.

The First Shachtmanite Position

On July 9, 1948, ten days after the Cominform issued its blast against Yugoslavia, Shachtman, while noting that the "Yugoslav bureaucracy" was resisting Stalin "fundamentally the same way that the rising bourgeoisie of the colonial countries seek to increase their independence from the big capitalist nations that rule them," nevertheless lumps Stalin and Tito together in the following terms:

To both sides of rival tyrants we say: Go to it, bandits! Deepen the rift between you! The people will surge through the opening which you create because you have to create it. And when they do, your knell will have sounded—the knell of all of you—and the hour of the people will begin to strike its challenging, liberating note! (New International, Aug. 1948.)

And in the September issue of the same magazine, Hal Draper launches an attack—against the Fourth International. Under the alluring title "Comrade Tito and the Fourth International," we are treated to a veritable Indian war dance around the topic of "the galloping political degeneration of the leadership of the Fourth International." Aside from displaying the breadth of his literary culture—like the chapters in Sir Walter Scott's novels, every subdivision of Draper's article bears an appropriate poetic epigraph—the author offers us a demonstration of the superiority of his method of logic over "the simplistic dialectic of Engels" to which these "left Stalinists hit by senility" are attached. "I have trapped you!" Draper cries out triumphantly. Didn't you characterize Yugoslavia as a capitalist state and the USSR as a workers' state? And here, you wretches, you are lining up with a capitalist state against a workers' state! Isn't the "strictest" revolutionary defeatism and even "military defeatism" required in such a case?

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the class character of Yugoslavia, which is at present under discussion in the International, let us remind Draper that at least for "simplistic dialecticians" there is no criterion, established once and for all, not even the criterion of the class nature of the states involved, that can provide automatically a position in any given conflict, without an examination of the concrete situation created by such a conflict. Thus in the case of Ethiopia, a feudal state largely based on slavery, we defended it against an advanced capitalist state; in the Spanish civil war, we defended one bourgeois state against another bourgeois state; and the Shachtmanites themselves, after their last turn, are defending a "bureaucratic collectivist" state.

Our epoch, which is that of transition between capitalism and socialism, is rich and will doubtless prove even richer in the future in complex phenomena in which the most contradictory aspects will be inextricably combined and which can never be elucidated by criteria forged once and for all time. It is precisely for the study of such problems that the poor old dialectic has been invented.

The remainder of Draper's article is full of heavy irony over the grotesque idea that there is the slightest chance of seeing the Yugoslav Communist Party as a whole return to the path of Leninism. In the policy of the International Secretariat which addresses itself to the "Congress, the Central Committee and the members of the CPY" he sees nothing but a crude maneuver of people who consider themselves very cunning, but who are bound to get entangled in their own snares.

In the October 1948 *New International* Shachtman amiably advises the International Secretariat to assume forthwith the title of "Comradely Advisers to Stalinist Police Dictators on How to Transform Totalitarianism Into Democracy, Capitalism Into Socialism, Counter-revolutionary Parties Into Revolutionary Parties, Oppressors of the People Into Progressive Leaders of the People, Rulers Into Ruled and Ruled Into Rulers, in the Best Interests of the Dictators, Oppressors and Counter-revolutionists Themselves" (what an amazingly loquacious individual!); and Draper, for his part, affirms that "the conflict between the Yugo and the Commissar is over who is to benefit from the exploitation of the masses."

Then in the November 1948 issue of this same periodical, expanding on his theme, Draper assures that the "Cominform accusations of 'adventurism' directed against Tito have more than a kernel of truth" so far as the objectives of the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan are concerned, which Draper considers as over-ambitious. As for Albania and the Yugoslav efforts to establish a Balkan Federation, here Draper denounces "Yugoslav sub-imperialism." (As early as July 12, 1948, the Shachtmanite weekly *Labor Action* was referring to Stalin's uneasiness over "Tito's imperialist ambitions.")

As everybody knows, the term imperialism has been employed by Marxists ever since Lenin in a very precise sense. It does not characterize the *policy* of the leaders of any given country nor their "desire for power" but rather a modification of the capitalist *economic structure* in these countries. To be able to talk at ease of "Russian imperialism" the Shachtmanites are obliged to employ this term in the popular—and vague—sense of domination, which empties it of any precise historical content and renders it devoid of any political implications. Why not then follow the bourgeoisie and talk of "Ho Chi Minh's imperialism," for example? And if Mao Tse-tung's troops should cross the Viet Nam border, shall we hear Shachtman denounce "Chinese imperialism"?

The Second Shachtmanite Position

Nevertheless, at their convention in April 1949—after the Yugoslavs had shown their capacity of resistance and a Russian attack appeared likely—the Shachtmanites sensed for the first time the need to change their position. In the event of armed attack by Russia against Yugoslavia, declares their international resolution, "the position of the anti-Stalinist workers should be to wish for the victory of Yugoslavia in its war against the invader. . . . While, however, the conflict between the two totalitarian regimes remains propagandistic and diplomatic and on the bureau-

cratic level, the Marxists give no support whatsoever to the Tito-Stalinist (sic) regime in Yugoslavia but expose its reactionary character and identity with the Moscow regime and seek to mobilize all popular support against it." (*New International*, April 1949.)

In other words, let us do everything we can to hamper Tito's economic, political and military preparations for resistance to Stalinist aggression, as well as to Tito's efforts to find support among the world labor movement—but if this aggression actually takes place, then we shall support him.

There you have the politics of people who, as everybody knows, are fortunate enough not to be entangled like the Fourth International in any prefabricated schemas, and thereby enabled to adapt their policies to dynamic reality! To complete the picture, the same resolution approves the support given by the Workers Party to Mikolajchik, the reactionary leader tied up with British imperialism, against the Stalinist government of Poland. . . .

And a New Turn

But in the latter part of 1949, the international crisis of Stalinism deepened and various fellow-travelers of the Communist parties along with some political organizations and tendencies came out in favor of Yugoslavia. (For example, in *La Revolutienne Proletarienne*, October 1949, R. Hagnauer, who can hardly be suspected of being a Stalinophile, wrote: "We shall lose the right to oppose the vile war against Indo-China if . . . we do not tell Stalin—Hands Off Yugoslavia!") The position adopted by the Shachtmanite "Independent Socialist League" became untenable and a turn became necessary.

On Nov. 21, 1949 *Labor Action* carried a "discussion article" signed by Rudzienski who declared:

Without identifying ourselves with Tito as the Fourth International has done, we must defend the Yugoslavian people, and all the other peoples, subjugated by the Kremlin, against Russian aggression as well as against capitalist intervention.

(Let me take this occasion to point out to Comrade Rudzienski that we do not "identify" ourselves with Tito and the CPY any more than we identify ourselves with the Bolivian miners and their unions, but we are unconditionally on their side in their respective struggles.)

