

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL is the theoretical journal of the International Committee of the Fourth International.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL continues the work of LABOUR REVIEW which concluded its 12th year of publication with its last issue, the fifth number of volume 7.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL continues the work and traditions of Revolutionary Communism since the death of Lenin.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL represents the unbroken chain of theoretical journals in the Bolshevik tradition, whose continuators were the Left Opposition led and inspired by Leon Trotsky.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL follows in the traditions of that Opposition and in the traditions of the Fourth International of Leon Trotsky.

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, with this issue commences a new period of activity in the international and British Labour movements and simultaneously prepares and equips the Marxist movement for its future intervention in the battles of the working class which promise to eclipse and transcend all previous struggles both in their depth and scope.

To: New Park Publications Ltd.,
186A Clapham High Street,
London, S.W.4

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
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Fourth International

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MARXISM PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Incorporating **LABOUR REVIEW**



Introducing Ourselves

On the Eve of the
General Election

Trends in Soviet
Literature

The Future of the
Fourth International

The Consequences
of Peaceful Co-existence

SPRING 1964 VOLUME I NUMBER I PRICE: TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

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A Journal of International Marxism

*Published by the International Committee
of the Fourth International*

Editors: TOM KEMP, CLIFF SLAUGHTER

186A Clapham High Street, London, S.W.4

VOLUME 1 NUMBER 1


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Introducing 'Fourth International'

THIS IS THE first number of **FOURTH INTERNATIONAL**, a journal of international Marxism published by the International Committee of the Fourth International. It replaces **LABOUR REVIEW**, the theoretical organ of the Socialist Labour League which, especially since January 1957, has carried on a forthright Marxist struggle against all forms of revisionism.

After the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution it became the rallying centre for all those members and ex-members of the British Communist Party who were endeavouring to understand the betrayals and counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism. As distinct from other journals which appeared at the time, **LABOUR REVIEW** did not confine itself solely to analysis of what went wrong in the Soviet Union; it turned its attention more and more towards the task of constructing the revolutionary party in Britain and the reorganisation of the Fourth International. In the pages of **LABOUR REVIEW** revolutionary theory and practice were brought together, and led to the formation, in the spring of 1959, of the Socialist Labour League, an organisation fighting for Marxism within the labour movement.

The preparatory work of **LABOUR REVIEW** from 1957-1959 then underwent a qualitative change. Opportunists such as Peter Fryer, who was once an editor of **LABOUR REVIEW**, deserted the Marxist movement to be followed early in 1960 by a handful of sectarians under the leadership of Brian Behan. Such an experience was a necessary part of the struggle to consolidate the Marxist cadre within the League. Other ex-members of the Communist Party who broke from Stalinism in 1956, now emerged as fully developed Marxists. They had acquired a knowledge they could never have gained inside the Communist Party of the importance of the political struggle against opportunism and sectarianism, in the construction of the revolutionary party.

The 1960 Conference of the Socialist Labour League brought to a close that stage of the struggle against the opportunist and sectarian elements who collaborated with **LABOUR REVIEW** after the Hungarian Revolution. The League and **LABOUR REVIEW** now turned their attention particularly towards political developments within the youth movement in the universities and the Labour Party and towards a closer study of the problems that were emerging inside the trade unions and the Labour Party. This work has brought great advantages to the Socialist Labour League. There were three times as many delegates and visitors present at the Sixth Conference as were at its founding conference in 1959. The average age of the delegates was 24 years. Today the League is the most youthful and theoretically advanced Marxist organisation in Britain. But it would be a great mistake to believe that our progress is based upon the policies we apply towards the British labour movement. On the contrary, such work as has been carried out would have amounted to very little were it not for the sustained international political struggle which we have waged against modern revisionism.

In January 1961, we opened up a discussion with the Socialist Workers' Party concerning its capitulation to Pabloite revisionism, which is based upon adaptation to the reformist and Stalinist bureaucracies, and the bourgeois national leaderships of colonial and semi-colonial countries. At first the Socialist Workers' Party avoided the discussion by simply ignoring it. So contemptuous had these pragmatists become of the international movement that 18 months elapsed before they thought it necessary to make something resembling a serious reply to the criticisms of the Socialist Labour League. This did not mean that they were inactive. Far

from it. Behind the scenes they were already in negotiation with the Pablo group in Paris. Eventually they worked out a formula which brought their dilapidated centrist forces into some kind of organisational relationship opposed to the International Committee of the Fourth International, an organisation to which the Socialist Labour League is affiliated.

This discussion was not confined to the pages of the controversial internal documents. It was brought out into the open within the British labour movement by members of the League, especially the youth. Out of their own experiences they were able to see almost at a glance what Pabloite compromise with bureaucratic leadership means in practice. They had the experience of being witch-hunted by an unholy united front of the extreme right wing, the Pabloites and that other gang of anti-Soviet opportunists known as the state capitalists.

Whilst the international discussion did not, unfortunately, clarify the leaders of the Socialist Workers' Party, it did clarify and rearm hundreds of young people who are now playing a leading role in the construction of the revolutionary party in Britain. The success of *LABOUR REVIEW* and the Socialist Labour League is therefore based on this international struggle rather than the practical side of our activity. The more our members, politically, fought the Pabloite revisionists, the stronger we became.

The international struggle against the revisionists came to a head when the SWP broke from the International Committee and the Socialist Labour League and renewed its relations with the Pabloite camp, in the late summer of 1963. Now the International Committee of the Fourth International was called upon to assume the leadership of all those Marxists throughout the world who are fighting to build revolutionary parties and whose work requires, above all, the reorganisation of Trotsky's world party of socialist revolution founded in 1938.

This decision is now of great historical importance to the Socialist Labour League. We are moving into a pre-revolutionary era where great political and class battles loom ahead. We are called upon to develop a new cadre of leaders from amongst the youth especially, who will provide the alternative leadership to the bankrupt traitors of reformism led by Harold Wilson. But this is not a task which can be resolved in Britain. It is first and foremost an international responsibility, inseparable from the building of the Fourth International as the world party of socialist revolution. All the main problems

in Britain today are in effect bound up with the problems of decadent international imperialism. The revolutionary leadership which is now being trained and prepared through the work of the Socialist Labour League must of necessity be an integral part of a world leadership with an international Marxist outlook concerning the interrelation of all the problems of the world labour movement including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Hence the need for replacing *LABOUR REVIEW* with the *FOURTH INTERNATIONAL*. The Socialist Labour League must take its place firmly inside the international vanguard of the world party of socialist revolution. It is through the work of our new magazine and the building of that world party that we shall pass from the stage of the training of cadres from amongst the student and working-class youth, to the stage when we shall be able to provide leadership in all the struggles of the day.

Again, it is not enough to launch *FOURTH INTERNATIONAL* with an editorial board which includes the most advanced international thinkers in the Marxist movement today. We have to provide our magazine with a programme which will not only enable it to analyse, but to provide leadership in the irreconcilable struggle against international capital. We have to make it the medium for a conscious effort to develop dialectical materialism in conflict with all forms and manifestations of bourgeois ideology. Here is the greatest challenge of all. In the last year of its work, *LABOUR REVIEW* was devoting itself more and more to this task. The *FOURTH INTERNATIONAL* promises in its first number to continue the urgent struggle between Marxist philosophy and its opponents.

Our magazine should avoid like the plague the habits of the abstract propagandist school which has done so much to damage and weaken the international Trotskyist movement in the past. The struggle for dialectical materialism emerges from our recognition that enormous class forces are now in motion under conditions which demand the most minute study. Dialectical materialism is the direct opposite of arid, abstract and lifeless propaganda. It studies all the forces in motion in order to enable the Marxists to work out a perspective that will lead the working class to the triumph of socialism. The time is now overripe for such work. Just as the youthful cadres of the Socialist Labour League contributed mightily to the defeat of Pabloite revisionism in Britain, so they must now join hands with their comrades all over the world to establish the *FOURTH INTERNATIONAL* as the real international organ of militant revolutionary Marxism.

On the Eve of the General Election

THE FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE of the Young Socialists, the youth section of the British Labour Party, will meet in Brighton at Easter 1964 almost on the eve of a general election.

The agenda of the conference contains resolutions which if taken in a group would provide a clear socialist programme for the taking of power by the working class. The contrast between the youth and the leadership of the parent body is striking.

Harold Wilson and the right wing are moving further to the right and away even from the most moderate reformism and the Young Socialists are moving steadily to the left, presenting full-scale socialist demands. The caucus which leads the British Labour Party rests mainly upon the most extreme right-wing bureaucracies within the trade union movement. Neither they, nor the Parliamentary Labour Party have any real contact with the working class. They prepare for the general election in much the same way as the Tories. Each side tries to out-do the other by taking advice from professional publicity experts and in concentrating on the technical background of television broadcasts.

The overwhelming majority of Labour voters support the Labour Party because it is against the Tories. On the majority of policy matters there is little to choose between the two parties.

The Young Socialists, on the other hand, have turned their attention over the past three years to serious work amongst young people, many of whom have had no experience of politics. They have been in the forefront of the campaign against unemployment.

Local and national demonstrations have been organised to rouse the labour movement on this most serious threat facing young people, particularly in industrial areas. As British monopoly capital

has gone over more and more to automated processes it has struck more savagely at the youth and in providing them with leadership the Young Socialists has been in the forefront of the campaign against big business. This has produced an experienced youth leadership, which although not immediately a threat to the right wing, may well become so when the bankrupt policy of a Labour government stands exposed before the working class.

The right wing live in fear of the youth movement. Hence on all occasions they do everything possible to witch-hunt and expel its leading members. The Easter Conference will be no exception to this rule. Efforts will be made to remove from the agenda the resolutions which stand for socialist policies. Indeed, it appears that the right wing are only waiting until after the election before they try to disband this most promising movement. This threat should not dismay the Young Socialists. They should now profit from their experience in the unemployment campaigns to turn their attention towards serious work within the trade union movement. Time and youth is on their side. They should refuse to bow to threats and intimidation of the right wing by continuing to recruit widely into the youth movement and at the same time train their members to carry the struggle from the trade unions into the Labour Party, so that they are ready to provide an alternative leadership when the betrayal comes.

Despite all their organisers and apparatus, the right-wing Labour leaders have lost the youth movement. This is in itself a mortal blow to the ageing social-democracy. This youth movement may well prove to be the main source of supplying revolutionary youth leaders for the coming struggles in Britain.

The future of the Fourth International

This article consists of the Report on the International Situation made to the International Conference of Trotskyists held in London in September 1963, and attended by national sections affiliated to the International Committee of the Fourth International.

THE TASK OF THIS Conference is to mobilise the forces of the International Committee of the Fourth International for the great class struggles which lie immediately before us. Our unity is based on the fight for the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International, founded by Trotsky 25 years ago. This fight has drawn us together to struggle against those revisionists who take the name 'Trotskyism' but have abandoned its programme. We must analyse the way in which this revisionism, expressed particularly by the Socialist Workers' Party of the United States of America and the 'Pablo' group, has developed, how it reflects the pressure upon the revolutionary vanguard of the forces of imperialism. Such an analysis is part of our struggle against the bourgeoisie, a necessary step in understanding the development of imperialism itself. The revisionists have retained the phrases and formulae of 'Trotskyism', duly to adapt them to the service of non-working-class forces: in particular, to the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and to the Stalinist and Social-Democratic bureaucracies in the workers' states and the advanced capitalist countries.

The aim of Marxist theory is to reflect accurately the reality of the class struggle as a guide to leading the working class. This can only be done through participation in the class struggle itself, armed with Marxist theory. In the modern epoch of wars and revolutions, there is no road to this scientific understanding except in the revolutionary struggle to build Leninist parties. Struggling to find a road to the working class, the party has to fight its way

through the resistance of agents of the class enemy, leaderships which dominate the working class and its organisations. These leaders, Social-Democrats and Stalinists alike, have betrayed the working class into the hands of monopoly capitalism. The development and the problems of these leaderships reflect the crisis of their social basis: the military, political and economic crisis of monopoly capitalism and the parallel crisis of the Stalinist bureaucracy. A revolutionary party based on the objective class struggles produced by these contradictions can be constructed to defeat the bureaucracy. This was the meaning of the Transitional Programme and of the First Four Congresses of the Communist International: the crisis of humanity was concentrated above all in the crisis of leadership of the working class. Many say they agree with that formulation, but in the real struggle they capitulate to the bureaucracy, so that their repetition of the Transitional Programme as a slogan loses any content, and becomes a deception. The struggle against this deception, against the revisionists, is a vitally necessary part of the rebuilding of the Fourth International. In the course of such a struggle we begin to probe the full extent of their departure from Marxism. This reflects and demonstrates to us the magnitude of the crisis confronting the working class, and it is only in such a struggle that we rediscover and begin to enrich the Marxist method. That method is not something that can be learned by heart by any intelligent Communist, then 'applied' to each and every situation. It is something which has to be fought for in the real struggle to build Marxist parties.

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Revolutionary Leadership and Marxist Method

The fight against revisionism in the Trotskyist movement, particularly in the Socialist Workers' Party, has revealed a basic difference in *method*. The Socialist Workers' Party leaders have abandoned Marxism for empiricism, they have abandoned that method which starts *from the point of view of changing the world*, as against interpreting or contemplating it. The far greater part of the work in the struggle against this revisionism remains still to be done on our part. It is not enough to be able to demonstrate the descent into empiricism by the revisionists—our problem is to build around this fight against revisionism, sections of the Fourth International able to lead the advance guard of the working class. Looking at the world from the point of view of changing it, means, today, starting from the point of view of the construction of disciplined revolutionary parties able to intervene in the struggles of the working class, able to build the Fourth International out of their interventions. These parties are proletarian parties, whose work and methods correspond to the general interests of the working class. In the advanced countries, such parties are only built in implacable opposition to the petty-bourgeois circles who have dominated 'official' left politics during the comparative prosperity since 1945. Inside our movement this means a constant fight to build a cadre consciously opposed to the way of life of the centrist propaganda circles who provide a left cover for the bureaucracy. This is the direct *opposite* of the Pabloite theory and practice of support for the bureaucracy, which takes the form of supporting supposedly 'left' trends inside the Stalinist bureaucracy, believing even that they will be forced to take the power in the capitalist countries or to carry out the political revolution in the workers' states. Alternatively it leads to 'deep entry' in the Social-Democracy, justified by the hoped-for emergence of mass 'left centrist' parties.

In the backward countries, fighting to resolve the crisis of leadership means fighting for the construction of *proletarian* parties, with the aim of proletarian dictatorship. It is especially necessary to stress the proletarian character of the leadership in countries with a large petty-bourgeoisie or peasantry. On this question, the revisionists take the opposite road to Lenin and Trotsky, justifying their capitulation to petty-bourgeois, nationalist leaderships by speculation about a new type of peasantry. In recent years, the Pabloites have declared that the character of the new states in Africa will be determined by the social character and decisions of the *élite* which

occupies state power, rather than by the class struggle as we have understood it. More recently, Pablo and others have discovered 'the revolutionary role of the peasantry'. These are only thin disguises for capitulation to the petty-bourgeois leadership of the FLN in Algeria and of Castro in Cuba. Above all, the 'theory' that the 'epicentre of the world revolution' has shifted to the colonial and semi-colonial countries, for all its revolutionary appearance, is used to justify this capitulation.

In relation to the Stalinist bureaucracy and the political revolution, the case is even clearer. The pronounced right turn of Khrushchev comes only a few years after Pablo's insistence that his section of the bureaucracy would lead the destruction of Stalinism. At the recent 'reunification' congress of the Pabloites, supported by the Socialist Workers' Party, Pablo's minority insisted that Khrushchev's was the 'left' tendency in Stalinism. Even though this was rejected, we must remember that as recently as April 1962, Germain, in the majority at this same Congress, spoke of the Khrushchev faction as 'the most flexible and the most intelligent wing of the bureaucracy'. What are the prospects of a revisionist tendency which thought the 'objective forces' for Socialism so strong that 'Stalinism could no longer betray', in face of the recent understandings of Khrushchev with Kennedy and the Roman Catholic Church? Any strategy which proceeds from assumptions that sections of the Stalinist *counter-revolutionary* bureaucracy can 'move left' is a negation of Trotskyism. The construction of independent Marxist parties, the paramount need of the working class, will be absolutely opposed by the bureaucracy in the workers' states, just as it is in the capitalist countries. Not to struggle against this bureaucracy is to abandon the construction of Marxist parties. The whole theory of 'mass pressure' forcing the bureaucracy to the left is nothing more than apologetics for this abandonment of the Fourth International and its programme. Marxist parties are the conscious expression of the decisive historical role of the working class. For the revisionists, the role of the working class is reduced to that of unconscious, spontaneous 'pressure', to which the existing leaderships respond. Thus Pablo maintains that, 'although in a distorted way', Khrushchev's group in the bureaucracy represents the revolutionary strivings of the masses.

Our fight against revisionism is thus identical with the fight to build parties of the Fourth International.

Without this fight the working class cannot defeat the bureaucracy. Pabloite revisionism arose specifically as an adaptation to the dominant bureaucracies in the labour movement. The failure to develop Marxist theory after Trotsky's death exposed the cadres of the Fourth International to this bourgeois pressure through the bureaucracy. We can only

overcome the split which this brought about by understanding this process in all its aspects. Such an understanding can only come from the actual struggle against revisionism in all its manifestations, theoretical, political and organisational. We shall see that the revisions are so deep that they affect the whole theory and method of Marxism.

Why an International Discussion?

The International Committee has insisted, in its relations with the Socialist Workers' Party and other forces calling themselves Trotskyists, on an all-embracing discussion. Such a discussion must include all the tendencies and must deal with all disputed questions. Only in this way can we grasp consciously the present stage of development of the class struggle and of our own movement in relation to it. Our determination to get to grips in discussion with the revisionists is not at all the result of any principle of super-democracy or of a desire for 'unity' for its own sake. On the contrary, we see revisionism as the highest reflection of all the tendencies which we have to combat in the construction of parties, in the fight for the political independence of the working class. Only the sharpest fight against revisionism, therefore, can equip us politically for the class struggle. We know that inside our own movement such a fight must be carried on internally for correct methods of work against revisionist conceptions. Pabloite revisionism was a response in the Trotskyist movement to a definite stage of development of imperialism and its relation to the world revolution, reflected through the Stalinist bureaucracy. It was not just the aberration of a few individuals, but has found a response in many countries. Consequently its influence necessarily pervades the methods of our own sections until we have fought through to the end all the problems of the split with Pablo. The Socialist Workers' Party leadership, for example, reacting empirically to the actions of Pablo in 1953, actually initiated the formal split in the International, yet within a few years find themselves 're-united' with the Pabloites. The formal rejection of some of the *consequences* of Pablo's revision of Marxist theory was not enough. Because Cannon and his group did not explore the roots of this revisionism (and this would have pinpointed the theoretical responsibility of the Socialist Workers' Party itself), the same forces which produced Pablo eventually overtook the Socialist Workers' Party.

Pablo's response to the turn of world events after 1945 was to build a theory of 'centuries of deformed workers' states'. The Fourth International's per-

spective of a revolutionary outcome of the world war, with the Trotskyist parties leading those revolutions, had been proven wrong, it was argued. Instead, the Stalinist parties, backed by the material strength of the Soviet state, had proven capable of overthrowing capitalist power and establishing deformed workers' states. The strategy and tactics of the Marxists must be subordinated to this new reality.

In the first months of its reaction against Pablo in 1953, the SWP leadership rejected this perspective, condemning it as only the theoretical mask for capitulation to the Stalinist bureaucracy. Now the SWP leadership supports 'reunification' without a discussion of the political causes of the original split. In any case, it is said, the differences have narrowed to almost nothing. In a way, this is true. In the last few years, both the Pabloite and the SWP leaders have found other 'new realities' which point the way to a type of socialism replacing capitalism *without the crisis of working-class leadership having been solved*. This was the essence of the theory of 'centuries of deformed workers' states'.

Our impressionists have now imposed the same historical perspective upon the national liberation struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Here, petty-bourgeois, nationalist leaderships will carry through the overthrow of capitalism; the leading role will not be played by the working class; there is no need for the construction of a Trotskyist party for workers' states to be established; Trotskyists work with a perspective of 'influencing' the leadership of these revolutions, helping them along the road to training the masses in socialist construction, etc., etc.

This, then, is the meaning of the SWP leaders' claims that the struggle in Cuba and Algeria has revealed the essential 'unity' between those who split in 1953. In essence, through the mechanism of the colonial struggle, the SWP has accepted the historical perspective of Pabloism: capitulation to petty-bourgeois leaderships in the struggle against imperialism.

Internationalism and Empiricism

The Socialist Workers' Party leaders and the Pabloites have attacked the sections of the International Committee as sectarians who substitute their own limited experience, particularly in Britain and France, for the general picture of international objective forces working for Socialism. It is then argued that these 'favourable objective circumstances on a world scale' demand formal reunification of all tendencies, putting aside the discussion of differences. But the line of the International Committee does not at all flow from narrow or national considerations. Our type of activity, our method of party building, flows from a thoroughly internationalist view of the class struggle. We have in the past three years begun an analysis of the present stage of development of world capitalism, of the class forces which defend it, and of the bureaucratic agents of these class forces in the mass movement.

The events of the last two years, since we tried to initiate political discussion with the Socialist Workers' Party, have decisively confirmed our insistence on the basic Trotskyist position that the Stalinist bureaucracy is *counter-revolutionary*. In the Cuban missiles crisis and Sino-Indian border dispute of October-November 1962, the political consequences of our line and the line of revisionism in the Trotskyist movement were sharply and decisively contrasted. Cannon, in the Socialist Workers Party, hailed Khrushchev's withdrawal of missiles as a contribution to peace, and in the course of it betrayed his whole descent into empiricism with the phrase: 'What else could he (Khrushchev) have done in the given circumstances?' In France, the Pablo group distributed a leaflet in the Renault factory calling on the workers to render assistance to Cuba 'equally with the aid from the workers' states'. The fact that Cannon found his way to Khrushchev via the uncritical support of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist leadership of Castro, whereas Pablo reflected the Stalinist pressure earlier and more directly, is only a matter of the particular historical situations of the two. Pablo reacted to the apparently overwhelming strength of the Stalinists in the 'two camps' period in post-war Europe, where there were mass Communist Parties. Cannon's evolution in the United States, where Stalinism was feeble, took longer, and expressed itself through the relations of the Socialist Workers' Party leaders, along with the whole 'radical milieu' in the United States of America, to the Cuban Revolution. The face of the Socialist Workers' Party had become turned to this petty-bourgeois

milieu and away from the working class. Here we see clearly that Pablo's original capitulation to Stalinism was only one variety of capitulation to the petty-bourgeois bureaucracies upon which modern imperialism depends.

In India the representatives of Pablo's 'International' supported the bourgeois government of Nehru against the deformed workers' state in China. This party issued a statement condemning the Chinese method of solving the border dispute. While the delegate of the Indian section voted with Hansen and Germain for 'reunification of the Fourth International', hundreds of Indian Communist Party members were in Nehru's prisons for opposing the Indian Communist Party leadership's capitulation to Nehru. The latter was part of the Khrushchev bureaucracy's deal with imperialism. Khrushchev supplied aircraft to Nehru, the United States supplied other weapons. Nehru's troops are with the United Nations forces policing the Congo on behalf of United States imperialism. These decisive class questions have exposed the end-result of Pabloism: it is not a temporary weakening before a wing of the Stalinists, but a full-blown revision corresponding to the latest needs of imperialism, i.e., the development of powerful bureaucracies and state personnel able to control the masses of all countries. It is the presence of such basic class questions at the root of the division which explains the magnitude of the departure from even the most basic Marxist ideas among the revisionists.

What Cannon betrayed in a phrase about 'the given circumstances', Hansen has developed into a whole case, arguing that dialectical materialism is the same thing as 'consistent empiricism'. What a contrast with Trotsky's warning to the Socialist Workers' Party! The ideas of pragmatism and empiricism have their direct and concrete expression in the domination of opportunism in the labour movement. The revisionists' attempt to assimilate empiricism to Marxism is the natural accompaniment of their capitulation to the opportunist bureaucracies. In this way is justified the characterisation of the July 26th movement leaders in Cuba as 'natural Marxists', the Pabloite faith in the Soviet bureaucracy's capacity for transforming itself, etc. In all this it is indicated that without conscious theory men will respond to 'objective forces' and arrive at the path of Marxism. This is a clear abandonment of the Transitional Programme, with its stress on the decisive question of resolving the *subjective* problems of the world revolution.

