



INTERNATIONAL

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

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Editorial

THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND KHRUSHCHEVIAN POLICY

With de Gaulle's visit to the United States the preparations among the "Westerners" for the 16 May summit conference have been completed. These preparations were laborious and difficult, for substantial differences divide the front of the "Atlantic" nations. To the degree that the economic power of international capitalism is rebuilt, revived competition and the struggle for markets are all the more sharply renewed. The stronger capitalism becomes, the more it is divided.

In the struggle for markets it is Germany and the countries of the Common Market, as well as Japan, which are stepping up their advance, in comparison with Great Britain, the other countries of the "Seven," and even the United States. But even inside the Common Market it is especially Germany which is making progress and seems to be threatening to dominate that market. From this situation several consequences arise, some of which have come fully to light during the preparations for the summit conference.

Macmillan went to the United States especially to bring Washington to a better understanding of vital British interests in connection with the expected strengthening of the Common Market. Britain fears a considerable reduction in its substantial exports to Benelux and Germany (which represent two-thirds of its total exports to the Common Market) if the dispositions for the "speeding-up" of the Common Market go into effect in July, raising customs duties in both Benelux and Germany. On a longer-term basis, it is the whole essential trade of Britain with the countries of the Common Market that is at stake. British reactions are therefore sharp, going to the extent of threatening all sorts of reprisals, in-

cluding a possible rapprochement with the USSR.

As for the United States, which is witnessing a drop in its international trade and a decline in its exports, it is, in this question, pulled one way by its political interest in cementing a unified continental Europe, including Germany, and in another by its own economic interests, which are beginning to suffer from the competitive dynamism of the Common Market, and of Germany in particular. Indeed, Germany is, by its continuing expansion, worrying even its partners in the Common Market — for instance, France. From this fact there arises another consequence which has played a role both in the transactions among the "Westerners" and in the outlook for the summit conference: the nearly common interest of both the "Westerners" and the Soviets not to strengthen Germany further, by maintaining the status quo of the present partition.

There always remains, of course, the special question of Berlin. The "Westerners" seem to have reached on this question an agreement based on the supposition that a "firm" attitude on their part will not produce any really dangerous reaction of the part of the Kremlin — whence their decision to stand firm on the present status quo in Berlin.

Thus the situation on the eve of the summit conference is as follows:

The "Westerners" are ready to swap the status quo of the general situation in Germany against a recognition by Khrushchev of the status quo in Berlin. Their soundings-out of Khrushchev seem to have convinced them that he will accept this deal for a while longer.

Under these conditions the summit conference will fall back on "disarmament," where up till now the impasse has been total, but where it is hoped that there will be limited agreements about stopping tests (at least, certain tests) and other dispositions capable of putting over on public opinion the impression of a maintenance of "ease-ment" and a beginning of measures of "disarmament."

Thus in the best of cases the summit conference might end without an abrupt break, by keeping up the dialogue even without any real agreement on any essential question. It would thus express, on the plane of the correlation of forces, the prolongation of an equilibrium preserving the status quo.

In reality, however, there is not exactly an equilibrium of forces imposing the strict maintenance of the present status quo. The combined strength of the workers' states, the colonial revolution, and the workers' movement in the metropolitan countries is able — on condition that it be taken under a revolutionary leadership — to make imperialism retreat still further.

It is the policy of the Kremlin and the Communist Parties which is granting capitalism advantages that scarcely result from its intrinsic power at present. The theme of "peaceful co-existence" on which Khrushchev's policy is at present based does not exploit any of the real weaknesses of capitalism so as to advance the revolution throughout the world. On the contrary, it operates fundamentally in favor of capitalism.

It causes the workers' states not to exploit their present military superiority to obtain possible concessions from imperialism without necessarily driving it to war.

It puts the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries in tow to the national bourgeoisie and its heroes, the Nehrus, Sukarnos, Nassers, Kassem, Lotts, et al, who all have profited to a greater or lesser extent from the unconditional support which the Communist Parties, under the Kremlin's instigation, have accorded them, to consolidate their power, install their dictatorship, and — invariably — turn against the masses, and even against the U S S R or China, and once more draw close to imperialism.

Lastly, it liquidates the revolutionary proletarian movement in the advanced capitalist countries, to the degree that it abandons the prospect and fighting methods of the socialist revolution and settles down into the practice of parliamentary neo-opportunism, even in so extreme a case as the Gaullist dictatorship in France, with its phantom parliament.

The "theoretical" justification of this policy of liquidating revolutionary possibilities is given by

the "argument" that the U S S R is now "catching up with" and will soon "surpass" the United States in economic production, and that by that fact the henceforth incontestable superiority of the Soviet system will be universally established. The universal victory of that system will then spread contagiously — almost automatically and peacefully. From this follows the supreme need in the meantime — at any cost, with every sort of opportunist compromise, every sort of alliance, etc — to preserve "peace."

But, first of all, "to catch up with and surpass" the *per capita* economic production of the United States — which, though it has fallen behind the U S S R in its rate of development, still also continues to go forward — would still require a couple of decades. It is hardly likely that imperialism and the colonial bourgeoisie would in the meantime stand passively watching this victorious march of "socialism" in the U S S R, or that the international situation would congeal, without explosions here and there in the limits of the current status quo, and would not bring about developments escaping from the strict control of both the Kremlin and the imperialists.

In reality the Kremlin's policy is determined, not by the vision of a completed "socialism" achieved "peacefully" in the U S S R, but by the specific interests of the conservative bureaucracy in the U S S R, and the no less specific situation of its present political leadership. The Soviet bureaucracy has no liking for a flowering of revolutionary possibilities throughout the world, which would finally imperil its own position as a privileged caste in the U S S R. It likes only limited gains, which it is in a position to control and digest, or to which it is driven in order to defend itself against imperialism.

The special situation of the present political leadership, namely the Khrushchev fraction, reinforces this conservative trend of the Soviet bureaucracy. The Khrushchev fraction hammered out its victory in the U S S R by staking on the deep repulsion of the Soviet masses for the abuses and crimes of Stalin and for the horrors of war. But the victory of the Khrushchev fraction is not and never could be definitive. The struggle is probably still going on both inside the Soviet bureaucracy and in the international Stalinist bureaucracy.

Noteworthy was the virulence of a new attack — against Stalin and against the "anti-party" Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, "themselves compromised in the abuses and crimes" of the Stalinist period — launched by the Soviet press on the occasion of the recent anniversary of Lenin's birth. Equally noteworthy on this same occasion was the series of articles that the Chinese press devoted to fighting against illusions about

“peaceful coexistence” and against Khrushchev’s way of “prettying-up” imperialism.

Throughout the world at present powerful new revolutionary forces are operating, which may cause blow-ups, explosions, in the status quo set-up that the imperialists and the Kremlin are busy in carefully maintaining. The “uninterrupted” Chinese Revolution is maintaining and extending the experiment of the Communes, which are bringing to the fifth part of humanity the most profound revolutionary overturn in history. The fact, furthermore, that China is not participating in the conferences and meetings that bring together the other countries of the world, is per se an enormous limitation of the scope of their “agreements” and their labors, and keeps up a ferment of revolutionary instability which will go on increasing.

In Africa the Algerian revolution raises the question of either a substantial retreat by French imperialism or an extension of the war, which would kindle further flames throughout all Africa.

In Latin America the Cuban revolution, the chronic revolutionary crisis in Argentina, the continuance of the Bolivian revolution, the events in Venezuela, the difficulties in Brazil — these are all so many focal points in mutual interaction which are preparing a higher stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolution in that region of the world.

The economic prosperity of the advanced capitalist countries themselves is only relative and fragile, especially in the United States. The dimensions of the “boom” expected after the steel strike, building up through the whole of the current year, have already been reduced to more modest proportions. “The revolution of rising great expectations” is over. The year began gloomily: a slight decline in industrial production in February and March, an increase in unemployment, a drop in steel production and building. In March it was even thought that we were seeing the beginning of a new “recession.” It will perhaps be avoided this year, but it threatens to occur in 1961.

For it is now recognized that it is possible that the American economy has again reached “maturity,” and that “it will be more and more difficult to find the effective demand needed to achieve full employment.” (*The Economist*, 23 April 1960.) It is also recognized

that each postwar recession has been a little worse than the one before and that each recovery has left the economy with a higher level of unemployment; that there appears to be a gradual widening of the margin between capacity and output in those industries for which measurements are made; that high and rising imports and the “export of jobs through foreign investment are scarcely bullish for employment; in short, that the economy has, after all, been spurred by artificial stimulants for the last twenty years and that the real test is only now beginning. [Ibid]

The British economy may also soon find itself out of breath again.

There remain only the German “miracle” and the currently more general one of the Common Market. But this “miracle” is exploiting conditions which, while still favorable, are conjunctural rather than eternal: broadening of the European market; extension in foreign markets at the expense of other imperialisms, including Great Britain and even the United States.

The hour of “maturity” of the German economy and that of the Common Market is also coming. It is a question of taking all these factors into account for a revolutionary policy resolutely hostile to the paralyzing illusions of the interpretation of “peaceful coexistence” offered by Khrushchev and the real revisionists who follow him. Everywhere it is necessary to work up a programme and an organizational tactic of a transitional nature, which would help the masses and their vanguard to carry on struggles with the prospect of the victory of socialism.

The rhythms and forms of this struggle will differ in the colonial and semi-colonial countries from those in advanced capitalist countries, and differ within each group; but the general orientation is everywhere the same: a concret transitional programme for socialism, to be applied by the united front of the proletarian and peasant forces, against imperialism, capitalism, and the national bourgeoisie.

It is also in this way that “peace” can be really guaranteed by disarming imperialism through the steady spread of the victorious socialist revolution.

25 April 1960

THE STRUGGLE FOR UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

While eternal wranglings on disarmament are going on at official conferences, action from the masses have produced not only wavering or even the spectacular overthrow of bloody dictatorships like those of Menderès in Turkey and Syngman Rhee in South Korea, but have also constituted the only effective means of struggle for peace, by opposing the continual and growing preparations by imperialism for war.

From the Far East to the Near East, the foundations of the three bastions of American Imperialism's military apparatus have recently been profoundly shaken by the revolutionary action of the masses. In Japan the struggle against the treaty which ties this country to the Yankee chariot of war, has produced vigorous and repeated demonstrations by the dynamic revolutionary student youth, supported by important sections of the working class movement.

In South Korea also, the student youth, encouraged by the example of Japan, set in motion the first mighty wave of the new revolution in this martyred country. This wave was immediately swelled and given a another dimension by the participation of the working class from the urban centers in the interior and from the ports.

In Turkey this same youth has fearlessly arisen to face the forces of repression, to challenge the open dictatorship into which the politico-military clique, who have bound the country hand and foot and delivered it to the criminal NATO strategists, are seeking refuge.

With mortal anguish, Yankee Imperialism has registered the extreme shakiness of the dictatorial regimes to whom it had given its mighty support, and now awaits the worst.

Here and there, even in Europe itself, there are signs of a new reinforced pressure from the masses against imperialism's military plans.

Action against nuclear weapons and for unilateral disarmament has met with remarkable success over the last period.

During April, anti-nuclear marchers in Belgium and especially in England, have attracted an important number of student and working class elements. It is also in England that the conscious movement for unilateral disarmament is gaining in proportion, and has now become the line of the great majority of the Labour Party against the official policy of its leadership.

In April two annual conferences, those of the Coöperative Party, and the Shop Workers' Union, and in May those of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, have passed resolutions reversing their previous policies on disarmament. The two unions are among the six biggest in the country, with a combined vote of about one and a quarter million at the Trades Union Congress, and a million at the Labour Party Conference. Those votes, together with Cousins' Trade Union, some 750,000 votes in the Constituency Labour Parties, will undoubtedly ensure the defeat of the official non-nuclear club policy drawn up by the Labour Party and the TUC last summer, during the next Labour Party's Conference.

The half-defeat suffered by the Gaitskell tendency in its vain attempt to suppress the famous Fourth Clause of the Party's programme, which concerns the nationalization of the means of production, has now become complete with the new defeat inflicted on them over the question of disarmament.

So the way is now open for the rank and file to expand and gain a very important victory for the whole European working class movement, by eliminating the opportunist right wing from the Labour Party's leadership, and by imposing the only effective transitional policy of disarmament: *unilateral nuclear disarmament accompanied by a walk-out from NATO.*

NEW PHASE OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The decision taken by the GPRA during its last meeting at Tripoli, to make an appeal to foreign volunteers "without distinction of origin", marks a new phase in the uninterrupted development of the Algerian Revolution.

The revolt of the ultras in Algeria, their open opposition to de Gaulle's regime, the determination, the firmness — at least apparent — with which he was able to face this revolt, as well as his statements to the French population during his tour, which preceded the one to Algeria, had created the illusion of a possible and forthcoming compromise acceptable to the FLN, which would open the way for a cease-fire and "auto-determination".

On the Algerian revolution and the FLN — the organization which leads it — rests the weight at this moment

of the combined pressures imposed by the imperialists and Moscow in favour of a "reasonable" policy, if not the "generous" policy of de Gaulle, promoting the "democratic procedure of auto-determination", as well as the pressure — no less negligible — from Bourguiba and the Sultan, and probably also that exercised by a whole wing of the FLN itself.

This wing which, by the way, has a changing composition of different elements, is susceptible to those pressures as well as to that of a section of the Algerian population, which has undoubtedly suffered from the length, the losses, sacrifices, the immense misery which the barbarous war of an exasperated imperialism has inflicted on them. It is not perhaps a numerically important wing, but divers elements who either by their social origin, their age, their role in the revolution, or through

lack of clear perspectives, become discouraged from time to time and are, more than others, inclined to envisage, with a sense of relief, the possibilities of an acceptable compromise.

The Algerian people, it is true, have up to now taken upon themselves an immense task and have already paid an incredibly heavy price for the tenacious continuation of the revolution: more than 600,000 deaths, especially civilians, more than 1,000,000 displaced persons, put in concentration camps in Algeria, more than 250,000 refugees, children, women and old people, in Tunisia and Morocco, more than 25,000 prisoners and deportees in France.

For a people of 9,000,000, this is an immense draining of blood.

On the other hand, we must never forget that the Algerian people have in reality fought for more than six years already, and practically alone.

Neither the French proletariat nor the European proletariat have as yet provided sufficient aid.

As far as assistance from the Arab and African countries and various Workers States is concerned, it is important on the material level, but neither complete nor decisive.

When studying in detail the methods, the limitations of this aid, one cannot help thinking that as far as the aid is concerned, everything happens indeed as if the various forces who "help", want to exploit the Algerian affair for their own ends: either so that it lasts without being victorious, or for purposes of interior propaganda for their own people. And one is induced to think of Spain in the years 1936-1938.

The assertions of de Gaulle during his Algerian tour — the demand that the ALN should surrender, otherwise there would be the perspective of a long war, the rejection of genuine independence, the blackmail of "partition" in case of cessation — have provoked and inflamed a unanimous revival of spirit in the ranks of the FLN.

So it is that the ideas, plans, the most radical and revolutionary perspectives, which have ripened through the experience and the struggle in the ranks of FLN's numerous young cadre, are blossoming and will bear fruit.

The decision concerning the formation of an International Brigade, without any distinction of origin, should be within the framework of this new stage of maturity of the Algerian Revolution.

This is a decisive choice which broadens the political horizon of the revolution, makes it more popular among the world revolutionary masses, and which will also abolish the last taboos which still lie so heavily on the heroic popular movement of the Algerian masses.

Their struggle becomes the struggle of all of Africa, the whole Arab nation, and of all revolutionary forces all over the world.

The partisans and the Algerian people will no longer feel solitary.

The spirit of active international solidarity on the exploited and oppressed will inspire even more, with its invincible force, the struggle of the Algerian people, and will purge its revolution of all backwardness.

It is now necessary to combine this very important step forward with a practical application of measures, such as the transformation of the FLN into a political party, with a more concrete social programme, a more clearly defined internal organization, more control from its popular base, with more direct liaison between the fighters of the interior and the masses of the country, the transfer of main power inside Algeria itself, and the control by the FLN, so transformed, and the masses, over the government.

The invincible power of the Algerian Revolution, despite the unequal battle being waged on a strictly material level, against a powerful imperialism, lies in the attachment of the Algerian masses to the national and social content of the revolution and in the unlimited resources of the international masses who are ready to help the revolution.

That is the reason why it is necessary to define more clearly the social aspect of the revolution and to place it inside the larger African, Arab and international context.

The Fourth International salutes the decision taken to establish the International Brigade, and appeals to the conscious proletarians all over the world to enlist in the struggle side by side with their brothers in the Colonial Revolution.

THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS

The Argentine parliamentary elections provided a new demonstration of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie, of the political instability of the country, and of the inability of all the bourgeois political sectors and tendencies to overcome this situation.

The election campaign took place in a period of great struggles by the workers and the other exploited sectors of the population against the anti-labor and pro-imperialist policy of the government, a period characterized by constant and combative strikes and mobilizations, in the midst of an increasing repression by the Frondizi government and the army, who, two weeks before the elections, imposed a "regime of exception" tantamount to martial law, and put the whole country under the direct control of the army.

The election results show that the three big parties of the Argentine bourgeoisie — the Intransigent Radicals of Frondizi (1,783,000 votes), the People's Radicals of Balbín (2,060,000), and the Peronists, who again called for blank

ballots (2,086,000) — not only did not win new voters (despite the normal population increase), but even polled a number of votes slightly lower than in the previous elections of 1957 and 1958.

The bourgeois opposition's inability to capitalize on the deep popular discontent against the policy of Frondizi, by offering a real alternative to that policy, was reflected on the one hand by the government's maintaining its electoral positions, and, on the other, by the lack of a bourgeois political centre of a decisive weight nationally, of a bourgeois political force that electorally controls a majority sector of the population. None of the three main bourgeois parties succeeded in obtaining even 25% of the votes.

This result will, on the one hand, spur the army even more to operate directly as the bourgeois arbiter of Argentine politics, and also, on the other hand, encourage those in favor of unifying the two Radicalisms to form a majority bourgeois party.

The Peronist campaign for blank ballots was carried out mainly by the "62 Organizations," the trade-union federation led by the Peronists, which forms part of the MOU (Movimiento Obrero Unificado), which engaged in an enormous publicity campaign of public meetings, leaflets, house-to-house visits, etc. The blank-ballot idea ran counter to the whole combative trend of the masses. It was a passive form of expression, and signified indirect support of the government by denying the masses any way of expressing themselves positively. Neither the Peronist Party nor the Peronist trade-union bureaucracy made any effort to "overturn" the government's decision preventing them from participating in the elections. In reality, blank-ballot voting constituted for them a means of keeping up their indirect alliance with the government, and especially of keeping the proletariat in a state of political passivity by preventing its mobilization and increase in political maturity.

Although the idea was at first received with great resistance, blank-ballot voting again got the support of the fundamental sectors of the proletariat, which, in the absence of any alternative, expressed in this way its desire to maintain its cohesion and unity and to vote against both the government and the bourgeois opposition tied up with the oligarchy.

The blank-ballot vote also showed the decisive political weight of the trade-union organizations, whose leaderships and apparatuses were the main support of the campaign, and the decisive argument for the proletariat and the masses.

This fully confirms the policy of the Argentine Trotskyists in fighting for the formation of a labor party based on the trade unions in order to swing on to this path of positive action, independent of the bourgeoisie, the immense political force centred round the trade unions.

The Communist Party also limited itself to blank-ballot voting. It made no real fight against the Frondizi government's decision not to permit its participation in the elections (as a matter of fact, in at least three provinces the local authorities had disregarded this decision, recognizing the CP as a having a right to run). It joined the Peronist trade-union bureaucracy in barring the road to increased political maturity for the masses. The Communist Party rank and file received with deep opposition and many protests the passive position of casting blank ballots, which had just been added to the CP's treacherous position of giving an official welcome to Eisenhower on his recent tour. It is certain that the (not very numerous) Communist electorate and even part of the CP members turned a deaf ear to the appeal to cast blank ballots, and gave their votes to the Left Socialists or to the Trotskyists. The Communist contribution to the blank-ballot vote can be estimated at not over 70,000 to 80,000 in the entire country. The result of blank-ballot voting constitutes a new failure of the Stalinist leadership and will within a short time deepen the crisis that is shaking the Argentine CP.

The only bourgeois party that achieved an important increase in votes (781,000 as against 407,000 in 1957) was the Conservative Party, supported by landowning sectors and favored by the Frondizi government's policy, which objectively strengthens and gives confidence to the limited electorate of the most right-wing sectors. Nevertheless, its weight as a national bourgeois force continues to be completely secondary.

Reformist socialism was divided into two sectors: the Argentine Socialist Party (left, 342,000 votes), and the Democratic Socialist Party (right, 297,000 votes). While the latter kept a large part of the traditional votes of the SP (especially of the petty bourgeoisie), the left SP in addition won over Peronist and Communist votes, although not in the proportions hoped for by its leaders.

The Christian-Democrats (345,000 votes) declined in comparison with 1957, and a whole series of small parties virtually disappeared from the electoral map.

It is in this frame of reference that one must place the

votes obtained by the Partido Obrero (Trotskista), which show the development of a considerable nucleus of the workers' vanguard toward the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

The Partido Obrero (Trotskista) put up slates in those of the country's five provinces with the highest concentration of proletarians: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Tucumán, Santa Fé, and the Federal Capital; but finally it was able to run only in the first three, since the government arbitrarily prohibited its legal recognition in the others.

Despite its limited economic and material means, it carried out a vigorous election campaign, with various daily public meetings, speeches on the radio, posters, a weekly newspaper, etc — in spite of the unending obstacles raised by the police (forbidding meetings, arresting party members), and of the fact that in some zones, like Tucumán, its public election campaigning was prohibited up until a few days before the elections.

The Partido Obrero (Trotskista) proposed for the elections the formation of a proletarian united front composed of the trade unions (62 Organizations, Movimiento Obrero Unificado), the CP, the Left SP, and the Partido Obrero (Trotskista). This united front was rejected by these tendencies.

The Partido Obrero (Trotskista) obtained 27,800 in the province of Buenos Aires, 8,340 in Córdoba, and 1,602 in Tucumán: a total of 37,742 votes.

In Buenos Aires, the Trotskyist party had run in 1958, winning 11,700 votes. But the increase in its votes is even greater if the zones of the greatest proletarian concentration are taken into account. Indeed, in the whole workers' belt round the city of Buenos Aires, the Partido Obrero (Trotskista) spurted from 5,294 votes to 19,342 in 1960, i.e., an increase of 365%. And in some zones of the greatest Trotskyist traditions, this average was even higher: in Avellaneda, 471% in Matanza, 641%; in Quilmes, 556%; in Berisso, 459%; and in La Plata, 520% (all compared to the 1958 figures).

In Tucumán, where the Trotskyist were running for the first time, their vote of 1,602 is to be compared with 4,275 for the Socialist Party, and with the CP's 3,300 votes in 1958.

In Córdoba, where they were also running for the first time, their 8,340 votes are to be compared with 9,325 for the SP, and exceeded the CP's 7,736 in the 1958 elections.

The success of the Argentine Trotskyists must be measured not only by the percentage increases, everywhere constant, but also in the fact that the 37,700 votes, coming in their majority from the most proletarian and combative zones, show the existence of an important nucleus of worker militants who support Trotskyist policy, and mean that the Partido Obrero (Trotskista) can count on a solid foundation for extending its influence over the millions of workers and other exploited masses who stuck together, with their unions, in the blank-ballot voting, in order to spur them on toward the fundamental way out for the Argentine masses in this period: the formation of a labor party based on the trade unions, which centralizes and helps increase the political maturity of the numerically enormous fighting force of the Argentine proletariat.

The Peronist trade-union leadership, after calling on the toilers to cast blank ballots "to defeat the government," has begun once more to apply its policy of conciliationism and retreats before Frondizi, clearly demonstrating the passive and capitulationist essence of blank-ballot voting.

The following are the main conclusions that *Voz Proletaria*, organ of the Partido Obrero (Trotskista), draws from the elections, in an article by Comrade J Posadas, "The Elections and the Proletarian United Front":

The crisis of the bourgeois parties continues and will continue. The elections have been a proof of this. The People's Radicals have sensed that they cannot win the majority, and will be tempted by

a coup d'état as a way out. The government, to maintain themselves, will resort to, and *have* to resort to, the policy of sell-out to imperialism, intimidation, and deals with the trade-union leaderships — but basing themselves in reality on the army. The army — more openly than at present, because the bourgeoisie is showing itself to be incapable of overcoming its own crisis — will tend to intervene more directly.

The election results also sharpen the crisis of Peronism. The votes for the Partido Obrero, the resistance to blank-ballot voting among broad sectors, the ineffectiveness of the passive way of casting blank ballots, and the lack of results from the struggle and of concrete advances through blank-ballot voting, will drive much broader sectors of Peronist workers and petty bourgeois to bring pressure and seek for a way out through an independent class policy and the fighting programme of the Proletarian United Front.

Under these conditions, with firm bases, the will of the proletariat and the rest of the exploited

population continues to favor struggle. The workers who cast blank ballots feel strong and firm, feel that they won in the voting but obtained no victory. Before disillusion can make its way among the layers of worker militants and sectors of the proletariat, it is necessary to organize the Proletarian United Front with the 13-point programme of the Movimiento Obrero Unificado. All the pre-conditions exist for the organization of a labor party based on the trade unions, to force adoption of the workers' programme against unemployment, against the high cost of living, and for workers' control of production, for a Constituent Assembly, and for a workers' government based on the trade unions.

This is the programme which the Partido Obrero made an appeal to fight for in the elections in a Proletarian United Front. Now it is calling for the formation of the same Proletarian United Front, to support the same programme, to bring the country out of the chaos into which it is being led by the crisis of the bourgeoisie and the instability of the state.

THE CONGRESS OF THE ITALIAN CP

In the first months of 1960 the interest of the Italian workers' movement was drawn to two important congresses: that of the Communist Party, and that of the CGIL (trade-union federation under Socialist-Communist leadership).

The CP Congress produced nothing new concerning what we already wrote about in our last issue. The complete victory of the leading group around Togliatti had been, moreover, discounted in advance; as a result, the "sectarian" and "dogmatic" current immediately took on "protective coloration": it not only abandoned an open defense, but even joined in the campaign against "sectarianism" and "dogmatism"! In consequence the stake in the struggle led some months before the congress by even some of the closest collaborators of Togliatti (especially Amendola) grew blurred, and some of the most notorious sectarians were able to keep their posts either in the Central Committee or in the leadership of the Control Commission which in the Italian CP should have, in theory, broader powers than is normally the case in other CPs). It must be added that, concerning the real extent of this category of "sectarians," a certain ambiguity was allowed to subsist: in this category were included all those who do not share the conception of the "democratic" road to socialism and who cannot be included in that other usual big category, that of the "revisionists." But most often the struggle against "sectarianism" and "dogmatism" was intended to be a struggle against those who did not like the turn taken after the XXth Congress and who still have a more or less concealed nostalgia for certain classic Stalinist methods and conceptions.

On this level, the evolution of the Italian CP has not stopped. The party is far from having gone back to the pre-1956 "automatic" monolithism. Even though this congress was not characterized by such animated debates as those of 1956, ideas circulated quite freely, and critical voices, although not very numerous, did rise up. It must be specified that, amid the persistent apathy of the widest sectors of rank-and-file militants, discussion took place most often among the lower and middle cadres, and even, sometimes, in a very lively way, in the apparatus. This relative differentiation within the apparatus was reflected in the elections to the new Central Committee, where certain leaders, including Togliatti, saw their names

stricken off by several delegates and trailed much less well-known elements.

There was, furthermore, a continuation of the process of rejuvenation, except at the very top (secretariat, top leadership), where it remained very limited. From now on the cadres who joined the party after the war have a great specific weight in it: these are men who did not receive the Stalinist education of the blackest period and accordingly have a quite different mentality from that of the "hard" Stalinists. The other side of the coin consists of the fact that these elements are often all-out rightists; but they are less crystalized, more openminded toward new needs, more attentive to the analysis of the real situation. Another thing that is remarkable is that the rejection of the theory of the Soviet state as guide is considered, by all these people as an irreversible datum in the conception of the party — whence the much greater flexibility of the Italian CP in its relations with the USSR, the popular democracies, and its brother parties, even if the acceptance of Khrushchevism remains complete.

The Rome Congress continued to work up new "theories" about "alliances" and "convergence"; it insisted on the need to collaborate with ever broader social strata. Now, according to Togliatti and his school, the allies of the Italian CP and of the workers' movement ought to be, not only the peasants and the petty-bourgeois masses of the cities, but also the small and middle non-monopolized industrialists; and in certain cases it is considered possible to work together with sectors of the agrarian bourgeoisie. The experiences of Sicily, the Val d'Aosta, and especially Sardinia, seem to have given confirmation of a concrete sort to such an outlook. Unfortunately for Togliatti and his team-mates, the congress had just ended when the Sicilian government of Milazzo fell in a shameful fashion. In synthesis, what happened was what the revolutionary communists in Italy had predicted right from the beginning. As long as the CP and the SP agreed to stay quiet, satisfied just to give their votes to the Milazzo government (in which, be it recalled, they did not directly participate), things could more or less work. But when they were obliged to put forward demands, even though these were extremely modest ones, the crisis broke out, for the representatives of the "agrarian bourgeoisie" preferred to return to the fold rather than help — however little — the workers' parties.

Lastly, on the question of the governmental formula, the Italian CP has lately undergone an evolution. At the 1956 Congress the slogan was put forward: for a democratic government of the toiling classes — which, it can be seen, remained rather vague (indeed, criticisms to this effect were raised in the Central Committee itself). Today this general formula continues to be valid, but it is specified that it might be possible to carry out economic and political reforms before the eventual formation of such a government. In reality, the focus of propaganda has been shifted toward the slogan “for a new majority” — which still remains vague and fluid. On the one hand, the belief has been permitted for a long time — and to a certain extent continues to be even now — that it would be possible to break the monopoly of the Christian-Democracy by seeking allies pretty much anywhere (to the right, too, after the example of the experience in Sicily); on the other hand, declarations have been made concerning a readiness from now on to give support to a coalition government of the Christian-Democrats and the Socialists, or even a centre-left government backed by the Socialist. As can be seen, Togliatti’s “flexibility” is really very great!

As for the CGIL Congress, it had traits in common with that of the Italian CP. Though participation by rank-and-file militants was especially slight, it cannot be said that a bureaucratic control prevented the circulation of critical ideas. Generally, if anyone had something to say, he could say it; and a debate was even organized in the Federation’s two organs (a contribution thereto by a leader of our Italian section, member of a union affiliated to the CGIL, was published without any difficulty).

The document prepared by the outgoing Central Committee (which was criticized for — among other things — its extreme length) was rather eclectic in character, so that, under a certain aspect, everyone could draw from it whatever he pleased (for example, there was a positive evaluation of the struggles in the period following the 1956 Congress, and at the same time a quite clear recognition of the narrowness of the improvements won or the very limited — not to say negative — results of certain

agreements about the sliding scale of wages, firings, etc).

But the part that is the most often stressed by the leaders is the chapter devoted to the programme of economic development. It concerns a quite organic platform proposed by the CGIL, which would correspond to the vital needs of the Italian economy. There is not place here to analyze this document in all its details; but we cannot pass over in silence its fundamental inadequacy. Once more a programme is worked up, but it is not said by whom and under what political conditions this programme might be carried out. That explains the indifference with which all these things are received by the toilers, who are in agreement, who want all that, but who do not see the concrete way of achieving it.

As for the internal structure of the Federation, much stress is laid of the need for democracy, and it is specified that the existence of different tendencies constitutes a serious guarantee (in fact, the real tendencies are two: Communist and Socialist), which naturally ought to be maintained in case of a general reunification of the trade unions. On this level, it is obvious that the attitude of the CGIL is more correct than that of the French CGT, which does not permit tendencies and thereby excludes any possibility of a unification in a single organization.

A word on the Socialist Party. Nenni’s attitude is more and more rightist, but the so-called left is in no condition, because of its own political and ideological weakness, to block him. At the February session of the Central Committee, the left gave a dazzling confirmation of its inconsistency. After its having preached in general against collaboration with the Christian-Democrats, when the discussion got down to brass tacks and concerned a possible collaboration in Sicily, even the left (with about two exceptions) voted in favor. The least that can be said is that these people don’t know where they want to go (even worse might be suspected, for in the Sicilian parliament, the “leftists” of the PSI are in the majority and obviously would have members in a possible coalition government).

21 March 1960

BOLIVIAN AGRARIAN REFORM

Its Situation and Tasks After Six Years

By HÉCTOR LUCERO

I

THE SITUATION OF AGRICULTURE

SOME FIGURES

Agriculture is the main activity of the population of Bolivia. Its peasants comprise 2,125,000 persons, 63% of the total population.¹ (The 1950 census gives the figure of 1,703,371, estimated as being 63% of the total, so that the proportion practically does not vary, if it is taken into account that the forest-dwelling part of the population is not included in this figure. Of all these persons, the census estimates that only 100,000 speak Spanish.)

Agriculture is also the activity that contributes the highest quota to the national product in goods and services: in the 1950-55 period, 29% came from this sector, while mining and petroleum contributed only 25%.

According to the 1950 census, agrarian property in Bolivia comprised 80.8 million acres. Of these lands, 1,616,000 acres are under cultivation (although the C E P A L estimates the figure as considerably less, only about 988,400 acres). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, for its part, estimates the total agricultural area as 53,299,000 acres (51,891,000 of natural pastures and 1,408,000 of tilled land), and the forest area as 116,137,000 acres, thus leaving 104,523,000 acres of non-cultivable land.

By a comparison of these figures, the conclusion is reached that the proportion of agricultural land under cultivation is very small, since it represents only between 2% and 3% of the total rural area. According to the 1950 census, 90% of this cultivated land is located on the Altiplano [the high plateau south of La Paz] and in the valleys, whereas the eastern plains (which comprise two-thirds of Bolivian territory) have only 10%.

In relation with the country's total population, this gives a cultivated area of only two-fifths of an acre per person, which is a very low figure, as is proved by a comparison with the other countries of Latin America: in 1955, Bolivia had 0.40

tilled acre per inhabitant; Mexico, 1.88; Chile, 1.61; Ecuador, 1.11; Brazil, 0.86.

If only the active agricultural population is considered, this figure rises to 1.66 acre per active person, which is only a very slight extension; in any case it is a question of highly eroded and impoverished land.

This quantity is not very far from that of China, where the estimate is of 2.42 acres per family.²

The amount of irrigated land is also very small. In reality, there exist only two irrigation dams: La Angostura, in Cochabamba, which irrigates some 24,700 acres; and Tacagua, in Oruro, some 12,800. Despite the great natural possibilities for irrigation works, the rest of agriculture — practically all of it — is dependent on meteorological factors that are irregular and often unfavorable. Work on the irrigation project of Villamontes, in Santa Cruz, has been stopped, and there is a risk that the part already built (more or less half) will be destroyed and lost. Irrigation is one of the most crying needs of Bolivian agriculture.