Thereupon, *Labor Action* began on Dec. 5, 1949 a series of articles entitled "Titoism and Independent Socialism," in which Hal Draper deemed it necessary to review the entire question.

The method which Draper employs in these articles cannot fail to make the reader ponder over the irony history displays in little things as well as the big ones. This method actually is the dogmatic, metaphysical method which Daper and his friends ascribe to the Fourth International!

Draper begins by shedding a tear over the poor unfortunates (everybody outside the ISL) who obviously understand nothing at all about Titoism because they are unblessed by the Shachtmanite revelation on the nature of

Stalinism. Stalinism, he reminds, is an "exploitive social system... in which the state bureaucracy rules over an economy which is the property of the state, which in turn the collective property of the bureaucracy." Having thus lit up his lantern, Draper goes on, with a magnificent ignorance of the facts, to delineate the international crisis of Stalinism as well as the situation in Yugoslavia.

Titoism, he explains, is national Stalinism. It can be defined "in six words, which also constitute the title of a book recently published by Professor George S. Counts. It is a translation of a Russian textbook for the education of children... and its title is 'I Want to Be Like Stalin.' That is all that Tito wants in the last analysis: 'I Want to Be Like Stalin.'" (*Labor Action*, Dec. 19, 1949.)

The very same explanation of the crisis of Stalinism is valid outside of the "Russian empire," Draper announces the following week: "... the end goal (of the Stalinists) is... the achievement of Stalinist power in their own country. They too Want to Be Like Stalin." This so-called "theory" permits Draper to characterize the "neo-Stalinist tendency" as follows:

In France, such well-known fellow-travelling intellectuals as Jean Cassou, Claude Aveline, and Martin-Chauffier have declared for Belgrade as against Moscow. **None of these people have changed their views one whit by so doing. What is characteristic of the neo-Stalinist type is that he has been drawn into the Stalinist orbit... not by socialist ideals, even mistaken ones... but (because) he looks toward planning as the key to the difficulties of the social system, and Russia appears to him as the archetype of a planned society... For them, Titoism... is Stalinism, their Stalinism...** (Our emphasis.)

Apparently content with the profundity of his own theoretical views, Hal Draper did not deem it necessary to check them against, say, writings like *Forty Eight* by Jean Cassou or the article, "Revolution and Truth" in which Cassou breaks with Stalinism. (*Esprit*, Dec. 1949; see also *Quatrieme Internationale*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 53-55.) Had Draper done so he might have found it rather difficult to deny this writer the slightest shred of "socialist ideals." (For our part, we are more inclined to reproach Cassou for his opinion that it is necessary to "round-out" Marxism with a few grains of the "spirit of 1848.") Suffice it to quote here only from the most recent of these "neo-Stalinists" Agnes Humbert, ex-President of the "Partisans of Peace" in the 13th arrondissement in Paris:

Let us recall Lenin's slogan: Don't lie to the people! Nowadays, they do nothing except lie. Our revolution of '89 took place under the banner of truth, so did the October revolution. (*Combat*, Feb. 21, 1950.)

As can be seen, the desire "to be like Stalin" assumes rather unexpected forms.

But in his fifth article Draper seems to take up what has been happening in Yugoslavia since the break with the Cominform. This is done, naturally, in order to assure us that there is not the slightest sign, not "even one visible under a microscope" of any democratization of the re-

gime. Why? Because this is demanded by the theory of bureaucratic collectivism.

This bureaucratic ruling class bases itself on the possession of the state power, and through the state power, on its exploitation of a completely statified economy... democratization means its abdication as a ruling class... this abdication will not be seen. Yugoslavia will be democratized through the overthrow of the dictatorship, not by its softening. (*Labor Action*, Jan. 2, 1950. Emphasis in original.)

While citing the declarations of Djilas against the creation of a new International, Draper naturally passes by in silence such documents as Kardelj's pamphlet, *People's Democracy*, or M. Popovich's *Economic Relations Between Socialist States*, or Kardelj's speech on the freedom of scientific research. All this does not interest him, because his mind is already made up. Presently he will describe as "purely technical" the decentralization measures of Yugoslav economy (*Labor Action*, Feb. 20, 1950). He will even foresee the possibility that Tito may allow an "opposition" in the Yugoslav March 25 elections and warns his readers against such a maneuver. Unfortunately, Tito has since flatly rejected such a project and this will doubtless provide Draper with another opportunity to denounce totalitarianism at work.

In passing, Draper naturally accuses the Yugoslavs of "not differing by an iota" in their judicial procedure from the Stalinists. We lack space here to refute this contention in connection with the Sarajevo trial of the White Russians. But the trial of four monarchist students was recently held at Belgrade. The Paris daily, *Le Monde*, which vigorously takes the side of the accused, is nevertheless obliged to recognize, Feb. 11, that this trial "in no way resembles the usual trials behind the Iron Country. The defendants pleaded not guilty and defended themselves stubbornly."

As for the "Yugoslav bureaucracy," Draper appears content to rest on his theoretical description. An examination of how the existence of this bureaucracy manifests itself objectively, for example, in the distribution of the national income, doesn't seem to interest him at all. Whether the wage differential is 1 to 4, or 1 to 5; whether miners and skilled workers, as Adamic reports in *Trends and Tides* (vol. 6, no. 1), make more than ministers—all this doesn't concern Draper at all. After all, aren't bureaucrats people who "want to be like Stalin"? What difference does it make what their actual social position is?

(All the revisionists, by the way, are obliged in one way or another to substitute a voluntarist conception for the materialist conception of history. Thus, Comrade Galienne, a partisan of the theory of state capitalism, writes in *Ecole Emancipee*, Feb. 9, "And when Tito's victory was assured, he slowly but surely built up a state where the bureaucracy has replaced the national bourgeoisie as the ruling class but where the exploitation of the masses has not ceased to be the rule.")

Is a very important part of the capital investments under the Five-Year Plan earmarked for production of con-

sumer goods? That does not matter, either! Yugoslavia's recent evolution, as we have said, is of no concern to Draper. All this is only so much sand in the eyes or "technical measures." Elsewhere in the March-April issue of *Quatrième Internationale* we carry a summary of the main facts—declarations of leaders, political and administrative measures—that have taken place in Yugoslavia in the last three months. This summary incontestably shows that the Yugoslav leaders give themselves a much clearer accounting of the social causes of the Cominform policy as an expression of the "bureaucratic degeneration of socialist construction" (Kardelj) and that the struggle against bureaucratism in Yugoslavia itself is one of their main preoccupations. It is impossible to confuse their declarations with the prevalent Stalinist practice of denouncing the "bureaucratic methods" of some second-rate functionary who serves as a scapegoat. Kidrich, for example, is careful to state precisely that "it is a question of bureaucratism as a social phenomenon."