It is in this sense that the fight for dialectics is the fight to build the world party in every country. Neither can succeed without the other. Dialectical materialism will only be understood and developed in the struggle to build the party against all enemies. The party can be built only if there is a *conscious* fight for dialectical materialism against the ideas of other classes. It is on revolutionary theory that the ability of the party to win the political independence of the working class is based. Marxism is a developing theory; it develops in the practice of revolutionary parties who 'discover' reality by acting to change it. Trotsky's warning about the fight against pragmatism was seen by the Socialist Workers' Party leadership only as a suggestion that one or two comrades should interest themselves in questions of philosophy—the consequence is before us now. An explanation of the degeneration of Pablo, Cannon and the others will be incomplete if it ignores this side of the question: the neglect of theory since Trotsky's death. It was this which halted Cannon's rejection of Pablo in 1953 at the level of a few programmatic points, preventing the necessary deeper analysis.

We have a parallel for this development in the historical relationship between Marx and Lenin. Lenin made gigantic developments of Marxist theory after a historical gap during which expositions of Marxist ideas on various subjects went alongside the

deepening degeneration of the Socialist movement in the Second International. The development of Marxism is not a purely theoretical development. It was the rise of imperialism, and the urgent tasks placed before the Russian working class, which laid the basis for Lenin's contribution. But these new objective conditions did not automatically produce Leninism and the Third International, much less 'transform' the Second International into a revolutionary organisation! On the contrary, the epoch of wars and revolutions brought about by imperialism had to be analysed and grasped consciously by the Marxist method. *Without* a theoretical struggle to rework the dialectic in the context of the new situation, in conflict with all other trends, the concrete meaning of the new historical stage and of the tasks flowing from it could not have been burned into the consciousness of the Bolsheviks. When we say that Marxism is 'the conscious reflection of an unconscious process' this is what we mean. Reflection is an active, struggling, contradictory process, not a passive adaptation. Marxism is the organised, practical consciousness of the revolutionary working class, not a bible used to place blessings on the accomplished fact. Today, the Socialist Workers' Party's descent into empiricism is the result of this loss of the historical thread in the development of Marxism. Once this happens, the way is open for capitulation to other tendencies.

Crisis of the Revisionists

The 'unification' with the Pablo group, supported by the SWP, is founded not upon Marxist theory and the actual development of the movement, the conscious resolution of the contradictions in that development. Instead, it is a combination of centrist trends each of whose development is determined by empirical adaptation to circumstances. For such a 'unified' organisation there can be no unified development and no growth. Within it, some groups, such as Pablo and his immediate supporters, go to the Right in complete capitulation to the national bourgeoisie in Algeria; others, held back by tradition and the force of inertia, resist this turn and look for face-saving formulae. Within the Socialist Workers' Party itself a large minority adopts a position to the right of the leadership in relation to China.

It is not a historical accident that the revisionists are driven together at this moment, nor is it simply a consequence of their subjective consideration of problems of their own internal development. The driving force here is the radicalisation of the working

class and the open manifestation of capitalist contradictions in the advanced countries in the last few years—in the US, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain—together with the accentuation of the crisis of Stalinism as the political revolution matures for the next blow after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Close to sections of the bureaucracy and the petty-bourgeoisie instead of to the working class, in the years since the war, the revisionists proceeded from their impressions of the comparative social peace in the advanced countries, as contrasted with the might of Stalinism on the one hand, and the upsurge of the national-liberation struggle in the colonies on the other. Thus they looked away from the decisive sector, the proletariat of the advanced countries, and conceived theories of left tendencies in the Stalinist bureaucracy, and of the epicentre of world revolution shifting to the colonial countries. In the advanced countries, they said, the class struggle took on a muted character, expressing itself only through the existing 'mass

organisations', i.e., through the labour bureaucracy.

The revisionist forces based on this perspective are driven together now in order to resolve their own crisis, because the forces upon which they immediately depend, the bureaucratic and petty-bourgeois servants of imperialism, are in crisis, a crisis caused above all by the class struggle in Europe and the US. The mechanism of adaptation, for the revisionists, was through adaptation to bureaucracy. Since the death of Stalin the development of the political revolution in Eastern Europe and the radicalisation in the advanced countries have brought crisis to the bureaucracies. Pablo's organisation first based itself on the perspective that the French Stalinists would even take state power. East Germany and Hungary in 1953 and 1956 exposed this perspective even more than the treacherous domestic policy of the French Stalinists. Pablo then

turned certain of his sections into little more than errand-boys for the national-bourgeois leadership of the Algerian FLN, turning away from the industrial working class itself in Western Europe. Now the crisis of the FLN deals a final blow and causes new crises and divisions within the Pablo camp. In the Socialist Workers' Party, we have seen a similar turn to the radical, petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and away from the working class. While Hansen and Cannon concentrated on finding 'radical' allies for the 'Fair Play for Cuba' committees and made a great noise about recognising Cuba as 'the first workers' state in the Western Hemisphere', the struggle of the working class in the US itself, particularly of the Negroes, came along and took them unawares. The same Kennedy against whom they defended Castro is called upon by the Socialist Workers' Party organ *The Militant* to arm the Negroes of the South.

Crisis and Militancy

The resolution which formed the agreed basis of 'reunification' with the Pabloites, endorsed by the SWP, must be criticised in detail, in order to understand the full extent of the revisionists' departure from Marxism, even though the document is intrinsically worthless from the point of view of a scientific view of the world revolution, its strategy and tactics, and the construction of the Fourth International.*

In the introductory section, the main thesis is stated: 'As a result of the successive failure of the two major revolutionary waves of 1919-23 and 1943-48—and of the minor one of 1934-37—the main centre of world revolution shifted for a time to the colonial world. The victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, following the post-war revolutionary wave in Europe, opened an uninterrupted series of colonial revolutions'. In the following paragraph the Resolution formally accepts that the lag in the advanced countries is to be placed at the door of 'the treacherous role of the official leadership', in place of which the working class must have 'a genuine Marxist revolutionary leadership'. The essence of the question is, of course, to build such a leadership to defeat the official bureaucracy. However, the Resolution concentrates upon another aspect entirely, with the 'subjective factor' entirely

ignored. Thus, 'the fact that the revolution won first in backward countries and not in the advanced is not proof that the workers in the advanced countries have shown insufficient revolutionary combativity. It is evidence of the fact that the opposition which they have to overcome in these countries is immeasurably stronger than in the colonial world'. (Our emphasis—Editors.)

In a single phrase, then, the Resolution indicates the responsibility of the traitorous leaderships for defeats in the advanced countries. Similarly, it contains a pious reference to the same problem in the backward countries: 'The crisis of revolutionary leadership exists, of course, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as in the advanced countries'. In both cases, however, this is only a question of repeating traditional formulae while rejecting their political meaning. For the advanced countries, the 'unifiers' have in fact gone over to the most reactionary revisionist viewpoint: it is the strength of the enemy, of the ruling class, which really appears to them the stumbling-block. For example, the Resolution refers to 'a very astute and supple capitalist-class leadership which has learned to transform reforms into a powerful brake upon revolution'. Here Marxism is abandoned for impressions of the will and ability of the ruling class. The basis for reformism in these countries is a historical-economic one; the actual force which puts a 'brake' on revolution is the counter-revolutionary, bureaucratic leadership of the labour move-

* 'The Dynamics of World Revolution', Adopted by the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International June 1963, in *Fourth International*, 17, Oct.-Dec. 1963.

ment What the resolution refers to as external, objective 'facts' are in fact the living force with which our movement is locked in struggle. We are based on the struggle of the working class as the contradictions of capitalism intensify; the bureaucrats rest on imperialism itself.

The Resolution continues: 'The failure of a revolutionary wave in an imperialist country gives way eventually to some form of temporary relative economic stabilisation and even to fresh expansion. This inevitably postpones new revolutionary uprisings for a time, *the combination of political setback (or even demoralisation) of the working class and a rising standard of living being unfavourable for any immediate revolutionary undertaking.*' (our emphasis—Editors). In these sentences is expressed the essence of the revision of Marxist politics by the Pabloites. Their description of an 'unfavourable combination of circumstances' leaves entirely out of account the main question, i.e., the relation between the working class and its leadership, the role of consciousness in the revolutionary struggle. Because they do not start from this decisive consideration, the 'unifiers' inevitably dissolve the concrete into the abstract. In the sentences quoted, the words 'working class' are an abstraction. For political purposes we have to see the working class with its internal divisions and contradictions, the developing relation between vanguard and mass, the changing relation to its traditional leaderships, etc. Contrast the glib 'combination' of the Resolution, for example, with Trotsky's analysis of the European working class during the ebb of the revolutionary wave in the early 1920s (*The First Five Years of the Comintern*, Vol. II, pp. 74ff.)

Trotsky shows that after 1914 there was a strong working-class upsurge, but that it was unorganised and poorly-led. Out of these struggles, the most dynamic sections were drawn into the new Communist Parties. Many more temporarily withdrew from the political struggle. This division in the class, resulting from a differentiation of consciousness in response to the first wave of struggle, was the basis upon which the labour bureaucracy restored its dominant position. When the crisis of 1920 broke over Europe, its effect was a series of bitter outbursts, but this was not sufficient to provoke the unity of the class necessary for revolutionary victory. For that to happen an economic revival was necessary. Here Trotsky concludes that an economic upswing is necessary for a new step forward in the class struggle. But it is not at all a question of formally opposite conclusions; under other circumstances an economic revival could, of course, have the opposite effect. But these 'circumstances' are the strategy and tactics of the leadership in relation to the economic and political struggle of the class. Because Trotsky examines the relation between leadership and class, examines the contradictions in the revolutionary camp, he is more concrete than our 'unifiers'. At the centre of his 'combination' of factors is the strategy and tactics of the class and the leadership; the 'combination' is not a collection of impressions from which contemplatively to draw conclusions. The latter approach is well suited to the 'deep entrism' of the Pabloites in the official reformist parties in Western Europe, where everything is staked on the hope of mass centrist developments, and the construction of the revolutionary party in struggle against the bureaucracy abandoned.

Leadership in the Colonial Liberation Movement

On the other hand, the expression, 'The crisis of revolutionary leadership exists, of course, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as in the advanced countries', is intended to put at their ease those who see that Pablo's open capitulation to Ben Bella has gone too far. But a phrase is not enough! Those who have drafted the Resolution *in fact* conduct their 'defence of the Algerian Revolution' by subordinating themselves to Ben Bella, by saying and doing *nothing* about the construction of independent revolutionary parties in Algeria and the colonial countries. Indeed, the Resolution itself provides adequate 'theoretical' justification for this capitulation. This is summed up in the conclusion: 'The weakness of the enemy

in the backward countries has opened the possibility of coming to power even with a blunted instrument.' In other words, workers' power can now be achieved in these countries *without* Marxist parties. The double-edged formula is masterly—and meaningless. There is a crisis of leadership, 'of course', in the backward countries, but there is no need for it to be resolved!

If we take the argument leading to this conclusion, we find exactly the same method, the same impressionism, the same dissolving of the concrete into the abstract, the same neglect of the conscious role of the class and the leadership, as in the Resolution's analysis of the advanced countries. For example:

'In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, on the

other hand, the very weakness of capitalism, the whole peculiar socio-economic structure produced by imperialism, the permanent misery of the great majority of the population in the absence of a radical agrarian revolution, the stagnation and even reduction of living standards while industrialisation nevertheless proceeds relatively rapidly [?], create situations in which the failure of one revolutionary wave does not lead automatically to relative or even temporary social or economic stabilisation. A seemingly inexhaustible succession of mass struggles continues, such as Bolivia has experienced for ten years. The weakness of the enemy offers the revolution fuller means of recovery from temporary defeats than is the case in imperialist countries.'

Now, of course, it is true that the 'specific weight' of the *national* bourgeoisie in the economic and political life of a colonial country is small, since it is international finance-capital which dominates the social structure. But when Trotsky wrote of this phenomenon in Czarist Russia, developing the theory of permanent revolution, he was especially concerned to bring out, on the other hand, the increased significance of the role of the industrial proletariat, despite its small numbers. The greater concentration and militancy of this class, its birth at an already highly developed stage of the international movement, qualitatively decided its leading role in the struggle against Czarism, and determined the necessity of the transition from bourgeois to proletarian revolution. Trotsky eventually realised that only the type of party constructed by Lenin could carry out the strategy and tactics flowing from this perspective. Such a party was founded upon Marxist theory and was quite specifically *proletarian* in character. This proletarian character of the leadership does not stand in contradiction to the overwhelming preponderance of the peasantry in the population. In point of fact, where the working class is so outnumbered and even has close ties on many sides with the peasantry, there is need for special vigilance to assure that the Party is based on proletarian methods and Marxist theory.

The revisionists draw the opposite conclusion. A 'blunted instrument' will be sufficient, because of the weakness of the enemy. Defeats and lost opportunities are not so serious, because in any case the number of mass struggles is 'seemingly inexhaustible'. This abstracted impression is substituted for any analysis of the experience of the proletariat, and of the revolutionary vanguard, in Bolivia, Algeria, Ceylon, South Africa. Of course, it appears as a 'hard fact' that 'mass struggles' continuously recur, but the actual course of these struggles and the experience of the classes in struggle is completely neglected. This is parallel to the actual

politics of the revisionists, with their uncritical praise of Castro-ism, peasant guerilla uprisings, and so on. Similarly with the phrase, 'the weakness of the enemy offers *the revolution* fuller means of recovery from temporary defeats than is the case in imperialist countries'. (our emphasis—Editors). Here the words 'the revolution' are an abstraction with no meaning, an abstraction at far too general a level for any political, *class* orientation. Like the phrase 'colonial revolution', it is however at a level of abstraction which is perfectly adapted to acceptance of the existing leadership of the national liberation struggles. Any more exact abstraction, based on the class content of the struggle and the contradictions within the fight for political independence, would be precisely against the interests of the petty-bourgeois leadership, who also prefer non-class formulations—the Algerian revolution, the Arab revolution, Arab Socialism, etc., etc.

The Resolution proceeds to discuss the various 'sectors'—colonial revolution, political revolution in the workers' states, revolution in the advanced countries—considering each one with the same method we have outlined. As 'Marxists', of course, our 'unifiers' must insist that the struggles in these three spheres form a 'dialectical unity'—'each force influences the other'. By this is meant something quite different from the actual struggle of the class forces on a world scale. The Resolution refers, for example, to the interrelation of the USSR and the absence of successful revolutions in advanced countries in this way: 'This same delay [in the advanced countries] also retards the maturing of the political revolution in the USSR, especially inasmuch as it does not place before the Soviet workers a *convincing example* of an alternative way to build Socialism' (our emphasis—Editors).

Now, of course, the propaganda effect in the USSR of such a revolution would be enormous. But to lay the major emphasis upon this 'example', or lack of it, in one's analysis of the interrelations of the struggles of the international proletariat, is to assume that in the class struggle the mechanism is identical with that of the Pabloites' own method—the response of individuals to impressions. What is above all important here is the single task of constructing fighting links between revolutionaries in all countries through the development of the Fourth International. Only a detailed historical treatment of the history of the sections of our own Marxist movement in relation to the experience of the working class in each country can give us the basis for such an analysis. Where events occur which pose *real* problems of the inter-related, international character of all revolutionary

struggles, the Resolution is silent. In the Cuban crisis of October-November 1962 the fate of the present government and of the working class in Cuba was clearly posed as an *international* problem. Only a correct orientation towards Stalinism as a counter-revolutionary force, and towards the organisation of revolutionary struggles led by Marxist parties against the rulers of the imperialist countries, could guide those who wished to defend Cuba against US imperialism. It was not just a question of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, undoubtedly true for Cuba, but of the *impossibility* of fighting for the socialist revolution in Cuba outside of a

struggle against the counter-revolutionary Stalinist bureaucracy, the specific stage of whose relations to imperialism must be grasped. What is more, Khrushchev's latest approaches to the US ruling class and to the Roman Catholic Church are a defensive reaction of the Soviet bureaucracy to the mounting struggle of the working class in both Western and Eastern Europe and the USSR. Instead of this kind of *class* analysis of the 'interrelation' of the struggles in different parts of the world we actually found the revisionists welcoming Khrushchev's 'actions for peace'. Once again the connection between revisionist theory and opportunist practice is crystal-clear.

What is the Colonial Revolution?

In its consideration of 'the Colonial Revolution' the Resolution expresses most clearly the politics of revisionism. This 'colonial revolution' is described in the terms used by petty-bourgeois and centrists everywhere:

'As a development in world history, the colonial revolution signifies above all that two billion human beings—men, women and children in areas where the tradition for centuries has been to live as passive subjects, condemned to super-oppression and super-exploitation, utter humiliation and destruction of their national traditions, even their national identity when they have not been made the target of mass slaughter and extermination—suddenly acquire a voice, a language and a personality of their own. Basically, the colonial revolution is the irrepressible tendency of these two billion human beings to become at last the masters and builders of their own destiny. The fact that this is socially possible only through a workers' state provides the objective basis for the tendency of the colonial revolution to move into the tracks of the permanent revolution.'

There follows a feeble attempt to answer the criticisms which have been made in recent years of the exclusive Pabloite stress on 'objective forces' making for this 'permanent revolution'. But we are left with an absolutely worthless conclusion

'... any ideas that this process will recur automatically or inevitably within a certain time limit [?] necessarily leads to a distorted estimate of the actual relationship of forces and replaces scientific analysis by illusions and wishful thinking. It presupposes that the objective process will solve by itself a task which can only be solved in struggle through the subjective effort of the vanguard; i.e., revolutionary socialist conquest of the leadership of the mass movement. That this is possible in the very process of the revolution and in a relatively short time, has been adequately demonstrated in the case

of Cuba. That it is not inevitable, and that without it the revolution is certain to suffer serious defeats or be limited at best to inconclusive victories is demonstrated by much in the recent history of other Latin-American countries; for instance, Bolivia, Argentina and Guatemala.'

It is difficult to see how this face-saving formula can be made consistent with the earlier conclusion that 'a blunted instrument' will suffice for victory of the socialist revolution in these countries. It might be argued that it is only a question of emphasis. But this is just the point: *unless* the whole concentration of Marxists is upon the construction of independent proletarian parties, then the masses will be betrayed. For the revisionists, it is quite a different matter; the existence or non-existence of such parties before a revolutionary situation *may or may not* be decisive! It is not possible to develop revolutionary strategy and tactics from such a perspective. All that follows is a passive acceptance of the existing leadership, covered up by a semblance of 'left' activity supposedly designed to encourage the likes of Ben Bella along 'the tracks of the permanent revolution'.

Wisely, the Resolution neglects a detailed analysis of the experience of the class struggle in particular countries: 'A more precise perspective for each of the great ethno-geographic zones of the colonial revolution (Latin-America, The Arab World, Black Africa, the Indian subcontinent and South-east Asia) can only be worked out on the basis of a concrete analysis of the specific social and political forces at work and of their more exact economic conditions.' The colonial revolution, already an ideological abstraction, is now subdivided into 'ethno-geographic zones'. The significance of this division is not indicated, but its relation to historical materialism is

obscure, to say the least. It conforms much more readily to the ideologies of the bourgeois-nationalist leaders.

In place of analysing the experience of the class struggle and of the revolutionary vanguard in particular countries, the Resolution enumerates 'certain general social trends which apply to all or most of the colonial or semi-colonial countries'. It is almost sufficient to quote at length from this section of the Resolution to confirm the correctness of the criticisms which the sections of the International Committee have made of the Socialist Workers' Party and the Pabloites in the last two years in relation to the struggle in the backward countries.

First, then:

(a) **The numerical and economic weakness of the national bourgeoisie.** Despite the priority granted them by history, the national bourgeoisie has proved incapable of handling the capital made available under the rubric of "aid to the undeveloped countries" in such a way as to achieve optimum results in industrialisation. This is perhaps the biggest obstacle in the way of a "bourgeois solution" of the problem of economic underdevelopment. Everywhere we find the same phenomena: Of available surplus capital, a major part is diverted from industrial uses to investment in land or usury, hoarding, import of luxury consumers goods, even outright flight abroad. This incapacity of the national bourgeoisie is not the result or mere reflection of its moral corruption but a normal operation of the capitalist drive for profits under the given economic and social conditions. Fear of permanent revolution is not the least of the motives involved.

We are dealing here with a tendency which capitulates to the petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership. Particularly in Algeria, this leadership has maintained relationships with French imperialism. Pablo has in the past 'explained' the necessity of such agreements, leaving intact as they do large French investments in Algeria. It is a matter, in

fact, of managing *better* the resources made available by the imperialists; this will achieve 'optimum results in industrialisation'. This paragraph from the Resolution abandons the Marxist analysis of objective relations between world finance-capital and the exploited masses of the colonial countries, with the petty-bourgeois, nationalist leaderships playing a Bonapartist role in the 'independent' states. Such a clear political characterisation of the role of the petty-bourgeois nationalists is avoided by the device of having separated off 'the colonial revolution' in each country for separate consideration, ignoring the international economic and class content of the actual social relations within the country.

The second 'general social trend' indicated is 'the creation of the infrastructure of heavy industry through the state, taking the form of nationalised property'. Referring in particular to Egypt and India, the Resolution points out that these nationalisations do not in themselves alter the *capitalist* character of the state; they are carried out under the leadership of the 'urban petty bourgeoisie, especially the intellectuals, the military and state functionaries', and are indispensable for the foundation of a *bourgeois* state. What is *not* discussed in the Resolution is the actual relation of the practical politics of the revisionists to these petty-bourgeois governments. In Algeria, the revisionists, as we have seen, in fact give support to the petty-bourgeois, nationalist government. They express similar uncritical approval of Castro in Cuba. There was even published an article by one Sadi both in the Socialist Workers' Party *International Socialist Review* and the Pabloite *Fourth International* advocating 'entry' into Nasser's national movement, and specifically disavowing any organised independent political opposition. A class characterisation of nationalisation is incomplete, and *turns into its opposite*, if it does not sharply define the role of the proletariat in opposing the petty-bourgeois nationalists.

The Myth of the Revolutionary Peasantry

The remaining two 'general social trends' in the colonial revolution are of special interest, insofar as they represent crude attempts, once again, to accommodate Pablo's extreme revisionist formulations while at the same time reassuring those who are not prepared to go so far as Pablo in drawing the logical conclusions from their revisionist method. It is a question here of 'the strategic role of the

colonial proletariat' and 'the radical role of peasantry'. The Resolution emphasises that factory workers are an insignificant minority in colonial countries; most important are 'the miners, plantation hands, agricultural workers and largely unemployed—typical for the colonial economy'. We have here a formula to satisfy Pablo, who recently wrote approvingly of Fanon's thesis that the colonial pro-

letariat is, in fact, a privileged stratum. From this flowed the conclusion that the rural masses, 'the revolutionary peasantry', would form the base of the socialist revolution. Many of Pablo's followers naturally could not accept this clear contradiction of Marxist writings on the peasantry as a class with no independent political role: the peasantry rebels against oppression, but the political content of this rebellion depends on the leadership coming from the bourgeoisie or from the proletariat. The Resolution we are considering somehow finds a halfway formulation: 'In the form of expanding guerilla forces, the peasantry has undoubtedly played a much more radical and decisive role in the colonial revolution than was foreseen in Marxist theory. It has revealed a social nature somewhat different from that of the traditional peasantry of the advanced capitalist countries.'

But what is this 'somewhat different social nature'? The Resolution itself finds it necessary to point out that 'the existence of a large majority of small land-owning peasants has undoubtedly served as a momentary brake on the revolutionary process in several South-East Asian countries (Malaya, Thailand, even [?] Ceylon)'. For the rest, it is no revelation that the peasantry is not a homogeneous class specific to capitalism. In every country its composition is determined by a complex history of past economic systems and their degree of dissolution. In no case is the peasantry a homogeneous class in the same sense as the proletariat tends towards homogeneity through the laws of capitalism and the necessities of the class struggle. Like other petty-bourgeois strata, the peasantry under capitalism is constantly being differentiated by the penetration of big capital into the countryside. There is no doubt of the economic breakdown and utter impoverishment of the peasantry in colonial countries in the epoch of imperialist decay, and of the consequent mass forces of revolt who become potential allies of the proletariat against imperialism. But none of this alters the central importance of proletarian leadership. Here it is necessary constantly to re-emphasise the elementary lessons of the experience of Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks, who had to fight against ideas of just this kind from Russian petty-bourgeois, radical intellectuals. This is particularly true in relation to the Resolution's final point on the peasantry: as against 'the ingrained individualism of the classical peasantry', the Resolution contrasts 'the predisposition towards collectivism among rural populations still living under conditions of total or partial tribal (communal) property. This class, in contrast to the traditional peasantry, is not *per se* opposed to the introduction

of socialist property relations in the countryside. It therefore remains an ally of the proletariat throughout the whole process of permanent revolution'.