A comparison of the 1955 figures on agricultural production with the population in this sector gives a value per active person of \$119, or £42. This figure is equal to one-fourth of the gross product per active person in the rest of the national economy, and also to about one-fourth of the income per active person in agriculture in Latin America as a whole (\$393, or £140) — which gives an idea of the very low level of existing productivity. If the total agricultural population is taken into account, the gross product scarcely reaches \$40, or £14, per person (whereas it is \$180, or £64, for the same year, in non-agricultural activities).

This explains why, with so high a proportion of agricultural population, Bolivia's imports of foodstuffs and farm- and ranch-produced raw materials reached 38.5% of its total imports, representing the most serious drain on the country's foreign exchange.³

After the promulgation of the decree of agra-

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in this article are taken from *El desarrollo económico de Bolivia*, a study made by the Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations (Comisión Económica para América Latina, C E P A L) in 1957. It is difficult or impossible to obtain more recent statistics that are reliable and well-organized.

² Solomon Adler, *La Economía China*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957.

³ Agriculture could, within a short time, not only completely satisfy national consumption, but also provide foreign exchange by means of various export items (some of which are exported today on a limited scale): rubber, chestnuts, coca, coffee, cocoa, pyrethrum, tea, quinine, vanilla, etc.

rian reform in August 1953, production fell approximately 15% (1954 harvest compared to that of 1950). This reduction was caused, among other reasons, by a considerable reduction of the tilled area, especially in potatoes, Indian corn, and wheat. The agitation and uncertainty about the agrarian reform had a bearing on this reduction.

But at the same time it is important to note that a remarkable increase in yield per acre in Indian corn and potatoes was recorded, which shows how the peasant, even without indispensable aid for improving his husbandry, raises the yield of his labor when he is tilling his own land and not that of the landlord. The figures are as follows:

*Harvested Area, Production, and Yields
of Main Agricultural Products*

Products	1950			1954			1955		
	Area (a)	Produc- tion (b)	Yield (c)	Area (a)	Produc- tion (b)	Yield (c)	Area (a)	Produc- tion (b)	Yield (c)
Hulled corn	257.7	124.0	1,057	105.0	85.0	1,781	111.1	90.0	1,781
Potatoes	209.8	140.0	1,485	82.3	100.0	2,671	98.8	120.0	2,671
Hulled barley	152.7	44.2	637	173.0	50.0	637	155.7	45.0	637
Wheat	187.5	41.0	481	84.3	17.5	456	84.3	17.5	456
Hulled rice	30.9	14.4	1,027	21.3	10.0	1,027	22.5	10.5	1,027

a) in thousands of acres; b) in thousands of tons (metric or "long"); c) in pounds per acres.

The basic situation, however, the extremely low yield of agriculture, is not a result of the agrarian reform, but an inheritance from the methods of cultivation and the system of land ownership in effect in Bolivia for centuries. The semi-feudal system constituted the greatest stumbling-block for any agrarian development.⁴

⁴ The CEPAL describes this phenomenon as follows:

Among the causes at the origin of the backwardness of agriculture in Bolivia, there must be mentioned in the first place the system of land-holding which was in effect until August 1953, the date on which the decree of agrarian reform was issued. The latifundist and semi-feudal system existing until that date proved to be almost completely impenetrable to the advances of agricultural technique, and in the majority of the estates the use of extremely antiquated methods of exploitation persisted, while the peasant continued to have miserable living standards. The estate-owner — usually absentee — unloaded his responsibility on to a bailiff, who had no more technical knowledge than his employer, and who tried to force production out of land that was steadily more exhausted without concerning himself about restoring to it its lost fertility. The application of the minimum norms of animal health or plant genetics, and the use of fertilizers and soil-conservation methods, were virtually unknown practices. In the same way, the tools of labor were generally very primitive, similar to those used in colonial times. For his part, the peasant, who had to devote between two and four days of the week to toiling on the owner's land, as a compensation for the use and products of a little plot or "sayaña," generally followed the same methods of production as these used on the estate. The result of all this was very low unit yields, which contributed to

This age-old stagnation in agriculture was increased by the upsurge in mining production for the world market. It turned out to be more profitable for the big mines, instead of stimulating agricultural development, to buy foodstuffs and raw materials abroad, thus increasing the country's dependence on the world market, and maintaining the internal stagnation, not only by their purchasing policy but also by the deformation on the economy as a whole (roads, railways, electric power, credits, etc) in favor of mining.

The April revolution and the agrarian reform nationalized the big mining companies and broke the feudal regime in the countryside. They did not, however, change the rest of the conditions produced thereby: backwardness in the methods of exploitation, imbalance between the population and the land under cultivation, lack of roads, etc, and furthermore produced some additional

giving agricultural activity a mere subsistence character, without any definite market purpose. The great mass of the peasantry took for sale in the urban centres only a minimum fraction of its production, for the purpose of obtaining the monetary means to buy those goods that it could not produce on its own land. For this same reason, the native almost never set any value on his personal labor, which often prevented enterprises of a market type from competing with him.

To this there must be added the personal obligations and unpaid labor of a feudal type owed by the tenant and his family to the landowner and the "estate mansion," and his situation as a serf bound to the land, much more oppressive and onerous than the simple labor-rent relationship indicated here.

problems. Plowing by a wooden-stick plow (when not by a foot-plow, i.e. a simple stick pushed by the foot) continued to be the dominant reality and the symbol of Bolivian agriculture. All this had a bearing on the stagnation in production.

The agrarian reform created the conditions for a development of production, but only the conditions; they were not put to profit by complementary measures, as will be seen below.

TWO AGRARIAN REFORMS

What is, in figures, the extent of the agrarian reform?

In the first place, there are two agrarian reforms: the legal one and the de facto one. The de facto agrarian reform, carried out by the peasants, starting in 1952, and especially in 1953 and 1954, by the armed seizure and parcelling-out of the land, was the factor that determined the proclamation of the August 1953 decree, so as to act as a brake on the seizures.

The reform carried out from below by the peasants themselves embraced the vastest traditionally peasant zones of the country. No exact figures about its extent exist, but the parcelling out of land was carried out especially in the departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, and Oruro, involving the majority of the estates, and on a smaller (though still extensive) scale in Tarija and Chuquisaca. The eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando (the eastern plains) underwent this process only in a reflected manner, because of the different character of the exploitation and the farm population existing there (these departments represent only 10% of the Bolivian cultivated land, and there are no Indian peasants there).

On the other hand, the legal reform, according to the dispositions of the 1953 decree, fell far behind the de facto expropriations. Here are the figures:

According to the 1950 census, there were in the country 86,534 farm properties, with a total area of 80,925,000 acres. Of this total, up till August 1959, according to the data of the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, there have been attributed and turned over to the peasants — with legal titles — only 806 properties, with a total area of 1,872,800 acres. The number of persons granted titles scarcely reaches 29,216. (The same source estimates the number of peasant heads of families, that is, with a right to a parcel of land, as 532,680).

That is to say that there remained to be legally distributed, on the sixth anniversary of the agrarian reform, no less than 79,072,000 acres. Even if it is taken into consideration that, out of this total, a good part represents properties in the east that have not been claimed by the peas-

ants, the figure of land distributed turns out to be ridiculous, and even more so the number of peasants who have "legally" become owners of land: 29,216, in contrast to the 2,000,000 peasants in the country.

In the same way that there are two agrarian reforms, there are two obstructions to agrarian reform.

On the one hand, the legal agrarian reform, the delivery of title-deeds to the peasants, is paralyzed by the enormous bureaucratic apparatus created by the decree on agrarian reform and by the government. Judgments for the attribution of land remain stuck in this apparatus. The Central Campesina de Ucureña has explained the incredible red tape that each judgment has to go through before the title-deed is granted to the peasant.⁵

⁵ On 20 December 1958 the Central de Ucureña approved the following resolution, to be presented by its fraternal delegation to the IIIrd Peasant Congress in La Paz:

Whereas:

Despite the passage of more than five years since the promulgation of the Fundamental Law of Agrarian Reform, it has not been applied with due despatch, thus causing, by this delay, demoralization and distrust in its benefits, and creating an oppositional atmosphere which is put to its own profit by the reaction for its purposes of trying to win back power.

Agrarian procedure is very costly and slow because of the intervention of too many functionaries, slowing down the timely application of the law.

A claim deposited five years ago with the Junta Rural has gone through a regular Calvary, and in the majority of cases still continues its heavy-footed advance.

After the two required hearings have been held, the plans and reports of the experts are obtained, and brought before the Agrarian Judge, where, the claim having been formalized, the proof of the demand is brought forward, with the presentation of ownership deeds, a certificate of the tax-list value of the estate, and the testimony of witnesses.

Once judgment has been pronounced, the records are presented to the National Council of the Agrarian Reform, where they are taken over by one of the Secretariats. Then they go on to the Technical and Juridical Department for the respective reports needed by the officer called the Vocal Relator in order to prepare his Writ of Judgment. Once this has been approved and the parties notified, either of them may have special recourse to an appeal for *reconsideration*, the applicability or inapplicability of which is resolved by the Plenum of the Council, which is difficult to obtain.

In the hypothetical case that the case has succeeded in getting through all this red tape, it is turned over to the Ministry of Rural Affairs, where, after a report by the Legal Section, a Supreme Resolution is prepared, which is transmitted to the services of the President of the Republic, a higher instance where it undergoes a new revision by their Legal Section, which can annul, at any moment and for any motive, everything that has been previously accomplished.

Once the respective Supreme Resolution has been decreed, the case goes back once again to the Ministry, and thence to the Council; from the Council

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of capitalist law, the validity of these title-deeds could be rapidly rendered questionable by a new reactionary regime in power. A Silist deputy has already demonstrated how the government itself is preparing the conditions so that the landowners can at the proper moment demand the invalidation of these title-deeds and the return of their lands.⁶

to the original Agrarian Tribunal, for a new examination, which very often takes place with no reference to the Supreme Resolutions.

Once the reexamination has been carried out, everything goes back to the Council for drawing up the title-deed, for which purpose the records go to the Technical Department to have the lines of demarcation drawn up, and to the Title Section to have the title-deed made act.

The title-deed having been drawn up, it is signed by the President of the National Council of the Agrarian Reform, and then taken to the President of the Republic, with whose signature it returns once more to the Council.

Lastly, the title-deed is retained until a certain date is reached, and, contrary to the provisions of Article 103, overelaborate commissions are named for the delivery of the title-deeds, involving immense expense for the National Treasury (in order to use as a pretext later for the non-existence of funds for really necessary and urgent expenses), with the aggravating circumstance that often definitive possession is not even established by a document in legal form.

A certification of the essential legal papers, with the original of the title and an inscription in the Register of Rural Taxes, will serve each party involved as sufficient official title, the two parties being allowed to separate out their original documents.

Whereas:

Because of this slowing-down of justice, there exist fundamental differences between the present situation and labor on the parcels of land, and the data produced by the procedure, with the result that the Writs of Judgment and the Resolutions are different from the reality, aside from the fact that there have been caused great expenses that have upset the peasant's economy —

Be it resolved:

Sole article: To ask the State Authorities to shorten agrarian procedure, making it more dynamic and effective, so that it may not be outstripped by the revolutionary process.

⁶ In a February 1957 interpellation to the Minister of Rural Affairs on the development of the agrarian reform, Deputy López Avila (MNR) stated the matter as follows:

Sometimes I have thought, with deep grief and sadness, of the embarrassing situation of the peasant enjoying title to his property, if political contingencies should produce a change in the present revolutionary regime. Many of them have received title, many of them have occupied their land, but can it be said that the peasants can defend and maintain their property rights forever? I think not; I am pessimistic about this sort of thing, fellow deputies, for the following reasons: by Decree 03525 of 15 January 1953, disposition was made that the payment that the peasants must take to the landowners as a result of the agrarian expropriation must be carried out by means of the system of 25-

The de facto agrarian reform, concerning the lands that the peasants occupied and have been working for their own account since 1952, 1953, and 1954 (years of the wave of land seizures), has also suffered from another obstacle: the peasant has the land, but all the other factors of production (seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, methods and tools of cultivation, marketing, etc) remain the same as before. The peasant has been left to his fate. The agrarian reform has stopped at the simple possession of the land.

Productivity has remained stagnant at a very low level. For example, in the region of Lake Titicaca, with the primitive methods of cultivation in use, yields are obtained of only 2,670 to 3,560 pounds of potatoes per acre, while on the Peruvian Altiplano some 8,900 pounds per acre are achieved.

The same occurs with stock-raising, whose yields, according to the CEPAL, are "impressively low." And stock-raising is of great importance in the production of rural Bolivia, since it contributes more than 40% to the total gross product of the farm sector. In sheep-raising, predominant on the Altiplano, there is a yield of wool of not much over one pound per animal, which is only one fifth or sixth of the average yields of other countries; and a yield in meat of 22 pounds per animal, which is less than half of that obtained in countries whose stock-raising is more advanced.⁷

year bonds; in the meantime, all the plots of land, the harvests, the tools, remained legally mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank of Bolivia. And who was it that was to issue the bonds? The state, under the guarantee of the signatures of the Controller-General of the Republic and the Treasurer-General of the Nation. Very well, fellow deputies, these bonds do not exist; therefore, the peasant has not paid the value of the land granted him by the agrarian reform. So then, when, from the classic viewpoint of contracts, the cancellation or payment of the thing or goods transferred is lacking, the contract is imperfect, and the agreement has not been formally carried out (Article 19 of the Political Constitution, and Article 290 of the Civil Code).

It must be added that Deputy López Avila is a landowner in Chuquisaca . . .

⁷ An FAO expert, A Quezada ("Estudio socio-económico y agropecuario de la provincia Dalence," quoted by the CEPAL) describes as follows the livestock situation in the Altiplano, Department of Oruro:

There are no enclosures or special pasture areas; no selection of pasturage is made; there is no rotation of pasture-crops; no forage has been introduced except barley; there are no silos; basic notions about the feeding of animals are unknown; there are no pure-bred animals; the peasants have not even the elementary genetic or veterinary understanding. As a result of the aforementioned negative factors, the weight and productivity of the animals are excessively low. In this zone it requires approximately 30 to 62 acres to support one cow; from 10 to 20 for a llama; from 5 to 10 for a sheep. All the animals that are bred are native; any exotic ones have be-

To the very limited area under cultivation per inhabitant, there must be added the fact that the land in question has for centuries been subjected to inefficient exploitation, without manure, fertilizers, etc, and is in an advanced stage of erosion, especially on the Altiplano — all of which results in very low fertility. On the Altiplano (except in the more fertile regions round Lake Titicaca) only a fraction of the tillable land is exploited each year, the rest being left fallow for periods as long as nine years. For example, in the province of Dalence (Oruro), out of 35,600 acres in exploitation, only about 8,900 acres, that is, one fourth, are actually cultivated each year.

All these figures, due to the primitive methods used, could be greatly increased with only slight improvements. But the MNR government, in this aspect, has not carried out the slightest agrarian reform. It is, for its petty-bourgeois leadership, a responsibility as grave as or graver than the paralysis in the delivery of title-deeds to the peasantry.

On both fronts, the capitalist government not only have paralyzed the agrarian reform, but in fact — despite using it as a propaganda theme — are sabotaging it, working against it, working for the landowner. Under the exigencies of imperialism, and with its help, they have surrounded the peasant by a double barrier: the barrier of law and the barrier of hunger. Lately, they have been trying to prepare the military barrier.

II

SITUATION OF THE PEASANTRY

LIVING STANDARDS

Although production has remained stationary or fallen off, the revolution has meant a considerable rise in the peasant's standard of living.

The standard of living has risen generally in terms of consumption, since the peasant no longer has to pay land rent to the landowner. The surplus of labor that went into the hands of the owner of the land now remains for the peasant himself.

come acclimated and degenerated. They are given scarcely any salt; they receive neither vaccination nor medication. The climate, especially the dryness, is also unfavorable.

In this zone a cow gives birth, on an average, every three years. It is milked for one month, with a yield of about one quart of milk a day. Sheep are shorn every two years, with a yield of 1½ pounds of wool per head. The ewes produce, on the average, one lamb per year. They are milked for two weeks, with a daily yield of about 3½ ounces of milk per head. There are few hogs. Their condition is lamentable, as can be demonstrated by how little weight they reach (a maximum of 77 pounds).

That is to say, they have all the characteristics of purely subsistence livestock.

But more important for the peasant than the relative rise in his consumption — which has fallen again with the general impoverishment caused by the Stabilization Plan — has been the change in his social situation, the suppression of the personal services of the feudal type that bound him to the landowner and the land: "pongueaje" and "mitanaje."

Herein lies the main difference from the previous regime, and the principal reason why the peasant is resisting and will resist, arms in hand, any attempt at a return to the past. The increase in his trade-union and political gains, in his human dignity, do not appear in statistics, but they do in the consciousness of every peasant, as good things, just as concrete as wheat and corn.

The trade union, the union militia, universal franchise, discussion and participation — even though limited — in the political life of the country, the victories over the landowners and their political agents, all violently expelled from the Bolivian countryside: all these mean, for the peasant, a rise in his living standards.

This rise has meant, furthermore, an automatic rise in living standards, in gains, and in freedoms, for the rest of the laboring population, for it is known that its situation, even in its privileged sectors, is permanently conditioned by the situation of the more numerous and more exploited strata.

"COMUNIDADES" *

Furthermore, there has been an improvement in the situation of even those peasants who already possessed land before the agrarian reform, as is the case with many "comunidades." The "comunidades" are generally to be counted among the most impoverished sectors of the peasantry. Their number before the agrarian reform (1950 census) reached 3,779, with a total of 320,818 members of "comunidades."

As a result of the permanent appropriation of their lands by the neighboring landowners, the "comunidades" have been left with the poorest land, with the poorest yield. Furthermore, they bear in themselves the germs of their own dissolution: in many of them, each peasant is the owner of his plot of land, there remaining in common only the pasture-lands, and there have been formed strata of rich, middle, and poor peasants who have the worst and smallest plots. The first-named have gone on increasing their properties at the cost of the last, with loans, etc. What is more, the "comunidades" are accustomed to give work to peasants from outside themselves,

* "Comunidad": a form of collective land property and work, inherited from the Incas. It is a survival of primitive communism which has undergone an advanced process of degeneration.

the upper stratum thus transforming itself into an exploiter of outside labor — very ill-paid, of course.

Now these “comunidades” were under the permanent pressure of the neighboring landowners, under the exactions of the authorities of the provincial or departmental capital (police, judges, mayors, et al) and of the middlemen for the sale of their products, and lacked any support or aid. With the growth of peasant power since the April revolution, all these abuses, when they have not been entirely abolished, have been driven back very considerably, and the Indian of a “comunidad” enjoys a series of liberties and possibilities that were previously denied him, including access to the market (although the abuses of the middlemen have not stopped).

STAGNATION OF THE REVOLUTION

Nevertheless, in spite of the great gains achieved, the peasantry has been deeply affected by the stoppage in the advance of the revolution. The whole weight of the country's backwardness, which the petty-bourgeois leadership has been powerless to overcome even in part, continues to lie on the peasant.

Under the pressure of the peasants themselves, one of whose most burning and constant concerns is education, the government have made a certain effort to combat illiteracy, that had been totally neglected by the regimes of the oligarchy, have built schools in the countryside, have considerably increased the number of primary teachers, etc.

But in face of the hair-raising figures on illiteracy — 70% of the population — what has been done is very little. Such illiteracy cannot be radically fought against from above, by merely official action, without appealing to a mobilization of the peasant masses themselves for this goal, and, above all, without raising in large measure the material standard of living. The great peasant masses remain isolated from the main circuit of culture. Furthermore, at no moment has the problem of teaching the peasantry to read and write in its own native language (and not in Spanish, indeed a foreign language for them) been faced up to — the only effective way of fighting illiteracy not only among the children but among the whole adult peasantry.⁸

Such social gains as social security have not reached the rural regions. Medical and hygienic

care continue to be very deficient. Infant mortality reaches one of the highest levels in Latin America: 150 per thousand up to one year, and 30.36 from one to four years, for the country as a whole — which presupposes a still higher level for the rural regions, where there is practically no medical and hygienic care.

The food diet is poor in an absolute sense, inferior to that of the Latin American countries of the lowest consumption levels. According to statistics, in the peasant families of the Altiplano (poor zones), the following is the annual per capita consumption of the main foods in the diet: wheat, 31 lb; meat, 9 lb, 4 oz; potatoes, 84 lb, 4 oz; corn, 64 lb, 8 oz; sugar, 2 lb, 3 oz; rice, 1 lb, 1 oz.⁹

The extremely low per capita income, in comparison with other under-developed countries in Latin America, has already been pointed out. Other data aid in determining the social situation of the peasantry. The lack of roads and bridges to connect the zones of production with the market is very great. What is more, transportation is expensive: a Bolivian peasant pays more to travel with his products in a truck than does a US passenger in a latest-model bus.¹⁰

The scanty electrification of the country is felt not only in industry and the mines, but especially, as is logical, in the countryside: 70% of the Bolivian population does not enjoy the benefits of electricity, a percentage in which the entire peasantry is included.¹¹

AVAILABLE LAND

The problem of the land is posed in some zones under a new aspect: that of the excess of population for the available land. This is aggravated by the fact that agricultural zones of potentially great richness are cut off and isolated from the consumption markets (for example, the upper Beni, 62.5 miles from La Paz).

⁹ A Quezada, op cit, consumption of a typical Indian family of Dalence (Oruro).

¹⁰ J Roy Alvarez (a UN technician), “Revista de la Facultad de Economía de Oruro,” no 10-18:

A passenger who travels in the back of a truck, seated as best he can manage on its freight and unprotected from the weather, pays 8 dollar-cents per kilometre [13 dollar-cents per mile]. In the United States, the bus passenger, with a reclining seat and air conditioning, pays about ten dollar-cent per mile.

¹¹ It is of interest to quote the figures of the C.E.P.A.L on electrical consumption compared to other countries, as an indication of the level of general development. In the following table, for Bolivia and Chile there has been discounted the industrial consumption of the big mines, but not the corresponding mining population. Figures are of annual kWh per inhabitant in 1954: Bolivia, 57; Uruguay, 359; Argentina, 339; Chile, 329; Brazil, 205; Cuba, 174; Colombia, 157; Peru, 148; Ecuador, 64; Dominican Republic, 55; Nicaragua, 45; El Salvador, 40; Paraguay, 33.

⁸ Asthenio Averanga M, in “Aspectos generales de la población boliviana,” 1956, p 94, demonstrates, in statistical tables with corresponding graphs, the direct correlation between the population that speaks Spanish and that which can read and write, province by province: the respective curves follow almost parallel trajectories. [The main native languages are Quechua and Aymara.]

In some regions of the Altiplano and the valleys a high demographic pressure exists. Whereas in Santa Cruz there is a density of 2.1 inhabitants per square mile, in Cochabamba this figure rises to 25.4, in La Paz to 20.2, and in Sucre to 15.5. These averages, however, do not give a real idea of the density in the zones of greatest agricultural concentration: for example, in the Cochabambine provinces of Jordán, Quillacollo, and Punata, the density reaches respectively 170.9, 155.4, and 160.6 per square mile. Furthermore, the increase in population in the Altiplano and in the valleys, where no more land is available (unless the methods of cultivation, irrigation, etc. are changed), is 25,000 persons a year, who can be only partially absorbed by other zones or other activities. The government's colonization plans, which consisted simply in moving peasants from the Altiplano and the valleys to the eastern plains of Santa Cruz (and lately to tropical zones like Caranavi), and there just abandoning them to their fate — equally with those who stayed in their original places, for that matter — failed, logically, on account of the inadaptability and desertion of the persons moved.

This demographic pressure is being translated in the valley of Cochabamba by a new form of the land problem, in which the young people, when they start a family, demand a new redivision of the already existing little plots of about 2 1/2 acres, while the old people, logically enough, refuse to subdivide even further areas that are already so small. This new sharing-out is called by the peasants the "igualá" [roughly, "an even divvy"], and is one of the sources of conflicts in the valley.

All these problems have received only very small-scale attention from the government. Not only because of their capitalist policy of abandonment of the masses' needs, but also because of a lack of real communication between the masses and the bourgeois power personified by the state: the raising of the economic, social, and cultural living standards of the great masses of the rural regions, with all their backwardness and the problems this pulls along in its wake, is a task that is impossible without incorporating the initiative of the masses themselves. It cannot be done from above, even if the government felt any interest: it runs up against insurmountable walls.

The government have entrusted to the agencies of imperialism the carrying out of experiments in some of these aspects: the Servicio Agrícola Interamericano (S A I) for production techniques, and the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Educación (S C I D E) for education. Both have wasted the country's money, with a swollen bureaucracy, with very little effective results, and with an abundance of imperialist propagand-

da, which increases the hostility with which they are received in the countryside.¹²

Some peasant unions in the valley of Cochabamba are maintaining schools, run by juntas formed by the peasants themselves, with much better results than those of the S C I D E, for they are based on the needs, problems, and psychology of the peasant himself. "Comunidades" of the Altiplano also have schools and hire teachers with their own funds, but these are so scarce, and so little adequately trained teaching personnel is available, that the teaching is very backward, and the children take years to learn to read and write.

III

POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

THE PEASANT REVOLUTION

The peasantry did not participate directly in the insurrection of 9 April 1952. But the revolu-

¹² *Lucha Obrera* (no 102, first half of January 1959) recorded the following information:

The peasants of Ucareña have approved a resolution to be presented by its fraternal delegation to the Peasant Congress in La Paz, judging the labors of the Servicio Agrícola Interamericano (S A I): that "it goes along without any control" without fulfilling the plans foreseen. The resolution shows that the S A I has not increased agricultural production; that it has not directly taught the peasants any improvements in cultivation; that it has not aided in obtaining modern technical tools and means of labor that make agricultural mechanization possible.

That besides not having fulfilled these projects, the S A I has pushed aside national agronomic engineers, and used an incompetent foreign element that is settled in the principal capitals of the Republic and in the United States, visiting only on very rare occasions the place of their work, the countryside, of whose needs they are ignorant, as they are of the idiosyncrasies of the Bolivian Indian.

That the S A I has a many-branched bureaucratic plant that is vegetating in offices with luxury and comfort imported from the United States, while the Bolivian Indian is struggling in a daily fight against drought, hail, phytoptera, dust-storms, frosts, ticks, the steady erosion of the land, and other calamities, without any of the technical leadership, which is, however, so trumpeted and publicized, with a profusion of photographs that are a fiction and a snare.

That the S A I has granted scholarships to its own employees so that they may go through the different states of the Colossus of the North, wasting Bolivian money that could be used for the practical solution of the basic problems of agriculture, seeing that the scholarship-holders have brought back no benefits to the country on their return from their tours.

That the S A I has covered up for all the big landowners, who, as a revenge for the agrarian reform, are sabotaging it.

tion had deep repercussions in the rural regions. Above all, the destruction of the army opened the gates so that the peasants, without the threat of being massacred by the forces at the orders of the landowning oligarchy, might hasten to seize the land.

The revolutionary method, from below, arms in hand, used to carry out the agrarian reform, showed itself once more to be the only effective one for the sharing-out of the land and the destruction of agrarian feudalism.

The peasant mobilization, furthermore, gave the mass backing that was indispensable for the support of the workers' gains achieved by the April insurrection. The C O B [Bolivian Trade-Union Federation] was transformed into the expression and the instrument of the worker-peasant alliance sealed after April.

Together with the occupation of the land, a wave of peasant unionism developed. And, together with the unions, peasant militia were formed, with a de facto centralization in Ucucreña, the capital of the agrarian reform.

The duality of power established in the country after the April revolution between the capitalist government and the trade unions was and is expressed more deeply than elsewhere in the peasant unions and their militia. In the zones of the greatest peasant concentration and tradition, such as the valley of Cochabamba, a real state within a state was formed. Within its confines, the peasant unions exercised and continue to exercise an authority superior to that of the state: they distribute land, dispense justice, decree judgments, possess militia and places of arrest, authorize or deny transit, and even marry and divorce.

On the disappearance of the latifundia and the expulsion of the big landowners from the countryside, the unions seemed to have lost their reason for existence, if they are to be understood as organs of economic struggle of the toilers of the countryside against the boss that exploits them. But the unions took on a new characteristic: that of being the instruments of defense of the gains that had been won, first of all, the land; and that of being the deliberative and executive organisms for all the problems of peasant life, organs of the peasants' power. The arming of the peasants and the militia transformed them into one of the pillars of agrarian unionism.

In reality, this mass arming is the force that has prevented or checked the blows of the counter revolution in trying to regain power, and, by its very existence, the deep roll-back of the revolutionary gains that the capitalist government would have desired.

The peasantry has entered into the national political life through its unions. The winning of universal franchise, in the peasant consciousness,

is linked up with its political expression through the union. The union or agrarian centre is the central point for any political participation or intervention by the peasantry.

This is one of the most profound and irreversible advances of the Bolivian revolution. Since the April revolution, there has arisen and been formed in Bolivia a peasant different from the traditional one: a peasant who, even with limitations, intervenes in trade-union life, possesses his rifle or sub-machine-gun, has won his own land, feels himself to be an active part and support of the revolution, which did not arrive from above but was made by himself in the countryside and defended by himself, arms in hand, more than once; he has, collectively, a certain degree of centralization and of political life through the agrarian unions and of participation in the C O B and feels himself to be a factor of some weight in the political life of the nation. This peasant has already ceased to be that backward and apathetic base on which the reaction has always counted for support or protection in order to hem in the proletariat.

THE STRUGGLES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Several years of the agrarian reform without a noticeable increase in their income, in their material living levels, with the paralysis in the delivery of title-deeds, with the abuses and personal enrichment of the M N R peasant leaders, etc, went on stimulating discontent in the countryside. It was not for all this that the April revolution had been made.

In an apparently isolated form, a new series of peasant struggles began since 1957 and 1958.

The evolution of the struggles in the countryside formed one of the principal events of the revolution during 1959. This evolution can be graphically summarized in the personal fate of the former Minister of Peasant Affairs, Vicente Alvarez Plata. In April he had to resign as a result of being repudiated by the peasantry of the entire country (which, in its repudiation of the minister, was in reality expressing its discontent with the policy of the government). In the following months he engaged in a campaign to split the peasant organizations of the Altiplano. In November, he was killed by the peasants of Atahuallpani (close to the Peasant Central of Achacachi), during one of his splitting tours at the service of Siles.

The death of Alvarez Plata is not an isolated deed. It is part of the armed struggle, of the beginning of the peasant war that is developing, from the north of Potosi in 1957-58 to the Cocha-

bamba conflicts and the Achacachi struggles in 1959. Large quantities of weapons continue to pour into the countryside: the peasants are seeking to arm themselves by every means. This is not a matter of individual impulse but a collective tendency, which has the presentiment that new events and still graver clashes are approaching.

The restlessness and clashes in the rural regions do not have their real origins in the internal conflicts within the MNR, although these brought on the outbreak thereof. They are rather the expression of a deep discontent in the peasantry, which for the moment is finding no other outlet to show itself.

They are also the expression of the lack of any workers' leadership that channels and offers a revolutionary way out for the peasants' needs and demands. And they express, simultaneously with the combativity and new mobilization that are spreading among the peasantry, the beginning of a decomposition of the forces of the revolution, which, unable to find real ways out, are getting into confused clashes.

The new peasant mobilizations, the death of Alvarez Plata, the resistance to the army in Cochabamba, the "strong point" set up by the peasants in Achacachi * — these open a new stage in the political evolution of the peasantry. The rule of the government up till now has been based fundamentally on the separation and difference in levels between the workers' and the peasants' struggles, in control over the peasantry, in the de facto dislocation of the worker-peasant alliance by the Lechinist policy of abandoning the peasantry and sabotaging the alliance.

The bases for this rule are disappearing. The ever greater mobilizations are bringing the government directly face to face with the peasantry. The collapse of the Falange since its 19 April defeat is another element that forces the government to present itself as frankly opposed to the peasantry. By losing the Falange, the capitalist government have lost their most priceless instrument for bringing pressure to hold back and confuse the peasantry. They can no longer argue, as they used to do, that any worker or peasant mobilization objectively favors the putschists and brings the revolution into danger. They can no longer dangle the scarecrow of the Falange, which was especially used against the peasantry. Now it is the government who are forced to assume directly the role of holding back peasant advances. All this is speeding up the political evolution of the peasantry, is still further compromising the fundamental bases of the government's stability, and is developing the precon-

ditions for once more setting up the worker-peasant alliance.

Under these conditions, the best agent of Siles for his policy of holding back and dispersing the peasant forces is the Lechinist leadership, which is demonstrating as never before its treacherous and criminal role. The workers' leadership, especially that of the miners, is the natural centralizer that the peasants need, all the more so in their present problems. The government's greatest fear is the regroupment of the workers and the peasants. Its main goal is to keep up the dispersion and paralysis of the C O B, to break up any attempt at reunification. For this, its agent is Lechinism, which is acting as a supplement to the policy of Paz Estenssoro, and is consciously maintaining the division and separation of the workers' struggles among themselves, of the peasant movements among themselves, and between the workers' and peasants' movements as a whole and the petty bourgeoisie.

This action of Lechinism, however, is possible only to the extent that a revolutionary leadership does not arise with sufficient strength, determination, and authority to carry out this regroupment. The objective situation, the development of consciousness among the peasantry and the proletariat, their growing confrontation with the government — all these tend to help such a leadership to emerge, to create better preconditions for it.

But only the concrete presence of the revolutionary Marxist leadership, that of the P O R (Partido Obrero Revolucionario), even as a minority but in the fundamental places, can bring about the achievement of this perspective. It is the absence or weakness of this leadership that enables Lechinism to be able to continue its labor of sell-out and capitulation. It is this weakness which, in the last analysis, constitutes the main reason why the elements of stagnation and decomposition of the revolution are developing, why in the rural regions they are expressed by clashes among the peasants themselves and in the abandonment of positions already won.

THE NEW PEASANT LEADERSHIP

The peasant masses have resisted up till today, as the worker masses have done, on the basis of an unheard-of heroism, suffering incredible privations, and witnessing every day the desertion and capitulation of the leaderships. At a frightful level of underconsumption, the peasant and worker masses have defended their revolution, have taken up arms dozens of times against the government themselves, to defend their gains. Their action and armed presence have, fundamentally, prevented the MNR itself from establishing the capitalist dictatorship, as it tried

* See "Fourth International," no 8, Winter 1959-1960.

to do with Siles, with Cuadros Quiroga, with Guevara. The masses "cut down to size" various candidates for dictatorship, and not only Unzaga de la Vega.

But the government and imperialism also have gone on speculating on the situation of hunger and impoverishment, on unemployment, on low agricultural production, to make the workers and the revolution retreat. The fundamental motive for the actions of the government has not been economic but political. Their main goal today is not to increase production, but to liquidate the duality of power, to put an end to the power of the unions and militia, especially in the rural regions and the mines. Even undertakings like the various colonizations (Santa Cruz, Caranavi, etc) had as their unconfessed purpose the creation of a counterweight to the poor and combative peasantry of the Altiplano and the valleys. In this purpose, they have, for the moment, failed.