It would take us too far afield to demonstrate here that the Yugoslav leaders still have a long way to go on this road; that they still have to understand that the struggle against bureaucracy cannot *definitively* be won without the support of the international proletariat and it cannot be won *finally* without an *extension of the revolution on a world scale*. Nor is this the place to undertake a detailed criticism of the measures they have taken, a criticism which would show that after taking two steps forward they often take a step or half a step backward. But the important fact is that there can be no doubt about the general direction of this whole evolution.

Draper's readers are naturally left in ignorance about the recent declarations of Djilas, Kidrich, Kardelj. How could he explain them? As mere sand in the eyes? But *whom* do they intend to deceive? The Yugoslav workers to whom they address themselves? But how can they deceive them for any length of time about conditions under their own eyes, their very own living conditions? And what a strange ruling class it is, indeed, that furnishes such excellent ideological weapons to the masses it exploits for them to combat it! On the contrary, it would be so easy to insist on the need of strengthening the state power, and so on, by arguing how difficult Yugoslavia's situation is, and how encircled it is by hostile forces!

Are these declarations then meant to deceive the bourgeoisie? But why should the bourgeoisie be interested in "deepening socialist democracy"?

Or is it to deceive Comrade Draper? He is much too clever for that, such an attempt would be doomed to failure in advance. Then, what is it for? Why, of course, it is to deceive the Fourth International and some of the other "neo-Stalinists" of the same stripe!

Let us quote from still another "neo-Stalinist," the Belgrade correspondent of the conservative London financial periodical, the *Economist*:

The greatest transformation of the past year, particularly in recent months, has been in the Communists themselves. In turning their backs on the rigid orthodoxy of the Kremlin, the Yugoslav Communists have found intel-

lectual release. At the year's end the Yugoslav CP began what its leading theoretician, Moshe Pyade, described privately as "the most important ideological development in Yugoslavia" since the Cominform resolution—the reorganization of the educational system. The party's Central Committee declared that, in the social sciences, textbooks prepared by Yugoslav professors will supplant Soviet ones and that in the physical sciences the accomplishments of all scientists will be treated on their merits, without regard to their nationality. In liberalizing educational methods the Yugoslav concept of Marxism as opposed to the dogmatic Soviet approach will be emphasized in an effort to give greater intellectual freedom to the young.

Equally important is the decision to decentralize industry. . . . In the Soviet Union the accent has been on greater and greater central or federal control. In Yugoslavia today the government has boldly reversed the direction. More and more factories are being turned over by Belgrade to the six Republics, and the Republics in turn are handing over greater responsibility to the *oblasti* (counties) into which the nation was divided last summer. This program of distributing responsibility and stimulating initiative is designed to prevent the appearance of a massive top-heavy pyramid of Soviet bureaucracy. . . .

There have been other tendencies in the same direction, as the party throws aside what some members call its "Stalinist mantle." In contrasting the direction now being taken by Yugoslavia to that of the Soviet Union, they list a flock of changes: production of consumer goods and housing are being emphasized as a result of the political situation; the inclination to create a Soviet-like gap between the top of the pyramid and the bottom has been reversed, and the party leadership is striving to follow Tito's instructions "to get closer to the masses", nepotism and favoritism are being curbed; the role of the mass political organizations—and not merely the Communists—is being increased. . . . (*Economist*, Feb. 4, pp. 271-2. Our emphasis.)

Frankenstein, Tito, Gapon, Chiang Kai-shek and Hal Draper

At the end of the sixth day, Jehovah saw everything he had made, and, behold, it was very good. And on the seventh day he rested. Less fortunate is Comrade Draper. After developing in his sixth article the brilliant idea that the only interesting thing about Titoism is that, despite the absolutely Stalinist character of its ideology, it forces the masses to do some thinking about Stalinism, and like Frankenstein, Father Gapon and other similar characters, Titoism unchains forces it cannot control—after all this, Draper still has left the difficult task of undertaking to propose in his seventh article "the defense of Yugoslavia" to the reader who has followed him thus far.

"What is there to defend in such a country?" the unfortunate reader must ask himself. "The poor people of Yugoslavia ought, above all, to be defended against Tito."

But, lectures the "Marxist" Draper, "... the elementary Marxist idea has to kept clear that our (political) attitude toward a given government or regime does not *automatically* determine our attitude toward a given war in which this regime is involved" (*Labor Action*, Jan. 23, 1950).

"Marxists," continues Draper, "support all legitimate struggles of peoples for national independence... including

those...ruled by native tyrants and dictators." And he compares this policy with the support of Chiang Kai-shek against Japan when, he affirms "there was no social difference" (between the regimes of China and Japan).

But it is precisely the *social* difference, the difference in *structure* between *non-imperialist* capitalist China and *imperialist* Japanese capitalism which constituted the basic reason why Marxists supported China against Japan. And undoubtedly it was disregard for this fact, among other reasons, that led the Shachtmanites to abandon the defense of China in World War II. ("To combat your classic enemy, imperialism, it is necessary to remove the principal obstacle on that road, Chiang Kai-shek." Shachtman to the Chinese workers, *New International*, June 1942.)

Draper completely neglects to offer any explanation why his organization took 18 months, and changed positions twice, before remembering that "Marxists support all legitimate struggles of peoples for national independence." But, of course, he reaffirms his determination to carry on in any case a struggle on two fronts for the "democratic socialist revolution which will mean the end of both Tito and Stalin."

The extremes to which Stalinophobia may lead can be illustrated by recalling that not so long ago a certain Jack Brad called for the support "with complete loyalty" of the reactionary government of the Indonesian republic. This was said in *Labor Action* at the very time when this government was preparing the assassination of Tan Malakka.

For Marxists, national independence in our epoch is not a progressive end in itself, independent of all historical conditions under which it is defended. And it is even more absurd to base a policy of defense of Yugoslavia (of Yugoslav "sub-imperialism" as Draper called it) exclusively on the slogan of national independence. For the Yugoslav Federated Peoples' Republic is a multinational state federating six major nationalities and several minorities. And to mention only the most important features, prior to the present regime, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes used to be "hereditary enemies" pretty much like the Germans and the French.

It is well known that the degeneration of the USSR has brought about the oppression of the non-Russian Soviet peoples by Stalin's Great-Russian bureaucracy. Draper keeps silent about the multinational character of the Yugoslav state. Because otherwise he would have to support the curious theory, today abandoned even by the Stalinists, to the effect that the Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and others who live within the frontiers of the YFPR are being oppressed by a "Pan-Serb bureaucracy" (or—and why not?—by "Serbian sub-imperialism"). Or else, because Draper would have to recognize along with observers of all shades of opinion that the Tito regime has achieved a harmonious solution of the national question within the YFPR and then he would have to explain just how reactionary "bureaucratic collectivism" could possibly resolve the national question in a progressive manner.

