



# INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

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INTERNATIONAL NEWS

WINTER 1959-1960

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# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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## Editorial

### THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

So there is to be a "summit" conference next May, after all. On top of one postponement after another, a date has now been fixed at last.

But we are already warned that the match in May will not be a pushover; that rather modest results are to be expected, that this will be in reality more of a prelude to other "summit" conferences than a meeting which will settle anything.

The positive aspect of developments, more particularly since Khrushchev's journey to the United States and the conversations at Camp David, consists apparently in the renewed East-West contact, the suspension of ultimatums, the relaxation of tension and the continuation of talks.

This attempted "détente" is in reality based on some kind of mutual misunderstanding which threatens to vanish more quickly than might be supposed.

The Kremlin continues to believe that the superiority acquired by the USSR in the field of atomic weapons, which will increase still more in the years to come, cannot but oblige the imperialist camp to consent to a reduction of armaments; and, above all, to the neutralization of Berlin, now an imperialist outpost in the Soviet zone. This would consolidate the division of Germany in east Germany's favor.

Khrushchev counts on coming to Paris in May to obtain a compromise on Berlin in accordance with this point of view, without this question being linked with the unification of Germany. It is not excluded, however, that he will again fail before de Gaulle's refusal to yield on Berlin (supporting Adenauer), and the Americans, who otherwise fear the dislocation of the Atlantic alliance. Then it will be up to the Kremlin to make up its mind on the course to follow in the face of this impasse: whether to grant the Atlantic powers

further time to reflect, or to proceed to a separate peace treaty with east Germany.

In the latter case, the stormy summer feared for 1959 should arrive a year late.

In spite of that, the imperialists are counting on being able to keep up the dialogue with the Kremlin thanks to proposals on the reduction of armaments. The insane competition which is now being carried on in this field, if it endangers the economic plans of the USSR and its ability to help the other workers' states and the under-developed countries, is also beginning equally to jeopardize the financial capacity even of a country like the United States, and to swallow up the sums remaining at its disposal for "peaceful competition" in the under-developed countries. But it remains to be seen whether the Kremlin will accept that disarmament take precedence over, or be granted instead of, the compromise it wants on Berlin.

In the meanwhile the laborious "summit" preparations have revealed some very interesting indications of certain new realities in the international situation which are going to characterize the decade into which we are now entering. The decade just ended, initiated by the historic defeat of American imperialism in Korea, and ending with the obvious superiority of the USSR in inter-continental and even inter-planetary atomic weapons, has to some extent set the seal on the decay of the formerly indisputable supremacy of the U.S.

This supremacy is now challenged right inside the Atlantic "partnership" by the new, rising capitalist power: the Franco-German alliance which dominates the Common Market.

The relative decline in American power is reflected on the economic as well as the military and international planes.

The United States' share in world trade is de-

creasing, to the benefit of Germany, Japan and the workers' states.

Certain exports have gone into a marked decline since 1958, especially cars, steel, planes, ships — cut out by the products of other capitalist countries, or even by those of American firms based in Europe or Japan.

But most of all it is the financial situation which is beginning to exercise the American leaders, and which reflects the relative decline in the field of economic productivity properly so called and, at the same time, the boundless extension of the unproductive economics of armaments and military expenses in general.

Since the last quarter of 1957, the USA has been running a deficit in its balance of payments: \$3 billion in 1958; more than \$4 billion in 1959. Its foreign liabilities, on the other hand, rose to some \$15 billion: a sum which, when added to the deficit in the balance of payments, about equals the total reserves of the country.

At the beginning of the past decade, moreover, the reserves exceeded by about \$15 billion the total liabilities of the country. In 1955 the surplus was of the order of only \$10 billion, and in 1959 it was almost nothing.

Under these conditions it becomes impossible even for the United States to be at one and the same time the "banker" and the "arsenal" of the capitalist world.

Whence the severe and oft-repeated warnings from Washington to its Atlantic partners to contribute more military expenditure, and to make plans to pool the resources at their disposal for the "help" of the under-developed countries. For the United States to maintain the armaments race and its international obligations, it will be forced to make severe cuts in the living standards of the American masses.

The titanic struggle at present being waged against the solid ranks of the steelworkers falls into this pattern.

\*

On the strictly military level, the advance achieved by the Soviet Union in the field of guided missiles, submarines, and even anti-aircraft defense is already big and quite probably irreversible.

In these circumstances it is no wonder that other, developing capitalist powers contest the supremacy, until recently well-established, of the United States within the Atlantic alliance. The main challenger is now the Franco-German partnership which dominates the Common Market, and whose ambition is to become the spokesman for the whole of continental capitalist Europe.

Whatever the future of this partnership and of the Common Market, it is a fact that we now

have to deal with a new capitalist power in the full course of its dynamic expansion. The Common Market is already the greatest exporter of finished goods and the greatest consumer of agricultural products in the world.

Inside the Six, trade has already doubled over the past five years, which cannot be said of any other region in the world.

On the other hand, from 1953, the output per head in this region increased two and a half times as much as in Britain, and much more rapidly than in the United States.

To this actual and potential power they plan to associate France's African empire, loosened and formally "de-colonized," which is the basis for French claims for an Atlantic triumvirate, a readjustment of NATO, and a firm policy on Berlin. Franco-German coöperation in all these fields, including Europe's acquisition of its own atomic striking-power, is now close, in spite of differences, which still remain, between Paris and Bonn on their international economic orientation and their military obligations flowing from the Atlantic alliance. The French and the Germans want a deciding voice on all the issues concerning Europe, and as a consequence on Berlin.

They also want military integration into NATO to be total, that is to say that decisions, including the deployment of the US Strategic Air Force, should be taken with their effective participation.

For the risk threatening the European power is to see itself exposed to atomic destruction, without American striking-power being completely committed in the battle, for fear of courting Soviet reprisals on the very soil of the United States.

De Gaulle has already argued this hypothesis clearly: however far-fetched, not to say absurd, it might seem at the present time.

But the decision, which now seems irrevocable, of the Franco-German alliance, to provide itself with its own atomic power, far from diminishing this danger, will only render the international situation more explosive, justifying all the fears and eventual steps of the USSR.

In this new relationship of forces now in process of being established within the capitalist world, it is Britain which risks being relegated progressively to the third, if not the fourth, rank, coming after the United States, continental Europe and even Japan.

The painful choice forced upon her with the creation of the Common Market and its growing attraction for the zone of the Seven in the Free Trade Area, is illustrative of the long-term deterioration in British power. While the Six "Europeans" trade more with each other than with the Seven, the latter export more to the Six than among themselves.

It is hardly probable that Britain will be able for long to sustain an economic war against the Six, especially in the event of a heightened commercial offensive from the United States, determined to arrest the deterioration in its balance of payments and the beginning of its eviction, still however slight, from foreign markets.

In the equally probable event, on the other hand, of a new rise in the prices of raw materials, Britain could find that it is the first to suffer and is in the most unfavorable position to compete with the other capitalist powers.

For all these reasons efforts are now being made to avoid an economic war to the death within the Atlantic alliance, which, added to the existing political differences, could very well provoke a de facto dislocation of the alliance.

Imperialism, moreover, cannot now permit itself this luxury, without running the certain risk of a still more serious defeat in face of the growing strength of the U S S R, China, the other workers' states and the colonial revolution.

The decade now opening will prove much more decisive so far as the competition between the two systems is concerned.

Imperialism enters this period in a condition characterized by the rebuilding of its economic power. This has even largely surpassed the pre-war level — thanks to the tremendous technological progress; to the stimulants to accumulation provided by European reconstruction; the advanced industrialization of the huge under-developed areas, in the dependent and colonial countries as well as in Europe itself; and by the immeasurable extension of the armaments economy, especially in the U S.

It is now possible that these stimulants are declining, and that capitalism will, in the decade now beginning, have to confront the classic difficulties of the past: relative saturation of the market in the face of new progress in productivity; increased competition between the capitalist powers; recessions and crises more frequent and more profound. But as it will have, on the other hand, to face the more rapid, and especially the continuous, economic development of the workers' states and increasing economic competition from them in the field of the under-developed countries — that is to say the most vital market for capitalism — it will be compelled constantly to find compromise inter-capitalist solutions to safeguard some reasonable chances for survival. Since the stimulant, both of European reconstruction and the armaments economy seem now to be largely exhausted, there remains in reality only the way out of so-called "aid" to the under-developed countries on a large scale and in a

semi-planned way. Besides, this enterprise does not have an exclusively economic aspect.

It represents at the same time the only theoretical chance for capitalism to prevent these countries in the coming years from exploding in revolution under the pressure of their growing population and their economic development, insufficient to keep pace with this increase in population. It should be recognized that the competition into which capitalism is forced when confronted by the dynamic development of the socialist world system, acts at the same time as a stimulant prolonging its survival. This is thanks to some tentative attempts at a certain coördination of its action on a world plane, to an increased productive effort, to the acquisition of a measure of supranational class consciousness. But it remains to be seen to what extent this kind of inter-capitalist economic and political "planning" will be in a position partially to overcome the structural contradictions and antagonisms of the system, and show some practical effectiveness.

What is certain is that capitalism in the coming decade will not be decisively beaten only by economic competition. The revolutionary strength of the colonial and dependent peoples and the awakened proletariat of Europe and the U S could alone overcome the resistance of capitalism and dam the stream of its lifeblood at its very source. Only the extension of the victorious socialist revolution into new regions really deprives capitalism of its economic and productive resources, drives it into an impasse and suffocates it.

On the other hand, so long as competition is limited to the exclusively economic plane, in the highly theoretical eventuality of the maintenance of an international and social status quo, the danger of war would remain equally real and enormous.

We must categorically reject the myth criminally propagated by the professional opportunists of the labor movement, according to which the "balance of fear" preserves peace, or that war has now become "unthinkable."

In reality, not only is there no reduction whatsoever of armaments, but on the contrary "new" powers, like France and Germany, are in the process of endowing themselves with atomic arms.

The increased mechanization and automation of atomic war and of "defense" against surprise attack, terribly increases the danger, including that from "accidents."

It can easily be imagined, on the other hand, that the only practical result of the "balance of fear" — and that in the best case — would be to neutralize the use of atomic weapons on the part of the principal belligerents, or to limit their use, and to conduct the war with the rest of the gamut of armaments, abundant and terrifying,

now possessed by one or the other.

As far as war is concerned, also, the only guarantee against its outbreak was and remains the disarmament of capitalism by the revolution victorious in each country.

The IVth International resolutely rejects all the affirmations of the opportunists — reformists and so-called “Communists” — in the international working-class movement, each of whom for different reasons peculiar to their special interests foster pacifist illusions combined with a policy of class-collaboration, and maintenance of the status quo and of capitalism.

For peace and capitalism are as irreconcilable as in the past.

The IVth International, on the threshold of

the new decade which is opening, appeals to the workers and the colonial peoples of the whole world to exploit to the full the growing difficulties of imperialism. By acting in this way, they will extend the basis of socialist revolution in the world: and thus beat back the danger of war; help the workers' states to overcome the economic obstacles which stand in the way of a real socialist democracy in those countries; and lift the whole of humanity to the level of the wonderful, fantastic material and cultural possibilities that science and technique have already assured, for the wellbeing and genuine civilization of an organized socialist society.

January 1, 1960

## Editorial Notes

### BRITAIN VOTES RIGHT, LABOUR VEERS LEFT

The Labour Party lost another round in the elections last October.

Despite more than 12 million votes and a loss of 1.2% at the most, the L P found itself wiped out by majority of over 100 Tory Members, determined to maintain themselves in power till the very end of their mandate.

In spite of the undoubted effects of the favorable new turn of the economic conjuncture and the Tories' clever exploitation of the masses' desire for peace, the Labour Party's usual specifically working-class clientèle remains faithful to it, and in places (such as Scotland) was even reinforced.

The L P seems to have lost out mainly among the petty-bourgeois layers won over by the “prosperity” — salary-earners and civil servants; on the other hand it does not seem to have been able to make an impact on the new generation of electors, who for the most part voted Tory.

The defeat of the L P, a parliamentary reformist Party, is almost normal under conditions of capitalist euphoria however limited and ephemeral the latter may be. At no time did the Party's Rightist leadership seek to differentiate itself from the Tories in a clearcut way on any fundamental issue, for example on nationalization or disarmament. It wished to compete with the capitalist Party par excellence, the Tories, in claiming to be able to improve the welfare state services within the framework of an unchanged social system. Thus it succeeded at one and the same time in deceiving the predominantly work-

ing-class block of its voters, that would be drawn by a bold, class program, and in appearing to be demagogic to other layers, having a “sober sense of reality.”

Even admitting that in a period of economic upswing the broad petty-bourgeois layers would vote for the Tories anyway, it remains true that even now there are in Britain several million workers, not in the unions, who still do not vote Labour.

A consistent class policy on the part of this Party, over a period of years, could well win these layers for the Party.

But in reality it would be fruitless to demand such a consistent policy from a parliamentary, reformist Party, within which a faction of the leadership operates the whole time on a firm bourgeois ideology.

It would be equally fruitless to concede that, even in Britain, any Party proclaiming itself to be working-class, could in truth conquer and keep the power, with the goal of a radical social transformation, exclusively by the parliamentary road, and without mobilizing and organizing the masses outside of this arena.

As expected, the third consecutive electoral defeat of the L P has provoked an acute *crise de conscience* in the Party, and the beginning of an ideological differentiation of great importance, without precedent in this Party's history.

The victorious bourgeoisie was waiting for its ideological agents within the ranks of the L P and the trade unions to profit from their defeat

in order to carry through the same operation as various other social-democratic Parties in continental Europe: to free themselves of all "socialist" vestiges, in particular the principle of nationalization and the class character of the Party.

Certain well-known lieutenants of Gaitskell have, in effect, sounded out the ground, before clinching such an operation.

But by contrast with what has just happened in the German, Austrian and Dutch social-democratic Parties, the great majority of the British Labour Party and trade unions has reacted to the Left, literally routing the planned offensive of the Right.

The special conference held in Blackpool in November has confirmed that the dominant trend of the present moment, alike in the constituencies and in the trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party, holds solidly to the principle of nationalization and the class character of the Party.

In reality, owing to some tactical mistakes made by the Rightist Gaitskell clique, the latter are virtually a minority in the leadership, faced by a centrist coalition extending from Bevan through Wilson to Cousins, which exercises the effective control. The Left finds itself reënforced by the support of certain trade unions which, frightened of otherwise seeing an anti-trade union offensive of the bourgeoisie gain ground with the help of the out-and-out bourgeois wing of the L.P., are now backing it.

While ideological life in the continental workers' Parties lies dormant or is sucked into the swamp of the most vulgar opportunism, in Britain the most vital and pregnant doctrinal and political discussions are now taking place.

The Left-wing press, from *Tribune* and *The New Left Review* (child of the marriage of *The New Reasoner* with *Universities and Left Review*) right up to the numerous publications of the different Marxist groups and tendencies active in the labor movement, reflects an intense ideological interest in the content, prospects and tactics of socialism, and in present political events on a world scale. The issue of nationalization is strongly debated, as an economic essential of the socialist substructure at least in its initial phase.

Certain reformist and centrist gentlemen maintain the most equivocal silence on this question of capital importance.

The bourgeoisie has centered its attacks on the nationalized industries, well aware that, if its operation were to succeed, it would destroy thereby the class doctrine of the Labour Party and transform it into an ordinary bourgeois Liberal party, incapable of endangering the bases of the present social régime in years to come.

The more so in that these years threaten to see

the decisive confirmation of the advantages of the planned and statified economies of the workers' states over that of competitive "free enterprise."

Equally, the British bourgeoisie wishes to lift the mortgage which lowers the flow of new foreign investments, north American in particular, as long as the Labour Party adheres to its doctrine of nationalization.

In the lively competition now being waged between Britain and continental Europe as to who can attract the best foreign capital, the threat represented by the Labour Party's position on this question is a serious handicap for London.

The pro-bourgeois wing of the Labourite leadership, which is opposed to the extension of nationalization and in favor of a mixed economy, largely private and competitive, is exploiting the lack of interest, if not the hostility, that the partial nationalizations under the control of the capitalist state, carried out immediately after the war, have provoked — with good reason — among the workers.

The Labour leadership has never waged a systematic campaign to popularise *the socialist content of statification of the economy, to wit: that to obtain a planned national economy, working not for capitalist profit but for the collective and private needs of society, it is necessary to nationalize all the main means of production, banks, insurance companies, big industrial firms and capitalist commercial enterprises, and transport, and to administer them under the democratic control of the working class and the people.*

It is this which makes the whole *qualitative* difference from *partial nationalizations administered by the capitalist state in a bureaucratic way for the benefit of capitalism.*

It is for the unified revolutionary Marxist tendency working within the Labour Party to define and clarify the doctrinal program and the present policy around which it is possible to regroup the basic forces of the British workers and to open the prospect of a decisive victory over reaction.

Profiting from the present ideological ferment oriented toward the Left which reigns in the labor movement, the unified revolutionary Marxist tendency must set out to build from the grassroots a serious Left-wing which holds firm and from now on struggles in a practical way for such issues as: *a nationalized and planned economy; a policy of peace by unilateral disarmament; a trade-union tactic guaranteeing full employment and an improvement in the purchasing power of the masses, thanks to the united struggle for the progressive reduction in working hours and the constant adjustment of wages to the cost of living and to the advance in productivity.*

## 1960 - YEAR OF THE GREAT TURN IN AFRICA

At the beginning of 1958, there was only one really independent African country: Ghana (Liberia being in fact an American protectorate, and Ethiopia a British one). In the beginning of 1959, Guinea joined Ghana. But in 1960, it will be a landslide. Nigeria, Somaliland, the Mali Federation (Senegal and Soudan), the Belgian Congo, will each attain independence in one form or another; Tanganyika will get self-government with a single voters' roll, which means government by the Africans. In Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the pressure of the African masses for an application of universal franchise, which will place political power in the hands of their organizations, will become irresistible.

As the British weekly *The Economist* bluntly stated in its issue of December 19, 1959, from 1960 on the overwhelming majority of the Africans, 180 million out of a total of 240 million inhabitants, against only 70 millions today, will rule themselves.

For several years we have noted the penetration of the colonial revolution into Africa. The Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya was a sign of the coming storm; the revolution in the Arab countries has been its main motor. From the Maghreb in revolt, the sparks of the revolution have spread throughout the French and Belgian empires, combining in British East and Central Africa with sparks from independent Asia.

The movement towards *political* independence of all nations thereby becomes universal. Hardly ten years ago, Africa was still considered the last bastion of colonialism. To-day this bastion is attacked on all sides and starts to crumble. Already the Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries represent the absolute majority of the independent member states of the United Nations; very soon, the majority of the sovereign nations of the earth will be colored.

The first result of this gigantic transformation is to undermine still further the last positions of colonialism and racialism in Africa, i.e. the Portuguese colonies, the Central African Federation, Kenya, South Africa. The Central African Federation will not be able to resist for long the internal and external blows which will provoke its disintegration. Only Southern Rhodesia could remain for some period a state with "white predominance," this is to say a second South Africa. As for the "Franco-African Community," it will dislocate more and more under the pressure of the examples of Guinea and the Mali Federation.

The independence of the Belgian Congo, and especially of its province of Lower-Congo, will have powerful echoes in Angola, where part of

the population has the same nationality as the Bakongo people. 1960 will therefore be a year of crisis for Salazar's African empire. It will threaten to overthrow the whole of that Empire as well as the fascist dictatorship of Portugal, stimulating in the same way a new upsurge of mass action against the Franco régime in Spain.

The progress of the colonial revolution in Africa thereby contributes powerfully to undermining the two last fascist dictatorships in Europe. It contributes also powerfully to the development of the Negro people's struggles against racial and social discrimination in the U.S.A., undermining thereby one of the pillars of American imperialism's political stability, and assisting also in the revival of the trade union movement, faced with an overall attack by Big Business.

As for the infamous apartheid régime in South Africa, the progress of the African revolution renders its survival more and more precarious. South Africa is slowly being transformed into a tremendous powderkeg. The myth of the white man's superiority and of the black man's so-called incapacity in building modern civilized nations is everyday contradicted by developments all over Africa. The self-confidence of the South African masses will thereby constantly increase; they will answer more and more courageously the bloody provocations and reprisals of the Afrikaaner masters. By maintaining themselves more and more exclusively by open terror, these masters can only prepare a terrible explosion and a civil war which will be all the more violent as the humiliations, oppression, exploitation and violence imposed on the African masses become unbearable.

In 1960, the majority of the African nations will arrive at some status of political independence. One should not, however, misunderstand the situation: for them it will be a change from the status of *colonial* to the status of *semi-colonial country*. There will be no genuine liberation from all the economic chains of imperialism.

As before, Unilever remains the real master of Ghana's economy; Péchiney hasn't lost any strength in independent Guinea; the Société Générale will continue to dictate the law on a broad scale in the independent Congo; and when Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya will pass under African rule, four big British companies will remain there, the real masters of the economic situation.

For in general, the conquest of political independence takes the form of a compromise between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie (or layers of educated functionaries and intellect-



uals, who become a hotbed for breeding a native bourgeoisie, e g by systematic pillage of the public budget, as has occurred for ten years in Indonesia). The national bourgeoisie gets bigger resources and the possibility to bargain from a more favorable position for a major part of the colonial companies' incomes. But these companies conserve a big part of their profits. Their exploitation of the African wage earners becomes even more stable than during the troubled period which generally precedes the conquest of political independence.

The new independent states lack the necessary resources and especially the favorable social conditions for a big upsurge in the fight against poverty, ignorance and bad health. Independence, it is true, generally means an acceleration in the process of economic growth, contrary to the allegations of the apologists for colonialism. But it does not yet mean the beginning of real reconstruction of the Black Continent which, for four centuries, has been really martyred by capitalist exploitation.

Such a broad scale reconstruction implies first of all an end to the *balkanisation of Africa*, which results from its having been carved up by European colonialism in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The present African boundaries do not correspond to any ethnic reality whatsoever. The Socialist United States of Africa will constitute the real framework of industrialization of the African continent.

## TO THE AID OF THE CEYLONESE REVOLUTION

The parliamentary elections in Ceylon, fixed for March, 1960, are being fought in the context of dark intrigues, plots and even crimes of the imperialist and native reactionary forces, and of the feverish expectations of the masses who are filled, according to their social layer (workers, peasants, Sinhalese and Tamil petty-bourgeois) with impatience for action, unrest and even confusion.

Elsewhere we publish detailed news of the events which have led up to the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike and the dissolution of parliament.

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From the confused and constantly changing picture which the political situation in the country has presented since then, certain traits emerge clearly, however: the country is going through a prerevolutionary crisis which is rapidly maturing and which will soon attain a radical conclusion, one way or the other. The social forces are being polarized around the most dynamic representatives of the extreme Right and the extreme Left,

This reconstruction needs in the second place a real banding together of all existing economic resources and planned development. If the international working class is able to safeguard large financial and technical help to the young African states, without political conditions or strings, this development could become very rapid. Africa could jump directly from the iron age to the age of electronics, of automation and of nuclear energy. But even if this help remains insufficient, planned economy, investment in the country itself of all the colonial companies' incomes as a result of their nationalization, and the coöperative development of agriculture, will be indispensable trump cards for tomorrow's independent Africa.

To pass from purely political independence to real independence from imperialism, the development of an autonomous labour movement will show itself to be indispensable. The African trade-union movement has undergone a tumultuous upsurge for several years. Three international confederations vie with each other for regrouping the young African trade union movement. Whether it appears out of this union movement or whether it differentiates itself as the extreme Left-wing of the national movement, a political labor movement basing itself on the ancient collectivist tradition of Black Africa will be able to play a more and more important rôle in the young African states, and will stake its claim to lead the African nation into being.

leading to the virtual disappearance of intermediary formations.

In such a climate the parliamentary way, even if it proves to be respected, could be only a stage in the search for a power resting on extra-parliamentary forces. Reaction, imperialism and the compradore bourgeoisie are still hesitating between holding the elections and staking everything on a victory of the United National Party and the temptation of a final coup d'état, consolidating the de facto dictatorship of the present government over which Dahanayake, the latest "strong man" in process of being built up, presides. The results of the partial local elections held recently in Colombo and elsewhere seem to favor the prospect of a possible victory of the UNP.

But how complete would such a victory be? Only a crushing victory of the Party in question could permit reaction to base itself on a power which, though with a parliamentary façade, would be sufficiently strong at a later stage to break the working-class organizations,

If reaction comes to doubt such a possibility in the course of the elections, it would be able to inflict anew its choice in favor of a coup d'état installing an openly dictatorial power.

The revolutionary Opposition must be seriously prepared for all eventualities both before and after the eventual elections. For in any case the days of bourgeois parliamentary democracy are henceforward numbered in this island, the "Switzerland of the Far East."

This Opposition is represented basically by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Ceylonese Section of the IVth International.

With the de facto disappearance of the centrist Party of Bandaranaike, and the marked setbacks both to the Philip Gunawardena group and to the Communist party, the L S S P becomes the pole of attraction, organization and activity of the revolutionary forces of the country which are lining up against the threatening reaction.

It is to be hoped that the organizations claiming to represent the working class will make a Front with the L S S P to ward off this danger.

The victory of the revolutionary opposition will be the result of a mobilization and an organization of the masses, both on the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary field, for the aim of a workers' and peasants' government applying

a bold class program and inaugurating thus the Ceylonese social revolution, proletarian and socialist. Never was the stake in the struggle taking place more clearly defined objectively: *a pro-imperialist and capitalist dictatorship, or a workers' and peasants' government.*

The revolutionary opposition will not fail to clarify for the masses this meaning of the struggle, and appeal to them to mobilize and organize in every way to confront reaction and beat it.

Organization of the masses, including their military organization into workers' militia and peasant corps which could eventually begin a guerilla war in the event of a reactionary coup, becomes an imperious necessity.

In the decisive fight in which the L S S P is now engaged, it benefits from the active solidarity of the whole international revolutionary Marxist vanguard, and particularly of the IVth International.

*The International Secretariat of the IVth International renews its appeal to the whole international Marxist proletarian vanguard, and particularly to the sections of the International, materially and morally to aid the struggle of the L S S P for workers' and peasants' power in Ceylon. Let our international solidarity show itself in action, full and prompt!*

## A NEW TURN TO THE RIGHT IN POLAND

During the last months the situation in Poland has again significantly worsened. The mistakes of bureaucratic planning have created a serious shortage of meat; assisted by a surprise offensive from General Winter, they have caused Warsaw to fall without heat, light and even water on tap! Clamoring for discipline, Gomulka has told the grumbling but despairing Polish masses that the time has come for a regime of austerity and tightening of belts.

It was in these circumstances that the Polish workers, students and intellectuals received the startling news of important changes in the leading personnel of the United Workers' Party. Edward Ochab was to be replaced as Minister of Agriculture, to become propaganda boss. Jerzy Morawski, the most faithful of Gomulka's lieutenants and — apart from Matwin, who had already been "disciplined" earlier — the most "Leftist" of the central committee members, who played a decisive rôle in October 1956, was dismissed as secretary of the C C in charge of propaganda. An old-time Stalinist and "Natolinist", Szyr, who favors developing huge heavy-industry projects, was put in charge of the Central Planning Board. One of the most hated Stalinists, ex-Minister TucharSKI, who by his bureaucratic despotism towards the workers of the Cegielski Plant had caused the general strike and uprising in spring 1956 at Poznan, was taken back into the government. General Witaszewski, another Stalinist henchman, responsible for the repression of the Poznan uprising, was named head of the political department of the army. Julian Hoch-

feld, a leader of the Left-wing social-democrats who went over to the Stalinist party in the post-war fusion, but who had played an intellectually leading rôle in the "thaw" of 1956-1957, lost his position in the Institute of Foreign Affairs, though still a deputy in the Sejm.

Two explanations are offered for these startling changes. According to one version, the serious meat shortage has forced Poland to call for Soviet help, and the Soviet bureaucracy has imposed on Gomulka, as the price of this help, a rehabilitation of the minor "Natolinists." There is, however, little reason to accept this version of events. All the signs indicate that Khrushchev has fully made his peace with Gomulka and regards him — in the same way as he regards Kadar in Hungary — as the only possible leader of the Polish party under present conditions. The strong attack made by Khrushchev on "Rakosi and his clique" at the second congress of the Socialist Workers' Party of Hungary indicates that the Kremlin has no love lost for its former agents who, through their "excesses", are considered mainly responsible for the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary.

The other explanation of these astonishing changes in the Polish party leadership seems to us much more plausible. As we already indicated before the third congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (in the spring 1959 issue of *Fourth International*) Gomulka is driven by the terrible logic of his purely pragmatic approach to the problems of Polish society. "Yesterday a victim of the bureaucracy, he has become in a few years its instrument and its main support", we wrote

in May 1959. The logical final stage of this evolution, the end of the 180-degree turn, is precisely his becoming convinced that his former main enemies, the ultra-Stalinist diehards of the "Natolinist" school, are the best leaders for Poland under present conditions . . .

In a typically bureaucratic, Stalinist way, Gomulka has arrived at the conclusion that all the decisive problems of Polish economy can only be solved through "discipline". There is a clear inflationary trend in the country? In order to do away with it, workers must be "disciplined" (i.e., not receive any more big bonuses), and farmers must be "disciplined" too (in the first place, they must pay at once the huge arrears of taxes and fines which have accumulated in the countryside.) There is an evident and desperate distrustfulness inside the Party? In order to eliminate it "liberals", "doubters", "deviationists," must be disciplined, and the seeds of "excessive liberalism" stamped out right inside the central committee and its secretariat. There is a terrible mood of indifference and hostility towards the Party in the country? To do away with it, people must be "disciplined", must be prevented from reading "anti-Party literature and newspapers"; newspapers must be straitjacketed again. The Writers' Union itself, that fortress of "rotten liberalism", must be "disciplined" too, as was done at its recently-held congress, when its president, Slonimski, was replaced by the official candidate of the Party for this job.

And who are more capable of doing an efficient job of "disciplining" than those very people who amassed a huge body of experience in this field during the years 1944-1956, "disciplining" thousands of men and women to death and prison, as they unfortunately did with Gomulka himself?

Social and economic problems, however, cannot be solved by "discipline" if the basic facts of life are not taken into account. It is sufficient to compare the Poland of today with Yugoslavia in order to discover the tremendous chance Poland missed in 1957 when, under Gomulka's pressure, the Party stopped short on the road towards workers' management, and a new and less rigid approach towards central planning.

There is no better "discipline" than the discipline of good results. Productivity of labor and economy of resources have tremendously increased in Yugoslav factories as compared with Polish factories - not because Yugoslav managers are better, or less bureaucratic, than their Polish colleagues, but because the workers' say in management, and their direct stake in the financial

results of the plants, have taught them a lesson which they will never forget. It now depends on their own output whether they get a thirteenth or fourteenth month of pay a year, whether their apartments can be repaired, or whether a new block and a new school can be built in their quarter. The direct link between increased production and increased wellbeing for the people, on the spot, has done more to further productivity than a million motions on "discipline" and a million speeches in favor of "socialist competition". The Poles were rapidly learning the same lesson in 1956-1957; when it was brutally interrupted, their leaders courted disaster. Disaster has now overtaken the United Workers' Party.

The same is true of the countryside. An increased flow of consumer goods to the farmers, coupled with big investment in agriculture and the development of model state farms which can compete with the private sector, control prices and force them down, has helped Yugoslavia to solve within a few years the basic problems of the transition period in the village. For the first time since Stalin's catastrophic experiment with forced collectivization, there now exists an example of a successful socialist policy in agriculture. Gomulka did not fail to try to seduce the peasant. But he failed to develop at the same time the parallel pressure of huge investments in efficiently-run state farms. As a result, the private farmer became the master of the market in agricultural goods. Again disaster was courted; again disaster overtook the Polish party.