The fall in production and in living standards is a new factor of dispersion of the workers and peasants, and the government want to disperse these forces by any means at all. They demonstrated this by provoking various mine strikes (that of March 1958 was the clearest example), and they demonstrate it in the countryside, where their policy is that of weakening the peasantry by hunger in order later to surround it by arms. This policy is dictated by imperialism. That is the condition it poses for continuing, by its aid, to maintain the MNR in power.

The agrarian reform, made from below, went much further than was suitable or acceptable for the capitalist regime. In order to re-establish the full functioning of capitalism, the agrarian reform must retreat, the countryside — like the mines — must again become a field for capital investment, capitalism must return to the rural regions. Not, this time, in the old form, which cannot be resuscitated, but by eliminating the peasant unions and militia, and clearing the way for a new capitalist concentration of agrarian property; it is not by chance that the MNR

theoreticians insist on taking the Mexican revolution as the example of their future.

The peasant movement needs a new national leadership. But the peasantry cannot by itself generate a new centralized leadership. Already at the previous stage it was the petty bourgeoisie that imposed a leadership from above, but basing itself on the Lechinist workers' leadership. The appearance and acceptance of a new workers' leadership will open the way to centralize a new peasant leadership on a national scale.

Whatever may be the vicissitudes through which peasant organization and struggles may pass, the capitalist petty bourgeoisie can no longer impose on them from above a more or less viable leadership, nor can capitalism liquidate or uproot the peasant revolution in Bolivia. But a new orientation, a national organization of the struggles, and a national peasant leadership, can emerge only from the junction of the permanent peasant combativity with a new revolutionary proletarian leadership.

The evolution of the peasant situation, of the political consciousness of the peasantry, have been a process of extraordinary richness in this most recent period. In it there exist in potential great possibilities for a new development of the revolution and of the worker-peasant alliance, but at the same time serious dangers of an increase in the decomposition and disorientation of the revolution.

The decisive factor for ensuring that the outcome of this crisis is a revolutionary one and for avoiding a deeper trend towards decomposition and even defeat, is the intervention of the revolutionary Marxist leadership, of the P O R. This intervention is the guarantee of once more soldering and re-erecting the worker-peasant alliance, with a programme that corresponds to the present problems and struggles, through the main worker and peasant unions, that are the ones which will bring a definitive solution to the destiny of the revolution.

December 1959

[The present article is, for reasons of space, being published in two parts. The second part, referring more concretely to the programme of transition and the revolutionary party's tasks in the rural regions, will appear in our next issue. We have, furthermore, considerably reduced section III, also for space considerations, while trying to retain those aspects of the greatest general interest.]

UPDATING ADDENDUM

In recent months the situation in Bolivia has been affected by important events. Since the present article was written (December 1959), not only have the peasant mobilizations continued to go forward, but the workers also have succeeded in hitting serious blows at their class enemy, strengthening the outlook for a new stage, for new opportunities to pull the revolution out of the stagnation in which the petty-bourgeois leadership of the MNR has been confining it.

Among these events there are to be noted:

1) The Proclamation of Achacachi, made by the peasants of that region in defense of their land, adopting a series of programmatic points from the P O R, and under that party's inspiration.

2) The armed victory of the miners' militia in Huanuni, where an insurrection of the Huanuni miners against the trade-union apparatus — terrorist in nature, and armed to the teeth — set up by the government

and by the M N R right wing (Guevara), received the support of the miners' militia of Catavi - Siglo XX, and ended in the complete triumph of the workers.

3) The candidacy of Víctor Paz Estenssoro - Juan Lechín, announced in February at the M N R Convention, for the next presidential elections (June 1960), which won out over the candidacy of the M N R right-wing headed by Guevara.

4) The defeat in March of a Guevarist coup d'état against the candidacy of Paz - Lechín, carried out by a sector of the carabinieri, who had to surrender after a day of fighting against a sector of the army and the union militia.

The above-mentioned events have for the moment sealed the defeat of that M N R wing that is most tied up with imperialism. The Paz - Lechín candidacy has been strengthened, and it is certain that it will carry with it an important sector of the masses, since the peasants still nurture hopes about Paz Estenssoro for a solution of their problems, and the workers see in Lechín their own leader raised to be the vice-president of the Republic.

Nevertheless, although the M N R may thus for a time maintain its control over the masses, that control will be exercised under very different conditions from those of the past. Not only have the masses worked up intense struggles against the M N R government headed by Siles, but also victories such as that at Huanuni, won by themselves without any aid or support from above, have strengthened their confidence in themselves, and powerfully increased their independence toward the official apparatus of the ruling party and the capitalist state.

The Paz - Lechín candidacy, while giving a certain extension of time to the M N R, means an encouragement for the struggles of the masses; and it is this that is feared by imperialism, the M N R right wing, the oligarchy, and Paz Estenssoro himself. That is why the right-wing opposition has gone to the extent of armed insurrection; and new pressure and struggles may be expected right up till the elections. In this sense, the defeat of the Guevarist coup d'état means another factor

of encouragement for the masses, of weakening of the pro-imperialist tendencies and of Paz's own position as a brake on the masses.

Because these facts are simultaneously encouraging the workers and peasants to carry forward the struggle to get out of the stagnation in which the revolution now is, Paz Estenssoro will not be able, from the presidency, to provide any real solution to the deeper problems of the revolution. The capitalist regime in Bolivia no longer works, yet Paz Estenssoro, with the help of Lechín, intends above all to defend that regime against the assaults of the masses.

All the problems of agrarian reform, of nationalization of the mines, of workers' control, of the living levels of the toilers, etc, are posed with greater or lesser sharpness in the next period, in the face of a workers' and peasants' movement which, although electorally supporting Paz Estenssoro, has developed a deep critical spirit and a great confidence in its own strength, concentrated and organized in the mass worker and peasant unions and in the armed militia.

To this must be added, as an element in the masses' development, not only the colonial revolution as a whole, but, much more concretely, the example of the Cuban revolution, which has enormous repercussions in the consciousness of the Bolivian masses.

In the inevitable crisis and confrontation with the masses to which the M N R - this time with Paz Estenssoro and Lechín (its last reserves of prestige) - will find itself led, it is the P O R which is called on to put itself at the head of the masses, offering an answer in the form of a programme and an organization for the needs for which the masses are mobilizing in this whole period, and which can find an adequate solution only along the path of struggle for the workers' and peasants' government, and its establishment in fact.

All the problems of the peasants' revolution raised in this article will arise even more acutely in the next period, in the face of the incapacity of the capitalist regime and its "left" (Paz Estenssoro - Lechín) to bring to them the slightest effective solution.

GAULLIST BONAPARTISM THROWS OFF ITS CAMOUFLAGE

By PIERRE FRANK

At the moment of writing, many French politicians and journalists are discussing whether de Gaulle, by refusing to summon a special session of the parliament despite the formal request of more than half its deputies, has violated the constitution which he himself got adopted in September 1958 or whether a provision therein permitted him so to act. A wonderful subject to keep professors of constitutional law busy for years! But to understand how and why it happened, it is preferable to use Marxist analysis, and, on this occasion, what it teaches us on the subject of Bonapartism.

Even since de Gaulle arrived at power, we have made a distinction between the fascisizing forces which brought off the May 13th coup d'état in Algiers with the support of the army, and the state power that was set up in Paris, the Bonapartist power of de Gaulle, an expression of a very dynamic wing of big capital.¹ It must be added, however, that this Bonapartism at that time had characteristics that seemed to be in partial contradiction to the classical definition of Bonapartism. On the one hand, the army in Algeria constituted a force still independent, to a considerable extent, of the new power in Paris: one of de Gaulle's essential goals was to ensure himself of the control of the army. On the other hand, de Gaulle began his reign by associating in the government Pinay and Guy Mollet, the heads of the two main parliamentary parties of the Fourth Republic. Bonapartism is above all a sabre and a philosophy. Whereas de Gaulle, at the beginning, did not have a firm grasp on the hilt of the sabre, and the philosophy of "grandeur" and of the firmness of the executive power was decked out in tawdry parliamentary finery. But in less than two years the situation has been clarified and we are coming to classic Bonapartism.

THE ARMY AND STATE POWER

The army was the main force which de Gaulle had to and still has to take into account. Having undergone a series of defeats for twenty years, it has — like any beaten military man — thrown the responsibility on to the civil power.

¹ See our numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6; also the author's preface to the reissue of *Où va la France?* (Léon Trotsky, *Écrits*, volume II, Paris, Editions de la Quatrième, 1958).

Especially when it was beaten or fought to a standstill, not by those gentlemen of the German Supreme General Staff, but by the Vietnamese, Algerians, etc. This situation helped to develop in this army currents that favored "the psychological weapon," i.e., fascist or fascisizing currents that had themselves worked out a policy for Algeria, whose goal was to make it into a French province.

As the representative of the essential interests of French capitalism, de Gaulle is determined to reach a solution in Algeria that guarantees the predominance of French capitalist interests there; but he knows that Algeria is "Algerian" and will never be French, and that he had to get the army to give up its illusory goals. This operation required time, and various efforts, involving the elimination of certain highly placed chiefs, first by pushing them upstairs to honorific posts, and conversations with many subalterns during several "tours round the messes"; and it was completed by checking and defeating the January 1960 attempt at a fascist Putsch in Algiers. The ultras felt driven to action by the removal of General Massu; they thought that they had at their disposal, as in May 1958, the aid or the benevolent backing of the army. And indeed, in the army there were not lacking cadres who felt sympathy for their attempted Putsch. But de Gaulle, speaking over the radio on January 29th, placed them before the alternative — either obey or make a pronunciamiento — and they obeyed.

The present condition of the French army (that is, of its cadres and its special troops) deserves some explanation. It is not only reactionary, as any army of a capitalist state is. It is at present politicized in an outstandingly reactionary way and it is a *political force* that the state power has to take into account. But, since the January 1960 events in Algiers, it is certain that this army, even though there will still be certain grumbings or certain angry shouts here and there, will submit to de Gaulle's authority. First of all because, as Delouvrier, highest French functionary in Algeria, said, "There's no other de Gaulle." And then because the army and de Gaulle are in agreement today about staying in Algeria. After the most recent Algiers events, many men of the left said that de Gaulle had made to the army the *concession* that it would remain in Algeria

and, when the time came, have control of the referendum about self-determination. This was no concession by de Gaulle, because it had never previously been his intention to let go of Algeria as the ultras accused him of wanting to do. We shall return later to the Algerian question. For the moment the French army is involved there in guerilla warfare that has lasted more than five years, after seven years of war in Vietnam. This long and embittering contact with the colonial revolution, in the absence of anything that could possibly be called an intervention by the French proletariat, has in any case made the army a hotbed of reactionary and fascisizing cadres, and great efforts by the workers of France will be necessary to overcome it.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GAULLIST REGIME

Relations with the parliamentary world presented a less thorny problem than those with the military men, though one that in the long run has no less important consequences.

Immediately after de Gaulle's arrival in power, with the exception of the leaders of the PCF (French Communist Party), who could not fail to fear every thing from Gaullism, only a few bourgeois-democratic or Socialist politicians — Mendès-France, Mitterand, the leaders of the PSA (Autonomous Socialist Party) and the UGS (Union of the Socialist Left) — stated that they would not stay within the framework of the regime and wait for the period that would come after the Gaullist regime. Some others, the Radicals with Gaillard, individual figures like Edgar Faure, adopted an equivocal position toward the new regime. As the months passed, various figures could be seen leaving the government, without, for all that, taking a position against the regime: first, Guy Mollet, because of the Pinay-Rueff economic policy, aimed at the laboring masses; then Radicals or Socialists of second rank, because of the anti-laïc policy in the school question; next, Pinay himself, worried by overly rough measures against small and mediumsize businesses; and finally Soustelle, wanting to capitalize on the hostility of the ultras and fascists toward de Gaulle's Algerian policy. With the refusal to summon the parliament, it was the Socialist Party of Mollet and the MRP (Popular Republican Movement) that are withdrawing. All these evolutions were carried out in the most complete ambiguity, and by invoking pretexts rather than the real reasons. None of these political leaders, none of these formations, gave a frank explanation or formulated a categorical opposition to the regime. Not one of them calls on the masses for any struggle whatsoever. It is

rather Premier Debré, a simple carrier-out-of-orders, than de Gaulle himself, whom they bring into question. All have adopted a waiting, passive attitude: let the state power shift for itself, alone, as long as it can; as for us, we intervene only to get into a better position for what will come *after de Gaulle*.

The result has been that in these first months of 1960 the new regime has appeared in its true light. The power is in the hands of de Gaulle and a brains-trust of a few figures who are neither ministers nor deputies; the government are above all a group of top functionaries, carrying out the decisions of the country's real leaders. The great mass of the population does not know the names of the men around de Gaulle or even those of the members of the government. The only political connection between the state power and the mass of the population lies in de Gaulle's own person. His refusal to summon the parliament will make no difference at all; it is merely the most finished expression of the nature of the Gaullist regime, for which even an Assembly such as that elected at the end of 1958 is intolerable if it shows the slightest desire to utter an opinion of its own.

The new regime created a new political formation, the UNR (Union for the New Republic) which almost all by itself ensures a parliamentary majority. But it is difficult to describe this formation as a *political party*. In the absence of any public demonstrations, it is hard to estimate its real organizational strength, but that in itself is an indication that it is not rooted in the various social strata. Since its creation the UNR has shown a dual aspect of this new "political" personnel: an unconditional lining up behind de Gaulle; a considerable appetite of men hungry for the profits of power, great and small, that leaves far behind it the long-sated palates of the old politicians of parliamentary democracy.

Bonapartism shows that just the link of the "Bonapart" himself with the mass of the population is politically sufficient in and of itself: he need not set up political formations that propose to discuss the problems of all sorts that are worrying the various classes and strata of society. The country need not concern itself with politics. Foreign policy, finances, the economy, the army, etc, etc — these are questions that lie in the domain reserved to His Highness! Under such circumstances, political formations of the right and the left — which corresponded to the functioning of the parliamentary regime and which formed the links between the state power and the social categories that they represented — have no functions in the Gaullist regime; they bring no weight to bear on the administrations, more and more under the thumbs of the technocrats

who serve the interests of a very narrow stratum of big capital.

It is not only because they have no longer any power of decision that the figures who formed the political personnel of the Third and Fourth Republics are withdrawing from the Gaullist regime, tiptoeing away. Indeed, it is rather painful for them to give up the material advantages that they might obtain by remaining in government posts. The main reason for their withdrawal is the continuation of the war in Algeria.

A LAST QUARTER OF AN HOUR... THAT WILL LAST FOR YEARS YET

The general secretary of the MRP recently made a statement to the effect that his party had accepted giving up democracy for a period in favor of the personal power of de Gaulle because he seemed to be the only person capable of rapidly bringing the war in Algeria to an end. And indeed de Gaulle in 1958 was at the point of convergence of currents which, while different and even antagonistic, all saw in him the man capable of quickly putting a stop to the war in Algeria. The anti-parliamentary reactionaries hoped that he would do so by pushing the war to its utmost, at the same time that he was ridding France of parliamentary democracy. The classic right hoped that he would liquidate the weight of the PCF and assign parliament a subordinate place that would not upset governmental stability. The men of the left, and especially Guy Mollet, hoped that de Gaulle might be the one man who could make the right accept a moderate solution in Algeria, and that, with peace restored, it would be easy to return to a parliamentary regime, threatened by the continuation of the war that aided the growth of reactionary and fascist forces. Even a great number of Communist voters, it will be remembered, showed their confidence in de Gaulle precisely as the man who was going rapidly to bring about peace in Algeria. As *Le Canard Enchaîné* put it, de Gaulle had been elected President of the Republic for the duration of the Algerian war.

The most reactionary sector was quite rapidly disappointed when it saw that de Gaulle refused to use the terms "French Algeria" and "integration," and it prepared for a trial of strength as a result of the 16 September 1959 speech, in which de Gaulle, using the term "self-determination," let it be understood for the first time that his own preference was for a sort of association between France and Algeria.

As for the French population in general, which wants peace but has never been called on to take the slightest action for this purpose, and as for the politicians who, faced with the fascist threat,

had turned the power over to de Gaulle — they were delighted by the position he took on 16 September 1959 and again in January 1960. Wasn't this the best justification for their own apathy? Everything that de Gaulle might lose on his right, he picked up again (and more to boot) on his left.

At the beginning of February 1960, after the collapse of the Putsch in Algiers, a referendum would have given de Gaulle more than the 80% of the votes that he had obtained in 1958. He had been the first, since the beginning of the war in Algeria, to stand up to the ultras, and they had collapsed pretty pitifully. For the first time the road looked wide-open for the reestablishment of peace in Algeria. Beside the ultras, who in France was not in favor of negotiations? Was the G P R A (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) doing anything except asking for the most modest guarantees that must be obtained by a people used for decades to faked elections? What obstacle could remain in the way of ending up in this "peace of brave men"? Nobody showed himself to be more confident — or, it ought to be said, more credulous — than the editors of *France-Observateur*, about very soon reaching a halt in the hostilities; and under these conditions, for the editors of that weekly, men like Francis Jeanson, who were in favor of the victory of the Algerian people, were not acting in the interests of peace!

But de Gaulle, who knows how to double back and to tack under certain circumstances, at other times has no fear of speaking bluntly. The Algiers Putsch was scarcely over before he obtained emergency powers for the defense of state security; once this was done, he decided to have new elections in Algeria very soon (a decision which was in opposition to serious self-determination), and he once more betook himself to Algeria to visit those gentlemen, the officers of the army. And there his language knocked the breath out of all those men of the left who had seen in him a champion of peace, and who believed that that peace was very near. It was to the effect that the FLN will not give up its arms; the army must go get them. That will take years. After which, at the end of a long time, the army will have control over the operations of self-determination. We are not in a hurry, de Gaulle added — thus showing that he was determined, under present conditions, to take the time necessary for obtaining the capitulation of the Algerians. Many French petty-bourgeois and even workers had for a long time had hope in Lacoste's "last quarter of an hour"; with de Gaulle they could believe that it was really the last quarter of an hour. And now here was de Gaulle settling into the war for years. As an old French song puts it: it surely

was hardly worth the trouble of changing the government . . .



And while we are on the subject of quotations, a better one could not be found for France after these last remarks of de Gaulle than the celebrated phrase of Richefort under the Second Empire: France has forty million subjects, without counting the subjects of discontent. In less than two years the new regime has found a way to come into collision with almost every category of the population, without distinction of age, sex, or profession. The "grandeur" of France is a more or less widespread lowering of the standard of living of the laboring masses (workers, peasants, functionaries, ex-servicemen), a strangling of the laïc school for the benefit of the self-styled free schools, extreme difficulties for the students, etc. In compensation, the French have the Reggane atomic bomb and the prospect of a war of indeterminate length in Algeria. We leave aside, naturally, the scandals of every sort which are also aiming at being "grand" ones compared with those of past regimes.

Unable to grasp what Bonapartism really is, the leaders of the left have passed through various phases since the arrival of the de Gaulle regime. First of all, they believed that fascism was coming very rapidly; then that things were settling down into a paternalistic regime capable of making peace in Algeria; now many are lulling themselves with the idea that, with the regime's inability thus to make peace, its end is near. Illusions, all along the line. The regime has set itself up on the basis of a new correlation of forces between the classes, and it is not liable to fall just because of a shift in public opinion, however serious a shift it might be. This regime will not go away of its own free will; it will be necessary to overthrow it, and for that more than a few demonstrations are needed. Established by force, it is only by force that it will disappear.

For the moment, the parties that have withdrawn somewhat from it are counting only on its wearing itself out. And they are still addressing de Gaulle, asking him to leave his regime at least some appearance of democracy.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE REGIME

The only party that might have effectively prepared the masses for a decisive struggle against the Gaullist regime is the Communist Party, but its attitude toward that regime is, for reasons specific to that party, also full of ambiguities.

On the one hand, the leadership of the Communist Party cannot fail to denounce the regime

of personal power on account of the threats implicit in it against the working class as a whole and in particular the Communist Party itself. As a political formation, the P C F is still more disdained by the political world than it has been at any time since the "cold war." But on the other hand, the direction the P C F takes is decided, in the last resort, by the orientation of Soviet diplomacy; and for this, de Gaulle, by his personal positions in N A T O and in Europe, appears as a sort of trouble-maker, a factor of tension, within the Atlantic coalition. We shall not go on at length here about the error in calculation by Soviet diplomacy, which is hoping by subtle manoeuvres to lead him to take the next step, advancing from his little game for obtaining a larger place within the imperialist coalition, to a total break with that coalition. This is not the first time that Soviet diplomacy has committed this sort of mistake. But the effects on the policy of the C P s is always the same. In the present case, the leadership of the P C F, brandishing the "German danger," has several times attempted an operation of bringing pressure within the limits of the new regime, and even a flirtation with certain Gaullist fractions. One of the presidents of the France-USSR Association is Deputy Schmittlein, president of the parliamentary group of the U N R, and vice-president of the National Assembly. For the P C F leadership, the main question in French politics is not basically the question of Algeria, but the question of "peace" between East and West, to which it subordinates its position on Algeria. This is shown very concretely: when it cannot help it, the P C F leadership puts up with committees for peace in Algeria that are independent of its own Peace Movement; but tries to torpedo them because those who are active in such committees refuse to be docile tools in the variations of Soviet diplomacy. The Algerian revolution has received no effective aid from the P C F. Under the pretext that the struggle against the Algerian war must be a mass struggle, the P C F leadership has denounced individuals who have contributed personal help to the Algerians, describing them on occasion as provocateurs, especially if they are oppositional communists.

After de Gaulle's arrival at power, and with a certain delay in reorienting itself, the P C F leadership put forward in its programme the slogan of a new Constituent Assembly — with a view to reestablishing a "renewed" democracy. But on the morrow of the January 1960 events — during which the P C F leadership yielded to the prohibition of public meetings — the spokesman of the Communist parliamentary group, Waldeck-Rochet, a member of the Political Bureau, asked

the government for new parliamentary elections. This was recognizing the framework of the regime of the Fifth Republic, and not merely fighting inside it because of necessity.

At the same time, the P C F leadership, through the voice of Thorez, after general remarks against personal power, made an appeal for a grouping identical with that of the Resistance during the war years; such an appeal, on the eve of Khrushchev's arrival in France, was plainly aimed at the Gaullists.

At certain moments the ambiguity of the P C F policy toward de Gaulle becomes evident even to considerable strata of working-class militants. Thus, during the one-hour strike on February 1st, many had the feeling that they were working for the benefit of de Gaulle. And there is not the slightest doubt that it is de Gaulle who profits most from the enormous confusion that arose in connection with Khrushchev's visit to France, Gaullists and Communists side by side cheerfully shouting — these, Hurray for de Gaulle! and those, Hurray for Khrushchev!

WHERE IS GAULLISM GOING?

Bonapartism has taken on a clearer aspect, but it has nowise said its last word, or, as yet, shown all its characteristics.

It is scarcely worried by the fact that there is much discontent with it, because none of the big formations is carrying on an active struggle against it. Bonapartism has no need of active support; a few big tours through the provinces from time to time suffice; what it lives on above all is political apathy — an apathy that it feeds by all the means at its disposal. For it, danger will begin when political resistance becomes active, militant. We are not yet at that point.

Like the Fourth Republic, the new regime will experience its most serious difficulties on account of the continuance of the war in Algeria. The Algiers Putsch probably marks the end of the trend to the right which has steadily shown itself in France since the beginning of the Algerian revolution; but, on account of the betrayal and deficiencies of the workers' leaderships, the possibilities — rather limited ones, on account of the regime established after 13 May 1958 — of a reactivation and mobilization of the masses against the war in Algeria are not exploited as they should be.

Nevertheless, though it must not be expected that the great masses will soon emerge from their political apathy and indifference, the series of events that have occurred from 1958 to 1960 rather favors a political re-awakening of the militants on the level of political thought. They had been overwhelmed by the May 1958 coup de force, ending in the victory of a united front of

all bourgeois currents, backed by the leadership of the Socialist Party. On the occasion of the Algiers Putsch, they saw that there was division inside the bourgeois camp, and recourse was made to their own intervention, even if only of a benign sort; and it was the ultras who came out the losers. But in either case they could see how the numerically limited Gaullist team exploited at one time the right and at another the workers' movement. For part of them, the question is now being raised of a policy that de Gaulle cannot exploit; this is an aspiration toward an independent class policy. The extent of this phenomenon must not be exaggerated, but, however limited and however little sensed it may still be at present, it is nonetheless one of the most essential factors on which a revolutionary vanguard must stake for the definition and achievement of its present tasks.



As long as the war in Algeria lasts, the future of France will be blocked. It is de Gaulle himself who stated this explicitly in his radio speech against the 29 January Putsch in Algiers. As he is now settling down for years into the war in Algeria, the obstacles will accumulate on the path of the modernization of French society; as big capital is not ready to give up its goals and its profits, it is inescapable that the masses will clash with the state power both concerning an improvement in wages for the workers, office employees, and functionaries, and concerning the general improvement in living conditions in both town and country (more and better housing, schools, roads, etc). It is to be stressed that, though the installation of the Gaullist regime was marked by a spread of political indifference, carefully kept up by the radio, the TV, and the big newspapers, the new regime has nowise been characterized by the disappearance of immediate demands, including by the big losers in the operation of 13 May 1958, the workers.

Granted, the workers' struggles have taken on a different character. It would be mistaken to expect, in the immediate future, big generalized struggles, and false to spread that idea in the present correlation of forces. But, beginning with the Spring of 1959, the workers and functionaries have been restating their demands, and we have witnessed numerous partial and limited conflicts. We cannot within the limits of this article proceed to a detailed examination of the problems raised by these struggles or of the policy followed by the principal labor leadership — that of the C G T — or of what should have been done. Let us simply say that the C G T, guided by the policy of the P C F, did not seek to put forward general demands or to educate the wor-

kers through these struggles with a view to decisive struggles at a later stage against the political regime and against the social regime; it limited itself to exploiting, for demands at the plant or trade level, the advantage given to the working class by a period of full employment. For the French economy, apart from a few very local pockets, is going through a good conjuncture, and the war in Algeria for its part is retaining conscripts in the army for at least 27 months — which withdraws about 200,000 young men from the labor market. In any case, there is no reason to think that the workers will not continue to make demands; indeed, quite the contrary.

Other social categories are being led or will be led to make demands. The very limited economic forces which are sparking the present regime are extremely dynamic, aiming at considerably speeding up the process of modernization, and consequently of concentration, of the French economy, especially in the sectors that modernization has heretofore reached very little or not at all (a large number of conversion industries, peasantry, distribution). It is not surprising that — by the fault of the workers' leaderships who have refused to appeal to the strength of the workers — petty-bourgeois strata injured by the economic policy of big capital have been directly polited politically by reactionary currents. Indirectly, Bonapartism makes use of this in its skilful play of counter-weights against the demonstrations and demands of the working class.

These demands by all the social categories can only become accentuated by the continuation of the war in Algeria — which is blocking the future. From a longer-term viewpoint, the agitation that will result therefrom will tend to nurture political oppositions — all the more so

in that the new regime, cornered by the difficulties inherent in the perpetuation of the war, will not fail to show a different face from that rather paternalistic and benign one with which it has up till now confronted demonstrations for demands. If it permitted itself to be tough with deputies who could do nothing but chatter, sending them packing, we may be sure that it will have no hesitation about unleashing the police and the C R S, and demanding severe sentences from the courts, against the workers and the toiling masses generally.



Thus there is being revealed, in its instability and in its strength, the political regime which was the end-product of the failure of bourgeois democracy, the betrayal and deficiencies of the workers' leaderships, the continuance of the colonial war, and the French economy's needs for modernization. The balance of social forces turns around the person of the "providential man." Political forces are in hibernation. The machine keeps running, partly under its own momentum, partly according to the caprices of its present "great man." Barring an accident to him, it will run like this for a period. Will he, or will he not, attain peace in Algeria? That is the decisive question. To achieve that, he would have to make more than verbal concessions; he has to grant the Algerian people something substantial.

In the uncertainty of the outlook, one thing however is clear: while the working class of France has not been led by its big organizations to bring real help to the Algerian revolution, it is the enormous sacrifices of the Algerian people that will still provide the French workers with the opportunities to emerge from their political torpor and to find once more the path of revolutionary combat.

23 March 1960

TEN DECISIVE YEARS FOR INDIA

By LIVIO MAITAN

In these last years, the real situation in India has often been presented in a deforming mirror. For MacCarthy-type ultras, India was a country suffering from the virus of neutralism, which therefore had to be considered as a field of manoeuvre for the most insidious actions by the "communists." For "enlightened" bourgeois, on the contrary, it was the scene of an advanced "democratic" experiment whose results were to belie certain basic criteria of Marxism and Leninism and refute the need of a "Chinese way" to solve the distressing problems of under-developed countries. In the workers' movement itself, a tendency was prevalent to engage in apologetics on its behalf: at the time of the XXth Congress the Indian example served as a demonstration of the particular nature of the paths to follow in reaching socialism, and Nehru was even awarded "diplomas" as a socialist or a semi-socialist.¹ Even recently, interpretations that are, to say the least, surprising can be read concerning the nature of present-day India and the aims pursued by its ruling class.²

In these last months, nevertheless, events of some importance ought to have inspired greater vigilance concerning apologetic judgments. At the end of July, Nehru proclaimed the dissolution, by an act that was undemocratic in both form and substance, of the only government in the Indian Union which his party did not dominate. A month later, demonstrations by the starving masses of Calcutta were broken up by bloody repression. Still during this same period, a skilfully conducted campaign exploited frontier incidents for the obvious purpose of creating a current of nationalism and strengthening anti-Chinese feelings even in the popular masses.

¹ Togliatti, in his March 1955 report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, considered it timely to attribute importance to the fact that "the Indian Congress Party, which is the government party, has declared that it intends to reorganize the country's economy in accordance with the principles of socialism," whereas elsewhere, obviously referring to India and the Kerala experiment, he concluded: "...the example of poorly developed countries where the Communist movement is, without violence, drawing close to power." (Cfr *Rinascita*, 5 May 1957, p 248.)

² We allude in particular to the article in *Avanti* (Milan edition, 29 October 1959, "Socialist World" column), in which, in defiance of the most elementary data, it is claimed among other things that "India, on the whole, even if its rulers do not every 24 hours make claim to a precise ideological choice, proves that it has assimilated the main teachings of Marxism, and we think that we are not mistaken in saying that it is adopting a national path of its own toward socialism."

These are three episodes situated on different planes but which, just because of that, could provide indications about the real situation in India and the present tendencies of its ruling class. If so little benefit was drawn therefrom, it is because, even in the workers' movement, motifs of propaganda and apologetics — which must confirm well-determined general theses or more or less "new" formulae — continue to be preferred to the direct analysis of reality and all the elements that go to make it up.

REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS IN THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

One of the most characteristic experiments of independent India is unquestionably that of the Five-Year Plans, one of which was completed a few years ago, a second is now going on, and a third is in the drafting stage. It is known that it is just concerning these plans — and certain proclamations that have accompanied them³ — that people have been tempted to describe contemporary India as "socialist" or "substantially socialist." We shall return to this point, but let us first of all tackle the problem from the viewpoint of practical achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that, the starting-point being very low, there was never in any case a question of reaching, in five or even ten years, considerable absolute levels. On the other hand, however, it ought to have been relatively easy to obtain big percentage increases. And yet even this second point has not been attained.

At the time that the policy of plans was adopted, what were especially put forward were long-range goals. There was talk of doubling the national income in about 15 years and the per capita revenue in 20 or more years.⁴ Consumption would have increased — according to other estimates — by a little less than 77% up to 1977.

It will immediately be seen that — even granting that such goals may be reached (which is far from being self-evident) — little will have been done in 10 or 15 years to solve the dramatic problems of India and its population. It suffices to think of the extremely modest value of a doubled per capita income when it is remembered that this income was, in 1944-55, of about 270 rupees [1 rupee = \$0.20 or 1s 5d], i.e., less than

³ There was official talk of a "socialistic pattern of society."

⁴ According to more pessimistic calculations, it is only in 1977 that it will be possible to double the per capita income. (Cfr *India: a Reference Annual*, 1959, p 200.)

half the income of the inhabitant of a country like Ceylon, itself backward.⁵

The first plan was to confirm the modest nature of the goals set. It suffices to take as an example investments, which were maintained at between 5% and 6% of the national income (raised to 7% during the last year), which means that they did not go beyond the annual average of the period of British domination. The greatest part of investments was reserved for irrigation and agriculture, whereas industry was attributed, in the overall plan, only a little more than 5% of the total investments.⁶

The final result is that the national income has increased 18.4% — representing about 3.6% per year — while the increase in per capita income was even more limited (only 10.8%).⁷ The index of agricultural production showed an increase of about 20%, an increase of small importance if the population increase during the same period is taken into consideration. What is more, in the general opinion, even this result could be attained only thanks to exceptional weather conditions (whereas those same conditions had been unfavorable in the year which served as the point of comparison).⁸

An obviously more important increase — of about 40%, or 8% per year — was achieved by industry. It is proper to note, however, that this advance took place especially in private industry and not in the public sector that was directly affected by the plan. In addition, though considerable percentage increases were obtained in certain sectors (e.g. the electrical industry), in other important sectors the situation was quite different: substantially they remained at the level of the war years, a level that sometimes was not even reached.⁹

The Second Plan was based on perceptibly dif-

ferent criteria concerning the distribution of investments and had more ambitious goals (the rate of investment was raised to 10-12%). The accent was placed on the requirements of the development of industry, to which 19% of the investments were reserved, whereas a reduction of 5% was foreseen for agriculture. The increase in the national income was to be higher than in the preceding plan and to reach about 5% per year.¹⁰ A particularly important increase was planned for the steel industry.¹¹ As for agricultural production, the increase was to be in the neighborhood of 18% (15% for food grains), that is to say, already at the outset it was lower than what had already been achieved under the preceding plan.

This Second Plan is to end in 1961, and it is therefore a little early to draw an overall trial balance, all the more so in that the indispensable statistics are provided with a certain time-lag. But the impossibility of a complete achievement of the plan was rapidly demonstrated, to the degree that the authorities were led to reevaluate the real possibilities after two years' experience. In practice the goals have been lowered and certain ones have been put in a category for which there is talk about conditional achievement. What is worse is that according to certain indications there is some skepticism about the possibilities of achieving even the thus revised programme.