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The Touchstone of Yugoslavia

In the August 1949 issue one could read under the signature of Henry Judd the following lines:

We must say, in retrospect, that the period of the Second World War marks a definite transition between two epochs—the Trotsky epoch, as analyzed by the last of the classic Marxist theoreticians and revolutionists, and the new retrogressive-collectivist epoch whose nature we attempt to understand . . . and which presents socialist revolutionists with a new set of problems to be mastered. It is doubtful, at least to this writer, that the concepts of classic Trotskyism can be of much assistance. . . .*

Less convinced than Judd that Trotsky's ideas are obsolete, Joseph Stalin tried to wipe them out ten years ago by assassinating their principal protagonist.

Nonetheless it appears that the Trotskyist doctrine—the living doctrine of Marxism—has sunk far deeper roots in our epoch than either Stalin or Judd thought possible.

"Stalin," said *Le Monde* editorially on Dec. 20, 1949, "upon reaching old age, sees anti-Stalinist Communist factions arising all over the lot. The hydra of deviation which he thought he had slain before the war is again raising its head. Thus Stalin's glorious birthday jubilee is not without its darker side. It is a sort of posthumous revenge for Trotsky."

It is indeed the theory elaborated by Trotsky—and buried by Judd on the heels of a thousand other such undertakers—which enables us to recognize the existence in the very heart of the Stalinist universe, beneath the heavy layers of bureaucratic crust, the boiling lava of the October Revolution which has not yet grown cold.

We can rightfully discern in the Yugoslav revolution the distant echo, muffled and deformed by the decades of the Stalinist counter-revolution, of the Bolshevik October of Lenin and Trotsky. The attitude toward Yugoslavia can become just as decisive a touchstone for judging revolutionary organizations as was the attitude toward the October Revolution thirty years ago. The Yugoslav events are bringing about a profound refreshment of the atmosphere around the proletarian vanguard. They are bound to make certain splits irreparable, but they can also serve as the starting point for fruitful regroupments.

The Russian Revolution was the springboard from which the Third International received its historic impulse. The Yugoslav revolution can very well become the springboard from which the Fourth International will launch out to win over the masses.

* Judd's article, to be sure, appeared as a "discussion article"; but apparently the ideas expressed in it are quite widespread among the members of the ISL. No other contribution to this "discussion" appeared in the NI up to the Jan.-Feb. 1950 issue, which we received after this article was written. In that issue, Gates, another ISL leader, disputes Judd's ideas. In the "Independent Socialist League" the leaders, at least, are very independent of one another.

The Movement For American Independence

By WILLIAM F. WARDE

No matter how much its traditions have been abused for reactionary purposes, the Fourth of July remains a revolutionary holiday. The Grand Inquisitors of the loyalty purge cannot erase the fact that the American people acquired national freedom through "sedition," that is, by an uprising against the intolerable evils of an outlived regime.

Paradoxically, when the curtain rises on the colonial contest, imperial unity had never seemed stronger or the affection of the Americans for their overseas "protector" so deep-seated. Benjamin Franklin, Jonathan Mayhew and other notable Patriots affirmed that "probably at no time during the entire colonial period was there more good will toward Great Britain in America than at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War." (*Origins of the American Revolution* by John C. Miller, p. 71)

The British and Americans had fought together in a successful war which ousted France from the North American mainland and hurled back the Spaniards and Indians. But this very victory generated conditions for the disruption of harmony and growing friction between England and her colonies. The elimination of the French threat removed the main factor which had hitherto bound the two together. The colonials no longer feared invasion and conquest from Canada while London, no longer needing colonial aid against the foremost challenger of its imperial interests, could concentrate attention on squeezing its possessions. At the same time this most expensive of wars had strained and drained the British Treasury, spurring the King's Ministers to seek new sources of revenue.

On the American side the triumph over the French and Indians had considerably enriched the colonies, given greater economic independence to the merchants and commercial planters, enhanced their political power and raised their self-confidence. The colonial assemblies took advantage of the Seven Years' War to cut down the prerogatives of royal governors, cripple the Crown's authority, and increase control over appropriations and expenditures.

Thus the Seven Years' War set the stage for the beginning of a realignment of forces and reorientation of policy in North America which eventuated in a life-and-death battle between the British overlords and their subjects. But that was not the way the situation presented itself to either of them when opposition to English domination first flared in the colonies toward the close of the postwar economic depression in 1765.

The colonial struggle started on a very elementary political level, developing through successive stages. At

first the dissident Patriots simply sought the repeal of odious laws and harmful edicts, directing their fire against colonial governors and Councils and appealing for remedies to the Parliament or Crown. Their activity was founded upon what seemed the solid rock of fealty to the British Empire. Their petitions and actions were designed as means of pressure to force retreats by the agencies of English rule and wring concessions from the government. They did not plan to alter or to overthrow it.

The Patriots regarded themselves, not as Americans driving toward divorce from England, but as "free-born subjects of Great Britain," moving to secure their rights as Englishmen. There were, to be sure, sharp differences in the methods advocated and employed by different sections of the Patriot party in securing these aims. Whereas the moderate merchants, planters and landowners preferred reliance upon permitted legal procedures and peaceful channels of protest, the radical and plebeian forces resorted to direct action in expressing their indignation and enforcing their demands. But from 1765 to 1775 the avowed program and aim of all elements in the colonial opposition were identical: the improvement of their positions within the British Empire, not withdrawal from it.

Indeed, right up to the Battle of Lexington in April 1775, and for months thereafter, the foremost Patriots were not only unaware of the real direction of their course and its logical outcome, but repeatedly, sincerely, indignantly denied any intention of breaking away from the British Empire, rejecting the very thought as abhorrent.

For ten years the encounters between the established regime and the Patriot opposition surged back and forth, mounting in intensity until in 1774-75 they exploded in armed insurrection as a reply to military dictatorship. The most remarkable feature of this decade of intermittent struggle is the fact that, except for its concluding months, the colonial leaders and ranks alike had almost no traffic with the idea of separation from Great Britain. The banner of independence under which the rebels fought and triumphed was not unfurled for the entire first decade of the movement. Until they came, so to speak, on top of it, the actual goal of their strivings remained beyond the view of the very combatants who directed and carried on the fight.

Astonishing as this may appear today in the light of subsequent developments, there is a wealth of evidence to confirm the fact. At every turn, from the Stamp Act Demonstrations in 1765 to the Battle of Lexington in 1775, leading Patriots took pains to make clear their loyalty to

the Empire. Here is a small part of the record.

The first intercolonial assembly of protest, the Stamp Act Congress, declared in 1765 that the connection of the colonies with Great Britain was their "great happiness and security" and that they "most ardently desired its perpetual continuance." At the next upsurge of struggle in January 1768, the Massachusetts legislature repudiated the very thought of separation: "We cannot justly be suspected of the most distant thought of an independency of Great Britain. Some, we know, have imagined this [probably a reference to Sam Adams and his Liberty Boys] . . . but it is so far from the truth that we apprehend the Colonies would refuse it if offered to them, and would even deem it the greatest misfortune to be obliged to accept it."