It is difficult to know where to begin in criticising such patent nonsense. Where are the rural populations still living under partial or total tribal communism? Without a doubt, all known existing societies are class societies. The subsistence cultivators of Africa, Asia and South America have long ago seen their societies fragmented by the penetration first of commercial and then of industrial and finance capital. Whether the greater part of them were still tribal-communal is very doubtful in any case. But worse follows. If such societies *did* exist, how could we explain the term used in the second sentence of our quotation: 'This class . . .'? If the people concerned are in a 'totally tribal' society, they are clearly not a class; if it is only a 'partially tribal' society, then its people are by definition differentiated, and share membership of the classes of that society into which they have been incorporated. It is thus impossible to attach any meaning whatever to this essay in a 'peasantry of a new type'. It is about as new as the Russian village community so beloved of the Narodniks. It is not, of course, necessary to comment on the Resolution's injunctions on future workers' states to imbue these primitive communists with 'the essential components of discipline, self-management and modern industrial rationality'!

Pablo's crowning formula, in his previous writings on the 'revolutionary peasantry', was the so-called 'Jacobin leadership *sui generis*', a conglomeration of petty-bourgeois intellectuals and other politically active people forced by repression to leave the urban centres and put themselves at the head of peasant uprisings. This is not even a sophisticated formula; it is only a very transparent justification of the existing domination of petty-bourgeois leaders over the mass movement in the backward countries. Those who have 'unified' on the basis of this Resolution cannot denounce and expose Pablo's role, much less make a principled break from his course, which will inevitably compromise them all. Instead, they adopt once again a formula designed to obscure the differences: 'It is an absolute necessity to educate revolutionary Marxist cadres and to build tendencies and independent parties wherever possible [?] in all colonial countries'. And finally, although it bears no relation and is emptied of all meaning by the earlier equivocations, double-edged formulae, and outright revisions, we have the pious repetition of correct phrases: 'The building of sections of the Fourth International capable of working out concrete analyses

of their specific national situations and finding concrete solutions to the problems remains a central strategic task in all countries'. What will these 'sections of the Fourth International' do, since 'blunted instruments' are sufficient? What will be

their role in relation to the existing parties and leaders? What will be their class basis? An answer to these questions is the absolute prerequisite of 'finding concrete solutions' to the problems of the class struggle in the colonial countries.

'Effects of the Colonial Revolution'

We saw earlier how the 'unifiers' conceived of the interrelations of the revolution in the advanced countries and the struggle of the workers in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The 'effects' of the colonial revolution are considered in similar mechanical fashion, instead of through the struggle and consciousness of the vanguard and the working class. We are told that the French working class received a 'breathing space' after de Gaulle's accession to power because of the struggle of the Algerian people. This is breathtaking! It was the failure of working-class leadership during the French political crisis provoked by the Algerian struggle in 1958 which brought the Bonaparte de Gaulle to power. Instead of proceeding from this *real* 'relationship of power', the Resolution proceeds from 'de Gaulle's power', 'the Algerian Revolution', and so on, as settled 'facts' to be balanced one against another. We are treated to a similar piece of mechanistic speculation with regard to Angola: 'In Portugal, the outbreak of revolution in Angola and other colonies proved decisive in undermining the stability of the Salazar dictatorship, creating the pre-revolutionary climate which has placed the overthrow of Portuguese fascism on the order of the day. The fall of Salazar would help accelerate the Spanish revolution, weaken the bonapartist regime in France and intensify the new wave of militancy in the West European labour movement'. Here is illustrated the extent to which the politics of the revisionists have become only the verdict of outside commentators on some process in which they have no part. They make some perfunctory remarks about the effect of the colonial revolution in radicalising certain elements in the labour movement but without any indication of the real content or class significance of this 'influence'. For example:

'... it has affected vanguard elements in an immediate way, crystallising new revolts against the waiting, passive or treacherous attitude of the old leaderships towards the colonial revolution or fresh reactions against the generally low level of politics [?] in some imperialist countries. This has occurred not only in France where these new layers have been most vocal [?] but also in several other European countries, especially Spain, and in the U.S. where the

opportunity to solidarise with the Cuban Revolution has opened the door to radical politics [?] for a new generation of vanguard elements [?]. In the same way the influence of the colonial revolution, especially the African revolution, upon vanguard elements in the Negro movement has helped prepare the emergence of a new radical left wing. In all these cases, it is the task of revolutionary Marxists to seek to win the best elements of this newly emerging vanguard to Trotskyism and to fuse them into the left wing of the mass movement.'

In point of fact, the SWP's method of 'solidarising with the Cuban Revolution' only served to take the Party closer to 'radical' petty-bourgeois circles. Similarly, the 'effects' of the mass struggles in Africa on the Negro movement in the US are not at all straight-forward and homogeneous. Insofar as they are seen simply as political struggles for 'independence' within the framework of imperialism, adequately represented by the likes of Nkrumah, then they can strengthen middle-class leadership of the Negro struggle. Only if they are understood and explained in a Marxist way can they be fused with the real class needs of the Negro workers. But the Pabloites prefer to speculate, once more, on 'general' influences rather than subjecting these to class analysis: 'In general the colonial revolution has helped to overcome lethargy and the feeling of political impotence.'

A final 'influence' of the colonial revolution considered by the Resolution is its effect on world Stalinism. Apart from the usual glorification of the existing character of the national liberation movement,* the most emphatic point made by the Resolution is that, 'The victory in Cuba marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the world revolution; for, aside from the Soviet Union, this is the first workers' state established outside the bounds of the Stalinist apparatus.' The essential consequence of this has been that, 'In fact an inter-

* 'The emergence of mass revolutionary forces led by parties or tendencies which have developed outside the realm of Stalinist control (Cuba, Algeria, Angola) has introduced a most powerful disintegrating element into international Stalinism, favouring the development of a revolutionary left wing.'

national Castro-ist current has appeared inside the world Communist and revolutionary-socialist movement.' If the influence of this current is still largely confined to the backward countries, 'One of the reasons for this is that the Cuban leadership has not yet reached an understanding of how it can best facilitate revolutionary rebirth in these areas.'

Here we have reached a crucial point in the role of revisionism today. Everything is staked on the initiative and consciousness of 'the Cuban leadership'. It is true that 'Castro-ism' has found much support among peasant leaders and radical intellectuals in backward countries, but this is precisely because of the failure of the working class to resolve its crisis of leadership. In such a situation, petty-bourgeois tendencies basing themselves on superficial theories about peasant risings and guerilla warfare easily find a following. Indeed, the bitterness of exploitation and the apparent ease of early success against rotten ruling cliques encourages many revolutionaries to go through an experience with this kind of ideology, particularly when the Stalinists offer them only class-collaboration policies. To accept as a 'fact' or 'new reality' the rise of petty-bourgeois-dominated, national revolutionary movements, instead of seeing as an essential part of their origin the opportunist betrayals of working-class leadership, is another example of the method of empiricism, of what Trotsky called 'worship of the accomplished fact'.

In case anyone should think that the revisionists have thereby abandoned the role of the Fourth International, we have what is really a very clear depiction of the perspectives of the Pabloites and the SWP:

'The appearance of more workers' states through further development of the colonial revolution, particularly in countries like Algeria, could help strengthen and enrich the international current of Castro-ism, give it longer-range perspectives and help bring it closer to understanding the necessity

for a new revolutionary Marxist international of mass parties. Fulfilment of this historic possibility depends **in part** on the role which the FI plays in the colonial solution and the capacity of the FI to **help** win fresh victories.'

This paragraph does not need lengthy analysis. The role of the Fourth International, in fact absolutely necessary to *lead* the proletariat in every country, is here reduced to 'helping' in the winning of fresh victories. This 'help' will have a 'part' in determining whether or not the 'Castro-ist currents' come closer to understanding the need for a Fourth International. By this subtle influence our 'Trotskyists' will also influence the revolution in Eastern Europe and Russia. Thus: 'The infusion of Trotskyist concepts in this new Castro-ist current will also influence the development of a conscious revolutionary leadership, particularly in the workers' states, will help prevent "Titoist" deviations and better assure the evolution of mass pressure and direct action into the cleansing force of the political revolution. The development of the Portuguese and Spanish revolutions, historically possible in a short period [?], can also give rise to new tendencies of the Castro-ist type which could help the Cubans and related currents to achieve a fuller understanding of world revolution in its entirety.' So much for the *phrase*, 'The crisis of revolutionary leadership exists, of course, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as in the advanced countries.' For Trotsky and the founders of the Fourth International the *content* of the insistence on resolving the crisis of working-class leadership was the urgent task of constructing parties of the Fourth International. The 'Reunification' of the Pabloites, with SWP support, is based on the exact opposite, reducing the 'International' to the role of ideological apologists for the existing leaderships of the mass movement, with appropriate formulae to suit the particular conditions of each country.

Russia, Eastern Europe and China

In considering the workers' states, the Resolution offers only a collection of impressions and speculations. There is no analysis of the contradictions within these countries and consequently no basis for any consideration of the tasks of building sections of the Fourth International against the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy. Phrases can be found which 'accept' the necessity of political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy, but exactly opposite formulations represent accurately the actual method and theory of the Resolution. Pabloism's first direct

political expression was the theory that the Soviet bureaucracy, in the conditions following the establishment of workers' states in Eastern Europe and China, would be forced to itself express the revolutionary pressure of the masses. Within the SWP leadership, which at first opposed this orientation, there soon appeared formulations which equated reforms and revolution in the USSR. The 'reunification' document preserves a solid base for this type of policy and leaves the way open for the most right-wing elements in their support of Khrushchev,

e.g., 'The evolution of the workers' states as a whole since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and especially after Stalin's death in 1953 has therefore steadily removed the causes that fostered political passivity among the masses and their vanguard', and 'Certain sectors of the bureaucracy have indicated awareness of the objective need to loosen the Stalinist stranglehold on the productive forces the better to meet the threatening military and technological advances of US imperialism.' Once again we have a picture of 'the evolution of the workers' states as a whole' objectively removing the basis of the bureaucracy's role, together with the 'supposition that these objective trends will be expressed through the bureaucracy itself. The essence here is the same as it was in considering the backward countries: the working class must have a conscious *leadership*, forged in struggle against the class forces who cling to their power and domination in face of the changing objective situation. Starting from this point of view, the reactions of the bureaucracy or of factions within will be seen as tactical defences of the reactionary forces, not as relatively progressive or 'left' tendencies.

For all the talk about political revolution, the consequence of the Pabloites' method is to accept the perspective of Soviet technical progress and 'peaceful

coexistence' upon which Khrushchev and the Soviet bureaucracy themselves insist. Thus:

'However entrancing the picture of the worldwide consequences of an early victory of the political revolution in the Soviet Union may be, the process may prove to be longer drawn out than we desire. It would therefore be disastrous for Marxist revolutionary forces to stake everything on this one card, meantime overlooking the very real opportunities for breakthrough in the colonial and imperialist countries before the political revolution in the USSR succeeds. Consequently it is advisable to take into account the effect which continuous technological and economic progress of the USSR and the other workers' states can have on the world revolutionary process in the absence of an early revolutionary victory.'

True, the Resolution rejects 'the view that the economic and technological advances of the workers' states can in themselves decisively modify the relationship of forces between the classes in the imperialist countries, or contribute decisively to the overthrow of capitalism,' but its conclusion is finally:

'The main contribution to the development of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries remains therefore the effect in the labour movement of the crisis of Stalinism and the technological and economic gains of the USSR.'

The Advanced Capitalist Countries—The Key

We have already indicated the basically false method and revisionist conclusion of the Pabloites and the SWP leaders on the class struggle in the advanced capitalist countries. In its final section the 'reunification' Resolution returns to the theme of the relation between militancy and changes in living standards.

In an attempt to justify their own concentration on work within the bureaucracy and inability to turn to the struggles of the most oppressed sections of the working class, the Pabloites have discovered that in fact the highly-paid workers, once their standards are disturbed, are most likely to set going the 'revolutionary process', e.g.:

'What both theory and experience do prove is that the most revolutionary consequences follow not so much from the **absolute level** of real wages and living standards as from their **relative short-term fluctuations**. Attempts to lower even slightly a hard-won high level, or the widespread fear that such an attempt is in preparation, can under certain conditions touch off great class actions that tend to pass rapidly from the defensive to the offensive stage and put on the agenda struggles of an objectively

pre-revolutionary significance around transitional slogans. Such struggles may even lead to revolutionary situations.'

'Recent strike waves in Belgium, Spain and Italy—spearheaded by the **best-paid workers**—again prove that it is quite false to hold that the highest-paid workers are automatically "corrupted" by "capitalist prosperity".'

It is necessary to be very clear about the role of this abstract speculating. The sharp swing to the right by Khrushchev is definitely a response to the revival of the class struggle in the advanced countries and in Eastern Europe. In the US and Europe the most oppressed sections of the working class, particularly the youth, are being drawn into the struggle. This is especially true in Britain and in the Negro struggle in America. Trotskyists will win the leadership of the working class only if they can build the revolutionary party out of these sections. At this point the struggle against the conservative organs of the labour bureaucracy becomes extremely sharp. In this sharp battle older workers and trade unionists who have gone through the prolonged 'boom' can be won from industrial 'militancy' to

revolutionary politics. Because the Pabloite analysis, as we saw earlier, is an analysis by commentators and not participants, it neglects entirely the factor of consciousness and leadership. This is why it ends with grandiose and abstract conclusions with no import for the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary party. Thus:

'If some of the obviously fine qualities of the undernourished proletariat of yesterday seem to have disappeared among Western workers, other good new qualities have appeared, precisely as a result of the higher standing of living and culture gained by the proletariat in the West. The gap between the knowledge of the skilled worker and the bourgeois technician has virtually disappeared or been greatly reduced. Technologically the Western worker is much more capable of socialist self-management today than was his father or grandfather; and he feels more strongly the need to play a conscious, leading role in the process of production.

'It is also easier for today's worker to grasp the overall economic interaction among all the factors, the intertwining of all economic problems and the needs and practical purposes of socialist planning. Increased leisure also means the increased possibility to participate on a mass scale in political administration [?], something that never existed in the past. It is not for Marxists to deny the basic Marxist truth that capitalism is the great educator of the workers for socialism, at least on the economic field.'

All this 'objective' consideration of the working class as a collection of individuals sensitive to the economic climate, rather than as a fighting force, is a prelude to the Resolution's justification of 'deep entry'. After explaining the pressure of the falling rate of profit on the employers, which will lead to

big wages struggles, the Resolution predicts even revolutionary situations:

'... provided that the working class, or at least its broad vanguard [?], has sufficient self-confidence to advance the socialist alternative to the capitalist way of running the economy and the country. This in turn hinges essentially on the activity and influence of a broad left wing in the labour movement that educates the vanguard in the necessity of struggling for this socialist alternative and that builds up self-confidence and an apparatus capable of revolutionary struggles through a series of partial struggles,'

and further:

'The objective is to stimulate and broaden mass struggles to the utmost and to move as much as possible towards playing a leading role in such struggles, beginning with the most elementary demands and seeking to develop them in the direction of transitional slogans on the level of governmental power and the creation of bodies of dual power.'

The advanced countries are the fundamental key to the world revolution. It is here above all that the resolution of the crisis of leadership of the working class, the construction of Leninist parties, will strike at the heart of imperialism. But here, too, the revisionists have found a formula for trailing behind the official leadership.

At the centre of the actual reconstruction of the Fourth International will be the building of Trotskyist parties who make a relationship with the strength of the working class in the advanced countries, a struggle which requires a bitter fight against the opportunists and centrists of all kinds. Those who excuse the betrayals of the bureaucracies, even dressing them up as reflections of mass pressure, stand in the way of this vital task.

The Fourth International

The revisionist ideas we have analysed here are the basis for the 'reunified Fourth International' of the Pabloites, supported by the Socialist Workers' Party (USA). Denouncing the Trotskyists of the International Committee as 'sectarians' and 'ultra-lefts', deliberately confusing our position with that of an adventurist group (the 'Posadas' group) which split from their own ranks only two years ago, they unite on the basis of liquidating the independent Marxist party, which necessitates the abandonment of Marxism. Instead, all manner of demagoguery and spurious nonsense talked by petty-bourgeois bureaucratic and nationalist leaders is welcomed by them as approaching Marxism.

For example, in its section, 'The Fourth Inter-

national', the Resolution says:

'The validity of the Trotskyist explanation of the character of the bureaucracy as a **social force** has become accepted by all serious students of the Soviet Union. It is even reflected in the theoretical basis and justification offered by the Yugoslav government in its experimentation with workers' councils and self-management.'

Not only Tito, but also Castro is welcomed as a convert to Trotsky's views on bureaucracy and the role of the working class, even to the extent of extravagant claims such as this:

'The attack Fidel Castro launched against the Anibal Escalantes of Cuba sounded like a repetition of Leninist and Trotskyist speeches heard in the Soviet Union almost forty years ago.'

In point of fact, Castro's speech* was a defence of the independence of the State officialdom, not only against one wing inside Cuban Stalinism, but also against *any* political control from outside the State apparatus itself. We thus have the spectacle of 'Trotskyists' not only justifying the manoeuvres of petty-bourgeois state bureaucracies, but even welcoming them as expressions of the creeping victory of Trotskyism.

Theory is no longer seen by these 'Trotskyists' as a guide to action, but as a series of formal, abstract writings to be checked and 'confirmed' in the heads of their possessors. Our 'theoreticians' have the function only of casting around for 'examples' in the course of events or in the speeches and writings of politicians, examples which they then abstract from the context and list as 'confirmations'. By contrast, Marxist theory is *in fact* confirmed and developed only by the active penetration of reality by the Marxists and the working class. The very expressions used in the document illustrate the difference: 'In the same way the theory of permanent revolution, kept alive by the Fourth International as a precious heritage received from Trotsky . . .' With this approach theory becomes an ikon with the possibility of perhaps a few quantitative additions, rather than a qualitative development through revolutionary practice. The Resolution indeed describes this explicitly:

'The cadres of the Fourth International carried out their revolutionary duty in keeping alive the programme of Trotskyism and adding to it as world events dictated.'

This part of the Resolution concerned with 'The Fourth International', which should be concerned with the struggle to establish and develop the theory and practice of independent revolutionary parties on the programme of the Fourth International, is in fact something quite different. After pointing out that small organisations are in greater danger from sectarianism than from opportunism, which is

*For a more detailed analysis of this speech, see 'Revisionism and the Fourth International' in **Labour Review**, Vol. VII, No. 5, pp. 179-180.

'generally easier to recognise' (this passes for serious argument!), this section is devoted to a collection of formulae to excuse the virtual liquidation of independent revolutionary parties. 'Entrism' is necessary, says the Resolution, because the masses are still dominated by opportunist leaders: under these conditions, 'the masses, when they display readiness to take the road of revolutionary action, do not begin with a fully developed Marxist consciousness but with an outlook which is closer to left centrism.

'In addition to this, the bureaucratic leaderships do not facilitate bringing Marxist educational material to the ranks. They operate as ruthless permanent factions, completely hostile to the ideas of Trotskyism and prepared to engage in witch-hunting and the use of most undemocratic measures against those who advance fresh or challenging views.'

We have seen how, both in the advanced and the backward countries, the revisionists in fact capitulate to leaders of a petty-bourgeois type. The theoretical justification for this is that, through a tactic of 'entrism', the Fourth International encourages the rapid evolution of 'left centrist' mass movements: 'The revolutionary nuclei actively participate in building left-wing tendencies *capable of leading broader sections of the masses into action*. Through the experiences built up in these actions, they assist in transforming the best forces of these centrist or left-centrist tendencies into genuine revolutionary Marxists.' For all the disclaimers that entrism does not mean forming only 'pressure groups', this formulation makes it very clear that the leadership of the decisive mass struggles will be centrist in character, and that the 'Fourth International' will not organise for the political defeat of these leaders, preferring instead to 'transform' them into Trotskyists. All the talk about transitional demands resolves itself into the assumption of a purely educational role within the centrist apparatus rather than revolutionary leadership of the masses. The history of the Belgium General Strike and the Pabloite capitulation to the FLN are the most striking examples.

Two Types of Leadership

The decisive test of a Marxist party's orientation towards the mass movement is the degree of success in building a revolutionary cadre, whose links with the working class are forged in struggle against the opportunists and bureaucrats. In their concern over the past ten or fifteen years to 'get closer to the new reality', the revisionists have produced a circle of 'leaders' and a method of work diametrically

opposed to this revolutionary preparation. For the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is clear that the so-called 'sections' of the Fourth International which follow Pablo have become mere apologists for the nationalist leaderships. Their abandonment of an independent orientation to the working class is explicit. Such a method produces only a soft group of professional advisers who are not averse to

becoming petty functionaries, as we see in Algeria. From these positions of 'influence' they help along the 'objective' process whereby the petty-bourgeois leaders are pushed towards Marxism.

In the advanced countries, these errors take similar form. The grandiose 'World Congresses' of Pablo's International, with their claims of innumerable represented sections, discuss everything under the sun except the actual construction of the revolutionary leadership. What is the balance-sheet of 'entrism *sui generis*'? The tactic of entry into the mass labour organisations must build up a body of experience about trade union work and the methods of politically preparing an alternative leadership in battle against the opportunists and centrists; that is the purpose of entry. But at no Pabloite Congresses is there any discussion of this experience. Marxism develops as a science, by consciously working over the experience of the movement in struggle. But for the Pabloites such questions do not arise: 'entry' work consists of steadily entrenching themselves in positions within the apparatus, from which they will 'help' or 'encourage' the 'left centrist' tendencies who are in any case historically next in line for the mantle of leadership.

Such orientation produces a particular type of national section and a particular type of leadership within the Pabloite International. Around the publications of this group there gather numbers of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who very easily accept a standpoint of 'principled' but quite abstract avowals of Marxism, divorced from any struggle to construct a leadership against the enemies of Marxism and of the working class. Such groups seek constantly for 'alliances' with all kinds of centrist trends, cultivating the most naive illusions about the 'leftward' tendencies of these 'allies' in Parliamentary and Trade Union circles, as in Britain and Belgium. The real task of Marxists, to 'go deeper and deeper into the working class' to build a power which will smash the bureaucracy, is anathema to these circles. To such a political way of life, the message that it is most important to encourage the 'left centrists' is a gift from heaven. The leaders of this International are, more and more, men of 'influence', men with 'reputations' in petty-bourgeois circles, and not working-class leaders, not leaders familiar with the intimate and detailed problems of the working class and the revolutionary party.

The sections of the 'International' led by this type of 'leader' are surrounded not by the most militant sections of the working class (in particular, today, the youth), but by their flimsy and deliberately unclarified relationship with the centrist and bureaucratic tendencies. In this environment, all the ten-

dencies towards extreme revisionism which we have indicated are assured of a rapid growth; and are now strangling to death whatever remains of the cadres of the Pabloite International. In the United States, as we have pointed out in an earlier section of this report, the same result has been achieved by the SWP without benefit of the 'entrism' tactic. The well-known theories of 'regroupment' of the Left after the Stalinist crisis of 1956 and of joint electoral activity independent of the Democrats and Republicans, both of which are part of a general orientation of the Party's work towards the 'radical' milieu in the United States, were the substitute for 'entrism', which was not a possibility. There is consequently a situation in the SWP where Trade Union work is at its lowest ebb and has produced no new cadres. The old leadership survives at the core of the Party, more and more concerned with creating a good impression in petty-bourgeois circles, from Castro to the *National Guardian*. While this orientation has matured over the period since the war, a profound process of radicalisation has surged through the most oppressed sections of the working class. In the struggles now taking place in the USA, part of the overall radicalisation in the advanced capitalist countries, the SWP is utterly incapable of leadership. It tails along behind the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Negro struggle, rejecting them only when their sway over the masses is coming to an end. The type of party into which the SWP has been turning is like the Pabloite sections, adapted to radical circles of petty-bourgeois, powerless to intervene in the real struggle of the class.