In the official document announcing this revision, while the causes indicated were inflationary tendencies and foreign-exchange difficulties, it was admitted that in the final period of the First Plan the national income had increased less than 4% per year, while agricultural production had begun to fall off compared to the level attained in 1953-54.¹²

As for the first years of the new plan, the production of finished steel, after having made an insignificant advance in 1957 over 1956, recorded a falling off in 1958 (even compared to 1956). An analogous drop was recorded in rolled iron and in cement production. A drop was already noted in 1957 in the production of products made of jute and cotton, which represent a quite important sector for the Indian economy, and in the sugar industry.¹³

The situation in agriculture was even more serious. Not only has no progress been possible since 1953-54, but a drop in the indices has been

⁵ For a period of the same length, the per capita income was 9,410 rupees in the USA, 4,351 in Great Britain, and 978 in Japan (cfr A B Das — M N Chatterji: *The Indian Economy, Its Growth and Problems*, 1957, p 1). During the following years, the increase in income in India was modest (278 rupees in 1955-56 and 284 [provisional figure] in 1956-57).

⁶ Investments for transportation were of the same importance.

⁷ Per capita consumption increased still less, about 8%.

⁸ Cfr Das — Chatterji: op cit, p 534-535. Cfr also — and not only in this connection — Ernest Germain: "L'Economie indienne du 1er au 2ème Plan Quinquennal" in *Quatrième Internationale*, October 1955.

⁹ Steel production during the First Plan was about 1,070,000 tons, while it had reached 1,250,000 tons at the beginning of 1940. Concerning fabricated steel, the increase from 1941 to 1956 was about 20%, whereas for rolled iron the level reached in 1956 was lower than that of 1939 (cfr *India 1959*, p 323). Let us recall that the general economic conjuncture was, in certain aspects, favorable (results of the post-Korean boom, absence of inflationary tendencies, etc).

¹⁰ Cfr Das — Chatterji, op cit, pp 399 et seq.

¹¹ From 1,300,000 to 4,300,000 tons; cfr ibidem, p 545.

¹² Cfr the official publication, *Appraisal and Prospects of the Second Five-Year Plan*, p 3. For the relative pessimism about the possibilities of application, cfr ibidem, p 19, and "The Plan" in *The Times of India*, 1 September 1959.

¹³ Cfr *India 1959*, pp 320-23.

recorded. The drop between 1956-57 and 1957-1958 was particularly perceptible.¹⁴

That means not only that the goals of the plan are not being and probably will not be attained, but that the already grave problem of agriculture will have a tendency to become even more acute. Even in the most favorable period, the increases in absolute amounts were scarcely sufficient to face up to the population increase, and even this at a frightfully low level of satisfaction of this population's needs. In case of a sag in this production, there is no other way out except an increase in imports, with all the negative consequences for overall economic development that can easily be imagined (it must not be forgotten to what a degree foreign-exchange difficulties have played a role already in these three years). But even this solution — without substantial changes — can be only an inadequate palliative if it is true, as is claimed, that, continuing the present rhythm, the difference between food resources and the population's needs will reach 25% in 1965, and that the minimum to sustain life could be ensured only by an annual increase of more than 8% in the production of grains.¹⁵ On the basis of overall postwar development, including the period of the Five-Year Plans, an absolutely pessimistic outlook is justified. If new factors do not intervene, and with strong influence, this essential inadequacy in agricultural development can have incalculable political and social repercussions on the structure of Indian society as a whole. The first element of a break might appear on just this plane.

Given the adoption of planning and the "socialist" intentions that go with it, it might be thought that, within the general limits of the Indian industrial economy, the role of the public sector, administered or directly controlled by the state, has been important. In fact, this is not so.

Granted, at the beginning the intentions were excellent and immediately after independence ideas of nationalizations circulated, even officially. But in fact it was to be decided later not to nationalize, the state limiting itself to administering and controlling the newly set-up industrial enterprises.¹⁶ In the industrial investments of the

¹⁴ The general index has shown the following trend between 1952-53 and 1957-58 (1949-50 = 100): 102.0, 114.3, 117.9, 123.8, 113.4. For grains, in the same period: 101.4, 120.1, 114.5, 114.9, 119.9, 108.3.

¹⁵ In a Ford Foundation report on the food situation in India, these elements are given, and it is specified: "It is impossible to conceive of an import and rationing programme that can cope with a crisis of this scope." (Re-translated from *Le Monde*, 11 July 1959.) Charles Bettelheim, for his part, states that "in 1966 the harvest deficit will be about 30 million tons of grains." (Cfr *Il Punto*, 1 August 1959.)

¹⁶ On the subject of the evolution of official ideas on this

First Plan, the public sector found itself clearly at a disadvantage. The Second Plan was satisfied to establish a balanced proportion, which meant that the specific weight of private industry would remain preponderant.¹⁷ Thus, as has been observed even in certain circles which, in the past, indulged in certain exalting apologetics, in reality the public sector in India is even more reduced than in certain capitalist countries of Western Europe.¹⁸

WORKERS' WAGES AND LIVING CONDITIONS

What has been the evolution of the remuneration of workers during these last ten years?

Even though, from this point of view as well, the inadequacy of official statistics is to be regretted, there exist sufficient indications to trace out a general chart of the situation.

Especially concerning the total of wages and profits compared to the net product of industry, it has been possible to assemble the following data:¹⁹

(Figures in crores of rupees; 1 crore = 10 million)

	1950	1954	1955
Net product	528.6 (100)	732.6 (136)	775.5 (145)
Wages	236.4 (100)	292.3 (123)	319.5 (135)
Profits	292.2 (100)	440.3 (150)	456.0 (156)
Percentages of wages on product	44.7	39.9	41.1

The percentage of wage income thus appears to have fallen. In other terms, a relative impoverishment seems to have been demonstrated even during this period.

point, and of the different categories that were set up for the development of the public and private sectors, cfr Das-Chatterji, op cit, pp 237-242.

¹⁷ Here are data for new investments in industry:

	Public Sector		Private Sector	
	Forecasts	Achievements	Forecasts	Achievements
1st Plan	94	60	233	233
2nd Plan	524	—	535	—

(Figures are in crores of rupees; 1 crore = 10 million.)

In general, furthermore, the relationship between public and private investments was 50/50 in the First Plan and should have been 61/39 in the Second Plan.

¹⁸ Cfr *L'Unità*, 12 December 1959.

¹⁹ Cfr *General Report at Ernakulam*, by S A Dange, the secretary-general of the AITUC (Communist-controlled trade-union federation), p 28.

Official indications about the parallel development of labor productivity and real wages unfortunately are not available for later than 1954, but the comparison with the starting-point (1939=100) is nevertheless interesting. The wage index rises to 108.6 in 1940, to fall again in 1943 to 67.0 and in 1946 to 73.2. There is then a new rise (with one brief interruption) until 1952 (101.8), whereas we find 99.9 for 1953 and 102.7 for 1954. The 1954 index figure is thus lower than that of 1940 and 1941. Even the increase in productivity seems modest, but it is at any rate more perceptible than that of wages: 1940, 104.2; 1943, 84.5; 1946, 74.7; 1953, 105.8; 1954, 113.²⁰

The data concerning the development of wages considered by themselves are not very complete, both because of the references, and because they are sometimes limited to nominal wages. But in general the rises which have been proved during the First Plan were very limited, not to call them drops in real terms as demonstrated between 1956 and 1958.²¹

The observable stagnation of remunerations or the modesty of their increase (and a fortiori their occasional decrease) does not, however, appear in all its gravity unless there is taken into account the fact that the absolute level was and still is extraordinarily low. The national average of annual wages distributed in 1956 was in fact 1,212.7 rupees (running from a maximum of 1,525.9 to a minimum of 786.4). In that year a textile worker received an average of 1,244.5, a metal-trades worker 1,487.9, and an oil worker 1,686.2 rupees.²²

In September 1959 the author had the opportunity to meet trade-union leaders and workers of the textile industry, both in Bombay — where there exists an important concentration of them, several hundred thousand workers strong — and in Madras — where, among others, the Buckingham Garnatic, with 15,000 workers, is situated. According to the information he gathered there, a worker's monthly salary was about

120 rupees at Bombay, while it was a little lower in Madras, scarcely reaching 100 rupees (at Buckingham, highly skilled workers — who form about 10% of the total — can, however, reach 200 to 250 rupees).

Since a rupee is roughly equivalent to twenty US cents, or 1s5d — even if it is realized that more can be bought with five rupees in India than with a dollar in the USA — anyone can observe to what a point these remunerations are ridiculous. According to the personal observations of the author, in Bombay the monthly rent of the most modest of rooms is between 15 and 20 rupees a month, a pair of blue jeans or a work-shirt costs between 15 and 18 rupees, a pair of sandals 4 to 5 rupees, while a pound of rice cost about half a rupee, as does a pound of bread.²³ In the factories the workers can get a miserable meal for 37 rupee cents, while they can eat in a very humble restaurant for half a rupee.

But statistical data and figures can give only a pale idea of the tragic conditions of the popular masses in India. To learn that a Bombay textile worker has to give up between 15 and 20% of his quite miserable wages to have a room means very little in itself: to understand it, one must see what he gets for it in the houses of popular neighborhoods.

In Bombay the workers live generally in slums or sometimes in small villages on the outskirts. Worli is one of these villages, where workers and fishermen live together. The tiny low-ceilinged houses are huddled together in an incredible way, separated only by little alleys of an indescribable filthiness. There is no sanitation, the results of which can easily be imagined. Half-naked children root in the swill, together with animals; they are undernourished and suffer from every kind of disease. The houses seem to be collapsing at every point, and the water leaks abundantly into them during the rainy season. The author was invited to enter the house of an office-worker: a tiny kitchen and a more-or-less square room six feet by six. The family consisted of two adults and four children. They claimed to be the privileged ones of the neighborhood because they could afford to pay a rent of 20 rupees. Another "privileged" person was employed by the Bombay municipality: 72 rupees a month. He lives in a sort of big five-storey barracks built around a large inside courtyard. The "apartments" are composed of a tiny kitchen and a room (ranging from six by nine feet to nine by twelve feet), in which lives this "privileged" man's family — consisting of 12 persons.

²⁰ Cfr *India 1959*, p 389.

²¹ A comparison with 1947 (before the adoption of the Minimum Wages Act) gives an index figure of 131 in 1954, 145 in 1955, and 135 in 1956 (real wages). (Cfr *India 1959*, p 391). Statistics on nominal wages (1951=100) give about 107 up till 1954, 113 in 1955, and 115.9 in 1956. (Cfr "Earnings of Factory Workers during the Year 1956" in *Indian Labour Gazette*, March 1958, p 22.) If, however, the evolution of prices (1949, 100; 1954, 101; 1955, 96; 1956, 105 — cfr *India 1959*, p 302) is taken into account, there is observed in 1956, in comparison with 1955, a drop. For the situation in 1958, cfr S A Dange, *Crisis and Workers*, 1959, p 68. It is again Dange who, in the already quoted work, *General Report at Ernakulam*, stresses the fact that in 1954 the wage level was more or less the same as in 1939 (p 24).

²² Cfr the already quoted "Earnings of Factory Workers [etc]," pp 13-15.

²³ These are, obviously, approximate indications, especially when the diversity of weights and measures is taken into account.

In the slums conditions are still more agonizing. The buildings are very large and resemble schools or barracks. One makes one's way through interminable corridors, a hundred and fifty feet or more long, half-dark and very dirty. When it rains, it seems that one wades in them ankle-deep in water. The "apartments" consist of single rooms giving on these corridors; they are real dens in each of which live four or five entire families. It is easy to understand why, at night, it can happen that one finds himself stepping on people lying in the corridors.²⁴

Bombay is the most advanced city, and, by unanimous opinion, Calcutta has for example the worst rooms. And this is not to mention the real semi-savage huts which characterize the countryside in India.²⁵ In the lowest circle on this inferno are to be found the worst-off among the masses, the unemployed, without resources of any sort, who, hundreds of thousands of them, do literally cover the sidewalks at night in the most important cities.

AGRICULTURAL INDIA

However serious the obstacles to industrial development may be, and however worrisome the problems faced by the city masses, it is however in the countryside that we touch on the most dramatic problems of this sub-continent, which is still today very definitively peasant.²⁶ It is in agricultural production that, despite the Plans, stagnation is the most pronounced; it is in the rural regions that the past makes its paralyzing weight the most felt; it is there that the old social divisions are the most persistent, the destitution the most deeply rooted; it is there also that there are to be counted tens of thousands of unemployed or under employed, who constitute, among the

infinite number of India's sores, what is probably the most painful one.²⁷

The most characteristic elements in Indian agriculture can be rapidly summarized. The land is still very little used, and only 19% of the terrain is worked, while only 15% of the arable land is irrigated.²⁸ Production for family consumption continues to be very important, while productivity is very low, as is per capita yield.²⁹ The break-down of farms into little parcels is very considerable, and indeed often pathological.³⁰ The results of the foregoing factors are easily understood. We shall not dwell upon the general living conditions in the rural regions: quite clear indications show them to be worse than those in the cities.³¹ We shall only make a brief comment on the situation of agricultural workers.

This category of labor has in India undergone a continuous development to reach the impressive figure of 50 million units, which represents about 20% of the agricultural population as a whole.³² The tragedy that torments them — and that is really the word for it — is under-employment: about 85% of agricultural workers work only part-time. The average of working days in the year is a little over 200, including days occupied in non-agricultural tasks; besides which, 15% of the workers of this category are unemployed during the entire year.³³ And even when one of them has the good luck to get a day's work, the

²⁴ Public housing ventures are absolutely inadequate. What is more, it often seems to be impossible for workers and clerks to pay the relatively high rents for apartments that are nevertheless still very modest (in Bombay, for example, in the Worli district, there are houses for the middle classes — one room, a kitchen, a veranda, sanitation — with a rent between 50 and 70 rupees).

²⁵ Along the route from Bombay to Calcutta Bihlai, where the steel-plants installed by the Soviets are situated, there is an oasis of modern life, characterized by the most advanced technical achievement. But all around it, a myriad of old huts and even tents give a picture of combined development in a country like India. What is worse is that the majority of the steel workers themselves live in conditions defined as revolting by a recent Socialist "investigation." Water and sanitation are lacking, and 20,000 workers are living in huts. Last year about 1000 dead were recorded as a result of cholera (cfr *The Leader*, 7 September 1959).

²⁶ According to a census taken in 1951, the rural population represented 82.7% of the total (cfr *India 1959*, p 45). In 1956-57 about 50% of the national income still came from agriculture (ibidem, p 189).

²⁷ Chester Bowles, who was the American ambassador in New Delhi, spoke of about 50 million totally or partially unemployed, while the estimates dating from the period of the First Plan counted about 70 million of them. According to Bettelheim, "...about 40% of the Indian rural population are excluded from the circuit of production or participate therein only for a very limited number of working days." As for unemployment in the cities, very grave in certain great centres (about 350,000 people in Calcutta), cfr *India 1959*, pp 192-3 (the data provided are probably very much lower than the reality).

²⁸ The cultivated land represents 38% of the geographical surface and 61% of the topographically usable surface (cfr *India 1959*, pp 195 and 251; cfr also *The Indian Economy*, p 76).

²⁹ Cfr Das-Chatterji, *The Indian Economy*, pp 57-59. Per capita production was estimated for 1950-51 at 500 rupees for agriculture, whereas it was 1,700 for industry, 1,600 for transportation, and 800 for small enterprises (cfr *India 1959*, p 19).

³⁰ Cfr two significant examples in Das-Chatterji, *The Indian Economy*, p 65, and statistical elements in *India 1959*, p 196.

³¹ According to an investigation carried out from August to November 1951, average monthly expenditure per person was 24.22 rupees in the country and 31.55 in the cities as a whole (54.82 in the four most important cities). (Cfr *India 1959*, p 197).

³² In 1882 agricultural workers were 7.5 million; this figure rose to 33 million by 1931, and to 49 million by 1951 (cfr *The Indian Economy*, p 110, and *India 1959*, p 265). In certain states it reaches 45%. (Cfr *Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question*, 1958, p 8.)

³³ Cfr *India 1959*, pp 265-6; *The Indian Economy*, p 111.

daily pay is in the best of cases less than 1.5 rupees for the men, while it reaches scarcely half a rupee for the women and children. Thus, in the course of a year during which the average per capita income for the entire country was 264 rupees, there were only 104 for these disinherited among the disinherited.³⁴

This picture of Indian agriculture and of peasant India is so sombre that it has become commonplace to seek the origins of the evil in the economic-social structures. The ruling class itself has had to raise the problem of agrarian reform. Let us pause then at this important chapter in the history of independent India.

The structure of the Indian rural regions is characterized by the existence of a class of non-land-working proprietors who receive a considerable amount of ground rent,³⁵ and by the fact that, as happens in backward countries where important residues of the pre-capitalist period persist, the burden of the working peasants is aggravated by the percentages of intermediaries, usurers, and parasites of very sort.³⁶ Caste prejudices, fought against officially but in fact deeply rooted, form an additional brake. It is well known that under such conditions it is not possible to expect a vigorous development of the productive forces. Those that profit by their income from land under cultivation — and who already possess privileges of all sorts — have no incentive at all to improve it because they are sure in any case of receiving high rents. This is true for the intermediaries as well. As for the farmers, they are working land that does not belong to them, are in a precarious situation, and also lack any incentive to bring about improvements — and even if they had, they have no margin with which to do so. Furthermore, the high rents cause a lot of capital to be invested in the purchase of land, capital which is thus withdrawn from industrial development.³⁷ Let us limit ourselves here to a few rapid statistical and classificatory data.

Above all, the data on the distribution of property — and need we remind the reader to what degree they are unreliable? — indicate that about 20% of rural families have no land. If there is next considered the category of those owning up to five acres, it is observed that this comprises about three-quarters of rural families, who all together own about one-sixth of the cultivated

area. At the other extreme, the owners of more than 25 acres, who represent only 5% of the total, occupy more than a third of the overall area. A more detailed examination — not placing in the same category those who have only a very little more than 25 acres and those who have more than 100 or even 250 — would give even more significant indications.³⁸

There are three classic systems of property relations, whose roots go deep into past centuries, and particularly to the first period of British domination:

1) The system called ryotwari, in which the property would belong to the land-working peasant, who must pay taxes directly to the state without the intervention of land-owners or other intermediaries. The area occupied by this system is estimated as 36% of the whole.³⁹

2) The system called zemindari, in which the property belongs to a landowner, responsible to the government for the payment of taxes (there exist two types: the fixed-settlement zemindari and the temporary-settlement zemindari, according to whether the tax is set once for all or is on the contrary subject to revision). The landowner does not directly cultivate the land, but rents it to tenants. The area occupied by the fixed-settlement zemindari system is estimated at 35% of the whole.⁴⁰

3) The system called mahalwari, in which the property belongs to village communities, responsible directly to the state for the payment of taxes.

Criticisms have obviously been aimed at the zemindari system, with its picture of the absentee landlord, all the more so in that the situation is aggravated by the introduction, between the owner himself and the land-working peasant, of different intermediaries in the form of tenants and sub-tenants and so on. From the economic point of view, this stratification was rendered possible by the fact that the growing value of the land made a counterweight to the tendency toward the stability of the taxes owed to the state by the landowner.⁴¹

But, as Thorner, among others, has correctly emphasized in his already quoted study, the classic subdivision becomes in the last analysis largely a formal one. In quite numerous cases, in fact, even with the ryotwari system the proprietor did not work his land directly. He preferred to resort to renting it out. Thus, from the

³⁴ Cfr *The Indian Economy*, p 111; *India 1959*, p 215.

³⁵ According to the specialist D K Rangnekar, rent, under its various forms, can vary from 40-50% up to 60% and even 80 of the crop (cfr *Poverty and Capital Development in India*, Oxford, 1958, pp 55-9).

³⁶ Cfr *The Indian Economy*, pp 124-5, and Daniel Thorner, *The Agrarian Prospect in India*, 1956, p 10.

³⁷ Cfr Thorner, op cit, pp 11-13; *The Indian Economy*, pp 125-7.

³⁸ Cfr *India 1959*, pp 195-6.

³⁹ Cfr *The Programme of the Revolutionary Workers' Party of India*, p 15.

⁴⁰ Unfortunately, in the source quoted from, the area covered by the temporary-settlement zemindari system is considered together with the area occupied by the third system (overall percentage, 39%).

⁴¹ Cfr Thorner, op cit, p 8.

social point of view, he tended to identify himself with the zemindari system landowner. This is not to forget, in addition, that very often the usurer enters into the play of forces, a usurer who, as Thorner writes, "without in fact becoming a landowner himself, ends by sharing with the landowners the privilege of finding in agriculture an income without furnishing any agricultural labor."⁴² In the last analysis, the existence of a social stratum that is relatively widespread and obviously very differentiated in its origins and juridical situation — whose common denominator consists in the fact that it finds the source of its profits and privileges in agriculture without participating directly in agricultural production — is one of the essential characteristics of the agrarian "problem" in India.

A more concrete classification might be set up in the following terms. The upper stratum is formed by the maliks or landowners, i e, by those whose agricultural income is derived directly from property rights. In a typical way, these pro-

⁴² Op cit, p 10; retranslated from French.

prietors rent out their land and limit themselves to receiving the income from it; but in many cases they may work it directly by means of rural wage-labor or workers by the day. There can also be found landowners who combine the two forms, renting out part of their property and having the rest worked directly.

A second stratum includes the kisans, who can be described, according to an expression that is current today, as direct cultivators. These are small landowners or share-croppers who obtain from direct agricultural work a sufficient income — under the best of hypotheses — to feed their families. They must often resort to the classic outside work (agricultural or non-agricultural) — at least for some members of their family. It is only in exceptional cases, and at all events for very short periods, that certain kisans hire labor.

The last stratum includes the mazdur, agricultural wage-labor or workers by the day, who work the land of others, and who, if they have a little plot, can derive from it only a secondary source of income.

[To be concluded in our next issue]

THE ELEVENTH YEAR OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

By JEAN-PAUL MARTIN

I

The Chinese Revolution has started its eleventh year. It is of considerable interest to examine the balance sheet of the first decade lived through by this revolution, and to see what its problems and prospects are on the threshold of the second decade now opening.

THE INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

It has now become a commonplace to speak of the growing international importance of the Chinese Revolution; but few people yet realize of what this importance consists.

The aspect most easily seized on by the greatest number of international observers of the Chinese Revolution is the impressive awakening to economic, cultural, and military power of this country of 600 million inhabitants, which, at its present annual rate of growth (15 millions), will reach, toward the end of the century, the figure of more than 1,000 million human beings.

The imperialists view with terror the shadow of this giant spreading over Asia and the entire world, and engage in all sorts of "geopolitical" speculations to exorcise "the yellow peril." The most imaginative among them are already dreaming of a future Sino-Soviet conflict that will simultaneously weaken both the USSR and China, or at least of a rapprochement of the whole "white race" from the Urals to California that will separate the USSR from its alliance with China.

It is known that this speculation has received much attention from both Adenauer and de Gaulle, and even from a man like Adlai Stevenson. It nurtures the "historical prospects" of the imperialists every time that they despair of seeing the workers' states collapse as a result of the outside intervention of a war that would be more and more risky for imperialism. It is now certain that the Chinese Revolution will carry more and more weight internationally in the second half of our century, and will even dominate it. This will be the result, not of the military action of New China in attacking "Western" or "white" civilization, but of the revolutionary repercussions of China on the under-developed countries and on the other workers' states.

To the degree that China already points out a valid way, taken by a typically under-developed country, rapidly to reach economic, cultural, and military power, this "Chinese" way threatens to "contaminate" more and more the neighboring Asiatic countries, starting with India, and even the countries of Africa.

The Nehrus and Sukarnos, who already sniff this "danger," are trying to counter it by staking on the nationalism of backward masses aroused against China's "aggressions" or "unwarrantable interferences." In the future, each bound forward that China makes in the fields of agricultural and industrial production, education, and liberation of women, will make the crumbling feudo-capitalist regimes of the Asiatic and African countries, formerly independent or still subjected to imperialism, tremble more than the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The problem of the countries described as under-developed is fated to become steadily more explosive and more insoluble by capitalist methods — both because the gap between the development of the advanced countries and these countries is widening, and because the per capita production of the under-developed countries is lessening even though their global production is increasing, as a result of the fact that their population is increasing even faster.

To overcome these two gaps and get a speeded-up industrialization under way, the under-developed countries need to solve the question of investments to the tune of 15% to 25% of a national income already comparable to that of the advanced countries.

Out of their own resources, the under-developed countries succeed in making capital investments of barely 8% of their meagre national income. The rest must come from foreign aid. Now this aid (including that of the USSR), even if it were invested under really productive conditions, scarcely reaches \$4,000 million per year, as against the \$20,000 million or even \$50,000—\$60,000 million per year needed to begin, for the purpose of promoting "in 35 years the doubling of the standard of living of peoples now able to obtain less than \$100 per capita per annum (that is, some 1,600 million persons)"! (These are the conclusions of United Nations experts and other even more serious estimates.) The revolutionary experience of China in this field brings daily

proof that it is possible — thanks to the capitalization by the state of the surplus-value of the native and foreign capitalists and of the land rent of the feudalists, and to the productive mobilization of millions of men and women whose labor power was previously not fully occupied — to find the means necessary for speeded-up economic development. But the social and political framework necessary for such a possible development is created only by the social revolution and workers' and peasants' power, nationalizing the means of production, planning the economy, and making morally and materially possible the productive mobilization of this immense human capital.

The other revolutionary influence of China operates on the level of the workers' states. These states, like China itself, are politically ruled by bureaucracies, which have reached varying degrees of numerical and social importance. Therefore the development of these states is deformed; this has its repercussions on their mutual collaboration, which normally ought to be harmonious.

Right now we are very far from that "norm." For that reason, among the present number of workers' states inter-bureaucratic antagonisms are beginning to be sketchily discernible; these are of another nature, and involve different consequences, from those among the international Stalinist bureaucracy in the past, when the main antagonisms occurred inside the Soviet bureaucracy, and, to a lesser extent, between it and Communist Party bureaucracies who lacked real power.

Today, however, we have to deal with several workers' states in which powerful national bureaucracies dominate. These bureaucracies, in their mutual relations, reflect their own special national interests as well as the special national pressures to which they are subjected.

A whole sociology might be written about this new phenomenon inside the system of the present workers' states. But let us limit ourselves for the moment to developing a few guiding lines.

There are already, within this system, three specific and distinct paths "to socialism": that of the U S S R, that of Yugoslavia, and that of China.

That of the U S S R is already well-known.

That of Yugoslavia is essentially distinguishable from the Soviet model by three traits:

1) It has replaced the autarkic economy of the U S S R by an economy open to the possibilities of the international market.

2) It has replaced forced collectivization of agriculture by a collectivization by persuasion, in accordance with the technical and financial possibilities of the workers' state.

3) It has turned over the management of the

economy and the state at the local and regional levels to a substantial self-administration by the workers in the enterprises and the population of the communities.

As a result of the fact that the Yugoslav economy is being developed with account taken of the possibilities of the world market, it is achieving a growth that is both rapid and harmonious, which benefits the producers, not in some distant future, but immediately. As a result, the social tensions are also less and the solidity of the social and even political regime is considerably greater than in the other people's democracies. Granted, it is because Yugoslavia profits by its international position intermediate between the two camps, that it is able to follow such an economic policy. The fact remains that its example is the most concrete condemnation, on the economic plane, of the autarkic policy of "socialism in a single country" which certain people — and not only the Stalinists — have accepted as the inevitably exclusive path to socialism.

The fact that the collectivization of Yugoslav agriculture lags behind the advances of its socialized industry is not a valid criticism of the Yugoslav system. For economically Yugoslav agriculture, while still being mostly subjected to the regime of small agricultural property, is prosperous, for the peasants have no reason to sabotage production. Under these conditions the workers' state can allow itself to extend the time-table for collectivization, and to bring it about along the coöperative path, in accordance with the state's increased possibilities in matters of *technics* (mechanization, etc), and *finances* (a fair remuneration for agricultural labor).

Meanwhile the danger of the formation of a neo-bourgeois stratum in the rural regions is being fought against by the state's tax policy, by the limitation of land holdings, and by a whole series of measures. This economic policy of the Yugoslav system is of course seriously strengthened by the substantial self-determination of the enterprises and the communities, an important stimulus to production and a source of attachment to the regime.

As to the Chinese model now being formed, it seems currently to be synthesized in the organization and functioning of the *rural and even urban communes*. After ten years of groping within the general limits of the Soviet example, China is setting out on a really "new path to socialism" by means of the communes, a network of rank-and-file organizations that are both economic and administrative, subject to the control of the central organs of the state.

Later we shall see within what concrete limits this experiment is currently developing, what are the problems it raises and the prospect that it

opens up. For the moment, however, let us limit ourselves to pointing out the existence from now on of a "third model" for the building of socialism, perceptibly different from both that of the USSR and that of Yugoslavia. It is clear that, under these conditions, the ferments arising from the de facto competition among these three different models will more and more work among the masses of the workers' states, and in the bureaucracy.

The Yugoslav example cannot in the long run leave public opinion indifferent in the USSR, the other people's democracies, and China itself. Nor can the Chinese example be accepted in the Soviet Union without grave repercussions, for the Soviet bureaucracy is tied up with its own model, just as the growing Chinese bureaucracy is currently hitching its fate to the success of the communes. Apart from the repercussions of these fresh models on the relations between the bureaucracy and the masses, it is necessary to take into account the inevitable ideological differentiation within the bureaucracies of the workers' states which will result from these experiments, each bringing into question the conception of both the economic policy to be followed and the structure of the state.

Alert observers have already noted the coolness, not to say hostility, shown by Khrushchev toward the Chinese communes, as well as various signs of disagreement between the Kremlin and Peking. It is beyond doubt that to the degree that the economic, cultural, and military power of China accumulates, on another model than the Soviet one, inter-bureaucratic frictions will become aggravated along yet unforeseeable lines.

But one thing is certain: in this field as well, the rise of New China acts on the Soviet bureaucracy not as a stabilizing but as a disintegrating factor. In the last analysis, such a process threatens to turn against the whole of the bureaucracy of the workers' states, including China itself, for the economic and cultural advances of these states prove to be more rapid and decisive than the reign of a bureaucracy that is subjected to — among other things — antagonisms of its different fractions on the international and national levels.

A CONSOLIDATED BALANCE-SHEET OF TEN YEARS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The main stages in the economic and social evolution of China since the 1949 victory of the revolution are known: 1949-1952, the years of "economic rehabilitations"; 1953-1957, the years of the First Five-Year Plan; 1958, the year of "the great leap forward" of the Second Five Year-Plan, of the communes.

During the First Five-Year Plan, according to official statements, "the total value of industrial and agricultural production registered an average annual rate of growth of 10.9% (18% for industry, 4.5% for agriculture). The average annual rate increase of total national income was 8.9%."

In the second half of 1955 the complete collectivization of agriculture was already terminated in the form of "agricultural producers' co-operatives of the advanced type." Immediately thereafter, in 1956, the industrial and commercial capitalist enterprises were transformed "into state-private enterprises by whole trades" and the handicraft workers were organized into co-operatives.

"This means," Liu Shao-Chi concludes in his article on "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China" celebrating the tenth anniversary of the revolution,

that in less than seven years after the founding of the People's Republic of China, we accomplished in the main the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce, and basically solved the question of "who will win" in the ownership of the means of production.

Naturally, by "socialist transformation" must be understood the administrative statification of all the means of production, including land, as well as the administrative imposition of coöperation. But we know that neither is in reality viable without an adequate material, technical, and financial foundation. Hence Liu Shao-Shi is engaged in wishful thinking when he states that the question of "who will win" is already basically settled in China.

On the basis of the results achieved in 1956 and 1957, the party, beginning with the Spring of 1958, put into practice the general line worked up by Mao Tse-Tung: "going all out, aiming high, and achieving faster, better, and more economical results to build socialism."

The results of this first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, although highly exaggerated at the outset and corrected later, are nonetheless impressive: "The total value of industrial and agricultural production rose by 48% compared with 1957" (66% for industry, 25% for agriculture), exceeding the total value of the production during the whole period of the First Five-Year Plan. Furthermore, "the national income for 1958 exceeded that of 1957 by an increase of 34%."

This exceptional rhythm slackened off in 1959, while still remaining at a very high level. According to the official communiqué published on 22 January 1960 at Peking, "China's gross industrial and agricultural output, in terms of value, registered in 1959 a 31.1% increase over that in

1958" (39.3% for industry, 16.7% for agriculture). The national income increased 21.6% compared to 1958. "Thanks to the continued big leap forward in the two years 1958 and 1959," this same communiqué states, "we have already reached the major targets originally set for the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1962), three years ahead of schedule."

Here are a few examples of this claim:

Steel output reached 13.35 million tons, exceeding the original 1962 target by between 1.35 million and 2.85 million tons; coal output reached 347.8 million tons, exceeding the original 1962 target by between 137.8 million and 157.8 million tons; grain output reached 540,000 million jin, exceeding the original 1962 target by 40,000 million jin.

In only two years steel output (not including that produced by indigenous methods) increased from 5.35 million tons to 13.35 million tons [...] whereas [— the Chinese leaders proudly noted —] in the capitalist world it took the United States 9 years, prewar Germany 13 years, France 33 years, and Britain 34 years to raise their steel output from some 5 million tons to over 13 million tons.

In 1958 already, China jumped to seventh place in the world of steel, third place in coal, eleventh place in electric power, and second place in cotton yarn production.

In the nine years between 1950 and 1958 China's total output value of industrial production rose at an average annual rate of 28%,

and since that time, this exceptional rate has been maintained and is being developed.

Exceptional economic, social, and cultural transformations have marked the country since the revolution. Chou En-Lai, in the *Jenmin Jibao* of 6 October 1959, writes:

In the ten years of New China, the value of newly added fixed industrial assets amounts to around 45,000 million yuan.

In Old China, after nearly seventy years of power development, power-generating capacity amounted to less than 1.9 million kilowatts by 1949; in ten years in New China the new power-generating capacity added is more than three times that figure.

By 1949, after nearly sixty years of development of its iron and steel industry, annual steel-making capacity was less than one million tons in Old China; the new annual steel-making capacity added in ten years of New China is more than ten times that figure.

[China at present produces] about 500 types of steel and 6,000 types of rolled steel, 2,500-ton hydraulic forging presses, complete sets of coal-mining and coking equipment, equipment for big blast furnaces more than 1,500 cubic metres [53,000 cubic feet] in volume, jet planes, various types of motor vehicles, tractors, sea-going vessels with a dead weight of 5,000 tons, 72,500 kilowatt hydroelectric-power-generating equipment, and 50,000-kilowatt thermo-power-generating equipment, complete sets of textile, paper-making, and sugar-refining equipment, and other products.

The advances in agriculture are no less impressive:

In ten years the total value of China's agricultural output has increased two and a half fold. Grain output went up 130% between 1949 and 1958. In 1949 there were all together 8 million workers and employees in enterprises, public undertakings, and state organs.

This number has risen to more than 45 million by the end of 1958, an increase of 5.7 fold, in which the number of industrial workers grew from 3 to 25.6 million, an 8.5 fold increase.

Since the creation of the communes and the mass liberation of female manpower, the number of workers has grown even further (by nearly 20 million during 1958 and 1959).