There is no chance that the inner resources of the Polish vanguard, or of the Polish working class - terribly demoralized by the abrupt end of their "October" hopes - will be able to force a change of line in the coming months. If a positive solution of the Polish crisis could be brought about, it would be only through an international development: a new stage in the "de-Stalinization" of the Soviet Union itself, or a big upheaval, e.g., in eastern Germany. But at least the scattered vanguard elements, who are all that remains from the October upsurge, can ponder the political lessons implicit in this terrible experience. These lessons can be summarized in one sentence: the bureaucracy is a *social force* which can be neutralized and overcome only through increased power, freedom and liberty of action for the *working class as such*. Any other approach to the problem remains pragmatic, and leads inevitably along Gomulka's road - back to Natolin!

## OLD-LINE STALINISTS CHALLENGE TOGLIATTI LEADERSHIP

At the end of January the Italian Communist Party will hold its IXth national congress. Three years have passed since the VIIIth congress, which met in December, 1956 under the direct influence of the Stalinist crisis and the Hungarian events. On that occasion the leading group succeeded in maintaining its control of the Party in spite of the latterly widespread feelings of dissatisfaction. The main trends of the economic and political situation, then frankly unfavorable to the workers' struggles, aided the leading bureaucracy in two ways: by limiting the discussion through the absence on Party work of many rank-and-file militants (undoubtedly the majority of the membership), who became disillusioned and collapsed in passivity; and, on the other hand, by favoring the acceptance of and giving apparently some foundation to Togliatti's new

theories about the "democratic way to socialism."

The objective situation favoured at any rate a principle of political differentiation in the leading bodies; so, to the Right of Togliatti, a Right-wing composed mainly of intellectuals and of petty bourgeois elements revealed itself. This tendency, after some months of disorganized struggle, dissolved and most of its adherents joined the Socialist party. But the most important dissensions arose in the inner leading group. A tendency of old Stalinist diehards opposed Togliatti's "new course" in the leadership of the Party, demanding the continuation of the old methods of bureaucratic, Stalinist management. Togliatti's "new course" was in no way an advance toward Party democracy: it was only an intelligent, neo-Stalinist method, securing the political monopoly of the party machine through some

forms of constitutionality, some verbal guarantees of political dissent, a new style of dealing with party members. The old Stalinist wing, reflecting in its positions some of the views of the French Stalinists like Thorez, opposed Togliatti's course as too advanced; it did not dare to bring these dissensions into the open, and so Togliatti was able to evict its members from the leading Party bodies, confining them to a body of resounding name but till then of no practical importance, the Central Control Commission. But the group of the "elders" — as they are aptly named — gave new impulsion and activity to the sleeping machine of this Commission, and succeeded in running it as a second Party leadership, so counteracting the power of Togliatti's group. This situation is now approaching a showdown: the Togliatti group is instancing its successes of recent years, which have brought the Party out of the difficult and menacing situation of three years ago. In spite of the fact that these successes are due to the objective course of events far more than to the merits of Togliatti's political mind, his group now finds itself strong enough to eliminate his opponents.

So the main theme at the central committee meeting preparing the Congress, and in the documents proposed by it, is the struggle against "sectarianism and dogmatism" which "countermanded" the full development of the Party's new policy, and "retarded" the realization of the VIIIth congress resolutions, both in inner-party life and in political action within the country. This is really a declaration of war against anonymous people, who, however, every Party member with some information is able to identify as the "elders" of Scoccimarro (their outstanding political figure). In any event the differences will not openly explode; Togliatti has no interest in this, and the "elders" will be faithful to their ultra-bureaucratic mentality. Moreover, they could not find any support among the rank-and-file: Togliatti and his main assistant, Amendola, are launching a campaign for the "renovation" of the Party, with the object of gaining the enthusiasm of the rank-and-file and of isolating their enemies.

Thus the Congress will presumably be controlled by the group of Togliatti, who will carry out a "renovation" of the party, that is, some democratic new concessions within the limits of the survival of bureaucratic rule. Togliatti and Amendola think that in this way they will give some courage to the membership, and will avoid the spread of critical thinking about the uncertainty of their political

perspectives; and, at the same time, resolve the inter-bureaucratic dissension with Scoccimarro.

But what are the general perspectives of the Party in the Italian situation? The documents, merely exaggerating the successes of the party in the last period, and presenting its situation in a propagandistic and distorted manner, contain nevertheless important admissions: thus it is revealed that the membership has been reduced by 247,000 (from two millions to 1,750,000 in round figures); that the militancy of the rank-and-file is now lower than three years ago, when this question was already grave; that the strength of the Party in industrial activity has been still further reduced (in reality there are no party cells in most industrial establishments). As to future activity, the documents reveal that the party has not succeeded in carrying on its "anti-monopolist" policy, and has not sufficiently counteracted the social and political pressure of the dynamism of the big monopolies. These are precious admissions, because, with these negative remarks, the great victories claimed are reduced to a pretty poor show.

But nowise is the policy of the "democratic way" under discussion. The Togliatti leadership will move even further along this road than in its position of 1956. Now the main perspective hinges on "broad alliances" of the middle class with the workers' Parties, on a program of anti-monopolistic policy. Big "democratic steps forward" are announced in this way. In reality there are no symptoms of such developments, nor in a theoretical analysis can Togliatti's forecast be maintained. Togliatti is theorizing from a particular experience, that of the regional government of Sicily, where a group of dissident Christian-Democrats, leaning towards the Right, is in power with the votes of the Left. This is a very complicated situation, which cannot be analyzed here, but which is evidently possible only in the peculiar political terms of a backward country such as Sicily. The theories and the forecast of the Stalinist leadership have no place in Italian national reality, and will serve no purpose except to cover the lack of real political perspectives and the opportunistic maneuvers with which Togliatti seeks to get out of his impasse. His political formulas already came under fire at the last central committee meeting, where some of his firmest associates have denounced their imprecision — a well calculated imprecision. The Congress will deal with Togliatti's program — and undoubtedly will accept it. But reality will soon demonstrate its deficiency.

## TOWARD THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

As announced elsewhere in this number of *Fourth International*, the recent plenum of the International Executive Committee reached the decision to hold next year the Sixth World Congress of our International, and to open, as from now, the preparatory discussion for this Congress. This discussion has for its scope supremely important subjects which at present preoccupy the vanguard of the international workers' movement, and concern at its highest point the future of this latter: *the situation and prospects in western Europe; the unfolding, the problems and the prospects of the colonial revolution; the economic prospects for the workers' states and for capitalism; a platform for the political revolution in the workers' states dominated by the bureaucracy.*

The discussion has already opened on the basis of a first document, whose general line was adopted by the recent plenum of our IEC, bearing on the European perspectives — of which we are publishing large extracts in this number of *Fourth International*.

We shall shortly publish, in like manner, the other documents which must serve as the basis for the discussion.

The revolutionary Marxist vanguard will thus have the opportunity to become familiar with the present stage in the thinking of our international movement.

As always, this thinking continues to be guided by the principles, the traditions and method of revolutionary Marxism, and is nourished by the living revolutionary experience of our epoch.

As a result, it is separated fundamentally from the vulgar opportunism in which, more than ever, the traditional social-democratic and so-called "Communist" leaderships delight. While the former, under the effects of the economic conjuncture of a passing euphoria which has for some years already characterized the capitalism of the advanced countries, are in haste to rid themselves of all "Marxist" vestiges, the so-called Communist leaderships seem to be drawing the ultimate conclusions from the theory of "socialism in one country" which Stalin put forward from 1924. After the fashion of pragmatists, the social-democratic leaderships theorize on a phase of the cyclical evolution of post-war European and north American capitalism, ephemerally dominated by the expansion and the "miracles" of "free enterprise." This phase they extrapolate into the entire foreseeable future, and so doing seem to forget not only the immense problem of the under-developed countries but also the lagging behind of the capitalist countries by comparison with the expansion in the workers' states. The so-called "Communist" leaderships theorize on the in-

terests, no less ephemeral, of the Soviet bureaucracy for an international agreement and "peaceful coexistence."

If we are to believe them, the world victory of socialism will prove to be in practice the result of the building of socialism in the U S S R in the first place, and of the universal and irresistible contagion of her example. Whence follows in practice, no less inevitably, an interim policy of ultra-opportunism, with the sole aim of preserving "peaceful coexistence." The communicative "optimism" of Khrushchev about the economic development of the U S S R in the years to come is responsible for much of this mysticism tending to liquidate the international revolutionary movement.

The thinking of the IVth International has nothing in common with these pragmatic theories, which are determined by very precise social and political interests.

The preparatory discussion for the Sixth World Congress will pose and clarify from the vantage point of revolutionary Marxism the fundamental questions so completely avoided, so entirely warped by the traditional leader-

ships: What are the causes, the limits, the prospects of the present relative stability of European and north American capitalism? What are the economic prospects of the evolution of capitalism and the workers' states and of their competition in the decade to come? What are the problems and the prospects of the colonial revolution? What are the balance-sheet and the prospects of the Khrushchevite policy in the U S S R and the European "people's democracies?" Where is China going? Whither the European and world workers' movement? etc, etc. To all these questions the forces of the IVth International working in the mass movements in the capitalist countries, the colonial and dependent countries, as well as the militants in the workers' states, will try to give the reply most in conformity with living revolutionary Marxism.

Both the preparation and the holding of the Sixth World Congress will brilliantly underscore the ideological and organizational advance of the IVth International, World Party of the Socialist Revolution.

# IN DEFENSE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

By MICHEL PABLO

Since the events in Tibet last spring, there has been an incessant stirring of the reactionary campaign against the Chinese revolution, which tends to undermine its influence among the Asian masses and colonial people in general.

In this campaign, the Asian capitalists are in obvious connivance with imperialism, only too happy to justify the scandalous prolongation of the international blockade against the great Chinese revolution. The Indian bourgeoisie first of all found in the demagogic exploitation of the events in Tibet, and then in what it calls the "frontier incidents," an opportunity to turn the attention of the Indian masses from their growing misery towards an exacerbated nationalism, and to set them up against China, chief catalyst of the revolutionary potential which is growing and threatens to explode in India.

For People's China, from all the evidence, represents objectively enemy number one of the Indian bourgeoisie, to the extent that its economic and cultural progress contrasts more and more with the stagnation, if not retrogression, in India under the bourgeois régime of the Congress party and Nehru.

The "friendship" which the latter had proclaimed over quite a long period was only making a virtue of necessity. This "friendship" was in reality the price paid in exchange for the ultra-opportunist attitude of the Chinese leadership in regard to the Indian bourgeoisie; the former having, with the connivance of the Kremlin, ordered the Communist Party of India to guarantee "social peace" and support Nehru.

But class realities and demands are, in the final analysis, more decisive than any calculated "friendship." The necessity for turning the attention of the Indian masses from the revolutionary experience of China and for setting them against her has become all the more urgent since the situation in India continues to deteriorate.

A part of the Indian bourgeoisie, which is becoming more and more important, can see no solution other than making an approach to American imperialism, an approach which goes along with the reappraisal of foreign alliances and friendships and a harder internal policy. The current reconciliation with Pakistan and the visit to New Delhi announced by Eisenhower are typical operations which enter into this range of ideas.

Nehru, a more subtle and equally more con-

scious representative of his class, is in reality the author of the present changeover of the foreign policy of India and of its internal climate.

To slow down People's China and set public opinion against her is a prerequisite for this operation. Nehru, pretending to yield unwillingly to the pressure of public opinion, has hypocritically continued to undermine the friendship towards revolutionary China and its popularity. He has put it in the dock on account of the events in Tibet and those which followed on the frontiers.

Let us get this last question clear. This is all the more necessary since the Communist party, as well as Khrushchev himself, have not hesitated to dissociate themselves from China, and to incriminate her indirectly as chiefly responsible for the "frontier incidents."

The Indian Communist Party, roused in a fervour of patriotism, not to say chauvinism, and with the blessing of the Indian bourgeoisie and its "hero" Nehru, suffers manifestly at the present moment from the pressure of "public opinion" and has shamefully capitulated before this pressure. This is the inevitable ransom for its ultra-opportunist policy, to which Peking as well as Moscow has greatly contributed. As for Khrushchev, who generously proclaims an equal "neutrality" towards China, a workers' state in full revolutionary development, and to India, a bourgeois state, fighting desperately against the revolution which is ripening and threatens to explode, he manifestly obeys the demands of his policy of "peaceful coexistence" and of compromise with imperialism.

What counts now for him is to give proof that he remains loyal to the spirit of his talks with Eisenhower.

It is this loyalty which leads him now to discover, for example, the "historic bonds" which have enchained Algeria, colonised by French imperialism, but ignore the rights which revolutionary China has reasons to consider to be really valid historically in regard to the delimitation of her frontier with India and Pakistan. In the case of Algeria, it is a question of Khrushchev coming to an agreement with de Gaulle to the detriment of the Algerian revolution. In the case of the "frontier incidents," it is a question for him of safeguarding Indian "friendship" to the detriment of the Chinese revolution.

Naturally, everyone can fairly deduce that such an attitude towards the latter betrays a state of

affairs between Peking and Moscow which is at present rather strained, for reasons which go far beyond the Indo-Chinese dispute. The near future will throw more light on this question for us.

We come back to the essence of the Indo-Chinese frontier dispute. It is a fact accepted by all, that revolutionary China has never accepted the frontier line with India and Pakistan, drawn in the past by British imperialism (the McMahon line) and reclaimed by New Delhi and Karachi: on the contrary she has declared that this question must be settled amicably "through friendly negotiation conducted in a well-prepared way step by step."<sup>1</sup> The frontier points and regions at present in dispute are shown on Chinese maps as forming part of China, and have been since the Liberation under the effective administrative and military authority of China. It is in such a region controlled by China since the Liberation that the recent incidents of October 20 occurred, when an Indian patrol came into conflict with the Chinese forces which had been installed there for a long time.

The revolutionary Marxists have no special reason for according more credit to the assertions of the bourgeois government of Nehru than to those of the Peking workers' government. The latter declares that all the incidents of the past month were provoked by the incursion of Indian forces into territories controlled by China since the Liberation and that "although the Chinese government cannot recognise the illegal McMahon line, guards have never crossed this line."<sup>2</sup>

Better still, if the points and regions of the frontier zone between China, India and Pakistan are in reality still undetermined and require fixing, clearly the revolutionary Marxists can only favor the Chinese point of view without complications, that is to say, the point of view which

conforms most to the strategic interests of the Chinese state and the Chinese revolution.

The entire frontier dispute is concerned with a desert mountain region of the Himalayas, but of very important strategic interest. It is really the hinge between the three countries and commands China's access to India and Pakistan, and vice versa (the access of these countries to China). There is absolutely no reason why the Chinese workers' state should show itself "generous" and give away gratuitously these very important strategic positions to the bourgeois states, India and Pakistan, allies of imperialism.

The revolutionary Marxists, including those of India and Pakistan, placed in a similar position, begin first of all by giving more credit and even favoring the point of view of the workers' state, and not of their own bourgeoisie, and by resisting the current chauvinism that the bourgeoisie will not hesitate to arouse in order to undermine the prestige and influence of its revolutionary neighbour. The revolutionary Marxist certainly cannot forget that the Chinese workers' state is now governed by a bureaucratic administration brought up in the school of Stalinism. But this bureaucratic leadership in questions of frontier disputes defends fundamentally the interests of the workers' state and of the revolution, independent of the possible criticisms of certain of its actions. Between it and the national bourgeoisie, the Marxist revolutionaries are neither "neutral" nor inclined to yield, for the strongest of reasons, to any kind of insidious form of nationalism. They are resolutely opposed to the chauvinist current in their own country, they unmask the hypocritical and reactionary campaign by their own bourgeoisie and subordinate the possible future criticisms of the bureaucratic leadership of the workers' state to the defense of this state. It belongs quite naturally to the IVth International to hold high the flag of defense of the great Chinese revolution, which is now so much embarrassing the Kremlin and the Indian Stalinists.  
November 10, 1959

<sup>1</sup> Declaration by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 26, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



## INDIA AND CHINA

By MICHEL PABLO

"It is a part of historical fact that the center of gravity of conflict is shifting from Europe to Asia," declared Nehru on the same day he received Eisenhower in New Delhi.

"For the first time," he added, "a would-be world Power is sitting on our border. Two mighty

armies are facing each other across 2,500 miles of the Himalayas, and today they are facing each other in anger . . . Mighty changes are converging on the 600 million Chinese. The 400 million Indians are also changing, but not in that violent and abrupt way. If two mighty countries face each

other in an armed way, it is a major world event.”<sup>1</sup>

For nine whole years, Nehru admits, he avoided raising the question of China, despite the fact that he was aware that “Communist China was making some kind of claim on Indian territory,”<sup>2</sup> and that she had even established administrative and military control over the territories appearing as Chinese in her maps.

Why, then, does Nehru now change his attitude, and even go so far as to allow himself to foreshadow the menace of a possible war between India and China?

The main explanation for this significant about-face is in reality to be found in the consequences which the events in Tibet this year are beginning to bring.

The “friendship” of India and China during these last nine years was based in large part on the existence of a barrier — the feudal régime embracing the whole Himalayan region which separates the two countries.

This barrier to some extent dammed up the dynamism of the Chinese revolution and considerably lessened the danger of its contaminating feudal-capitalist India. The Tibetan events, forcing the Peking government to proceed with a radical social transformation of the Himalayan zone, busted the dam. Henceforward the torrent of the expanding Chinese revolution will come bursting through the mountains, overflowing into India itself.

This is the fundamental reason now impelling Nehru to hover between alarms and threats. Already the question has gone far beyond a dispute over some frontier positions, never clearly defined historically — though certainly of very considerable strategic interest — and situated in a deserted area. It is now becoming an extremely serious affair: *concerning the revolutionary infection of all the buffer territories stretching over 2,500 miles, which should form a barrier to the Chinese revolution — Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Tibet, Kashmir.*

For so long as this danger did not exist, Nehru avoided raising the question of the control established by the Chinese over the territories figuring on their maps.

For example Nehru admits that he knew, two years ago, that the Chinese were solidly installed in Ladakh and that they had even built a road. “In order not to stir up Indian national feeling,” he claims, he withheld the information from parliament.

Really he avoided for a long time negotiating the delimitation of frontiers, as the Chinese had

never ceased from requesting, knowing that, *even from the historical and juridical points of view, his case was not so solid.*

“The quarrel with India is about frontiers which were fixed by British imperial power,” the British *Observer* frankly admits (November 22, 1959). It adds:

Britain, having conquered India, *pushed out her frontiers as far as they could be carried without a major war.* In doing this, Britain occupied a border area *much of which was inhabited by non-Indian peoples.* The frontier with China, where demarcated at all, *was fixed arbitrarily and surreptitiously,* or by treaties which Peking now denies were correctly negotiated with the Chinese central government of the time. (Emphasis added.)

The frontier incidents of this year did not occur as a result of a so-called recent incursion of the Chinese into Indian territory, but on the contrary as a result of the entry of Indian patrols into regions and strongholds controlled administratively and militarily for a long time by the Chinese.

#### END OF “BUFFER” ZONE

This is a point which generally escapes the hasty critics of Peking. *But then why, after being uninterested for so long in the presence of the Chinese in these regions and strongholds, does Nehru decide so late in the day to dislodge them by military force?*

That is the question to which an answer must be given.

Let us listen to the voice of the London *Times* (November 28, 1959), which no one could very well suspect of particularly friendly sentiments towards Peking. In a leader of very great consequence, the organ of the British big bourgeoisie made some extremely significant and important confessions. We cite them almost in full:

*Ever since Chinese power was reasserted in Tibet, the whole Himalayan region has been given a new importance.* At times, in the past, this area may have served as a buffer zone. But it has also been for long periods under the influence of either India or China. . . . Now Chinese influence *could return again to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.* All these territories have at times recognized some kind of shadowy authority in Peking. *To say that Chinese power threatens to spread in the area is not to impute any present aggressive designs to the Chinese.* They have, indeed, been expressly denied in Peking. But *the steady transformation of Tibet cannot go on in total isolation. Change will always filter through these high valleys and across these bleak plateaux where most of the inhabitants are*

<sup>1</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, December 10, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem.*



*Tibetans by race.* This is true of Ladakh, of parts of Nepal and Sikkim, of most of Bhutan and of some pockets along the McMahon Line. For the moment the rulers and the priests in these territories have reacted sharply against Peking and its works. But absolute rule is being questioned even in these remote places and those who question it may not be so ready to abhor the changes going on across the frontiers. The long-term possibility is therefore quite simple. Either *progress in Tibet* — ruthlessly imposed maybe, but visible in its material change — will slowly *draw the people of these other territories into its orbit* or India must make a move to assure her own northern frontiers from this possibility as well as reaffirming lines on maps. The buffer state can survive only so long as the Powers on each side respect and value its position and its own internal development proceeds in the same relative isolation. That can no longer be true of these Himalayan territories. In Mao Tse-Tung's phrase, they must *lean to one side or the other*. The shift may not come about immediately; a certain neutrality can and should survive. But to the question: on which side are you neutral? Mr Nehru has now stated the Indian answer. (Emphasis ours.)

It is impossible to be more clear on the revolutionary consequences of the events in Tibet, and on the profound reasons for the new attitude of Nehru, conscious representative of the threatened Indian bourgeoisie.

Recent events perfectly underline these conclusions.

Nehru is in process of applying pressure on Nepal to align this state with New Delhi against Peking. He has gone so far as to declare in parliament that "any attack on Nepal or Bhutan would be regarded as aggression against India"!

But the masses of these areas are far from welcoming Indian "friendship" and "protection." Obviously the language of the Chinese revolution emanating from Tibet suits them much better.

"The land of Gurkha warriors surrounded by mountains and sandwiched between Red China's Tibet and the Ganges plain, is determined not to get dragged into Delhi's squabbles with Peking," writes the correspondent of *The News Chronicle* in Khatmandu. (November 30, 1959.)

So determined, that its inhabitants openly revolt against Indian officers who try hard to utilize these Gurkha warriors to exterminate the supporters of unification of Nepal with Tibet and China!

"India has withdrawn almost all its crack Gurkha troops," writes the correspondent of *The Daily Express* in Calcutta (December 2, 1959),

"from the two vital strategic areas of Sikkim and the North-East Frontier Agency, and replaced them by Punjabi regiments of Sikhs.

"The move follows repeated reports of disaffection and intensive political activity among the Gurkhas, the hardy hill fighters from Nepal and the surrounding districts. An organization called the Gurkha League has been active among Gurkha troops." Members of this League "talk of a Mongol Brotherhood in which Nepal, Tibet and China would be 'blood brothers.'

"When the Gurkha troops," commanded by Indian officers and destined for the repression of such League members, "found that the people they were supposed to shoot at were exactly like themselves, some units became completely demoralized."

### NEHRU'S HYPOCRISY UNMASKED

Thus the hypocrisy of Nehru in accusing China of having suppressed the "national revolt" in Tibet is completely unmasked by his own attempt to crush the national and social revolt in Nepal. The revolutionary infection originating in China and Tibet is penetrating ever more profoundly into Indian territory.

Despite the shameful attitude of the Communist Party of India to the frontier incidents, and in spite of the nationalist propaganda which the Indian bourgeoisie is spreading among the masses, and particularly the petty-bourgeoisie, of the country, the peasants of India, hungry for land and justice, are interpreting the Chinese "provocations" after their own fashion: they continue in some regions to vote in massive proportions for the Indian Communist Party.

The same correspondent of *The Daily Express* in Calcutta cables (December 3, 1959):

The Communist Party of India has just won a crucial by-election in a constituency of Assam on the edge of the North-East Frontier Agency. Previously the seat had been won twice by Congress. They had confidently raised the Chinese border issue during the campaign." (Emphasis added.)

When Nehru speaks of the new "historic" fact constituted by Sino-Indian relations at the present moment, which he wishes to present in terms of nationalist tension, this should deceive nobody.

*It is the expanding Chinese revolution, "brusque" and "violent," which is threatening the rotten feudal-capitalist régime of India.* The peasants, serfs and share-croppers of the Himalayas, and beyond the Himalayas deep into Indian territory, are beginning to cock an ear to the powerful echo sounding out of rumbling Tibet and from the revolutionary Chinese countryside. The Indian bourgeoisie and imperialism have instantly understood the danger. The Eisenhower visit, the con-

versations which have taken place, the agreements reached, have sealed the rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington now under way, which has no other aim than to try to consolidate a lasting feudal-capitalist reactionary bastion "as a counterweight to China" (*Le Monde*, December 11, 1959.)

Imperceptibly the "neutralist" régime of Nehru and his "socialist" economy — so-called, presumably, because of the preponderance of the public over the private sector — are sliding into alliance, including military alliance, with imperialism, and the sudden and swift enlarging of private, in-

*December 15, 1959*

cluding foreign, enterprise and capital. The Third Five-Year Plan, in preparation, is based more particularly on the more or less concealed contribution of the latter (foreign capital.) For "defense," in case of need, "both guns and butter are equally useful," declares Nehru, counting on the comprehension, already attained, of Eisenhower.

But it will not be long before the Indian bourgeoisie understands that such a "defense" against the revolution will only have the effect of accelerating the irrepressible advance of the latter.

Rolling round the Himalayas, already thunder sounds the coming of the storm.

# GODESBERG - A VICTORY FOR THE LIQUIDATORS

By G GERBEL

German social-democracy adopted a new program at the Godesberg Party congress. The gist of this document is its clear and unequivocal adaptation to bourgeois society, the capitalist state and its military defense. All changes in the social situation, all reforms of state and society, are conceived strictly within the framework of capitalism and have as their goal its protection from the consequences of crises and class struggles.

The program is an equivocal abjuration of the remainder of the stock of Marxist ideas tolerated until now in the SPD. In the best case, Marxism is granted a historical place in the history of the workers' movement of a time "when there were still class struggles." The authors go back to the compost of pre-Marxian ideologies, including the Sermon on the Mount, apparently not yet rotted by the passage of history. At the same time the "socialist goal," the rudiment of which till now still glimmered in festive speeches has been abandoned in favor of formal democracy. Instead of the old, reformist way to socialism through democracy, bourgeois democracy itself has appeared. In reality the new program does not reveal any new discoveries. It is composed of waste products of the most various schools of bourgeois ideology, of which the alien class wing is the active representative inside the SPD. This ideology has already been for years the spiritual basis of a deciding part of the SPD (the NATO wing, the fraction in the Bundestag, the Rightists under the leadership of Erler, Schmidt, Arndt and Deist.) This liquidationist clique deemed it timely to make its ideology the official spiritual basis of the Party, giving thereby a programmatic legality to deeds already done.

Even though Bernsteinian revisionism is high as the sky compared with what Godesberg has allotted the German workers' movement, yet this program is an important station on the revisionist track, if not yet the terminal. This is the road from a false and erroneous class policy to a full capitulation to the bourgeois class and its most reactionary ringmasters. This road is marked by the milestones of August 1914, the November 1918 days, the January 1919 murders, the rôle of doctor at the sickbed of capitalism during the Weimar republic, the capitulation without a fight of 1930-1933. Already in this period the SPD had ceased to be a socialist Party. In all difficult moments of social upheaval it has saved bourgeois society from collapse and from socialist revolution; but time and again it has, in such periods, hidden behind some washed-out socialist phrases — even they were abused by the then Right-wing. The Right had to commit this abuse,

paying lip-service to the ideas, in order partly to maintain the Party's proletarian basis. This it was necessary for it to do, to be able to play its rôle, as the guarantee against proletarian revolution, at all.

Today the influence of anti-socialist, of alien and hostile class elements inside the Party is so strong, and the political consciousness of the working-class rank and file so much weakened by historical, actual objective and subjective factors, that they can take the liberty of dropping the "socialist" masquerade. In addition to which, the SPD apparatus, up to now always a buffer between the Right and the working-class rank and file, has fully subordinated itself to the will of the liquidators.

No one can be surprised by Godesberg and the preparatory "discussion" who has watched the political situation of the workers' movement in the Federal Republic and the practise of the leaderships of the workers' organizations — as well as the sporadic activity of the Leftist forces during these last years, especially after the strangulation of the movement against remilitarization. It would have been an illusion to believe that this Party would still be able to work out even a reformist program by a political discussion. When events like the First World War, the revolution and counter-revolution of 1918-1923, the victory of fascism in 1933, the Second World War, and the collapse of fascism and German capitalism have not succeeded in driving social-democracy back on to socialist positions, it were illusory to attribute this task to a programmatic discussion.

It should be added that for a long time social-democracy has not been ideologically in a position to carry on such a discussion. The sham fights in *Vorwärts* served only to preserve the pretense of Party democracy. This "democracy" showed its real face when about 240 proposals from the basic organizations were wiped out with a flick of the wrist on the "advice" of the Party committee.

In its overwhelming majority the membership has shown no interest whatsoever in this discussion. In view of the ideologically low level at which the Party organizations are maintained, the members are scarcely capable of participating. But organizational democracy begins with the ability to coöperate in the elaboration of principles, strategy and tactics; this ability is more important than statutory "rights."

The composition of the party congress, at which 25 % of those qualified to vote had not been elected, but possessed delegates' rights on the strength of holding an office, shows another side of the

Party's "democracy." The other delegates were sifted out by a voting system which works like a sieve: in the Party units, scarcely 10% of the members were present at the meetings in which the program and the extraordinary Party congress were discussed — so that the vote at Godesberg, and all commanded and consecutively arriving declarations of consent cannot be considered as the decision of the membership. The greater part of the elected delegates came from the Party, trade-union, laender and municipal bureaucracy.

Only 16 delegates summoned up enough courage to vote against the whole program. This dwindling minority demonstrates the weakness of the Left among the middle layers of social-democratic functionaries, and shows the present narrow basis of a Left-wing inside this Party. These 16 votes represent, in the best case, a socialist nucleus.

A more particularized picture was given by the clause-by-clause voting. Thus 99 delegates voted against the decisive clause on economic policy. This figure comes closer to the real division of votes and the real influence among the membership. It is very significant that the largest number of opposition votes should have been recorded on this clause. This was a last endeavor to cling to the old goal of socialization. Exactly at this point, and more than on foreign or cultural policy, the Party members see through the total adaptation of the SPD to the existing property relations. Therefrom comes the influence of the Munich basic program of the DGB (trade unions) and the exploitation of the Ahlen program in the struggle against the "Christians" and the CDU.

By far the greatest part of the delegates, however, capitulated on the final vote under the massive pressure of the praesidium and the Party leadership. After voting against an important and decisive clause, they gave their votes to the whole program. That was a capitulation before the massive unity of the Right plus the Party apparatus. The apparatus did not, as many Left-wingers had hoped, combine with the working-class rank and file against the Right — as it did some years ago against the ballast-throwers — but exercised, together with the Right which it found far more congenial, exerted pressure on the "Left" and consciously pushed it in the desired direction.

#### ROLE OF HERBERT WEHNER

The most important rôle in the demoralization of the Left has been played by Herbert Wehner. He not only defended the draft program in the discussion before and after the Party congress, but, in a steam-rolling and Stalinist way, tried to unleash a pogrom against the critics. That is the practice of a real renegade, who wants to liberate himself from even the pretense of a past.