The *Massachusetts Spy* on July 7, 1774, two years before the Declaration of Independence, characterized independence as "a tree of forbidden and accursed fruit, which if any colony on this continent should be so mad as to attempt reaching, the rest would have virtue and wisdom enough to draw their swords and hew the traitors into submission, if not into loyalty." (Massachusetts was to head the independence movement a short time later.)

That same year John Adams wrote that independence was "a Hobgoblin of so frightful mien, that it would throw a delicate Person into Fits to look it in the Face." (He was later to help draft the Declaration of Independence and lead the fight in the Continental Congress for its adoption.)

The delegates to the First Continental Congress which met at Philadelphia in the autumn of 1774 assured the King: "Your royal authority over us and our connection with Great Britain we shall always carefully and zealously endeavor to support and maintain."

During this same crucial period Franklin, Washington, Jefferson and others voiced equally strong protestations of loyalty to mother England. In March 1775 Franklin testified in London that he had never heard in America one word in favor of independence "from any person, drunk or sober." Even after the Battle of Lexington George Washington told his Tory friend Jonathan Boucher that if ever he heard of Washington's joining in any such measures as the colonies separating from England, Boucher "had his leave to set him down for everything wicked." More than two months after the Battle of Bunker Hill, Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, wrote in a private letter that he was "looking with fondness toward a reconciliation with Great Britain."

One year and two days before issuing the Declaration of Independence, the Second Continental Congress, while setting forth colonial grievances, explicitly assured "our friends and fellow subjects in any part of the Empire . . . that we mean not to dissolve that union which had so long and so happily subsisted between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored."

These professions of loyalty were not uttered for diplomatic reasons or inserted to veil the real aims of the colonists. They expressed the inner hopes of representative figures in the Patriot camp and the policy they pursued until it became practically impossible. Far from their minds was a yearning for departure from the Empire.

Finally, we have unimpeachable testimony from Tom Paine, who did more than any other to promote the independence movement. He wrote in "The American Crisis": "Independency was a doctrine scarce and rare, even towards the conclusion of the year 1775; all our politics had been founded on the expectation of making the matter up . . ."

Some extreme radicals like Sam Adams and the Liberty Boys did not shrink from the prospect of independence and would have welcomed it. The Patriots could see certain advantages in separation—but, prior to the decisive events of 1775-76, the overwhelming majority reckoned that the losses would far outweigh them. Such a leap into the unknown appeared to most as impossible, unnecessary and undesirable.

Why They Clung to Britain

It seemed impossible because England stood forth as the mightiest and richest power on earth which had just crushed such formidable foes as France and Spain. How could the weaker colonies which had never achieved unity under the Empire expect to consolidate and mobilize enough strength to consummate the overthrow of Great Britain? Where would the forces and resources for so hardy an enterprise be found? Up to 1763, there had been no successful revolts of colonials in America, Africa or Asia.

At the same time so radical a step appeared unnecessary. The Patriots hoped to gain their demands by putting pressure upon the British rulers, through alliances with friendly elements in England and through traditional channels of protest. After all, they had forced the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1767 and wrested further concessions from the Crown government; why could not these methods suffice in the future? This was the main argument both of the Tories and those Whigs who later remained loyal to the British regime.

Independence was obnoxious because of the incalculable risks involved. Civil division and armed strife might open the door for France to return and the Indians to rise up again. War would throw everything out of kilter and plunge the colonies into turbulence and disorder. The merchants and planters felt this was too hazardous an enterprise on which to stake "their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor." Finally, the major deterrent was the foreknowledge and foreboding among the colonial possessing classes that the struggle for secession would release sentiments and forces among the masses that would be highly dangerous to their own privileges and power. This justified dread of the revolutionary potential of the democracy, this fear of "plebeian phrenzy," curbed their aspirations for independence for a long time.

For these reasons the Patriot leaders adhered to their limited ideas and comparatively moderate methods. There was only one flaw in their outlook. The British despots wouldn't and couldn't grant the major demands of the colonists, reasonable as they seemed. Consequently, the ten-year struggle for reforms within the Empire finally had to pass over into the revolutionary struggle for national independence.

The incubation period of the independence movement extended from the Boston Tea Party in December 1773, which provoked the Crown to impose its military dictatorship over unruly Massachusetts, to the Declaration of Independence in July 1776. These two and a half years witnessed the maturing of the *subjective* conditions for independence and the passing over of the Patriots to actions popularizing the demand for separation from England.

The defiance of the Bostonians initiated the sequence of events which produced the radical overturn. The insurgent masses, hitherto excluded from the political arena or kept to the background, now came to the fore. They were the radical merchants, the militant artisans, shopkeepers, and workers of the seaports backed up by the anti-British planters, farmers and frontiersmen. Thereupon two interacting processes cut the ground from under the advocates of compromise on both sides of the Atlantic. One was the uprising of the people in the localities against the authority of the King. They refused obedience to the laws, armed themselves, proceeded to depose the representatives of the Crown and set up their own courts, assemblies, armies and governments. Although undertaken as defensive measures against the aggressions of the British despots upon the rights of the Americans, these actions constituted a thrust toward complete independence.

This revolutionary outburst was met by equally firm determination on the part of the British rulers to subdue the rebellious colonials once and for all; to strip them of all acquired rights and powers; and tyrannize without restraint over Massachusetts and the other colonies. The clash of two such forces heading in opposite directions could not be resolved by compromise.

The British power had already been effectively shattered and replaced by new authorities created by direct action of the Committees of Safety and Correspondence in the separate localities and provinces before independence was set forth as the general slogan and goal of the movement by Tom Paine and others. In fact, the issue of independence had been fought out and decided by a series of direct contests for power between the Loyalists and Patriots within the cities, villages and districts of the colonies throughout 1774 and 1775 which brought victory for the most part to the insurgents. But this *de facto* state of independence had still to be fully recognized by the active fighting forces of the revolution and formally ratified by their official political representatives in the Continental Congress.

For well over a year and a half after civil war had been raging and new relationships of power had been instituted within the colonies, the conservative merchants and moderate planters, clinging to hopes of reconciliation, kept restraining the liberation movement. Although British rule had been successfully broken and overthrown by the assault of the people in arms, their acknowledged leaders shrank from admitting the actual state of affairs and decreeing the abolition of British sovereignty. That meant cutting off the road of retreat and placing feet firmly upon the revolutionary highway. They kept looking backward as the masses kept pressing forward.

Events emerging from the struggle itself assisted the

rebels and propelled the liberation movement forward. The breaking point in the attitude of the colonial masses came with the Battle of Lexington which drew a line of blood between the King and the most resolute rebels. This armed encounter snapped the last ties binding the radical wing in the Patriot camp with the Crown and steeled their will to resist to the end.