As for the material conditions of the workers and peasants, it is difficult to determine them exactly. The regime claims that "the average wages of Chinese office and factory workers more than doubled between 1949 and 1958," and that "the personal income of the peasants nearly doubled." What is in any case beyond doubt is that the average level of the great mass of peasants and workers has been raised at the expense of the other formerly more privileged strata, and that, in the fields of education, sanitation, and social security, an exceptional effort has been made.

THE CHINESE PERMANENT REVOLUTION

"China's development in the past ten years," Chou En-Lai writes with pride in the aforementioned article, "has been a process of *uninterrupted Revolution*." (Our italics.) The Chinese leaders like more and more to use this term, whose content they clearly explain. On this subject, let us once again listen to Chou En-Lai:

As early as at the second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in March 1949, the Central Committee and

Comrade Mao Tse-Tung pointed out that the founding of the People's Republic of China would mark the victory of the democratic revolution on a nationwide scale and at the same time the beginning of the socialist revolution.

The state power of people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker and peasant alliance, as a result of the victory of the Revolution, though including some representatives of the national bourgeoisie, was in essence already a state power of the dictatorship of the proletariat. [Our italics.]

It is this power of the dictatorship of the proletariat, according to Chou En-Lai, which carried out the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution and then without interruption tackled the "socialist revolution," liquidating the aftermaths of capitalism, including the "national bourgeoisie."

The Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-Tung firmly refuted such bourgeois points of view of certain people both inside and outside the Party as those calling for the "consolidation of the new democratic order," "long-term coexistence between socialism and capitalism," and the "guaranteeing of the four great freedoms in the rural areas — freedom of sale and purchase, letting and renting of land, freedom of employing farmhands, freedom of borrowing and lending money and freedom of trading," and in good time set forth the Party's general line for the transition period of simultaneously carrying out socialist transformation and socialist construction. [Op cit; our italics.]

Let us also listen to Liu Shao-Chi, a theoretician second only to Mao Tse-Tung in the Chinese Communist Party:

... The founding of the great People's Republic in 1949 [...] is essentially a dictatorship of the proletariat and thus successfully brought about the turn from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution.

As far as the main question of the Revolution is concerned, i.e. the question of the State Power, the founding of the People's Republic of China marked the end of the democratic revolution and the beginning of the Socialist Revolution in China.

In the early years following the nationwide victory, although it was still necessary for the Chinese people to carry out the tasks left over from the period of the democratic revolution, mainly the task of

*implementing land reform over a large part of the country to eliminate the feudal landlord class, the transition to socialism had actually begun in 1949 ["The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," October 1959. Our italics *.]*

It is evident by what subterfuge the Chinese leaders are trying a posteriori to justify both their behavior after the victory and their previous behavior.

The Stalinist theory of the *two revolutions*, distinct in the class character of their social regimes, one "bourgeois democratic," carrying out the "bourgeois democratic" tasks, the other "socialist," has in fact been abandoned by the Chinese. It is now a question only of one single revolution in two phases, in an uninterrupted process, being carried out under the same social regime, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And there we are, smack in the "permanent revolution," in the meaning given to the term by Leon Trotsky and our international movement.

The "democratic revolution," distinct from the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, has now been relegated by the Chinese to the period preceding the seizure of power, in order to justify the Chinese CP's past policy of compromising with the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek, the so-called representatives of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal "national bourgeoisie."

The Chinese Communist Party did not open the way to the victory of the only possible revolution, that which it achieved by taking power, until the moment when it was obliged to disobey

* The most advanced clarification, up to the present time, on this question, has been given recently by the Chinese leader Lu-Ting-Yi, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP, in the, for more than one reason, important speech that he has pronounced on the 22 April 1960 at the meeting to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the birth of Lenin, in Peking.

Here are some very significant extracts, related to Permanent Revolution, from this speech:

"Lenin brilliantly applied and developed the Marxist idea of uninterrupted revolution, regarding it as a fundamental guiding principle of the proletarian revolution.

"Lenin set out the principle that the proletariat should obtain the leadership in the democratic revolution and transform the bourgeois democratic revolution without interruption into the socialist revolution" (Hsinhua News Agency, Supplement No 41, 23-4-60).

For Lu-Ting-Yi, the "democratic" phase of the Chinese Revolution was "a peasant war and an agrarian revolution (under the leadership of the proletariat)" in the process "of uninterrupted revolution turning the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution."

Lu-Ting-Yi, for this purpose, quotes Lenin, who, speaking of the relationship between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, "pointed out: '... this first grows into the second. The second, in passing, solves the problems of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first.'"

Stalin's directives, break with Chiang Kai-Shek, and draw the revolutionary masses under its leadership for the drive for power.

The "democratic revolution" is no longer presented as a stage which is gone through under a regime of the so-called "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants," different from the dictatorship of the proletariat, which solves the "bourgeois democratic" tasks, but simply the period of struggle of the Communist Party, at the head of the revolutionary masses, against Chiang Kai-Shek, which preceded the seizure of power.

This did not prevent Liu Shao-Chi from finding an occasion to attack both

the right opportunists in the Chinese Revolution, like the Russian Mensheviks [who] set up a "Great Wall" between democratic and socialist revolutions, and failed to see the interconnections of the two revolutions, [and] the "left" opportunists, like the Russian Trotskyites [who allegedly] confused the distinction between the democratic and socialist revolutions, would eliminate the bourgeoisie and carry out the tasks of the socialist revolution in the stage of the democratic revolution.

This is naturally the height of confusion. Liu Shao-Chi means that, in the democratic revolution, i.e., in the period which precedes the taking of power, it is necessary to ally oneself even with bourgeois or petty-bourgeois strata opposed to "imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism [of Chiang Kai-Shek]." He calls that one of the "tasks" of the "democratic revolution," to which, according to him, the Trotskyists are opposed.

The historic reality is, of course, quite different. The Trotskyists were opposed to any conception of a National Front "of the four classes" subjected to the political leadership of the "national bourgeoisie" at a time when Stalin and the Chinese leaders who were carrying out his orders viewed Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang as the representatives of such a class.

The Trotskyists have never been opposed, on the contrary, to a front, led in practice by the proletariat and its party, at the head of the peasant, worker, and urban petty-bourgeois masses, fighting effectively against imperialism, the feudalists, the compradore bourgeoisie — and for power.

That, in a country like China, "national bourgeois" should at a given moment participate in such a front, accepting the programme and the methods of struggle of the proletariat and its party who are leading the front — what objection could there be to that?

The practical importance of such strata and the reality of their participation in a front really led by the proletariat and its party should not, however, be exaggerated.

When Liu Shao-Chi claims that the line of the Communist Party, including that of the period of the "democratic revolution" that preceded the seizure of power, was always "the revolution of the masses of the people, led by the proletariat (through the Communist Party) to oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism," and that this policy was the "key" to victory, he is consciously prettying up the past policy of the Chinese C P by referring to the very last period of its struggle, when it had finally broken with the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek, and engaged in revolutionary struggle for power.

Let us in any case remember the fact that the Chinese leaders are in fact coming back to the theory of the permanent revolution by admitting both the thesis of the accomplishment of the bourgeois democratic tasks under the sole regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the thesis of the uninterrupted development of the revolution into a socialist revolution properly so called.

April 1960

[In our next issue: Chinese conceptions about rhythms and means for economic development in industry and agriculture; differences of opinion on this subject within the Chinese C P; the theory and practice of rural and urban communes; concerning the liberation of women, effective or not, and family and social transformations; the future of the Chinese revolution.]

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

(It Feels the Need for a Revolutionary Orientation

But Remains a Prisoner of Its Bureaucratic Conceptions)

By SAL SANTEN

Much attention was given in the world press to an article published on April 1st by *Red Flag*, the theoretical journal of the Chinese C P, and entitled: "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times and also on the Way for All Peoples to Struggle for Peace." It was written for the forthcoming 90th anniversary of Lenin's death. The main passage, republished by the bourgeois press, read as follows:

Lenin taught us that in the era of imperialism, the imperialist system is the source of war. Imperialist war is a continuation of its policy of aggression and enslavement. (Emphasis of the Peking Review translation). In times of peace, the imperialists always pursue a whole set of policies for the continuous extension of the rule of monopoly capital. The exploitation and oppression of their peoples at home, their domination and plunder of the colonies and semi-colonies and the rivalry among monopoly capital groups in various countries do in fact breed new wars. To the imperialists, peace is no more than an interval between wars. Taking advantage of the interval, they work energetically to expand their arms and prepare for the next war. (...)

(...) Of late certain representative figures in U S ruling circles seem to be paying greater lip service to peace than hitherto and playing more peace games. They hope to create the illusion among people that Eisenhower and his kind are capable of "laying down the butcher's knife and turning into buddhas." They want people to believe that U S imperialism will offer the gift of peace to the world.

Will Eisenhower and his like really lay down their butcher's knives? Does U S imperialism actually desire world peace? Facts are most eloquent. Numerous events have demonstrated that juggling with peace, Eisenhower and those like him are actively preparing for war. (...)

(...) U S imperialism being what it is will certainly not abandon its policy of war.

The peace which U S imperialism seeks is

nothing but peace with U S global domination. (Emphasis of the Peking Review translation). Neither Eisenhower today, nor Dulles yesterday, made any effort to hide the meaning of their "peace with justice." In their eyes, the socialist countries are "captive nations," all revolutions are "means of evil" and "peace with justice" is a peace in which socialism is eliminated, revolutions in all countries are "strictly verboten" and the peoples of the world submissively knuckle under to the oppression and exploitation of U S monopoly capital.

For some time, more precisely since the Sino-Indian border disputes and since Khrushchev's trip to America, such statements — though in a less concrete form — could frequently be found in the Chinese press, and in official speeches. They stood in sharp distinction to the honey-sweet official Russian statements on the possibilities of "peaceful coexistence." Revolutionary Marxists can only welcome this distinction, favorable to the Chinese Communist leadership. But their doing so does not mean that the last word has been said.

Though much less cynical and conservative than the Russian bureaucracy, the Chinese leadership is nevertheless a bureaucratic one. It is true, by its origins and experience since the victory of the Chinese revolution, it has no illusions about the character of the imperialist enemy. By its ties with the colonial revolution, it welcomes every defeat of imperialism, and — what is essential — it does not fear the revolutionary mobilization of the masses in the way the Soviet bureaucracy does. But fundamentally its policy is also a bureaucratic one, though more sensitive to the revolutionary changes in the world.

Whilst stressing Lenin's teachings on imperialism, it does so much more through opportunism than for reasons of principle. It does so much more in order to bring pressure upon the Soviet bureaucracy (which did not hesitate to "forget" the interests of its Chinese ally while looking for a compromise with imperialism), than to work up a revolutionary communist policy in the fight against imperialism.

It is absolutely necessary to be aware of this.

Insofar as the Chinese Communist leadership criticizes imperialism as such, it has a revolutionary position. At the same time, however, it is incapable of drawing clear, valid *Marxist* revolutionary conclusions from it. It welcomes defeats of imperialism, of course, and that is a good thing. It supports, also materially, the colonial revolutions, and this can only be welcomed, though it should be said that its aid, e.g. to the Algerian revolution, is absolutely insufficient. But on the ideological field, it continues to create confusion by its uncritical support of the colonial national bourgeoisies, and by doing so, it reveals all the conservative — and even anti-revolutionary — traits of a bureaucracy.

This contradictory, and empirical attitude is also reflected in the article in the *Red Flag* quoted above. Though it begins by stating, and correctly so, that the “peace” of imperialism is a “peace in which socialism is eliminated, revolutions in all countries are ‘strictly verboten’ and the peoples of the world submissively knuckle under to the oppression and exploitation of US monopoly capital,” it immediately afterwards jumps over to the position (“discovered” and defended by Stalin shortly before his death) that the present epoch is characterized by “inter-imperialist contradictions.”

In order to justify such a position, it throws overboard every time the revolutionary conclusions it had (spontaneously) reached. The same thing occurs when it speaks about the character of the imperialist war preparations:

To realize its ambition for world hegemony, US imperialism is on the one hand actively preparing for “total war,” that is world war, while on the other is energetically engaged in preparing for “limited wars,” that is, “local wars.” (. . .)

(. . .) The US imperialists consider the strategy of carrying on local wars on the basis of active preparation for world war most advantageous to them. They are aware that lagging far behind the Soviet Union in military science and technology, they will suffer extremely serious consequences if they venture to start a world war.

If we disregard the exaggerations, which of course have a political foundation, this is correct. But immediately afterwards, the *Red Flag* drops its own conclusions, and states:

Nevertheless, they are neither willing nor able to abandon their policy of war. That is why in the hope of step by step realizing their imperialist objectives they have adopted the *strategy* [emphasis by me, S] of “limited wars” (i.e., “local wars”) short of world war.

If this were true, it would mean that imperialism had abandoned its strategy of “eliminating socialism,” as this “purpose” could be reached (if it ever could be reached) only by an “overall war, that is a world war.” Thus it could try to maintain itself for some time by intervening in this or that revolution, by “local wars” only, but such a strategy, as is clear, would be one only of defending the “status quo,” of accepting the existence of a series of workers’ states as an *accomplished fact*. It would be a strategy of defeat for the imperialist enemy, as it would start from the invincibility of the workers’ states. It would mean an imperialist *retreat* before the forces of world revolution, and therefore would be of *world historical importance*. It would open a new epoch, in which the final defeat of imperialism would be a short-term perspective, as imperialism would not be capable of maintaining itself very long with the sole weapon of “local wars” against the rising forces of world revolution. Militarily stated, imperialism would have decided to fight against its downfall by means of guerilla-warfare.

Unfortunately, the combined forces of world revolution are not yet strong enough to provide grounds for such conclusions. The *Red Flag*, however, does not hesitate to draw them:

The US policy of “local wars” is a kind of conclusion drawn from historical experience in pursuance of its policy of aggressive wars. US control over the Western Hemisphere was effected by resorting to this tactic of “local wars.” The era of imperialism has a history replete with “local wars,” besides (!) the two world wars. The Second World War began (!) with a series of local wars. From the end of World War II until today, there have been an uninterrupted series of local wars started by the imperialists: wars of imperialist intervention against the revolutions of other countries, wars of imperialist suppression of the national liberation movements and wars of imperialist aggression against the socialist countries.

Here we see a clear contradiction with the beginning of the *Red Flag* article, in which it was said that “To the imperialists, peace is no more than an interval between wars.” The era of imperialism being “a history full of local wars,” even “besides the two world wars,” i.e., even in “peace” time, it should be a duty for revolutionary Marxists to draw some more general conclusions from the “local wars” which have characterized and are still characterizing the period after World War Two. They were and are, as is correctly stated in the *Red Flag* article, “wars of imperialist intervention against the revolutions of other countries, wars of imperialist suppression

of the national liberation movements and wars of imperialist aggression against the socialist countries.”

For Marxists, who have the courage to think things through to the end, the conclusion is not so complicated. The “local wars” after the Second World War have a common denominator: they are directed against the rising revolutionary forces in the world in all their forms, that is to say: they are counter-revolutionary in essence. They form part of a *world* strategy of imperialism, led by the strongest and most conscious imperialist power, the U S A, which — *inevitably* — will lead to a final showdown between imperialism and the forces of socialism. To conclude, as does the *Red Flag*, that the imperialists “have adopted the *strategy* of limited wars,” is, au fond, a “theoretical” capitulation before the combined forces of imperialism, that is: an effort to escape from the most burning problem with which humanity is faced in the present epoch.

In order to justify its overhasty conclusions, the *Red Flag* of course is obliged to minimize the strength of the imperialist enemy. Faithful to its *contradictory* conception, it walks again on “two legs”: one revolutionary and the other bureaucratic. On the one hand, it speaks of “the inevitability of revolutions in the imperialist countries” as “an objective law of history.” But on the other hand, it plays the card of “inter-imperialist contradictions,” and says:

According to the Leninist theory, the contradictions between the imperialist countries are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature and constitute one of the root causes of modern wars.

It prefers to forget that the world has changed a little bit since Lenin’s death; that, the relationship of forces in the world having definitively changed in favor of the forces of world revolution and to the disadvantage of imperialism, the *fundamental* contradictions on a world scale in the present epoch relate to revolution and counter-revolution, and no longer to inter-imperialist rivalries, however important they may be. What are now irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature are the contradictions between the workers’ states, the colonial revolution, and the working-class movement on the one hand, and on the other hand, imperialism. There is, in spite of their rivalries, a *holy alliance* among the forces of imperialism, from Franco to Eisenhower, from Adenauer to de Gaulle, in order to face the rising forces of world revolution.

Prisoner of its own confusion, the *Red Flag* develops a kind of schema which should prove the predominance of the inter-imperialist contradictions over the contradictions between revolution and counter-revolution.

It therefore states:

The resurgent imperialist powers of West Germany and Japan are two sources of serious war danger. The *inevitable* (emphasis by me, S) outcome of the US fostering West Germany and Japan will be, as the Chinese saying has it, to lift a rock only to smash its own toes.

The argument is not very convincing, as a child in politics knows that the arming of West Germany and Japan by American imperialism forms part of the over-all war preparations against the workers’ states, the U S S R, and China in particular. For the *Red Flag*, this is not a problem:

According to the wishful thinking of the United States, a rearmed West Germany will serve as a mainstay in an anti-Soviet war in the West and a rearmed Japan in a war against the Soviet Union and China in the East. But did not the United States, Britain and France, prior to World War, also plan to use Germany and Japan to wage war against the Soviet Union? History, however, followed a course quite independent of their will.

Wishful thinking, we fear, is this time on the side of the *Red Flag*. It simply projects the present situation from the one existing *before* World War II. As it is not possible, however, to convince anybody with such reasoning, it suddenly adds:

In this respect, the situation today differs from that before the Second World War *only* (emphasis by me, S) in that the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has grown incomparably strong. Whoever dares launch a war against the socialist countries will only be courting his own destruction.

So there is no reason to worry. “It is in the nature of imperialism to bully the weak and fear the strong,” is the consolation of the *Red Flag*, and it continues:

Raw materials and markets are vital to the imperialist powers and they will fight for them by every means available. World War I was a war among the imperialist powers and World War II began in the first place among them. Though West Germany and Japan owe what they are today to US help and support, they will not always bow to US dictates. Who can guarantee that West Germany will not unleash a new war of aggression in Western Europe and Japan in Southeast Asia? And who can guarantee that there will be no repetition of Pearl Harbour or that a new

world war will not break out among the imperialist powers?

Really, sense becomes nonsense here. And this is written to commemorate Lenin, who knew the class enemy better than anybody else, who *never* minimized or underestimated its "will to survive," its counter-revolutionary capabilities, who always orientated toward what was *fundamental*, who untiringly analyzed the changes in the relationship of forces between revolution and counter-revolution, and who relegated those who stuck to outdated formulas (correct in a certain concrete former situation, nonsense and therefore *anti-revolutionary* in the new one) to the "museum of antiquities."

And as the question "Who can guarantee that a new world war will not break out among the imperialist powers?" is only meant to stress that this variant is unrealistic, the *Red Flag* is looking for another "guarantee." It quotes Mao Tse-Tung in order to assure that "the real, direct contradictions in the post-war world *are not contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States.*" [Emphasis added.] But then, again "walking on two legs," Mao Tse-Tung contradicts himself, and adds:

The propaganda about an anti-Soviet war consists of two aspects. On the one hand, US imperialism is *really preparing a war against the Soviet Union* (emphasis by me, S); the current talk about an anti-Soviet war and other anti-Soviet propaganda is the political preparation for an anti-Soviet war. On the other hand, this propaganda is a smokescreen put up by the US reactionaries to cover up the many real contradictions US imperialism is now facing. These are the contradictions between the US reactionaries and the American people and those between US imperialism and capitalist countries and colonial and semi-colonial countries. At present the US slogan of waging an anti-Soviet war actually means the oppression of the American people and the expansion of its aggressive forces in the capitalist world.

In reality, the article in the *Red Flag* is full of such contradictions. One sentence is in opposition to the next, from the beginning to the end. It does not want openly to attack Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence"; it repeats — as is clear from the above quotations — the really Stalinist "conception" of inter-imperialist wars in the present epoch; but at the same time it wants to warn against too many illusions about it. It brings to mind Lenin's words that "we are surrounded by people, classes, and governments

who openly express the greatest hatred for us," and it adds:

Today, US imperialism still surrounds us with a network of military bases and guided missiles; we must still maintain the keenest vigilance with regard to the danger of war which it creates.

It preaches "peaceful coexistence," or, better said: it wants to "force imperialism to accept peaceful coexistence," but with quite another conception than Khrushchev's:

... peace for which the people of the whole world thirst cannot be won if we beg it of imperialism instead of rallying all peoples to a struggle to defend world peace and oppose imperialist wars so as to tie the hands of the imperialist war-makers.

It disregards the need for an independent proletarian leadership in the colonial countries where the revolution is a *living reality*, but at the same time it flirts with the idea of a proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries, where it says:

According to the Leninist theory, the contradictions between the monopoly capitalist class and the broad masses of the people are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature and constitute one of the root causes of modern wars. (...)

(...) He also said, "Only the proletarian, socialist revolution can bring mankind out of the blind alley created by imperialism and imperialist wars. Whatever the difficulties of the revolution and its possible temporary setbacks, or whatever waves of counter-revolution may arise, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable." Lenin further pointed out, "Civil wars are also wars. Whoever recognizes the class struggle cannot fail to recognize civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the socialist revolution." Has there been any relaxation today in the contradictions between the monopoly capitalist class and the broad masses of the people in the imperialist countries? Has the imperialist system been transformed into "people's capitalism" and even reached the point "nearest to the communist ideal of 'prosperity for all'" so that the above mentioned principles of Lenin no longer hold good as claimed by the imperialists?

No doubt, the *Red Flag's* article is — compared with the opportunism and revisionism of Khrushchev, who in the theoretical and political field is in reality a *liquidator* of the communist movement in the world — a great step forward. Only sectarians could neglect this positive side of the Chinese attitude towards imperialism. It reveals at the same time that there are great contradictions between the Chinese Communist and Russian bureaucratic leaderships, and that China is orientating towards a more revolutionary policy *on a world scale*. This can only be welcomed by every revolutionary Marxist.

But it would be light-minded and irresponsible to be satisfied with noting this. For the colonial peoples, and for the working class in the West, the policy of the Chinese Communist leadership continues to contain many dangers.

This becomes clear, even when the *Red Flag* “forgets” its speculations about “inter-imperialist rivalries,” and, at the end of its article, implicitly starts from the conception that a war would be a world class war, directed against the combined forces of revolution, whilst stating:

We have full confidence in being able to shatter the war plans of imperialism. But should we be afraid if the war maniacs, defying the will of the people of the world, unleash a war? Comrade Mao Tse-Tung has given a Marxist-Leninist reply to this question in his work “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.” He said: “We stand resolutely for peace and oppose war. But if the imperialists insist on unleashing another war, we should not be afraid of it. Our attitude on this question is the same as our attitude towards all disturbances: firstly, we are against it; secondly, we are not afraid of it. The First World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. The Second World War was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism; then there will not be much room left in the world for the imperialists, while it is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse.

If they are taken *as such*, every revolutionary could only applaud these words, insofar as their meaning is a *revolutionary* one. But at the same time they have an *anti-revolutionary* aspect, are contradictory, like the whole policy of the Chinese Communist Party. They correspond to similar, though less courageous, *routine* statements from

the Soviet bureaucracy, which have the tendency to “threaten” the imperialists with the consequences of a war, in order to make them accept “peaceful coexistence.” Here the proletarian revolution (or better said: the threat of the proletarian revolution) is used only to serve the interests of the bureaucracy. Fundamentally, such a policy is in full agreement with the policy of Stalinism, which permanently subordinated everything to the interests of a privileged bureaucratic caste.

For the world working class, the necessity of overthrowing imperialism, in order to establish its own proletarian rule and a planned socialist economy all over the world, cannot be “postponed” to the catastrophic event of a new world war. If it is true, and it *is* true, that imperialism is preparing such a war, the world communist movement has more than ever the *duty* to fight such preparations effectively by the means of proletarian revolution: by disarming imperialism, by breaking it before it can drag along a great part of humanity with it in its downfall.

Never before in history have the exploited masses had to face such a dangerous, criminal, rotten enemy as imperialism. While it is true that the strength of the world revolutionary camp is constantly increasing, thanks to the heroism of the colonial peoples and the rapid economic development of the workers' states, imperialism is nevertheless still a very real force on this globe, which we cannot yet exchange for another. “The historical experience of mankind shows that the ruling class will not give up state power of its own accord,” the *Red Flag* teaches in its article. Even though it refuses to draw the necessary lessons from this, for the world working class and the fighting colonial peoples it should be a warning.

Only a world revolutionary strategy, aiming at the concrete downfall of imperialism in *our* epoch, by combining the strength of the workers' states, the colonial revolution and the proletarian movement in the West, could open the perspectives of the transition of humanity to socialism without the calamity of a Third World War, or, if imperialism, in despair and in a last effort to react, should launch such a war, its immediate transformation into international civil war on the highest level.

History has still to give its final answer to the question whether the coming showdown between the combined forces of revolution and those of imperialism will take the form of an overall nuclear war, or whether imperialism, definitively weakened by the rising forces of revolution, would have to retreat to the defensive. There cannot be the slightest doubt, however, that imperialism is preparing for the first variant. It would have

launched such a war already (and it set the time-limit of 1953 for it, as it revealed later on), if it had not been surprised by the rapidly increasing forces of revolution on the one hand, and the "generosity" of the Soviet bureaucracy in making concessions on the other hand.

Commemorating Lenin, the *Red Flag* should not have forgotten that Vladimir Ilyitch, drawing a perspective for the fight against the class enemy, *always* started from the *worst* variant as regards the strength and the intentions of the enemy. This is the only way to prepare victory.

"Know the enemy and know yourself, and you will win any battle," is a Chinese saying, as we learn from the *Red Flag*. Alas, the Chinese Communist leadership still has many illusions about the "inter-imperialist rivalries" amongst the enemy; that is to say, it does not know the enemy well enough.

In spite of that, the saying is a good one. It strengthens our conviction that the irresistible fusion of the Fourth International with the rising

revolutionary forces in the world will make the battle victorious. The rapidity of *this* process will be decisive for the question, whether imperialism will be *compelled* to change its perspective of nuclear war for the coming showdown into one of merely defensive fights. Contrary to the *Red Flag*, however, we do not want to lose our time, and to confuse the vanguard, by similar speculations. We know the enemy, and we face the problems by starting from its worst intentions — which, moreover, correspond with its present strategy and counter-revolutionary activity all over the world. If our "pessimism" should be rejected by the further course of history, so much the better! This would depend, however, upon the rapid conscious combination of the forces of the workers' states, the colonial revolution, and the proletarian movements in the West.

No movement other than the Fourth International can provide the bases for it, and change it into an invincible force.

April 1960

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

During the past year there have been frequent signs of a mounting movement of the South African masses against the barbarous and insane policy of Apartheid.

One remembers the bus boycott of 1956, in which some 70,000 people participated, and which came to an end only when the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce took on itself the task of acting as mediator between the African leaders and the Government.

In 1958 Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister of South Africa.

Since the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, Dr. Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, dominated the political life of the country.

The manner in which the policy of racial segregation, or *Apartheid*, functions at present in South Africa, and also the plans for its amplification, are due to him.

After a classic text extracted from Rosa Luxemburg's famous work, "On the Accumulation of Capital," which analyses the penetration of capitalism in South Africa, we publish ample information, with comment, on Apartheid. These extracts are taken from the book, "Education for Barbarism" by I B Tabata.

The year 1959 was above all marked by the participation of African women in the struggle, the extent and tenacity of which has amazed the whole world.

The marches of the women of Natal, their clashes with the police, their determination to liberate their imprisoned fellow-demonstrators, were indications of a new revolutionary explosion in the making.

These demonstrations have proved the effectiveness of direct action by the people through their own organs as against the use of "constitutional" channels, such as Advisory Boards, etc.

It is the same direct action which took hold of the greater masses on March 21st 1960, — the date which marks the "beginning of the South African revolution." (*The Times*, 6-4-60)

For more than 15 days the African masses, heroically resisting the cruel repressions, have given innumerable signs of their resoluteness to combat and of their rapid political maturation.

Strike, marches to the cities, destruction of the abhorred passes, violent clashes with the police, have demonstrated that "Saracen armored cars and all the up-to-date ordnance at Dr. Verwoerd's disposal can kill more men and women than the muskets did. *But they cannot*

break the will of the Bantu." (*The Times*, *ibid.*) (Our italics).

The masses have acquired through their action a new sense of their possibilities, of their dignity.

They have seen the racist government sway under their pressure, and suspend the system of passes, even if only for several days.

They have become conscious of the extreme division which their action has provoked inside the leading European layers, as well as the reactions of international opinion, beginning with those of the English bourgeoisie.

In spite of the re-establishment of the most odious repression by a Police State fighting with their backs against the wall, these achievements are destined to have lasting results, and to provoke profound and irreversible changes.

It is not only the new South African context which forces these changes, it is also the whole of the present African context. Interaction between the two processes is constant.

The new young leaders of the South African national movement are conscious not only of the dynamic movement of the masses, but also of its historical perspectives.

During the trial of Mangaliso Sobukwe, leader of the activist wing which emerged from the African National Congress to constitute the Pan African Congress and to engage in the action which was feverishly awaited by the masses, he proudly declared:

"Our aim is the complete overthrow of white domination in South Africa. It is our contention that South Africa is an integral part of the continent of Africa and cannot therefore solve its problems in isolation from and with utter disregard to the rest of the continent. For that reason we agreed as our historic role, to contribute to the establishment of the United States of Africa... from Cape to Cairo and from Morocco to Madagascar."

This is the strength and these are the ideas which inspire the African national movement in the new stage it has reached through action.

It is strangely reminiscent of the Algerian revolution on the eve of its outburst.

The Algerian Nationalist movement, divided into Messalists and Centralists, stagnated, seemed paralyzed, by inaction.

The C R U A activist tendency which emerged from the ranks of this movement and was re-assembling the young cadres longing for direct action, gave, on November 1st 1954, the signal

for this action and involved with them the Algerian masses — and very soon, the Algerian immigrants in France as well.

So came the F L N and so came the revolution. A similar process has begun in South Africa. It cannot be doubted or ignored.

The ultra-racialist section of the Afrikaans farmers which supports the present government, risks, in the long run, finding themselves isolated from their own class.

The reaction of the English bourgeoisie and the steps the industrialists have taken (most of whom are of English origin) in the direction of Verwoerd, before the unsuccessful assassination attempt against him, (which, incidentally, was made by a rich European), through the Federated Chamber of Industries, are of great significance in this matter.

Industrialists and businessmen of this country, which is potentially very rich and economically the most developed in the whole of Africa, are disquietened by the fact that the productivity of work has been in a steady fall since 1954. Last year national income per head in real terms again showed a small decline.

The economic and social conditions imposed on the African labor, on whom the industrialists and agriculturalists so rigidly depend, provoke both the conditions of frequent interruptions of production as well as the lowering of productivity.

The industrial bourgeoisie of South Africa, who feel the imposition of compelling international competition, is demanding measures capable of stabilizing and increasing the productive effort of the masses: readjustment of the extremely low wages; revision of pass laws; attenuation of the humiliating status imposed also upon even the small but growing middle class of Africans, whom this bourgeoisie intends to use.

On the other hand, this industrial bourgeoisie of South Africa fears that the foreign investments

will be withdrawn or decreased, and also the possible repercussions of a boycott by the international organization of transport workers aimed at South African exportations. We have noted that during the recent revolutionary crisis in the country, the capitalization values of South African stocks in London and Johannesburg have fallen by £600,000,000.

“No one but a mad man would buy South African shares now” writes *The Economist* (9-4-60). The threat over investments with “people no longer looking for industrial revival” (ibid) is even more serious.

In this field England is the most interested, having invested £866,000,000 out of a total of £1,396,000,000 of foreign capital invested (followed closely by the United States, who have invested more than £170,000,000).

However important might be the pressure exercised from the bourgeois milieu on the “ir-responsible” who rule South Africa, only revolutionary action from the masses, led by an authentic revolutionary organization, can in reality overcome the inevitable and ferocious resistance of such a regime. A minority of some 3,000,000 Europeans exploit and oppress a people of almost 11,000,000 (of whom 1,500,000 are Colored).

This minority is determined to safeguard at all costs their enormously out-of-proportion privileges. In order to overthrow this regime, it will be necessary sooner or later to undertake an action “à l’Algérienne” — combining the armed struggle of the peasants of the reserves (approximately 3,000,000) together with the revolutionary mobilization of the agricultural proletariat (also about 3,000,000) and the urban proletariat (approximately 3,000,000).

The whole of the African continent, immense hinterland of South Africa, will support South Africa.



THE INTRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

By ROSA LUXEMBURG

In the Cape Colony and the Boer Republics, pure peasant economy prevailed until the sixties of the last century. For a long time the Boers had led the life of animal-tending nomads; they had killed off or driven out the Hottentots and Kafirs * with a will in order to deprive them of their

* At the time R L wrote her book, “Kaffir” had not the derogatory sense which the Colonialists have now given it.

most valuable pastures. In the eighteenth century they were given invaluable assistance by the plague, imported by ships of the East India Company, which frequently did away with entire Hottentot tribes whose lands then fell to the Dutch immigrants. When the Boers spread further East, they came in conflict with the Bantu tribes and initiated the long period of the ter-

rible Kaffir wars. These godfearing Dutchmen regarded themselves as the Chosen People and took no small pride in their old-fashioned Puritan morals and their intimate knowledge of the Old Testament; yet, not content with robbing the natives of their land, they built their peasant economy like parasites on the backs of the Negroes, compelling them to do slave-labor for them and corrupting and enervating them deliberately and systematically. Liquor played such an important part in this process, that the prohibition of spirits in the Cape Colony could not be carried through by the English government because of Puritan opposition. There were no railways until 1859, and Boer economy in general and on the whole remained patriarchal and based on natural economy until the sixties. But their patriarchal attitude did not deter the Boers from extreme brutality and harshness. It is well known that Livingstone complained much more about the Boers than about the Kaffirs. The Boers considered the Negroes an object, destined by God and Nature to slave for them, and as such an indispensable foundation of their peasant economy. So much so that their answer to the abolition of slavery in the English colonies in 1836 was the "Great Trek," although there the owners had been compensated with £3,000,000. By way of the Orange River and Vaal, the Boers emigrated from the Cape Colony, and in the process they drove the Matabele to the North, across the Limpopo, setting them against the Makalakas. Just as the American farmer had driven the Red Indian West before him under the impact of capitalist economy, so the Boer drove the Negro to the North. The "Free Republics" between the Orange River and the Limpopo thus were created as a protest against the designs of the English bourgeoisie on the sacred right of slavery. The tiny peasant republics were in constant guerilla warfare against the Bantu Negroes.