Not even a glorious past, however, is in question. His way to the Communist Party of Germany and his comet-like rise therein took place at a time when this Party had degenerated, emasculating thereby both itself and the working class. By a false perspective (fascism was already in power with Brüning, von Papen, etc, exhaustion of the Nazis within a short time); a false strategy and tactics (splitting the trade unions by means of the RGO — Red trade-union opposition, the SPD viewed as the Left-wing of fascism, the theory of social-fascism, the concept of the united front from below, the common struggle with the Nazis in the Prussian "Red referendum" against the SPD government); and by the complete Stalinization of the Party organization, the KPD leadership cleared the road for the victory of fascism. Wehner's activity against the Left-wing rank and file in 1959 was in no way different from his rôle, as part of the Stalinist bureaucracy, against every critic during the years 1928-1933 and during the first years of the emigration who had the courage to warn against the fatal development of the KPD. At that time he denounced these comrades as agents of social-fascism. Today he insinuates that those who warn against the fatal development of the SPD are agents of the Socialist Unity Party (east German Stalinists.) When, at the Party congress, appearing in the character-part of a repentant Marxist, he warned against the totality of Marxism, he forgot that he has never been a Marxist, that in the KPD he embraced "Marxism" in a Stalinized form. His personal characteristics — egocentrism, disdain of people and of the masses — which at one time drove him into the arms of the anarchists, have eased his path in the Stalinist as well as in the social-democratic bureaucracy. The example of Wehner shows the inherent evolution of the bureaucrats of various hues.

The capitulation at the final vote will contribute to a deepening of the apathy among the proletarian base of the SPD, which as a result of the Godesberg program is perceptibly extending. A still smaller number of workers will take part in the internal life of the Party; to a still greater extent the influx of fresh, activist elements into the Party will dry up.

The Godesberg program is absolutely nothing new. It is the programmatic legalization of a policy practised for years by the alien-class elements working within the Party leadership, but above all by the Bundestag leadership. On the basis of this legality, these forces will develop a still more capitulatory policy in the wake of the CDU government.

Their appetite and eagerness for office will grow continually. This will find its clear expression in the coming elections and in the electoral program for 1961. The spirit of this program is

not the "will to power," which anyway was still extant with Schumacher, but the basis for participation in office on the basis of bourgeois society. In the event of this wishful dream being fulfilled, the German social-democracy will show in practice that it has "learned" from the fate of the Weimar republic to trample still more upon the historic and immediate interests of the working class. To that extent the Godesberg program can introduce a new phase in the development of the German workers' movement: the phase of the differentiation between the working class and the S P D. The workers do not evaluate the S P D on its program, but they will recognize and rate at their true value its policy and its practice.

It is the task of the socialist nucleus inside the S P D to see that this recognition does not demoralize the workers completely, leading to a passive acceptance of the situation. In the clear realization that along the road of the S P D there is no return from the bourgeois morass, but that a class differentiation must and will come, this nucleus must not allow the Right and the apparatus to separate it completely from the workers organized in the S P D. Without the slightest theoretical concessions, and without accepting any responsibility for this (Godesberg) program, all the existing possibilities must be utilized fully to begin a struggle within the framework of this program, and to extend it beyond the program over the whole field of the Party's theoretic and political life (control of "abuses" of economic power, socialization as a "last resort," etc.) This is no recognition of the program, but a tactical attitude on the basis of the situation created after Godesberg.

The real Left inside the S P D must, by uncompromising criticism of the program, forge the ideological weapons which will enable it, in the course of the coming process of differentiation, to become the nucleus of a widely-based Left-wing which, in the practical daily struggle, pushes out beyond the program.

As a result of the Godesberg decisions, the S P D stands today on programmatic questions to the Right of the D G B (even the Ahlen decisions of the C D U are to the "Left" of Godesberg.) In the long run it cannot tolerate such a correlation. Before the great mass of trade-union officials the decision is posed thus: to stand on the Munich basic program or on that of Godesberg.

At the Stuttgart congress of the D G B a Rosenberg-inspired "improved" program was already circulating. At the next D G B congress it will be lying on the table of the house. In the meantime the S P D leadership, supported by the Right in the D G B, will develop an increased activity in support of an equivalent program of class collaboration. Here the Left has a new chance to defend the basic questions of the reconstruction

of society from a socialist point of view. From this point of view the Left must devote more attention to developments in the trade unions. But here also a point is valid which has already been demonstrated by the programmatic discussion in the S P D. The defence of the Munich basic program, also, cannot be carried on abstractly by participation in a program discussion. The starting points for this are to be found in an active and intensified work in the trade unions and in the shops.

The colourful picture presented by the "wild-cat" strikes, which have been taking place continuously for some weeks, shows that, in contradiction of the spirit of the Godesberg program, even in time of boom the working-class struggle exists. That this movement does not carry an extraordinarily high level of class consciousness, that it does not reach out immediately to the great political and social questions, is the product not of the boom but of the treacherous class rôle of the leadership of the workers' movement during the whole of the last decade. But these movements can become schools for class consciousness provided the conscious socialist forces not only support them but, after careful study of all the conditions, become their initiators.

Here the Left strikes layers which were "absent" during the program discussion in the S P D. Experience has proved that precisely the working-class youth, devoid of any experience of the class struggle, untouched by the history of the workers' movement and by its theories, take their first steps *in the class struggle*. In their great majority they are sceptical of the older generation and of the past of the workers' movement, but also of the bureaucratic machinations of the apparatuses of the S P D and the trade unions, and of the complete passivity of the S P D.

All this is the first stage of their class-struggle activity, which they themselves often do not recognize as a class struggle, the abstract concept of which has no attractive power for them. On this basis of a new activation of older and politically disillusioned, and younger and illusion-less, layers of the workers, new forces for the Left inside the S P D and the trade unions can develop from the great differentiation within these organizations brought about by the developing class struggle. The discussion around the Munich basic program can become a connecting link between elemental Left movements and a conscious Left-wing. This development will then supersede Godesberg, leaving the representatives of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie in the S P D, and the class-collaborationist elements in the trade unions, isolated on the Right, and constituting from the dynamism of the movement a new leadership on the basis of a socialist program and a revolutionary practice.

# THESES ON THE TASKS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

By ROSA LUXEMBURG

A large number of comrades from different parts of Germany <sup>1</sup> have adopted the following theses, which constitute an application of the Erfurt program to the contemporary problems of international socialism.

1. The world war has annihilated the work of 40 years of European socialism: by destroying the revolutionary proletariat as a political force; by destroying the moral prestige of socialism; by scattering the workers' International; by setting its Sections one against the other in fratricidal massacre; and by tying the aspirations and hopes of the masses of the people of the main countries in which capitalism has developed to the destinies of imperialism.

2. By their vote for war credits and by their proclamation of national unity, the official leaderships of the socialist parties in Germany, France and England (with the exception of the Independent Labour Party) have reinforced imperialism, induced the masses of the people to suffer patiently the misery and horrors of the war, contributed to the unleashing, without restraint, of imperialist frenzy, to the prolongation of the massacre and the increase in the number of its victims, and assumed their share in the responsibility for the war itself and for its consequences.

3. This tactic of the official leaderships of the Parties in the belligerent countries, and in the first place in Germany, until recently at the head of the International, constitutes a betrayal of the elementary principles of international socialism, of the vital interests of the working class, and of all the democratic interests of the peoples. By this alone socialist policy is condemned to impotence even in those countries where the leaders have remained faithful to their principles: Russia, Serbia, Italy and — with hardly an exception — Bulgaria.

4. By this alone official social democracy in the principal countries has repudiated the class struggle in war time and adjourned it until after the war; it has guaranteed to the ruling classes of all countries a delay in which to strengthen, at the proletariat's expense, and in a monstrous fashion, their economic, political and moral positions.

5. The world war serves neither the national

defense nor the economic or political interests of the masses of the people whatever they may be. It is but the product of the imperialistic rivalries between the capitalist classes of the different countries for world hegemony and for the monopoly in the exploitation and oppression of areas still not under the heel of capital. In the era of the unleashing of this imperialism, national wars are no longer possible. National interests serve only as the pretext for putting the laboring masses of the people under the domination of their mortal enemy, imperialism.

6. The policy of the imperialist states and the imperialist war cannot give to a single oppressed nation its liberty and its independence. The small nations, the ruling classes of which are the accomplices of their partners in the big states, constitute only the pawns on the imperialist chessboard of the great powers, and are used by them, just like their own working masses, in wartime, as instruments, to be sacrificed to capitalist interests after the war.

7. The present world war signifies, under these conditions, either in the case of "defeat" or of "victory", a defeat for socialism and democracy. It increases, whatever the outcome — excepting the revolutionary intervention of the international proletariat — and strengthens militarism, national antagonisms, and economic rivalries in the world market. It accentuates capitalist exploitation and reaction in the domain of internal policy, renders the influence of public opinion precarious and derisory, and reduces parliaments to tools more and more obedient to imperialism. The present world war carries within itself the seeds of new conflicts.

8. World peace cannot be assured by projects utopian or, at bottom, reactionary, such as tribunals of arbitration by capitalist diplomatists, diplomatic "disarmament" conventions, "the freedom of the seas," abolition of the right of maritime arrest, "the United States of Europe," a "customs union for central Europe," buffer states, and other illusions. Imperialism, militarism and war can never be abolished nor attenuated so long as the capitalist class exercises, uncontested, its class hegemony. The sole means of successful resistance, and the only guarantee of the peace of the world, is the capacity for action and the re-

<sup>1</sup> On January 1, 1916, they formed the Spartacus League.

volutionary will of the international proletariat to hurl its full weight into the balance.

9. Imperialism, as the last phase in the life, and the highest point in the expansion, of the world hegemony of capital, is the mortal enemy of the proletariat of all countries. But under its rule, just as in the preceding stages of capitalism, the forces of its mortal enemy have increased in pace with its development. It accelerates the concentration of capital, the pauperisation of the middle classes, the numerical reinforcement of the proletariat; arouses more and more resistance from the masses; and leads thereby to an intensified sharpening of class antagonisms. In peace time as in war, the struggle of the proletariat as a class has to be concentrated first of all against imperialism. For the international proletariat, the struggle against imperialism is at the same time the struggle for power, the decisive settling of accounts between socialism and capitalism. The final goal of socialism will be realised by the international proletariat only if it opposes imperialism all along the line, and if it makes the issue: "war against war" the guiding line of its practical policy; and on condition that it deploys all its forces and shows itself ready, by its courage to the point of extreme sacrifice, to do this.

10. In this framework, socialism's principal mission today is to regroup the proletariat of all countries into a living revolutionary force; to make it, through a powerful international organization which has only one conception of its tasks and interests, and only one universal tactic appropriate to political action in peace and war alike, the decisive factor in political life: so that it may fulfil its historic mission.

11. The war has smashed the Second International. Its inadequacy has been demonstrated by its incapacity to place an effective obstacle in the way of the segmentation of its forces behind national boundaries in time of war, and to carry through a common tactic and action by the proletariat in all countries.

12. In view of the betrayal, by the official representatives of the socialist parties in the principal countries, of the aims and interests of the working class; in view of their passage from the camp of the working-class International to the political camp of the imperialist bourgeoisie; it is vitally necessary for socialism to build a new workers' International, which will take into its own hands the leadership and co-ordination of the revolutionary class struggle against world imperialism.

To accomplish its historic mission, socialism must be guided by the following principles:

1. The class struggle against the ruling classes within the boundaries of the bourgeois states, and international solidarity of the workers of all countries, are the two rules of life, inherent in the

working class in struggle and of world-historic importance to it for its emancipation. There is no socialism without international proletarian solidarity, and there is no socialism without class struggle. The renunciation by the socialist proletariat, in time of peace as in time of war, of the class struggle and of international solidarity, is equivalent to suicide.

2. The activity of the proletariat of all countries as a class, in peace time as in war time, must be geared to the fight against imperialism and war as its supreme goal. Parliamentary and trade union action, like every activity of the workers' movement, must be subordinated to this aim, so that the proletariat in each country is opposed in the sharpest fashion to its national bourgeoisie, so that the political and spiritual opposition between the two becomes at each moment the main issue, and international solidarity between the workers of all countries is underlined and practised.

3. The centre of gravity of the organization of the proletariat as a class is the International. The International decides in time of peace the tactics to be adopted by the national Sections on the questions of militarism, colonial policy, commercial policy, the celebration of May Day and, finally, the collective tactic to be followed in the event of war.

4. The obligation to carry out the decisions of the International takes precedence over all else. National Sections which do not conform with this place themselves outside the International.

5. The setting in motion of the massed ranks of the proletariat of all countries is alone decisive in the course of struggles against imperialism and against war.

Thus the principal tactic of the national Sections aims to render the masses capable of political action and resolute initiative; to ensure the international cohesion of the masses in action; to build the political and trade union organizations in such a way that, through their mediation, prompt and effective collaboration of all the Sections is at all times guaranteed, and so that the will of the International materialises in action by the majority of the working-class masses all over the world.

6. The immediate mission of socialism is the spiritual liberation of the proletariat from the tutelage of the bourgeoisie, which expresses itself through the influence of nationalist ideology. The national Sections must agitate in the parliaments and the press, denouncing the empty wordiness of nationalism as an instrument of bourgeois domination. The sole defense of all real national independence is at present the revolutionary class struggle against imperialism. The workers' fatherland, to the defense of which all else must be subordinated, is the socialist International.

# TOGLIATTI CONDEMNS THE POLICY OF "SOCIAL-FASCISM"

## 30 YEARS LATE!

By HENRI VALLIN

The theoretical magazine of the Italian Communist Party *Rinascità* published in its issue of July – August 1959 an article by Palmiro Togliatti, entitled "Some problems of the history of the International". A long summary of the same article appeared in the international Stalinist magazine *World Marxist Review* (our quotations are from the French edition of that magazine: *La Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, No 15, November 1959). Many things stand to be corrected in this article. We shall however concentrate our attention, for the time being, on only one of the problems it touches on, a problem which was of decisive importance for the fate of the German and Austrian working class, nay of the working class of the whole of Europe and of the Soviet Union: the attitude of the Communist International and the Communist Parties towards the rise of Nazism, on the eve of the conquest of power by the Hitler gangs on January 30, 1933.

Togliatti's article offers us in reality a self-criticism in his capacity of member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International of that period. This self-criticism is at the same time a criticism of the policy followed by all the Communist Parties during Hitler's rise to power. We translate the most important paragraphs from the French edition of the magazine:

The worst mistake, said Togliatti, consisted in treating social-democracy as social-fascism; no less mistaken were the conclusions which followed from that definition. It is correct to say that the social-democratic leaders had gone so far as to struggle against the revolutionary mass movement, and to suppress it even by arms, exactly as did the fascists. It is also correct to say that there are points of encounter between reformist ideology, defending class collaboration, and certain aspects of the ideology defended by the fascists. But the social nature of both these movements was different. The fascist were supported by the most reactionary layers of Capital; the reformist leaders were linked with entirely different groups, which had broken neither with a certain democratic tradition, nor with bourgeois pacifism. The basis of both movements was also different: in many countries, the majority of the workers and of the toiling masses were in the organisations led by the reformists; and fascist violence attacked those organisations and tried to destroy them.

But it was above all important to understand in time the perspective created by the progress of fascism: a perspective of destruction of all democratic institutions and liberties. To talk about social-fascism meant fundamentally to state that the reformist leaders and social-democracy as such pursued the same goal, which was obviously wrong. For it had to happen — and in fact it did happen — that a (not negligible) part of social-democracy was ready to defend the democratic institutions [...]. On this basis, the unity of action with the social-democratic masses and their organisations became naturally much more difficult; it had only a sporadic character and could not influence the situation (pp 157-8 of the French edition)

Some paragraphs further, on p 159, Togliatti states

openly that the absence of this unity of action had decisively contributed to the victory of Nazi fascism.

We shall not analyze here the *opportunist deviation* which is contained in this self-criticism. Instead of regarding the antifascist united front as a form of the *proletarian class struggle*, which would have made it possible (as the French and Spanish examples of 1934 – 36 have shown) to pass from the defensive against fascism to a general attack against the capitalist economy and state, till the point where a revolutionary situation is created which puts the conquest of power on the agenda, Togliatti limits this united front to all extent and purposes to the defence of bourgeois democracy, arm in arm with layers of the "liberal bourgeoisie". He cannot understand that it was precisely the crisis of *bourgeois* democracy and of the *capitalist* economy which drove hundreds of thousands of desperate and pauperised petty-bourgeois and unemployed into the arms of fascism. To *limit* the united front to purely defensive purposes, to fail to open socialist perspectives to the toiling masses, meant to prepare by a detour the very same victory of fascism (as the tragic example of Spain 1936 – 9 and of France 1934 – 40 have also shown).

But we want to concentrate not upon Togliatti's present errors, but upon his self-criticism, i e, upon his errors of 30 years ago. In this context, a misunderstanding must be eliminated. One could think that Togliatti has honestly made a mistake, that in the years 1930 – 1933 he had really thought the policy of social-fascism to be correct, and that it was only after Hitler's victory that he "saw the light" and penitently beats his breast now.

### TROTSKY – AND TOGLIATTI – ON THE UNITED FRONT

Unfortunately, such a hypothesis is untenable for two reasons. First of all, Togliatti has correctly understood the fundamental social differences between fascism and social-democracy *already before 1930*, as indicated in an article he published in the magazine *Communist International*, an article which in broad lines gave a correct estimation of fascism. Nevertheless, he kept silent between 1930 and 1933, when the whole international communist movement had become a gigantic factory for mass production of "social-fascist" theory and practice. Secondly, during these decisive years for the destiny of the German and European proletariat, Leon Trotsky and the International Left Opposition (forerunner of the IVth International), analysed and denounced in all countries, but especially in Germany, in hundreds of articles, appeals, speeches, pamphlets and books the folly of this theory and practice of "social-fascism", warned the German workers that it would lead to Hitler's coming to power, and showed them at the same time the road towards the proletarian united front which could prevent disaster. To all these warnings given at the crucial moment, Togliatti found only one argument to oppose: he kept silent.



We could therefore characterize Togliatti's conception of Marxism – Leninism in the following way: It is of vital importance to understand the nature of fascism, before it becomes an actual threat; it is of equally vital importance to analyze – in a “critical and selfcritical manner” – the nature of that danger, after the fascists unfortunately have come to power. But while the danger is urgent, but can still be overcome, one must have the courage to keep silent, in order “not to break the unity of the world communist movement”, in order to prevent the slightest cloud to obscure the blue sky of “complete solidarity with the Soviet Union” (actually: with the ruling bureaucracy in Soviet society).

In the light of this self-criticism which comes 30 years too late, we have to ask three questions of Togliatti and of every honest communist militant.

In the first place, isn't it necessary to put an end to the Thälmann myth, which presents the leader of the German Communist Party in the years 1930 – 33 as a kind of German Lenin, always correct on all important political issues, in the forefront of the fight of the German working class?

We have of course respect for Thälmann as a victim of fascist terror, as we respect the thousands of working class militants who lost their lives through that same terror. But we should never forget that Thälmann was the chief person in Germany responsible for the policies of “social-fascism” and that with his stubborn sense of bureaucratic obedience, he crushed and neutralized the spontaneous protest of broad layers of the communist workers against that mad policy.

We should [...] now especially apply the strategy of the main attack to be directed against social-democracy inside the labor movement [...] As long as they have not been liberated from the influence of their social-fascist leaders, these millions of workers (of the SPD and the ADG B) are lost(!) for the anti-fascist fight,

wrote Thälmann in the July – August 1932 issue of the official theoretical (!) organ of the German CP, *Die Internationale* (p 281). And in the same article – written six months before Hitler came to power! – we find the following “answer” to Trotsky's warnings about the urgency of a united front against the Nazi threat:

Mister Trotsky and similar “consultants” of the proletariat want to propose to the working class a policy which separates (!) the struggle of the revolutionary party against fascism from that against social-fascism, the struggle against the Hitler party from that against the social-democracy, and opposes these struggles to each other. Following their recipe, the CPG should abandon today its struggle against social-democracy, and form a block with the party of the Hindenburg socialists, with “Noske and Grzesinski,” in order to “fight” in this way against Hitler (p 283.)

Trotsky, of course, never proposed to stop the struggle against social-democracy. He only stated the cruel fact that if this struggle was not subordinated to the *common* struggle against Nazism, it would have to be pursued under the quite uncomfortable conditions of a concentration camp. Explaining things in this way would create, by the way, the necessary conditions for being listened to by the social-democratic workers, i.e., for an efficient struggle against reformism. Thälmann obstinately refused to understand this, and found a tragic death in a concentration camp, together with hundreds of “social-fascists” and thousands of communists.

#### STALIN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NONSENSE OF SOCIAL FASCISM

In the second place, it is necessary to state openly that if Thälmann bears the main responsibility for the madness of “social-fascism” being applied to the unfortunate German labor movement, the main responsibility for putting this madness over the international and German communist movement in general undoubtedly lies with J V Stalin. In the theoretical organ of the German CP *Die Internationale*, there appeared in February 1932 (p 68) the following significant quotation from J V Stalin:

Fascism is a combat organization of the bourgeoisie, which supports [!] itself by the active collaboration of the social-democracy. Social-democracy is objectively the moderate wing [!] of fascism. There is no reason to suppose that the combat organization of the bourgeoisie could obtain decisive successes in the struggle for the government [!] of the country without the active support of social-democracy [...] There is equally little reason to suppose that the social-democracy could obtain decisive successes in the struggle for the government of the country without the active support [!] of the combat organization of the bourgeoisie. These organizations do not exclude [!] each other, but are of a complementary nature. They are not antipodes but twins. Fascism is a formless block [!] of both these organizations.

To continue in Stalin's style: There is no reason to suppose that without the pressure of the Comintern's apparatus, the German CP would have obstinately clung for three long years to this mad policy. There is equally little reason to suppose that without that pressure, the united front between social-democracy and the CP could actually have been prevented. There is therefore no reason to suppose that without the “ideological activity” of J V Stalin, Hitler could have come to power.

In the – for this moment – current version of the *History of the CPSU*, Stalin is represented as having been “basically right in his struggle against the Trotskyists and the Right-wing deviationists.” His “errors” only begin to appear in the thirties, more exactly in the purges of 1934, which also start the “personality cult.” Our second question therefore runs as follows: Does Palmiro Togliatti agree with this latest version of the *History of the CPSU*? Is he of the opinion that Stalin was right against Trotsky on the German question between 1930 and 1933, when he defended the theory of “social-fascism” and its inevitable consequences, and condemned Trotsky's urgent appeals in favor of a proletarian united front against fascism as “counter-revolutionary”?

Third: Hitler's coming to power threw back the cause of socialism in Western and Central Europe for 15 – 20 years. It cost the German and the international working class thousands of its best sons. It led to tremendous destruction in the western territories of the Soviet Union, took a toll of 20 million deaths from the Soviet people and probably retarded the economic growth of the Soviet Union by at least ten years. No person in his right mind could justify today that it was “preferable, in the interest of the defense of the Soviet Union,” to let Hitler come to power, instead of preventing this conquest of power by the proletarian united front!

We therefore pose our third question: was it right

for Togliatti (and many other communist cadres) to "obey" in the thirties the nonsense of "social-fascism" *notwithstanding their knowing better*, in order to remain "disciplined" and not to "favor Trotskyists and Right-wing deviationists"? Was it in the interests of the international communist movement to keep silent on this crucial issue for reasons of so-called discipline — *bureaucratic* discipline, for Leninist discipline is based on telling the truth to the workers and to one's own Party?

Could Togliatti bring himself to a self-criticism on this point too? To state the question more precisely: Will

Togliatti criticize the current issue of the *History of the CPSU*, at least at those points where it suppresses Stalin's responsibility for the theory and practise of social-fascism, where it suppresses the fact that Trotsky was the only internationally known leader of communism who defended a correct position on this crucial issue?

Will Togliatti answer these three questions? If he doesn't, one will have to conclude that he lacks, now as well as in the years 1930–33, the twin qualities of strength of character and faithfulness to principles. And without character and principles, no successful communist policy is possible, no more to-day than 30 years ago.

# MARXISM AS SEEN BY BOURGEOIS ECONOMISTS

By ERNEST GERMAIN

For a few years now, Marxist theory, and more especially Marxist economic theory, has enjoyed a kind of revival in academic circles.<sup>1</sup> It is not that this theory is being studied or lectured on objectively at the western universities. It is rather a curious by-product of the economic successes realized by the workers' states, and more precisely the technical exploits of the U.S.S.R. The most "liberal" spirits of the bourgeois world again and again ask themselves if these results are not due, in the last analysis, to the superiority of Marxian theory. To rephrase a famous sally of Marx: these gentlemen are more ready to admit the correctness of 38 theses of Marxism among 39, than to admit the inherent superiority of a single socialized factory in a planned economy compared to a capitalist one.

Nevertheless, each time, these bourgeois economists come back disappointed from their strange queries into the unknown land of Marx. Their disappointment has a double origin. One, the (practical and theoretical) models of Stalinism to which they address themselves mostly in order to know what Marxism is all about; second, their own ideological (and in the last analysis, class) prejudices, which do not permit them fully to comprehend the particularities, complexities and remarkable suppleness of the method of investigation and interpretation of economic phenomena developed by Marx and his disciples.

Jean Marchal and Jacques Lecaillon, two French University professors of political economy, have recently published a long book on Marxian economics.<sup>2</sup> They have undertaken a doubtless honest effort of analysis and synthesis. Nevertheless, their results are mostly disappointing, as much to the well-informed reader as to the authors, who do not lack information either. The sources of this disappointment are precisely those which we have just indicated.

## OBJECTIONS TO THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE

Whatever may be their goodwill, these two professors do not succeed in understanding certain

<sup>1</sup> Famous bourgeois economists like Joan Robinson, Samuelson and Fr Perroux have devoted articles and books to Marxism recently.

<sup>2</sup> *La Répartition du Revenu National*, tome 3: *Modèles Classiques et Marxistes* — Edition Génin, Paris 1958, pp 393. Of these 393 pages, only 50 odd treat classical political economy; all the rest is devoted to Marxism.

### NOTE

Unfortunately we received this important article on Marxism and certain contemporary bourgeois economists too late for mention on the cover page. — Editors.

nuances, certain basic notions, although they are rather simple ones. They develop a real obsession for presenting Marxist theory as a *closed, abstract and logical system*. There is of course an element of truth in that; but at the same time, the categories of the Marxist "system" cannot be simply understood as pure abstractions. They are always abstractions which result from *an analysis of a real historical process*, which afterwards is "re-constructed" by thought in a more or less simplified manner, in order to become fully understandable.

Let us take the example of the basic notion of Marxist economic theory: the value (or exchange value) of the commodity. It is well known that Marx developed and completed the labor theory of value first elaborated by the classical school of political economy (Petty, Adam Smith, Ricardo). This theory states, shortly, that the value (exchange value) of a commodity is determined only by the *human labor* necessary for its production. Marx made this definition precise by adding: *socially necessary* human labor is the only source of value production.

Our two professors admit that this theory is correct — but only in the very long run. They admit, in other words, that *in the last analysis* all value can be retraced to the only source: of human labor. Even if one admits that there are two "inputs of value", labor and capital, one has still to examine whether "capital" (e.g., machines) is a "source of the last resort." It is clear that these machines have also been created by labor and other machines. If one goes back far enough, one arrives first at raw materials, in which labor already represents 50—60% of the production costs. Going back still further, one can finally discover that all man-made instruments received their original value only from human labor. Adding everything together, one then arrives at labor as the only source of value.

But our authors go on by stating that this analysis becomes incorrect if one substitutes a short period (e.g., one year), or a very short period (e.g.,

one production cycle, or one month), for this very long period. For,

the building of equipment implies also that the builder [?] does not receive immediately [?] a remuneration for this effort, that he consents not only to work but also to forego consumption, that he gives time. Marx poses implicitly that this time isn't worth anything (p 88.)

We admit that we do not understand at all the distinction which Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon introduce between normal, capitalist production of equipment, and any other form of capitalist commodity production.

Between the beginning of any productive process and the moment the value of the produced commodity has been realized there is always some period of time during which the capitalist "foregoes remuneration"; the only exception is the one of producing on fixed order and being paid on delivery. In that case, only during the actual period of production does the capitalist forego remuneration. It is true that it takes quite a bit more time to build a modern transfer machine than to produce, say, a table and four chairs. But on the other hand the transfer machine is nearly always sold the moment it is produced, whereas the table and chairs may remain six months in a shop before being sold. As for the workers, they don't receive an "immediate remuneration" either; they are paid at the end of the week, of two weeks, or of the month. What *qualitative* difference there exists between these situations, and why "waiting" should "produce value," we cannot very well comprehend.

Our authors in reality seem to suggest (p 90) the case of a handicraftsman, building himself, with his own means of production, and without wage-labor, new productive equipment. In this case, it is quite true that the handicraftsman "foregoes consumption" by using his revenue for buying raw materials etc — which is of course not true at all in the case of a capitalist.<sup>3</sup> But here again, it is not a special case of a handicraftsman building some productive equipment; this is the case of anybody engaged in petty commodity production and not working on orders. There is, from this point of view, no difference whatsoever between, say, an independent toolmaker, a tailor, or a chemist who is launching all by himself a new beauty product.

Each one of these petty producers runs a terrible risk: his product may not be sold at all; his sacrifice may have been — commercially — use-

less. This risk is implied in any form of commodity production for an anonymous market. But far from being an argument *against* the labor theory of value, it constitutes one of its most striking applications.

Marx did not conceive the labor theory of value simply as a "logical" explanation of the "mysteries of the capitalist jungle." This theory had to explain also, in his eyes, how exchange, how the market, could coördinate and weld together the seemingly individualistic and disorganized activities of millions of persons, independent of each other and following only their "self-interest." It isn't the whim, the malice or the relative skill of thousands of individual producers which determine the value of their commodities; it is only that portion of the labor time they spend *which satisfies a valid social need*. It is not the total labor time spent by each producer which automatically creates new value; it is only the portion of that time which is *socially necessary labor*. And only the act of selling — or, more correctly, the act of paying, for beware of insolvent creditors! — decides which is this portion of socially necessary labor present in each commodity.

To return to our handicraftsman building tools all by himself: inasmuch as he "has to wait" in order to sell his product, not only does he not get the right to impute more "value" to this product, but rather the longer he waits, the less the chance that his commodity incorporates any socially necessary labor, i e any value, whatsoever! If in the end he cannot sell his commodity, he has "failed" in the eyes of society, not in contradiction but in application of the labor theory of value. His labor spent was not socially necessary but socially wasted labor. And as such it has no equivalent whatsoever.

If they had approached the question in a historical spirit, our authors could have easily solved the problem. In an eleventh-century demesne "income distribution" follows often a very simple pattern. The peasant serf works three days a week on his own plot of land, and three days on his landlord's. The origin of the landlord's income is not hidden by any mystery; it is simply the serf's unpaid labor.<sup>4</sup>

Some people could say, of course, that "in exchange" for this unpaid labor, the serf gets the "protection" of the landlord, and, if his landlord be clerical, spiritual solace as well. This may be as it is, but it is clear that the words "in exchange" are used here in an absolutely *non-economic* sense.

<sup>4</sup> Sophists say that the serf has to pay the landowner because otherwise "he couldn't find access to the land he needs." This is of course history turned upside down. In general, the serfs were living on their land for a long time, when the feudal lords arrived or arose and took away their surplus-product.

<sup>3</sup> Could one seriously say that Lady Docker, who hasn't exactly a modest standard of living, "foregoes consumption" when her husband invests his millions? What could she do otherwise with them? Buy a hundred gold-plated Bentleys instead of a couple of them?