Leaders of this type are, not unnaturally, hostile to the International Committee, and particularly to the Socialist Labour League. Hansen advises the SLL to stop criticising the centrists and instead, 'advance to meet the leftward-moving stream' in Britain. He is really advising an abandonment of the SLL's orientation towards the working class in struggle against the bureaucracy. But it is the work of the SLL and the other sections of the IC which is the real guarantee of the defeat of the revisionists in the international movement. In contrast to the Pabloites and the SWP, it has been possible to develop the basis of a new working-class leadership, to train in struggle a force which knows how to lead workers and to fight the opportunists. On this fundamental, principled basis, the SLL in fact has a tactical relationship on limited issues with centrist tendencies in the trade unions which is far more stable and successful than that of any of the revisionists, who merely submit themselves as errand-boys to the centrists.

The Resolution eventually tries to justify liquida-

tionism by accepting a formulation which the SWP leadership has been toying with for the last two and a half years:

'An acute problem in relation to the construction of revolutionary-socialist parties in many countries is lack of time to organise and to gain adequate experience before the revolution breaks out. In previous decades this would signify certain defeat for the revolution. Because of a series of new factors, however, this is no longer necessarily the case. The example of the Soviet Union, the existence of workers' states from whom material aid can be obtained, and the relative weakening of world capitalism, have made it possible for revolutions in some instances to achieve partial successes, to reach certain plateaux (where they may rest in unstable equilibrium as in the case of Bolivia) and even to go as far as the establishment of a workers' state. Revolutionary Marxists in such countries face extremely difficult questions, from an inadequate level of socialist consciousness among the masses to a dearth of seasoned or experienced cadres to carry out a myriad pressing tasks. No choice is open to them in such situations but to participate completely and wholeheartedly in the revolution and to build the party in the very process of the revolution itself.'

This passage is a fitting end to our long series of quotations. It contains the conclusion which excuses everything: *because of 'new factors' working-class power can be obtained without there necessarily having been constructed Marxist parties.* In practice, this means that the primary *emphasis* in the work of the Pabloite national sections will be to encourage the 'left centrist' leaderships, for this will be seen as the quickest way of making sure the working class is not 'overtaken' by revolution. In reality *the crisis of leadership has passed*; new factors mean that humanity can emerge from capitalism *without* the formation of conscious leaderships based on Marxism.

When these revolutions occur, Marxists have no alternative but to participate in them 'wholeheartedly', i.e., they must not appear as opponents of the petty-bourgeois leaderships. In Cuba, for example, they must enter Castro's party and work loyally within it. In Algeria, they must work for Ben Bella, and join with him in denouncing and imprisoning any opposition movements, Right or Left. The 'dearth of seasoned or experienced cadres to carry out a myriad pressing tasks' is a direct reference to the Pabloites' role with regard to Algeria, where they have made themselves recruiting sergeants for technicians to strengthen the Ben Bella government. As for 'building revolutionary parties in the process of the revolution itself', this is only the most extreme of the hypocritical formulae in

which the Resolution abounds. It is precisely in the revolutionary situations of Algeria and Cuba that the building of the independent party has been most blatantly abandoned, on the assumption that the petty-bourgeois leaders themselves will become revolutionary Marxists. Even if the formulation were taken seriously as a contribution to theory, it would have to be immediately rejected as false. The task of revolutionaries is never to speculate about whether there is 'time' for the party to be constructed, but to work in all the stages of development of the class struggle, guided by the long-term, revolutionary interests of the working class, to steel the revolutionary party in struggle against every arm of the capitalist class and its state, to develop a Bolshevik cadre with bonds of steel uniting it with every section of the proletariat. This constant struggle, through periods of black reaction as well as in times of revolutionary upsurge, is the only guarantee of preparedness in the struggle for power. Even such a party, when the revolution occurs, will find it necessary to overcome internal conflict, hesitations, even desertions, as Lenin found in 1917. Such a perspective is absolutely alien to the facile notion of 'building parties in the process of revolution itself.'

Such are the political bases of the 'reunification' of revisionists which took place in Rome in 1963. The sections of our International Committee in Europe, in Latin America, in Africa, in Japan, and in the deformed workers' states of Eastern Europe, are united in their complete opposition to the revisionists. We are confident that in the course of action and of discussion, many of the followers of Pablo and Cannon will be compelled to change their views, and to recognise the need to return to the founding Programme of the Fourth International. Above all, the resurgence of the working class of the USA and of Western and Eastern Europe is the foundation for the great leap forward which is now possible in the Fourth International. This rising militancy of the revolutionary class is the ground of all our activity, and it is also the ground upon which the opportunists and centrists of all kinds will be defeated, because their room for manoeuvre with the imperialists grows smaller and smaller. The great international crisis of Stalinism is the most important proof of this process. Our fight against revisionism in the Fourth International is a vitally necessary part of our revolutionary political work in the working class. It is the revolutionary practice which will surely enable the Fourth International to provide the leadership of all those communists who come to take their place in the coming final battles of the working class to overthrow the power of world capital.



ANDREI ZHDANOV

Trends in Soviet Literature

Part 1

By Jean Simon

THE CHANGES WHICH have taken place in the USSR since the death of Stalin concern in differing degrees the various fields of political, economic, social and cultural life. Nowhere are they so deep as in the literary field. It is here that the changes, their consequences and their nature are reflected most amply, if not violently.

The Soviet intelligentsia constitutes a highly diversified social layer. At the bottom of the scale schoolteachers, college teachers and even faculty lecturers* are both overwhelmed with work and poorly paid. The 'artists'¹ on the other hand form a privileged group, especially the writers. Once admitted to the Writers' Union, the Soviet writer receives an honorary monthly salary, author's rights and a comfortable flat (a particularly important advantage in the USSR where numerous families still live in a single room). In general, only the author's royalties on his works published abroad, which are taken over by the Soviet government, escape him. Obviously admission to a section of the Writers' Union is limited as far as possible by those beneficiaries who are already inside. This is especially so in the large towns.² Despite all this the Union comprises several thousands of writers who constitute a real 'social élite'. Besides their enormous social advantages the writers benefit from highly-prized favours such as being able to travel abroad.³ All these privileges together are apparently only counterbalanced by two inconveniences: firstly, the work of the writer is fairly strictly controlled, each work being published under the surveillance and responsibility of a publishing board usually of five members and, secondly, and most important, the writer can lose all his privileges if he is excluded from the Writers' Union. This does not necessarily mean that the debarred writer is denied any possibility of getting his works published. All he has to do is find a provincial magazine or publishing house far enough away from Moscow or Leningrad. But socially he is truly struck off the rolls.

Whilst the writer, who is officially recognised as

* 'Assistants de faculté' [ed.]

1. In Russian the term 'artist' takes in writers, painters, musicians, etc. The average salary of a practitioner of the arts, as of a doctor, is from 30 to 35 pounds sterling a month. Moreover the Soviet government decided at the end of 1963 to increase the salaries of both these categories to some extent.

2. At the beginning of 1962, out of 1,300 members of the Writers' Union in Moscow, only 18 were under 30 and only ONE under 25.



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The Soviet intelligentsia constitutes a highly diversified social layer. At the bottom of the scale schoolteachers, college teachers and even faculty lecturers* are both overwhelmed with work and poorly paid. The 'artists'¹ on the other hand form a privileged group, especially the writers. Once admitted to the Writers' Union, the Soviet writer receives an honorary monthly salary, author's rights and a comfortable flat (a particularly important advantage in the USSR where numerous families still live in a single room). In general, only the author's royalties on his works published abroad, which are taken over by the Soviet government, escape him. Obviously admission to a section of the Writers' Union is limited as far as possible by those beneficiaries who are already inside. This is especially so in the large towns.² Despite all this the Union comprises several thousands of writers who constitute a real 'social élite'. Besides their enormous social advantages the writers benefit from highly-prized favours such as being able to travel abroad.³ All these privileges together are apparently only counterbalanced by two inconveniences: firstly, the work of the writer is fairly strictly controlled, each work being published under the surveillance and responsibility of a publishing board usually of five members and, secondly, and most important, the writer can lose all his privileges if he is excluded from the Writers' Union. This does not necessarily mean that the debarred writer is denied any possibility of getting his works published. All he has to do is find a provincial magazine or publishing house far enough away from Moscow or Leningrad. But socially he is truly struck off the rolls.

Whilst the writer, who is officially recognised as

* 'Assistants de faculté' [ed.]

1. In Russian the term 'artist' takes in writers, painters, musicians, etc. The average salary of a practitioner of the arts, as of a doctor, is from 30 to 35 pounds sterling a month. Moreover the Soviet government decided at the end of 1963 to increase the salaries of both these categories to some extent.

2. At the beginning of 1962, out of 1,300 members of the Writers' Union in Moscow, only 18 were under 30 and only ONE under 25.

such through his admission to the Union, is privileged, he does not participate directly in the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus. 'Socialist realism' only requires him to justify and embellish its functioning. Moreover, unless he is to be strictly a literary lackey, in order to practise his craft the writer needs a certain amount of freedom of expression, choice of subject, and criticism which can only be ensured by a minimum degree of personal, legal security. Without that, literature—whatever its artistic level—dies away, as it did in the 1950s in the USSR. If one adds to this that Russian

literature has (traditionally) always been much more closely linked with social movements than has western literature, one can easily understand how the Soviet writers have used the concessions which the régime afforded them (as it did to other social layers) with a wideness and strength which rapidly changed each concession they received into a new demand.

This is why Soviet literature has for ten years been the field in which the tensions between the Stalinist heritage, 'Khrushchevite liberalism' and the desire for emancipation have been publicly revealed in their liveliest and most explosive form.

The heritage of socialist realism and Zhdanovism

It was in the years 1934-35 that the necessity of conforming to the canons of 'socialist realism' was imposed upon Soviet literature. This term acquired an increasingly restrictive meaning until it placed in question the very existence of a literature in the USSR. The expression of Stalinism in the field of art, 'socialist realism', cannot easily be defined, although it is one of the fundamental components of the so-called 'Soviet' system of bureaucratic oppression. By and large, the work of art must represent 'socialist' society, or one of its aspects, so as to convince the reader of the superiority of this society and then in such a way as to help him perfect himself and perfect it. Whence springs the propagandist and moralising character of what are officially the most typical works: those of Fadeyev, B. Plevoy, C. Simonov, Babayevsky, etc.

The great epoch of socialist realism stretches from 1946 to 1953. On August 14, 1946, the Central Committee of the CPSU published a decree devoted to literature which violently attacked the Leningrad magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* and two great Soviet writers whose works were published in these magazines: Zoschenko and Akhmatova. At the same time this decree defined the tasks of Soviet literature:

'The strength of Soviet literature, the most advanced literature in the world, consists in the fact that it is a literature in which there are not and cannot be interests other than the interests of the people, the interests of the state. The task of Soviet literature is to help the state to educate the youth correctly, to answer to its requirements, to bring up the new generation to be strong, believing in its cause, not fearing obstacles, ready to overcome all obstacles.'

On August 26 and September 4 two new decrees from the Central Committee applied the same

principles with regard to the theatre and the cinema. On September 4 the Praesidium of the Writers' Union stated that one of the essential tasks of the Union was: 'the education of the Soviet writer as a loyal and attentive servant of the interests of the people and of the Soviet state, as an assistant of the Party in the communist education of the people.' So the educator must be educated. The distrust of Stalin towards the writers showed the degree of difficulty of the task assigned them. If socialist realism was to content itself with being the faithful representation of existing 'Soviet' society, the Writers' Union, that is to say the police apparatus responsible for controlling writers' activities, would have no need to educate its members. The real meaning of socialist realism was the reduction of literature to the role of First Propagandist of the Political Bureau. That meant its disappearance as literature, very soon to

ANNA
AKHMATOVA
under fire with
Zoschenko



pose a problem of which Stalin himself was to become aware.

For war literature the decrees of the Central Committee substituted the era of the *cult of optimism*, which has been called the *Babayevschina* from the name of the novelist Babayevsky, a specialist in the production of rosy-hued novels and idyllic depictions of Stalinist life, and author of *Cavalier of the Gold Star* and *Light on the Earth*. This Zhdanovist process was characterised by a shameless idealisation of Soviet literary life and the reduction of literary, romantic or dramatic conflict to its most simple expression: Good, whose victory is obvious from the first words onwards, struggles against Bad, which represents either elements foreign to Soviet society or the remains of backward elements still existing inside it, however feeble these might be.

With regard to the period starting from before the war, Zhdanovism was conspicuous for the systematic application of terror to solve literary and artistic problems. Unable to realise that it was itself responsible for the progressive disappearance of Soviet literature, Stalinism sought scapegoats, who also found themselves charged with other than literary crimes. By virtue of the public that he influences the writer is in fact always a potential danger.

In 1949, one year after the death of Zhdanov, there began the first big terror campaign in the world of letters: *the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign*. On January 28, 1949, *Pravda*, in an article entitled: 'On an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatre Critics', launched a violent attack against certain drama critics who had denounced the insipidity of the conception of dramatic conflict in the Soviet theatre. To set the tone for this campaign it had been preceded by a denunciation of the magazine *Znaniya* which was accused of having 'weakly participated in the struggle to unmask bourgeois cosmopolitanism' and of 'not having led an active struggle against formalism and naturalism in literature'. *Pravda* denounced the drama critics in question in this way:

'Nests of bourgeois aestheticism, camouflaging an anti-patriotic, cosmopolitan, corrupt attitude towards Soviet art . . . aesthetic formalism merely serves as a camouflage for anti-patriotic substance . . . the top-priority task of the Party criticism is the ideological crushing of this anti-patriotic group of theatre critics.'

In the face of these increasing attacks, the writers in question confessed their mistakes. But in the police-hysteria style then in vogue, they were accused of conspiracy. The *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of February 26 describes them thus:

'They tried to represent the chain of consciously committed crimes as 'chance errors'. The facts refuted them. Driven to the wall, they found themselves obliged, reluctantly and incompletely, to admit the existence of a group, of agreement, of co-ordinated acts which had been prepared in advance.'

Through the drama critics, the campaign was aimed at two goals: to carry into the literary field the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign which had at that time been organised in the political sphere and which was aimed at Jews and prisoners of war of 1941-45; and to sweep aside any attempt to loosen control, aesthetic and political, of the Party over artistic life. During the whole of this period the Soviet press took pleasure in revealing the 'real names' of Jewish journalists and authors who were using Russian pseudonyms, a task especially assigned, of course, to other Jewish journalists. The writers who had been singled out disappeared for a time from the literary scene.

With all the campaigns developing to the same pattern, it is sufficient to point out the following:

An article in *Pravda* of July 1951 entitled: 'Against Ideological Distortions in Literature' marked the beginning of the campaign, the opposite of the previous one, *against bourgeois nationalism*. The main pretext for it was a poem 'Love The Ukraine' by the Ukrainian Sosjura and, secondly, the libretto of an opera on 'Bogdan Khmel'nitsky', a Cossack leader of the 17th century, written by Vasilevskaya and Korneichuk. Sosjura's poem was written and published in 1944. He was now being reproached for depicting an anachronistic Ukraine and not the radiant Ukraine of 1950, the industrialised Ukraine, happy to work, 'the new, flourishing Soviet Ukraine, created by the will of the people under the guidance of the Bolshevik Party'.

This campaign spread into the field of history. It was then in fact that the heroes of the non-Russian peoples who had formerly fought Czarist expansion, were suddenly dethroned and relegated to the rank of Anglo-Turkish agents. In the literary field proper, the campaign was aimed at chasing out every manifestation of literary a-politicalism. Within the mosaic of peoples which makes up the USSR, the return to the traditional themes, the 'native soil', and the 'region', was a fairly convenient way out for the authors who refused to be police-poets. The campaign quickly assumed the features of a struggle to impose the point of view of a great Russian nationalism which Stalin had made one of the themes of his policy. The chauvinistic exaltation of Russia, from Ivan the Terrible to Stalin, was meant to replace the material needs of the masses. It went so far that,

on August 2, 1951, *Pravda* brutally attacked the old epic poem of 11th century Azerbaidjan, 'Dede Korkout', which was suddenly qualified as 'a reactionary work' . . . 'scandalous', serving to spread 'pan-Turkish nationalist ideas' . . . 'an ignoble epic, of a character hostile to the people'. A few weeks later *Pravda* announced: 'Thanks to the intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidjan it has fortunately been possible to unmask the reactionary character of the epic poem "Dede Korkout" . . .'³

Eventually in 1952 Stalin began the liquidation of the Jewish intelligentsia which led to the deaths of dozens of intellectuals like Markich, Kvitko and Bergelson and which culminated in the 'plot of the Jewish doctors'.

It is obvious then that the Stalinist regime did not know how to resolve the problem with which it was faced: how to control literature closely in order to make it an effective instrument of propaganda, while at the same time ensuring a wide distribution of this conformist literature. But, while the works of Tolstoy, Pushkin or Gogol and the translations of Charles Dickens, Mark Twain, Jules Verne or Victor Hugo would disappear almost as soon as they were published, the works of Soviet authors cluttered up the library shelves. Even from the point of view of the bureaucracy and its interests, Soviet literature was in crisis because it seemed incapable of carrying the good word to the masses who turned away from it. The meddling of the Party in the slightest details of literary life could only sterilise literature. When A. Fadayevev, an author-policeman character, found

**ALEXEI
FADEYEV**
author-policeman
shot himself in
1956



3. On January 11, 1951, *Culture and Life*, the weekly journal of the Central Committee's Agit-Prop, had already denounced the old Buryat-Mongolian epic poem 'Gesser-Khan' for its 'reactionary character' because it preached 'hostility against the Russian people' to whom the Buryats and Mongolians owed 'their liberty and well-being' . . . a somewhat strange statement if one considers that the Buryat-Mongolians had been submitted to Great-Russian domination by the Czarist regime.

himself obliged in 1951 to publish a corrected version of *Young Guard*, a novel which had won the Stalin prize in 1946, it was clear that the very act of writing was dangerous if the author did not limit himself to a simple 'aesthetic' tabulation of resolutions of the Political Bureau.

It was necessary therefore to fill in somewhat the ditch which had been dug between official art and the masses, and to get a bit of life back into literature. The bureaucrats enthusiastically embarked on this task even in Stalin's lifetime, launching in 1952 the campaign for *the development of satire*. In Stalinist socialist realism the literary concept of conflict lessened considerably and tended logically to disappear. It no longer existed save in the shape of an external struggle between the capitalist and socialist worlds and of an internal struggle between past and future, between the good and the better. The Soviet writer had to handle the idea of internal conflict in the Soviet world with extreme caution, as any criticism could very easily be imputed as slander. In such an atmosphere satire was obviously impossible. It was reduced to a police-type denunciation of all those who were at a given moment the enemies of the leading bureaucracy.

It was not suprising therefore that a Soviet 'dramatist', holder of the Stalin Prize and a complete cynic, N. Virta, should go so far as to elaborate the theory of the total absence of conflict in Soviet literature and particularly in Soviet theatre, an absence due to the very high social and cultural level reached by the USSR. On being attacked Virta switched sides and in an article entitled 'Let Us Speak Frankly' published by *Sovietskoye Isskustvo* (Soviet Art) he explained that his false conceptions 'arose as a consequence of cold observations of the mind on the manner in which those of our plays which contain sharp life conflicts passed through the barbed-wire obstacles of the agencies in charge of the repertoire'. In this way Virta pushed the (his?) responsibility on to the bureaucratic control imposed on literary activity.

At this time the Party papers launched a campaign intended to restore a little life to Soviet literature, concentrating on two themes: the necessity for developing an authentic Soviet satire, and deschematising, making the depiction of society 'typical'. *Pravda* on March 4, 1952, stated: 'We need our Gogols and Shchedrins.' An editorial on April 7, 1952, entitled 'Overcome the Lag in Drama' emphasised the necessity for depicting 'real' men. One writer, who was completely devoted to the régime and who figures today amongst the most fervent of the ultra-Stalinists, wrote in May:

'Plays must portray the working man in a comprehensive and detailed manner. To portray a worker does not mean to bring a turner onto the stage at the moment when he is turning out a mould. We must get to know his inner world, his loves, his friendships, the whole range of feelings and passions which possess him. . . .' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 27, 1952)

Socialist realist literature has to implant in the reader a certain number of values, those of work, the family, the homeland, devotion and self-abnegation. The Stalinist construction of 'socialism in a single country' needs to implant in the masses these 'values' which the bourgeoisie cherished so fervently in the days of the primitive accumulation of capital. But a literature which depicted nothing more than the man at work, as if no other side of life existed, overstepped the desired aim. To depict Stakhanovites was all very well, but to depict nothing but Stakhanovites was a mistake which was all the more serious since the workers and peasants had, and still have, a solid hatred of these herolackeys of the bureaucracy. On August 28, 1952, *Pravda* spoke out against this error in cinema:

'Not infrequently the authors of scripts subordinate the rich material of life to a set scheme, depicting the workers and collective farmers in a

one-sided way as persons entirely absorbed in technical interests.'

It is impossible to speculate on the course of development which this campaign might have taken. The death of Stalin was to express itself amongst other things, in the liquidation of one of the fundamental theses on which Stalinist policy in the artistic field, as in that of social and political life, had defined itself—the thesis of the heightening of the class struggle concomitant with the strengthening of socialism in the USSR. In any event, the new literary orientation undertaken in 1952 emphasised the absolute defeat of Stalin's policy in the literary field as elsewhere. The use of terror to resolve literary problems had killed Soviet literature. The reduction or suppression of terror was the only way to give a real basis to the calls for a renewal of satire and of honest depiction of the true man. But the Stalinist régime could not survive wholly intact unless it kept the operation of the terror also intact. This was the bureaucracy's only method of maintaining its domination in face of the vast passive strike of the Soviet masses and intelligentsia. The potentially revolutionary situation in which Stalin's heirs have involuntarily placed the USSR by liquidating part of their master's heritage is sufficient to bear out this assertion.


The thaw

Trotsky wrote:

'A revolutionary party is neither able nor willing to take upon itself the task of "leading" and even less of commanding art, either before or after the conquest of power. Such a pretension could only enter the head of a bureaucracy—ignorant and impudent, intoxicated with its totalitarian power—which has become the antithesis of the proletarian revolution. Art, like science, not only does not seek orders, but by its very essence cannot tolerate them.' (June 1938).⁴

It was in the name of this principle that Trotsky, in collaboration with Lunacharsky and Bukharin, in 1925 drew up a resolution which was adopted by the Central Committee in which, amongst other things, one can read the following:

'Without being beguiled as to the class content of literary currents, the party, as a whole, cannot afford any favour to any kind of conception of literary form . . . the party cannot support a single literary faction. . . . The party must come out in favour of



TROTSKY LUNACHARSKY BUKHARIN

. . . in 1925, drew up a resolution

free rivalry between the different literary groups and currents. . . . The party must stifle attempts at administrative, arbitrary and incompetent interference.'

Following the decree of the Central Committee on April 23, 1932, which dissolved the existing writers' organisations and ordered the regrouping of all writers in a Writers' Union under the rigid control of the party, the Stalinist policy went in the

4. cf. *Labour Review*, Autumn 1962.

opposite direction to that of the 1925 resolution. Since the death of Stalin writers have spontaneously attempted to seek out once again the interrupted tradition: to practise their craft and their art without control and likewise without any attempt to bring into question the acquisitions of the October revolution.

The first sign of demands by the movement which was subsequently to be dubbed 'the Thaw' was the publication of an article by the mediocre Leningrad poetess Olga Bergoltz: 'A conversation about lyric poetry' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, April 16, 1953). O. Bergoltz emphasised that Soviet lyric poetry had died because the poets were constrained to put across an entirely optimistic view of man and society in their works. Ehrenburg, Powstovsky, Tvardovsky, writers of standing, affirmed in the months that followed, the right of the writer to obey the demands of his personality. This demand was linked with the winning by the writer of guarantees of minimum legal personal security, held out in the reform of the Penal Code promised by Malenkov, but which were not to become effective until after the liquidation of Beria and the demolition of a section of the police apparatus which had come under his control. The subordination of the various departments to the party and the regularisation of the party's functioning constituted real guarantees for the writers insofar as they belonged socially to the privileged layers in the USSR.