And it was on the backs of the Negroes that the battle between the Boers and the English government, which went on for decades, was fought. The Negro question, i.e. the emancipation of the Negroes, ostensibly aimed at by the English bourgeoisie, served as a pretext for the conflict between England and the republics. In fact, peasant economy and great capitalist colonial policy were here competing for the Hottentots and Kaffirs, that is to say for their land and their labor power. Both competitors had precisely the same aim: to subject, expel or destroy the colored peoples, to appropriate their land and press them into service by the abolition of their social organisations. Only their methods of exploitation were fundamentally different. While the Boers stood for out-dated slavery on a petty scale, on which their patriarchal peasant economy

was founded, the British bourgeoisie represented modern large-scale capitalist exploitation of the land and the natives. The Constitution of the Transvaal (South African) Republic declared with crude prejudice: "The People shall not permit any equality of colored persons with white inhabitants, neither in the Church nor in the State."¹

In the Orange Free State and in the Transvaal no Negro was allowed to own land, to travel without papers or to walk abroad after sunset. Bryce tells us of a case where a farmer, an Englishman as it happened, in the Eastern Cape Colony had flogged his Kaffir slave to death. When he was acquitted in open court, his neighbours escorted him home to the strains of music. The white man frequently maltreated his free native laborers after they had done their work — to such an extent that they would take to flight, thus saving the master their wages.

The British government employed precisely the opposite tactics. For a long time it appeared as protector of the natives; flattering the chieftains in particular, it supported their authority and tried to make them claim a right of disposal over their land. Wherever it was possible, it gave them ownership of tribal land, according to well-tried methods, although this flew in the face of tradition and of the actual social organisation of the Negroes. All tribes in fact held their land communally, and even the most cruel and despotic rulers such as the Matabele Chieftain Lobengula merely had the right as well as the duty to allot every family a piece of land which they could only retain so long as they cultivated it. The ultimate purpose of the British government was clear: long in advance it was preparing for land robbery on a grand scale, using the native chieftains themselves as tools. But in the beginning it was content with the "pacification" of the Negroes by extensive military actions. Up to 1879 were fought 9 bloody Kaffir wars to break the resistance of the Bantus.

British capital revealed its real intentions only after two important events had taken place: the discovery of the Kimberley diamond fields in 1869-70, and the discovery of the gold mines in the Transvaal in 1882-85, which initiated a new epoch in the history of South Africa. Then the British South Africa Company, that is to say Cecil Rhodes, went into action. Public opinion in England rapidly swung over, and the greed for the treasures of South Africa urged the British government on to drastic measures. South Africa was suddenly flooded with immigrants who had hitherto only appeared in small numbers — immigration having been deflected to the

¹ Article 9.

United States. But with the discovery of the diamond and gold fields, the numbers of white people in the South African colonies grew by leaps and bounds: between 1885 and 1895, 100,000 British had immigrated into Witwatersrand alone. The modest peasant economy was forthwith pushed into the background — the mines, and thus the mining capital, coming to the fore. The policy of the British government veered round abruptly. Great Britain had recognised the Boer Republics by the Sand River Agreement and the Treaty of Bloemfontein in the fifties. Now her political might advanced upon the tiny republics from every side, occupying all neighbouring districts and cutting off all possibility of expansion. At the same time the Negroes, no longer protected favorites, were sacrificed. British capital was steadily forging ahead. In 1868, Britain took over the rule of Basutoland — only, of course, because the natives had “repeatedly implored” her to do so.²

In 1871, the Witwatersrand diamond fields, or West Griqualand, were seized from the Orange Free State and turned into a Crown Colony. In 1879, Zululand was subjected, later to become part of the Natal Colony; in 1885 followed the subjection of Bechuanaland, to be joined to the Cape Colony. In 1888 Britain took over Matabele and Mashonaland, and in 1889 the British South Africa Company was given a Charter for both these districts, again, of course, only to oblige the natives and at their request.³ Between 1884 and 1887, Britain annexed St. Lucia Bay and the entire East Coast as far as the Portuguese possessions. In 1894, she subjected Tongaland. With their last strength, the Matabele and Mashona fought one more desperate battle, but the Company, with Rhodes at the head, first liquidated the rising in blood and at once proceeded to the well-trying measure for civilising and pacifying the natives: two large railways were built in the rebellious district.

The Boer Republics were feeling increasingly uncomfortable in this sudden stranglehold, and their internal affairs as well were becoming com-

pletely disorganised. The overwhelming influx of immigrants and the rising tides of the frenzied new capitalist economy now threatened to burst the barriers of the small peasant states. There was indeed a blatant conflict between agricultural and political peasant economy on the one hand, and the demands and requirements of the accumulation of capital on the other. In all respects, the republics were quite unable to cope with these new problems. The constant danger from the Kaffirs, no doubt regarded favorably by the British, the unwieldy, primitive administration, the gradual corruption of the *volksraad* in which the great capitalists got their way by bribery, lack of a police force to keep the undisciplined crowds of adventurers in some semblance of order, the absence of labor legislation for regulating and securing the exploitation of the Negroes in the mines, lack of water supplies and transport to provide for the colony of 100,000 immigrants that had suddenly sprung up, high protective tariffs which increased the cost of labor for the capitalists, and high freights for coal — all these factors combined towards the sudden and stunning bankruptcy of the peasant republics.

They tried, obstinately and unimaginatively, to defend themselves against the sudden eruption of capitalism which engulfed them, with an incredibly crude measure, such as only a stubborn and hide-bound peasant brain could have devised: they denied all civic rights to the *witlanders* who outnumbered them by far and who stood for capital, power, and the trend of the time. In those critical times it was an ill-omened trick. The mismanagement of the peasant republics caused a considerable reduction of dividends, on no account to be put up with. Mining capital had come to the end of its tether. The British South Africa Company built railroads, put down the Kaffirs, organised revolts of the *witlanders* and finally provoked the Boer War. The bell had tolled for peasant economy. In the United States, the economic revolution had begun with a war, in South Africa war put the period to this chapter.

Yet in both instances, the outcome was the same: capital triumphed over the small peasant economy which had in its turn come into being on the ruins of natural economy, represented by the natives' primitive organisations. The domination of capital was a foregone conclusion, and it was just as hopeless for the Boer Republics to resist as it had been for the American farmer. Capital officially took over the reins in the new South African Union which replaced the small peasant republics by a great modern state, as envisaged by Cecil Rhodes' imperialist programme. The new conflict between capital and labor had superseded the old one between British

² Moshesh, the great Basuto leader, to whose courage and statesmanship the Basutos owed their very existence as a people, was still alive at the time, but constant war with the Boers of the Orange Free State had brought him and his followers to the last stage of distress. Two thousand Basuto warriors had been killed, cattle had been carried off, native homes had been broken up and crops destroyed. The tribe was reduced to the position of starving refugees, and nothing could save them but the protection of the British government which they had repeatedly implored' (C P Lucas, *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, par ii, vol. iv (Geography of South and East Africa), Oxford, 1904, p 39).

³ “The Eastern section of the territory is Mashonaland where, with the permission of King Lobengula, who claimed it, the British South Africa Company first established themselves” (ibid, p 72).

and Dutch. One million white exploiters of both nations sealed their touching fraternal alliance within the Union with the civil and political disfranchisement of five million colored workers. Not only the Negroes of the Boer Republics came away empty-handed, but the natives of the Cape Colony, whom the British government had at one time granted political equality, were also deprived of some of their rights. And this noble work, cul-

minating under the imperialist policy of the Conservatives in open oppression, was actually to be finished by the Liberal Party itself, amid frenzied applause from the "liberal cretins of Europe" who with sentimental pride took as proof of the still continuing creative vigor and greatness of English liberalism the fact that Britain had granted complete self-government and freedom to a handful of whites in South-Africa.



APARTHEID IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Bantu Authorities Act is a remarkable Act. Its aim is to re-establish tribalism in the midst of industrialism. The whole African population at present living in what are known as the Native Reserves (comprising 12% of the total land area) is to be uprooted, re-shuffled and resettled according to their ethnic groupings: Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, Pondo, "Fingo," etc. Every village will be turned into a Bantu Community, with a government-appointed chief and councillors constituting a Bantu Authority. (Government here means the Native Affairs Department, with the Minister of Native Affairs at its head.) In the towns, where the Africans have to live in segregated locations, they will also be re-shuffled according to their old clans and tribes, each with a government-appointed chief at its head. Just imagine some racial messiah let loose in London and in attempting to solve the crises of the West he should re-shuffle the population according to their original tribal or clan groupings, putting English, Welsh, Irish, Scots, Jews, etc., into separate locations, and further subdividing your men of Sussex, Wessex, and so on, or your Macdonalds, Mactavishes and Mac-what-nots. If such a scheme succeeded, the workers' trade unions might be broken up, but the social life of England with its vast industrial machine would be in an unholy mess.

It does not even occur to the makers of *Apartheid* in South Africa how ludicrous the idea of chieftainship is, particularly in the old towns, where many Africans do not even know the language of the tribe to which their forebears belonged and still less any of the ancient rites associated with it. But all that the rulers are concerned with is the splitting up of the Africans; for they are mortally afraid of African unity, and still more of the coming together of all Non-Europeans. It is a theme that is frequently harped upon in Parliament. The chiefs in the rural and urban Bantu Communities are to be little tin gods

answerable only to the Great White Chief, the Supreme Chief of all "Natives." Dr. Verwoerd, it may be said, once expressed himself a believer in the divine right of chiefs, but, of course, it must be understood that the divine right stops short sharply where the authority of the Minister of Native Affairs begins. These chiefs, then, have the power to regulate and regiment the lives of every African man, woman and child. A Proclamation in the Government Gazette has recently been published, giving them unheard-of powers over the people. These illiterate representatives of a barbarous age can order any person in their area — be it farmer, worker, teacher, minister of religion, lawyer or doctor — to obey perhaps some old tribal law or perform some archaic rites. The same Proclamation enables the chief to compel any person or group of people to carry out any public work without pay.

EDUCATION IS THE KEY — STATEMENTS OF POLICY

This brings us to the second part of Dr. Verwoerd's far-reaching schemes, namely, Bantu Education, which is to wrench the African from the progress of the civilization of mankind and condition him for life in a backward, tribalized community. In other words, it is education for barbarism. These schemes are so diabolical that it is difficult for the ordinary civilized man to treat them seriously. He tends to dismiss them as the aberrations of a sick mind and fails to realise that while he goes complacently about his daily business, a machinery of state worked out to the minutest detail is already set in motion to create an intellectual gas chamber for the children of a whole people numbering more than nine million.

Let it be understood that Dr. Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, acts for the Government and speaks for the governing party, a party which was put into power by the majority of the

White electorate in South Africa, who alone have the vote. We shall quote extensively from the speeches of his fellow party members, cabinet ministers and front benchers in Parliament, in order to show how the Bantu Education Act crystallises a policy which all of them strenuously uphold. In fact, they have more than once expressed fulsome gratitude to Dr. Verwoerd for his services.

In 1945, three years before the Nationalists came into power and prior to the Bantu Education Act (1953), they were making emphatic statements of policy. During a debate in Parliament on the subject of education, Mr M D C de Wet Nel, who subsequently became second in command in the Native Affairs Department, said:

"As has been correctly stated here, education is the key to the creation of the proper relationship between European and Non-European in South Africa... Put native education on a sound basis and half the racial questions are solved... I say that there should be reform of the whole educational system and it must be based on the culture and background and the whole life of the native himself in his tribe... The whole (present) policy is a danger for our own western civilisation." (Hansard, V 11, 1945.)

Then Mr J N Le Roux, now Minister of Agriculture, in the same debate said:

"We should not give the natives an academic education, as some people are too prone to do. If we do this we shall later be burdened with a number of academically trained Europeans, and who is going to do the manual labor in the country? I am in thorough agreement with the view that we should so conduct our schools that the native who attends those schools will know that to a great extent he must be the labourer in the country." (ibid).

Continuing this theme, Mr S A Cilliers, M P, said:

"I am very anxious about the position unless we lay down a very sound policy regarding native education. The reason is this: if we go a little too far in respect of the suggestion made here that some of the (African) children on the platteland (ie farming areas) should attend school, the future of South African agriculture may in my opinion drift into a very precarious position." (ibid).

Then Mr C R Swart, now holding office as Minister of Justice, endorsed the opinions of his colleagues:

"Hon. members have mentioned that the Department of Native Affairs adopts the

policy that natives should not be detribalised but should be educated in their own manner and should learn to be good natives, and should not be imitators of the white man. That is the policy which we favour and in my opinion it is the only sound policy." (ibid).

Mr P O Sauer, now Minister of Lands, said:

"We have two directions in South Africa. The one direction is that of the Nationalist Party, namely, that wherever it is possible to do so, the native should be kept in his tribal state, and that he should be educated and developed as far as possible in accordance with his customs and traditions." (ibid).

On the question of the control of education, Mr Sauer said:

"In my opinion there is only one department which ought to have control of native education, and that is the Department of Native Affairs... We want the native problem to be regarded as a unit, and for that reason we want to place all aspects of it under one department which can then carry out a continuing policy in connection with education." (ibid).

When the Bantu Education Bill was finally tabled in 1953, all the same arguments were hammered home. Mr J J Serfontein, now Minister of Health, took up the theme of the separate Bantu Community.

"Native education (he said) must be based on the fact that the Bantu forms a separate community." (Hansard, V 11, 1953.)

Amplifying Dr Verwoerd's condemnation of encouraging in the African "unhealthy white collar ideals," Dr A Hertzog, a true son of his father, the late Prime Minister, stated:

"As soon as we teach the native children that everything the white man has is the best... we have turned them into a potential danger to European civilisation." (ibid).

The threat to "European Civilization" is an old and favorite theme in the House. In 1945 Captain G H F Strydom, M P, had warned that if they did not arrest the present development,

"within half-a-century we shall be a coffee-colored nation. We shall no longer exist as a nation. The white man will no longer exist here... If we allow the native to remain in his raw state, if we allow him to remain within his tribe, he has his own laws and he continues to govern himself, and there is not much difficulty."

What the Hon. member lacked in elegance of style he made up by the eloquence of his threat.

For there was not a member of the herrenvolk who would not leap to action in answer to the call to save the nation from the doom of becoming coffee-colored. Thus at all costs the African must not be allowed to develop, particularly in education. Captain Strydom went on:

"We say, he (the African) must live in the hut and we must live in the house. He must remain separate in his place. We want to retain the respect of the native but we are not going to sleep with him in the kraal. He is not our equal." And he concludes: "We feel that we should have central control of native education and that the Minister of Native Affairs should be responsible for that." (Hansard, V 11, 1945.)

Each of these Ministers and front benchers was expressing in his own fashion what Dr. Verwoerd, seizing the core of the matter, bluntly stated:

"Their education should not clash with Government policy. . . . If the native in South Africa to-day . . . is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake." (Hansard, V 11, 1953.)

APARTHEID IN VOCATIONAL TRAINING

The *Apartheid* policy, over which they all expressed themselves so eloquently and clearly, covered not only formal education but also all vocational training in skills or professions, in fact every aspect of education concerned with earning a livelihood. Let us hear what Mr. Greyling, M P, had to say on what he called the "wrong attitude of the Bantu himself in regard to his education." He referred to the old system of education where

"time and attention must be given to introducing the Bantu to the civilization of the European. It is this cloak of European civilization that has to be hung round the shoulders of the Bantu that makes him the enemy of and hostile to us Europeans."

And again:

"The Bantu has begun to lay more emphasis on and strive more and more for one goal in his education, namely, to compete with the Europeans . . . The Bantu saw only one meaning in his education and that was to help him find work, so as to be a sort of economic asset to him . . ." (Hansard, V 10, 1953.)

There we have the heart of the matter, the cause of their uneasiness, in that pregnant phrase, "to compete with the European." It was for this reason that the Government's comprehensive

schemes cover every aspect of training for the Non-Whites.

In 1950 they passed a law to cover the training of Africans as builders, prohibiting them from receiving the same training as all other artisans. The Minister of Labour, Mr B J Schoeman, introducing the Native Building Workers' Bill, said:

"The standard of training is not the same as the standard of training given to the ordinary artisan who enrolls under the Apprenticeship Act . . . Native builders will therefore not be artisans in the full sense of the word. They will only receive training which will enable them to erect houses and buildings for their own use." (Hansard, V 5, 1950.)

The same law makes it impossible for anyone to train an African to become a fully qualified artisan. Having fixed the future trainees to his satisfaction, the Minister then dealt with those Africans already qualified as builders:

"In order to protect the European artisan, the following provisions will apply. In the first instance, immediately after this Act has been promulgated, no employer in the building industry will be permitted to employ a Native to do skilled building work. And by means of proclamation, all other persons will be prohibited from having building work done by Natives in specified European areas." (ibid).

The Nursing profession, too, had to come under the axe. Now it is a notorious fact that there is a shocking inadequacy of hospitalization in the country and even in the existing hospitals there is a desperate lack of nurses. This shortage is chronic, since it is a by-product of a color-caste society. White girls in South Africa, brought up in homes where they supervise Non-White servants, who do all the housework, find nursing burdensome and some of the duties objectionable. So they shun the profession. The Non-Whites, on the other hand, are entering the profession as readily as they enter the teaching profession and are filling a crying need. They have to have the same training and qualifications and do the same work as the White nurses. It is this situation that caused alarm and even horror in the hearts of the herrenvolk. A Bill had to be rushed through Parliament to put a stop to it.

AN INSTRUMENT FOR SERFDOM

Under the *Boerenasie* republic the Non-Whites will be reduced to utter helotry. In preparation for this, the schools are no longer centres of education, but of indoctrination for the docile acceptance of this position. Dr Verwoerd himself, in introducing the Bantu Education Bill, has said:

“Above all, good race relations cannot exist when education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Native, if such people believe in a policy of equality. . . . It is therefore necessary that Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the State.” (Hansard, V 10, 1953.)

Bantu Education, which is already being put into practice, is calculated to serve as an instrument for creating and ensuring the continuance of a voteless, rightless and ignorant community whose main purpose in life, apart from reproducing their kind (for there is not yet a specific law against that aspect of their life) is to minister to the Whites. The invoking of a dead tribalism and of Bantu Communities wherein “education will find its fullest expression” is cynical political claptrap. The plain fact is that Bantu Education is intended to rob the African of education, cut him off from the main stream of modern culture and shut him into a spiritual and intellectual ghetto.

Prior to the introduction of Bantu Education it had been the policy of every successive Government — as we have pointed out — to see to it that as few Non-Whites as possible received education. But now it is the boast of Dr. Verwoerd that he is giving education to many more African children than before. According to him, he has already, in a short space of time, doubled the number of pupils attending school. Is there then a contradiction here? The very manner in which he effects his boasted increase reveals the real purpose behind his so-called education. He has made it quite plain, indeed he is emphatic on the point, that the State will not increase the already meagre expenditure on education for Non-Whites. So what does he do? He institutes a system of double shifts in schools, reducing the time to three hours each shift. As he laconically puts it:

“In this way both the teacher and the class-room will be able to serve two different groups of pupils every day. The same applies to the furniture, school requisites and class-reading books.”

Like the mine worker who has to leave his tools behind at the end of his shift, the African children must leave the school books behind to be used by the next batch. It doesn't require much imagination to picture the plight of the second batch of youngsters who have to start their school day under such adverse conditions when they ought to be going home.

It hardly needs any reference to the actual content of the instruction, and the general

management and the attitude to the teachers, to realise that these are no longer schools for education as is understood in any civilized community, but institutions for indoctrination. The sudden urgency to double, treble and even quadruple the number of pupils is determined by the new objectives of Bantu Education. As many as possible must go through this mill. It is no small task to transform a population of Non-Whites, who comprise about four-fifths of the whole population of the Union, into docile slaves contented with their lot. If, however, we look into the management of school, the curricula and the calculated debasement of the teacher, we find ample confirmation that the scheme before us is a huge conspiracy, first against the Africans and eventually against the whole Non-White population of South Africa.

Their plans for reducing the numerically small section of the Non-Whites (the Coloured and the Indians) to the same position of helotry are still at the earlier stages. But it is already clear that they are working out the same pattern for them as for the Africans. Having first removed the Coloured and the Indian people from the Parliamentary Voters' Roll, the Government proceeded to create a special Department of State known as the Coloured Affairs Department (C A D), which means lifting the Coloured people of the body politic and treating them as a separate entity in accordance with the Nationalist policy of *Apartheid*. The C A D is the counterpart of the N A D which was instituted for Africans. Following the De Vos Malan Commission on Coloured education, the Government intimated its intention to transfer education for the Coloured and Indians from the Department of Education to the political Department, the C A D. It thus becomes an instrument for fitting the Coloured people into a separate community, as Bantu education prepares the African people for a tribalized community. Bantu education presages what is in store for the Coloured and Indian people. In the fully-developed plans for the Africans they can see an image of their future state of complete bondage.

DEBASEMENT OF EDUCATION

The many speeches of Cabinet Ministers and others quoted earlier in this work make the position quite clear. The point is further driven home by Dr. Verwoerd that Bantu education is designed to fit the African into a special position allocated to him by the politicians. The quotation is worth repeating:

“My Department's policy is that (Bantu) education should stand with both feet in the Reserves and have its roots in the

spirit and being of Bantu society . . . There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor . . . For this reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze." (*Bantu Education: Policy for the Immediate Future*, p 23.)

With this purpose in view, the control of education for Africans was transferred to the Native Affairs Department (N A D). This is the Department that is charged with the artificial retribalization of a whole people and the setting up of Bantu Authorities. It deals with the supply of cheap African labor to the mines, the farms and industry; it deals with agriculture, the compulsory culling and dipping of cattle, the collection of poll-tax and the enforcement of pass-laws. Indeed, Bantu Education is not so much placed with both feet in the Reserves as thrust into them on all fours. Dr. Verwoerd makes it plain that education is in the service of these activities.

"The Inspector of Schools, the Native Commissioner and the Agricultural Extension officer," he states, "will remain in close contact with one another." (*ibid*). And again, "A community, for example, will not be able to claim advantages of education and at the same time ignore or even oppose guidance in regard to the care of the soil." (*ibid*.)

In practice, this has meant that when the people in a village refused to reduce the number of their stock under the culling regulations, their school was closed down.

The local management of the schools is handed over to tribal school committees and school boards who work under the tribal Authorities, with a Chief at the head. The inability of the Chief or headman to read or write his name does not disqualify him. When he has to append his signature to an official document he puts down a cross, which must be witnessed by one of the teachers he employs or some other literate person at hand. It is these people who not only direct and supervise the schools but employ and dismiss the teachers.

The curriculum likewise is fundamentally altered. An inordinate amount of time is given to religious instruction and devotional activities. The longest teaching time is given to manual training. And there is plenty of practice. For the Minister has decreed that "the daily cleaning of the school building and grounds will naturally

be the work of the pupils under the supervision of the teachers." In this context "manual" should be understood to signify "menial." Broom, pick and shovel are the tools they must be familiar with. It sometimes happens that children spend as much as a whole week in the brickyard making bricks for school buildings. Or they have to stop school work to go road-making. On one occasion when a chief was to be installed, it fell to the children to lay a road so that the magistrate's car could reach the chief's place. No pains are spared to ensure that African children will never suffer from "unhealthy white-collar ideals" — to use Dr. Verwoerd's happy phrase.

The three R's, which are a golden rule in any educational system, are almost crowded out. These basic tools for the acquisition of education cannot possibly be polished, sharpened and given to the child who is being prepared for slavery. More properly speaking they are used as an excuse for gathering the children together to pursue a course in indoctrination. They must, of course, acquire a rudimentary knowledge of the two official languages, Afrikaans and English, suited to the requirements of their inferior position.

BANTU EDUCATION IN PRACTICE

The whole scheme is bad enough on paper, but its sinister nature emerges more fully when we view it in practice. What stands out with appalling clarity is that the more progressive section of the Non-Whites, the educated section, is delivered into the hands of the most backward elements of the population. For purposes of local management, power is put into the hands of the chiefs, the illiterate representatives of a barbarous age. The teacher, completely deprived of all those rights vested in his position, including the legal right of tenure of his office, is thereby placed at their mercy. Such a situation opens the door wide to corruption, bribery, nepotism and other malpractices. An example here and there in cold print can hardly convey an adequate conception of the seeping poison permeating the whole fabric of the system. We have to imagine the day-to-day life of the defenceless teacher, prey to the bullying whim or greed of any official. It takes innumerable petty forms. To begin with, jobs are bought and sold, and when a teacher has landed a job there is all the anxiety of holding on to it with "tobacco money" judiciously doled out to this one and that one. Then there is the unofficial taxation system, present for inspectors and sub-inspectors on the occasion of their transfer to another circuit; or the interminable singing and handwork contests that necessitate contributions by the teachers to defray expenses. Picture such an occasion in a rural community; crowds

coming from far and wide have to be catered for; sheep and possibly an ox have to be bought and slaughtered. Of course there is no written law compelling the teacher to pay up out of his very

meagre salary. But then there is no law to save him from being dismissed when he offends an irate official. And all that is required is an adverse report.



THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN SOUTH AFRICA

LAND DISTRIBUTION

(Figures from 1956-57 Yearbook and the Tomlinson Report 1956)

(a) Of all farming land, white and "Bantu" Areas, when all the land for Africans has been acquired under the land and Native Trust Acts of 1936,

European farms will occupy 86.2%
"Bantu Areas" will occupy 13.8%

(b) At present farm holdings are as follows:

(i) WHITES

571,014 whites own, lease etc, 101,480,108 morgen of land, i.e. 21.6% of the white population or 10% of the whole population of South Africa.

(ii) AFRICANS

a) "Native Areas" where people live as peasants under tribal conditions.

17¹/₂ million morgen occupied by 3,306,234 people i.e. 42.6% of total African population.

b) 2,336,714 people i.e. 24.3% of total population on white farms.

c) 6% of total African population in Rural townships, government areas, construction gangs and farms owned by Coloured or Asiatics.

So that of all rural areas

101¹/₂ million morgen owned by 571,614 whites.

17¹/₂ million morgen set aside for 6¹/₄ million Africans.

This accounts for rural population of 6¹/₄ million. But according to the Tomlinson Report, of the 2¹/₃ million people (Africans) in urban areas only 1¹/₂ million are permanently settled. The rest i.e. 828,534 are migrant laborers and therefore this number must be added to the rural population in so far as distribution of the land. It is interesting to note that according to 1951 Census of urban African people 645,350 are in compounds i.e.

Municipal Compounds	29,019
Industrial	142,277
Mine Compounds	474,060
	<hr/>
	645,350

(c) *Nature of the land, of all "Bantu Areas."*

11% pure mountain country.

23% very mountainous or very broken.

20% hilly or broken.

46% gently rolling or flat.

[e.g. In Transkei 10% flat (Population 1,269,277)]

[In Natal 23% flat (Population 1,810,102)]

This means that of the 17¹/₂ million morgen of land in "Bantu Areas" on which 42.6% of total African population settled, less than half i.e. 46% of 17¹/₂ million morgen can be used for cultivation.

Besides the nature of the land is the question of soil erosion.

In Transkei 30% in "Bantu Areas" badly eroded;

44% in "Bantu Areas" moderately so;

26% in "Bantu Areas" free from erosion.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

(d) *1951 Census*

27.1% of Africans in Rural Areas.

42.6% in "Bantu Areas."

30.3% on European farms and other rural areas.

24.3% on European farms and 60% other rural areas.

De facto population in "Bantu" areas 3,633,000

De jure population if absentees added 4,202,000 i.e. 569,000 migrant laborers.

Permanent urban dwellers ± 1,500,000.

(e) *Annual Income of the Peasants*

Annual family income of farming families in "Bantu" Areas £43. i.e. £22 from farming and £21 from outside work. Family doing Pastoral farming on trust farms £49.4 per annum.

"Real" income produced in Reserves has remained unchanged from 1936 and per capita income has fallen.

According to the Tomlinson report a farming African family requires 52.5 morgen of land to realise gross income of £70 per annum. Thus all "Bantu Areas" can carry 307,000 farming families i.e. 51% of present population therefore half of the present population will have to leave and seek employment outside agriculture.

THE PARTAI ACOMA ANALYSES SOEKARNO'S "GUIDED DEMOCRACY"

We herewith publish the main extracts from the following document of the Partai Acoma, Indonesian section of the Fourth International:

THESIS OF OCTOBER 1959

Torch for the People's Struggle in the Context of "Back to the Constitution of 1945"

Promises from the time of colonial rule

In difficult times colonial rulers proved not to be averse to promises which resemble something that the people will demand. Confronted with its ruin Japanese imperialism came forward with the promise known as "Indonesia free in a short time". We had already experienced Dutch play with the promise "Indonesia independent within the context of the Dutch kingdom."

Neither the Japanese nor the Dutch promise was meant to lead the independence movement present among the people. The mentioned imperialistic promises only had one aim: to maintain colonial rule. When we look more closely those imperialistic promises were essentially aimed at defeating a possible people's revolution.

For completeness' sake, it is good to put forward here that the Japanese promise "Indonesia independent in a short time" almost defeated our Proclamation of Independence of August 17, 1945. The groups which grew up on this Japanese promise as a matter of life and death, desired to delay the matter and to wait, full of loyalty, for the day on which the Japanese would transmit sovereignty. They relied so much on the Japanese promise that they did not believe that the Japanese had capitulated. This group erred so excessively that it condemned the "Proclamation of August 17, 1945" as a provocation from spies of the enemy, who tries to bring confusion to "Indonesian independence", an independence which in any case was "to be had from Japanese hands".

On the other hand, a great part of the Indonesian people, confronted with the Dutch promise "Indonesia independent within the Dutch Kingdom" lacked revolutionary readiness, or even lost it. With this Dutch promise "Hollandism", opportunism and defeatism were developed in the organization of our revolution, so the course of the revolution of August 17 was turned straight to Linggardjati, Renville and the Round Table Conference. This proves that the Dutch promise played a counter-revolutionary rôle; with our revolutionary readiness we regrettably could not cope with it sufficiently.

History proved that one has to meet promises of rulers with revolutionary readiness; promises which are not aimed at guiding the desires of the people, but on the contrary at lulling them to sleep, in order to maintain the position of the rulers. This revolutionary readiness is needed to save revolutionary energy.

1. The revolutionary energy of August 1945 was saved. Thanks to the revolutionary readiness, present during the time of organizing "the movement to demand fulfillment of the promise", a movement which had as its object to fight for everything which possibly would not be fulfilled by the promising rulers.
2. After August 1945 the revolutionary energy experienced damage and defeat because of lack of revolutionary preparedness. Moreover, it was forgotten that the government of the Republic of Indonesia originating from the revolution was in fact a ruling power which had to realize the aims of the revolution; aims which in themselves could not be connected any more with promises of another ruler from another time, based on the counter-revolution.

Promises of Soekarno

After 14 years of experience with an authority which strayed from the revolutionary road while the mass of the people grudged and suffered, the President of the Indonesian Republic delivered a speech on August 17, 1959; a speech under the title "rediscovery of our revolution". This speech formed the Political Manifesto of the Soekarno government, within the content of the Constitution of 1945.

This speech represented a ruler's promise. This speech brought the promise of "food and clothes, security and freedom for the millions of the people". Now the question arises whether this promise aims at guiding the desires of the people or only means a "political move", in order to maintain the position of the present rulers. If we were to ask the President-Chief of the Armed Forces, First Minister Soekarno, about this matter, we would certainly get the answer that the above mentioned promise had no other aim than the realization of revolutionary objectives, that is to say guiding the desires of the millions of people. This answer was reflected in the speech of Soekarno on August 17 last, a speech which among other things runs as follows.

"Really we do not make a revolution, we do not struggle, we do not make sacrifices, we do not dance with death, to hoist the Red-White flag, or to let fly the Indonesian Eagle in the sky, do we? No, we are in action because of our misery, we are in action because we desire to live better and fully; we are in action only for an ideal, we are in action because we desire sufficient food, clothes, land,

houses, education, arts and culture, in short, we are in action because we desire to better our lot, in all its parts and branches. This improvement of our lot can only be 100 % when society ceases to be capitalist and imperialist. Because this (capitalist) system developed like a sort of parasite on our body, living and flourishing from our forces, from our means of subsistence, from the essence of our society. That is why our movement is no small affair. Our movement has to be one which wants to change the character of our society thoroughly. The demands concerning social justice, freedom and independence, democracy and so on rushed forward, in the open, in a revolutionary way, in our generation; this after we had for decades carried in our hearts a fire in a shell; and those demands of the Indonesian people must be satisfied, being a revolutionary stream — and not bit by bit or morsel by morsel, not in a reformist way, not “piece-meal”, not in the form of a compromise, and to fulfill those demands, like a revolutionary stream we ourselves must be inspired by a revolutionary spirit”.

Revolutionary ends cannot be realized with forces that divert and obstruct the revolution. There is the experience of our 14 years of independence showing that the group which diverts and obstructs the revolution is the big bureaucracy.

That the bureaucracy consists of civilians and military men, in their living and thinking very much different from and hostile to the development in the mass of the people. They form a sort of cabal which holds fast to the important functions and strategic positions in the ministries, services, concerns, governmental and semi-governmental institutions, various organizations and committees, parties and associations. In the back ground of the bureaucracy stand foreign monopoly capital. With this bureaucracy, it is impossible to realize revolutionary aims. If we really want to realize the contents of the above-mentioned speech of Soekarno, then it is necessary to break through the bureaucracy. Without such a break-through everything amounts to nonsense.

We have already explained that revolutionary vigilance in face of the governmental promises is necessary; these promises were in fact only made to maintain the positions of the rulers.

Without seriousness and competence, in this initiative of claiming our due the positive aims will only be turned off their course and will become a striving for the extension of the life of the bureaucracy, which in fact has to be fought. We have a collective approach to prevent the bureaucracy — and behind it foreign monopoly capital — continuing to posture under the flag of the revolution.

The bureaucracy and the government parties

In the Netherlands Indies period the nobility and their descendants were given very good positions and room to live, so that they formed a bureaucracy which became a loyal agent of foreign monopoly capital. In the Japanese period this bureaucracy experienced some ups and downs, but in reality this bureaucracy could still maintain itself, so that Japan finally had to make use of the bureaucracy as a channel, to search out and plunder the forces and goods of the people. In the time of the revolution of August 1945, the Netherlands Indies bureaucracy was in semi-chaos, but thanks to the

Right-deviationist course of the revolutionary leaders, this bureaucracy could reorganize itself; yes it could even broaden its ranks with the bureaucracy of a new generation: namely of the generation of Linggardjati, Renville and the Round Table Conference. Both bureaucracies had as a basis foreign monopoly capital, both were agents of foreign colonial capital, which is hostile to the interests and the needs of the people. If one still wants to find differences between the old and the new bureaucracy, this difference is not to be found in the function but in the composition. The old bureaucracy consists exclusively of the nobility and its descendants; the new bureaucracy consists of men of the political movements; among these were men who distinguished themselves and won a good name in the prewar struggle.