The same situation applies to the capitalist wageearner. To say that profit is not only unpaid labor of the wageearners, but also the "price," the "equivalent," the "result of an exchange" for the "waiting" and "foregoing of consumption" by the capitalist, is simply playing with words. "Waiting" has no more price than the "security" offered by the manor, or the "spiritual solace" offered by the abbey. As a matter of fact, the serfs had to pay specially for each and every mass they wanted for the "spiritual solace" of themselves or their families. Under capitalism, the workers do not "buy" the "waiting" of the capitalists any more than the serfs "bought" the "protection" of their robber barons. They are *obliged* to abandon their surplus-product to the capitalist entrepreneur, in the same way as the serf was *obliged* to leave his surplus-product to the landowner: because otherwise they cannot get their means of livelihood under the given social setup.

#### VALUE AND PRICES OF PRODUCTION

But Marx made a very significant amendment to the operation of the labor theory of value under the capitalist mode of production; this amendment once again stresses the *social rôle* of exchange. The total mass of surplus-value is distributed between the different capitalist enterprises not according to the surplus-value directly created in each of them — the number of workers they employ and their degree of exploitation — but proportionately to the mass of capital each capitalist enterprise commands. This is the problem which the theoreticians call the problem of "transformation of value into prices of production," the price of production of each commodity being determined by the capital (constant plus variable) spent for its production, plus this same capital multiplied by the average rate of profit.

More simply we can call this problem the problem of *equalization of the rate of profit*.

Our professors develop a tremendous lot of difficulties in this respect; they discover a thousand "contradictions" which they then set out to "solve" in the most ponderous manner possible. And in reality the problem is a rather simple one . . .

First objection which they raise: Marx says that only variable capital (used to buy labor power) is "productive" of new value. But the distribution of surplus-value between capitalists, the equalization of the rate of profit, transfer surplus value created in one factory to another factory where it wasn't created. Isn't there a contradiction? This is a theme they constantly refer to, e g on pages 115-6, 119, 122-3, 190-1 etc.

Our authors forget here that accumulation of capital is not simply the expression of the "thirst

for wealth" or the "thirst for power" of the capitalists, as they somewhere state; this accumulation is *forced* upon the capitalist class by *competition*.

In order to succeed in the competitive process, it is necessary to lower the cost price of the products. In order to lower this cost price, it is in the last analysis necessary to lower their value, i e, to produce more commodities of a type in the same length of time. This again means to increase the productivity of labor, and this is done by developing equipment, i e, constant capital. Our authors try to imply that Marx did not consider constant capital an element of productivity of labor. The thought is of course ridiculous; Marx stated that the development of constant capital was the typical capitalist way to increase the productivity of labor.

The distribution of surplus-value among various capitalists is realized through the competition between various capitals. Through this competition, the enterprises which, thanks to their bigger constant capital, work *above the average level of productivity*, can undersell their competitors while realizing at the same time a profit above average. The enterprises which work below the average level of productivity will have to sell their commodities for a lower profit, or even at a loss. As a result, there is in fact a *transfer of surplus-value* from the last ones to the first ones. This transfer is no mystery at all; it is a result of price competition on the market.

But doesn't that mean that unpaid labor is not the *only* source of profit? Our professors now formulate their second objection, e g on p 124. Doesn't that mean that besides unpaid labor, the very act of exchange can under given conditions be a source of surplus-value?

Our authors are quite wrong. The transfer of surplus-value from one enterprise to another, "through the process of exchange," is not in contradiction with the labor theory of value. Only *socially necessary labor* determines the value of commodity. But under the capitalist mode of production, with the exception of work on order, no *capitalist* knows in advance if his commodities contain only socially necessary labor, and to what extent they do. It is only after having sold them that he can establish a balance sheet.

But enterprises which operate below the average level of social productivity of labor precisely waste social labor, for which they do not receive an equivalent on the market, in exactly the same way as a badly skilled or lazy handicraftsman isn't paid for his lost hours under petty commodity production. On the other hand, enterprises which operate above the average level of labor productivity receive more than the equivalent of the actual labor time spent on pro-

ducing their commodities; they get exactly the difference between this actually spent amount of labor, and the amount which would have been socially necessary, in order to produce the same quantity of commodities.

Third objection: no equalization of the rate of profit is actually possible, if the organic composition of capital is different in the different branches of industry, while at the same time the rate of surplus-value is everywhere the same. Our

$$\text{rate of profit} = \frac{\text{surplus-value}}{\text{constant} + \text{variable capital}}$$

can thus be written as follows:

$$\text{rate of profit} = \frac{\text{rate of surplus value} \times \text{variable capital}}{\text{constant capital} + \text{variable capital}},$$

which means

$$\text{rate of profit} = \text{rate of surplus value} \times \frac{\text{variable capital}}{\text{constant} + \text{variable capital}}$$

In other words: if the rate of surplus-value is equal in two industrial sectors, the rate of profit cannot be equal if variable capital is not an equal portion of total capital or, what is the same, if the organic composition of capital is different.

Let us state in passing that our authors have written their book in a very hasty manner (and probably each of them has written a separate part). For whereas on some pages we find the correct definition of the organic composition of capital (the relation between constant and variable capital), in some passages the author implies that the organic composition of capital is the relation between variable capital and total capital. This leads him to the statement that the organic composition of capital "falls," when constant capital increases more than variable capital, which is quite "unorthodox" indeed (see e g pages 124 and 173).

Is there a contradiction between the theory of the equalization of the rate of profit, the fact of the differences in the organic composition of capital on the one hand and the equal rate of surplus-value on the other hand in various industrial sectors?

Once again, our authors needlessly complicate their job. Contrary to what they say (p 118), Marx never taught that the rate of surplus-value was identical in all industrial sectors. This would have been a monstrous statement indeed, completely contrary to the logic of his "system" and to the historical evolution of capitalism. Marx simply stated that he wanted to *abstract* from the very real difference in the rate of surplus-value, while working out his famous schemes of reproduction. It is necessary to recall here that these schemes in general abstract from all "laws of motion" of

authors arrive at this "penetrating" conclusion after a long and complicated series of ten equations. They could have found this truism much more easily.

The rate of profit is the relation between surplus-value and the total capital spent in production, constant as well as variable. Surplus-value, on the other hand, is the product of variable capital and the rate of surplus-value. The formula for establishing the rate of profit,

capitalism, and that to try to discover these laws from the workings of the schemes means to commit a very serious methodological error.

The solution of the "contradiction" is thus very simple. In different branches of industry there exist different organic compositions of capital, and also different rates of surplus-value. In general, the higher the organic composition of capital, the higher the rate of surplus-value. These two factors cannot, however, increase *in the same proportions*. This is the "last resort" reason for the tendency to a fall of the average rate of profit, as our authors correctly — and surprisingly! — state at one stage of their enquiries (p 195), quite at a loss however in many other passages of the same book . . .

When the rate of profit is higher in a branch of industry, new capital tries to break into this field. This means an increase of competition, an increase in the organic composition of capital, an increase in the average level of productivity, and thereby a lowering of the rate of profit. On the other hand, when capital leaves a sector where the rate of profit is below average, production falls (relatively or absolutely), the socially necessary labor time allotted to the production of that commodity by socially useful demand is no longer exceeded (there may even be "under-production" for a period). Prices rise, and the rate of profit increases.

In other words: Marx never taught that the rate of profit was actually always equal in all sectors of industry. He started, on the contrary, from the assumption that these rates were *different*, and that these *differences* determine the movement of capital (the processes of investment). There is thereby a *tendency* towards equalization,

but only a tendency, constantly counteracted by competition between capitals. The "average rate of profit" is an abstraction; real rates fluctuate around this average, being below it or above it, and thereby "guiding" investment movements.

### PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOR

Another source of difficulties and constant "contradictions" for our authors is the "lack of homogeneity" of the working class; the differences of wages inside this working class; the "difference of status" between the productive and the unproductive workers etc. This is another of the recurrent themes of the book.

Let us underline, in passing, an incredible passage which shows how the author is hypnotized by Stalinist influence:

Mao Tse-Tung was probably [!] the first among the important Marxist authors who insisted on the contradictions which can exist "within the working class" (p 87.)

Without doubt the author of this remarkable sentence has never heard about Marx's pamphlet on the Paris Commune, which dwells on the problem of bureaucracy, nor about Kautsky's *Origins of Christianity* which ends with a whole passage on the (possible) contradiction between the mass of the workers and the workers' bureaucracy; nor about Rosa Luxemburg's articles which treat the same question in the light of the German labor movement 1900-1914, nor about Lenin's *Imperialism* which treats at length the problem of the "workers' aristocracy," starting from some remarks Engels made on that subject 25 years earlier; nor about the enormous mass of analysis which Leon Trotsky, the world Trotskyist movement, and later on the Yugoslav Communist Party devoted to the subject of the "contradiction between the mass of the workers and the labor bureaucracy." Or perhaps our author considers neither Engels, nor Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky... or Marx himself as "important" Marxists, compared with Mao Tse-Tung!

In their treatment of the differences between productive and unproductive labor, our authors are confused by an abundant mass of quotations from Stalinist authors who excel in byzantine dogmatism on this subject. The confusion is felt right from the start, for our authors do not understand that Marx discerns three notions which are not "contradictory" but *complementary*:

1) Labor which *produces surplus-value*: this is all wage labor which creates commodities owned by a capitalist, be it factory labor, or home industry labor, or even labor of some small share-croppers. The only conditions are that the products must be sold on the

market and must be — at least in part: this is true for the small share-cropper — the property of a capitalist.

- 2) Labor which *produces* value but not surplus-value: this is all labor of petty independent producers, provided their products are commodities (sold on the market), and they do not employ wage labor. One could, in theory, add that if such petty producers succeed in exceeding the average level of productivity of labor, they could accumulate a (small) part of the surplus-value produced in the capitalist sector. Outside of periods of exceptional shortness of goods, the case has no practical importance.
- 3) Labor which produces use-values but neither surplus-value nor exchange-value. This is the case with all servants who manufacture products for their masters, or of all production *within the household* which is not sold on the market. However, especially in underdeveloped countries, quite a part of the material wealth of the nation is composed of these use-values, and they cannot be passed over if one wants to assess realistically the national wealth of such a country.

Our authors correctly state that Marx makes a fundamental distinction between "unproductive labor" (i.e. labor which does not produce material goods or commodities) and "socially harmful" (or unnecessary) labor. Poisoned food sold in the market, pornographic literature, armaments, are all products of "productive labor," because they are sold on the market and bring their owners surplus-value (or only value, if they are products of petty commodity producers). But the work of doctors, teachers, scientists occupied with "pure" research, many artists not working for the market is "unproductive" labor, while being socially highly useful and important. In fact, socialism would have the tendency to constantly increase these "unproductive" human activities, compared with activities which "produce value" and which would wither away.

A big part of the book is concerned with the problem of "absolute pauperization," drawing again heavily on Stalinist sources. We shall not treat this problem here, as we have analyzed it in a previous article.<sup>5</sup>

Let us say simply that when Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon try to deny "relative pauperization" of the working class, they do not sound very convincing. They quote some statistics from UN sources which indicate a rising trend of "wages and salaries" in the national income. Unfortunately, these statistics do not tell us anything on the wages of industrial workers, for they lump

<sup>5</sup> See *Quatrième Internationale*, June-July 1957.

together these workers with factory directors, hairdressers' aides, soldiers and officers drawing pay, bank administrators and state functionaries (lower, middle and high) etc. Our authors only quote a few figures comparing industrial workers' wages in France, Italy and Norway during the last 20 years, which don't tell anything either for or against the tendency to "relative pauperization." We can assure them that there are many serious statistics on the subject which quite confirm that law.

### WHO PAYS FOR THE SERVICES?

One of the most interesting questions posed by this book is the question regarding the place of the so-called "tertiary sector" (the "services") in contemporary economy and in the Marxist "system." Marx often wrote on this subject. But he considered only "services for the enjoyment of the capitalists," as was quite correct in his time. Can one still defend the same point of view today?

The correct answer is given on page 172 by the authors themselves, in a confused paragraph however, where they mix together the "wage-earning bourgeoisie" (?) and the "wage-earners working in the sector of the services." Nobody could deny that the needs of the workers have become greatly diversified in the course of the last 75 years, at least in western Europe. In the typical budget of a western European workers family, the purchasing of such "services" as the barber's and hairdresser's, the cleaner's and presser's, not to speak of the doctor's, the schoolteacher's and the public services (water, gas, electricity, public transport etc) has become a standard need. In the USA, Canada, Australia, one should add the services of garages and service stations inasmuch as the use of automobiles has become widespread in the working class.

In other words: services are at present bought by all incomes created in the production process. They are being exchanged against wages as well as against profit and land rent. Certain "popular" services are mostly exchanged against parts of salaries; certain "de luxe" services are more exclusively exchanged for surplus-value.

Could one consider that the income of wage-earners working in the "service" sector is a deduction of the industrial wage-earners' incomes (i.e., results in a lowering of the industrial workers' real wages)? Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon examine this question so to say in the light of Stalinist scholastics and sow thereby a lot of confusion.

The redistribution of national income by [...] high prices of the services [...] results in a decrease of the real wages of the workers,

writes the *Handbook of Political Economy*, published by the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union. And our authors quote also (on page 144) a sentence by Maurice Thorez, relative to the "pauperization" of the working class:

If the working class knows increasing difficulties, it is also because an always heavier pyramid of non-producers, from the yellow press pirate to the super-prefect, from the finance inspector to the priest, weighs down on its back.

These various statements do not resist an objective inquiry. When a working girl buys the service of a beauty parlor instead of buying herself a new sweater, she isn't "pauperized" in any sense whatsoever. She simply replaces one form of consumption by another. Workers who buy cars but eat or dress less well than before, do not get poorer nor do they get richer. Inasmuch as their nominal wages have not changed, and as the average cost of living has remained the same, their real wage has not been modified in any sense, when *the way in which they spend it* has been changed as the result of a diversification of needs.

One doesn't understand very well what the "high cost of services" has to do with it all. If prices rise without a proportional increase in nominal wages, there is of course a decline of real wages, "absolute pauperization." But this applies for any rise of commodity prices exactly as it does for an increase in the price of "services." An increase of 10% in the price of potatoes has exactly the same effect on the real wages of workers as an increase of 10% in the price of the public transport services, provided public transport represents the same part of the average working class family's budget as potatoes do.

Even more confusing is the Stalinist *Handbook's* reference to "redistribution of national income" in relation to services and their costs. When a worker buys the services of a cleaner's, he doesn't any more "redistribute" the national income as when he buys a pound of butter. These are acts of exchange, of buying and selling, and not of redistribution of national income. The fact that in one case a commodity is bought, and in the other case a specialized labor service doesn't modify in the least the nature of the act as an act of exchange.

This confusion stems from two sources. In the first place, the Stalinist authors on which Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon draw so heavily confuse services paid for by the consumers with public services *paid for by the state* (e.g., free education). When such services are handed out free, there occurs of course a redistribution of national income, for somebody has to pay for this in the last



resort (either by taxes or by inflation). In order to find out in whose favor this redistribution is carried out, it is necessary to analyze first the class structure of the tax payments, and secondly the class structure of the beneficiaries of the said publicly paid service. It is doubtful that this analysis will prove that there exists any serious redistribution of national income in favor of the industrial workers, contrary to what apologists of present-day capitalism so loudly claim. But it is even more doubtful that anybody will be able to prove that this redistribution of income actually increases the share of the bourgeoisie. As for the thesis that the state redistributes income in favor of the . . . capitalist entrepreneurs in the "services" sector, it is slightly ridiculous.

The second source of confusion is more serious but not less false. It is in fact the notion, inherited from certain 19th-century economists, according to which there exists a rigid "wage fund" corresponding to each given mass of capital, in each given period. If this were the case, then of course the distribution of wages to non-productive workers automatically would cut down the remnants of the fund to be distributed among the productive workers. The greater the total wages of workers occupied in the services, the less the residue which could be distributed among the industrial workers. Any increase in the former could only be realized at the expense of the latter.

But this "wage fund theory" has been discredited for a long time and proven completely wrong. It has never been part of the Marxist theory; in fact, Marx has vigorously polemized against it. Such a theory not only establishes an antagonism between workers in the services and industrial workers. It also establishes an antagonism between employed and unemployed workers, between workers asking for higher wages and the other categories etc. For following this theory, any advantage in income for any part of the working class derives always from a disadvantage for all other parts.

Reality is of course completely different. There isn't any preëstablished "wage fund." There is only a maximum capacity of productive forces, a given supply of means of production and manpower in society, and, in a capitalist society, a given mass of capital. The way it is divided, between constant and variable capital (wages), between the two big sectors of capitalist production, between totally or partially utilized plants and idle ones; the way surplus-value is in due course again divided between the unproductive consumption of the capitalists, the new constant capital and the supplementary variable capital (wages) — all this depends on many factors, among which the relationship of forces between the working class and the capitalist class is not unimportant.

It is from this *distribution of capital*<sup>6</sup> between different branches of activity that one must start in order to determine the influence of the "services" on the whole of the capitalist economic mechanism. Inasmuch as contemporary, largely monopolized, industry has a tendency to limit the fields of new capital investment, the development of the "service" branch, far from "depressing" wages, has rather played the historical rôle of a "new industry," i.e. has procured supplementary sources of employment and thereby relatively reduced unemployment and pressure on real wages. It is true that inasmuch as the average productivity in the "services" sector is much lower than in industry, and capital invested in this sector must thereby operate with lower wages in order to enjoy more or less the average rate of profit, a contradictory tendency has counteracted this positive effect on the general wage rates.

To state that surplus-value invested in the "services" sector has been "deducted" from industrial investment is true, of course, only in a general abstract sense. Under present-day conditions, industry is suffering in most advanced countries not from under-capitalization (shortage of capital), but of over-capitalization. It is not capital but fields of profitable investment which are lacking. It is in the light of this obvious fact that the problem of the development of the "services" sector must be seen.

#### AN OVERALL APPRECIATION OF MARXIST ECONOMIC THEORY

What is the final appraisal of Marx's economic theory by our two professors? Marx succeeded in integrating political economy and sociological (as well as juridical) analysis. Instead of reducing the economic activities to a unique form of human behavior — as is done by the neo-classical school which developed the marginal utility theory of value — he reduced these activities to two kinds of behavior — the behavior of two *social classes* — each determined by specific social conditions in which it occurs.

On the other hand, instead of considering the economy's social framework as stable and eternal (as the classic school of political economy more or less implies), Marx tries to *integrate the me-*

<sup>6</sup> It is absurd to pose the question: are the investments in the "services" sector deductions from wages or deductions from surplus-value? In the first place, all surplus-value is a "deduction" from the wages (i.e. unpaid labor). In the second place, all capital derives from surplus-value, i.e. is capitalized surplus-value. In the third place, the sums invested in the "services" enterprises are, directly, neither a result of the distribution of wages nor of surplus-value. They do not spring from a distribution of income, but are a result of the *distribution of capital*. Only the *payment for services rendered* derives from either wages or surplus-value.

*chanism of the capitalist economy (its laws of motion) and the evolution of society.*

In other words: our authors admit that Marxism tries to reintegrate economy, sociology and history which were arbitrarily separated from each other by bourgeois ideology at a given stage of the class struggle in capitalist society. This merit is not a slight one.

But Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon oppose to these merits some "solid" reproaches. The sociological analysis of Marx has been "too schematic" (p 377). Exploitation could operate not only vertically (between workers and capitalists), but also horizontally (between different industries, between different groups of workers etc). We have answered that argument already. At the same time our authors argue that Marxist analysis gets further and further from reality, in as much as capitalist economy becomes more and more complex (and, our authors seem to imply, in as much as it becomes less and less capitalistic).

As for the historical approach of Marx, which our authors consider quite valuable in itself, it seems to them unfit to take into account a *gradual transformation* of social structure, i e, it includes only the possibility of "global reactions" (social revolution) and not of "partial reactions" (trade union activities; state intervention; nationalization of some branches of industry etc.)

Our professors thus express in a somewhat learned, nay pedantic manner, a current truism of liberal bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles: Marx' analysis would apply to the "capitalism of the 19th century," but would be more or less useless in the "present reality, infinitely more complex than in Marx' epoch."

In a general sense, this objection is of course incorrect; it is a typical expression of ideological,

i e class prejudices. Even if one were to admit that Marx "has forgotten" the middle classes, it would be difficult to deny that the American economy of to-day is based fundamentally on the relations — and the antagonism — of the two great classes of capital and labor. Even if one were to admit that Marx "has forgotten the importance of trade-union activity," it would be equally difficult to deny that between these two classes is waged to-day, as it was a century ago, a *class struggle*, not only for the distribution of the industry's "net product," but also for the ultimate purpose to know who has to be the master in the shops, i e who has command over the means of production. During the recent great American steel strike, this has been openly stated by the steel bosses. They are, in their own pragmatic way, much better specialists on Marxism than our two university professors.

Needless to say: Marx neither "forgot" the middle classes nor trade-union action, and his system is infinitely more elastic and complex than is implied by superficial manuals written by Stalinists, on which Messrs Marchal and Lecaillon lean much too heavily.

What is, however, true is the fact that Marx' disciples have been too much occupied with repeating and interpreting the master's formulas, and much too little with analysing and commenting on contemporary economic developments in the light of his theory. Stalinism, which led to a pragmatic and apologetic degeneration of theory, has a tremendous responsibility in that respect. It is necessary to demonstrate in practice the superiority of the Marxist method, and to rebuild with the materials of contemporary reality the imposing and majestic theoretical construction of Marx. But that is another story.

December 15, 1959

# THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION REACHES THE "BELGIAN CONGO" AND RUANDA-URUNDI

By PHILIPPE VAN DAMME

For many long years the colonial revolution, which erupted in Kenya and has been developing in various parts of Negro Africa, seemed to have halted at the frontiers of the Congo.

The only political development of some importance before 1956 in the Congo was the appearance of the politico-religious Kimbanguist sect, whose propaganda, recalling that of the Anabaptists, spread mainly in the province of the Lower Congo during the twenties and up to our own day.

Condemned to death by the Belgian colonial administration, Simon Kimbangu, founder of this sect and one of the initiators of the Congolese revolution, died in 1951 in a prison where he had been held for 30 years.

The great anti-imperialist victories represented by the independence of Ghana and then that of Guinea, the unfolding of the Algerian people's struggle and of the Arab revolution in the Middle East, and, simultaneously, the economic crisis which seriously affected the Congolese economy during the course of 1957 through the lowering of the prices of primary raw materials; these are the decisive factors which have given rise to an extremely rapid political awakening of relatively large sectors of the Congolese masses in all the urban centres and a good number of the rural areas.

## THE ECONOMY OF THE CONGO AND CONGOLESE SOCIETY

The industrialisation of the Congo, slow enough before 1940, has been greatly accelerated over the last 20 years. Thus electrical production in the mining province of Katanga has increased from 300 million to 2,000 million kwh between 1949 and 1957, thanks to the building of three new hydro-electric stations. The production of copper by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (U M H K), the main Congolese trust — copper being the principal export product — increased from 143,000 tons in 1946 to 247,000 tons in 1956.

On the other hand, the mining industry has been mechanised to a very large extent, so that in 1957 it employed no more than 6.63% of the manual workers of the Congo, an extremely low figure for a colonial-type economy.

Equally, industrialization has promoted the formation of enterprises concentrating a great number of workers. In May, 1957, there were in the Congo 89 enterprises employing more than 1,000 wage-earners, of which 11 employ more than 10,000. These latter employ 170,000 workers.

The number of wage-earners, not including domestic servants, reached 1,198,000 in 1956, which represents 39% of the "healthy adult males,"<sup>1</sup> against 27% ten years

<sup>1</sup> The total number of wage-earners, by province, is (1956 figures): Leopoldville, 306,000; Kivu, 216,000; Katanga, 175,000; that is, nearly 50% of the "healthy adult male" population. In the other provinces, the percentage is lower: eastern and equatorial provinces, 30—32%; Kasai province, 32%.

earlier. That figure, if we take into account the mechanization, especially of the mines, amply demonstrates the extent of industrialization and the extremely rapid proletarianization. The Congo has thus become the second industrial power of Africa, coming after the Union of South Africa but before Egypt.

However, industry remains oriented fundamentally towards export, and Congolese economy exhibits the basic defects of all colonial and semi-colonial countries. It is only within the last few years that a certain amount of light industry has developed, in a pretty unbalanced way, in two or three big towns (textiles, bicycles, etc.)

Brutal techniques for the recruitment of forced labor and bad treatment have been replaced over the last 15 years by a paternalistic attitude typified in the building of laborers' towns, etc.

The rural exodus towards the urban and industrial centers has assumed enormous proportions, destroying the institutions of tribal society. As Basil Davidson puts it in his book, *The Awakening of Africa*: "It can be said that in reality the chief no longer anywhere leads his tribe; the tribal group nowhere remains intact. The bonds which, in former days, united the members of a tribe with one another and with their chief have everywhere loosened, and often snapped... Village life is disintegrating. It is a fact that the development of the towns has reached down into the tribal areas themselves. Tribal organization runs counter to the wishes of those who wish to participate in this development. The villagers seize on the ideas of urban civilization. They seek out ways to apply them to their daily lives, as the people of the towns do" (retranslated from the French. — Ed.).

The population which has deserted the tribal areas has increased from 1,017,000 (being 9.83%) in 1945 to 3,047,000 (23.13%) in 1957 and this feature has continued to increase thereafter.

The wages of these African workers have been very low until almost right up to the present, although noticeably higher than those of French Equatorial Africa, the British Central African Federation and Portuguese Angola. During the first four months of 1957, 45% of wage-earners in the Congo earned less than 11 Congolese francs a day, and 73% earned less than 20 francs (one Congolese franc is roughly equal to 10 "light" French francs). A perceptible increase has taken place in the last two years, but the standard of living remains very low.

In Leopoldville and the industrial centers of the Katanga, "high"-wage areas, the rates now prevailing are around 40 to 50 francs a day for workers in heavy industry, and 35 to 40 francs a day for workers in light industry.

In 1953, the grand total of wages of more than a million Congolese workers amounted to only 10 billion 130 million Congolese francs, while the national revenue was estimated at more than 43 billions. Of this sum, some 24,000 civil servants and European wage-earners allowed themselves nine billion 700 million, the rest

representing other revenue, duties, saving and, for the most part, the profits of European businesses and private individuals.<sup>2</sup>

The profits of the U M H K alone rose, on a capital of three billions, to one billion 454 million in 1948, only to climb in 1956, on a capital of eight billions, to the sum of five billion 471 million Congolese francs, of which 900 million was turned over to sundry amortizations and four billion 571 million comprised the net profits. Ninety million of the latter were divided among the 15 Belgian and British directors.

The net profits alone of ten important Congolese companies forming part of the financial group of the U M H K — the Société Générale — rose in 1957, notwithstanding that it was a year of recession and falling profits, to the sum of one billion 810 million Congolese francs.

If the income of wage-workers has risen during the last two years, that of rural workers remains very low, and can be estimated at less than half that of the industrial workers.<sup>3</sup>

Beside this considerable body of African workers and peasants at a very small income-level, the number of Europeans is very restricted: 0.7% of the population; some 100 to 105 thousand of the 14 million inhabitants of the Congo. This is a feeble percentage; noticeably weaker, for example, than that in Tanganyika, which is by no means considered a settlers' territory, and where Europeans are about 1.4% at the present moment.

These 100,000 Europeans, of whom three-quarters are Belgians, specially included at the end of 1957: 2,000 civil servants, 8,000 missionaries and about 2,000 settlers. Staff of the different companies comprised the overwhelming majority of the rest of the European working population: 21,700 persons in 1957, of whom 17,200 were Belgians. The number of self-employed persons, members of the liberal professions and small businessmen is very low.

### THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONGO

Before becoming a Belgian colony in 1909, the Congo, under the name of "the Independent Kingdom of the Congo," underwent 20 years of unheard-of exploitation and brutalities, widely denounced during the period by the social-democratic and even the Liberal press throughout Europe. The name of King Leopold II remains linked in a sinister way to this period, when gangs of adventurers in his service hurled themselves on central Africa. This first phase of colonization can be called the rubber and ivory phase, since these two natural products were the greatest source of profits for the bands of European pillagers who came to "civilize" the Congo by organizing spectacular raids into its territory. They

<sup>2</sup> Europeans' salaries in 1957:

Earning less than	10,000 Cong. fr. per month:	1.5 %
" from 10,000 to 20,000	" " " "	: 56 %
" " 20,000 to 30,000	" " " "	: 31.5 %
" " 30,000 to 40,000	" " " "	: 7 %
" more than 40,000	" " " "	: 4 %

<sup>3</sup> A statutory order of May 19, 1959 fixes the price of raw cotton bought from the natives, the sole producers, to prices varying from 4 to 5.85 Congolese francs according to quality. The price of sale F O B in Matadi, the export port, fixed by the monopolist COTONCO company at the same time reached some 46 Congolese francs per kilo of cotton bails, after a processing and handling of relatively slight importance.

left ruin and desolation in their tracks, and where, as in numerous cases, villages did not supply the quantity of rubber and ivory exacted, they massacred the healthy adults or cut off their right hands by way of reprisal. Victim to this barbarous repression, the population of the Congo was reduced by two or three million between 1890 and 1905, according to estimates made at the time and mentioned by Basil Davidson.

Forced human transport was introduced during this period and — the fact should be underlined — it was not until 1928 that the "Permanent Commission for the Protection of the Natives" set up by the Belgian parliament obtained the abolition of forced transport by humans in the case of Congolese women.

The countless deaths should also be recalled — one under each track-sleeper — which were the cost of constructing the Lower Congo railway, along the course of the river rapids from Matadi to Leopoldville . . .

From 1929 to 1940 the economic crisis and its consequences led to a very clear strengthening of the powers of the police in the Congo. Till a quite recent date penalties were imposed upon "negligent" workers, who on conviction were swiftly transformed into forced laborers used by the administration for building roads, etc.

In 1957 the total number of exiles sent to work camps under police supervision rose to 4,815, being a decrease of 300 by comparison with 1956. In December 1957 the decision was taken no longer to place people under house arrest for the mere fact of their belonging to a forbidden religious sect (this fact is referred to in the report for 1957 of the "Native Affairs and Labor Department").

Towards May 1956 it was possible to divine the development of precise political tendencies out of the Kitawala and Kimbanguist clandestine politico-religious sects. The national movement was born in reality with the support of the members of these sects, but more on the basis of the tribalist movements such as the ABAKO, born in 1952 in the Lower Congo, which groups the peoples of the Bakongo tribe, some of whom are in Portuguese Angola and French Equatorial Africa, in the "Republic of the Congo."

The Catholic Church which, with the royal family and the financial holding companies, forms one of the three powers which in effect govern the Congo, for several years has favored independence. For a long time the Vatican and the all-powerful Belgian Catholic missions have cherished the dream of an independent Catholic state in the Congo. From May 1956 the missions have favored the formation of the group "Conscience Africaine," which published a moderate nationalist manifesto in that month. In 1957 other political groups came into being representing different tendencies. At the beginning of 1958 "L'Action Socialiste Congolaise" was created by the African trade unions affiliated to the Congolese General Federation of Labor (F G T), an affiliate of the Belgian General Federation of Labor (F G T), led by Belgian socialists living in the Congo.

When, in December 1957, the administration dared to make the timid turn represented by the municipal elections in Leopoldville, then in the county towns of four out of the five other provinces, the result of these elections surprised everybody. In Leopoldville more than half the votes were cast for the candidates of the

ABAKO, regarded by the administration until then as a cultural association without influence among the Bakongo. The election results in Leopoldville unquestionably marked a forward leap in national consciousness. The ABAKO showed itself at once as the first Congolese nationalist organization of some importance.