An article by Pomerantsev 'On Sincerity in Literature', published in the December 1953 edition of *Novy Mir*, raised the debate to a higher stage. Pomerantsev denounced the rule of 'insincerity' in Soviet literature; he saw this as the basic reason for its mediocrity. Despite the author's prudence in discreetly leaving in the shade the answers to the question he was posing ('How was insincerity able to penetrate our literature?') the official reactions were savage. Denounced by the secretary of the Writers' Union, Tvardovsky was dismissed from the post of chief editor of *Novy Mir* and replaced by the more docile C. Simonov. But the fact that the cogwheels of the terror had jammed was sufficient to bring the crowd of critics into attack on the bureaucracy. Three months after Pomerantsev's article the magazine *Theatre* published a play by Zorin, 'The Guests'. The argument and content of this play called into question the very nature of the bureaucratic regime.

Zorin depicts three Soviet generations: an old Bolshevik, Alexis Kirpichev, still morally loyal to his origins; his son, Pierre, a cynical high-up official, married to a parvenue; and two grandchildren, one

of whom is a teddy boy who hangs around the cafés. At one point in the play Pierre's sister, Varvara, interrupts a conversation between him and his wife by shouting out: 'How I detest these bourgeois!' Further on, with regard to these bourgeois, she states that she 'feels something resembling class consciousness', and she ends with a question for which she finds no answer: 'How was this high society able to come about in our country?' In a conversation with his son Pierre the ageing Alexis, recalling the old Bolsheviks, says: 'I worked alongside them and I never knew the taste of power. But you have known it since your childhood and it has corrupted you.' The play was taken off after its second performance.

In June the 'college' of the Ministry of 'Culture' denounced the play as a 'harmful absurdity'. What more harmful absurdity than this passage in which Alexis says to his son: 'The country has become stronger, the people have become richer. But the bad part of it is that together with the good man, alongside the hard workers, imperceptibly, people like you have appeared: rank-conscious, aristocrats, greedy and conceited, remote from the people?' But these are precisely the words used by Russian workers and students to characterise those who claim to speak on their behalf. So less than a year after Stalin's death, the first signs of literary liberalisation had overflowed into an investigation of the character of the bureaucracy and its social pre-eminence in all fields: in order to get the workers to work more and better, the peasants to produce more, and the intellectuals to produce better, the bureaucracy makes certain concessions. But no sooner is the door ajar than the bureaucracy has to expend all its energy to prevent it opening any more. The initial concessions open up the cycle of demands which place its political power and its social privileges in question: the Soviet economy is still far too much an economy of hardship for the bureaucracy to be able to distribute its privileges harmoniously and to noticeably slacken its absolute power.

The May 1954 edition of *Znamya* published the first part of Ilya Ehrenburg's new novel 'The Thaw' which was to give its name to this period. The enlisting of Ehrenburg, an official and prudent personage, an old-time licensed dealer in slander against Trotskyists, surrealists, the POUM and so many others, proved that a section at least of the controlling circles supported the liberalisation which had been commenced. The movement once again tended to step outside the official limits: on October 26 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published an open letter signed by seven writers (B. Kaverin, Kazakievitch,



**ILYA
EHRENBURG**
**'If I write another
book . . .'**

Lukonin, Marshak, Powstovsky, Pogodin and Chipachev) which spoke out violently against the bureaucratisation of the Writers' Union: 'The Writers' Union is taking place in a vacuum. . . . Literature is following its own path which does not coincide with that of the bureaucrats. . . . The liquidation of the Union's commission would do nobody any harm. . . .'

In November, the polemic started by this letter broadened its scope and some moderate writers called for the creation of rank-and-file sections of the Writers' Union in Moscow and in all the big towns in the USSR. ('For real democracy inside the Writers' Union' by A. Bezumensky and Korolkova in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on November 13, an idea taken up in the same paper, on November 23, in an article by N. Zadornov.)

Two days before the opening of the Second Congress of Writers, on December 13, a delegation from the Writers' Union was received by the Party leadership. In order to regularise the functioning of its domination over the USSR, the ruling clique of the CPSU sought to associate with it the broadest possible layers of the bureaucracy by consulting with them and associating them with the decisions it took in their field of activity. It was a 'democratisation' which was carefully limited to those who had a more or less direct share in the privileges of the ruling bureaucracy. While it did not reject authoritarian argument, discussion replaced terror. Obviously that could only represent a *break* with Stalinism to common impressionists who judge a régime's social nature by the number of prisons or the degree of feminine elegance.

The Second Congress, a public ceremony, was more limited than the individual initiatives which had preceded it. The probable division of the Party leadership was reflected in the attacks made on

Ehrenburg's 'Thaw' and the latter's astonishing reply to his opponents in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*: 'If I write another book, I shall try to make it a step forward from my last novelette, not a step back.' One month before the conference opened, in the November issue of the magazine *Theatre*, the dramatist Alexander Stein had published a play called 'A Personal Affair' whose contention underlined the deepening of literary criticism of the Stalinist past. With a 'doctors' conspiracy' in full cry, an honest communist is expelled from the party by an opportunist leader who knows how to make use of the watchwords of 'vigilance' and the hysterical police atmosphere of suspicion of the 1950s. With the box-office kept open, in contrast to Zorin's play 'The Guests', 'A Personal Affair' enjoyed a vogue that was significant since it was a political work and the Soviet public was deserting the theatres where conformist political plays were shown.

The year 1955 was a year of cautious adaptation to the new and uncertain possibilities. At the same time as the rehabilitation took place of certain writers like Babel who had been shot under Stalin, a Party official, Mikhailov, replaced the philosopher Alexandrov in the Ministry of Culture. The factional struggle which then developed in the top layers of the bureaucracy and especially the shake-ups of the Twentieth Congress (February 1956) gave a new spurt to the literary liberalisation movement which this time was displayed in a double qualitative leap:

1. Numerous works appeared which brought into question the traditional content of socialist realism and, often, going on from there, the social foundations of the bureaucratised USSR: the poems of Kirsanov ('Seven Days of the Week'), and Yevtushenko ('Station Zima'), and Dudintsev's novel ('Not by Bread Alone'), etc.

**YEVGENI
YEVTUSHENKO**
**His 'Station Zima'
raised questions**



2. We saw how in 1954 a large number of writers stood up against the tutelage of the Writers' Union, either by demanding its liquidation or its decentralisation. The attempt was renewed on a higher level in 1956. Under the leadership of Benjamin Kaverin a group of writers decided to set up an autonomous trade union organisation alongside the bureaucratic official organisation.

This dual critical and organisational movement showed itself spectacularly with the publication of the Moscow Literary Almanac, the second volume of which went to press during the first days of the Hungarian Revolution. The publication of the almanac was destined to provide a programme, or at least a platform, for the literary opposition. The editorial board included amongst others M. Aliguer, A. Bek, B. Kaverin, E. Kazakievitch, C. Powstovsky, V. Tendriakov.⁵ Volume II contained numerous texts which vigorously denounced the bureaucratic character of the Soviet regime especially in the countryside. (A. Yashin: 'The Levers'; N. Zhdanov: 'Return to the house'.)

'As long as there is no confidence in the rank and file peasant, things can't be right. . . . Everything has to be handed down from the top. Plans from the top, chairmen from the top, even crop-fields are prescribed from the top. . . . It's so much easier this way: just launch out, regardless of anything, and keep on "recommending". . . .' (A. Yashin: 'The Levers'.)

The dramatic critic A. Kron tried to deepen the criticism of Stalinism by going beyond the official thesis of the 'personality cult' and of the pro-imperialist manoeuvres of Beria. This criticism reached no higher a level than that of an idealist description, but insofar as it itself underlined the idealist and subjectivist character of Stalinist ideology, it did constitute a preliminary platform for discussion:

'Any kind of cult is organically hostile to the proletariat's scientific conception of the world, Marxism-Leninism. Wherever there exists a cult, scientific thought is obliged to draw back in face of blind faith, creative spirit in face of dogma, public opinion in face of despotism. The cult gives rise to a hierarchy of servants of the cult: any deity requires bishops and flatterers. The cult is incompatible with critique, and the most healthy critique is readily transformed into heresy and sacrilege. The cult is anti-popular in its very essence: it humiliates the people and forces what has been paid for entirely

5. Kazakievitch, Tendriakov and Rudny were members of the Communist Party. Since then, Rudny has been expelled and Kazakievitch has died.

by the sweat and blood of the people to be considered as a gift from on high. . . . The Chief was the servant of the People, but when millions of conscious individuals rose to their feet at the mere name of their 'servant', this was something completely foreign to the democratic traditions in which we had been brought up by the revolution and by the Soviet regime. . . . We must clearly evaluate our forces and our potential, and we shall see that we have more than enough to overcome in a resolute and consistent fashion the aftermath of the cult in all the fields of our régime, economic, political and cultural. . . . The personality cult was above all an ideological perversion.'

Volume II of the Moscow Literary Almanac was sent to the printers at the height of the Hungarian uprising, at a time when the ruling bureaucracy, endangered by the revolutionary ascent in Hungary and Poland, was brutally hardening its line: the bureaucracy was favourably disposed to what liberalisation was necessary to harmonise its relations with the intelligentsia, but it was hostile to a liberalisation constituting a threat to itself. The Hungarian revolution showed quite clearly that intellectual agitation, initially limited to the top layers of the intelligentsia, could become, if linked with the discontent of the masses, an explosive factor. In the absence of any independent organisation of the workers, the intelligentsia played, with regard to the workers, the role of a detonator in a barrel of gunpowder. In themselves the attempt to set up an autonomous writers' trade union and the reformist social criticism which constituted its platform were no more than limited phenomena, but they bore witness to an elementary revival in *consciousness* in a country where the entire efforts of the Stalinist bureaucracy had been aimed at destroying every possible breeding ground for the awakening of consciousness, beginning, of course, with the old Bolsheviks, including the most humble of them and including the basic part of Stalin's own faction. Deprived of the means of reaching consciousness, the masses' reaction to bureaucratic domination and wastage tended to be constrained inside the framework of the individual enterprise, of intermittent sabotage, of passive refusal and of striking with arms folded.

In June 1957, in a warning aimed at the rebellious writers, Khrushchev stated that, had they executed a few dozen intellectuals in Hungary in 1956, the 'counter-revolution' would never have taken place. This manifest exaggeration, while it shows a highly bureaucratic lack of understanding of the spontaneity of the masses, also displays the bureaucracy's need to tame culture in order to maintain its domination.



V. DUDINSTEV
branded an
epileptic

1957 and 1958 marked the triumph of conservative reaction which followed the crushing of the Hungarian revolution. To recount its history would be devoid of interest. On the question of the brutal attack against the upholders of intellectual liberalisation, let us simply take this passage from a contribution by Alexis Surkov at the Moscow Writers' Union in January 1958:

'Unfortunately my hopes were not fulfilled that some comrades who hold extreme points of view would speak at this conference, not in order to cast ashes over their heads, but in order to say, gathering all their inner manliness, that from now on, they will no longer make such mistakes.'


While certain writers had in fact capitulated in face of the conservative offensive (Kazakievitch, Bek, Aliguer), the majority had taken refuge in silence. This quotation from Surkov — 'unfortunately my hopes were not fulfilled' — displays the essence of the difference between 'Stalinism' and 'Khrushchevism': the disappearance of terror and the fear of physical elimination as a means of settling every question. The writer who is denounced by a policeman-colleague knows that this denunciation no longer means being sent off to a concentration camp. Sofronov had branded Dudintsev, Kirsanov and their ilk as 'epileptics', but the epileptics did not lose their heads; they were able to continue writing; quite simply, their works of summer 1956 were listed in the index.

6. The Nobel Prize for Literature has never been awarded to a writer from the 'socialist camp', but in 1953 it was awarded to such a great writer as Winston Churchill. To present it to Pasternak in a period of sharp reaction and to do so manifestly for his *Doctor Zhivago* was to throw an open defiance to the bureaucrats.

The Pasternak affair, unleashed by the provocative presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize for literature⁶ to the author of *Doctor Zhivago*, published in the West in November 1957 but banned in the USSR, raised the Stalinist counter-offensive to a higher level while at the same time demonstrating its limitations. Pasternak was obliged to renounce his Nobel Prize after having declared himself to be 'infinitely grateful, touched, proud, delighted, moved'; he was expelled from the Writers' Union, which normally speaking means being deprived of his salary and accommodation, and, broken by the vicious campaign which was directed against him, was obliged to send a letter to *Pravda* in which he 'confessed his mistakes' (November 6, 1958). But while the terror had succeeded in morally breaking a great poet, it stopped short there. The rebel writers kept quiet, but did not consider themselves to be faced with a choice between prostitution or deportation. One could not fail to be struck by the contrast between the rage of certain leaders (like the secretary of the Komsomols) and the paucity of political measures taken. The conservative victory was a Pyrrhic victory, as subsequent events were to show.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the panorama which we have just outlined:

1. Contrary to a theory which is often put forward, the literary liberalisation movement was not simply a product of decisions from above brought into material being by the 20th Congress. It expressed the desire for emancipation *in a privileged sector and in a privileged way* which all layers of Soviet society were advancing, including the bureaucracy, which wanted to rid itself of Stalinist



**BORIS
PASTERNAK**
expelled from
the Writers'
Union for
'Dr. Zhivago'

terrorism for which it had itself paid the price on more than one occasion! And there, in part, lies the ambiguity of this literary liberalisation movement. Every ruling power needs a finery of intellectuals to serve as clowns or as leaders of the congregation. Even if this power switches from the cudgel to the carrot and to discussion, the preceptors or the clowns can make only bad use of the freedom that they have acquired.

2. Ever since the break-up of the police terror mechanism the social contradictions, which had been apparently checked, if not eliminated, and at any rate distorted by the concentration camps and the

summary executions, have once again been expressed in all their amplitude. No longer is absolute control possible for the ruling caste; as a result, as we see in the USSR, the democratic needs of the masses tend to be expressed in a confused way and to slowly undermine the whole edifice. Then there is posed the problem of *consciousness*, of the link between the unconscious aspirations of the Soviet masses and the expression of revolutionary consciousness. We will handle this subject when we examine the evolution of Soviet literature from 1959 to 1963.

(To be concluded)



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The consequences of peaceful co-existence

(Translated from 'La Verité' October/November 1963)

by Michel Varga

From peaceful co-existence to alliance against the Chinese revolution

THE FOREIGN POLICY of a country, as was shown long ago by Marxism, reflects fundamentally the same social content and the same interests as its home policy. The present crisis of the bureaucratic regime in the USSR cannot fail to have effects on the Kremlin's foreign policy just as heavy in consequences as on its domestic policy. It is the evolution of this foreign policy that will now be examined, beginning with some historical and theoretical reminders.

1. Stalinism and Marxism

(a) From the 'tragi-comic misunderstanding' . . .

At the end of 1934, Trotsky, drawing up the balance-sheet of eleven years of Stalinist leadership of the Communist International, was able to write:

'With regard to the USSR, the role of the bureaucracy, as we have said, is dual; on the one hand, it protects, with its own particular methods, the workers' state, and on the other it disorganises and slows down the development of the economy and of culture, repressing the creative activity of the masses. But in contrast to this, in the field of the international labour movement, not a trace of this duality remains; here, the Stalinist bureaucracy plays, from start to finish, a role of disorganisation and demoralisation, a disastrous role.'

And in *The Revolution Betrayed* he showed how 'from the policy of socialism in a single country, the transition to the theory of revolution in a single country is quite natural'. Moreover, on March 1,

1935, Stalin had given a rightly famous interview to the American journalist Roy Howard:

Howard: What about your plans and intentions for world revolution?

Stalin: We have never had any such designs.

Howard: But yet . . .

Stalin: It springs from a misunderstanding.

Howard: A tragic misunderstanding?

Stalin: No, comic, or rather tragi-comic.

As we see, the policy of Khrushchev is based on an already old tradition. The bureaucracy, which was only able to come to power thanks to an historically transitory equilibrium between the fundamental class forces inside the USSR as well as on a world scale, can imagine nothing beyond the status quo in all fields, in relations between states as well as in relations between classes. And, in 1938, Trotsky was able to write that 'The Communist International has definitely gone over to the side of the bourgeois order', while Soviet diplomacy, through Stalin's mouth, had proclaimed the dearest dream of the bureaucracy:

'We don't want an inch of foreign territory, but we won't yield an inch of ours.'

Thus, for the bureaucracy, the line of demarcation between the USSR and imperialism no longer coincided with the front line of the international class struggle of the proletariat, but indeed with the geographical frontier of the Soviet state. Such a conception, implied by the theory of 'socialism in a single country', constituted a deep revision of the

Leninist theory of imperialism. Lenin showed that imperialism constitutes a world social system, the highest stage of capitalism; on the other hand, for the bureaucracy, imperialism was henceforth essentially a policy of expansion, particularly at the expense of the USSR, practiced by the capitalist states, or by some of them (even by 'certain groups of capitalists'). This policy could therefore be modified without changing the social regime.

However, the utopian dreams about the status quo in all fields, for all their fostering by the Kremlin, have not become an historical reality. In fact, the status quo has not ceased to be placed in question by the workers and the exploited of the whole world who are continually driven afresh by the development of capitalism's objective contradictions to mobilise themselves against imperialism, despite the desperate efforts of their reformist, nationalist, or Stalinist leaderships. Nor has the status quo ceased to be placed in question by imperialism which, suffocating in the ever more restricted limits of the world market, cannot fail to work, directly or indirectly, for the reintegration under its control of the economy of the 'socialist' countries.

... to the partition of the world

The Second World War thus had to overturn the status quo in many fields. Confronted by what was, for both of them, the principal danger, the threat of a European socialist revolution, in 1943 Stalin and Roosevelt concluded the Yalta agreement. In exchange for military occupation of the Eastern half of Europe, where the army of the USSR undertook to canalise the mass movements, and to brutally stamp out any attempt at autonomous action on their part, Stalin placed the CPs of Western Europe at the service of the faltering capitalist system to put it back into the saddle. On this point, at least, the agreements were loyally respected. And imperialism naturally took advantage of the repulse of the revolution in Europe to increase its pressure on the USSR (Marshall Plan and policy of air bases), thus taking the initiative in the cold war.

The Kremlin bureaucracy, which had thought it possible to assure its control over the 'popular democracies' while allowing the basis of capitalist productive relations to continue there, had therefore to determine to what extent such a policy, although conforming to the conception of substituting the struggle between states for that of the class struggle, made its situation precarious in an Eastern Europe subjected to the powerful attraction of the capitalist market. It then had hastily to remedy this state of affairs, completely nationalize the industry of the

'popular democracies', undertake a bureaucratic collectivisation of agriculture, and begin the 'construction of socialism' under the shield of the state plan. The 'Prague coup' will remain the symbol of this sharp turn imposed on the Kremlin by the active manifestations of the true nature of imperialism as a world social regime.

(b) 'Co-existence' after Stalin

The unleashing of the cold war by imperialism and the counter-measures forced upon the Soviet bureaucracy created a new situation, for which Zhdanov found the 'theoretical' definition: for the struggle of international classes was henceforth to be substituted the struggle of the 'bloc of socialist states' against the bloc of capitalist states.

American imperialism having undertaken out-and-out rearmament, the USSR found itself obliged to imitate it. We have seen what a staggering burden this rearmament caused to weigh on the economy of the USSR,¹ whose productivity is still far inferior to that of the United States, and how, under these conditions, rearmament managed to accelerate and intensify the crisis of bureaucratic planning. The situation was further worsened by virtue of the almost complete break-off of trade between the two blocs under the banner of the 'theory' of two independent world markets.

Stalin's foreign policy, like his home policy, thus ended in an impasse or, more precisely, his foreign policy contributed to the further worsening of the consequences of his home policy. 'Cleverly' practising the ostrich policy, in December 1952 Stalin announced that henceforth wars between the imperialist states were more probable than a conflict between the two blocs!

For his successors, at grips with the threat of a revolutionary rising of the masses, 'co-existence' was to become no longer a desire, but a necessity which they were to elevate to the rank of a theory. It was necessary to develop commerce with imperialism in order to obtain on the world market the commodities vital for the satisfaction, even if very relative, of the needs of the Russian masses; from a more long-term view, it was necessary to aim at lightening the intolerable burden of the armaments race.

It was under these conditions that Khrushchev and Co. made the 'fight for peace' the *principal objective* of the world Stalinist movement; they had therefore to 'demonstrate' that this object was accessible. From the moment that the struggle between 'systems' replaces the class struggle, to state that war can be

1. In an earlier part of the study not printed here.

indefinitely avoided is to state that the two systems can become compatible—and therefore that they are not, by nature, incompatible. To be more precise: if the Stalinists mobilise their forces to *preserve* peace on an international scale, they are mobilising them in order to preserve the international status quo. This status quo is dominated by imperialism; the *essential objective* of the Stalinists then becomes the preservation of imperialism. It is here that the paths of the conservative and liberal Stalinists diverge. The former have remained faithful to the Stalinist 'class struggle' viewed in the form of military bloc politics. The latter found the way out of this contradiction in a new 'theoretical development'. According to them, today, it is necessary to achieve 'peaceful co-existence' between different regimes and systems, a co-existence at the same time both necessary and possible. The development of nuclear weapons arrived just in time to demonstrate the necessity of 'co-existence'.

This is where Stalinist logic leads. Obviously, there are only very few people who actually want a nuclear war or, for that matter, any other war. But in vain do the Stalinists, the petty-bourgeois of all countries, and other 'left-intellectuals' repeat in every key that the only alternative to nuclear war is peaceful co-existence, because that is not enough to make it really so. For the international working class the daily struggle against capitalist exploitation is the very substance of its existence, whether the war must be waged with nuclear weapons or with arrows. Lenin wrote in 1915:

'Dreams of peace without the propaganda of revolutionary action only express the horror of war and have nothing to do with socialism.'²

'Nothing to do with . . .', that is to say that this argument is no more than a pretext for completely abandoning the class struggle.

(c) Stalinist pacifism

For a long time now the Stalinists have put an immense amount of energy into the international organisation of 'the peace movement'. They began to do so during the reign of Stalin, and the liberals only developed this policy, giving it a new impulse. First of all there is the international movements and bureaux. The Stalinists suppressed the Third International; but they have built up the international organisation of the 'peace movement'. But the betrayal of the class struggle by Stalinism does not stop with this change of form, which covers up a

deep meaning: the international Stalinist movement, in its most varied forms—parties, unions; youth and women's organisations, etc.—has been subordinated to the 'peace movement'.

Of course, the 'pacifism of the oppressed' has a 'progressive character', as Trotsky wrote in the Transitional Programme. Our hatred of imperialism is all the greater since it threatens humanity and, in the first instance, the oppressed masses, with all the suffering of war, nuclear or 'conventional', even to the extent of total elimination. But the Stalinist policy of the preservation of peace under the slogan of 'peaceful co-existence' leads, inside the imperialist countries, to the abandonment of the class struggle. The Stalinist movements, fighting for peace, collaborate with the bourgeoisie in order to maintain the existing social order. In order to unmask the true nature of this policy, it might well be useful to quote from some texts, little known today, by Lenin who, at the time of the First World War, said everything essential on this subject:

'The war is not an accident, not a 'sin', as is the idea of the Christian ministers (who preach patriotism, humanitarianism and peace no less eloquently than the opportunists); it is an inevitable stage of capitalism, it is a form of capitalist life as natural as peace.'³

And in the conference of Foreign Sections of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (1915):

'Some of the means employed to fool the working class are pacifism and the abstract preaching of peace.

'Under capitalism, particularly in its imperialist phase, wars are unavoidable. . . . A propaganda of peace at the present time, if not accompanied by a call to revolutionary mass actions, is only capable of spreading illusions, of demoralising the proletariat by imbuing it with confidence in the humanitarianism of the bourgeoisie, and of making it a plaything of secret diplomacy. . . . In particular, the idea of the possibility of a so-called democratic peace without a series of revolutions is deeply erroneous.'⁴

Here once again is what he wrote in 1915 in his article, quoted above, on 'bourgeois philanthropists':

'The Messrs. Bourgeois know . . . that phrases of a democratic peace are an idle, foolish utopia as long as the old forces "actually direct diplomacy", i.e., as long as the class of capitalists has not been expropriated.'⁵

As if he had known in advance the arguments of the Stalinists Lenin wrote, still in the same article:

'The enlightened advance-guard of the proletariat,

2. 'Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy', in *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII (Lawrence & Wishart edition), p. 180.