We are now confronted with the question of breaking through the bureaucracies of the Netherlands Indies, Linggardjati, Renville and the Round Table Conference generations. This bureaucracy maintains itself with the jumping gait of a coconut rat, moving from one government party to the other. The bureaucracy, agent of colonial capitalism, maintains itself by entering and surrounding whatever party is becoming a government party.

It is clear that the government parties are incapable of damming the danger of this bureaucracy. The government parties are in reality already devoured alive by the bureaucracy — agent of colonial capitalism — which certainly damaged the good name of the parties concerned. This explains the growing annoyance which recently was used as a starting point to promote the anti-party activity.

Soekarno and the parties

Soekarno himself did not lead the parties in a direct way, and in this present transitional period he in fact has no clear standpoint concerning the position and the role of the parties, as a means to overcome the national problems which are complicated in all respects. About two years ago, on the youth day, Soekarno as head of state even fostered the anti-party tendencies with an utterance in which he seemed to dream of the liquidation of the parties. Not much later, Soekarno as head of State let drop something else: on a reception of the P.N.I. (National Party of Indonesia) he let resound his desire for one vanguard party with a progressive radical and revolutionary character. Finally Soekarno turned up with the proposed simplification of the party system. From that angle Soekarno came forward with the abandonment of their party membership by the ministers and high civil servants. At last he released the national council of ministers from party-relations and (party) discipline. From these events one can conclude that Soekarno is not content with and very much disappointed by the development of the Indonesian party system.

Meanwhile Soekarno is very busy making use of the present opportunities to lay the foundation of a power which he would have in his hands directly. By releasing the ministers and high civil servants in all departments, functions, concerns, governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the centre and the territories, from their party ties, Soekarno hopes to discipline and mobilize the mentioned forces for the national advancement directly.

The bureaucracy and Soekarno

The above-mentioned attitude of Soekarno somewhat touches the position of the bureaucracy. That bureaucracy did not keep silent. Elements of the bureaucracy desired to free themselves from the decisions which concerned them. The parties which for some time held governmental power, which in fact was wholly ruled by the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — were as capricious as if their own strength was being gnawed. Among them the P.N.I. wants to have the prohibition of parties-membership for civil servants withdrawn. For the conscious party-members a party is a matter of ideology which cannot be dammed up just by the interdiction of party membership, for them party-discipline is a thing which they have got, a thing which in fact cannot be swept away with the formula "give up your party membership"; for them party-discipline is a thing which develops in the context of realising a party-ideology. On the other hand, for the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — the parties are a means of protection, a sort of shield against the opposition of the people. Getting in and out, from one party to the other is for the bourgeoisie — agent of foreign capitalism — a matter of routine. That means that if the parties indeed cannot any more be used by the bureaucracy as a basis to maintain itself, certainly that bureaucracy will seek other ways to maintain its position. In a structure in which the outward authority is commonly concentrated in the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister, the bureaucracy certainly will not shrink back from surrounding the ruling individual, Soekarno. The prohibition of party-membership which hit the ministers and high civil servants, in this way, did not solve the problem, but shifted it. The bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — which originally surrounded and entered whatever party was on the way to becoming a government party, now has the opportunity to change its course by gathering around the Presidential Palace and by not being averse to shouting loudly "long live brother Karno". (Soekarno)

At the crossroads

The struggle against the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — is no new problem. It existed already before this revolution. It was again a problem after the revolution and now we are again confronted with it. We have to bear in mind that in the field of struggle there are 3 groups. On the Left we meet the revolutionary group. On the Right we see the counter-revolutionaries. In both groups we observe movements of groups which play a rôle in all classes within the framework of this polarization; groups which in our terminology are called "bonapartist". The revolutionary groups want to put national affairs completely in order by means of the system of people's democracy, where deliberations take place among the friends of the people. On the other side, from the counter-revolutionaries, one hears the demand of liquidation of the revolution with a bureaucratic system which — whether by crude or gentle ways — continuously deals blows to the revolution. The class-basis of the revolutionary groups lies in the proletariat and the peasants. The class basis of the counter-revolutionaries consists of the foreign capitalists. The bonapartists, present in revolution and counter-revolution, among proletarians and peasants on the

one hand, and foreign capitalists on the other, are the backbone of the national bourgeoisie. As we know, beside the national bourgeoisie we have the petty bourgeoisie, which failed in its endeavour to become national capitalists. In this failure they desire to maintain the revolutionary leadership, by means of the concept of guided democracy, a concept which in fact is no longer on the strength of a solid class but is exclusively dependent on the personality of Soekarno. Half the national bourgeoisie — in its despair — become a comprador class of foreign capitalism. The tradition, already established by the Round Table Conference is continued in the context of the SEATO-authority by means of the system of liberal democracy. After liberal democracy is pushed aside by guided democracy the comprador bourgeoisie continues its rôle in the political content of a military junta, which leans on the army. Confronted with the system of bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalists — Indonesia stands now at the crossroads, in the midst of several systems:

1. The system of people's democracy, which leans on the class of proletarians and peasants and other progressive groups.
2. The system of liberal democracy, which leans on the national bourgeoisie.
3. The system of guided democracy which leans on the personality of Soekarno.
4. The system of the military junta which leans on the military (the army).

The system of people's democracy

This system had its roots in the revolutionary groups, its basis in the class of proletarians and peasants, and it embraces the mass of proletarians, peasants and other progressive groups. This system depends on the ideological maturity of the proletarians and peasants and on the activity of Marxist-Leninist groups, that is to say: the communists. This system cannot flourish when opportunism still reigns tyrannically in the revolutionary wing. This system cannot progress when the bonapartists of the national bourgeoisie still have influence over the proletarians and peasants. This system cannot go forward effectively when the communists are not — or not yet — capable of realizing a sovereign (people's) policy. One can hope that this system will be completed when the communists do not hesitate to educate the mass of proletarians and peasants in revolutionary actions, when the communists end their (defensive) policy (of very modest demands) and want to start with a sovereign (people's) policy, independently. The communists endeavour to defeat as much as possible the intrigues of bonapartists and counter-revolutionaries, they are not permitted:

1. to sacrifice the interests of proletarians and peasants to the advantage of the interests of the corrupt national bourgeoisie;
2. to popularize the bonapartism of the national bourgeoisie;
3. to desert the rôle of vanguard of the working class.

The system of people's democracy will only develop fast after the bonapartism of the national bourgeoisie has failed in all its forms; at the moment when (even) the most backward workers are able to move against bonapartism. With the system of people's democracy, which has its roots in the broad mass, the liquidation of the counter-revolutionaries is possible.

The system of liberal democracy

This system has as its kernel the class of the national bourgeoisie. In the content of this system, this class has as its dearest wish: to become national capitalists. The position of the national bourgeoisie in the governmental leadership is used, as far as possible, to fulfil its desires. With an eye on the reality of the petty bourgeoisie, our national bourgeoisie changes its standpoint, going hither and thither, between revolution and counter-revolution. From the national bourgeoisie originate the political champions of the bonapartist course. These bonapartists have pleasure in everything which they (can) call: looking for a synthesis. A synthesis is for the bonapartist not a victory of revolution over counter-revolution. Along this middle road they infiltrate the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — and probably the bonapartists are already working in the framework of the bureaucracy of foreign capitalism. In the liberal democratic system which they praise highly these bonapartists finally do not want to compete with their political enemies. The failure of the liberal democratic system is seen at last as a reality. In the liberal system the national bourgeoisie failed to attain its object: to become national capitalists. The national bourgeoisie itself has — in this system — belatedly noticed that its position has become hard-pressed. Thereupon, a part of the national bourgeoisie leaders left the bonapartist way, choosing the counter-revolution, with the slogan “anti-communism”. This slogan is moulded on the system of “democracy without the communists” otherwise called: the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie.

The system of guided democracy

Because the national bourgeois class has already failed in its struggle in the direction of national capitalism, the system of guided democracy did not turn up clearly as the interpreter and protector of the national bourgeoisie. The device “socialism” was embroidered on the banner of this guided democracy. This “socialism” which rests on the national bourgeoisie is indeed a peculiar affair. In order to reduce the peculiarity, the system of guided democracy which is bonapartist in its structure is based essentially on the personality of Soekarno. And this Soekarno delivers speeches on socialism while the national bourgeoisie silently cultivates its phantasies, concentrated on national capitalism, and while it certainly will make use of every possible opportunity to enrich itself in any case. Proletarians and peasants want to realize the socialism on which Soekarno delivers speeches, while the national bourgeoisie tries to limit socialism to speeches. Soekarno’s bonapartism puts Soekarno in a precarious position, because with this bonapartism the distance between speech and reality is so much the greater. The more Soekarno is involved in problems which must be solved directly, the more Soekarno needs a force which he can master directly. As a leader outside the parties, bonapartism still more shows the complexity of the personality of Soekarno, weaving in and out between the various classes, a Soekarno who in practice only collects problems, who from day to day accumulates these problems without really solving one of them. Taking into consideration the present relationship of forces, Soekarno’s bonapartism makes him still more dependent on the bureaucracy which up to now is not yet demolished. This guided democracy, based on

the personality of Soekarno, can certainly only experience failure, because it cannot defeat the bureaucracy.

The system of the military junta

The military junta makes use of the military system of work where the rank and file are not allowed to think otherwise than ordered by their superiors. Thus the military junta is a personal dictatorship of the high military. Because the military were not allowed, before, to participate in politics, otherwise than by submitting themselves to the orders of Linggardjati, Renville and the Round Table Conference, which were hostile to the interests and needs of the people, the military were politically the most backward elements. To speculate about a personal military dictatorship which determines the national policy, is very dangerous because it has no roots in a solid class, it has no clear ideology which can be followed, it is very much dependent on personal temperament. The condition of a military junta is objectively very unstable, it is easily shaken and, in view of the concrete internal situation of our armed forces, the military junta is an easy prey for the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — which in its development can easily become the incubator from which finally a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie will be hatched.

The future of Indonesia goes in the direction of the people’s democratic system, because the military junta is unable to overcome the internal contradiction of the Armed Forces and incapable of solving the national problems in the interest of the mass of the people. After the current failure of the government of the national bourgeoisie which desired to become the national capitalists, the system of peoples’ democracy will create a development in the direction of a peoples’ government without capitalism. This means that we are now already in a period of history which is more progressive than the situation of 1945, when we had as a slogan “a peoples’ government”. This slogan has now become insufficient. This slogan has to be fortified in the (following) form: a peoples’ government without capitalism.

In face of the reality that in the Armed Forces themselves not all want a military junta, the system of people’s democracy will bring together the mass of workers and peasants on the one hand and the mass of the soldiers on the other hand, in the organization of a front of workers, peasants and soldiers, who move progressively towards a peoples’ government without capitalism.

The liquidatory simplification of the Indonesian party system

The system of people’s democracy is based on the class of workers and peasants and other progressive groups. This system needs parties. We in Indonesia are confronted with the reality of many parties. We count several national bourgeois parties, religious as well as national. Evidently we are confronted with more than one workers’ party.

In the context of a people’s democracy the process of simplification of the party system essentially takes place in the practice of the struggle against feudalism and imperialism.

The system of people’s democracy needs parties, and the parties which can continue their life in a people’s democracy are the revolutionary and progressive parties.

The reactionary parties are beaten back because the system of people's democracy follows the policy of hitting the enemies of the people directly. In the present relations of power, where the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — is still in authority in all areas, every endeavour to discipline the parties from above follows the twistings of the law.

The parties and similar organizations are in practice only a canal for the bureaucracy to maintain itself, from our side we need revolutionary preparedness in face of the endeavours of the national bourgeoisie and the bonapartists, known under the name "simplification of the party system".

In other words, with the organization of the strength of the people against the bureaucracy — agent of foreign capitalism — parties which fulfill their revolutionary calling are needed, revolutionary and progressive parties. An organization of revolutionary and progressive parties must be created from within the present parties.

We ourselves cannot tolerate the attempt to liquidate the parties which wage a revolutionary and progressive fight, and the simplification of the party system has to be realized from below, in a true development. These things cannot be organized from above, cannot be constructed.

A fusion between parties which is not a true one, is in fact no progress but, on the contrary, a retrogression. This is illustrated by the developments with the national bourgeoisie's parties. The Catholic Party and the Christian Indonesian Party (PARKINDO) certainly fight against a fusion, even while both parties profess the Christian religion of the prophet Jesus.

Both nationalist parties, the National Party of Indonesia (PNI) and Indonesia Party (PARTINDO) are very difficult to fuse. The same difficulties we observe with the Islamic parties. The Nahdatul Ulama (NU), orthodox Islamic party, already put up a clear fight against a reunion with the Masjumi in one Islamic party. The same applies to the PERTI, PS, etc.

Between the parties of socialist-communist or Marxist-Leninist character there are several differences which cannot be reconciled. The MURBA party cannot be fused with the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI). We also observe differences between the ACOMA Party and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

The ACOMA Party and the PKI

I). The ACOMA Party and the PKI are both based on Marxism-Leninism. Still there are fundamental differences between them.

1. The PKI is already contented when the national bourgeoisie follows the policy of not contradicting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and in order to reach this the PKI does not shrink from sacrificing the interests and needs of the mass of Indonesian workers and peasants. In the context of this policy the PKI chose the path of liquidating the revolution of August 1945, with Linggardjati and Renville, because according to the PKI, at that time the Soviet Union was not yet ready for all eventualities. In the context of this policy the PKI chose the path of the Madiun revolt because, according to the PKI, in 1948 the Soviet-Union was again strong enough. Essentially, the PKI took up its defensive and offensive position, not by weighing and starting from the potentialities of the mass of the Indonesian peo-

ple, but of those of the Soviet Union. Thus in the years that followed the revolution of August, the PKI, with its position of supporting Linggardjati-Renville, acted *below* the capacities of the mass of the people. In the Madiun affair the PKI on the contrary acted *above* the capacities of the people. The retreat of the PKI caused damage, while its going forward caused damage too. The PKI thus only caused damage in all respects.

2. The PKI observes the development towards a compromise between the Soviet Union and America. In order not to disturb this compromise, the PKI acts moderately and makes broad concessions to the national bourgeoisie. Treading this defensive path the PKI is not averse to suppressing the unsatisfied feelings of its followers.

II). The PKI has no critical attitude in face of the internal developments of the workers' states. Whatever is ordered by Moscow, is law to the PKI. The PKI for instance a priori fights Trotskyism and Titoism because that is the standpoint of the people in authority in the Soviet Union. The ACOMA Party has not got that attitude.

The ACOMA Party has to fulfill the task of exchanging the bonapartist national bourgeois government for a people's government without capitalism, while in this free choice the ACOMA Party leads the revolutionary development not from the viewpoint of the capacities of the Soviet Union, but from those of the mass of the Indonesian people. It acknowledges that the Indonesian revolution is part of the world revolution, but it wants it to be known that the Indonesian revolution is an important part of the world revolution.

That is the way for the Soviet Union and the other workers' states to help Indonesian revolutionary development effectively. What clearly sacrifices the interests of the revolution is not our way. Our way is: to lead this revolution and to wrench the revolutionary leadership from the hands of the national bourgeoisie. Of course we must accept what is good in the political coördination between the workers' states and the national bourgeoisie(s) which have become the government, but this political coördination is insufficient to make us accept that the bonapartist national bourgeoisie should settle solidly in the revolutionary leadership, because as long as the revolutionary leadership is in the hands of this bonapartist national bourgeoisie, our revolution will not develop fast and the counter-revolution cannot be liquidated soon.

The ACOMA Party stands on the side of the workers' states and the revolution for liberation, in the struggle against the pressure and the attacks of capitalism and imperialism. In these matters the ACOMA Party goes together with the PKI. But meanwhile the ACOMA Party has a critical and objective point of view concerning the developments and internal contradictions of the workers' states. Here the ACOMA Party differs from the PKI.

The fundamental differences between both parties cannot, in fact, be overcome by fusing the two parties. From our point of view the national bourgeoisie which cannot overcome the fundamental differences between its parties within one party — so that the national bourgeoisie is compelled to struggle organized in several parties — has no moral right to force a liquidation or

simplification of parties which touches the position and the rôle of the ACOMA Party as a communist party.

The widening of the sector: national economy

Apart from the differences, competition and intrigues between the various groups and parties, which everywhere give rise to many subjective considerations and attitudes, it is necessary to put forward here the progress in the internal national development, which in an objective sense certainly cannot be neglected. The action of the working mass in 1945 which confiscated the capitalist concerns of the rulers was beaten back by the counter-revolution, which was fostered by the social-democrats and the Stalinists (PKI) who collaborated with the ruling capitalists. At the end of 1957 the working mass again came into action, and this time it limited itself to the concerns of Dutch capital. While the counter-revolutionary side went its own way and wanted again to break the action of the working mass, this time, however, it did not attain its purpose fully.

They (the counter-revolutionaries) only succeeded in watering down the principle of confiscation into the principle of nationalization. This means that the working mass finally has become ideologically more mature than before, but not yet sufficiently mature to conquer the leadership of the revolution.

Thanks to the above-mentioned action of the working mass in 1957, the national (public) sector of the Indonesian economy has become wider. We have a collective approach to protect the results of this struggle of the working mass. And everything which is attained has to be used as a starting point to continue the revolution. On this pressure of the working mass, the government has already acted as an active agent in export and import matters by the formation of eight national corporations.

Anyhow these national corporations are a progressive development. But with the nationalization of the Dutch concerns and with the establishment of the national corporations for export and import we are still far from a just and prosperous society.

The national bourgeoisie (which failed to become national capitalists along the way of liberal democracy) which now wants to maintain itself in the world of guided democracy, keeps battening like a parasite on and around the already nationalized business concerns and national corporations which were recently formed by the government.

As supplier, contractor and wholesale dealer the national bourgeoisie continues its cold practices. The ideology of the national bourgeoisie still has a great influence on the way of thinking and working of the leaders in the national business concerns. Under the influence and the pressure of the national bourgeoisie, the leaders in the national business concerns everywhere lay the basis for and protect the intrigues of the bourgeoisie, which considers the national companies only as a field for corruption and for enriching themselves by sacrificing the interests and needs of the working people.

In order properly to take care of production so that it can equal and surpass the pre-war level, the above-mentioned infection has to be extirpated. To maintain and develop the results of the revolution, revolutionary preparedness is needed. Here we have to fight for the participation of the working mass in the control of

personnel, production and distribution matters of the companies.

The energy and creative potential of the workers has to be stimulated and led in a proper way. Here we need a council of workers — or whatever name it can give — in which the representatives of the workers are sitting beside the leadership of the concerns, companies and businesses. One can surmise beforehand that the national bourgeoisie will fight, obstruct and sabotage, in various ways, every step towards the formation and competition of this council of workers.

To fight the ideology and the intrigues of the national bourgeoisie in and around the national business concerns, we need very much unity of action among the organization of the working mass. This unity of action has to be realized in the context of a front of proletarians, peasants and soldiers, directed towards a people's government without capitalism. The need for unity of action, in maintaining and broadening the results of the mass movement compels us to broaden the activity of the parties around the trade unions.

The infection which disturbs the economy — and which we dealt with before — may not be considered unimportant, the more so because the danger of foreign capital investments can still provide a good soil for that infection which we have to extirpate. Besides Dutch capital, which is not yet wholly nationalized, there is still other foreign capital the position of which is still unimpeded. The laws on foreign capital investment still permit additions to foreign capital investment. It is now in our interest that the workers collectively demand the annulment of the laws on foreign capital investment, together with the broadening of the national sector of our economy.

The increase of production, efficiency and cleanliness in the nationalized sector of the economy will, in the present circumstances, have a big influence on the development of the corporations. As long as the public sector of the economy is not cleansed from destructive lice, the corporations will be directly and indirectly be forced to work under the supervision of foreign capitalist economy, which is fundamentally hostile to the coöperative economy. There is a national way to secure the development of the corporations, but for that purpose the public sector of the economy itself must be secure and healthy, so that the hopes of the vast majority of the people will be fulfilled.

The question of the national front

To overcome the sharp controversies in the body of the nation, together with the consolidation of the national strength, the bonapartists come forward with the slogan of national unity for which purpose they want to have a sort of national front.

In all national fronts led by bonapartists there is a tendency to castrate the working class by means of decrees to diminish the class controversies in the body of the nation, in other words to excuse the twistings of the national bourgeoisie, which amounts to sacrificing the interests and needs of the workers. And it is clear that by sacrificing these interests the national interests are not served. After the bitter experiences we had in several national fronts during our revolution, it is necessary to put forward our firm opinion that in principle we do not want a national front led by bona-

partists. In the present circumstances we devote ourselves wholly to the formation of a workers' front, consisting of proletarians, peasants and soldiers, a workers' front towards a people's government without capitalism, and nothing else.

The question of the workers' front

The workers' front which we are now organizing is far from perfect, so that it still cannot be used as a force which can determine the development of this country.

Our attention has to be drawn to the mass of proletarians, peasants and soldiers. This attention must be given the concrete form of an energetic support of the mass, which holds firmly to the solution (i.e., in the endeavour to solve several problems, the solution of which has become its task).

A permanent compass must be: the unity of action which is a vital question for proletariat, peasants and soldiers. This unity of action — a permanent supporting belt — has to be used so that it can be combined with the political action of criticising the ideology and policy of the national bourgeoisie. In this way the mass of proletarians, peasants and soldiers must be prepared to move towards a people's government without capitalism. The activity of criticising the ideology and policy of the national bourgeoisie must be increased among the mass of proletarians, peasants and soldiers. This activity is needed to realise a sovereign (people's) policy, free from the influence of the bonapartist national bourgeoisie. The system of people's democracy has to be propagated. The weakness of Soekarno's guided democracy must be criticised and the danger of the junta must be fought. We have to be conscious of the necessity to begin the revolutionary activity seriously in a workers' front which embraces that mass of proletarians, peasants and soldiers.

Many of the young intellectuals who are poor or unemployed are attracted by revolutionary work. Along various roads and for various motives, they must be led into a worker's front. For the administration and organization of the Party, the general and specialist schooling of the members, for editing matters and for our relations with the international workers.

Within the context of the return to the Constitution of 1945

The PKI expects much from Soekarno's guided democracy. According to the world of thought of the PKI, Soekarno is needed as a shield against the danger of a junta, and according to the conviction of the PKI the present situation is a period of transition towards a go-tong-rojong cabinet [a solidarity cabinet, cabinet of mutual assistance (note of translator)], where the PKI will also get a place in the government. In order to attain this the PKI already pushes Soekarno forward as the expert on the unity of the Indonesian people, as the only leader who can conquer the present national difficulties. Soekarno's bonapartism seduces the PKI and the PKI welcomes with gladness the concept of a national front under the bonapartist leadership of Soekarno.

We have already explained the point of view of the ACOMA Party in all these matters.

It is clear that under the flag of "back to the womb of the motherland" the counter-revolutionaries join with bureaucratic elements and continue the rôle which they already played in the context of the constitution of 1945.

The antithesis between revolution and counter-revolution will certainly continue in the ensuing period with undiminished sharpness. In the following periods the antithesis between revolution and counter-revolution will certainly continue with undiminished sharpness in the body of the Indonesian Republic.

The sharper the controversies become the clearer is shown that bonapartism is not the way to solve problems. The best blueprint which the National Planning Council can make, cannot be realised to the advantage of the people, even if this road be taken. The ideology of the bourgeoisie cannot be used to advance a just and prosperous society. The recent financial operation of the government, which placed monetary matters above matters of production and distribution, is a sufficiently clear proof. All this forces us all to prepare ourselves for a peoples' government without capitalism.

This road is not an easy one, but it is the only way that can be taken.

Djakarta, 7 October 1959.

*Letter from the International Secretariat of the Fourth International
to the Editorial Staff of "International Socialist Review"*

IN DEFENSE OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

15th April 1960

To the Editorial Staff of
"International Socialist Review,"
theoretical organ of the SWP, New York.

Comrades,

In the article published in your last issue, Spring 1960, signed Shane Mage, entitled: "De Gaulle — a Lesser Evil?", once again your press contains an unqualified attack against the organization which leads the Colonial Revolution in Algeria, the FLN.

This article follows those published on 16, 23, 30 December 1957, and 6th January 1958 in the "Militant", signed Philip Magri, and the more recently published article in the "Militant" of 18th October 1959, also signed Philip Magri. All those scandalously defamatory articles on the FLN, full of glaring inaccuracies, probably come from the same person who "specializes in the Algerian question".

Comrade Patrick O'Daniel replied in due course* to the articles by Philip Magri published in the "Militant".

This detailed and exhaustive response brought to justice amongst other things, the slanders and discrepancies of Magri concerning the "MNA", so-called "left", "socialist", and the FLN, "right" "bourgeois wing", of the Algerian Revolution.

We were convinced after this reply, that with the help of the events, and taking into consideration your good faith, your prolonged silence on this question indicated a change on your part in the appreciation of the Algerian Revolution.

We certainly would have liked the supposed change to have manifested itself in an active way, by concrete and real acts in favour of the Algerian Revolution as it is, and not as revolutionary Marxists would now like it to be. For this reason, we have long ago written of the necessity in this respect to organize also in the United States together with other tendencies and persons, a Committee of Aid for the more than 25,000 Algerian prisoners in France.

The fact that up to now no practical steps have been taken on this suggestion, to which we nevertheless hoped you would be susceptible, and immediately interested in, and the fact that, to the contrary, in your magazine there appears an article such as the one written by Shane Mage, and his version identical with the assertions made by Magri, without any comment or reserve on your part, obliges us to consider that the specialist on the Algerian question largely enjoys your confidence.

Now, the Algerian Revolution and the colonial revolution in general is not a subject for light minded disser-

tations in which everything can be indiscriminately said, and without great consequences. It is a burning problem of the real revolutionary struggle in our days, which should be treated by a revolutionary organization with extreme seriousness and a sharp sense of responsibility.

The positions defended by Magri and Mage, to the degree where it emanates from a "Trotskyist" in an organ which assumes "Trotskyism", can only serve as arms for the enemies of Trotskyism, in circles which know little about the ideas, evolutions and organization of the international Trotskyist movement.

The analogous position of the Lambert group in France, calling itself "Trotskyist", has already considerably damaged the cause of Trotskyism in Algerian revolutionary circles little knowing about the fact that this group, since 1951, had broken with the Fourth International. It is true that your organization has also ceased all collaboration with the Fourth International since 1953, and has even publicly attacked it at various times. But up to now we have refused, and we still refuse, in spite of it, to assimilate it with the Lambert group and we have often attributed these errors of appreciation rather to the lack of precise information and to a tendency towards insufficiently dialectical interpretation of the phenomena of the present international political life.

However, we repeat, a question like that of a colonial revolution in struggle, as is the case of the Algerian revolution, is an extremely grave one, and a serious revolutionary Marxist movement should not be incited to undignified indulgences.

We would like to express the hope once again, and for the last time, that, taking everything into consideration, the specialist on the Algerian question will be severely called to order, and that your magazine and organization will clearly, firmly and unconditionally take a position in favour of the Algerian revolution as it is, in its struggle against French imperialism.

Let us come now to the assertions and "arguments" of Shane Mage. We quote in full:

"At the start of the Algerian revolution the governments of the Fourth Republic refused to negotiate with the Algerian Nationalists. At that time a socialist tendency, the 'Algerian Nationalist Movement' (MNA) was predominant in the Algerian nationalist movement. Concessions to Algerian nationalism, then, would have opened the door to a socialist revolution in which French capitalism would not merely have lost control of the Algerian economy, but would itself have been directly menaced.

"During the past four years however, the FLN, led by former right-wing Algerian politicians like Ferhat Abbas and M'hasid Yazid, has been able to gain complete control of the Algerian Resistance movement. The methods it has used to eliminate

* February 1958, published in the *Fourth International*, No 2, Spring 1958.

the MNA have been those of assassination and slander — but they have succeeded, thanks in large measure to all-out financial support from the Arab States, and political support from the Stalinists and their fellow travellers who have always considered the MNA 'semi-Trotskyist' and thus a major enemy. The victory of the FLN has meant safe bourgeois control of Algerian nationalism and thus dispelled the spectre of socialism*.

We thus come back to the positions of Philip Magri sustained at the end of 1957 and beginning of 1958, in the columns of the "Militant", a rather long time before de Gaulle's coming to power and before the experience obtained afterwards.

Now the position of the "socialist" MNA, led by the very pious and religious Messali Hadj* (who still sports the very good "socialist" Muslim hat on his head) in the matter of de Gaulle and Gaullism, is well-known by all political persons in France and by all those who are even to a small degree acquainted with French realities.

Whilst the FLN, the organization which has led since November 1954, the armed struggle against French imperialism, is naturally still strictly illegal in France, its leaders imprisoned, and its militants also imprisoned, in their thousands, the MNA legally enjoys undeniably scandalous public favours from the new regime!

On the 14th January 1959, de Gaulle decreed the immediate release of Messali Hadj, who had been under surveillance for three years in the villa "Les Liserons" at Belle-Isle-en-Mer, and the Gaullist press now launches him, in a provocative and obvious way, as the future *ideal interlocutor*.

His 1st Lieutenant, Mouley Merbah, already calls him "the man of peace" — a declaration in the papers of January 27th, 1959.

And the "leader" declared: "We shall continue to fight for liberty. In my view the task is to make the French understand the absolute necessity for a *happy solution for everybody in Algeria. It is a tremendous fight . . . my fight. There is an alternative way: the gun. But this fight is too easy, it is not mine!*" ("Paris-Journal" 1959) (Our italics).

The "democratic", "socialist" Messali who has disdained the "too easy fight with the gun", on the contrary, visualizes "the round table" in France, for example, (an "Aix-les-Bains"), around which, "without any exclusive preamble", the representatives of the French government, on the one hand, and all the "Nationalist tendencies" on the other hand, would unite. More precisely, he declares: "As I have proclaimed the necessity to recognize the Algerian personality (!) I have the right to recall that General de Gaulle, and also Guy Mollet, has done the same". ("France-Soir" — 27-1-59) (our italics). He multiplies the statements praising de Gaulle

as "great man", alone capable of "solving the Algerian problem". "It does not matter how, there is in France only General de Gaulle who can organize a solution to the problem. For great times you need great men." ("Fortune Française" 6-3-1959) To the Algerians he propounds for this purpose comprehension towards the Europeans in Algeria and to de Gaulle in France.

"The Europeans in Algeria are our brothers, our compatriots, and we must work hand in hand for the French-Algerian future." ("Le Figaro" 23-1-59) "Through the unity of the Algerian people, we shall show our comprehension of the problem which has been posed, by this unity *we shall facilitate the task of the French Government.*" (ibid.) (Our italics)

And we can quote abundantly from the French press of this epoch, which paints Messali as a ponderous man, a comprehensive man, a man of reconciliation, a man who can teach reason to the Algerian masses — in a word, an interlocutor — not only valuable, but ideal!

At the same time, the illusion is created amongst certain French opinion that Messali represents one of the "tendencies" of the "divided" Algerian national movement, and of course the most "democratic", the most "comprehensive".

In reality, the "democratic" procedure of the "round table" visualized by Messali, besides corresponding to the best intentions of imperialism to reign by division, constitutes the only chance for Messali to see himself consecrated as an interlocutor through the French Government, as, for a long time now, Messali has lost, both in Algeria and in France itself, any important base whatsoever.

With the liberation of Messali, the whole MNA has been brought into prominence by de Gaulle, it benefits by the open support of the police and leads, with more ardour than before, its unique "anti-imperialist" struggle against the FLN.

Messali has installed himself in Chantilly, a suburb of Paris, protected by the police and MNA "militants" organizing themselves as his body-guards against infiltration of "suspect elements". (The French press, 18-1-1959)

On the 22nd February 1959, Messali held a meeting which, according to the Minister of the Interior, "drew about 1,000 North Africans", who came from all over France and had no obstacles put in their way. According to the same Minister, "Messali Hadj's speech reflected a rather subtle political position, in agreement with the ideas which he had already expressed during statements made to the press."

There was no question, according to the Minister, of forbidding this meeting. On the contrary, the French police have taken "the necessary precautions in order to prevent public disorder", whilst protecting the meeting against a possible incursion of the FLN.

The Messalist terrorism against the FLN survives both in France and in Belgium.

On the night of June 23-24, seven young militants of the FLN were assassinated at Villeurbanne.

The Belgian socialist paper "La Gauche" in an article published by the professor Le Greve (against whom "The Red Hand" had just launched an attack) gives in its issue of June 29th ample details about the collaboration between the French police, the Belgian police and MNA against the FLN organization in Belgium.

Other attacks followed, both in France, in Sarre and

* To the question of Jean Lacouture, from the paper "Le Monde" (29-1-1959): "Are you still making Islamism one of the foundations of your doctrine?" the "socialist" Messali replies: "Of course. In political matters you have to start from realities. Now the reality in Algeria is that Islamism is more solid, more alive than ever, and than elsewhere." An assumption which is, moreover, very cheap, as the revolution has de-Islamized the youth to a great extent. To André Luis, who obtained an interview with Messali at Chantilly for the "Cité," a Belgian Catholic paper, the "revolutionary leader" declares: "We are Muslims and, as such, attached to certain ways of seeing things."

elsewhere, perpetrated by the MNA against the FLN in spite of the fact that the attacks were denounced by the latter, whilst constantly appealing to its followers "to exclude all violence, attacks or fights for the solving of conflicting opinions, which may divide them."

"The French government have closed their eyes to the activities of the MNA, the responsible members of which can travel without restriction with the national identity card," reaffirms the responsible group of members of the MNA and of its trade union organizations who went over to the FLN at the end of 1958.

In their public statements dated December 1958 and January 1959, those responsible members gave ample details about the police protection now enjoyed by the MNA in France.

In December 1959, Messali moves to Lille, participates in and speaks at the "congress" of its "trade unions" held there, protected by the French police, etc. etc.

What more is needed in order to understand where the "Tito's" and "Mikhailovitch's" of the Algerian Revolution are? Certainly the FLN is far from representing the proletarian wing of socialist revolution, but incontestably it represents the militant organization which leads the popular Algerian Revolution in its present phase of armed struggle against imperialism.

Shane Mage ironically notes the acceptance by the FLN of the principle of "self-determination" offered by de Gaulle in September 1959, and makes believe that with the compliance of de Gaulle, the FLN has compromised itself by betrayal.

Well informed, this curious specialist even knows that: "In Tripoli the FLN after a three-week meeting reorganized its top leadership. *Dropped were the leaders oriented toward Cairo or Peking — in full control remained the 'Paris' and 'Washington' factions*". (Our italics)

Thus a clear and simple perspective for this informed specialist writing, unhappily for himself, just before the about-turn of de Gaulle, of the imminent de Gaulle-Ferhat Abbas deal, the latter being characterized "the political leader of the FLN".

That the FLN, pressed from all sides and without efficient aid from any side, after six years of struggle, with 600,000 dead, 1,000,000 displaced persons in Algeria, 250,000 refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, more than 25,000 persons imprisoned in France, has accepted the principle of "self-determination", can certainly not be reproached as a "betrayal" and above all, not from the apologists on the side of Messalism, which does not cease to preach its "round table" and "independence" within the French "commonwealth". The FLN have

understood by "self-determination" the freedom to exercise the right of the Algerian people to pronounce its own fate, having confidence that the overwhelming majority of people will choose its independence.