The speech delivered by its leader, Kasavubu, before 15,000 people on April 20, 1958 stimulated another bound of the national consciousness: the mayor of Dendale (a district of Leopoldville) on assuming office called for freedom of the press and internal autonomy, demands which would have been considered extremist one and a half years before.

A stepping-up of developments marked the rest of the year 1958, underlined especially by the May Day demonstration in Leopoldville, organised by l'Action Socialiste, and by the subsequent publication of its manifesto on May 26. Nationalist groupings appeared everywhere, even in Bukavu, chief town of Kivu province and main seat of the reactionary and racist settlers, where the "Centre for African Regroupment" sought to win legal recognition in the face of a thousand difficulties.

The Congolese National Movement (MNC) was formed in the autumn of 1958 and united a host of different groups under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba and Kalonji. Lumumba represented the MNC at the pan-african conference at Accra in December 1958.

On January 4, 1959 Kasavubu called a meeting of the ABAKO on this last question. The meeting was banned and the demonstration which followed, in conjunction with a police provocation, set off the bloody repressive measures of January 4, 5 and 6 in the huge township of Leopoldville, which numbers half a million inhabitants. To the 72 deaths officially announced, the murderers being principally the police commanded by whites, it is absolutely certain that about a hundred other killings should be added, inflicted by the police and by armed white civilians. The report made to the Chamber by the commission set up to enquire into the January events in Leopoldville makes the point, on this subject, that the "European volunteer corps" established by a decree of 1948 with the aim of organizing "self-defense of factories and to ensure the defense of certain points of vital importance" numbered 120 members on January 4, but rapidly reached a thousand. Guns were put at the disposal of these volunteers. They were taken back only on January 18!

#### THE BELGIAN BOURGEOISIE FACES UP TO CONGOLESE NATIONALISM

Taken aback by the scope of the Leopoldville events, the bourgeoisie had to make its choice. Under vigorous pressure from the royal palace (Baudouin's speech), the Church (John XXIII and the missions) and big capital, the bourgeois politicians were obliged to yield, notwithstanding the grandiloquent pretensions of some of their representatives. The minister van Hemelrijk, providential man of the Social Christian party, handed down the line in a speech on January 13: he promised independence (without fixing a date), announced a face-lift of the colonial administration, a big accession of indigènes to the administrative cadre and sundry other reforms. The independence promised was formal enough, to be sure, and would allow the salvation of the investments which Belgian capitalism has sunk in the Congo, and the preservation of the essence of the profits which

the Belgian bourgeoisie extracts from it, which represent one-third of its total profits in Belgium and abroad.

Belgian imperialism, which unlike France has no solid military tradition at its disposal, felt too feeble and ill-annned to engage in a colonial war which would have as its main result a more or less complete stoppage of Congolese exports or an enormous increase in the cost price of mineral and vegetable products, which it would have to export by rail across Angola or Tanganyika instead of by boat.

There exists a certain confusion in Belgian public opinion, unprepared, by the apparent calm of the preceding years, suddenly to receive the idea of independence for the Congo. During the first four or five months of this year the socialist press fostered this confusion by persistently exaggerating the social character of the Leopoldville uprising (poverty of the unemployed without a dole, jealousy of unschooled children for those with opportunity for study, etc) and by minimizing its national character, far more real, and clearly shown in the slogan and the chant repeated a thousand times: "Independence!"

The leadership of the Socialist Party of Belgium, embarrassed and divided, took up a soft-peddling attitude, profoundly careful of its associations with Mollet-Lacoste, with the settlers and the reactionary layers of the colonialist petty-bourgeoisie.

By contrast, the progressivistic program of van Hemelrijk necessarily called forth an understandable resistance on the part of the diehard colonial administration, the settlers, a section of the Belgian finance-houses which had least capital tied up in the Congo (Brufina, the Launoit group) and, finally, the royal family, which has uncovered the mirage of an independent kingdom of the Congo, attributed to Leopold or to his son, Albert.

This opposition came into the open with the demonstration of the settlers of Kivu — the only province where their influence is of some importance — at the time of the Minister's journey to Bukavu on June 13 and 14. The joint pressure of all these forces resulted in an immobilism leavened with fine words from the Minister in the course of his very reticent speech in Leopoldville on June 25. However, during the summer the situation continued to "deteriorate." After the repression in the district of Cataractes in the province of Leo from January to April, there were nationalist demonstrations throughout the Congo, and it became obvious that the police forces were no longer sufficient for them to be active everywhere at once. Minister van Hemelrijk, faithful to his ambition to be the Belgian Mendès-France quit the government rather than carry out the policy forced on him and which he judged was well behind events. His successor de Schrijver, a Social Christian like himself, was quickly forced to proceed farther along the road of concessions than he had foreseen.

The attitude of the nationalist movement has sharpened out since the beginning of the year. The Congolese nationalist leadership as a whole now represents, in the complete absence of a national bourgeoisie, a very radical petty-bourgeois current with a program of nationalization, etc, comparable in this respect to the old Algerian M T L D, or to Sekou Touré's party, which led Guinea to independence.

So far from being bourgeois, the Congolese nationalist leaders are in general not even representatives of

the "liberal professions" but more often clerks, holders of middle-school certificates. The members of their organizations are mostly wage-earners living in the townships.

For its part l'Action Socialiste Congolaise, which since April 18, 1959 has published a semi-monthly called *Emancipation*, "organ of socialist combat, edited by Congolese," since April 26 has transformed itself into a Party called "The People's Party." Organized on a class basis this workers' party numbers some 1,500 members distributed over several provinces. At the present moment its relations with the ABAKO, which still represents the principal Congolese political current although its audience is limited to two provinces, seem very good. It is hardly likely that the mass of the workers will assemble around the People's Party before Congo independence, but its creation before the culminating point of the independence struggle gives it a fairly serious chance of playing a decisive rôle.

Despite their influential part in the formation of the first Congolese nationalist tendencies (Conscience Africaine and even the MNC at its beginnings) the missions see their political importance diminishing day by day. The activity of the clergy will certainly not be a determinant factor in the independent Congo of the future. In fact, the missionaries appear almost everywhere today as small business bosses, hypocritical exploiters whose paternalism arouses a sullen hostility in the Congolese.

During the last days of November a heterogeneous Party, well received by the administration, saw the light of day. It calls itself the "National Party of Progress" and rallies the moderates of divers different hues.

Mention should also be made of the fact that various weeklies published by the main nationalist tendencies have been appearing for some months now, mainly in Leopoldville; that is the case with *L'Indépendance*, the MNC organ, and with *Congo*, the journal of the ABAKO.

#### THE LATEST EVENTS: FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER

Towards mid-October there was a sudden inter-racial explosion originating at Luluabourg and in the environs of that city, capital of the province of Kasai: the Lulua and the Baluba, the two tribes in the region, hurled themselves at each other in internecine conflict. The provocative role of the administration, and more particularly of the Governor of the Province, appears incontrovertible, the more so since he knew of a study made on July 8 by the district office at Luluabourg which suggested the taking of discriminatory measures in regard to the Baluba people at the time of the December municipal elections. The Belgian big bourgeois press made the best of it: The proof is given, it said, that the Congolese will put each other to death once they are independent; they are not ready for independence, etc, etc.

Another provocation, yet more obvious, was brought about a few weeks later at Stanleyville, capital of the eastern province. The MNC was holding its inaugural conference there. On October 28, in closing the conference, Patrice Lumumba gave a lively criticism of the new proposals of the Minister for the Congo. During the course of his meeting a warrant was issued for his arrest and the police, aboard armoured lorries, intervened with the object of arresting him. Captured on

the following day, he is still in prison at the present moment. By November 3 calm had been restored, the number of victims, according to reports, being 70 killed and 200 wounded.

We come now to an important incident. Near Matadi on October 13 the police wanted to disperse a gathering of the Kimbanguist sect. Officially there were six dead and 30 wounded.

Belgian opinion did not remain indifferent in the face of so much bloodshed. The Minister de Schrijver, in office since the beginning of September, on October 16 made a declaration in which he specified that independence would be granted to the Congo after a waiting period of four years, and that a Congolese government presided over by the governor-general would be set up at the end of 1960. During the year 1960, he announced, those elected at the December municipal elections would elect, at one degree removed, provincial assemblies which, at two degrees removed, would designate a sort of parliament, part of whose members would be nominated by the administration in its own right. This declaration went much further than that of January, but still was not acceptable to the Congolese parties. Lumumba's clear reply explains this well: "The divorce between Belgium and the Congo is definitive."

M Kalonji, second leader of the MNC, arrested after the provocation of Luluabourg, was shortly afterwards released and associated his movement with the position very firmly taken by the ABAKO, the People's Party and the other nationalist Parties: from the beginning of November, there was total and obvious disagreement between the Minister for the Congo and the Congolese Parties. The latter reckoned quite rightly that they did not have the necessary guarantees for putting forward candidates at the municipal elections on December 15. The tension increased. There was an important session of the Belgian Chamber throughout November 3. The bureau of the socialist trade unions (FGT) had just decided that "it will oppose by every means the despatch, on whatever pretext, of troops to the Belgian Congo." That afternoon, in parliament, Leo Collard, the Socialist Party leader, interrupted the Minister and made a declaration demanding a round table conference of all the Belgian and Congolese parties: "Announce that the discussion is open to all and that it is the whole Belgian people who are coming to sit at the round table. Do this great deed, and do it now, or you will go into an adventure and *you will go it alone!*"

This is the first time since 1945 that the leadership of a great workers' movement, socialist or Stalinist, has spoken so firmly on a colonial matter and unmistakably refused at a critical moment to associate itself with preparations for a colonial war or, at the very least, a partial repression of nationalism in a country under its tutelage.

This firmness, though surprising in itself, does not run counter to the evolution to the Left which since December 1958 has been apparent in the Belgian Socialist Party. Its refusal to associate itself with the repressive plans of the bourgeois government is explained by the constant pressure from the "Renardist" trade-union Left-wing, the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, and the Left-wing of the Party, which for three years has found expression

in the weekly *La Gauche* and its Flemish equivalent *Links* (for one year).

This firmness from a social-democratic Party which commands nearly 40% of the votes of the Belgian electorate obliged the bourgeois to beat an important retreat. The Defense Minister, Gilson, stated that there was no question of sending troops to the Congo. As for the Minister for the Congo, de Schrijver, he agreed to meet the leaders of the Congolese parties, who had decided on an electoral boycott, before the elections. These two Ministers were thus led to act in opposition to their own more recent pronouncements. The Social Christian Prime Minister, Eyskens, even deemed it necessary to create a second ministerial post for Congo affairs and to confer it on his Social Christian colleague Scheyven, known for his progressivist attitudes.

These events deserve special study. They show to what extent the bourgeoisie needs the social-democracy in order to carry through a colonial war or merely to court the risk by beginning repression on a large scale. If the leadership of the workers' movement decides, for whatever reason, not to take part itself in the indispensable propaganda for a colonial war, which will cripple and isolate its vanguard, and disorient the mass of the workers, pushing them into nationalism; the bourgeoisie, deprived of this indispensable support in the working-class movement and momentarily cut off from its usual agent, the social-democracy, is virtually paralyzed and dare not act alone.

It is impossible, to be sure, to place any serious confidence in Belgian social-democracy after this Left zig-zag, which can be followed by a Right zig-zag after a resurgence of its existing centrist current.

Indisputably the bourgeoisie is committed, even more clearly than from January to October, to a concessionary course; and so the very big fears, still existing at the beginning of November, seem to have been overcome for the time being. The journey of de Schrijver to the Congo and the masterly strategy of the Congolese coalition of the three main Parties (the ABAKO, the MNC and the PSA) — whose leaders arrived in Brussels on December 3 demanding an immediate interview with the Belgian SP leadership, and making their participation in the December 15 elections conditional on negotiations in the form of a democratic round table conference — show the extent of the ministerial retreat.

#### THE CIVIL WAR IN RUANDA

Whereas the Congo is an industrialized country, the primary or secondary producer of uranium in the world, the fifth producer of copper, etc., the small territories of Ruanda and Urundi are above all reserves of manual labor for the mines of the Katanga, a thousand miles away, and are almost untouched by industry.

An overpopulated portion of the old German colony of Tanganyika, these two feudal kingdoms had in 1958 about 4,700,000 inhabitants, 85 per square kilometer, of whom at least a tenth were Watutsi, a Hamitic race — the nobility, landowners and cattle-owners (one million oxen) — and nearly 90% Bahutu, a Bantu race — the serfs.

The Belgian administration has patently been reluctant to touch the feudal structure of the country, and has heaped honors on the two kinglets and the few great feudal families who share the chieftaincies and the power. The staple food of the country, based on

maize (150,000 tons in 1955) gives the population an inadequate standard of health. During the Second World War a bad harvest year gave rise to a terrible famine, which perceptibly reduced the population . . . The only important export is coffee: 18,600 tons in 1958, valued at 770 million Belgian francs. Electricity production reached only a million kwh before 1954 and four million since then, that is to say less than the 5,000 inhabitants of Greenland consume (!) and, per head of the population, two thousand times less than those of Belgium. In addition to which, in 1954 there was only one doctor per 67,000 inhabitants (as against one per 20,000 in the Congo and one per 950 in Belgium).

In this country under Belgian suzerainty, three political Parties whose programs appear to differ only slightly have been conducting an agitation over the past year which, together with the events in the Congo, has prepared the way for an eruption of social and racial hatred among the Bahutu against the Watutsi. The news from Ruanda and Urundi announced suddenly, on November 12, military operations conducted by the civil and military police and, for the first time, by Belgian troops flown from bases in the Congo. These operations were carried through following the outbreak of a veritable civil war between the serfs in revolt against their overlords. As early as the 13th, a communique from the headquarters of "the Belgian Forces of the Congo, operating in Ruanda — Urundi," announced the death of 50 "incendiaries" as a balance sheet of the activity of "air and land patrols". The next day the Socialist daily *Le Peuple* ran a headline "State of emergency proclaimed in Ruanda! Hundreds of Watutsi fleeing to Uganda." Ever since, information, carefully doctored, has left the impression that these military operations are going on: "pacification" is not yet over . . .

#### TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The main difference remaining between the Belgian government and the Congolese Party leaders flows from the desire of the government to grant, rather than to negotiate independence. Failing to find on confronting them any "interlocuteurs valables", that is to say, people sufficiently corrupted or corruptible, the Belgian bourgeoisie, unable to negotiate with a non-existent Congolese bourgeoisie, affects to deny the representative character of the Congolese Parties. It has beaten a retreat in connection with the electoral machinery imposed in Leopoldville, but hesitates before entrusting the future Congolese state to people capable of thinking in terms of nationalizing the rich mineral deposits of the country!

Prompted by this fear, some of them even openly contemplate the eventual secession of the mining province of the Katanga and its neighbor, Kivu, center of white settlement. This policy, however, could only be a last desperate remedy for the bourgeoisie, as problems of transport would liquidate its gains . . . Another nascent separatist tendency exists within the ABAKO. Some of its leaders, afraid of seeing those provinces more backward than the capital, Leopoldville, bury the progressive votes of the pilot province beneath their electoral weight, are not content with demanding a federal structure (in any case rejected by the administration). They dream of reestablishing, without delay, the unified state of the Bakongo, with its boundaries extending from the limits of Gabon, in the north, to the middle of Portuguese Angola, in the south; this was the

kingdom in existence at the time of the Portuguese colonization in the fifteenth century.

The journal of the People's Party, *Emancipation*, has given a clear answer to this question in its issue of June 15 last: the problem of the various national groupings contained within the frontiers of the "Belgian" Congo or cut in two by those frontiers, should be solved *after* independence. At this moment what is required is to unite all forces in the struggle for independence and against colonialist oppression.

This viewpoint is correct. The revolutionary Marxists of Belgium, however, should show their unconditional solidarity with the Bakongo people if it were the victim of colonialist repression in a struggle waged by the masses for Bakongo independence. The fact of their belonging to the nation whose bourgeoisie maintains colonial and national oppression over the Bakongo and the other peoples of the Congo, prohibits them from taking a position on the question of the way in which the victims of Belgian colonialism choose to organize: whether to unite or separate, to preserve or abolish the frontiers imposed upon them by imperialism at the end of the 19th century, when the colonial booty was shared out.

During the summer the bourgeoisie took special measures to preserve its possessions. Capital was withdrawn and repatriated to Belgium. To be sure, the main part of the 160 to 180 billion Belgian francs invested in the Congo remained untouched by these measures; but certain companies, big companies included, stopped reinvesting an important part of their profits on the spot. At the same time the government set about undermining the economy of the future Congolese state, already now fastening firm financial ties between Belgium and the Congo, whose currencies are of equal value. Moreover, horsedealing has already commenced in connection with the eventual construction at Inga, on the Lower Congo, of the biggest dam in the world, planned over the last two years.

It is clear that the financial powers-that-be are hesitant about vesting enormous sums of capital in the construction of this dam and the ancillary industries which will make use of its potential of energy, notably the production of aluminum.

From the beginning of 1959, strikes have increased throughout the Congo, which has seen more in this one year than in the whole of its history! Some have been really big, like that of the 25,000 transport workers of Otraco. Others have been violently repressed. This was especially the case in the "Huileries du Congo Belge" at Elisabetha, a small city in the eastern province, where many workers were wounded. The Congolese working class has still scarcely been touched by trade unionism. Built by Belgians, the Congo CSC

(Christian trade unions), and the Congo FGT, have mainly served to form cadres for the future African mass trade unions linked with the nationalist movement. These have perhaps already come into being with the "General Union of Congolese Workers", but this trade union of recent creation, frowned on by the administration, has not yet found the road to the broad masses of the workers.

The experience of the last 15 years has shown that the gaining of political independence, and even a certain degree of struggle against the economic positions of imperialism, were possible under a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership on condition that these leaderships were able to retain control and leadership of the mass movement. Possessing already, even before independence, a working-class Party well rooted in the various regions; lacking any kind of national bourgeoisie on the one hand, and provided by contrast with a numerous working class; the Congo will very probably, and in a relatively short time, have an organized working-class movement capable of claiming the leadership of the state and of seizing real power from Belgian imperialism which will, however, remain the master of the mines, the factories and the plantations on the morrow of independence.

Throughout Negro Africa, the struggle for independence is today combined with a profound longing for a vast panafrican federation of the "United States of Africa", grouping the states and the national federations and covering the whole continent south of the Sahara.

But no more than the genuine unification of the Arab nation from Morocco to Iraq can be realised under the bourgeois leadership of the Nassers or the Kassem, can that of Negro Africa be effected under the leadership of bourgeois politicians like Nkrumah or Senghor, or of the Congolese petty-bourgeois. Only a mass working-class Party, only a revolutionary Marxist leadership will be able to accomplish an historic task of such immense proportions. Only a federation of workers' states would moreover be able to expropriate the big colonial companies and effect a general industrialization of Negro Africa, which would imply for the Belgian Congo the creation of a large consumer goods industry, at the moment scarcely sketched out.

An active support of the young Congolese workers' movement by the Belgian and European proletariat will prove, after independence, as important as is their present unconditional support to the struggle for independence and against the colonialist claims of Belgian imperialism. Then, as now, the Belgian revolutionary Marxists and the vanguard of the workers' movement of this country should strive to lead the whole proletariat of this country in that sense.

December 1, 1959



# WORK FOR SOCIALISM IN DENMARK

By HANS ARENDT

Denmark, like a great part of the capitalist world, is in a period of boom, which has taken an upward turn over the past year. The most important products of the country are agricultural, and during the last 15 years these have shown an increasing yield: partly because of a better exploitation of the acreage, partly by a more rational technical processing of the products such as butter, eggs, bacon and canned goods, which are world market goods disposed of at rising prices.

In the last years there has been some anxiety about this market, in which Britain is the biggest customer, because the British Dominions, in competition with Denmark, compel Britain to limit her imports from Denmark and force the prices down. But just now the market is stable and prices on the British market are rising.

Due to the mechanization of *agriculture* the number of agricultural workers is decreasing, and their influence will decrease proportionately. The farmers are firmly organized in two large organizations, for the smaller and bigger farmers respectively. These groups work quite well together, but in politics the smaller farmers support the government, and the bigger and biggest the opposition. During the general crisis of the thirties there was a very strong fascist agricultural organization, working hand in glove with the Nazis. In the favorable agricultural conditions of today the latter has little importance, but it maintains its organization in being and, at the smallest sign of a weakening in the position of agriculture it will reappear. Its policy — state support for agriculture, modification of taxes and debts, and raising of prices on the home market — is directed against the towns and especially against the trade unions. It includes bigger as well as smaller farmers but, in view of the record-breaking harvests of the past years, has been holding its hand.

*Industry*, especially the highly-developed Danish ship-building industry, is in a period of progress, with sale of the products at rising prices. This is also the case with the shipping trade, of great importance in proportion to the size of the country, which like its Norwegian counterpart earns big money by freighting abroad.

These three sources of revenue — agriculture, industry and shipping — give their owners a principal influence in Danish politics.

These three groups have given the formal parliamentary leadership of the country to the strongest parliamentary Party, the social-democrats, who command 41% of the votes and a proportionate number of seats in the one-house parliament. (Folketinget.) This Party, as in Norway and Sweden, has been unable to increase its strength for the past 40 years; nowhere in Scandinavia do the labor parties poll as much as 50%. But the tremendously increasing proportional influence of the managerial class, and the stagnation in the trade-union organizations, point to the fact that it will take rather a long time to come to socialism the parliamentary way!

The Danish social-democratic government has tried to get a coalition with two small Liberal-capitalist parties, whose one or two members in the government strengthen direct capitalist control over the economy, procuring for the particular groups whose interests they represent the necessary places and orders they demand. The social-democratic leaders have long since gotten accustomed to this control, which also provides them with an alibi in justifying their policy to the working class.

The boom, with increased productivity and full employment for the workers, has clearly set its seal on political life. The idea of a welfare state has penetrated deep into the minds of the workers, who once had a socialist outlook: but this latter has disappeared from both the social-democratic and the trade-union organizations. The workers are on the whole satisfied when their wages cover

the steadily rising inflation (about 5% per year); though they obtain these increases only about once in three years after a tug-of-war with the employers' organizations, when the increases are backdated to cover the arrears. The workers do not reflect that increased production is due above all to the application of technique gained through scientific investigation, and not at all to the forms of political life, and that the workers' share in increased production has not increased during the last 70 years.

As a corrective to the seeming political stability, it can be mentioned that in 1956 there was a *labor conflict* on a wide scale, where a compromise from the side of the social-democratic government was rejected by a vote of the workers. During this conflict there was one week in which, to the surprise of everybody, a positively revolutionary atmosphere arose, increasing from day to day. Not only that the old workers' representatives were pushed aside, but they were replaced by representatives elected for the immediate situation by a "workers' council," a new formation whose consequences the workers were not aware of, but which had been put forward by the Communist party. A thorough radicalization was set in motion.

Seeing this, the government, wanting to help the employers restore "law and order," brought in a bill to give the proposed compromise the force of a law. There was a predominant feeling in favor of defying the bill, introduced by the social-democrats and recommended by the trade-union leaders. But this would have led to a change of government: the social-democrats would have been superseded by the conservatives, and here, to the disappointment of the workers, the Communist party completely failed. Pleading that the Party would not contribute to the defeat of the social-democracy, they called the action off; the defeat of the workers was thus sealed, as they could not win the battle without the support of the Communists, or against them.

The disappointment among the working class was great. The Communists' expectation that they would gain from the social-democrats due recognition for services rendered was, as usual, disappointed. The apathy towards struggle, political or trade-union, which followed, unfortunately took even deeper root with the economic upswing. But during the last six months a long series of illegal strikes have broken out, all of them due to the severe rationalizations and the pockets of unemployment thus created, which opens the possibility of a greater stress on the employers.

The workers' greatest problem at present is to get rid of the "September compromise," forced on them 60 years ago after their defeat in a lockout. This now takes the form of a fundamental law for the workers (the "workers' constitution"), a treaty between trade unions and employers for legal and professional regulation of conflicts, and a string of regulations intended to give the employers any support they might want.

Another domestic problem is the *housing shortage*, which despite the prosperity probably cannot be relieved. Capital demands priority in the investment of funds, and social and hygienic interests must wait. It is a fact that "defense" (integrated with NATO) has unlimited capital at its disposal.

The workers are not deeply influenced by events relating to foreign politics. Rather these are ripples on the surface, as the workers are not accustomed to generalizing the news they receive nor to making a socialist analysis. The hold of social-democracy on the workers must be considered safe for some years, as also its direction of the policy of this Liberal-capitalist society. Though most of the workers are traditionally anti-militarist (like almost everybody in the coalition Parties), both they and the middle class silently submit to the capitalists' demand for rearmament and approval of the American-directed

N A T O. This great price they are willing to pay to defeat the Soviet Union and communism; and it is this price which the social-democratic leaders are glad to demand from the workers so as to be allowed to retain formal power in the state. Under these circumstances stability seems to have set in, and displacements in the state of the Parties have for years been minimal. There are no signs of revolutionization of the workers, saving the radicalism evoked by the present lay-offs resultant from rationalization.

Perhaps the *split in the Communist party* will be instanced as a sign of such a process. But it is not. This split is part of a world phenomenon, and must in this country be regarded as evidence of *latent reformism* on the part of a great many members of the C P, afraid that Moscow might instruct them to execute a "Left turn" after the pattern of 1948-52.

Although this split has resulted in the formation of a new Party, the People's Socialist Party, in which by now about half the former members of the C P are participating; and although this Party has been supported, from the revolutionary side, by Marxist-Leninists; this is because this new socialist Party, as a protest against Stalinism, has felt obliged to appeal to *everybody who wants to be active in working for socialism in Denmark* and has been compelled, in accordance with the democratic traditions of the country, to promise to abolish terror in the Party, to allow criticism of the Party from within, to do away with authoritarian Party discipline and to fight bureaucracy and careerism.

The Party has a fairly good social composition, with industrial workers and trade-union officials forming the overwhelmingly larger part of its central committee. Among the 26 C C members there are only three university men, and two or three clerks. Axel Larsen, for 30 years chairman of the Danish C P, has secured a majority on the committee for his friends and former associates such as Willy Brauer, chairman of the typographers, Over Petersen, chairman of the metalworkers and Hans Jensen, chairman of the works committee in the country's biggest armaments factory. On the other hand the editor of the Party paper, Kaj Moltke, is an old revolutionist, an expert on foreign affairs, who used to be in vigorous opposition to the C P D. Because of a rather complicated electoral law, the Party retains about seven seats in parliament formerly held by the C P, which has lost all five seats remaining to it at the time of the split.

But the new Party (the P S P) has not succeeded in absorbing the discontented social-democrats, not to mention the prominent Left-wingers in that Party. This may seem rather strange, and it is a great disappointment to the leaders of the new Party, and most of all to Larsen, its chairman. Many malcontents have explained that Stalinism has repelled them from all communist formations. But the real explanation is that many of them identify the P S P with Larsen, whom they still distrust despite the fact that he has turned away from Stalinism and is maintaining that the P S P is independent of the U S S R — it is the same distrust that prevents many former members of the C P from joining the P S P.

The social-democracy has a certain justified fear of the P S P because a minor displacement in the distribution of seats between the three government Parties and the two conservative Parties might lead to a situation in which the attitude of the P S P could be of decisive importance in determining the balance of the parliamentary scales. It is the hope and wish of Axel Larsen and his immediate supporters that the government Parties will on account of this be prepared to pay a price for the P S P's support — perhaps by offering them posts as cabinet Ministers. This, however, seems beyond the realm of possibility, though it has long been the dream of the leaders of the moderate wing in the old C P. This dream was fostered during the occupation, when they were fighting alongside the bourgeois Parties.

The C P D carries on unconcernedly as the vassal of the Soviet Union, like the C P's of the other European countries, and is able to do so much more freely in that most critical members have now left the Party, so that the rest are much easier to manage. A part of the members stay in the Party from loyalty and through the law of inertia, combined with uncertainty about the new formation. Part of them stay because they are recipients of some of the favors which the Party has at its disposal, and which have for years been used for the benefit of many members: for the hundreds, indeed thousands, who travel every year to the Soviet Union or the other workers' states, who have joined brigades for work in these countries or have joined the many cultural associations which have arisen around the embassies of the "socialist" countries, and which are nurseries for loyal "friends of the Soviet Union" — with their cocktail parties, social gatherings, festivals, travel facilities, cultural delegations, and so on. Finally, the great economic and technical progress of the Soviets, and the strong international position derived as a consequence therefrom, of course impress many people and bind them to the old Party, because for many people, inside and outside the Party, the Soviet Union and communism are identical concepts. A great number of Party officials keep with it, moreover, for bread-and-butter reasons, as is the case with the string of Communist authors economically dependent on the market provided by the non-capitalist countries — both categories being of great value for the propaganda of the Party.

If, however, the Soviet Union found it opportune to leave the C P D to its own devices, withdrawing economic support, the life of the Party could not continue.

A most significant directive by the P S P is its programmatic position on N A T O with which, like the C P D, it is in favor of breaking off all connections, and its consequent demand for disarmament: not a man, not a gun, not a cent for imperialist war. This is sharp and clear, and appeals to the traditional antimilitarism of the workers. It is also something which appeals to and finds an echo in agricultural circles, because of the economic advantages they would gain by abolishing the enormous military expenditure. This military policy will by the next election be of much use to the P S P, at the same time cutting the ground from under the feet of the C P D. The latter Party, recoiling from "pacifism," will now take its stand on a somewhat reduced military program, about half that of the government — in fact neither fish nor fowl, but surely in harmony with the wishes of the Soviets.

Of course the bourgeois Parties in Denmark, as elsewhere, consider Trotskyism to be the "most dangerous form of communism." And as there are no signs of the rehabilitation of Trotsky in the U S S R, and therefore in the other workers' states, this is also the case inside the C P D. Axel Larsen, who was a Trotskyist in the Soviet Union, has been trying for the last 30 years to whitewash this "youthful error," and is naturally anxious to make quite sure that he and his close friends are not mistaken for "Trotskyists." In truth he is definitely oriented towards *reformism* and has already begun the fight inside the P S P against the program of the *10th International*, just like his former associates in the C P D and in the Soviet Union. He is also, to some extent, interested in fighting the friends and adherents of Trotskyism active in the P S P.

The Danish Trotskyists continue undismayed, however, their activity for the ideas of the *IVth International*, fighting against terrific odds. A leading figure of the Left, Comrade Georg Moltved, has broadcast three programs on Trotskyism over the Danish national radio: 1) The soviet, its birth under Trotsky, its victory under Lenin, its liquidation under Stalin; 2) Lenin pushes forward the revolution in spite of the leaders of his Party; 3) Homage to Trotsky, on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of his birth, — without advance censorship. The Danish Trotskyists have also begun translating *The Revolution Betrayed*.

## Resolutions of the XXII<sup>nd</sup> Plenum of the I E C

### I. RESOLUTION ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN FRANCE AND ON OUR TASKS (EXTRACTS)

1. The evolution of French capitalism has unfolded in the last years under the sign of a contradiction which demanded a solution: on the one hand, industry, agriculture, and even the network of commercial distribution have been modernized at a rapid tempo, imperceptibly removing the traditional image of backward French capitalism; on the other hand, France carries the burden of an old-style colonial empire, in the maintaining of which she has been bogged down in incessant colonial wars, handicapping the development of the economy and in any case doomed to defeat.