3. 'Position and Tasks of the Socialist International, 1914', *Collected Works*, p. 88.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

the revolutionary Social-Democrats, attentively watch the sentiments of the masses, utilising their growing tendency towards peace, not in order to support the vulgar utopias of a "democratic" peace under capitalism, not in order to encourage hopes for the intervention of the philanthropists, the authorities, the bourgeoisie, but in order to make the vague revolutionary sentiments clear.⁶

In 1915, in his article 'The Peace Question', Lenin is even more clear, if that is possible.

'The peace slogan can be advanced either in connection with definite peace conditions, or without any conditions at all, as a desire for an indefinite peace, for peace in general. It is obvious that in the latter case we have a slogan that is not only not socialist, but that is entirely devoid of meaning. . . . Slogans must be advanced in order to make clear to the masses, by means of propaganda and agitation, the irreconcilable difference between socialism and capitalism (imperialism); they must **not** be advanced in order to **reconcile** two hostile classes and two hostile lines by means of a little word which 'unites' the most divergent things.' (Lenin's emphasis)⁷

And, further on:

'We are not for the status quo, nor for the philistine utopia of shrinking away from great wars. We are in favour of a revolutionary struggle against imperialism, i.e., capitalism.'⁸

'... a more or less democratic peace [is impossible] outside of a number of revolutions and revolutionary struggle in every country against their respective government.'⁹

And he finishes:

'Here is a choice for a revolutionary struggle or for servility to the bourgeoisie. There is no middle course.'¹⁰

So Lenin was not against the peace slogan in an abstract manner; rather he clearly defined that the struggle for peace must be accompanied by a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and precisely in that way to ensure peace. Now, there is added to the peace policy of the Stalinists on an international scale a peace movement inside each country, inside the imperialist countries. The Stalinists state that the class struggle is going on between the two systems; they state, moreover, that, given the existence of atomic weapons, this struggle must become 'peaceful'. The policy of co-existence is thus applied internally to the imperialist countries, which ultimately leads to the abandonment of the

class struggle. This is shown in two basic forms in the present policy of the Stalinists. First of all by an unprincipled alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie and even the bourgeoisie under the aegis of the 'peace movement'; secondly, by parliamentary cretinism which reduces the workers' movement to be a loyal opposition within the existing bourgeois order.

We could be countered here once again with the Stalinist argument according to which the existence of nuclear weapons qualitatively changes the nature of imperialism. This 'argument' is nothing but blackmail. Between the two paths, nuclear war and peace at any price, which in reality lead to the same impasse, there lies the path of revolutionary struggle; it is only along this path that it is possible to finish once and for all with nuclear terror and with terror plain and simple. A second objection might take on the following form: could not a policy of 'peaceful co-existence' manage to prevent an attack on the USSR for at least long enough for her to build up sufficient strength and for capitalism, torn by internal contradictions, to collapse? There are two dangerous illusions here: that the USSR can 'fool' imperialism and thus escape its attacks; and that imperialism can collapse without workers' revolutions. Through the present practice of 'peaceful co-existence' we shall see exactly just to what degree these claims are false, anti-Marxist and petty-bourgeois.

... and the nature of imperialism

The Stalinists have launched their slogan of general and complete disarmament. They are inviting the imperialists to conclude an agreement with the USSR and, since 1955, have begun negotiations on the technicalities of disarmament. Let us pose the question: is such disarmament possible?

And, once again, let us listen to Lenin. In his article 'The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution' he wrote:

'The arming of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is the most significant, the most fundamental, and the most important fact of modern capitalist society. And yet, despite this fact, it is being proposed that social-democrats should put forward the "demand" on "disarmament". That is the equivalent of the complete abandonment of the class struggle, of the complete negation of the revolution. Our slogan is the arming of the proletariat, for the conquest, the expropriation and the **disarmament** of the bourgeoisie—this is the only possible tactic for the revolutionary class which flows from the **whole objective development** of capitalist militarism and which is motivated and prescribed by that development.' (Lenin's emphasis)

6. *Collected Works*, p. 181.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-7.

10. *Ibid.*

And Lenin goes on:

'The fundamental character of the prevalent opportunism is that it passes over in silence and ignores the concrete question of the relationship . . . between the war and revolution as well as the other concrete problems of the latter. . . . The principal deficiency of the disarmament demand is exactly the fact that it avoids every concrete question of the revolution. Or perhaps the trusty followers of disarmament stand for some kind of unarmed revolution, of a new type?'

The Stalinists in fact establish a close relationship between their policy on 'peace' and the 'parliamentary roads to socialism' 'developed' by Khrushchev. 'Peaceful co-existence' is a 'theory' and a practice, not only on the international scale, but also inside each country. This inevitable relationship was already perfectly well known to Lenin who discovered it among the opportunists of the Second International. He addressed these admirable lines to the workers in 'The Collapse of the Second International' (1915):

' . . . today you are given an election ballot—take it. Understand how to organise for it, to hit your enemies with it, and not to place men in soft parliamentary berths who cling to their seat in fear of prison. Tomorrow you are deprived of the election ballot, you are given a rifle and a splendid machine-gun equipped according to the last word of machine technique—take this weapon of death and destruction, do not listen to the sentimental whiners who are afraid of war. Much has been left in the world that **must** be destroyed by fire and iron for the liberation of the working class.' (Lenin's emphasis)

And in his article 'On the Slogan of Disarmament' he wrote:

'He is no socialist who expects the realisation of socialism **without** the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . To adopt "disarmament" into the programme is equivalent to say: we are opposed to the use of arms. The Kautskyan preaching of "disarmament" in **reality** serves only to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle.' (Lenin's emphasis)¹¹

It is a very widespread commonplace among economists, and even among non-specialists, that the imperialist economy is incapable of managing without an armaments programme. One does not have to be a Marxist to realise that, if armament orders were suddenly cut off, the imperialist economy would, practically overnight, be plunged into chaos. Leaving aside the general militarisation of life, let us simply take the economic aspect of the problem.

The industrial capacity of the imperialist world, as a whole, just as for each country taken separately, stays in a chronic state of partial disuse. It is solely the armaments programme which permits the use of 'optimum' capacity and still ensures a semblance of life for the economy. In a survey by the official *Disarmament Agency*, the American capitalists estimate ' . . . that a tenth of the nation's total resources, and a practically identical percentage of manual labour, are at present devoted to national defence.' (*Le Monde*, May 11, 1962). We can be sure that in reality this proportion is far greater. All of this is reflected in the budgets of each imperialist state, in a discreet but visible manner. On January 17, 1963, President Kennedy presented the budget for the year 1963 to the US Congress. The defence budget amounted to \$2,400 million more than that of the previous year and to \$10,000 million (!) more than that of the last year of the Eisenhower administration. Let us not forget to add the separately presented space budget which, with \$2,400 million, increased by 75 per cent relative to the previous year. The military provisions of the French budget are also climbing to dizzy heights. England is an equally typical example by which to appreciate the privileged position occupied by armaments in the imperialist economy.

Under these conditions the disarmament policy extolled by the Stalinists is the equivalent of invidiously fooling the working class, by sowing the illusion that imperialism might be able to abandon its armaments policy, as if this policy did not constitute an integral part of the imperialist system. The Stalinists sow the illusion that it is possible to disarm imperialism without overthrowing it. In reality, the Stalinist disarmament policy says that imperialism has ceased to be imperialist, and that it is no more than a question of men of good or bad faith. So the Stalinists denounce the 'fomenters of war', Adenauer and the German revanchists, or the 'militarist circles (!) of the Pentagon'. Against these wicked men they contrast the 'wise and understanding' policy of other politicians like, circumstances permitting, Stevenson, Thant, Kennedy and others. So, in the international arena, there are good and bad capitalists, and the latter wreck the attempts of the USSR, supported by the former, to achieve an agreement on disarmament. This 'reasoning' obviously has nothing in common with a Marxist analysis of the character of imperialism. The imperialist system is one and indivisible. Imperialism is still the same capitalist system of exploitation and oppression, independently of the technical standard of military equipment. In the face of this

11. *The New International*, August 1934.

reality, which weighs down on every worker in Detroit, Birmingham, Algiers or anywhere else, Khrushchev states to the American ambassador: 'We can like each other or dislike each other. But for the sake of maintaining peace, we have to embrace or, at least, shake hands.' (*Le Monde*, November 9, 1962). And these words were spoken at the reception organised for the anniversary of the October Revolution.

2. The diplomacy of 'Co-existence'

We will now examine how the new foreign policy of the 'liberals' in power in Moscow has worked out in the evolution of the international situation.

(a) 'The spirit of Camp David'

First of all a few words on the negotiations which took place at Camp David, at the time of the meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, in September 1959. In this way we shall see just what this 'spirit of Camp David', which Khrushchev was so happy to invoke months later, really was. These negotiations were and have remained secret, except for certain occasional hints. It is therefore difficult to examine them deeply. This underlines for us how wrong are those who hold that the slogan of the Transitional Programme: 'Down with secret diplomacy', is no longer applicable.

We know that in particular the question of trade between the USSR and the United States was tackled at Camp David. The history of this trade shows that it had already reached some importance in 1930, with a value of \$240 million, a record figure if we exclude the war years (in 1944, for example, it amounted to over \$4,000 million). Since then, mutual trade decreased, until, parallel with the beginning of the 'cold war', it reached almost complete stagnation. The USSR tried to substitute exchange with Europe for trade with the United States, who set up a rigorous control over exchanges with the USSR. It was 1956 before there were any signs of change in this position. It is no accident that this came about after the first meeting between heads of state, at the time of the transition and re-orientation of the Soviet economy, and in the full heat of the struggle between the Soviet 'conservatives' and the 'liberals'. The Americans began by lifting restrictions on several articles, and the Soviet bureaucrats in turn launched a campaign of Russian offers to American 'businessmen'. The American bourgeoisie harboured no illusions about trade with the USSR, but wished to obtain from the American government the lifting of restrictions and the same

possibilities as the European bourgeoisie. The balance of payments deficit was a weighty consideration in this attitude. The political representative of the 'enlightened' bourgeois, Senator Fulbright, clearly demonstrated these intentions in his letter of July 1959 to the State Department, in which he demanded that the latter should define its position vis-a-vis the Soviet offers. The reply pointed out that enlarged exchanges between the United States and the USSR, like a loan to the latter, would be of considerable assistance to a country opposed to the western system. In other words, a fair number of American capitalists, faced with the threat of a crisis, wanted to be sure of Soviet outlets. But the political representatives of American capitalism placed against the short-term interests of these capitalists the general interest of their class: to exert growing pressure on the USSR to bring about its transformation into a 'friendly' country.

During this time, the Soviet bureaucrats harrassed both the American government and the private capitalists, going so far as to state in one of Kozlov's speeches in 1959 that mutual exchanges could rise to the level of several thousands of millions of dollars per year.

Certain American capitalists were ready to undertake such trade with the USSR, but they came into collision with the American government, which kept up its political conditions with the aim of inciting the bureaucrats to abandon the conquests of October. Despite its difficulties, the leading group in the USSR was not ready to give in. Hence its attempts to call upon private capitalists, and to try to get them to put pressure on their own government. It is in this soil that there blooms the touching friendship of Khrushchev and Cyrus Eaton.

In these conditions Khrushchev showed himself at Camp David to be hostile to the discussion of full agreements, hoping perhaps that the affair could be settled by the intervention of his new friends. At the same time he opened the door for further negotiations. For example, as far as the Soviet debt was concerned he at first rejected the American demands, but afterwards had to back down in face of the insistence of his interlocutors, who considered payment of this debt to be a preliminary condition for any trade. An agreement was reached on the resumption of the negotiations about payment of the debt which had been broken off at the beginning of the 'cold war'. It was nevertheless specified—a strange way of setting one's mind at rest—that the settlements would include neither the old debt of the Czar nor that of the Kerensky government! Khrushchev likewise rejected a general agreement on patent

rights and licenses stating that such agreements could be settled directly with the enterprises concerned. It was in this way that the Soviet government paid the Du Pont de Nemours company the sum of \$1.5 million for outstanding royalties. The Americans, for their part, accepted all this in the hope of a favourable outcome of the negotiations and in order to facilitate the successive lifting of restrictions.

Although deep down there was no general agreement and although the bureaucracy was very careful not to make any basic concessions, these negotiations did mark a stage in its evolution. As a bourgeois observer put it: 'Khrushchev appears to have agreed to "pay" through a settlement of the Lease Lend account for the normalisation of economic relations with the United States, while in 1958 Mikoyan refused any negotiation on this point, believing that it was possible to arrive at commercial results without altering the general political climate.' (*Politique Etrangère*, 1959, No. 5)

(b) The test-ban treaty

Through all the negotiations which have been going on for years about a disarmament agreement, we can diagnose several important phenomena. First of all they allow us to evaluate the true nature of imperialism. Then, they show us the real content of the disarmament policy and, at the same time, the 'value' of the Stalinist illusion on the possibility of fooling imperialism. Finally they unmask the Soviet leaders.

We realise that, for many readers, an examination of negotiations dealing with the disarmament problem and with a connected problem, an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, might seem somewhat boring. However, in our contemporary history there is no more interesting or dramatic subject. This time, we shall only deal with its history, in 1962, and that only in broad outline. Nevertheless, it is necessary to return to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna (June 1961) to introduce the subject.

According to various sources the problem of nuclear tests was not directly touched on there. But immediately afterwards, on June 17, 1961, the United States and England sent a joint note to the USSR concerning their proposals for a nuclear agreement, summed up in six points:

1. The number of inspections annually on the territory of the three countries concerned must be fixed at between 12 and 20.
2. The number of control posts in the USSR must be reduced.

3. A control commission must be set up.
4. Means of controlling tests in space must be set up.
5. The moratorium to be sustained for three years.
6. Nuclear documents which are used for research 'on the detection of tests, or for peaceful technical use' to be opened for internal and external inspection.

In their note they point out that the USSR, at the time of the resumption of the negotiations about the prohibition of tests, on March 21, 1961, changed its mind on the already accepted principle of a single impartial administrator of the control system. They said that 'she now maintains that the conclusion of an agreement on the banning of tests must be subordinate to the solution of the other problems posed by disarmament, despite the fact that it was the Soviet Union which, from the start, had insisted that the two questions should be separate'.

Now we are at the heart of the matter. The bureaucracy, faced with the imperialists' insistence on the necessity for effective control of disarmament, had opted for the separation of the problem of nuclear tests, hoping thus to avoid its central dilemma, on-the-spot control. In fact, it was on-the-spot control that was really at stake in the negotiations. The bureaucrats well know that acceptance of an armaments control on USSR territory would represent the opening of a breach which would allow imperialism to infiltrate into the planned economy, threatening to dismantle the monopoly of foreign trade. The intermediate stages could be dressed up in various and multiple forms, beginning, for example, with control over the arms industry and, consequently, over the state budget. This is the projected route for the re-establishment of capitalism in the USSR, which would thus become a special colony of imperialism. Obviously the imperialists, too, are well aware of what is at stake in the problem, and they do not yield an inch on the question of the demand for on-the-spot control.

We have seen what economic and political realities have led the Soviet bureaucracy to adopt a diplomatic orientation likely to result in the reduction of military expenditure. For them, faced with the threat of revolution at home, agreement with the imperialists on disarmament has become a life and death question. But the imperialists do not grant their agreement for nothing. They have fixed its price: capitulation. It is this that explains the efforts of Soviet diplomacy to escape from the dilemma. The imperialists make on-the-spot control of general disarmament a condition for an agreement. The Soviet diplomats then drop their proposals and pose

the question of an agreement 'solely' on the banning of nuclear tests. The imperialists persist, and then put forward their condition: on-the-spot control of nuclear tests. The bureaucrats are in a dilemma; they once again pose the problem of disarmament in general. Here we arrive at the situation where the Anglo-Americans want to continue the discussion: their note of June 17 insists on the necessity of on-the-spot control. The bureaucrats then put forward their proposal for self-inspection by each of the countries concerned. Naturally, the imperialists reject it.

During the subsequent months American diplomacy accepted the principle of discussions dealing with 'general and complete' disarmament. In the month of September 1961 an agreement on this point was reached between the USSR and the United States. In the Autumn of 1961, however, to impress the other negotiators, Khrushchev broke the moratorium by letting off a super-bomb. In December a special UNO resolution welcomed the USA-USSR agreement and also the new composition of the disarmament committee. The changes in the composition of the committee had been demanded by the USSR. It is possible that the bureaucracy, frightened by the flexibility of American diplomacy, wanted to introduce possible partners. Moreover, the explosion of the Soviet bomb showed that the USSR was proposing to launch a diplomatic offensive to oblige the Americans to accept its proposals. The latter in turn tried to ward off this offer of participation by 'neutrals', but without success. UNO set up the 'Committee of 18' which incorporated eight 'neutral' states: India, Burma, UAR, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Brazil, Mexico and Sweden. France refused to participate and so on March 14, 1962, it was 17 states which opened discussions.

But even before the opening of the conference the preparation for it had clearly shown the attitudes of the two camps. On February 7, 1962, Kennedy and Macmillan stated in a letter to Khrushchev that it should be the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 18 countries who should participate in the preparation of the conference. In his reply on February 10, Khrushchev insisted that the conference should be held 'at the summit' between heads of state. On February 14, Kennedy and Macmillan replied that they would only accept 'summit' talks if there was any 'real progress' in the negotiations. Meanwhile, on February 8, to emphasise their firmness, the United States and England had decided to resume their nuclear tests.

So the bureaucrats' offensive was checked. The imperialists let it be understood that they would

stick to their essential conditions and, that, until these were accepted by the USSR, they considered the conference as secondary. By 'real progress' they understood acceptance, at least partial, of on-the-spot inspection. Soviet diplomacy tried to break the 'unity' of the imperialists: on February 10 Khrushchev sent a message on disarmament to de Gaulle. In his reply on the 17th the latter declined these advances saying that 'it is necessary for negotiations to take place between the powers which possess nuclear weapons. In a speech on March 3 Kennedy showed his determination not to give way: he announced the resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underlined the firmness of the West and stated that it was up to the Soviets to alter their position.

Were we witnessing a hardening of this position? Apparently yes. The rumpus around Berlin was at its highest point; the world waited agonised. And yet . . . as ever, the bureaucracy's sabre-rattling was in reality a cover for its readiness to yield. The sign of this came on February 9 with the exchange of the spies Powers and Abel. And then, what else was there to do? On March 5 Khrushchev replied nicely to Kennedy and Macmillan and accepted that the conference should be held at ministers' level.

As the conference opened the Soviet delegate proposed 'general and complete' disarmament and a moratorium on nuclear tests. The reply was obviously that, without effective control, disarmament is impossible. The United Nations, too, insisted on the necessity of control equally with that of disarmament. As far as the imperialists were concerned there was no doubt that it was the USSR which must yield. The *Daily Telegraph* (March 16, 1962) wrote:

'If only one could pierce this mutual barrier of mistrust in one place, an important agreement could follow on. . . . Such is the possibility that certain new elements in the American plan are trying to sound out. . . . It is possible that a solution for controlled disarmament could be found which the Russians could be led to accept without having the feeling that they are sacrificing their principal secret weapon: the secret itself.'

The imperialists laid down the order of the problems: first of all a nuclear agreement. On April 9 Kennedy and Macmillan placed before Khrushchev an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests with international control. On April 12, Khrushchev rejected the very idea of control. In turn, on the same day, Kennedy and Macmillan rejected the moratorium on tests proposed at the conference. This dramatic contest, in which the

existence of the USSR itself was at stake, ended once again in an impasse. Nevertheless, we can see that, despite their somersaults, their twists and turns and their refusals, the bureaucrats *continued* the discussion and let it be seen that they were to some degree prepared to give way. The imperialists were implacable: control, control yet again, and always control. They left the bureaucrats no hope of escaping from this demand. Why then did the latter continue to negotiate? They continued because they were looking for less brutal, more subtle, ways of capitulation. The deep meaning of their obstinacy in continuing these negotiations was the search for a comfortable and reassuring outcome for the regime of the bureaucracy, the search for a not too glaring capitulation.

In order to lead the conference out of the impasse the eight neutral countries put forward on April 16 a compromise on the international verification of tests. They set aside the problem of on-the-spot inspections and proposed the immediate prohibition of tests in the atmosphere and under water. Two days later Dean, the American delegate, registered a project for general and complete disarmament in three stages. The next day the USSR accepted the neutrals' proposal. On April 25 the United States resumed their nuclear tests in the atmosphere. A conversation between deaf men? No. We see that the USSR immediately accepts any proposal which does not include on-the-spot control. Moreover, if the Americans employ as brutal a reply as the resumption of tests, it is to underline their determination to stick to their essential condition. A new impasse.

Macmillan showed some inclination towards having recourse to a summit meeting as a way out. The Americans opposed this energetically. On April 28 Kennedy and Macmillan met in Washington, where the latter stated that an East-West summit meeting was no longer really urgent. On June 15 the disarmament conference was adjourned until July 16.

The resumption of negotiations showed no promise of progress. Already the preliminary signs were unfavourable. On July 9 the Americans exploded an H-bomb in the Pacific and on July 10 at the world congress for peace and disarmament Khrushchev pushed forward the solution of the Berlin problem. The conference dealt mainly with the problem of Laos and an agreement was reached on the neutralisation of that country. On July 22 the Soviet government announced that it was obliged to resume its nuclear tests. In these conditions the continuation of negotiations was fraught with diffi-

culty. Right up to the end of August there was only one noteworthy event: on August 15, Italy accepted the proposals of the neutrals. This provoked a veritable storm. The *New York Times* wrote: 'The solidarity of the Western powers, already compromised by the French boycott, has been further weakened.' The imperialist machinery was rapidly set in motion and on August 17 the Italian delegate, such a sensible child, took the side of the West.

Before going on to the new stage of the negotiations which began after the 'Cuba affair', let us examine the respective positions of the USSR and the imperialists at the end of August 1962.

On August 27 the American and English delegates made their position more flexible. They proposed to the USSR a limited agreement on the ending of high-altitude nuclear tests without breathing a word about inspection. Next day the *Times* stated that this agreement 'would not be useless, even if it only served to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, especially when we know of the progress China is making in this field'. We can see to what kind of solution the problem was evolving. We shall return to an analysis of the role played by China in Russian-American relations later. Suffice it to say for now that, if the imperialists were displaying a greater flexibility, it was in the hope of arriving at a partial agreement aimed directly against China.

Pravda of August 27 summed up the position of the Soviet bureaucracy. It condemned the previous American project and said: 'The aim of this document is to impose on the Soviet Union "on-the-spot" inspections and consequently it could not serve as a basis for an agreement.' As for the second project which aimed to prohibit high-altitude explosions, it pointed out that this led to the pursuit of underground tests. Nevertheless, it added that the USSR '... is ready to discuss questions of control, although it is convinced that national means of detection are quite sufficient for revealing tests.' Here is the reflection of the disarray and the perplexity experienced by the bureaucracy in face of the imperialists' intransigence and their attempts to bring China into question. Nonetheless it seemed disposed to conclude an agreement at China's expense.

Despite this greater flexibility in the respective positions the impasse was obvious. It was not until after the 'Cuba affair' that the question of a test ban was once again posed, and this was no accident. Further on we shall return to this affair and also to its relationship to the Chinese problem; for the moment let us simply take note that it was settled by a capitulation to imperialism by the bureaucracy. The imperialists were then able to hope that this

would have repercussions in 'nuclear affairs'. It did indeed. The tone of the new Soviet attitude was set by Khrushchev himself at the time of the reception held on the anniversary of the October Revolution. Questioned on the problem of banning nuclear tests, the head of the Soviet bureaucracy unmasked 'peaceful co-existence' better than any critic. He declared:

'How can humanity be rid of this kind of suffering? If you are Marxists you say: by liquidating capitalism, by giving power to the workers, in this way there will obviously be no more fighting. But if we demanded that other countries change their social system and adopt ours, we would find ourselves in contradiction with peaceful co-existence. The act of imposing a system on another country would lead to war. . . . We live on a basis of mutual concessions. If we want peace, we have to build up peaceful relations on the basis of acceptable mutual concessions.' (*Le Monde*, November 9, 1962)

These lines need no comment.