The news of this battle, for example, aroused the Liberty Boys of New York to take over that key city. Tom Paine testified in "Common Sense" that his own change of heart was produced by Lexington: "No man was a warmer wisher for a reconciliation than myself, before the fatal nineteenth of April 1775, but the moment the event of that day was made known, I rejected the hardened sullen-tempered Pharaoh of England forever."

The decisive drive toward independence dated from this event. Its effects can best be gauged by its stimulus upon Paine himself, the trumpeter of emancipation. Some historians write as though Tom Paine's individual literary efforts virtually called forth the independence movement overnight. Actually, its material premises had been growing for many years before 1765 and its psychological and political conditions were created by the struggles of the preceding ten years.

What Tom Paine did was to disclose the inner tendencies of the mass upsurge, to give a clear goal and a general slogan to the unfolding struggles and draw the indispensable political conclusions and imperative dictates of action from the actual situation. He crystallized the deepening conviction that freedom was the only answer to the problems of the day; he was the first to openly propagate the idea of a free and independent United States of America. His writings entered as a link in the chain of events at the most critical turn of the revolution, leading the movement to higher ground than it had dared dream of occupying only a little while before.

The Role of Tom Paine

Tom Paine had been revolving in his mind the main points in his message ever since the Battle of Lexington incited the wrath of rebellion throughout the colonies. He wrote his first pamphlet "Common Sense" toward the end of 1775 and issued it on January 10, 1776. Its doctrine of independence was still so novel and audacious he had trouble finding a publisher in Philadelphia.

Few political documents ever had greater effects in changing people's minds and moving them to act than this pamphlet. In its first six months Paine's pamphlet sold 100,000 copies in a country of three million. Printing presses turned them out day and night. Its arguments were read, repeated, debated in clubs, streets, taverns, schools, churches and in the Continental Army. George Washington wrote on April 1, 1776: "I find Paine's 'Common Sense' is working a wonderful change there (in Virginia) in the minds of men..."

What accounted for the wonder-working power of this pamphlet? Its simple, colloquial style, its clear line of explanation, its teachings matched the occasion and meshed into the machinery of the developing struggle.

Hurl a flaming torch into a forest covered with snow or soaked by spring rains and it will sputter and die out. But let a spark be thrown among the same vegetation baked by heat and dried by drought and it can blaze into a raging conflagration.

The American people had to be prepared and to prepare themselves by a cumulative series of experiences, tests and trials to respond so eagerly to Paine's arguments, to be kindled by his proposals and hurry them into realization. Paine cast his flaming appeal for freedom into the midst of masses seething with rage and poised for the most daring deeds.

"Common Sense" generalized in its teachings what the people were already carrying out in real life. Just as the Committees were destroying the authority of the Crown, Paine launched his main attack upon the King, exploding the fiction of a distinction between the King and Parliament or the King and his Ministry. The truth of revolution is a mighty destroyer of such fictions.

Paine argued for an independent American Republic, not as a remote prospect, but an immediate objective. When he beat the drums for independence and fided for republicanism, defying all former declarations by the Continental Congress and colonial assemblies, he succeeded in winning the assent of the masses because the proofs of life had convinced them of its unpostponable necessity.

Paine was well aware of this fact. There can now be no turning back, he keeps insisting throughout his polemics. "The independence of America should have been considered as dating its era from, and published by, the first musket that was fired against her. This is a line of consistency; neither drawn by caprice, nor extended by ambition; but produced by a chain of events, of which the colonies were not the authors... We have it in our power to begin the world over again... The birthday of a new world is at hand... Every day convinces us of its necessity."

The Continental Congress

The independence movement originated and was forced forward by the clash of interests between the colonists and the system of British domination. But its rate of development depended upon the interaction of the different social forces within the Patriot camp. The impetus for action came from the demands of the masses and the initiative from the leaders who best expressed them. But between the masses below and the British on top stood the merchants and planters who wanted to confine the struggle within safe boundaries.

The Continental Congress became the central stage upon which the drama of independence was enacted. This Congress was constituted exclusively of representatives drawn from the upper classes: lawyers, doctors, merchants, planters, large landowners. The wealthiest men in the colonies, Washington, Carroll, Hancock, were there. The common people were not directly represented by men of their condition and choice, although the most radical spokesmen for the merchants and planters like Sam Adams and Patrick Henry leaned upon them for support.

Three main divisions of opinion contended for suprem-

acy within the Congress. As Sam Adams characterized it, it was "one-third Whig, one-third Tory and the rest mongrel." On the right was the conservative section, headed by Albert Galloway of Pennsylvania, who was later to go over to the British; at the left a group of radicals inspired by the Massachusetts delegation. The bulk of delegates occupied a more or less indeterminate ground between these extremes.

The conservative influence predominated up to 1776. The Congress directed its main efforts along the line of conciliation, acting timidly and reacting sluggishly to events. The right wing was suspicious of any radical proposals by the "violents" which would push them too far forward.

This mistrust was so strong that before the opening session of the Congress the Philadelphia radicals sent a committee to intercept the Massachusetts delegation at Frankford and warn them that the New Englanders were suspected of desiring independence. "You must not utter the word independence, or give the last hint or insinuation of the idea. No man dares speak of it."

This episode is especially instructive because it enables us to chart the curve of independence sentiment in leading circles of the Patriot party. The word independence which was unspeakable in 1774 was on everybody's lips by 1776; the abomination rejected in 1774 was embraced as the doctrine of salvation in 1776.

We cannot here detail the complex chain of circumstances which produced the conversion of the Continental Congress.

Suffice it to say, the active masses were ready for independence early in 1776 but the possessors were not; their representatives had to be pushed forward or swept aside. The half-year between the publication of "Common Sense" and the adoption of independence was a critical period of tense and passionate controversy in the Continental Congress around this question.

As late as January 1776, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland instructed their delegates to vote against independence if the matter was brought up. In February the moderates brought in a report on independence which stated: "We are accused of carrying on war for the purpose of establishing an independent Empire... We disavow the intention." By this time the radicals were influential enough to have the resolution laid on the table.

Meanwhile the demand for independence was growing from a whisper into a roar which began to drown out cries for compromise. Joseph Hawley wrote John Adams on April 1, 1776 that if Congress didn't act swiftly a "Great Mob of citizens and soldiers would descend upon Philadelphia to purge Congress and set up a dictator." But the radicals did not have to purge the Continental Congress as Cromwell's men did the Presbyterian Parliament.

The pressure of the masses on one side and the aggressions of the British on the other broke the hold of the conservatives on Congress. The surge toward independence became so irresistible that the majority was swept along with it. On May 23 Congress heard that the King was going to send 30,000 mercenaries to America by June. This pro-

jected invasion cut off the last hopes of conciliation and speeded up the steps in the colonies and Congress resulting in the final break. By July the great deed was done.

The Declaration of Independence represented not merely the triumph of the Whigs over the Tories, but the victory of the radical wing of the Whigs over the conservatives, the masses over the upper classes, the future over the past. The revolution was at last marching to its own music.