2. The process of modernization of the French economy was part of the more generalized development of European capitalism, and of the European economic integration today personified in the Common Market.

The choice for this integration signified on the part of French capitalism the irrevocable decision to maintain, accelerate and extend its course towards modernization of the economy, to the detriment of the special situations and forces which placed a paralytic burden on the political institutions of the country — to wit, parliamentary democracy in the style of the Third and Fourth Republics.

Apart from the parliamentary strength of the Communist Party of France, the fragmentation of the bourgeois parliamentary forces and the influence of the different pressure groups, often representing retrograde economic interests, gave an instability to bourgeois political power, hardly propitious to the achievement of the urgent and vital needs of big capital.

In opposition to the decision to step up the modernization of the economy, especially urgent because of the acceleration of European integration and the demands of the Common Market, there stood, objectively, from the eruption of the Algerian revolution onwards, the specific coalition which was established between the army, the settlers and the metropolitan extreme Right.

3. It is in fact the army, with the overwhelming part of its strength posted outside the metropolis, in the war against the Algerian revolution, which has excessively inflated the importance of the extreme Right in the political evolution of France in these last years, and which until the present time effectively countered the "liberal" colonial policy towards which, because of a better understanding of objective conditions and its own long-term interests, big capital tends.

The army, humiliated by its previous colonial defeats, transplanted to Algeria in this frame of mind, and in alliance with the reactionary mass of the settlers, has provided itself with exceptional conditions, weighting the political evolution of the country in an ultra-reactionary sense.

4. For a whole period this rôle of the army was not directly challenged by French big capital, for a whole series of reasons: it was itself inclined towards a "strong state"; the elemental drive of the Algerian revolution threatened to lead to the effective loss of its positions in Africa, considered by French big capital to be in every way essential; also because the political means to control the excesses of the army were lacking, even had it wished to do so. The tendency of the French big bourgeoisie towards a "strong state" corresponded to the need to accelerate modernization under way of the economy and the empire, fettered by the parliamentary institutions of the Fourth Republic and their way of functioning.

On the other hand, the "liberalism" of the colonial policy of big capital did not go and never can go beyond certain political reforms and concessions, without putting the fundamental interests of French imperialism in Africa in danger. In the more concrete case of Algeria, the "liberalism" of French big capital could not permit it to contemplate the loss of its effective control of the Sahara. On the contrary, its "liberalism" in looking for a political solution in Algeria is determined in reality by its concern to safeguard its Saharan interests by dint of political concessions made in time in face of the strength and tenacity of the Algerian revolution.

Finally, within the framework of the institutions of the Fourth Republic there was lacking to French big capital the practical possibility of controlling the army under the concrete conditions of the Algerian war.

#### *THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUP OF MAY 13, 1958*

5. May 13 signified a very grave defeat for the French workers' movement. For a time it was weighed down, apart from the apathy of the masses and the demoralizing effects of their defeat without a fight, by the united strength of all the capitalist and reactionary forces, and by the threat to the legal existence of working-class organizations.

From the viewpoint of big capital, the unique success of the May 13 operation consisted in its ability, having paralyzed the masses, to transform a super-nationalist and ultra-reactionary crisis into a victory for the political power of big capital in the greatest and purest concentration ever reached in the recent history of the country. This operation was made possible thanks to the instalment in power of the Bonapartist de Gaulle and of his government of high-grade clerks, experts and functionaries, in the service of big capital.

For a whole period after the May 13 coup there was installed a sort of political dual power of the bourgeoisie: that in Paris, with de Gaulle clearly representing French

big capital; that in Algiers, of the coalition of the ultra-reactionary forces of the army, the settlers and the economically retrograde layers of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie.

Profiting from his Bonapartist power, de Gaulle for a whole period avoided a direct conflict with the power in Algiers. On the contrary, strong in the support given to his "national" government, he forced through a whole series of deep-going administrative, economic, financial and social reforms, accentuating the grip of big industrial and finance capital on the life of the country, and tending to sweep aside the obstacles which stood and still stand in the way of its capitalistic modernization.

Thanks to this *de facto* alliance between the two powers during the whole of the first phase of the Gaullist régime, above all against the Communist Party and parliamentary democracy à la Fourth Republic ("the system"), the "operation Pinay" could be forced through, that is to say, a sharp and very considerable lowering of the standard of living of the masses. Integration into the Common Market imposed on the bourgeoisie the immediate necessity for such an operation.

Unable to support at the same time the colonial war, the modernization of the economy and the standard of living conceded to the masses, big capital decided on a first recovery at the masses' expense (the Pinay devaluation). To carry through this operation at a minimum risk, it had largely to weaken and paralyze the workers' organizations and eliminate for a whole period all forms of parliamentary opposition (plenary powers).

Subtly, by introducing equivocation, ambiguity, doubt and confusion into the "integrationist" policy on Algeria, de Gaulle has at the same time little by little undermined the basis of this policy, fragmenting, isolating and paralyzing the ultra-Rightist forces.

In the concrete French conditions which resulted from May 13, the way de Gaulle has proceeded, machiavellian and cowardly as it may seem, was determined not least by the relationship of forces between the two centers of bourgeois political power, as much as by de Gaulle's concern not to wound or alienate the army and, more than anything else, by the background provided by the profound apathy and prostration of the masses.

De Gaulle's "cunning" is the way taken by the conscious big bourgeoisie to settle accounts inside the bourgeois and pro-bourgeois camp, and attain its aims in the minimum time and cost, without having provoked the intervention of the masses at any time.

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6. The new Algerian policy announced by de Gaulle in his speech of September 16 corresponds to the views of French big capital in this matter. It reflects, moreover, the increase in the latter's political power by comparison with the second power in Algiers. Confronted by the strength and tenacity of the Algerian revolution; by the failure and impotence of military "pacification"; by the worsening prospects for the whole reformed African empire and for the economic interests of French imperialism in the Maghreb which continuation of the Algerian war represented; by, finally, the serious economic and financial handicap which this war constituted for the plans for modernization and European integration of French capitalism, the latter is now hurrying to put forward its "liberal" solution for Algeria.

This solution — whatever it may be — would not sacrifice the economic interests of French capitalism in the Sahara. Moreover, it would not ignore, in the concrete conditions which still prevail in Algeria, the reactions of the settlers and of a considerable part of the army staff, with eventual repercussions in Rightist circles in France itself. It has on the other hand to take into account the difficulty, greater than ever, of finding, in the present state of mind which characterises the rank and file of the Algerian revolution, trained and matured in bloody struggle, its morale strengthened by recent military and diplomatic successes of the revolution, any treachery to the revolution.

Under these conditions, the effective cessation of hostilities will imply concessions to the Algerian revolution which de Gaulle is still far from having formulated, and which still appear unacceptable not only to the settlers but to a considerable section of the army general staff.

*Whence the prospect of difficult negotiations, long drawn out, extended eventually over ever some years to come, opening on a solution still uncertain, in the midst of an armed struggle which is holding out, and of violent crises inside the bourgeois camp in France.*

7. Through these crises it will be possible at least in part to overcome the present apathy of the metropolitan masses and to a certain extent to set them against the most reactionary forces, but without in this eventuality minimizing the danger of a fresh prolonging of the popularity of de Gaulle and his régime.

Helped by economic developments in the sense that the recession has been left behind, and a new recovery of European and world capitalism, the popularity of the Gaullist régime will certainly be reinforced in the event that it can announce a successful solution of the Algerian question.

On the other hand, in the case of the war being prolonged in the absence of sufficient concessions to the Algerian revolution through de Gaulle's own resistance or that of the army before which he would have bowed, the setting of the masses in motion once again, against those resistances and for immediate peace in Algeria could, under certain conditions, on the contrary, make the Algerian solution appear as a victory of the masses themselves against de Gaulle.

In this case, the internal divisions in the bourgeois camp and the blows which the Algerian revolution would inflict upon it could modify the relationship of forces anew somewhat in favour of the working-class forces, without this modification permitting the rapid overcoming of the effects of the defeat of May 13 and opening up revolutionary prospects in France itself.

*This, naturally, is the prospect which it would be necessary to work to achieve in redoubling the mass political campaign for the immediate opening of negotiations with the G P R A with a view to a swift solution guaranteeing the free self-determination of the Algerian masses and their right to independence. In this campaign, the number one task of the present phase for the French proletarian vanguard, our organisation must play the rôle of pioneer at the level of activation and coördination of the campaign.*

The new period, in which the Bonapartist régime of de Gaulle is obliged, to reach a solution of the Algerian question, to place itself in opposition on this very question to that reactionary wing which bore it into power

on May 13, offers in this respect better *objective* possibilities for the workers' struggle both on the economic plane and on political problems (beginning with the Algerian question.)

The danger lies, above all, in the "Left Gaullism" of the traditional leaderships, whether proclaimed openly as in the case of Guy Mollet, or having become so de facto, as in the case of the Thorez leadership since the prospects of a summit conference materialized and since Khrushchev lent his support to the proposals of September 16. This "Left Gaullism" merely aims at support for de Gaulle with a view to reaching a "liberal" solution on Algeria, independently of any struggle against the régime — being, in fact, opposed to any struggle against this régime.

If this treacherous attitude of the traditional leaderships is perceived with greater difficulty by the broad mass of militants on the level of the struggle against the Algerian war, the consequences of this policy of indirect collaboration with the ruling power will be, on the contrary, all the more obvious, above all to the trade-union rank and file.

#### THE LONGER-TERM PROSPECT

8. As to the more long-term prospect on the morrow of the Algerian solution which French imperialism will be forced to find, the latter will then attain a degree of relative stability greater than in the past, in the context of the relative stability which European capitalism in general has known for some years.

The Algerian solution will permit French imperialism to lessen the tensions within its African empire, to acquire in the process an elasticity in its reform of the latter, to open for itself the prospects of exploitation, with the countries of the Maghreb, of the riches of the Sahara, to recuperate the economic and financial resources wasted in the Algerian war, to facilitate the process of modernization of its economy integrated within that of the Common Market.

In the event, however, that the Algerian revolution should not halt for long in a quasi-Bourguibist phase

but should drive forward with élan as a permanent revolution extending over the entire Maghreb this would enfeeble, from the beginning and very considerably, the African colonial outposts of French imperialism. It is, among other things, the fear for this eventuality which compels de Gaulle to seek out a compromise solution in time.

In any case, in the circumstance where the compromise on Algeria does not signify a de facto capitulation of the Algerian revolution — this latter eventuality appears extremely improbable — the important victory for this revolution which this compromise would anyhow represent will anyway stimulate the revolution in all Negro Africa.

The problems of French capitalism immediately after the solution of the Algerian problem, while they will not be absolutely identical with those of the other advanced European capitalist countries, will tend to become similar. The traditional image of a French capitalism much retarded by comparison with that of countries like Germany, Britain, Belgium, Holland and north Italy will no longer be valid. France, especially now under the Gaullist régime, is in process of attaining, in her turn, the level of advanced European capitalism, with some points, some branches and certain sectors being among the most modernized.

Consequent on the ultra-opportunist and class-collaborationist policy of the reformist and Stalinist leaders, the revolutionary crises which French capitalism experienced immediately after the war and during the colonial wars in Vietnam and subsequently in Algeria, could not be exploited to the full by the proletariat to put forward its own solution in the form of a workers' government, of a coalition of workers' parties, applying a radical program of transition.

Modernized French capitalism is now progressing, in the phase of the Gaullist régime and the solution sought in Algeria, towards a greater stability than in the years which have passed since the war, and will pass in years to come through the same twists and turns as the whole of European capitalism.



## II. RESOLUTION ON THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE WORKERS' MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE AND OUR TASKS (EXTRACTS)

### EUROPEAN REVOLUTION AND WORLD REVOLUTION

1. For the second time in 25 years, capitalism in Western Europe has survived a political, economic, and social post-war crisis without being overthrown. In France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Holland, the state apparatus had been infinitely more shaken than on the morrow of 1918. In Great Britain and in the Scandinavian countries the masses were clearly manifesting their will to replace capitalism, instigator of wars and unemployment, by assuring unprecedented electoral victories to the workers' parties. In France and Italy, the working class, while partly armed, had created de facto organizations of dual power, and maintained, even after their dissolution, a powerful pressure against the capitalist régime, which ended in the great strikes of 1947-1948 in France, and July 14th 1948 in Italy.

All these factors produced in the capitalism of Western Europe a crisis more serious even than that of the period just after the First World War. But today, ten years later,

everywhere capitalism appears recovered and consolidated. Its economy, entirely reconstructed, has surpassed the pre-war level by 50%. Its states, consolidated, are governed everywhere — save in the Scandinavian countries — by the direct representatives of the bourgeoisie.

In France, the key-country of this post-war period in western Europe, it has been able to inflict a very serious defeat on the workers' movement by establishing without a fight the Bonapartist régime of de Gaulle. Elsewhere, under the pressure of the recession and encouraged by its victory in France, the bourgeoisie is endeavoring to take back the economic concessions given to the working class in the preceding period, and to reinforce its state.

2. Historically, this relative stabilization of western European capitalism is due neither to the lack of combativity of the masses, nor to objective conditions favorable to capitalism. With the exception of Germany, the situation on these two planes was more unfavorable for the bourgeoisie in western Europe in the period immediately after

the Second World War than after the First. *The fundamental responsibility for that relative stabilization devolves on the bureaucratic leaderships of the SP and CP, who with their own hands rebuilt the crumbling edifice of capitalism.* By preserving the foundations of the economy and of the bourgeois state; by using the pretext of the extension of the state sector so as to sow confusion about the nature of this economy and of this state (notably by way of the theory of the "new democracy"); by dissolving the armed forces of the proletariat, and chanting in favor of the collaboration between the classes with the de Gaulles and de Gasperis; by explaining to the workers that it was necessary to make sacrifices for "national reconstruction," the French and Italian CPs, with a big majority in the working class, objectively played the same role in France and Italy in the aftermath of the Second World War that was played by the Social-Democracy in Germany and Austria in the aftermath of the First.

This treacherous policy of the traditional leaderships of the proletariat had the consequence that the favorable opportunities for a struggle for the conquest of power were lost: "they missed the bus." From that fact, inevitably, the correlation of forces evolved in favor of the bourgeoisie. *There are no economic and social situations without a way out for capitalism. If the workers' movement proves incapable, after several years, of resolving a national crisis in its own way, then the bourgeoisie ends up by imposing its own solutions.* It was thus after 1918; it was the same after 1944.

3. Nevertheless, the relative stabilization of capitalism in western Europe occurred under conditions absolutely different historically from those which prevailed at the end of the revolutionary wave which followed the First World War. In that period, capitalism was more or less stabilized, on the whole of the European continent right up to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. After the Second World War, the proletarian revolution triumphed in a new European country, Yugoslavia, and capitalism was destroyed — by military-bureaucratic means — in the rest of eastern Europe.

From 1923 to 1929, the European bourgeoisie had in addition maintained, without major shocks, its domination over the colonial and semi-colonial countries — with the exception of the Second Chinese Revolution. Since 1945, on the contrary, the colonial revolution has not ceased to extend from country to country and from continent to continent. By its victory in China it has modified the global relation of forces between the classes. By its extension to Africa, it is now delivering new blows to the economic, social, and political equilibrium attained in western Europe. By penetrating the Portuguese colonies, it may be able to bring about the fall of the régime in Portugal, and on the rebound that of France.

On their side, the economic upsurge of the workers' states, especially that of the U.S.S.R., created insecurity and doubt about the advantages of the capitalist régime even among broad layers of the petty-bourgeoisie of western Europe, increased and will increase the popularity and the force of attraction of the ideas of socialization of the means of production and of economic planning. If the crimes of the Soviet bureaucracy have incontestably in the past demoralized the workers' movement in western Europe and thus contributed to the relative stabilization of capitalism, the present upsurge of the Soviet economy, without reducing the distrust of the masses towards the bureaucracy and its agents, will become more and more an important force in favor of a new radicalization of the European working class.

4. For these reasons, this temporary stabilization of capitalism in Europe will be more unstable, more apt to produce abrupt breakdowns and to create new chances for a rise of the workers' movement than during the last six to seven years, themselves not destitute of abrupt flare-ups of the class struggle. The possibility of a long period of

reaction, seeing the triumph of fascist or semi-fascist dictatorships in numerous countries, is excluded. In a world where the relation of forces continues to evolve in favor of the anti-capitalist forces, the opportunities for giving telling blows to capitalism will be offered numerous times.

The existence of unsolved international questions (the question of German unity); the decline of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships; the fact that structural deficiencies create potential foci of political and social crises (colonial war for France; question of the Mezzogiorno in Italy; misery in Greece and Turkey) all that contributes and will contribute to sap the relative stability and will create the possibilities of a chain reaction, if the workers' movement rises to the height of its tasks.

5. For a long period, the international revolutionary movement considered the European revolution, and more especially a victory of the proletarian revolution in one of the big industrialized countries of Western Europe (Germany, France, Great Britain), and even in the United States, as an indispensable condition, for reversing the relation of world forces in favor of the revolution, and for ensuring the rise of new forces against the bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R., and the possibility of a victory of the political revolution in that country. That thesis, correct for the 1947-1949 period (and 1928-1949 in relation to the U.S.S.R.) had to be revised a first time with the victory of the Third Chinese Revolution. That and the extension of the colonial revolution which it aided, have incontestably shifted the centre of gravity of the revolutionary movement outside the advanced capitalist countries. By modifying in the U.S.S.R. itself the relation of forces between the bureaucracy and the proletariat, they have also created the objective conditions for the defeat of the Soviet bureaucracy in the workers' states.

The upsurge of the colonial revolution will continue to mount; at different paces, in the different regions (South-East Asia, the Arab countries, Negro Africa, Latin America) during the months and the years to come, though it has not immediately brought in its wake a parallel rise of the European workers' movement. On the contrary it has rather coincided with a stagnation and ebb of this movement. The causes of this phenomenon lie in the internal dialectic of the class struggle in western Europe. The victory of the Chinese revolution, the victory of the revolution in North Vietnam, the extension of the colonial revolution to the Arab countries, to North Africa and to Negro Africa, were produced precisely after the *turning point* in western Europe, when the relation of forces started to evolve in favor of the bourgeoisie (1948-1949). The objective consequences of this new situation, and the negative effects of the betrayal of the traditional workers' leaderships, have been stronger than the subjective favorable impulses the workers' movement should have received from the success of the colonial revolution. This was all the more true in that — for reasons already made explicit in the theses of the Fifth World Congress, and mentioned further on — European capitalism was able to allay for a long time, even in France (until 1958), the direct effects of the colonial revolution on the economic situation and the standard of living of the masses.

6. But the dynamic of the world revolution is not merely a question of a time table; it is also and above all else a question of social forces. Today without any doubt the proletariat of western Europe no longer represents the majority sector of the world proletariat; it constitutes not more than a quarter, the other more or less numerically equivalent sections being represented by the proletariat of North America, that of the U.S.S.R. and the "Popular Democracies," and that of China, Japan, India, Indonesia, and the semi-industrialized countries of Latin America.

Still it is distinguished from the three other sections of the world proletariat by the fact it is the oldest, the longest settled in towns, having the richest tradition of struggle and trade-union and political experience, and also without

doubt possesses even today the highest political consciousness and democratic tradition of self-administration. If its entry on the arena of the world revolution is no longer a condition sine qua non for the victory of the colonial revolution or for the victory of the political revolution in the USSR, it remains and will remain yet for a long time the decisive factor for raising the world revolution to its highest level of consciousness, as well as for drawing the American proletariat on to the path of socialism.

That correlation of forces can be fundamentally modified only by two factors: either the destruction of European industry by war, with the simultaneous maintenance or upsurge of industry in the other parts of the globe, an improbable hypothesis, or the victory of the political revolution in the USSR and the conquest by the Soviet proletariat of a standard of life superior to that in the United States, as well as democratic managerial practices serving as a pole of attraction for the rest of the world. Even in that case, it is much more probable that this force of attraction will make itself felt at first in Europe, and only through Europe on the United States.

For all these reasons, European revolutionary Marxists, while measuring in a realistic way the objective and subjective difficulties which hamper a new revolutionary rise in western Europe, *must be profoundly convinced that the decisive battles are ahead of them and not behind them, that the European proletariat has still a key rôle to play for the victory of the world revolution, and that its own destiny depends essentially, in the years to come, on its capacity to resolve the fundamental crisis which has until now prevented a great revolutionary victory in Europe: the crisis of revolutionary leadership.*

#### THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF WESTERN EUROPE AND ITS PERSPECTIVES

7. Contrary to the 1919-1929 period, one of relative stagnation and of a relatively slow and quickly interrupted growth of the productive forces in western Europe, since this second post-war period, after the period of revolutionary crisis and of instability in 1943-1948, has been marked by an exceptionally important rise of the economy of western Europe and by a high level of employment. That is the fundamental objective fact which distinguishes the 1948-1958 decade from the 1923-1933 decade.

Even in the supreme year of the 1929 boom, the national per capita income was higher than that of 1913 by only 2% in Germany, 5% in Great Britain, and 26% in France (falling back to 10% in 1938 in the last-named country). The share of western Europe in the world market was continually declining. In 1929, in value, its exports were higher than those of 1913 by some 20%; in 1938, they were generally lower than before the First World War. The volume of foreign trade of the 1925-1929 period was lower than that of 1913, exceeding it generally only in 1929, falling back in 1938 to less than 70% of the pre-First World War period.

The evolution during the last ten years is entirely different. The national per capita income has risen an average of 50% for the countries of the OEEC (it has exceeded the 1938 level by 40%). If that rise is unequally divided, there are however among the industrialized countries only Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark who remain greatly below that average, and these three countries already in 1948 enjoyed an income level higher than that of the pre-war period.

Industrial production during that same period has nearly tripled (starting from a very low base) in western Germany, and risen nearly 80% in France and 90% in Italy). In these countries the increase was uninterrupted for the whole of the 1948-1958 period, only France having marked time in 1952. In fact, these three countries have an increase of 40 to 50% in their production from 1953 to 1957, when reconstruction was largely terminated, which constitutes a

rate of growth nearly equal or equal to that of the USSR during that period.

Thanks to that rise, western Europe has greatly improved its share in world trade, and in world industrial production from the morrow of the Second World War, is near or has already slightly exceeded the levels of 1938 in that sphere.

8. This historical phenomenon, unforeseen both by our movement and by all economic observers on the morrow of 1945, has three fundamental causes:

a) *American aid and inter-capitalist solidarity.* Contrary to what took place during and just after the First World War, and during the Second World War, solidarity and mutual aid were developed among the imperialist powers and took precedence over inter-imperialist competition. This has continued to operate, but as a secondary and contradictory force within the framework of the "cold war," from the consciousness that the American bourgeoisie has acquired of being engaged in a struggle to the death with the anti-capitalist forces, and from the consciousness which it has of the decisive rôle which western Europe would play to tilt the scales definitively to the side of the anti-capitalist forces.

This solidarity explains the extremely important aid in dollars (Marshall Aid, off-shore procurements, MSA aid, etc) granted by American imperialism to the capitalists of western Europe, aid which without doubt is as high as 25,000 million dollars if private capitalist investments in Europe are taken into account.

Without that aid, which continued even when European export industry became competitive with American industry, the European "boom" would not have been possible. It is necessary to add to this the inter-European aid, in the framework of the EPU, without which various countries like Italy, Holland, Denmark, and especially France would have undergone extremely serious commercial crises at different times.

b) *The broadening of the European industrial base, and especially its base of raw materials.* Since the Second World War western Europe has largely surpassed its own production of raw materials in a series of important sectors, especially that of gas and petroleum (Italy, France, Holland, Germany), that of synthetic textile fibres, of artificial rubber, of plastics, etc. At the same time the rise of the machine-tool industry, particularly in Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, France, and Great Britain, has made Europe practically independent of the importation of American industrial plant, save in a few sectors. An important increase of production has resulted from the modernization of European industry.

c) *The extension of the internal market,* especially by the rise of the industry of durable consumers' goods. The production of cars in western Europe at present exceeds 3 million per year, or more than ten times pre-war production. The loss of the fields of investment in the colonies has been compensated to a large extent by the rise of industries of durable consumers' goods, made possible by a continuous increase of the real income of broad layers of the population, who have modified the distribution of their budgets.

9. The creation of the Common Market — enlarged or not to a zone of free trade — was to be, in the minds of the bourgeois ruling circles in Germany, France, Italy (and, as regards the free-trade zone, Great Britain) the king pin which might clinch the economic upsurge and ensure it a long future. Thanks to the freeing of the exchanges, to the competition and productivity thus stimulated, produc-

tion and national income should continue to increase at the rate of 5 to 6% per year, attaining in 12 to 15 years the present level of production and productivity of the Americans. (Interview of Jean Monnet, the inspirer of the Common Market, in the magazine *United States News and World Report*.)

At the very moment, however, when the Common Market began to be established, the 1957-1958 recession brought to several European countries a serious warning. In spite of the fact that it has been equally possible to get over this recession at no very great cost and that we are now present at a new recovery, it does not seem that it will be possible, in most European capitalist countries, to find again the same high rate of expansion as in the years 1950-1957. American aid will be drying up. The needs created by the war and new manufactures have begun more and more to reach saturation point in the framework of the purchasing power which capitalism concedes to the broad masses. A period of increased competition is opening among the capitalist powers — the United States, Great Britain, Japan and the Common Market, and within the bounds of the latter — in a climate of constant technological progress.

In these conditions, and taking into account the monopoly price structure in several fields, and thus the ever-present danger of inflation fed by very high military expenditure, the probable consequences of the new conjuncture should not be neglected: increased technological unemployment and, after a period of new relative saturation of the market, the danger of a new recession in the face of an internal and foreign market which has not expanded proportionately.

On the other hand, the imperatives of the enlivened competition between the capitalist countries will dictate a greater resistance than in the past to working-class demands, if not direct attacks on the workers' standard of living, particularly in those countries and branches of industry where the standard was highest (including in the United States).

This changing social climate is favorable to a comeback of the workers' movement, if the latter knows how to organize adequately and to push back in an energetic manner the attack of which the working class is now the target.

#### THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE CLASSES IN EUROPE

10. Three successive phases can be distinguished in the post-war evolution of social relations. Although their determining dates naturally do not coincide exactly in all countries, these phases appear nevertheless in most if not all of them:

- a) A phase dating from 1944 (1943 in Italy) until 1948-1949, during which the relation of forces remained fundamentally in favor of the working class. The bourgeoisie was weak, its economy shaky and not yet reconstructed, its state without sufficient foundations. The workers' parties remained predominant from the point of view of government and parliament: the organizations representing the working class within the factories (comités d'entreprise; betriebsräte; commissioni interne; shop stewards, etc) to a great extent laid down the rules, sometimes even taking over the functions which made them appear as potential organs of dual power. The property and the authority of the bosses were challenged in the big plants and entire sections of the economy.
- b) The phase from 1948-1949 until 1957. This was the phase of the economic boom following the partial defeats of the great workers' struggles (French strikes of 1947-1948; July 14, 1948 in Italy). An ebbtide became evident in the workers' movement. The political actions launched by the French Communist Party isolated it from a part of

the working masses. The split in the trade unions sapped the workers' strength in various countries. The bourgeois parties gained predominance and exercised power in a more and more exclusive way. The bourgeoisie regained confidence and strength. It tried both to corrupt the working class and to de-politicize it. The power of the representative organs in the plants became lessened.

- c) The phase which began with the end of the boom, with the rise to power of de Gaulle, and which is at present being prolonged into a new recovery. The bourgeoisie, encouraged by its political victories, and under pressure from the imperatives of the enlivened competition between the capitalist countries, maintains the offensive against the working class in order to snatch from it certain advantages which it gained in the preceding period. The working class is replying to this offensive according to the forces of the working-class movement and the resources of the masses for a spontaneous comeback.

11. In general, the workers' movement started this new phase of bourgeois offensive with its organizational forces more or less intact, and with real possibilities for a counter-stroke. The big exception was France, the only country where the workers' movement had suffered a defeat during the preceding phase. It is incontestable, however, that the workers' organisations no longer possess today, in most of the countries of western Europe, the same organizational strength, and especially the same enthusiastic support from the masses that they enjoyed in the days immediately following the war.

Is that ebb of the workers' movement due to the objective effects of economic prosperity, of the boom? It is necessary to combat resolutely that defeatist thesis. Certainly, a period of economic prosperity is not favorable to *revolutionary* workers' struggles; the possibilities of such struggles, numerous in the first years after 1944, were gradually reduced thereafter in most of the capitalist countries of Europe.

But though a period of economic prosperity is not favorable to a revolutionary upsurge, that nowise means that it *necessarily* implies a weakening of the workers' movement. On the contrary, it is traditionally in a period of prosperity, when full employment improves the relation of economic forces to the benefit of the proletariat and at the expense of the employers, that the trade unions can gain the maximum members, and that *offensive economic struggles* to win increases in wages and shorter hours are possible. In a period of political and social instability, that favorable climate can moreover aid broader strike struggles, for transitional demands. Thus the great strikes, with occupation of the factories, in France, Belgium, and the United States, did not occur right in the middle of the 1929-33 crisis but during 1936-37, the year of the best economic conjuncture between 1929 and 1939.

12. It is therefore not essentially the boom — an objective factor — which explains the relative weakening of the workers' movement in sundry European countries, and, on the rebound, the lowering of combativity and political consciousness in the working class. On the contrary, principally it is the weakening and the bad politics of the workers' organisations — the subjective factor — that witnessed an undeniable lowering of the combativity and political consciousness of the masses of western Europe.

The betrayal of the traditional leaderships; the lack of audacity of the trade unions; the sectarian line of most of the CPs inside the workers' movement which, beginning with 1949, replaced the opportunist line of the preceding phase; the absence of a programme of transitional demands; the refusal to generalize the struggles; the practice of "rotating strikes"; the generalization of procedures of "conciliation" and "arbitration" applied by the reformists... all these



phenomena considerably weakened the parties and the trade unions at the time when the employers were in a position to make important economic concessions to the working class.

Now, the workers' organizations are, for the great mass of the workers, above all, *instruments of struggle*. If these instruments are no longer effective, if they no longer yield anything, if even the rights and advantages of the workers are increased *independently* of these instruments, then the workers' organizations enter a deep-going crisis and run the risk of being gradually reduced only to the layers of the vanguard, the most politically conscious.

This becomes clearly apparent if one compares the way in which the principal increases in wages and social advantages have been achieved since 1948-1949. In Great Britain and Belgium, they are the product of *trade-union demands*, backed up by the threat of strikes, and sometimes, by strikes themselves; the trade unions have roughly preserved their 1945 strength (70% unionists in Belgium, 50% in Great Britain). In western Germany, these increases in wages are the result of *trade-union negotiations*, in which, with some rare exceptions, the threats of strikes were not taken seriously by anybody, the employers having made clear their willingness to concede increases by annual portions; the trade unions there group only 40% of the workers. In France and Italy as a consequence of the split in the trade unions, and as a result of the deliberate intention of the employers to weaken the CGT, wage raises have been conceded in *inverse proportion* to trade-union demands and without prior negotiations with the CGT and the CGIL (Renault and Fiat agreements); their result has been a downright collapse of trade-union strength, reduced to 15 or 20% of the mass of the wage-earners, and divided among three or four federations, and in Italy an analogous development, with forces which remain more important.

13. If the relative weakening of the European workers' movement is not the necessary and inevitable result of the boom, it is even less the result of "profound social transformations" as argued by the theoreticians of various reformist tendencies: André Phillip in France, Giolitti in Italy, Crosland and Strachey in Great Britain, etc.