There was never any question that the FLN would accept this right on the terms that the French Army should occupy the country and the Algerian Army should graciously give up its arms.

Whenever the FLN has understood that de Gaulle, under pressure from the Army, withdraws and launches again the "long war", it has immediately replied with the intensification of its own military effort and the creation of the International Brigade, "without distinction of origin".

Thus a new phase of the Algerian Revolution has opened.

We would like to express the hope that your organization, in spite of everything, will reorientate its thinking on the Algerian question, and will give efficient, political, moral and material support to the Algerian Revolution in its struggle against French imperialism. This does not mean the support goes to Ferhat Abbas, the "leader" of the "bourgeois" FLN. It goes to the popular Algerian Revolution, as it is, which has given itself a leadership — the FLN — in which the thousands of young militants of this revolution — peasants, workers, intellectuals — are actively participating, and who are constantly differentiating ideologically to the degree in which the experience of the revolution is ripening and deepening.

What the future of the FLN shall be depends also on the effective aid which the workers of the international movement will give — in time — to the Algerian Revolution.

As for the personal position of Ferhat Abbas in this revolution, one should really be a specialist of the Algerian question, as informed and as serious as Shane Mage, in order to consecrate him as the "political leader" of this revolution. There is, however, a difference between Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj at this stage: the former supports, up to the present, unconditionally, the armed struggle of his people against imperialism, for independence; the latter, protected by de Gaulle in France, leads his Great Fight, without gun, against . . . the FLN. It is a small difference, but in spite of all, not to be neglected, we must avow!

With our communist-internationalist greetings,

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

Africa

SECOND AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

In Conakry, Guinea, from April 11 to 15, the Second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference was held. It was attended by 72 delegations coming from Aden, Algeria, Angola, Basutoland, the USSR, China, Somaliland, Ghana, the Mali Federation, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Vietnam Democratic Republic, the Korean Democratic Republic, Japan, Guinea, Mauritania, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Libya, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, South and North Rhodesias, the Cameroons, Uganda, Ruanda-Urundi, Liberia, Zanzibar, Yemen, Kenya, and other Asian and African countries.

The Conference passed many important resolutions. In a resolution on *Algeria*, it announced its active support to the Algerian people and stated its determination to render the Algerian people all necessary means to realize national independence.

A resolution on *South Africa* strongly condemns the massacre of unarmed South African demonstrators, and demands that all Afro-Asian countries immediately boycott the products of South Africa. June 26th was fixed as the Independence Day of South Africa.

In a resolution on Social Development, emphasis is given to the encouraging growth of the African workers' movement.

A resolution on the struggle against colonialism and imperialism hails the defeats of imperialism in every corner of the world. Nothing can save it from inevitable doom.

In order to face the menace of a Third World War, a conference should be called as quickly as possible. Its first task should be to set up a united front for the liberation of Africa and Asia, to exchange experiences and give maximum aid to the struggling people. Its second task should be to set up an organization to spread information. A third task mentioned is, under appropriate conditions, *to set up an Afro-Asian volunteer corps to help all Afro-Asian people*. The fourth task would be to set up a solidarity fund to aid the Afro-Asian peoples.

Resolutions were also adopted on culture, youth, and economics.



Australia

STATEMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SECTION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

A development significant of the viability of the Fourth International took place today, on April 15, 1960, in Australia.

An 8 hour Conference of the Australian Section admitted to membership all members of a rival group formerly associated with the International Committee.

Also admitted to membership were a number of workers, students and professionals of equally fine calibre.

The Australian Section has a history of activity dating back to the early "thirties." An outline of its successes and vicissitudes was given by the chairman.

It contains competent cadres well integrated in the mass movement and its numbers are now greatly strengthened.

All agreed on the primacy of the entrism orientation while a secondary orientation towards the Communist Party was agreed on, the latter retaining as it does an

important position in the trade union movement.

Plans were laid for the production of a regular organ of the Australian Section and of an entrism paper.

Regular membership meetings were set down and a leadership, a Working Bureau of 7 members, established.

The Australian Section expresses its solidarity with the leadership of our World Party and its National Sections and expresses the hope that the sense of responsibility demonstrated here today will be emulated by other groups whose present isolation from the International resulted from their untenable opposition to its well reasoned theses which have been vindicated by world events.

We are confident that the growing strength and attractive power of the International will bring back into its ranks more serious cadres from the dissidents and will make the approaching World Congress the greatest ever.



Brazil

THE PREPARATION OF THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The leadership of the CP has just issued the "Discussion Thesis" for the 5th Congress. The last Congress was held in 1954, notwithstanding the fact that the line of the 4th Congress has been left aside in 1955 (beginning of the rightist course) and that it had been formally rejected and criticized during the discussion after the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, and especially after the Prestes' document of March 1958 (where the line of alliance with the national bourgeoisie was established).

In Brazil, the CP leadership walks behind the reactionary nationalist candidate Marshal Lott. Lott repeats incessantly that he is, above all, anti-communist. Recently,

on the occasion of his opponent's, Janio Quadros, journey to Cuba, Lott reaffirmed that he is a "moderate" candidate, opposed to the "reformist radicalism of Janio." At the same time, he made another statement that should have gone right to the heart of the CP leadership: he declared himself absolutely hostile to the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, "until the latter had a democratic government, elected by secret ballot, and even then the initiative must come from the Russians."

Janio Quadros, who has the support of the rightist bourgeois opposition, tries to run away from his position as

a candidate representative of the conservative parties, taking advantage of Lott's peculiarities and of the discredit of the Kubitschek government, in order to enforce a break-down inside the nationalist front, and especially taking advantage of the situation confronted by the C.P.

This explains his trip to Cuba, his ever more stressed "leftist" campaign, his declarations in favour of the diplomatic recognition of China, of the U.S.S.R., of the revolutionary Algerian government, in favor of C.P. legality, etc.

The contents of the Thesis do not differ from the line applied by the Party to date. The most they have tried to do is to introduce some order in the midst of the frequently contradictory positions publicly stated by the Party leaders.

In a total amount of 23 pages, 10 are devoted exclusively to the self-criticism made over the last 15 years, a subject which has raised the most different positions among the leaders themselves.

From 1956, self-criticism has been one of the Prestes' leadership's more developed subjects. The reason for this lies in the fact that this leadership, after the XXth Congress, was not able to recover its equilibrium in front of the rank-and-file criticism. It was obliged to recognize more and more "mistakes" in its past, sometimes beyond that which wisdom requires. To codify its self-criticism, to put it in order, with the intention of resisting the rank-and-file, is a pressing need of the leadership.

So, the leadership go on with an endless enumeration of "mistakes," trying to take out of it a line favorable to his ultra-rightist present positions. The method is the common one: it dissociates the real tendencies that had existed inside the Party, and puts them arbitrarily amalgamated, in two sacks: that of the "dogmatism and sectarianism," in one hand, and that of the "revisionism" in the other one.

Thus, the leadership expects to jet discredit upon the resistance to the pro-bourgeois policy, amalgamating it with the abhorred stalinist past, the "manonism," the cult of the personality of Prestes and of Stalin, and the putschism and adventurism from 1948 to 1954. On the other side, it tries to mix up the resistance against the bureaucratic line and the terrorist methods, with the real liquidationist tendencies like that of Agildo Barata.

The pro-bourgeois policy, which goes against reality and against the needs of the working class is the cause of this crisis. The leadership was not free when the support to Lott was decided. It was tied up by a thousand compromises, and in addition there was the situation created by the former line of support to Kubitschek and the "nationalist sector of the government." In fact, the leadership was put in front of the masses by its own line.

The task of the revolutionary Marxists, identified with the workers interests, is to intervene in this crisis in order to open the way to an independent expression of the communist left. This must be not against the party and in favor of another bourgeois experience, but against the party leadership, for an independent and proletarian communist policy, against both bourgeois candidates, for the independent intervention of the mass organizations in the Brazilian political life, for a worker candidate to the Presidency of the Republic, supported by a front of the C.P., the trade-unions, the peasants' leagues and the students' associations.

The Brazilian Trotskyists, as a well-known tendency in the workers' movement, fight for their right to intervene in the discussion and in the Congress itself, as well as for the right of all the excluded tendencies which maintain their fidelity to communism.

April 1960



Ceylon

TOWARDS NEW ELECTIONS

The results of the elections of March 1960 were, to a great extent, unexpected.

The United National Party gained one-third of the seats, whilst the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, that of the assassinated former Prime-Minister, Bandaranaike, gained about another third. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International, only obtained ten seats: but it has brought its votes from about 274,000 in 1956 up to 324,000 (being 10% of the total). The Party of the former Trotskyist, Philip Gunewardene, obtained the same number of seats and votes as the L.S.S.P., whilst the Ceylonese Communist Party obtained three seats and about 146,000 votes.

The polarization which was expected between the right and the extreme left, with a dislocation of the Center Parties — and especially of the S.L.F.P. — has not taken place.

On the contrary, the latter Party has shown a notable vitality, only provisionally, it is true, due to the difficult, but not at all critical economic conditions, and also due to the insufficient experience acquired by its clients, the

peasant masses and petty-bourgeois masses of the city, of the bourgeois class character of this Party.

In the light of these results, the International Secretariat of the Fourth International has considered it necessary to suggest, in a letter addressed to the leadership of the L.S.S.P., the necessity for a profound examination of the reasons which determined the non-verification of the perspectives of the Party and of the International, concerning the chances of the Party in the elections. The formation of an homogeneous U.N.P. government has not been able to survive the vote of confidence in the new Parliament.

Hereafter, the right, in agreement with its protectors and advisors of imperialism, has decided to proceed to new elections in July next, in which it hopes to obtain an even greater victory.

It would be rather dangerous, however, for the Workers' Parties to restrict themselves to the framework of the parliamentary aims and not look for a new, effective contact with the masses, through vigorous, extra-parliamentary activity among the worker and peasant masses; and at an electoral policy which puts forward a radical programme to be realized by the United Front of the Parties which claim to be working class.



Chile

THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITIZATION OF THE WORKERS

The last municipal elections of April 3rd, 1960, have shown an increase in the votes for the Socialist and Communist Parties, as compared with the municipal elections of 1956.

The Socialist Party won 112,000 votes (approximately 80,000 in 1956), the Communist Party 113,400.

The workers' parties cannot present themselves as FRAP (United Front) in these elections because an electoral law prohibits electoral alliances — a law which was expressly aimed at preventing the FRAP in order to weaken the chances of the workers' parties in this last election and in the next one.

The total number of votes of the parties which constitute the FRAP amount to about 280,000. The Liberals and Conservatives won approximately 300,000 votes; the Radicals 283,000, and the Christian Democrats 224,000. That means that, with the exception of the Radicals, whose votes were raised by nearly 90,000, all the other parties obtained less votes than in the last presidential election.

The Partido Obrero Revolucionario Trotskista (Revolutionary Workers' Party) has given its support to the Socialist Party, and has organized a campaign to put up FRAP candidates only, without bothering about the reactionary election regulations. It can be done by supporting the candidates of the Communist or Socialist parties, and by presenting them as FRAP candidates.

This position was widely accepted by the rank and file of both parties, but rejected by its leadership.

The Partido Obrero Revolucionario gave its support to the Socialist Party because it is more to the left of the Communist Party; and in some places, for instance, Concepción, the POR and the Socialist Party worked dynamically together in a broad front. This brought about great sympathy and fraternity among the militants of both parties. The POR-supported candidates emphasized at meetings and in radio speeches the co-operation and support of the Trotskyists.

It is essential to say, in addition, that the 230,000 votes of the Communist and Socialist Parties are as significant as the 365,000 obtained by Allende. It is the highest number of votes which the Communist and Socialist Parties ever received as separate parties.

The votes for the Socialist and Communist Parties show the elevation and maturation of the political consciousness of a vast sector of the working class and the masses. Here we have a vanguard which has reached one of the highest political and revolutionary levels in Latin America — a level which is expressed in the existence and the strengthening of the Workers' Front in the form of the FRAP and CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores — Chilean Trade Union Central); in the resolutions of the last National Congress of the Socialist Party; and in the great degree of receptiveness of the workers' parties towards Trotskyist positions and policies.

It must be stated too, that the FRAP and the workers' parties are handicapped by the reactionary electoral system: that is to say, qualified vote and voluntary registration — which eliminated more than one million voters from the electoral registers: voters who belong to the poor and exploited layers of the population. And now, in addition, the workers' parties are also handicapped by the ban on electoral alliances.

As a whole, the petty-bourgeoisie voted almost exclusively for the Radicals and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats are in opposition to the reactionary government of Alessandri; and the Radicals, at the last minute, adopted a demagogical line of opposition to the governmental policy of a wage and salary freeze. But at the same time, the petty-bourgeoisie has a combative attitude in the social field. So their vote for the bourgeois opposition parties is due, to a great extent, to the lack of influence of the FRAP in these circles, owing to the lack of a consistent anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist policy of the workers' leaderships.

In conclusion, we can say that the municipal elections have expressed the continuation of the process of polarization of the social forces. They show that the vanguard of the masses, organized and concentrated around the workers' parties, is sufficiently strong and conscious to push ahead in the fight for a workers' solution of the crisis of the country, with a FRAP-CUT Government as its goal.

E P

April 1960



Cuba

REORGANIZATION OF THE CUBAN POR AND FIRST ISSUE OF "VOZ PROLETARIA"

In the city of Guantanamo, Oriente, Cuba, on the basis of the old Trotskyist movement, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario has been constituted and has asked the International Secretariat and the Latin American Bureau to recognize it as the official section of the Fourth International.

Amongst the comrades who comprise the branch of Guantanamo is a comrade who was a founder of the Cuban CP, and who later on started the Left Opposition which, through a profound programmatic and ideological struggle, produced a serious split in the CP, and on the basis of the best working class cadres, constituted in 1934 the Partido Bolchevique Leninista, which then took the name of Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers Party).

Separated from the international Trotskyist movement during the entire period of the war and during the post-war revolutionary process, the POR suffered a series of crises which led to its isolation from the revolutionary

process ripening amongst the Cuban people under the régime of Batista.

But if the party as such did not play a role, many militants (including most of the comrades who started the POR), participated actively in the armed struggle of the Cuban people. They were among the expeditionaries of the "Gramma," amongst the guerilla fighters of Sierra Maestra, and they helped to organize sabotage. They participated in the working out of the economic and political theses of the Movement of the 26th July; in the militant and political organizations, by conducting education courses, and in the illegal work. Many of them, because the Party was not functioning during that period, joined the Movement of the 26th July, occupying leading posts.

Other comrades, in trade union positions, led workers' actions of great importance, especially amongst the railway workers.

The POR opened its permanent headquarters in Guantanamo, with a successful public meeting. The first number

of *Uoz Proletaria* (Proletarian Voice) has appeared, as the national organ of the P O R.

The P O R has strong links with the left wing of the Cuban revolution, in the trade unions and in the Movement of the 26th July, and with the left militant cadres of the Movement of the 26th July organized in the section "Acción y Sabotaje" who played a decisive and fundamental role in the struggle against Batista. In its principal leading circles, this vanguard belongs to the youth who, in 1953, were expelled from the Communist Party for "revisionism" and "Trotskyism," and who, today, study

Trotskyist literature, defend it and read it over the radio, in courses, etc.

The Cuban P O R, another new section of the Fourth International that will be present in the coming Sixth World Congress, has great perspectives of national development, rooted as it is in the workers and peasants movement, in the revolutionary youth and in the women's and housing movements. Thus, it has to play and has already begun to do so, a decisive vanguard role in the whole process of the Cuban Revolution.



Holland

ANTON PANNEKOEK HAS DIED

In Wageningen, on April 28, *Anton Pannekoek* died at the age of 87 years. Though almost forgotten by the younger generations, for many years he had been an internationally known Marxist theoretician, especially before the First World War.

In 1902 he entered the Dutch Social-Democratic Workers Party (S D A P), and soon (together with Wijnkoop, Gorter, Henriëtte Roland Holst, Frank van der Goes et al) belonged to its Marxist left wing.

In 1906 he was appointed as a teacher at the Central Party School (Zentrale Parteischule) of the SPD, the German social-democratic party, and later on at the Arbeiter Hochschule (Workers University) of the same party in Bremen. In those years, as a teacher of the working class cadres, he worked under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg.

He contributed to the German Marxist theoretical magazine *Die Neue Zeit*, and polemiced with Karl Kautsky about the question of the State, a discussion quoted by Lenin in *State and Revolution* in a way which was favorable to Anton Pannekoek. In this book, Lenin wrote about him:

"Pannekoek acted against Kautsky as a representative of that "left radical" tendency which counted in its ranks Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek and others, and which, as a representative of revolutionary tactics, was united in the conviction that Kautsky was going over to the "Zentrum" and that he was unprincipledly wavering between Marxism and opportunism. The correctness of this opinion was completely confirmed by the war, when the tendency of the "Zentrum" (which by mistake was called Marxist) of "Kautskyanism," exposed itself in its full horrible misery."

(Translated from the German edition)

During the First World War, Anton Pannekoek remained an internationalist. In 1919 he joined the Communist International. He participated in the left-wing tendency, developed by Gorter, which was criticized by Lenin and Trotsky at the Second World Congress of the Communist International, and by Lenin in his book on "Left Wing Communism." In 1922 Pannekoek left the Third International, and, in reality, gave up his activity as a militant communist, whilst dedicating himself completely to his scientific work as an astronomer, in which field he also distinguished himself internationally.

He still wrote some ultra-left books. Under the name of Horner he attacked "Lenin as a philosopher." In this book he tried to deny the working class character of the Soviet Union.

When Sneevliet, in 1936 — during the infamous Moscow Trials — asked Pannekoek to come out in defence of Leon D Trotsky, Pannekoek refused to do so with the argument "that the revolutionary honour of Trotsky could not be smeared by the Trials." It was then the well known communist mathematician *Mannoury* who, in Holland, was at the head of those revolutionary intellectuals who fought against the Stalinist slanders against Leon Trotsky and the Bolshevik Old Guard.

Anton Pannekoek was a typical representative of the Dutch Marxist school, about which Karl Kautsky, still being a revolutionary Marxist, once jokingly said to Henriëtte Roland Holst, that he had set his hope in the Russian and Dutch Marxists. Having lost its intimate ties with German Marxism, however, in 1914, after the collapse of German social-democracy, the Dutch Marxist school began to develop a series of peculiarities, in which dogmatism began to predominate and which finally led to its desintegration.

Henriëtte Roland Holst, who once belonged to those Marxist intellectuals, tried to explain their fate in poetical words by the contradiction between the broad horizons of their flat country and the narrowness of its frontiers. As long as the problems of Revolution belonged to the domaine of theory, the school, represented by Pannekoek, was able to understand. It had no profound roots, however, in the world of catastrophes and revolutions, which began with the First World War, and which had only feeble echoes in a country like Holland. At that moment, Kautsky's words appeared to be prophetic as regards Russian Marxism (though Kautsky had become a renegade then), and a joke as regards the Dutch Marxists.

But even in a joke, there is an element of truth. Before and during the First World War, the Dutch school made a valuable contribution to international Marxism: before the war by its fight against revisionism, during the war by its internationalism and by its solidarity with the Russian Revolution.

The degeneration of Marxist theory and practice under Stalin, delivered the final blow to the Dutch Marxist school. It was the Russian "school," led by Leon D Trotsky, which profoundly understood the ups and downs of Revolution, and which laid the basis for the victorious revival of revolutionary Marxism on a world scale, as it is embodied now in the programme and practice of the Fourth International.

This fact does not diminish the duty of the Fourth International to pay a last tribute to the memory of Anton Pannekoek, who dedicated the most fruitful part of his life to the defence of revolutionary Marxism.

SAL S.



India

KERALA ELECTION SHOWS SHARP POLARIZATION OF FORCES

by HIMOO KALANI

So the die is cast. The dust and fury of the months preceding the election in Kerala have subsided, even if temporarily. The post-election party alignments in this problem state have now emerged clearly. To understand the political situation in Kerala today as well as to anticipate its possible future orientation, one must attempt an objective analysis of the election results, leaving aside one's political sympathies and antipathies for the time being.

One thing about the Kerala election that strikes us at the very outset is the normally high level of polling. About 80-90 percent voters participated in this poll.

Of the 126 seats of which the new Kerala Legislature will be composed, the CP has gained, together with its "independent" allies, only 29 seats, the United Democratic Front, comprising the Congress, Praja Socialist Party and the Muslim League, has obtained a crushing majority of 94 seats (Congress, 63; PSP, 20; Muslim League, 11). The other 3 seats were shared each by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Karnatic Samity and an unaffiliated independent. The following table shows the votes received by the major parties in the 1957 and in the 1960 elections:

TABLE I

Total votes polled (1960)	8,200,000				
Total votes polled (1957)	5,900,000				
	Congress	PSP	ML	Combined C-PSP-ML	%
					votes polled
1960:	2,791,294	1,146,029	399,928	4,337,251	52.8
					3,550,136 (43.3%)
1957:	2,209,251	528,261	205,698	3,043,210	51.5
					2,308,408 (39 %)

It appears from the above table the CP and its UDF opponents got 96% of the total votes polled and 123 seats out of 126. The other parties were virtually wiped out. The whole population of Kerala seems to have divided into two camps, supporters of the CP on the one hand and their bitterest opponents on the other hand, thus showing a sharp polarization of forces.

In this election the CP and CP-supported Independents contested 125 seats, lost 96 of them and gained only 29. (In the old Assembly they commanded 65 seats) Even if we add to it the 11 seats which the CP lost by a margin of less than 1000 votes the number of CP controlled seats could not exceed 40; for an absolute majority they would still require 24 more seats in a House of 126. How can the CP explain the loss of so many seats by such a large margin (ie more than 1000 votes)? Besides their political prestige has slumped heavily due to the defeat of 7 ministers of the old ministry; only 4 Ministers, including Premier E M S Namboodiripad, could manage to get elected.

The Riddle of Increased CP votes

Political observers have already noticed an apparently paradoxical phenomena evident in this election. Although the CP's performance has been very poor so far as the gaining of seats is concerned, they have succeeded in getting not only 12 lakhs of more votes in this election (compared to 1957 election) but have actually improved their relative position vis-a-vis the UDF parties. An examination of Table I would clearly show this. While the Congress — PSP — ML votes recorded an increase of only 1.3%, the CP votes rose by 4.3%. How to explain these two apparently contradictory facts?

One explanation immediately offers itself. Compared to the 1957 election, there has been a sharp increase in the number of straight contests in this election, due to the UDF alliance. The CP lost much of the advantage it enjoyed last time due to the splitting of the non-CP votes. (See Table II)

The fact that the CP had to face straight contests in 42 more seats than the last time certainly contributed substantially to its defeat. Even so, the assumption of some of the Newspaper Correspondents, visiting Kerala during the election, that the CP's defeat has been mainly due to this factor, appears to provide an oversimplified explanation of a much more complicated situation.

The above assumption may be contested on two very important grounds: First, it may be held that the increase in CP votes is partly explainable by the fact that the CP contested 125 seats in 1960, compared to 100 seats in 1957. Thus, the increased vote may very well indicate an actual recording of the potential CP sympathisers of 1957, and not a real increase of new adherents.

Secondly, if the CP has lost mainly because of the combination of all the opposition votes, then how to explain the loss of 18 seats (out of 34) which the CP won in 1957 by absolute majority. Another significant fact to be noted in this connection is the drastic reduction in the margin of votes, even where the CP candidates have won, except certain isolated areas like Palghat and Calicut. Some notable examples will illustrate this point. Five of the defeated CP ministers lost their seats which they held last time by absolute majority, while the Revenue Minister Mrs K R Gouri, although returned, had her margin of votes reduced by half in 1960. All the above facts testify to a serious loss of CP's influence among a substantial section of the Kerala people, even in areas that were once CP strongholds, such as Quilon, Alleppey and Trichur. The last two columns in Table III amply bear this out. They show the increase in the total votes and increase in CP votes, only for those seats which the CP contested both in the 1957 and the 1960 elections. It clearly demonstrates that the increased polling benefited everywhere the anti-CP forces; only in Palghat and Calicut the majority of the increased votes went to the CP.

The following table, which shows district-wise election results, gives a deeper insight into the situation, indicating how the CP lost and the PDF reaction gained in the different districts.

TABLE II

	Number of Contestants for a single seat		
	2	3	More than 3
1960:	63	34	9
1957:	21	58	35

One significant feature of this election is the universal defeat of the CP candidates in all the urban centres ie in all the district headquarter towns of the above 9 districts as well as in 4 other important towns — Changanacherry, Mattancherry, Fort Cochin and Tellicherry. The relatively higher level of political activity among the urban people which generally operates in favor of the leftists and against the Congress in other parts of India, is here found to operate against the CP. In Quilon where there are many cashew nut factories and mineral industries and in Alleppey which is an industrial area, possessing numerous coir factories, the CP has suffered major reverses. In Alleppey, they lost 3 seats, including one held by the labor minister T V Thomas. This reflects undoubtedly the popular verdict on the anti-labor policies of the CP ministry. Comparatively, they have gained greater votes in rural areas.

This is partly due to the selfish political thinking of the rural people and may be partly due to some of the progressive features of the Agrarian Bill and other land reforms enacted by them.

Brightest spot

The brightest spot in CP's election record is provided by that CP bastion — Palghat. Although even in this district, they have suffered a net loss of one seat (losing 2 old seats and gaining a new one) their percentage of votes has increased enormously from 45% of total votes to 54%, an absolute majority in the district as a whole. (See also Table III, last 2 columns.)

Thus, when we consider all the relevant facts, mentioned above, we come nearer to solving the riddle of CP's utter defeat in the election, matched by a higher percentage of votes. This is due mainly to two factors: contesting of more seats (25% more) and intensive working of certain areas, mostly rural, as in Palghat, side by side with a uniform activity maintained throughout the state, as reflected in higher CP votes almost everywhere within the State. The 1960 election has definitely proved CP to be, still, the strongest party in the State, taken singly. In the 1951-52 election, the Congress and the PSP got 35.5% and 14.3% votes respectively; in 1960, the votes are again 34.2% and 14%. In the meantime the CP votes have steadily increased from 23% to 43%. These figures sufficiently speak for themselves.

Why Reaction Triumphed?

The Kerala election came as a sequel to the so called "Liberation Struggle" unleashed last July by the reactionary leadership of Congress, the Communal Nair Service Society and the Muslim League, the Catholic Church and the opportunist P S P. During this election, this alliance became more consolidated. All the reactionary forces and

vested interest groups in Kerala and outside combined together in a determined move to rout out the CP from the soil of Kerala. Unlimited resources — financial, organisational and political — were mobilised to save "democracy" against "communism." Against such formidable odds, the CP's organisational performance is quite impressive.

But it could have been much better, had not the CP ministry antagonized the masses by its criminal planter and anti-working class policv. Even in regard to the last July movement, they should have followed a dual policy, displaying an attitude of understanding and conciliation towards the masses engaged in the movement and a stern attitude towards the reactionary leaders of that movement. What the CP ministry did was exactly the reverse. Motivated by cowardice, they adopted the softest attitude towards their leaders for fear of incurring the displeasure of their mentor, the Nehru Government, while in relation to the masses themselves who responded to the call of these very leaders they gave a free hand to the trigger happy police, knowing fully well that the Nehru Government itself being a party to indiscriminate outrages against the people all over India, would not take any exception to it.

It is particularly noteworthy that the constituencies where the CP suffered worst defeats are precisely the places that witnessed the most brutal police atrocities against the people. (See Table III). Thus in Trivandrum where in last July, two CP ministers were defeated and the party could retain only 2 seats out of 8. Similar is the case with the labor dominated districts of Alleppey and Quilon. In Ernakulam a few persons died owing to firing during the July movement and look at the election result there. In Trichur which was once a CP-stronghold, 2 ministers were defeated and only 1 seat was retained out of 8. The lessons of all this are obvious for the CP ranks.

TABLE III

District	No. of seats	Congress		P S P		M L		C P		Increase in Votes	
		1957	1960	1957	1960	1957	1960	1957	1960	Total	C P votes
Trivandrum	12	1	2	3	7	x	x	8	2	189,589	91,663
Quilon	14	4	6	x	3	x	x	10	4	192,907	76,614
Alleppey	14	5	8	x	x	x	x	9	6	159,624	55,011
Kottayam	13	9	10	1	1	x	x	3	2	229,705	62,102
Ernakulam	14	9	13	x	x	x	x	5	1	180,238	73,039
Trichur	12	3	9	1	2	x	x	8	1	203,120	57,161
Palghat	15	3	2	x	x	1	3	11	10	256,350	161,838
Calicut	20	8	7	2	4	7	8	3	1	212,812	133,113
Cannanore	12	1	6	2	3	x	x	8	2	214,283	88,422



Indonesia

THE SITUATION TODAY

The following report from Jakarta by Comrade Ibnu Parna casts some fresh light upon Soekarno's adventures in "guided democracy."

The failure of the national bourgeoisie in its struggle to create a national capitalist society in Indonesia has not yet reached the stage where the working class comes to the forefront. This situation offers the possibility for left-wing bourgeois groups to maintain themselves legally in power by means of a return to the Constitution of 1945, with the slogan "Socialism in Indonesia," erected into a system dubbed "guided democracy" and "guided economy," under the leadership of President Soekarno.

The legal powers invoked are those which are placed in the hands of the President in a situation where the country is already declared to be in a state of war. The

armed forces become and are constituted as the main supporting power. Every proposal by Soekarno is accepted as a command from the President as Chief of the Armed Forces, the highest military authority, who must be obeyed. On the other hand, high officers in the Armed Forces, as a compensation, are given the opportunity to exercise important civil functions in the sphere of governmental or economic organizations. There are now five generals in Soekarno's cabinet, and many highly placed members of the Armed Forces have obtained posts as directors of state enterprises, while several military men have been named governors of provinces.

The parties have been put under heavy pressure, and by now an anti-party atmosphere has been created. It is now forbidden to high civil servants, staff personnel of state and semi-state enterprises, to be members of politi-

cal parties. It has also been decided that the President has the power to demand an investigation into the administration and finances of the parties. Several measures have been taken to liquidate existing small parties, and certain conditions set up for a party's obtaining legal recognition. On March 6th President Soekarno took measures even to put an end to the activities and functions of members of parliament. It has, furthermore, become everyday news when newspapers undergo the fate of being banned for a certain period.

Confronted by these measures of President Soekarno, the big parties, such as the PNI (National Party of Indonesia), the Masjumi, the NU (Nahdatul Ulama), and the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia), are visibly at a loss. This fact heightens the prestige of President Soekarno and lowers that of the four above-mentioned big parties. Around this strong position President Soekarno is directly assembling what is called "the 1945 generation" (the forces which took the initiative of launching the Declaration of Independence at the beginning of the revolution), who want to be the nucleus of the National Front, which — according to what it is being said — will be led directly by Soekarno himself. By these steps Soekarno will evidently cause internal contradictions in the big parties, and will draw to his side the important people of the small parties and eminent non-party personalities.

Khrushchev's arrival in Indonesia strengthened Soekarno's position. Several times Soekarno exalted Khrushchev as a symbol of world peace, of the anti-colonial struggle, of the struggle of society on its way to justice and prosperity. On the other hand, the Soviet Premier continually called President Soekarno his friend and gave him a guarantee that the Soviet Union is on his side in all eventualities.

In short, in the upper social layers, authority is shifting from the leaders of the big parties to President Soekarno. In the lower social layers, on the other hand, the economic difficulties which confront the mass of the people with rising prices, and the production shortage, provide Soekarno's enemies with perfect material for agitation. In the present stage, the people of Indonesia face absolute power in the hands of President Soekarno, which afterwards will be followed by or combined with internal contradictions in the Soekarno bloc — as a result of the practical concerning particularly the economy, that have to be overcome. These contradictions existed from the beginning, but now have begun to emerge more clearly.

As of today the position of our Partai Acoma is not yet

strong enough so that it can hope to intervene to produce a change in the decreasing influence of parties; we are seeking the way to put a stop to the attempt to liquidate the small parties — a liquidation that Soekarno is carrying out within the framework of what is called "simplification of the party-system." It is certainly not impossible that at any moment President Soekarno could appear with a decree to abolish parties. The ABC of Communism can give us in fact sufficient suggestions as to what ought to be done in this situation in the immediate future.

In order to consolidate workers' policy and to mobilize social consciousness, the Partai Acoma is putting forward a transitional programme. In so doing, it is fully conscious of the decreasing influence of the big parties, and of the increasingly wide-scale concentration of power in Soekarno's hands accompanied by the development of internal contradictions in the Soekarno bloc. Some of the main points of the transitional programme follow:

1) To drive "guided democracy," based on the personal influence of President Soekarno, up to the level of a democracy based on the mass of the people.

2) To transform the "guided economy," ruled by the bureaucrats, into a genuine planned economy, organized by a Production Council, where the technical and political know-how of the workers can be combined and developed in an authentic way.

3) To put an end to the authorities' habit of trying to overcome social contradictions by means of exclusively administrative solutions.

4) To engender revolutionary initiative by killing the germs of the personality cult, by eliminating its characteristics of "super-authority" and "the war lord," and by eradicating "bapakisme," the custom of obediently following "the" leader.

5) To set up one single Trade-Union Federation, an authentic labor organization free from the influence of the nationalist bureaucracy, an organization that can be critical of and take corrective measures against, the authorities and functionaries during the rise towards a socialist society.

6) To spread the slogans that bring the working people together in the spheres of politics, economics, and defense.

7) To link the militia up with the fate and well-being of production in order to protect economic objects in town and village, by means of guarding and strengthening the potential resources of the working people that are being brought into question.

Jakarta, March 1960



Uruguay

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY

The deepening of the crisis and of the mass struggles in Latin America, has had great repercussions in the workers' parties. The XXXII Congress of the Socialist Party (in January) decided to walk out of the Second International and also to adopt a line of construction of a "Left Front" "without Communists and Trotskyists," but almost half the Congress pronounced itself in favor of the Workers

Front. Afterwards, in the elections for the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party, the left wing obtained nine seats over fifteen, including three workers leaders. The new General Secretary of the CP is Trias, "theoretician" of the left wing, who, in a very distorted way, gives in to the pressures of the developments of the colonial revolution.

NEW PUBLICATIONS OF TROTSKY'S BOOKS

In *Denmark*, the publishing house Borgen-Forlag (Copenhagen) has published a Danish translation of Leo D Trotsky's book "The Revolution Betrayed" under the title "Revolutionen Forradt." It has been translated by the well known Danish Marxist Georg Moltved, who also wrote an adequate preface.

In *Italy* and *Greece*, Trotsky's Diary has been published, and has aroused great interest in both countries.

In *Germany* a (briefly abridged) paperback edition has appeared of Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution, from the publishing house S Fischer-Verlag, Frankfurt—Berlin.

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