* * *

A Lesson of the Struggle

The restricted influence of Marxism and the slow growth of the revolutionary socialist movement are often brought forward as proof that socialism is not a suitable program or a realizable prospect in the United States. "You Trotskyists will never get anywhere here," jeer the renegades and reactionaries "even your beloved workers reject your ideas or worse, simply ignore them."

Arguments of this type fly in the face of all historical experience, and, in particular, this country's own experience. The story of independence itself teaches that revolutionary mass movements do not begin with a carefully defined program or comprehensive understanding of their ultimate aims. Their development is far more complex and uneven.

The collective awareness of the participants and of their acknowledged leaders develops at a different, and usually at a slower pace, than the objective material forces underlying and stimulating their forward march. Thus to the Americans opposing the English, the clamor for independence seemed to surge up all of a sudden as the indicated response to imperative needs. Yet it is obvious now that the formative elements of independence had been ripening for a considerable time within colonial society before the banner-bearers of this cause found themselves propelled to the center of the political stage.

In fact, this very disparity between the needs of social progress and the consciousness of the masses which is so glibly cited as evidence of the impossibility of revolution-

ary transformation is one of the conditions for its occurrence. If people altered their institutions and ideas step by step in conformity with the changes brought about in their methods of living and working together, there would generally be no need for revolutionary overturns of political regimes and social systems.

Ideas play a central part in the revolutionary process—but they neither create nor sustain it. Bourgeois rationalists imagine that the mind is the most dynamic element in human progress; actually, it is sluggish and conservative. People of all ranks hang on to traditional ideas long after circumstances have rendered them obsolete. When class conflicts reach the breaking point, their minds are rarely prepared for so sweeping an outburst, and they are obliged to revise their conceptions rapidly and radically to swing them into correspondence with the new situation. This sudden shift in mass feelings and moods is an integral part of revolution.

That is why it would be false and superficial to deduce the remoteness of revolutionary developments in this country from the prevalent ideas of people. Great upheavals have usually taken not only the ruling classes but also their opponents by surprise. That was so in the 18th century American Revolution—and this observation is also pertinent to the movement for workers' power and socialism today.

The events culminating in the break with Britain have a special interest for us today because we, too, are living through a prolonged preparation for another immense upheaval of the American people leading to the radical transformation of the old and outlived order. No one can say just how far the movement toward the great change has already matured in this country. Only further developments of a climactic character analogous to the outbursts preceding the Declaration of Independence can divulge that information. History may have some startling surprises in store for Americans of the second half of the 20th century as it had for the colonials of the 18th century.

How Lenin Studied Marx

By LEON TROTSKY

Leon Trotsky devoted many years to the writing of a biography of Lenin, a work he was unfortunately never able to complete. He did, however, finish those chapters which deal with Lenin's youth; these were published in 1936 in France. The section on how Lenin pursued his Marxist studies comes from one of the chapters—"The Stages of Development"—of this volume dealing with Lenin's youth.—Ed.

* * *

Unfortunately, no one has told us how Lenin pursued his Marxist studies. Nothing has come down to us except a few superficial and very limited observations. "He spent whole days studying Marx, making digests, copying passages, jotting down notes," wrote Yasneva. "It was then difficult to tear him away from his work."

Lenin's digests of *Capital* have not come down to us.

The only basis for reconstructing this young athlete's work on Marx is provided by the notebooks he compiled in his studies during the subsequent years. While still in high school, Vladimir invariably began his compositions by first working out a finished plan which was later supplemented with arguments and suitable quotations. In this creative process he exhibited a quality which Ferdinand Lassalle correctly designated as the physical force of thought.

Study, which is not merely a mechanical repetition, also involves a creative effort, but of an inverse type. To summarize another man's work is to lay bare the skeletal framework of its logic, stripping away the proofs, the illustrations and the digressions. Joyously and fervently Vladimir advanced along this difficult road, summarizing each chapter,

sometimes a single page, as he read and thought and verified the logical structure, the dialectical transitions, the terminology. Taking possession of the results, he assimilated the method. He climbed the successive rungs of another man's system as if he were himself constructing it anew. All of it became firmly lodged in this marvelously well-ordered brain beneath the powerful dome of the skull.

The Formative Stage

For the rest of his life, Lenin never departed from the Russian politico-economic terminology which he assimilated or elaborated during the Samara period. This was not owing to obstinacy alone—although intellectual obstinacy was characteristic of him to the highest degree. It was because, from his earliest years, he became used to making a strictly calculated choice, deliberating over each term in all of its various aspects until within his consciousness it had become fused with a whole cycle of concepts.

The first and second volumes of *Capital* were Vladimir's basic manuals at Alakayevka and Samara for the third volume had not yet appeared at the time: Marx's rough draft was just being put in order by the aged Engels. Vladimir had studied *Capital* so well that each time he returned to it thereafter, he was able to discover new ideas in it. As early as the Samara period he had learned, as he used to say in later years, to "take counsel" with Marx.

Before the books of the master, impertinence and banter automatically departed from this altered spirit who was capable of the deepest gratitude. To follow the development of Marx's thought, to feel its irresistible power, to discover deductions from incidental phrases or remarks, to renew each time his conviction of the truth and profundity of Marx's sarcasm and to bow down with gratitude before this relentless genius—this became for Vladimir not only a necessity but a joy. Marx never had a more attentive reader or one in closer harmony with him, nor did Marx have a better, more perceptive and grateful disciple.

"With him Marxism was not a conviction, but a religion," wrote Vodsoy. "In him one feels a degree of conviction that is incompatible with a genuine scientific approach." For a philistine no sociology merits the designation "scientific" except the one which leaves intact his right to keep on vacillating. To be sure, Oulianov, as Vodsoyov himself testifies, "was deeply interested in all the objections raised against Marxism and reflected upon them"; but he did so "not for the sake of seeking out the truth," but simply to uncover in these objections some error "of whose existence he was already convinced in advance."

There is an element of truth in this characterization, namely: Oulianov had accepted Marxism as the ripest product of the entire previous evolution of human thought; he had no desire, after attaining this high level, to descend to a lower one; he defended with indomitable energy those ideas over which he had been pondering and which he was verifying every day of his life; and he regarded with pre-conceived mistrust the attempts of conceited ignoramuses and erudite mediocrities to substitute a more "acceptable" theory for Marxism.

When it comes to such fields as technology or medicine,

routinism, dilettantism and medicine-man mumbo-jumbo are held in justifiable mistrust. But in the field of sociology these come to the fore in every instance in the guise of a free scientific spirit. Those for whom theory is merely a mental toy, flit easily from one revelation to another or more often still remain content with an agglomeration of crumbs from the different revelations. Infinitely more exacting, rigorous and well-balanced is he who views theory as a guide to action. A drawing room skeptic may scoff at medicine with impunity, but a surgeon cannot live in an atmosphere of scientific uncertainty. The greater is the revolutionist's need for theory as a guide to action, all the more intransigent is he in guarding it. Vladimir Oulianov mistrusted dilettantism and detested quacks. What he valued above all else in Marxism was the severe discipline and authority of its method.