Parallel to this the Soviet press set out to present the concessions which the USSR had in mind on control over the banning of nuclear tests. The principal point of disagreement was the control of underground tests for which, according to the Americans, on-the-spot inspection was vital. Then, at the beginning of November 1962, the Soviet press began a publicity campaign in favour of seismicographic equipment invented by Soviet scientists which would be capable of automatically recording underground explosions. The bureaucrats, in order to avoid the basic problem of on-the-spot inspection, carried on a campaign stating that this automatic equipment (the famous 'Black Boxes') could be installed on the territory of the countries concerned and would record explosions *automatically* and *without inspection*. It would be sufficient to place them in the responsibility of the governments of the said territories. The *New York Times* immediately replied that ground inspection would still be national, and therefore ineffective and that it would in no way replace international on-the-spot inspection. Did the bureaucracy really imagine it could fool the imperialists by avoiding the basic political problem through this technical trifle? Of course not, but it knew that this proposal would bring a settlement nearer. The game warmed up.

On November 23, 1962, Macmillan indulged in a highly scientific explanation to prove that the 'black boxes' were not sufficient for detecting nuclear explosions. He maintained that the only effective method was on-territory inspection. Khrushchev said to the English ambassador who was just leaving

the USSR: '. . . that he understood very well that the "black box" system did not entirely satisfy Great Britain and the United States . . . (that he) would show that he was prepared to open serious negotiations on this subject.' (*Le Monde*, November 24, 1962). Every bourgeois observer pointed out that the 'softening' in the Soviet attitude with regard to the test ban was a result of the Cuba crisis.

Before the resumption of negotiations by the conference of the 17, the English and American delegates made their proposals known: yielding nothing on the necessity for on-the-spot inspection, they thought it would be useful to hold a meeting of scientists, alongside the conference, to discuss the real worth of the 'black boxes'. On the resumption of the negotiations on November 26 every speaker evoked 'the memory of the recent Caribbean crisis' which dominated the negotiators. Dean, the American delegate, made this more specific by saying that the first session of the conference '. . . had revealed the existence of a good spirit and of a sure desire for co-operation.' In contempt of this 'good spirit' the Swedish delegate presented a project, a revised form of the previous proposal of the neutrals, which the Soviet delegate Tsarapkin considered to be reasonable. The English and Americans rejected it, insisting on the necessity for on-the-spot inspection. Tsarapkin retorted: '. . . there is only one issue in question: forgetting inspections on Soviet territory.' Despite the attempts at a compromise put forward by Sweden, then by Mexico and India, on December 3, Tsarapkin refused any agreement, emphasising that every one of these projects held out at the minimum for on-the-spot inspection. It was true. The 'neutrals', including the 'friendly nation', India, firmly supported, although in a more flexible manner, the Anglo-American position. On December 7 discussions continued on the 'black boxes' which Dean described as an 'obscure system'. A new impasse? It seemed so.

But to everybody's surprise on December 11 Tsarapkin, the same Tsarapkin who wanted on-the-spot inspection forgotten about, solemnly announced that the USSR would accept the control of an international commission in specified places, well-defined and very limited in number, where automatic recording stations sealed by this commission would be placed. For the first time the Soviet bureaucracy had been induced to make an important concession. It had accepted the installation of 'black boxes' in three places on Soviet territory by an international commission. The specifications regarding this inspection were prudent and, in this respect, revealing: 'If it were necessary to employ foreign personnel

to plant the boxes, and then to transport them to the international control centre, the USSR would consent to this, provided that it could take the appropriate security measures.' (*Le Monde*, December 12, 1962)

But the imperialists refused to budge. Tsarapkin could only just cover up his deceit behind sharp words, when he saw that the English and American delegates were continuing their attacks. Godber, the English delegate, stated: 'It is interesting that the Soviets have made a specific offer. It is a ray of hope, but we are thinking of a more realistic number of "black boxes". This number must be of at least three figures, and moreover there must be on-the-spot inspection.' (*Le Monde*, December 13, 1962). No, one really cannot fool imperialism. What is more, in the meanwhile an expert had stated that there was no difference between automatic recordings of underground nuclear explosions and those of earth tremors. These imperialists were indeed tough. Against this redoubtable enemy should one then choose the class struggle? The conclusion of the Soviet bureaucrats was, of course, different. Despite the categorical rejection of this 'Christmas present', as Dean described the Soviet proposal on the installation of black boxes, the USSR wanted to continue the discussion. However, on December 20 the conference was adjourned for three weeks and, on January 5, 1963, Dean, the American delegate, resigned. Five days later, on the joint initiative of the Soviet ambassador in Washington and Foster, the director of the American disarmament agency, the conference decided to adjourn until February 12.

In reality this adjournment corresponded to the exclusion of the undesirables. Some months before, the USSR had still been insisting on the importance of the presence of neutral countries. Now the Americans and the Soviet bureaucrats had concluded an agreement, behind the scenes, to continue two-sided negotiations in Washington without even an English delegate. The discussions were resumed at a higher level on January 14, 1963, between Foster, the American delegate, Fedorenko, permanent Soviet delegate at the United Nations, and Tsarapkin. The following day, in his 'State of the Union' message, Kennedy sounded a siren call: '. . . If all the present tendencies can persuade the Soviet Union to take the path of peace, then let her know that all the free nations will accompany her.' (*Le Monde*, January 16, 1963)

Khrushchev heard it. On January 22, the press announced that the USSR had definitely accepted the installation of three seismic stations on its territory, and two or three annual inspections in the

areas where suspect oscillations took place. *Le Monde* went into this important concession: 'It is permissible to think that the crisis which occurred in the Caribbean and even more the redoubled attacks against him for some time now by the Chinese communists who condemn his prudent policy . . . have definitely convinced Mr. Khrushchev of the urgency of an agreement. The head of the Soviet government has thus taken a step forward.' (January 22, 1963)

If we review this fast-moving history of the Soviet-American confrontation, we must say that the impasse is only an apparent one. In reality one can distinguish a retreat on the part of the USSR in face of the intransigence of the imperialists and their desire to penetrate ultimately into Soviet territory. They want to obtain this basic concession in order, when all is said and done, to destroy the conquests of October. They do not draw back in face of platonic peace slogans. The nature of imperialism is just that. It does not want disarmament, it wants to penetrate into the USSR. If that is done under the cover of the slogan of disarmament, so much the better. If the bureaucrats want to fool the world, that is their business. The imperialists themselves are more realistic: they use atomic blackmail, resume or suspend nuclear tests, reject a summit meeting in the absence of 'real progress', demand on-the-spot inspection but, presented with a limited concession, they start all over again . . . that is imperialism.

It is not hard to understand that the Soviet bureaucrats are lying when they say that disarmament is possible. They know full well that the condition for such 'disarmament' would be capitulation on their part: handing over the USSR to the imperialists. In reality they are moving along this path, but each time they take a few steps, they get frightened and turn half-circle. But slowly and surely the imperialists are putting on the pressure and it is a constant withdrawal by the bureaucracy which is brought out by the history of the negotiations. The refusal of the Soviet leaders to break off the talks and, at the same time, their successive concessions, show very well that under the cover of their deceitful disarmament policy they are ready to trade the socialist heritage of the October revolution. For the moment they are still maintaining a hesitant attitude, but at the cost of an ignoble betrayal of the Chinese revolution. We shall return to this problem in greater detail. But we must take note here of this other central point in the present negotiations on the banning of nuclear tests.

Under the considerable pressure of imperialism, the Soviet leaders are trying to sacrifice China.

We have already observed how, especially in the last couple of years, there has been more and more talk about the 'danger of a spread of nuclear weapons'. Hypocritical journalists prefer to mention, very virtuously, the terrible danger which might result for humanity if, for example, Egypt and Israel possessed such weapons. These bourgeois hypocrites are, however, well aware that in fact it is a question of China. Indeed, behind the Soviet-American search for a compromise, and the 'softening' of their respective positions, there lay one clear aim: to disarm China. It was characteristic of the Soviet bureaucracy to show itself completely ready to sign an agreement on the banning of high-altitude and underwater tests (the 'neutrals' proposal). Such a ban would remove all possibility of armament by China in face of the imperialists equipped with nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would serve as a pretext for taking discriminatory measures against China, for isolating her and, ultimately, for surrendering her. The hope of the bureaucrats is to reach a nuclear agreement and thus to bring about 'peaceful co-existence'. They have already betrayed socialist China under the banner of this 'co-existence'. But even that has not saved them: imperialism took this gift, but without thanks. It still holds to its conditions, which aim at the complete capitulation of the USSR itself. There is no way out for the bureaucracy.

3. The colonial movements and Cuba

Having regard to all we have just said, we will make do here with a brief résumé. The day-to-day events provide a documentation which will excuse us from putting forward various items of supplementary proof.

The 'theory' of socialism in a single country distorted the Marxist analysis of imperialism by reducing this to being, we have seen, no more than a particular policy of oppressing nations, above all the colonies, practised by the advanced capitalist countries; it is this conception which lies at the root of the Stalinist practice of hailing every step forward by any national liberation movement against imperialist oppression as a victory for socialism. It is obvious that these movements weaken imperialism and that consequently a revolutionary policy must support them. But that is not the problem. It lies in the fact that for the Stalinists *national movements* replace the class struggle; so much so that for them the birth of a new politically independent state in Africa, for example, is the equivalent of a victorious

socialist revolution in that country. Now these states are still wholly bound to imperialism and are part of its world system. These movements and the birth of these states cannot be understood outside of the context in which they were born.

The existence and the strengthening of a workers' state, the example of the October revolution, aroused the colonial masses. After 1917 the colonial movements became stronger. But the strengthening of these struggles was accompanied by the degeneration of the workers' state in the USSR. Today in the international relationship of forces, the colonial bourgeoisie has had to yield the political foreground to the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries. The latter put forward socialist slogans, but the content of these movements is still bourgeois. The objective sought by the bourgeoisie of the colonial countries is to force imperialism to yield to it its share of the proceeds of the exploitation of the workers; but, without the aid of the masses, it would never manage to achieve this objective. And, in order to mobilise the masses, it has to leave the leadership of the movements to the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries with their socialist slogans. The 'revolutionary' phrase, coupled with submission in face of force, is the very essence of the attitude of the petty-bourgeoisie.

It was the degeneration of the USSR, leading the bureaucracy to present the class struggle as a struggle between two 'systems', which caused the colonial movements to appear as a 'third force'. A policy of oscillation between the two world systems, always giving way to the stronger one, admirably suited their petty-bourgeois political nature. And the 'third force' mirage only reflected the relationship of forces between the USSR and imperialism. In the conditions of 'peaceful co-existence' the role of these new states is multiple. First of all they serve as an argument for the Soviet bureaucracy to prove that it is struggling against imperialism, since it helps and supports these national movements. At the same time, they allow it to keep on good terms with imperialism because the political independence of these countries does not basically alter the relationship of forces. Finally, these bourgeois nationalist movements can distract attention from the struggle of the international working class, while the socialist revolution is presented as having fallen into disuse in the industrialised countries.

Moreover, the colonial petty-bourgeoisie, promoted to this elevated rank both by the Stalinists and the imperialists, becomes at the same time their principal connecting link. It plays the role of the vanguard of 'peaceful co-existence'; which is as good

as saying that the colonial movements and the new 'independent' states serve as an accurate barometer for the relationship of forces between the USSR and imperialism.

And it is precisely when national colonial movements are capable of going as far as expropriation of imperialism without indemnities that the international status quo and 'peaceful co-existence' are immediately placed in question. Since 1945 in the backward countries there have only been two revolutionary movements which have decisively broken into imperialism's positions: the Chinese revolution and the Cuban revolution. Everywhere else, without exception, the movements, however 'revolutionary' they might be in words, have stopped on the threshold of a real overturn in property relations, or have returned to 'reason'. This is a fact which can be checked and verified in the case of each state which has gained 'independence' since 1945, from India to Egypt, from Indonesia to Ghana, and from Guinea to Algeria. The only exceptions, and we leave aside here the profound differences which exist between them, are China and Cuba.

But precisely these two revolutions, which shook imperialism, dealing it serious blows, provoked the hatred of the imperialists and the distrust of the bureaucrats. We will not deal here with the history of these revolutions nor with an analysis of their character. We simply affirm that they showed themselves capable of overthrowing capitalism. And we also affirm that the attacks made on them were made under the banner precisely of 'co-existence'.

Let us recall here some aspects of what is called the 'Cuban affair'. First of all, the destiny of this revolution was artificially linked to the USSR and separated from the class struggle in America. Ever since, the perspectives, and consequently the tasks, of that revolution have suffered serious damage and distortion. Face to face with the citadel of imperialism, the Cuban revolution should have immediately established a concrete link with the class struggle in America. It should have established itself as the nucleus of revolution in North and South America. Forgetful of this revolutionary duty, the Cuban leaders could only link their fate with the Soviet bureaucracy. This narrow alliance in turn came into greater and greater contradiction with their initial duty: the extension of the revolution. Why? Because Soviet policy had as its basis 'peaceful co-existence' and as its aim the preservation of 'peace'. Cuba, allied to the USSR, was not able or allowed to shake up the 'peaceful' situation in America in any way. But from the moment that this revolution became contained in the mutilating framework of 'co-existence', its own fate depended

on the evolution of the latter. In proportion as revolution ascended in Latin America, North American capitalism had to finish off the Cuban example. From that moment on, the revolution was dependent on a bargaining deal. The contradiction between the socialist revolution and 'co-existence' is shown here in a concrete manner. The more the revolution in America is on the ascent, the greater is American pressure on Cuba, and the stronger are the Soviet attempts to 'keep the peace'.

There can be no doubt that the sending of nuclear weapons to Cuba by the USSR was nothing more than a provocation. The Chinese have emphasised strongly the role of agent provocateur played by the Soviet bureaucrats. After that came the handing over of Cuba to imperialist infiltration, in the shape of disarmament with on-the-spot inspection by the United Nations; this betrayal was displayed as 'saving peace'. It was *solely* thanks to the resistance of the Cuban revolutionaries that this manoeuvre was unsuccessful. The mission of 'convincing' them was entrusted to Mikoyan himself who, not having completely succeeded, felt able to come to an agreement with Kennedy. Then Khrushchev brandished the American 'guarantee' not to invade Cuba, the word of Kennedy! This betrayal of the Cuban revolution displayed the real nature of 'peaceful co-existence' and the actual relationship of forces between the USSR and imperialism. Since then, an international process has developed. On the one hand imperialism has built up its strength and, casting off its negotiator's mask, puts its 'recommendations' more and more in the form of dictates. On the other hand, the international petty-bourgeoisie is developing towards the right and aligning itself more and more with the Western position. In various countries the petty-bourgeois political formations are bowing before capitalist power, while the 'neutral' countries are becoming orientated towards imperialism. Wherever reticence is shown imperialism has no qualms about the direct overthrow of the regime in question, under the benevolent gaze of the Stalinists. But 'peaceful co-existence', that is to say 'servility in face of imperialism', has brought about another phenomenon, doubtless the most important of our time: the split in the international Stalinist movement.

4. Imperialism and the bureaucracy against China

(a) The second betrayal of the Chinese revolution

The history of the fatal policy of the Communist International with regard to the Chinese revolution

during the decisive years 1925-27 and afterwards is well known. The basic feature of the Stalin-Bukharin policy was to subordinate the revolutionary movement to the leadership of the bourgeois party, the Kuo-min-tang. When the time came, the Kuo-min-tang, enjoying the support of the Communist Party which followed the directives of the Comintern, did not hesitate to massacre thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants. It was in this way that the Chinese revolution was betrayed, surrendered to the enemy. Nevertheless we would like to emphasise strongly that the attitude of the Comintern led by Stalin and Bukharin was not the product of a deliberate betrayal. Neither Bukharin, nor Stalin, nor in general the bureaucracy wished for the defeat of the revolution, but the internal logic, the objective content of their politics led them to it. So the Chinese revolution was set back for many years and China was weakened in face of the Japanese attack. We believe that the Chinese revolutionaries, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, learnt a lot about the bureaucratic politics of the Russian Stalinists. The writing of a complete history of the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the Soviet bureaucracy, from Trotsky's last analyses up to our times, would be of the greatest importance.

In this study we take it up only from the years 1961-62. While relations between the USSR and the victorious Chinese revolution had known many a difficulty, it cannot be denied that their mutual relations, under the banner of friendship, were close and multiple. Every study, article, or document dealing, for instance, with economic relations, underlined the importance attached to them by both sides. Of course, an examination of the facts would reveal that the USSR was providing more important material aid to India than to China. But at the same time, among the peoples' democracies, China occupied second place in the volume of commercial exchanges with the USSR. Such was the situation in the years 1958-59, a very difficult period for China, which was going through the anxious decline of the 'great leap forward', the threat of famine, and, in short, an economic catastrophe. It was because of China's incapacity to supply them that the USSR in 1960 had to search elsewhere for lard, groundnuts and soya, for instance. In spring 1961, apart from these difficulties, bourgeois observers still could not discern anything abnormal in Sino-Soviet economic relations. Without exception every piece of news or analysis of the economic situation in China, however, emphasised its catastrophic character in 1960 and 1961: severe rationing, famine, and a drop in production.

It was precisely in this difficult situation that China found itself deprived of Soviet aid. The GATT report on international trade in 1961 published some surprising figures. We quote a section of this report from *Le Monde* (October 7-8, 1962): 'Sino-Soviet trade . . . diminished by 55 per cent between 1959 and 1961, ending below the 1950 level. So much so that the share of these exchanges in the total foreign trade of the Soviet Union has fallen from 20 to 8 per cent, while, in the same period, USSR trade with the rest of the world increased by 30 per cent.' Of course, everybody might say that as soon as China could no longer fulfil her commercial obligations, a decrease in trade was a normal thing. We reject this objection: precisely because China was in an extremely difficult situation, the socialist duty of the USSR should have been to provide it with greater assistance than before. Even the capitalist system practises 'aid' to a country struck by a natural calamity.

On June 4, 1961, the new head of American politics had a meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. Many articles were published about this meeting, but the main points were kept secret. We have therefore to extract what we can from what has been published, and that, of course, hinders our analysis.

Immediately after the announcement of the meeting, the international bourgeois press began to create a lot of noise about the German problem and Berlin. One gained the impression that these two gentlemen had just deeply discussed the Berlin affair and the German question. The German press, still very susceptible on this subject, thought just after the meeting that Khrushchev would refrain from provoking a German crisis. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the important German newspaper, wrote on June 5: '... While the Soviets would doubtless have preferred to put the accent on these problems . . . they did not discuss them ' . . . until the end of the talks.' The international press acknowledged unanimously that it knew little of what had gone on, but that this talk had been *very useful*, despite the fact that *nothing* had changed . . . (?) We rubbed our eyes: the public was meant to believe that the purpose of this meeting was nothing more than to let Kennedy and Khrushchev look each other straight in the eyes. The Italian and Spanish papers were more accurate . . . asserting that what Vienna meant was an understanding by the super-powers reached over the heads of the others. An understanding? . . . Yes! But what about? . . . On what subject? *La Stampa* (June 6) spoke of a 'Soviet manoeuvre'. There is something to think about. The same

Kennedy who had rejected any summit meeting on the subject of disarmament, until the time when 'real progress' had been made, quickly rushed over and arrived at Vienna in order to talk about . . . nothing, or better still in order to be of service to a Soviet manoeuvre. Come now!

If we examine the brief joint communique issued after the negotiations our eyes begin to open. It announced that both parties realised that neither of them could win a war and that, *consequently*, they must try to *jointly organise the world*. In this way one arrives at a perfected peace through mutual compromises. The aim of this meeting was none other than *the joint organisation of the world*. Both 'parties' were not content with an agreement in principle. They passed on to put it into practice. Practically the whole communiqué was devoted to the problem of Laos. In it it said that both parties ' . . . reaffirmed their support for a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and for international agreements aimed at assuring this neutrality and independence. In this respect, they bore in mind the importance of an effective cease-fire.'

This then is the basic feature of what went on at the time of this meeting: they began to '*organise the world*' right on China's doorstep. That is the content of 'peaceful co-existence'. The *New York Times* of June 6 was concerned chiefly with the Laotian problem. It said that there was nothing really to hope for, since perhaps Khrushchev must first of all reach some understanding with the Chinese, the Vietnamese and the Laotians, but that, despite everything, there was a beginning there. The Stalinists were preparing the ground. In his report of the Vienna meeting Khrushchev did not even mention Laos, but devoted most of his speech to . . . the German problem! *Neues Deutschland* was more explicit, for the East Berlin paper accused the partisans of the cold war . . . in West Germany (!) of wanting to continue it by bombing Cuba and Laos (!) instead of seeking a settlement. 'These ultras are dangerous!' it exclaimed on June 5. Kennedy's speech broadcast on June 6 was more interesting. The American President only mentioned the problem of nuclear tests and Berlin in passing, but spoke at length about Laos: ' . . . The only field offering any immediate prospects for agreement was Laos. Both parties realised the necessity of reducing the dangers held out by the situation. Both parties subscribed to the conception of a neutral and independent Laos in something like the same way as Burma and Cambodia.' Something like, yes. However, in Laos the Pathet Lao had been conducting a civil war against the imperialists and their Laotian

lackeys. This is how Kennedy's speech went on: 'Mr. Khrushchev emphasised a point that I would like to recall. *He said that numerous disorders are happening in the world and that not all of them should be attributed to him. He is quite right.*' (our emphasis—Editors)

'But, of course, Mr. Kennedy, I, wise old Khrushchev, I am not capable of this folly . . . it's the Chinese to whom the disorder must be attributed. See how they liquidated the poor old Kuo-min-tang, despite our warnings. They are capable of anything; the devil only knows what they think and want.' Thus spoke the 'clever pupil' in the classroom at Vienna to the strict schoolteacher. But in politics things happen otherwise and are called by different names. We would be fascinated to know the undivulged details of this meeting.

'The organisation of the world' inside 'co-existence' or, if you prefer, 'co-existence' inside 'organisation of the world' had to begin by checking and liquidating the revolutionary movements in the neighbourhood of China. The Chinese example threatened imperialism's position in Asia. It was absolutely necessary to put an end to these 'disorders' which were in no way 'attributable' to the peaceful Khrushchev. Through this pact the bureaucracy gave an unrestricted passage to manoeuvres aimed at the encircling of China and to preparation for an armed attack.

The negotiations on the technicalities of this agreement were entrusted to a commission which, in the framework of the disarmament conference, was to discuss the accomplishment of peace in Laos. We should take note that when this conference opened on March 14, 1962, that country still constituted a serious problem, and the obstacles seemed insurmountable. From this we may deduce that since June 1961 Khrushchev had not managed to completely impose his point of view on the Chinese. A deep and detailed study of these negotiations would be able to enlighten us on this subject. We think, however, that there were differences which certainly contributed to making the Soviet bureaucracy reconsider its aid to China. Finally, on July 9, 1962, the Laotian declaration of neutrality ended in complete agreement. Laos declared itself ready to observe rigorously the conditions of neutrality: adherence to the five principles of Bandung, rejection of any military alliance, rejection of installation of any military base, rejection of any interference in its internal affairs. Two facts emphasised the real nature of this agreement. Under the attacks of his extremists, Kennedy had to acknowledge that the Laotian agreement was a withdrawal, while at the

same time emphasising that it opened up further possibilities. Without such an agreement the Laotian situation threatened to deteriorate definitely in favour of the communists. According to Kennedy this agreement served on the one hand to check the development of the revolution and on the other hand to open up 'possibilities'. What these meant was the encircling of China. The comment of the *Christian Science Monitor* of July 24, 1962, unmasked the role of the Soviet bureaucracy in this affair: 'If, after signing an agreement in these conditions, the Soviet Union allows its colleagues and its agents situated inside or in the neighbourhood of Laos to violate it, then the whole world will know why the agreement was not able to function.'