It is not accurate that "transformations of structure" have been produced which have modified the fundamental characteristics of the capitalist system in our epoch, that of monopoly capitalism. More than ever it is the directors of the great monopolies who lay down the law in the economy and in the state. Especially where the state sector has been extended in the economy (France, Austria, Italy, Great Britain), it is not the state which has subordinated the monopolies to itself, but the monopolies which more and more subordinate the state directly to themselves.

That does not signify that differences of interests, often very deep, cannot oppose such or such a sector of the big bourgeoisie to such or such an other (heavy industry of the Ruhr to conversion and export industries in Germany; finance capital and state monopoly capital in Italy, steel and other modern sectors to textiles and other sectors interested in the French Union in France, etc.). But these are antagonisms of interest *within* the bourgeoisie class, and not oppositions between a new class of "managers" and the "old bourgeoisie."

It is no more accurate either to say that "the working class is deeply divided," or even "on its way to disappearing." From the point of view of its remuneration, the working class has never been completely homogeneous. It is true that, during the boom, the big enterprises tried to ensure themselves a stable labor force by giving it voluntarily supplementary so-called "social" advantages (*freiwillige Sozialzuweigungen*). That was the case in the petroleum industry, steel, and the great automobile factories, in most of the European countries. From that fact, the wages of these workers were generally superior to those of the skilled workers (and naturally of the laborers) in the other

branches, in the peripheral regions, etc. But these differences have always existed in the past.

On the contrary, a serious comparison will prove that the wage spread between laborers in light industry, and skilled workers in privileged branches has rather lessened than increased in the last 50 years — without speaking of the agricultural proletariat, homeworkers, domestic servants, and the mass of the sub-proletariat, much more numerous, more wretched, and further from the standard of a skilled worker half a century ago than now.

It is equally false to affirm that the transfer of manpower towards other branches of activity than industry (a transfer moreover still very slight if not non-existent in countries like Great Britain, France, west Germany and Italy, where the number of industrial workers has risen compared to pre-war) would have destroyed the homogeneity of the working class. More than half a century ago nobody contested the fact that dockers or railwaymen belonged to the working class, in spite of the fact they were not directly involved in production. Why should it be different today with the workers of the "tertiary sector," of telecommunications, of electricity, gas or petroleum distribution, of drivers, or even of the technical personnel of aviation?

It is finally inaccurate that, from the sole fact of the raising of the standard of living, the workers' combativity "seems to be disappearing." On the contrary the raising of the standard of living can result in a raising of the cultural and political level, and therefore to a greater class activity, *on condition that the workers' organizations fulfil their duties, carry out the work of education and of formation of the necessary consciousness, and that they aim their struggles towards more general objectives* than the immediate demands which are satisfied thanks to the boom: the transitional demands.

14. From this analysis, a crucial conclusion must be drawn: the working class of western Europe generally preserves practically intact its capacity to react, with the exception of the French working class, at the time when the bourgeois offensive is becoming clear. The workers' movement, from that fact, has at its disposal the possibility of organizing an energetic counter-action against this offensive, and even of passing over in its turn to the attack. If the success of this defense, and of a possible counter-offensive, depends in the last analysis on the leadership of the working class, on the unity and generalization of the struggles, on the concentration of all energies on the conquest of decisive transitional demands and on the struggle for power, the *possibility* of an effective workers' policy is created from the more or less spontaneous will of the masses to counteraction.

*Revolutionary Marxists have the duty to face up to this new stage with the firm conviction that their class "will not let itself be done in," that it will seek by numerous means and multiple ways to counter the capitalist offensive, and that their political rôle of coordinator of the struggles, of creator of a replacement leadership for the class, can be decisive.*

15. Two objections must be met in this context. It is true that in France no spontaneous reaction against the coming to power of de Gaulle occurred. That fact, however, constitutes *an exception and not the rule*. It is due essentially to the Algerian war, i.e. to the possibility for the bourgeoisie to launch its offensive in a field where it played up to the hilt on the disorientation and demoralization of certain layers of the workers, the hold of the poison of chauvinism spread for years by the French CP and the SFIO — the field of the colonial war. Even in France, the following events demonstrated that spontaneous reactions occur when the offensive touches the domain where the working class is the most sensitive: standard of living, working conditions, and stability of employment.

Are the creation of the Common Market and the existence of new European institutions a major obstacle to

the launching of a counteroffensive by the workers? It cannot be asserted at the current stage and for the two or three years to come. Granted, in the framework of the Common Market, the employers' solidarity fortified in each branch of industry, the cartellization of industry, and tomorrow the international interpenetration of capital, will make the employers much less sensitive to direct actions of the workers conducted on a regional or national scale, and put more and more on the order of the day the necessity of *internationally coordinated strikes*. But, during the whole transitional period which embraces especially the stage of the class struggle before us, the working class of all the countries of Europe preserves the objective possibility of dealing very hard blows to the bourgeoisie in each country. The tighter bonds among the European countries will act in that sense rather in favor of an international extension of the struggles, starting from one precedent or a spectacular success in one or several countries.

#### EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

16. At the moment of the post-war revolutionary crisis, when the strength of the workers' movement was at its zenith and the bourgeoisie was seriously afraid of a general assault against its power, the setting for "bourgeois democracy" was extremely shaky; its essential support was the reformist and Stalinist workers' organisations themselves — to the degree that they were not violating this "sacred" legality, notably by their high-handedness with regard to the revolutionary organizations and the representatives of the liberation movement of the colonial peoples. The traditional formations of the bourgeois right and centre were in clear decline. The Christian-Democracy appeared as the sole and least direct prop of the bourgeoisie, while yet incapable of governing alone. Organizations of the right and the extreme-right, partisans of "strong states" of different kinds, grew stronger in many countries (neo-fascism in Germany and Italy; RPF in France; Nazi influence in the Free Democratic Party of Germany, etc).

The temporary stabilization of capitalism, and even more, the capitalist boom in Europe, modified that situation. The gradual weakening of the workers' organizations was expressed also on the electoral plane — although often in a distorted and slow way. The CPs were the first to be eliminated from the governments. It even came, little by little, to governments without the participation of the Social-Democrats, although these were able to appear in power consequent on minor electoral swings (as in Belgium in 1954 and in Italy for some months after the last elections). The extreme-right was in decline if not in complete defeat. The bourgeois centre was triumphing.

17. The reasons for this surprising "renaissance" of traditional bourgeois parliamentarism are not difficult to uncover. Régimes of dictatorship are not ideal for the bourgeoisie. In addition to the fact that they are very expensive and that they open the way to revolutionary crises of collapse they involve an abandonment of liberty for the bourgeoisie itself (at the least for a big part of the capitalists and all their political personnel). When it is a question of saving "the main thing," i.e. capitalist property and the state which protects it, the bourgeoisie is ready to make the sacrifice of its own political liberties. But when no immediate danger threatens it, such a sacrifice appears to it dangerous and useless.

From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the boom has strengthened two tendencies which create a certain social base for parliamentarism and traditional governments: the middle classes have seen their standard of life relatively improved and have vigorously reacted against "austerity," "planning," and "statism," with which they identify more or less the workers' parties (this niggling "dirigism," that has nothing in common with socialist planning, operates furthermore especially for the profit of the big monopolies); this is the key to the electoral victories of the Conservatives in Great Britain and of the

CDU in Germany during the boom. In other respects this permits the bourgeoisie to make economic concessions, often considerable, to the laboring masses. *In the absence of an energetic and aggressive political leadership*, utilizing the favorable economic conditions, to deal stronger and stronger blows at the employers, the working class had a tendency to be de-politicized by the climate of "prosperity" and by the impotence that its organizations were manifesting concerning itself.

Under these conditions, the "ideal" policy from the bourgeois point of view appeared one of the "mendèsiste" type (with its diverse national variants: Butlerism in Great Britain, the Gronchi-Mattei tendency in Italy; the Social-Christian left in Belgium, etc). This policy maintains the framework of bourgeois democracy and carefully avoids anything which might provoke political reactions on the part of the workers. It patronizes "constructive trade unionism," and encourages it by negotiations and agreements involving important advantages for the working class, and endeavors at the same time to de-politicize and integrate it in a "social," "settled-down," "popular" capitalism.

Its first objective is to break the hold of the Left tendencies (French and Italian CP; Bevanism in Britain; the trade-union Left in Germany and Belgium, etc) on the majority or important minority sectors of the working class. This is an attempt to *Americanize the social life of Europe*, the "high standard of living" supposedly sapping the political consciousness and certainly the "Marxist tradition" of the European workers' movement.

18. In spite, however, of a boom exceptional in magnitude and duration, this policy has not been able to be applied with cohesion and lasting chances of success by the bourgeoisie:

a) It runs up against all the exorbitant weight of the military expenses in certain countries (Great Britain and France), which have held up or shown an improvement of the standard of living which its lawyers would have liked to see more massive and more spectacular.

b) It has run up against numerous contradictions within the possessing classes which have provoked decisions which awoke as lashes the political reactions of the masses (German rearmament, Indochinese crisis in 1955, prolongation of military service, Suez crisis, economic policy, causing a massive periodical unemployment in Belgium, stagnation of the situation in meridional Italy, etc, etc). These reactions have often caused political swings which have brought to power the Social-Democrats, or the Right Conservatives who are impermeable to the doctrine of "social capitalism."

c) The bourgeois political personnel is profoundly divided by this question of fundamental orientation, a division often tied to antagonistic material interests (Gronchi against the Right Christian-Democrats in Italy; Left against the Right in the CDU; Butler against Macmillan in Britain; Independents against mendèsistes in France, etc).

d) The political tradition of the European working class still remains deep. Even if under these unfavorable subjective conditions, it seems to be burning but dimly, it can abruptly reappear as the consequence of the first "unpopular" decision of a conservative régime (this is what is just occurring particularly in France).

19. Even during the honeymoon period of "social" capitalism, we have witnessed a *permanent tendency to the strengthening of the state apparatus*, which profoundly differentiates this "new look" bourgeois democracy from the traditional pre-1914 bourgeois democracy. That tendency corresponds to the deep economic and political-military necessities of the period. Economically, all the capitalist countries are characterized by a growing intervention of the state in the economy for the *fundamental benefit of the monopolies*, by an extension of the public sector of the economy, by the increased importance of the public budget in the national income, by the considerable increase in the number of functionaries and of their rôle

in the numerous spheres of social life. On the political-military plane, the capitalist boom in western Europe has coincided with a period of "cold war" — accentuated from 1949 to 1959, relatively slackened from 1954 to 1957, accentuated anew from 1957 on — of preparation for world war and of preparation for civil war implicitly contained in that world war.

All the bourgeoisies of western Europe are profoundly conscious of it, and the N A T O treaty and headquarters make it "their duty" to recall it periodically to the different governments. Laws on the state of emergency and of civil mobilization are being prepared or in effect. Special police (Celere, C.R.S., Bereitschaftspolizei) are created and strengthened. The administration receives full powers to use them in case of "civil disturbances." Laws on "compulsory consultation" and even of "compulsory arbitration" are being prepared or in effect. The strikes which avoid this procedure are declared "wildcat," and the strikers are threatened with prosecution or actually prosecuted. Frontal attacks against the right to strike are being prepared. The power of the army in the state — and in the economy, of which the arms sector becomes a permanent important sector — is steadily increased.

20. When a serious military and political crisis destroys the "normal" equilibrium of political life (Algerian war in France); when the end of the boom and the growth of competition in the framework of the Common Market oblige the bourgeoisie to take back the economic concessions previously granted to the working class, the bourgeois-democratic stage-setting risks speedy collapse. The tendency towards "the strong state," purely "technical" in the previous period, and hardly perceptible to the masses, is rapidly pushing its way toward the surface. The bourgeoisie is testing various replacement solutions and is looking for a "supreme arbiter-savior" of the Bonapartist type (de Gaulle) whether by a partial or total outlawing of the workers' movement, or by a frank military dictatorship. When that tendency coincides with a sudden impoverishment of layers of the petty and middle bourgeoisie — especially of the peasantry, tradesmen, and the non-competitive industries subjected to the shock of the Common Market — an objective base for the fascist danger can reappear for the first time since the end of the war.

21. If a new and graver recession breaks out, with its consequences (unemployment, a revival that is relatively limited and, especially, varying according to sectors); if a structural depression continues in agriculture and retail trade, the attempt to orient within a limited time towards a Gaullist-type solution might show itself in many of the countries of western Europe. But such an attempt would not appear in a vacuum; it would appear in a social milieu that is also able and inclined to react to the effects of the recession and of the Common Market. *The most probable hypothesis, is that this workers' reaction will everywhere precede the attempt to install a strong state by the bourgeoisie.* Under the whip of the same conditions that are pushing the capitalists to modify the democratic idyll, the workers themselves are also pushed to react and to manifest anew their hostility to capitalism, to the recession, to unemployment, to political reaction, both by voting more to the Left and by launching direct class actions against firings and attempts to lower real wages.

With the keynotes of recession and unemployment, most of the elections this year and next will probably show a relative strengthening of the parties claiming to represent the working class (particular national conditions can increase or lessen the importance of the fluctuation). Actions like those of the "Galileo" workers in Florence, of the miners of the Borinage in Belgium, of the workers of Fives-Lille and of other enterprises in the north of France, will have a tendency to spread.

22. *It will depend on the ability of the movement to generalize these struggles and give them a precise political objective — the constitution of workers' governments or*

workers' and peasants' governments, under the political form appropriate to each country — whether the bourgeois offensive will be thrown back or not, before passing to a decisive political stage. The spontaneous energy of the workers' reaction can, by itself, if it is sufficiently extensive, prolong this intermediary period and thereby increase the chances of a decisive counter-action.

*It is only after a possible failure of all these reactions and the demoralization which would flow from it, that the achievement of "the strong state" would be put on the order of the day. This hypothesis is improbable in the immediate future.* Our sections and our militants have the duty of combating tendencies to demoralization among the masses and especially in the vanguard, by explaining the real mechanism of the evolution. In France too, the Algerian crisis at first gave an opportunity to "the Left" (movement of the recalled conscripts; January, 1956 elections); it was only when the workers' parties criminally squandered this chance that it opened the way to May 13, 1958 and the Gaullist régime. At the same time, our sections must warn the masses that a change of policy by the big workers' organizations is urgent and of vital importance if the new struggles are to terminate in victories, if the awakening political interest and the growing combativity of the masses are not to be once more wasted. Otherwise, there is a risk of the repetition of the French affair.

#### THE SITUATION OF THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

23. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Communist Parties have everywhere experienced an unparalleled rise; the social-democratic Parties nonexistent or suffering from the force of the attraction of the CP as well as from the contradictions of their long-term bourgeoisification went through a deep crisis, save in some countries like Great Britain, Sweden, etc, where they comprise the crushing majority of the working class.

From the end of 1947, however, the situation has rapidly evolved towards a division of the structure of the workers' movement into two zones: one, that of France, Italy, and Greece, has a solid and durable workers' movement, predominantly Stalinist, with a social-democracy in slow decomposition and of relatively indifferent importance; the other, comprising all the other countries of western Europe, has a social-democracy that groups the great majority of the working class, with the CPs falling to the level of little isolated sects, often weaker than before the war and even sometimes than during the '20s. Finland and Iceland constitute two exceptions to this rule, explained without difficulty by peculiarities of developments since 1945.

24. The cause of this division must be sought essentially in the regroupment of the principal workers' cadres of the different countries in question, during the whole historic period from 1933 to 1958. Wherever the CP has succeeded — especially thanks to the 1936 strikes and to the battles of the Resistance — in winning the decisive cadres which have the ear of the working masses in the enterprises at the time of periods of struggle, they have been able to preserve their majority in the workers' movement, in spite of the periods of ebb and often dramatic isolation (1958, 1949-53, and, the most terrible of all, 1939-41).

Wherever their progress in the so-called "Popular Front" periods and the post-war upsurge has not permitted them to win their cadres or the majority thereof, they are, in the stage of the ebb-tide, falling as low if not lower than before the rise.

25. The failure of the "break-through" of the CP in most of the countries of western Europe is not explained by the boom: *it preceded it.* Its fundamental causes are:

a) The especially baneful influence of direct experience with the reactionary aspects of Soviet bureaucracy, particularly since the outbreak of the "cold war" (this is especially true for Germany and Austria after 1947). In the same way, the "Khrushchev report" and the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution caused an unprecedented crisis

in the CPs of western Europe, further aggravated by the new "Yugoslav affair."

b) The fact that just at the decisive moment when the masses began to go over from the social-democracy to the CPs, the latter were roughly copying social-democratic policy, thus eliminating any objective basis for the possibility of a break-through (1944-47). To this must be added the fact that as the masses began to flow back to social-democracy, they were once more severely shocked by the sectarianism in the working class movement which became the "general line" of the CPs after they abandoned the opportunism of the preceding period.

The second is the most fundamental and lasting of these two factors. The day-to-day policy of the small western CPs combining small-scale reformism with a vague communist eschatology (the "final victory of the Socialist camp"), postponed to an uncertain future and brought about practically independently of any action of the working class of the country concerned, offers no perspective or interesting function to the working masses of the west. At best they are small parties, reformist in their activities and linked to the USSR which ask for their votes side-by-side with the big reformist parties. They obtain less and less support from the masses. At present in most western European countries, apart from France and Italy, the electoral influence of the CPs has fallen to 2% or 3% of the votes (often the lowest for 35 or 40 years) and their active cadres within the working class have fallen to a few thousand, and in some countries even a few hundred persons.

26. From the fact that the basic cause of the failure of the small CPs of the west to break through lies in their incorrect policies and not in the handicap of their continuing links with the Kremlin (however important this factor may have been at specific moments in the past), there follows an extremely vital conclusion: *Even when the attitude of the masses changes and becomes more favorable to the USSR, or even when they are attracted by many aspects of Soviet reality, they do not turn to the CPs.* This could be seen in the "thaw" of 1955-56. It will be even clearer in the future when the industrial advances and a rising living standard in the Soviet Union and some "peoples' democracies" may renew such an attraction especially if there is relative stagnation in the living standards of the west. The result would be to increase the interest of the masses in the planning and socialization of their own economies. This would favor "indigenous" Left-wing tendencies within the mass movement. If these develop, the decline of the CP might continue in spite of the change in attitude to the USSR.

On the other hand, in France and Italy, for the same reasons of organizational tradition, it can already be confidently predicted that the coming wave of working-class militancy will at first be led by the CP, even if it is a CP more critical and independent of its leadership.

27. Electorally, the European social-democracy is still very strong, and even in certain countries stronger than ever. In several cases, it has just obtained or will obtain within a short period the highest electoral percentage in its history. In Austria it has even succeeded three times in winning the Presidency by an absolute majority under universal adult suffrage. The "40% barrier" is about to be broken through in many countries.

Yet this façade of power conceals deep decrepitude. In many countries, such as Austria, Germany, and Sweden, the social-democratic parties are only a shadow of what they were 30 years ago — at a time when they had already degenerated greatly from what they had been at the beginning of the century. Everywhere the Marxist tradition has been swept away with the bulk of the cadres, murdered by fascism, broken by repeated betrayals, and suffocated by a pervasive tendency to go bourgeois. In many countries these parties have been reduced to just an apparatus without contact with the masses save during

election campaigns. Even where the links with the working class are strongest — as in Norway, Belgium, and Britain — the number of workers who take part in the internal political life of these parties is far lower than at the best periods in their past. The political level is terribly low; this is most striking in countries like Austria, Germany, Holland, and Norway, which had a deep-rooted Marxist tradition. The masses still follow these parties, but do not seem to work inside them.

The political degeneration of these parties has been swift in the fields of policy and theory — to the extent that any theoretical interest remains. Formerly reformism was defined as a belief in the attainment of socialism by the path of reforms. Nowadays it may be defined as a "mixed" economy, as acceptance of the welfare state and a "broad sector of market economy" in an "ideal" society. The programs of the Austrian, Swiss, west German and Dutch social-democratic Parties, the propositions for "reform" put forward by Right-wing Labour on the morrow of the recent British elections, are syntheses of this petty-bourgeois ideology, which has much more in common with the mentality of bourgeois civil servants than that of trade-union bureaucrats.

28. Yet the electoral stabilization or even gains of the Socialist Parties, which make them seem more than ever to be the only political expression of the anti-capitalist desires of the broad masses, are in complete contradiction with this gradual degeneration of the reformist organizations and their apparatus. This contradiction tends to show itself suddenly and violently on a large scale whenever the will to fight and the reawakening of the masses runs up against the petty-bourgeois conservatism of their leaders. The outcome of such clashes is the appearance of vast Left-wing tendencies which express, after a fashion, the aspirations of the masses without bringing into question the reformist character of the party, e.g. Bevanism. The youth and the most militant trade-union cadres are the ideal field of recruitment for this Left. It is significant of the crisis in the social-democratic parties of several countries (France, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Germany) that the youth and the most militant trade-unionists are to be found to the Left of the Socialist Parties and in as-it-were uninterrupted opposition for eight to ten years, if not since 1944.

The contradiction between the anti-capitalist aspirations of the masses and the conservatism of the reformist party apparatus can be more or less kept down as long as the economic situation is favorable and the masses' standard of living is rising, even if it is more slowly than they would wish. When the bourgeois offensive is opened against working-class living standards, it will be no longer possible to reconcile the pressure of the masses with the fundamentally rightist and collaborationist course of the Socialist Parties, and they are forced to make a Left turn. Even the Dutch Socialist Party, the most Right-wing in Europe, was obliged to follow this law. Such turns to the Left have favorable effects, objectively by encouraging the militancy of the masses, and subjectively by facilitating the work of revolutionary Marxists inside the Left. But it will be a historical deception if a new leadership does not emerge which, in the view of the masses, can fight the rotten Right wing for the control of the movement.

29. Recently various intermediate formations have appeared, independent of both Socialist and Communist parties: the Left Socialist Union (UGS) and Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA) in France, the *New Reasoner* and *Universities and Left Review* groups in Britain, the Pacifist-Socialist Party and Bridge-Group in Holland, the People's Socialist Party in Denmark, the Independent Socialist Group in Austrian Carinthia, etc. These groups have been produced by two phenomena: on the one hand, the deep crisis which has for years been affecting both the Communist and Socialist parties in these countries, and, on the other hand, the absence of a Left-wing sufficiently politically conscious, militant, and powerful within the

mass movement to attract critical elements of varying origin.

To varying degrees, all these groups in general are marked by a sectarian attitude to the mass movement, and by the lack of a serious program and international connections. They are, therefore, essentially transitional, more or less centrist, and doomed to a series of explosions, and to electoral and trade-union insignificance.

But special conditions in some countries may create for them opportunities for relative success. Thus, in France, the integration of Guy Mollet's SFIO into the Gaullist régime is favorable to the appearance of a traditional social-democratic Party, a place which the UG S-P S A could occupy. In Denmark and Holland the extremely

Right-wing character of the Socialist parties and the rapid decline of the C P have created the possibility of a limited regroupment of centrist elements, that might even win more votes than the C P.

While carefully following these developments and devoting some of our forces to them — without weakening our basic work inside the mass movement — we must understand that these experiments cannot have any historically valid results, and help their militants to avoid experiences which would end in demoralizing and breaking the best of them. We can do so only by presenting to them, with the necessary flexibility and caution, the perspective of constructing a new working-class leadership inside the mass organizations.



### III. RESOLUTION CONVENING THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS

The 22nd Plenum of the International Executive Committee resolves to convene the Sixth World Congress for a date, to be fixed later, between September 15 and October 15, 1960.

Its agenda will comprise the following main subjects:

A document (in preparation) on *the development of the colonial revolution since the Second World War, its problems and its prospects;*

A document (in preparation) on *the economic prospects of capitalism and the workers' states;*

A document (in preparation) on *the concrete platform of the political revolution in the degenerated or deformed workers' states;*

The document issued from the 22nd Plenum on *European perspectives and our tasks.*

The Plenum has opened the preparatory discussion for

the Sixth World Congress on this latter document and the accompanying amendments.

All the other documents must be submitted for discussion at least six months before the holding of the Congress.

The International Secretariat and the Latin-American Bureau will ensure the publication of the documents and the main discussion-articles in Internal Bulletins in four languages: English, French, German and Spanish.

The Sections are invited to produce these same documents and articles in Internal Bulletins in their respective (other) languages.

Representation at the Sixth World Congress will be on the basis of the rules which have been applied to preceding congresses of the International. On the other hand, the Sections are invited to consider from now the necessary financial effort for the expenses of their delegations.

*This resolution was adopted unanimously.*

## HOW WASHINGTON PREPARED FOR "GENERAL WAR ON COMMUNISM"

By SAL SANTEN

*Arms and the State.* By Harvey C. Mansfield and Walter Millis. New York.

"Disengagement" may be a meaningful term in the Middle East; perhaps, by a narrow definition of its meaning, in Europe but hardly for the Soviet Union and the United States," says Mr. Stein in his introduction to *Arms and the State*, published by the 20th Century Fund, New York, 1958.

It is not necessary to have read the book to have few illusions about "disengagement" in the Middle East, and Europe too. But one thing is certain: there is not one single person in the leading American administrative and military circles who has any "tendency" to disengagement. Their main preoccupation is, how to halt the revolutionary tide in the world, and to drive it back by *all* means. *Arms and the State*, based on research in government files, Congressional hearings, military writings, presidential memoirs etc, gives, willingly or not, clear proof of this.

The first part of the book, on the pre-war decade, written by Harvey C Mansfield, faithfully follows the official pattern of pre-war American foreign policy. Only when Mansfield, though rarely, tries to look "behind" it, his chapters get some interest. Thus we learn that in the USA until the autumn of 1942 "no firm strategical plan existed." It is of importance to note this, not only for having an idea of the empiricism of the ruling American circles both administrative and military, but also in order to get a clear idea of the enormous changes which have taken place since then.

This empiricism did not only complicate military planning to the utmost. It was characteristic for all fields of activity:

In this course the service chiefs were only emulating their chief, the President. For Roosevelt too, though he was ready enough to proclaim bold production goals in big round numbers, had little patience to follow through the details and problems of their achievement. He is recorded as once telling Marshall that "planners were always conservative and saw all the difficulties, and that more could usually be done than they were willing to admit."<sup>1</sup> Military strategists, in turn, called supply problems logistics and relegated them to others to solve. Top strategists, in uniform or not, regarded production and supply as a lower order of activity except when shortfalls or mistakes directly jeopardized specific operations (p 88).

What an enormous difference with the conception of Leon Trotsky, who, when leading the Red Army, said in a speech to the Third World Congress of the Communist International:

Let me state quite candidly that I have had a great deal more to do with the Red Army's statistics than with its sword [...] I have had a great deal more to do with counting up the numbers of boots, trousers, and with your permission drawers, than with wielding the sword. Generally speaking I believe that there is no contradiction whatever between swords and statistics, and that statistics relating to military equipment play a very big

rôle in war. Napoleon used to say: "Dieu est toujours avec les gros bataillons" — "God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions." And statistics as you know, also takes in the strength of battalions. (*The First Five Years of the Comintern*, p 227).

It is not necessary, however, to go back to Trotsky for making a comparison between the empiricism of the imperialist rulers and the enormous advances of planning in the workers states. Even under the catastrophic leadership of Stalin, in the first years of the war, Russian policy, based on a plan, seemed a miracle to the Americans:

Only the Russians seemed to know consistently and specifically what they wanted. The United States needed to transform its attitudes and traditions about war and foreign affairs to correspond to its new role (p 92).

This, in reality, is the meaning of the book. To show how the US leading circles are wrestling in order to "correspond to its new rôle"; empirically once more, but nevertheless arriving at a plan, as it moves at the head of a world coalition, directed against the workers states.

During the second imperialist war, such preoccupations only existed in an embryonic form. The main direct enemies, in that period, for American imperialism were Germany and Japan. The United States' alliance with the USSR, after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941, completely flowed from the "necessity" to beat these imperialist rivals:

Thereafter (June 1941), and almost to the end, Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs continued to regard the Russian fighting contribution as essential to the defeat of Germany, and of Japan later also; they continued to be apprehensive until after the Russian victory at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43 that Russia might be forced to a separate peace; and they continued accordingly their firm support of Russian lend-lease.

### THE AMERICAN LEADERS

It would be a mistake to underestimate the capacity of the American ruling classes to produce leaders fit "for the new rôle." Marshall was such a man, no doubt by far superior to Eisenhower, who is a compromiser much more than a coordinator:

Roosevelt's regard for Marshall was perhaps best expressed in Cairo, at the time Eisenhower was selected for the supreme command in Europe against the known preference of Churchill and Stalin and the strong recommendations of Stimson and Hopkins, very simply in the President's words as Marshall recalled them: "I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country" (p 111). *Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p 803.

Eisenhower's capacities when "out of the country" in Europe — proved to be of quite another, inferior character. Unscrupulous compromiser as he is, whilst starting from the interests of American imperialism (his task today is to find a "compromise" between the military and civil interests), he was not hindered by some "democratic conception" when looking for allies. It was he who put Darlan

<sup>1</sup> Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p 259.

in charge of French civil affairs, and later gave the following explanation:

I believe in a theater commander doing these things without referring them back to his home Government and then waiting for approval. If a General makes a mistake, he can be repudiated and kicked out and disgraced. But a Government cannot repudiate and kick out and disgrace itself not, at any rate, in wartime<sup>2</sup> (p 120).

At any rate, his conception did not differ much from Roosevelt's, who at the end of the war thought a military government was needed in France; he expected a civil war there when troops were withdrawn, and wanted no provisional government in office and making reprisals until conditions permitted free and orderly elections (p 123).

It would be easy to give more examples of the completely counter-revolutionary, reactionary conception of the "democratic" American ruling circles in that period. Compared to the present rôle of American imperialism, that of "super-Wrangel no 1," to use Trotsky's words about Hitler, there is a qualitative change. How this change took place is the subject of Part II of the book, written by Walter Millis, which gives a rather vivid (though far from complete) picture of the efforts of the American state machinery "to correlate its attitudes about war and foreign affairs to its new rôle."

#### MILITARY CONQUER THE STATE

A great deal of part II is dedicated to the increasing (even dominating) rôle of military men in American administration and policy.

Neither civil nor military policy could exist and prosper in isolation. They were now deeply inter-linked, not only in theory but in human fact, by a host of already existing joint boards, committees, policy-forming groups, in which professional soldiers, civilians temporarily in uniform and civilians still in their gray-flannel suits combined to make policy decisions both great and small (p 142).

Such was the situation in 1945. At that moment, the book relates, there were "three major and urgent issues":

- 1) The administration of the occupied territories, in which "commanding generals were final sources of civil authority";
- 2) The atomic bomb, the "future management of which" demanded that "political and military considerations must be closely integrated," and
- 3) The reorganization of the military establishment in the following sense:

We should adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coördination between the military and the rest of the government. Our military policy, for example, should be completely consistent with our foreign policy (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol 2, pp 48-49, *Arms and the State*, p 154).

#### THE ATOMIC BOMB

In 1945, already, the atomic bomb played an enormous rôle in American foreign policy. Its use against Japan was much more a threat against Russia than a means to make Japan capitulate. Stalin may have welcomed its criminal "usefulness" in the cases of Nagasaki and Hiroshima; the American politicians had quite other preoccupations. And so, no doubt, had the Russian. On September 11, 1945 (a month after the dropping of the bomb) Stimson wrote to Truman:

In many quarters it [the atomic weapon] has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be

certain that the Soviet Government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time [...] The result will be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence that such activity may have already commenced. (*On Active Service*, p 643, *Arms and the State*, p 157).

And not without reason, Stimson pronounced the expectation that the relations with Russia "may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia."