In 1893 appeared the last books of V. Vorontsov (V.V.) and N. Danielson (Nikolai-on). These two Populist economists argued with enviable tenacity that capitalist development in Russia was impossible, just at a time when Russian capitalism was preparing to take an especially vigorous leap forward. It is improbable that the fading Populists of that day read the tardy revelations of their theoreticians as attentively as did the young Marxist at Samara. Oulianov had to know his adversaries not only in order to be able to refute their writings. He was above all seeking an inward certainty for the struggle. It is true that he studied reality in a polemical spirit, directing all his arguments at the time against Populism which had outlived itself; but to no one else was pure polemic as an end in itself more alien than to this future author of twenty-seven volumes of polemical writings. He had to know life as it is.

The nearer Vladimir came to the problems of the Russian revolution and the more he became acquainted with Plekhanov, all the greater became his esteem for Plekhanov's critical works. The current falsifiers of the history of Russian Bolshevism (like Presniakov) write tomes on the topic of the "spontaneous birth of Marxism on Russian soil free from any direct influence of the emigre group and of Plekhanov"—and, it ought to be added, free from Marx himself, who was the emigre *par excellence*. And they convert Lenin into the founder of this genuinely native Russian "Marxism" from which the theory and practice of "socialism in one country" was later to flow.

The doctrine of the spontaneous birth of Marxism as a direct "reflection" of Russia's capitalist development is itself an execrable caricature of Marxism. The economic process does not find its reflection in "pure" consciousness in all its native ignorance; it finds its expression in the historic consciousness, enriched by all the past conquests of mankind. It was possible for the class struggle in capitalist society to lead to Marxism in the middle of the Nineteenth Century only because the dialectical method was then already at hand, as the achievement of German classical philosophy; only because of the political economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo in England; only because of the revolutionary and socialist doctrines of France which rose out of the Great Revolution. The internationalist char-

acter of Marxism inheres, therefore, in the very origins of its own birth. The growth of the power of well-to-do peasants (*kulaks*) on the Volga and the development of metallurgy in the Urals were utterly inadequate to bring about independently the selfsame scientific results. It is not mere coincidence that the Emancipation of Labor Group came to be born abroad: Russian Marxism first saw the light of day not as an automatic product of Russian capitalism like sugar-beet crops and the poor cotton cloth (for the manufacture of which, moreover, machines had to be imported), but as a complex of the entire experience of the Russian revolutionary struggle coupled with the theory of scientific socialism originating in the West. The Marxist generation of the Nineties rose on the foundations laid by Plekhanov.

How Spiritual Paupers "Exalt" Lenin

To appreciate Lenin's historic contribution there is no need whatever to try to show that from his early years he was obliged to break the virgin soil with a plow of his own. "There were almost no comprehensive works available," writes Elisarova parroting Kamenev and others. "It was necessary for him to study the original sources and draw from them his own deductions." Nothing could be more offensive to Lenin's own rigorous scientific scrupulousness than this claim that he took no account of his predecessors and teachers. Nor is it true that in the early Nineties Russian Marxism possessed no comprehensive works.

The publications of the Emancipation of Labor Group already constituted at the time an abridged encyclopedia of the new tendency. After six years of brilliant and heroic struggle against the prejudices of the Russian intelligentsia, Plekhanov proclaimed in 1889 at the Socialist World Congress in Paris, "The revolutionary movement in Russia can triumph only as the revolutionary working-class movement. There is and there can be no other way out for us." These words summed up the most important general conclusion from the entire preceding epoch and it was on the basis of this generalization of an "emigre" that Vladimir pursued his education on the Volga.

Vodovosov writes in his memoirs, "Lenin used to speak of Plekhanov with profound feeling, especially about (Plekhanov's book) *Our Differences*." Lenin must have indeed expressed his feelings very vividly for Vodovosov to be able to recall them after a lapse of more than thirty years. The main strength of *Our Differences* lies in its treatment of revolutionary policy as indissolubly linked with the materialist conception of history and with the analysis of Russia's economic development. Oulianov's first pronouncements at Samara against the Populists are thus closely associated with his warm appreciation of the work of the founder of the Russian Social Democracy. Next to Marx and Engels, Vladimir was most indebted to Plekhanov.

Toward the end of 1922, while referring in passing to the early Nineties, Lenin wrote: "Soon after this Marxism, as a tendency, began to broaden, moving in the Social-Democratic direction proclaimed much earlier in Western Europe by the Emancipation of Labor Group." These lines,

which sum up the history of the development of an entire generation, also contain a part of Lenin's own autobiography. Starting out in the Marxist tendency with an economic and historical doctrine, he became a Social Democrat under the influence of the ideas of the Emancipation of Labor Group which far outstripped the development of the Russian intelligentsia. Only spiritual paupers can imagine that they exalt Lenin by attributing to his natural father, the State Councillor Oulianov, revolutionary opinions which he never held, while at the same time minimizing the revolutionary role of the emigre Plekhanov, whom Lenin himself considered as his spiritual father.

At Kazan, Samara and Alakayevka, Vladimir thought of himself as pupil. But just as great painters in their youth display their own independent brush stroke even while copying pictures by old masters, just so Vladimir Oulianov brought to his apprenticeship such vigor of thought and initiative that it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between what he assimilated from others and what he elaborated himself. During the final preparatory year at Samara, this line of demarcation became definitively obliterated: the apprentice becomes an independent investigator.

A Historic Controversy

The controversy with the Populists passed naturally to the field of current developments, of evaluating whether or not capitalism was continuing to grow in Russia. Diagrams representing the number of factory chimneys and of industrial workers as well as those showing the differentiation among the peasantry took on a special meaning. To determine the dynamics of the process it was necessary to compare today's figures with those of yesterday. Economic statistics thus became the science of sciences. Columns of figures held the key to the mystery of Russia's destiny and that of its *intelligentsia* and of its revolution. Even the census of horses taken periodically by the military administration was called upon to give an answer to the question: Who was the stronger, Karl Marx or the Russian village commune?

The statistical material in Plekhanov's early works could not have been very rich: the statistics of the *Zemstvos*, of exceptional value for the study of village economy, became developed only during the Eighties; moreover, the publications containing these statistics were rarely accessible to an emigre who was almost completely isolated from Russia during those years. Nevertheless, Plekhanov indicated with complete accuracy the general direction of scientific work to be undertaken on the basis of statistical data. The early statisticians of the new school followed this road. M. A. Hourwich, an American professor of Russian origin, published in 1886 and 1892 two essays on the Russian village which Vladimir Oulianov valued highly and which he used as models. Lenin never let slip an opportunity to give recognition to the works of his predecessors.