Why, one might then ask, did the Chinese sign the agreement? The concrete reasons could be very numerous and, amongst others, it is possible that the Chinese were fooled, despite their increased distrust towards their 'Soviet brothers'. Now a general picture emerges. Beginning with the Laos agreement, the respective positions on nuclear tests softened up. The two 'great powers' made visible efforts to achieve a partial agreement in this field. A mere coincidence? In politics there are no coincidences *like this*. The vast 'organisation of the world' was beginning concretely with the encircling of China. The Laotian agreement, the unprincipled position on the nuclear test ban and the suppression of all economic aid to China illustrate the second great betrayal of the Chinese revolution by the bureaucracy of the USSR. But this time the nature of the betrayal is somewhat different from that of 1925-27. It is consciously and directly that Moscow is negotiating to hand over China to imperialism.

(b) For the defence of China

But the Chinese reaction had to come some day or other. It is quite possible that the attack of the Chinese army against India was China's reply to the preparations for encircling her. It seems probable that the Chinese wanted, through the offensive launched on October 20, 1962, to unmask the real aim of Khrushchev's manoeuvres, disrupt the process of encirclement and thus force both the imperialists and the Soviets to lay their cards on the table. In this sense the question of the responsibility for the unleashing of military operations, not decisive nevertheless, had already been settled by the installation of the means of encirclement. Did not Nehru himself say on November 11 that he had ordered the liberation of Indian territory in the North-East frontier area?

The Sino-Indian war cannot be separated from its international context and considered in isolation. It was an integral part of the whole of the imperialist plan for South-East Asia, of which the first stage was the 'neutralisation' of Laos. Seen in a wider framework, it showed that the pressure exerted by imperialism had, momentarily, shifted its point of application from the USSR to China. For the Stalinist bureaucracy, panic-stricken by the threat of a revolution, had allied itself with imperialism against China. In giving this concrete, and in no way peaceful, content to its policy of co-existence, the Soviet bureaucracy ratified in its actions the plans of imperialism. We have to take up the brief history of this short war in detail to shed some light on these various aspects.

First, the interdependence which existed between the 'Cuban affair' and the Chinese question obliges us to point out certain facts concerning Cuba, closely linked with the Sino-Indian war. Thus it was three days after the start of the Chinese offensive, on October 23, that Kennedy ordered the blockade of Cuba. The determination of the imperialists to switch to a general offensive became very clear. On October 26 the Indian government proclaimed a state of emergency; two days later the USSR and the United States reached agreement over Cuba. This Soviet capitulation was made complete by the mission of Mikoyan who was 'sent to 'convince' Castro on October 31. Reassured, the imperialists launched a very broad operation. On November 1, Krishna Menon left Nehru's defence ministry. Later on, Averell Harriman, Kennedy's special Far Eastern adviser, unveiled what lay behind this affair in these terms: K. Menon '... appeared to want to come to an agreement with the Chinese communists and to be convinced that he could manage to do this.' That is to say that Menon preferred negotiations to war with the Chinese; for this he paid by having to resign. In other words imperialism would not tolerate anyone envisaging 'peaceful co-existence' ... with China. American armaments were already expected in the Indian ports. 'The English ... are busy speeding up their deliveries of military equipment.' (*Le Monde*, November 3, 1962). The Egyptian champion of 'non-alignment' also indicated his ardent desire to send arms, alongside the imperialists, to his 'non-aligned' Indian friend. The USSR '... stays silent, and in vain would one look in the Moscow papers for a hint of encouragement for the Chinese in their dispute with India.' (*Le Monde*, November 3, 1962). This 'neutrality' in the struggle of a socialist country against imperialism, poorly hidden behind the figure of Nehru, constituted

a betrayal without precedent even in the history of the bureaucracy. The Indian Communist Party, for the first time in history, adopted the attitude of the social-democratic parties during the First World War. After two days of discussion its national council passed a resolution for the 'defence of the fatherland' against 'Chinese aggression'. And this time, the 'aggressor' was a workers' state and the 'fatherland' the imperialists. Despite this, it must be said again, unprecedented betrayal, the imperialists were not impressed. On November 5 the arrest of 40 communists was announced. Did the party reconsider its resolution? It did not.

In order to judge the Soviet attitude to the encircling of and the attack on the Chinese, we should recall that in 1961 Nehru requested that the Americans should contribute to India's armament. Later he renewed his demand, pressing Kennedy to send weapons. No reaction by the USSR was recorded. The protests came from Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand and Formosa, who for one reason or another created a big uproar over these projects for arming India. Already, the Soviet silence was an important sign. Now '... the announcement of the delivery of American weapons to India, and the articles describing the 'aerial bridge' designed to put these supplies rapidly on a working footing have not, *even in appearance*, provoked any reaction in Moscow.' (*Le Monde*, November 10, 1962.—Our emphasis). On November 11, Nehru expressed the hope that the USSR would honour its undertakings to deliver MiG-21 fighters to India and to install an assembly line for these fighters. We know Nehru's proverbial prudence. If Nehru allowed himself to proffer such insolence, it was only because he was absolutely certain about Soviet benevolence towards him. There were many signs of this in the USSR and the people's democracies: Indian cultural shows, exhibitions dealing with various aspects of Indian life, etc. In November an Indian consulate was opened in Odessa.

It was the 'Cuban affair' that unleashed the virulent attacks by the Chinese (and the Albanians) on the Soviet capitulators, but these attacks were spiced by the very recent experiences they had had in Chinese affairs. On November 15, the Peking *People's Daily* denounced Khrushchev's capitulation over Cuba. Two days later, *Red Flag* (the theoretical organ of the Chinese Communist Party) first evoked the struggle of Lenin against the opportunism of the Second International. The same day, the Chinese recommenced a widespread military offensive, and advanced rapidly into the interior of India. November 22 was the day of the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet bombers from Cuba,

and of the lifting of the American blockade: from then on the imperialists had their hands free.

From the point of view of the Sino-Indian war and, in general, of the establishment and strengthening of imperialism in Asia, the agreement on Cuba, apart from its general and 'Cuban' significance, possessed a special and well-defined character. This act of 'peaceful co-existence' released the means at imperialism's disposal for use against China and immediately made possible the spread of an imperialist war against the Chinese revolution. Future historians will establish to what degree the Soviet leaders consciously sought to sell out China.

The Chinese, at any rate, understood what was going on. With astonishing rapidity they reacted by ordering an immediate cease-fire, proclaimed a general fall-back to behind the previous demarcation line and proposed a meeting between Chou en-lai and Nehru. Stupefaction all round! No one could understand the Chinese: what was at the back of their minds? Obviously the leading actors understood. The first stage of the war was over; it was now necessary to move the pawns on the encirclement chess board and for this to be seen.

The rapid advance of the Chinese had disclosed the bad state of the Indian army and the weak points of the encirclement preparations. The Indian troops were seriously threatened. The United States and England, without even worrying about appearances, had sent, each for their own part, a military mission. The importance of the problem was displayed by the fact that they were led by Duncan Sandys and Averell Harriman, two high officials in their respective governments. Kennedy had already begun to study seriously the technicalities of massive military aid. In another quarter, the help given to India revealed the encirclement's other great weakness: the system of alliance against China was by no means solidly constructed. Pakistan, in particular, was energetically opposed to the military aid provided for India. It was also necessary to make certain of the more active 'neutrality' of the USSR. Lord Home, the English Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated on November 23 that he foresaw '... the transformation of the sterile and negative doctrine of co-existence into an active co-operation with all European countries *at present* communist and amongst them the USSR . . . (for) one day, and perhaps sooner than you think, the leaders of the Soviet Union will realise that their country *belongs to the West . . .*' (*Le Monde*, November 23, 1962.—Our emphasis). The worthy Lord was urging the bureaucracy, '*at present*' communist, to break with '*Asia*', and to practise '*active co-operation*' in this quarter, for co-existence was no longer enough.

The Indian efforts had the same purpose, serving, in this way, too, the aims of the English and Americans.

The English and American missions arrived at New Delhi but, on November 28, Duncan Sandys was in Pakistan where he met Ayub Khan and the Pakistan National Assembly. The aim of these talks was to calm down opposition to the military aid supplied to India, and to press the Pakistanis to settle their dispute with India over Kashmir. While these negotiations were being carried on openly, 'left wingers' in Europe were shamefully flocking to condemn 'Chinese aggression'. The overflowing activity of the military and diplomatic missions was, in itself, a symptom of great interest. Sandys, negotiating with the Pakistanis on the 28th, returned to New Delhi on the 29th but was back in Pakistan that same evening. While he was away in New Delhi Harriman continued the discussion with the Pakistanis. . . . One might have thought that these missions had lost their way and that it was Pakistan which they were patronising against the 'aggressor'. Play in the diplomatic game became sharper. The Chinese understood the situation very well and were masters of it, not only by virtue of their own diplomatic activity but also through this magnificent setting where every actor has to play his part openly. This deserves our detailed attention, for the masks were being torn away on every side. Events of different kinds rushed forth requiring us to employ a telegraphic style. It is from these mosaics, from this kaleidoscope of events, that the real physiognomy of each of the actors emerges.

On November 28, Chou en-lai stated to the Indian chargé d'affaires: 'We want to stay friends.' Obviously Nehru had to reflect somewhat, as the newspapers point out, on what his reply to the Chinese proposals for a friendly settlement should be. An Afro-Asian 'summit', called by Mrs. Bandaranaike to serve as an intermediary in the conflict, was being prepared in Colombo. Harriman arrived back in Washington and on December 1 he gave his report. He found the condition of the Indian army alarming. However, as *Le Monde* pointed out: '. . . it was first of all politically that the Harriman mission sought to straighten out the situation in the Asian sub-continent.' The English and Americans wanted, in the first instance, to settle the Kashmir problem. Nehru had already indicated his willingness to discuss. But there were difficulties. It was reported from Pakistan that opposition there to negotiations on Kashmir was extremely strong. At precisely the same moment the friendly talks between Mikoyan and Kennedy were continuing in Washington Nehru was still wondering about his reply, which had to be

'non-aligned', despite the fact that '. . . military preparations are going ahead just as actively as at the height of the crisis.' (*Le Monde*, December 4, 1962). In the end the reply, worthy of a policy of 'non-alignment', was a note to China, on December 3, announcing the closing of the Indian consulates in Shanghai and Lhasa. It politely invited the Chinese to do likewise with their consulates in Bombay and Calcutta.

One important fact: while, on June 22, the USSR, for the hundredth time, had used her veto in the security council against the settlement of the Kashmir problem, now she was briskly dispensed with. Nor did she do anything against the Anglo-American manoeuvres in Pakistan. On the contrary; at the Congress of the Italian CP, Kozlov stated: 'This conflict is doing serious harm to the interests of the fraternal Chinese people as well as of friendly India.' (*Le Monde*, December 5, 1962). Naturally a war harms the interests of the belligerents. On December 4, Dange, the nationalist leader of the Indian CP, left for Moscow. Harriman revealed the objectives of American policy to a television audience: '. . . It is in the interest of the United States that India maintains friendly relations with the USSR.' (*Le Monde*, December 11, 1962). But Kozlov had already given an affirmative reply to this recommendation. 'My brother's enemy is my friend'; is that one of those Russian proverbs that Khrushchev likes to quote so much?

The Americans acted accordingly. On December 5, the Agency France Presse announced that a Japanese commercial delegation in Washington '. . . would undergo political pressure from President Kennedy, who is demanding that Japan give definite co-operation in the struggle against People's China.' A Japanese newspaper replied: 'If people try to make us adopt a position of inflexible hostility towards China, they will set off a storm not only in Japan but throughout Asia.' (*Le Monde*, December 6, 1962). The encirclement of China was not easy. The Americans realised this. Far more costly was friendly 'neutrality', the peaceful co-existence so dear to the Soviet bureaucracy. In his article in *Le Monde* on December 11, entitled 'Americans seduced by "realpolitik"', André Fontaine summed up the situation in this way: 'In South Vietnam . . . American troops are actively engaged against Communist guerillas, and the Federal treasury is devoting a million dollars a day to this struggle . . . (In India) they lost no time in sending planes with American crews . . . they are beginning to receive the profits of this investment at the disarmament conference where the Indian delegate, Mr. Lall, has sensibly

become reconciled to their point of view on the necessity for on-the-spot inspections.' As we see, Mr. Fontaine knows how to connect causes and effects. The uproar surrounding the 'Chinese aggression' must not make us forget that at the self-same moment the American army was fighting against the Vietnamese revolution and was engaged in severe battles. It was in fact a question of one single large problem: the extension of the revolution in Asia or the stabilisation of imperialism which was preparing, by isolating it, for aggression against China. The meaning of the Indian attitude of 'non-alignment' is clarified by the 'reconciliation' referred to by the *Le Monde* journalist.

However, diplomatic activity was intensifying. A Chinese personality visited the countries of the Colombo conference one after the other. The Indians did likewise with two delegations. The presence of the Yugoslavs was noted: Popovitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was in Cairo, and Kardelj was in Indonesia, from where he was preparing to leave for New Delhi. What were they up to in this affair? We were to find out on December 19 when Kardelj arrived in the Indian capital. On December 21 the *Le Monde* correspondent cabled: '... there is hardly any doubt that, in this affair, the Belgrade government is doing its best to promote New Delhi's theses.' A significant term: now one could better understand what Kardelj's wish to see the conflict resolved under 'honourable conditions' meant. Moreover, there was talk about attempts by the Yugoslav leader to broaden the Colombo conference which, according to him, was too much influenced by the presence of countries bordering on China. He feared that 'pro-Chinese' sentiments would dominate the conference. So we find Nehru, Kardelj, the prudent Khrushchev and the western intellectuals, all indignant at the 'Chinese aggression'. The tragedy was that Sandys and Harriman were indignant too and that, behind this noble sentiment, there still lay the reality of the American intervention in India, Vietnam and elsewhere. These 'revolutionaries' were serious; they protested; they were anxious; all this was harmful 'to friends and brothers'. But they remained blind—or at any rate, dumb—in face of what even a Fontaine could see. They protested against the presence of Chinese troops in India, but did not protest against that of American forces in Vietnam, which, it is true, would have been difficult because it would have been a bad policy of co-existence to protest against Harriman who 'understood' so well their indignation at the 'Chinese aggression'.

The six 'Colombo' countries reached agreement

and entrusted Mrs. Bandaranaike with a conciliation mission to Peking and New Delhi. On the same day Khrushchev received Dange, head of the Indian CP. We do not know anything about their conversation but in the USSR Soviet-Indian friendship was raised to an exalted level. Now, the Indian 'friends' no longer wished for peace. Distrust of any idea of conciliation and of the 'good offices' of Colombo was widespread. Naturally, Khrushchev kept Soviet diplomacy out of the way. The dirty work was left to Kardelj. For their part the Soviet bureaucrats contented themselves renewing the violence of their attack on the Chinese. That the Soviet trade mission in Shanghai returned to Moscow and that Chinese consulates in the USSR had already been closed was 'nothing'. On December 17 the AFP reported a message from Khrushchev to Nehru which, it was said, assured the latter of the USSR's sympathy and informed him that the USSR had tried without success to hold the Chinese back. It was stated that the message included a promise by Khrushchev to support the Indians all the way. Did such a message exist? That is not important, for in any case, it would have been in full conformity with Soviet policy; moreover, no denial of the AFP despatch came from any Soviet quarter.

However, one can see that it was not really India that was in question here. Even if one artificially separates that country from the context of world imperialism, not one minute's hesitation is possible for a Marxist when a workers' state is in danger. In any case, it is impossible to consider India, or any other capitalist country, in isolation. The events and facts of this war, one after another, furnish us with an impressive documentation on the nature of imperialism, one and indivisible, under the direction of American capital. The secret content of the policy of imperialism is precisely to organise the encirclement of the Chinese revolution and to prepare to attack it.

On December 15 there opened in Washington a series of talks between Harriman and the American ambassadors to Pakistan and India. The aim of these discussions was to find the best and quickest methods of supplying India with modern military equipment and of facilitating Indo-Pakistan reconciliation. Three days later the *Le Monde* correspondent reported from New Delhi that the Americans were threatening to cut off India's arms supply, if no agreement between her and Pakistan were forthcoming; he pointed out that the Americans '... would like to drown all the petty national and local rivalries in a great wave of resistance to Chinese imperialism.' The so-called 'non-alignment'

and neutrality of India had already collapsed. On December 19, India voted for the American project for Korea at the UNO political commission.

But the diplomatic battle was not easy. On December 21 China returned military material she had captured to India. Five days later came the signing of a frontier agreement between China and Outer Mongolia. The next day an India delegation at last left for Pakistan. But hardly had it arrived when it learnt the result of the Sino-Pakistani negotiations: an agreement in principle on common frontiers. On the same day, December 28, came the signing of an agreement between a Japanese trade delegation and China. The Indo-Pakistani negotiations began in a very bad atmosphere. On December 31 Mrs. Bandaranaike arrived in Peking, and let us at once point out that on January 22 the Chinese government was to accept the Colombo proposals as a basis for negotiations. On January 3 a Chinese trade delegation arrived in Pakistan and two days later a trade agreement was concluded. Meanwhile great displays of Sino-Ceylonese friendship were under way in Peking. The Chinese were conducting their foreign affairs devilishly well. Faced with this aptitude and success, the prospect of an encirclement receded into the distance and 'necessitated' brutal intervention by the Americans. They now threatened Ceylon with suspension of economic aid. At the beginning of January 1963 big battles between the Viet Cong and the Americans were announced: heavy losses by the latter. According to an American enquiry, it was possible that Peking was actively supporting the Viet Cong. On January 9, the commander in chief of American forces in the Pacific, Admiral Felt, arrived in Saigon in person to organise and strengthen the intervention. On the 12th there was a meeting between Kuznetsov and Harriman in Washington; Harriman demanded that the USSR should accelerate the departure of Vietnamese soldiers from Laos. On the same day the American ambassador in Vientiane offered transport planes to the Laotian government, thus violating the neutrality agreement. And, while Chiang kai-shek was sinking a warship belonging to People's China, Gromyko was drinking a toast to Soviet-Indian friendship in the course of a luncheon at the Indian embassy in the presence of Malinovsky.

We will halt here. The hands have been sufficiently revealed. Everyone has shown his true face. But this struggle has not yet finished. Within the framework of 'peaceful co-existence' the preparations against China continue. Our voice must be raised: against the betrayal of the Stalinists, committed in the name of 'co-existence', and for the defence of the Chinese revolution!

5. Split inside Stalinism

Faced with the threat of revolution, and, by way of consequence, with serious world problems, international Stalinism is going through a deep crisis. The component elements of Stalinism have begun a struggle which is leading them to break apart.

The most noticeable sign of this breach is the attitude of the Indian party which has openly taken sides both with its own bourgeois government and with imperialism against China. Immediately afterwards comes the Yugoslav party, the promoter, on the theoretical and practical plane, of 'co-existence' and what is more the *eminence grise* of the policy of encouragement to the Indian bourgeoisie. It is difficult to imagine a reconciliation between these parties and the Chinese party.

Revisionism characterises the Stalinist parties. The majority of them, including that of the USSR, have not yet reached the stage of openly sharing the attitude of the Indian party. This revisionism plays a centrist role between the two present poles of international Stalinism: Chinese and Indian. In reality, it fights the revolutionary position of the Chinese party and protects and encourages the open betrayal of the Indian party. The whole of international Stalinism is involved in the debate which is developing and which, by our own choice, we are omitting to analyse in detail. The discussion is developing between the capitulatory position of 'peaceful co-existence' and the revolutionary position of the class struggle. At the present stage, the decomposition of Stalinism has only just begun, and it is crystallised in the fact that the vast majority of parties have taken an unprincipled centrist position which expresses itself in attempts to 'overcome' discussions by compromises and mutual concessions.

In reality, this equivocal situation disguises the fact that the discussion is developing around a false alternative. The bases for the Chinese criticism are confused. The Chinese communists have let it be understood that they support a return to the policy of Stalin in contrast to the 'liberal' course of Khrushchev. The principal question is to realise how the revolutionary alternative to 'peaceful co-existence' is presented and understood by the Chinese. It seems to us that, so long as they maintain their unprincipled alliance with the murderer Enver Hoxha, and so long as they hail the bourgeois regime of Ben Bella as authentically revolutionary and so on, their criticism of Khrushchev remains within the framework of Stalinist conceptions. This is also expressed in the fact that they address themselves to the leaderships of the other parties, in

visible anticipation of bringing them round to accept their position. That is a serious illusion. In the field of Stalinism the Russians are the strongest, not because they discuss more intelligently, but because Stalinism is the policy of the petty-bourgeois bureaucracy of the USSR. Now, the Stalinist parties, throughout the world, are organised in such a way that their leadership expresses the interests of this social layer. Hence, a debate undertaken on Stalinist bases can only lead either to a reconciliation on an unprincipled compromise or, of course, to the isolation of the Chinese party.

Today the Chinese party is addressing itself to the leaderships which unite Stalinism's petty-bourgeois components. Now, the Stalinist parties, even today, harbour a revolutionary potentiality; not in themselves but by virtue of the fact that they incorporate and influence the working class, directly or indirectly. The fundamental condition for the development of this potentiality is, for the Chinese, to turn their back on these leaderships and to address themselves directly to the workers and revolutionaries, that is, to adopt Marxist revolutionary theory and practice. This presupposes the complete abandonment and criticism of the Stalinist position of socialism in a single country in favour of revolution by the international working class. The principal elements of such a policy are, firstly, a consistent and resolute struggle against the bureaucracy which is, at the same time, a struggle for the achievement of workers' democracy; then, in the international field, a complete break, not only with imperialism (which is already a fact where the Chinese communists are concerned), but also with the pseudo-revolutionary Stalinist petty-bourgeoisie. Workers' democracy at home, a break with petty-bourgeois tendencies of all kinds abroad, and a policy of alliance with the international working class, only this kind of orientation could provide a really revolutionary basis for the discussion carried on against Stalinist revisionism. Only with this attitude could the Chinese CP be capable of separating the working class from the

corrupted leadership of the Stalinists.

Is it possible for the Chinese CP to manage to adopt such a position? That is a question to which we cannot give a categorical reply. The internal situation in China leads us to fear a bureaucratisation going against workers' democracy. Such a tendency asserted itself with the brushing aside of the revolutionary wing in 1957-58. But, on the other hand, the Chinese communists brought about their own revolution precisely in opposition to Stalinist policy, and this not so long ago. We cannot then, *a priori*, dismiss the possibility of a recovery by this party. The international context plays the role of a catalyst. The policy of 'peaceful co-existence' is imposed on the Soviet bureaucracy. But the Chinese communists have to fight this policy, which means the encirclement of China and the preparation of an attack against her. Here is the choice: capitulation or alliance with the international working class. This international pressure will sooner or later bring the Chinese party and communists face to face with this fundamental choice.

But independently of their choice, between the roads of capitulation and that of revolution, 'peaceful co-existence' is introducing, and has already introduced, the elements of a split inside Stalinism. That is obvious, but this split will not be automatic. Even a discussion around a false alternative has shaken the unity of these parties. It is even more important to realise that this split and the decomposition of Stalinism are inconceivable unless the real revolutionary position is put forward. Stalinism must be unmasked before the working masses and the revolutionaries. This is the only way to transform the possibility of a break into a real fact, and this real fact into a truly important process. The Chinese have already begun this development. In order for it to continue, hard and persevering work is necessary in an international scale and in each country. The aim is a new revolutionary leadership for the international working class, an indispensable condition for tomorrow's revolutionary victories.

The New Course By Leon Trotsky

A collection of articles written in 1923 during the lull before the great storm of persecution which was later to overwhelm Russian Bolshevism. Here Trotsky, analyses the incipient stages of the degeneration of the Communist Party, uncovers its causes and proposes measures for combating its further decline. He here analyses the party in a historical, that is dialectical way, the relationships between generations, social strata, groups, factional formations, tradition and the multitude of factors that go to make a revolutionary party. 111 pages, 3/6




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
The Draft Programme of the Communist International by Leon Trotsky

This is part of the author's criticism of the draft programme submitted by the Executive Committee of the Third (Communist) International to the 6th Congress of the Comintern which was held in July 1928. The manuscript of that criticism was written by Trotsky during his exile in Alma-Ata (Central Asia). It was sent to the Congress in Moscow together with an appeal for reinstatement into the party from which he had been expelled a few months before by the Stalinist faction in 1927. Stalin and his supporters had invented the theory of 'Socialism in one country', which was made party policy in 1925 and converted into an article of faith to be defended by the world institutions of Stalinism. It is this theory which Trotsky criticises in these pages. 64 pages, 1/-

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