The way the "approach" was made is too well known to everybody. Stimson resigned completely, as his warnings did not fit with the tendency of American imperialism to prepare for an "approach" of quite another character.

The implications of the "bomb" were several. It accentuated the influence of the military on the American state apparatus to the extreme, while undermining democratic bourgeois traditions. The House "was less suspicious of the professional military services than of their appointed civilian superiors":

A similar attitude was reflected in the unbounded confidence which the congressmen were coming to place in the professional police of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One could trust the professional soldiers and policemen; one could not trust the civilian administration to have sufficient regard either for the national security or the preservation of a free enterprise economy (p 168).

#### THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE COLD WAR

In 1947 the National Security Act was introduced. By this "the post-war reorganization of the American military, diplomatic and political system was substantially complete."

It put the capstone, so to speak, on the new governmental structure deriving from the experiences of the Second World War. Subsequent developments were to flow, not from the experiences of the war but from the harsh lessons of the post-war period to which it led (p 178).

In spite of its weaknesses, which would appear later on, "as it could not transfer the real world into one of order and precision," it armed American imperialism for the cold war.

Among the many problems which worried the American rulers so intensely, the revolutionary development of China was most burning. What to do against it? Dean Acheson had reported in 1945, already, that

while the policy of refusing in any way to cooperate with the Chinese Communists was "diplomatically correct," it was also practically "dangerous." He felt that "if this situation continues [...] the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated and chaos in China will be inevitable (p 190).

Ambassador Patrick J Hurley, in his turn, sharply opposed a policy of "coöperation with the Chinese Communist," and for this he based himself upon... Stalin:

Hurley returned to Chungking by way of Moscow; there he received from Stalin himself what Hurley thought were assurances that Russia, wanting only a stable government in China, was uninterested in the Chinese Communists and would firmly support Chiang Kai-Shek. This seems to have convinced the Ambassador that there was no need to make concessions to Mao Tse-Tung in order to avert "disastrous civil conflict" (p 191).

Happily, both Hurley and Stalin appear to have been mistaken, as "nearly everyone seems to have been mistaken in this crisis, at once so vast and so vaguely apprehended for what it really was."

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, pp 648-655.

Moreover, the situation was "complicated" by the desire of the soldiers to go home. A proposal on November 20, 1945, of the secretaries of State, War and Navy, "to get the Japanese out of Manchuria and establish the authority of the Nationalist government over the whole country" was "obscured" as: "They were under heavy pressure to 'bring the boys home'" (p 192).

Under those conditions Byrnes finally suggested "the wise course would be to try to force the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist to get together on a compromise basis." And he added that it might even be well "to tell Russia what we intend to do and to try to line them up with this policy" (p 194, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p 113).

Wedemeyer the soldier, however was of the opinion that they "either have to support the Generalissimo in full-scale warfare, with many more American troops than anyone dreamed of committing, or in effect surrender the colossal population of China to Communist conquest." According to Millis, "our total policymaking machinery — military, diplomatic, administrative and legislative — was simply incapable of facing and clearly resolving such a dilemma." And, whilst referring to the concrete "communist conquest of China," he formulates: "It was just such failures in basic policy-formulation which it was hoped that the National Security Act would correct."

#### THE CRISES OF 1948

The complete disdain of American government and military leaders for "planning," still so evident in the course of the Second World War, had changed rapidly. It was no longer possible to face the problems of the world in a purely empirical way. America had to give "leadership" to the "threatened free world." In accordance with this mission, people also changed:

The top administrators of American civil and military policy in these years were all friends; they shared a common apprehension of the Soviet Union and a common conviction that the answers were to be found primarily in foresight, planning and coöperation (p 202).

The necessity of it became clearer from day to day. Before even the Policy Planning Staff (set up by Marshall in 1947, and a forerunner of the National Security Council Staff) could meet, on April 29, 1947 "the Secretary of State demanded from Kennan a policy adequate to meet the impending crises of Greece and Turkey, of a collapsing Europe and a collapsed China":

The next day the Secretary called Kennan in and said he wanted the policy within ten days or two weeks. One result was the "jelling" of what was later known as the Marshall Plan (p 202).

The extreme rapidity with which the American imperialist governors learned to react (a "policy within ten days or two weeks") in order to face the problems, gave clear proof of their decided intention to resist to the utmost any tendency to "capitulation." "But in spite of the new machinery of the National Security Act, there was no easy way in which to reconnect the two," military demand and civilian economy.

In order to "grapple with the underlying issues confided to them by the Security Act," a Conference of the Joint Chiefs was planned:

The conference was to meet at the isolated Key West naval base on March 11, 1948; before it could do so, however, there intervened a series of startling and ominous events which were to lead to its deliberations an unexpected urgency. Our efforts to defeat Communist rebellion in Greece were going badly. In early February the Communists in South Korea had precipitated a wave of strikes, riots and sabotage which, though not widely noticed in the United States, was menacing for

the future. On February 24, 1948 democratic Czecho-Slovakia was captured by her internal Communist conspiracy in a coup which did profoundly shock the United States and the whole non-Communist world. And on March 5 there arrived a topsecret telegram from General Lucius D Clay, commanding in Berlin:

Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it (war) may come with dramatic suddenness.

*The Forrestal Diaries*, p 387, Millis, p 210.

Faced with this situation, the Joint Chiefs agreed, amongst others, "that the President should ask for a supplemental military appropriation to bring the armed forces as a whole to a state more nearly commensurate with the ominous "realities of the world" (Forrestal, p 393, Millis p 212).

How many times since then will they have repeated such "requests"?

Everything was moving then. In the midst of the Key West conference "a telegram was handed in announcing that Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, was proposing the expansion of the Brussels Pact (which was signed on Friday) into a larger structure of Atlantic Security." And indeed, one year later, the NATO pact was signed.

The Key West conference appeared to be a turning point:

On Monday afternoon Forrestal found the President prepared to make a strong statement favoring some measure of rearmament and a revival of the draft. The Secretary had gone to Key West mainly with the idea of beating the Joint Chiefs' heads together on the technical issues of service functions; he returned to find that the Key West decisions were expected to provide the basis for an immediate strategic plan to meet the suddenly urgent immediate issues (p 213).

And on March 16, after studying the Clay telegram, the Central Intelligence Agency predicted "that war was not probable over another sixty days." On the last day of the same month, however, "there had come the first hint of what was to become the Berlin blockade." The very same day a meeting took place with Forrestal, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff, in which "Several possible courses of action were considered, starting with an idea that the President might send a message direct to Stalin threatening war" (p 221).

With such perspectives, the Berlin crisis was faced. For the first time, American imperialism knew how to react promptly to what it considered to be the "Russian threat":

While mastering the blockade the United States achieved at least three fundamental decisions. The first was to found the military security of the United States upon a military defense of Europe. [...] The second strategic decision was that Nationalist China could not be saved. [...] [...] The third basic strategic decision arrived at by the latter months of 1948 was never clearly stated and many of its aspects are still obscure. But it amounted to committing American defense and foreign policy ultimately to the atomic bomb [...].

#### THE FORMATION OF NATO

On the formation of the NATO, in 1949, the book gives only a little information. As is clear from the above, it was a creation of American imperialism, and "in the event of war" there should be a "Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief (West)" who should be an American (p 237).

It started from the conception, however, that "the defense of the West had to be unitary." By shaping the



NATO, American imperialism had succeeded in unifying the imperialist world, and to dictate to it her policy of "containment" in her own terms. By doing so, quantity changed into quality. And though still much had to be done to forge the NATO into the force it was expected to become, its realisation was of fundamental significance for the aggressive policy of the world imperialist bloc since then, under the leadership of the United States.

Much earlier than the Americans had expected, the Soviet Union "had the bomb." To the men in government "the shock was extreme." "They knew that at a stroke the whole military-political situation had been transformed":

There was to ensue one of the truly great debates of our times over military and foreign policy, perhaps more significant to history than the great debates over the League of Nations, over the approach to the Second World War or over the United Nations. But in two ways it was extraordinary: it was almost wholly secret, hidden in the upper recesses of government; while its decisions, insofar as they were arrived at, were administrative rather than political in character. The Congress, the press and the public — the great organs of modern democratic government — were only peripheral parties to an argument upon which the whole future of American and Western society might well turn [...].

[...] To thoughtful men, whether in uniform or out of it, the announcement of September 23, 1949 presented a crisis — intellectual, moral and technical — far transcending the usual crises of international affairs [...] (p 245-6).

Whilst referring to the hearings *In the Matter of J Robert Oppenheimer* (spring 1954), Walter Millis calls it a "tragic record of the actual processes of policy formation in the modern age":

it records with precision the manner in which some of the more basic decisions of our time are arrived at: at the same time making clear the extent to which all these responsible officers had to operate in secret, to make their decisions in secret, to arrive at judgments on which they knew the nation's if not civilization's future might depend without the political officer's normal support in public argument and expression (p 247).

The conclusion of all those secret debates and decisions in the "bulwark of democracy" was the H-bomb. "The Russians had knocked our strategic position into a cocked hat; we had lost our "lead" in atomic energy, and the best way to regain it was at once to produce the thermonuclear weapon." In 1952 the terrible weapon was ready, indeed. "The first Soviet thermonuclear explosion took place in August 1953; the first "droppable" American bomb was fired in the following March....

"Thus in the fall of 1949 and the winter of 1950 the nation had faced a major transformation in the world scene and its administrators had secretly made or prepared drastic changes in military and foreign policies."

One of the main consequences of it, for America itself, was a further undermining of the democratic institutions:

The image arose of a vast and lethal fog of Communist conspiracy, infiltration, espionage and betrayal, at work everywhere in the national community and especially in the Democratic Administration. That this was seriously to distort the more normal processes of policy formation in the military and diplomatic fields can scarcely be doubted. Tightened "security" measures were to divorce the public even further from participation in major policy issues, of which they might now be kept in almost total ignorance (p 258).

The American rulers themselves had prepared the field for the sinister McCarthy....

### THE KOREAN WAR

"The Korean War was to bring the most dramatic, the most complex and most illuminating issue of civil-military relationships since the end of the Second World War."

The great changes in the American civilian/military apparatus began to pay. Washington was prepared for prompt intervention but, as would become clear during the Korean War, not yet on a global scale.

According to Millis, who follows here the very doubtful official version, "the attack of June 24, 1950 upon South Korea came as a virtually complete surprise." He adds to it, however:

The possibility, of course, had been long foreseen. Only a day or two before, John Foster Dulles (then a special representative of Dean Acheson's State Department) had been inspecting the South Korean defenses along the 38th Parallel (p 260).

In Blair House (as Truman revealed in his Memoirs later on), there was "complete acceptance" of the fact that "Whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done" (p 262).

If both military intelligence and political foresight may seem to have been deficient, the crisis when it did break was handled with courage, skill and effectiveness. Truman maneuvered promptly and adroitly, both to throw in military force and to secure UN authorization for doing so. State and Defense functioned smoothly and cooperatively to bring forth agreed recommendations; Congress raised no objections; public opinion seemed overwhelmingly behind the decisions taken, and Acheson was later to think it probable that he might have got a war resolution by acclamation, and perhaps regretted that he had not risked the attempt (p 265).

Whatever may have been the disillusion for American imperialism in the course of the Korean War, at the outbreak of it it was decided to go to the end. Hesitations, then, come from the side of its allies, before all Great Britain, who feared that an extension of the "conflict" would spread the civil war to the rest of Asia.

Our UN allies were already nervous over the idea that the Korean police action might be expanded into a general crusade against communism in the Far East that would precipitate the third war (p 271).

The American government, then, tried to maneuver its allies in such a way, that, whilst taking into consideration their argument, the Korean war would become a direct threat against the Chinese Revolution:

If there was no indication of threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force, the National Security Council recommended that General MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry (Truman, *Memoirs*, cited by Millis).

The gentlemen preferred to neglect the fact that "the entry of Chinese Communist elements in force" might be provoked, by the extension of the operations North of the parallel. Not without reason, Millis comments:

If Washington was to commit our troops to the "occupation of North Korea" then it should have been prepared to accept the possible consequences, already foreseen; if the risks were too great, then the commitment should not have been authorized (p 274).

In reality, Washington accepted the consequences. If it began to waver, later on, it was owing to the dynamic force of the heroic Chinese soldiers, to the moral breakdown of the American army in Korea, and to the pressure of the Allies.

Placed before those facts, Washington had to change its plans.

MacArthur's later complaints of his inability to secure clear policy directives from Washington were not without substance (p 274).

At any rate, Washington could not be unaware of what was at stake:

Both in Washington and Lake Success there was much division of opinion. Our UN allies were already concerned lest we convert the war in Korea into a general war on communism. The general whom we had appointed as UN commander had rather plainly indicated his leading toward such a course (p 276).

Then a meeting took place between Truman and MacArthur at Wake Island, in which the latter (no doubt against his own conviction) denied the possibility of Chinese entry, whilst Truman (all too glad) accepted this statement in order to leave a free hand to MacArthur, who moreover stated his "firm belief that all resistance would end, in both North and South Korea, by Thanksgiving. This, he said, would enable him to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas" (Truman, *Memoirs*, Millis, p 279).

#### THE CHINESE REPLY

The Chinese army did not wait long with its reply. Even before MacArthur was aware of it, "they had passed the Yalu many days before and were actually massing in the midst of his own forces. The "trap" had not been avoided; "the real trap had not yet even been detected." (p 287).

And then it became crystal clear that American imperialism once again had by far underestimated the enormous force of the Chinese Revolution. It had to drop its ambition "to convert the war in Korea into a general war on communism," and, for the same reason, it had to drop MacArthur. It became clear to Washington, that for "a general war on communism," it had to prepare better:

Korea could be, and apparently was being, held with the available bits and pieces of the World War II military machine. But to hold the free world itself it seemed suddenly urgent to convert the new NATO alliance into an effective instrument of defense; to raise and re-equip American military forces for its support and, even more, to raise the American military production potential to a point at which we would be reasonably prepared to face the possibility of a third general war (p 280).

MacArthur was sent into the wood, only in order to prepare better for what he had propagated. He was replaced by Ridgway, who was

in these hours touring the front lines of the 8th Army. It is not surprising that he was shocked by the state of morale which he encountered. It was an army of beaten, apprehensive men who had lost not only their aggressiveness but their alertness. They were "not patrolling as they should"; they knew nothing about the enemy before them; they did not know the terrain; they were not preparing rear lines of defense against the attack which everyone expected to come, and they did not know what they were fighting for or why they should be expected to continue (p 306).

This was the greatest victory of the Chinese Revolution. It had succeeded in breaking the morale of the troops of the combined imperialist powers. Revolution was victorious over counterrevolution.

#### THE GLOBAL PROBLEM

In the last part, dealing with "The Global Problem" and "The New Look," the book loses much of its interest. Such important problems as the State intervention in industry in favor of armament, and the radical changes in budget, are treated too superficially for having much interest.

As for German rearmament, it might be interesting to quote:

German rearmament, in short, was the condition on which the military command would permit the essentially civilian and diplomatic NATO policy to go forward. (p 338)

But such dominating facts as the Russian lead in "missiles" is only mentioned with a few words, as are Indo-China, Formosa, Suez, because "the facts of these episodes and issues are still hidden in the top-secret papers."

For this reason, it is not worth while to follow the book to the end. It would still be possible, to find here and there some interesting details, but there is no line in it.

So we return to the middle of the book, in which Walter Millis says on page 260:

The events of late 1949 and early 1950 were a case history in the reaction of a modern democracy to a revolutionary, but long-range, shift in the international power balance. Korea was a case history in its reaction to an immediate military crisis.

The value of the book, though written from the point of the view of the enemy, lies in the fact that it gives an interesting look into those years, in which the "revolutionary, but long-range shift in the international power balance" took place in such a breath taking tempo in favor of world revolution, and to the disadvantage of world imperialism.

It was then, that American imperialism set 1953 as its "target date" for its counterattack against the revolutionary forces in the world:

In the panic atmosphere of late 1950 the Joint Chiefs had formulated their huge expansion plans on the estimate that by 1953 the Soviet Union would be reaching the peak of its military capability, and that *this should consequently be taken as our own target date*" (p 396). (Our emphasis).

It will always remain to the honor of the IVth International, that, at the outbreak of the Korean War, it understood immediately the profoundly revolutionary significance of the great changes in the world since 1948. Against the hue and cry of many revolutionaries who were frightened in that period by the complexity of the situation, it concluded that American imperialism would not be prepared to leave the scene of history in favor of revolution, without a life-and-death fight, that it had taken the lead of a world imperialist coalition with the conscious intention to prepare from that moment on for war against the combined forces of world revolution, the Workers States, the Colonial Revolution and the working class movement. It did not hesitate to say that war became possible from 1953, as American imperialism would be ready then for launching it (and indeed, as we see from the above, 1953 was their "target date").

For the Fourth International, this *correct* analysis of the real situation in the world, did not flow from *pessimism*. On the contrary, it understood that the war preparations by American imperialism were a consequence of the *enormously increased strength* of world revolution, and not a consequence of its defeats, as had been the case before World Wars One and Two. For this reason it predicted, that such war preparations (counterrevolutionary in essence) would give rise to new revolutionary shocks in the world, and that a war, if it would become a reality, owing to its character (being in a distorted form and in final analysis the *showdown* between world revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces) *would and should* be transformed *from the start* into the world civil war against imperialism.

*Arms and the State*, based on a wealth of material and written by partisans of the American imperialist policy, confirms this analysis even in details.

From the book we understand the enormous force, the will to survive, of the American ruling classes. Their flex-

ibility has reached a remarkable level, and the way they knew promptly how to react to the enormous changes in the world, every time they reproduced themselves, is unique in the history of imperialism. And indeed, they succeeded in "transforming their attitudes and traditions about war and foreign affairs to correspond to their new rôle." There cannot be the slightest doubt about it.

In spite of this, the rising revolutionary forces in the world have given proof of being stronger than the capability of the enemy to halt and defeat them, although American imperialism has not hesitated — since 1953, the

"target date" — to bring humanity to the brink of war. In his introduction, Harold Stein concludes:

But Truman and Eisenhower, and all of us alive today, also live with the new problems of that terrifying new world we never made, or at least never meant to make.

And indeed, the time is over when the imperialists "made this world" according to their will. What is "terrifying" now for them, the rise of world revolutionary forces, will be the world of tomorrow. Neither "arms," nor "the state" will be able to prevent it from becoming a reality.



## Book Reviews

### THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN WORLD WAR ONE

*The Workers' Movement in the First World War*, Vol. 2. By Alfred Rosmer. Paris.

The working-class movement has a relatively short history; but the intensity which this history has acquired in recent years, to which must be added the acts of deformation of the working-class leaderships, has meant that as a result events which are known to generations still living are literally unknown to most of the rank and file.

Thus, the years of the First World War and the first years of the Russian revolution are still unknown not only to the youngest generations, but even to the main part of the rank-and-filers of thirty to forty years old. We cannot expect the present leaderships and the historians at their disposal to give a true account of this period, whether they be socialist or Stalinist. So the second volume of Alfred Rosmer's book, *The Workers' Movement during the First World War*, will fill a gap and educate new generations of working-class militants.

This second volume covers essentially the year 1916, and deals mainly with the repercussions of the Zimmerwald Conference on the working-class movement which was beginning, under the pressure of the growing misery provoked by the war, to awaken from the torpor into which it was plunged by the declaration of war and the passing to the side of "national unity" of the organizations — Parties and trade unions — which had existed before 1914. It ends on the eve of the outbreak of the Russian revolution, which opens a new period for which Rosmer promises a third volume.

An extremely rich account is to be found in the book which has just been published, mostly of that part of the working-class movement which was obliged to act in an underground or semi-clandestine manner, and which began to wage a struggle against the leaders of the Socialist party and the C G T, the Renaudels and the Jouhaux. Here are to be found not only the events and their unfolding, but also the essence of the ideas and arguments which clashed — both in the struggle against the corrupt leaderships and within the minority groups which, on the morning of August 2, 1914, found themselves in an extremely confused ideological state.

It is not our intention to summarize this book, meant for study and reference. Every militant will have many occasions to refer to it, either in discussion or in preparing historical talks. This book prompts many reflections on the development of the working-class movement since that time.

First of all, the working-class movement was then mainly European, with certain extensions into the United States. All the discussions turned on Europe and the European peoples. At the time, nobody imagined that, 40 years later,

the colonial peoples would surpass, in their revolutionary struggles, the workers of the advanced capitalist countries.

Apart from this, resistance to social-patriotism, although still rather weak in 1916, was nevertheless much more accentuated than it is at present. Who could have imagined that the founders of the Third International would be in the position later to be exploited by usurpers who would compete in social-patriotism.

One of the most interesting aspects of this book is its illustration of the ideological feebleness of the opposition to the war, more particularly in the French working-class movement. It is enough to see how the leadership of the Socialist party, for a long time was able to outmaneuver the oppositionists, thanks to the intervention of a wing which interposed itself between the leadership and the oppositionists. The gap is also noticeable between the vigor of the Kienthalian's speeches in parliament, and their theoretical poverty. Without forecasting what is coming in the third volume of Rosmer's work, one can easily understand, in the light of volume 2, what will be in effect the Communist party which will emerge, less than four years later, at the Tours Congress, and how far it was from being a really Communist party.

The question which, from Zimmerwald onwards, projects itself over the whole working-class movement of this period, is the question of the new International, the Third International to be created. The most patriotic of the old socialist leaders, those of France to begin with, did not wish even to hear talk of a meeting of the former Second International. Those among them most conscious of the new tendencies, which penetrated deeply into the masses, tried hard, like Camille Huysmans, by means of elaborate maneuvers, to isolate the revolutionary vanguard.

At Kienthal, as at Zimmerwald, it was the Russians who were the most determined partisans of the Third International, because they saw most clearly the reasons for the débâcle of 1914 and the possibilities provided, after all, by the war. In his book Rosmer shows that Lenin, on this question also, combined the most implacable firmness of principle with a tactical suppleness, planning that no meeting of the old International should take place without the revolutionary minority being represented and heard. This political and theoretical superiority which he showed from the beginning of the war on a question concerning which there had been much discussion within the working-class movement in former years (though without much clarity or consequence), was very soon to find its expression in the capacity to lead the Russian revolution in a way which remains a model unparalleled in history.

## THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION IN ALGERIA

*L'An Cinq de la Revolution.* By F Fanon. Paris.  
*Le Front.* By Robert Davezies. Paris.

There is already a rich body of literature on the Algerian revolution. Various documents and eye-witness accounts, sociological studies, and novels by Algerian and other writers, have appeared in abundance since 1954 to throw light on the meaning, the prospects and the glory of the Algerian revolution.

Here now are two books which complement each other in testifying at once to the profundity gained by the revolution after more than five years' heroic and tenacious struggle — without precedent, as a matter of fact, in the history of the colonial peoples — against the major forces of the third of the three great capitalist Powers, and to the epic already written by this revolution.

It is no longer simply a struggle for national independence. The Algerian people, expressly held by its oppressor, imperialism, in a very anachronistic economic, social and cultural status, in the course of its liberation struggle is shattering on every side the superannuated social structure fettering its progress. Through blood, fire, sacrifices and the most atrocious sufferings, these mountain peasants, as poor as they are proud, these workers from the Algerian towns and from the metropolis, have leaped in the space of a few years over the stages of colonial barbarism to land eager for knowledge and progress, in the very heart of the most advanced problems and aspirations of our century.

This is the living permanent revolution which from an united anti-imperialist national struggle, is transforming itself irresistibly into a profound social revolution in the quest for its true nature and achievement — as a proletarian and socialist revolution.

Frantz Fanon's book perfectly illustrates the profound upheaval wrought in the Algerian family, and in the mode of life of the people in general, under the colonial yoke: the extraordinary, irresistible advancement of the women and the youth, the familiarisation with technique and science in the service of revolution, the marked stripping away of the "mental sedimentation and spiritual and intellectual arrest" of the Algerian people "imposed by 130 years of oppression."

This book by a learned doctor pulsates with knowledge, amounting almost to expertise, of the social and psychological terrain it minutely explores.

Robert Davezies' book is made up of a series of raw recordings of men, women and even children of the revolution, which in their poignant simplicity sketch the most sober tableau of the Algerian epic, and of the organization which directs it: the F L N.

Robert Davezies has had the happy idea of letting rank and file trade-unionists, Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco, Algerian girls and boys, djounoud and djoundia<sup>1</sup> of the interior, and political cadres of the F L N speak

<sup>1</sup> Men and women partisans.

for themselves. This results in singular, dramatic intensity of a high political and social interest. Wonderful, heroic figures — women, young girls, boys and men — stand out.

But the main interest of the book lies in the explanations it gives of the profound motives activating the Algerian fighters, and of their hopes.

Here is the trade-union cadre, working in Algiers and Paris, preparing the revolution, throwing himself into it body and soul once it explodes.

"It is a peasant revolution," he declares, "essentially a peasant revolution." There is much talk among the djounoud of "the future Algeria," declares another. "They speak much about this, and first of all they speak of the agrarian reform: the land was stolen from us; it must come back to us. We will not lay down our arms before we get the land."

The djounoud want "to build a republic for the people, an authentic republic: it is necessary to tackle the problems at rock bottom, to carry the struggle for independence through to the end. And to do that, to fight for mastery of the people over the mines, the oil, the factories and the banks."

Another affirms: "The feeling of us all is that the real fight will begin after independence, and everyone is getting ready for it."

The agrarian reform, the redistribution of the land grabbed by "the big companies, the big settlers," will be "the basis of the Algeria of tomorrow."

More than the djounoud, it is the entire people who are claiming back *their* land. "There is no idea of revenge among the people, but only a desire for justice: their land, which was stolen from them, they will take back by force of arms."

The theme of the peasant character of the revolution and of the bold agrarian reform, "the first object of the revolution," recurs in most of the recordings. Social and political preoccupations, in the proportion and measure that the struggle is prolonged and experience is ripening, become pressing.

After a clear fashion the revolution is being politicized and deepened, following its own logic, that of the permanent revolution which proceeds inexorably from its national to its social stage.

All the testimonies here recorded, whether among the djounoud and the peasants of Algeria, or among the thousands of militants of the F L N organized in the prisons of France, agree on the extraordinary social and political maturity of the rank and file of the Algerian revolution.

It is up to the French and European working-class movement to shake off its present torpor and effectively come to the help of its class brothers who are fighting imperialism, hastening thereby the victorious development of socialism, in the one case as in the other.

M P

December, 1959



## THERE WERE NO MOSCOW TRIALS!

*History of the C P S U.* Paris.

During 1959 the manual promised by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress was published. The new *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* is a fat volume of 740 pages which — like the Stalinist work — begins with the origins of the Marxist movement in Russia. Unlike its predecessor, which ends with the year 1938, it takes

in not only the years of the Second World War but those following it, after the death of Stalin, and also treats the question of the elimination of the "anti-Party group" (Molotov, Kaganovich, etc). This, then, is a very "Khrushchevite" handbook. But does it conform to Marxist scientific objectivity?

A rapid reading enables one to see that though many things bearing the imprint of Stalin himself have been suppressed, many lies and deformations still remain — but it would take more time to refute all these than this book will live in the USSR.

But this book is best characterized by what it leaves out: *the Moscow trials!*

Stalin's *History* was written as a kind of mighty drama. The Party originated in Lenin's struggles against his political adversaries. The struggle rises to a crescendo. Stalin assumes the mantle. His enemies are more and more unmasked: "The Bukharinites degenerate into two-faced politicians," "the Trotskyites, from two-faced politicians, degenerate into a band of white guards, assassins and spies." (French edition, p 359). The trials reveal that "the Trotskyite and Bukharinite monsters, on the orders of their employers, the bourgeois espionage agencies, have set themselves the goal of destroying the Party and the Soviet state, of undermining the defense of the country, of facilitating foreign military intervention against the USSR, of preparing the defeat of the Red Army, of dismembering the USSR, of yielding to the Japanese the Soviet maritime province in the Far East, of yielding to the Poles Soviet Byelorussia, of yielding to the Germans the Soviet Ukraine, of annihilating the conquests of the workers and collective farmers, of restoring capitalist slavery in the USSR." (French edition, pp 384-385).

And now let us read and re-read the new *History*, Khrushchev's. All that could be construed as an allusion to, not even a mention of, the infamous trials, comes after the affirmation that Stalin's thesis according to which the

advance of the Soviet state is accompanied by a sharpening of the class struggle was false, on pages 483-484, in the following terms:

In practice, this thesis served as the basis for mass repression of the enemies of the Party, already ideologically defeated. The repression fell on many honest Communists and non-Party elements. In this period there crept into a responsible position in the state the political adventurer Beria who, for criminal ends, did not shrink from misdeeds, exploited Stalin's personal defects, slandered and destroyed many honest men faithful to the Party and to the people. During this same period, a contemptible rôle was played by Yezhov, who found himself in the post of People's Commissar of the Interior.

The young Soviet student of this book — and all young people in the Soviet Union will in the coming years receive their instruction from this manual — will learn that the Berias and the Yezhovs exploited Stalin's character to commit crimes not specifically designated, but he will not even know about the Moscow trials having taken place!

This alone is judgment enough on the new historical handbook. There are many species of the lie. Pascal in *Les Provinciales* showed how this was true of the Jesuits. But examples are rarely to be found so extreme as in these two bureaucratic manuals of history: in the one case, of the grossest and most fantastic lies to justify counter-revolutionary crimes; in the other, the application to these same crimes of the lie by omission.

# News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

## International

### XXIIInd PLENUM OF THE I E C

On November 28, 29 and 30, 1959, the 22nd Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the IVth International met. There were delegates from all European sections, from Ceylon, Latin America, and an Arab country. At the same time the European sections sent active cadres of the mass movement to participate in the discussions, particularly that on European Perspectives.

The main points on the agenda were:

- 1) Theses on European tasks and perspectives;
- 2) Preparation for the 6th World Congress, to be held in 1960;
- 3) Report by comrade Livio on his tour of Asia;
- 4) Reports by comrade Luis on the situation in Latin America and on Cuba;
- 5) Report and resolution on the situation and perspectives in France.



## Latin America

### FIRST CONGRESS OF LATIN-AMERICAN WOMEN

In the last week of November, 1959, in Santiago (Chile) the First Congress of Latin American Women took place. The Stalinists tried to give it a "broad" character, by trying to secure the participation of bourgeois tendencies. This endeavour failed, however, because the bourgeoisie was not interested in participating in a Congress in which the working-class women were dominant. For the same reason, the Chilean Christian-democrat and bourgeois-Radical representatives withdrew from the Preparatory Commission of the Congress, under the pretext of "lack of democracy."

The Stalinists tried to change the Congress into a platform for the Latin American echo of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence," but also failed in this effort.

Most successful, on the contrary, was the combative intervention of a broad Cuban delegation, formed above all by delegates from the Movement of July 26. They participated in the main Commission, which approved a report by a socialist comrade who defended the perspectives of the IVth International.

Many Chilean Trotskyists were also delegated to the Congress, in spite of the resistance of the Stalinists. They fraternized with the other delegates, distributed the *Revista Marxista Latino-Americana* and other Trotskyist material. The Partido Obrero Revolucionario (IVth International) issued a declaration to all delegates, in which it was stressed that the problems of the working women of America cannot be separated from the general process of the class struggle.

The Congress adopted a series of declarations on the youth, on crèches, on the agrarian reform. The strongest discussion took place on the problem of peace. The Stalinists proposed a resolution that "This Congress want peace." The Trotskyists, socialists and Movement of July 26 approved another statement: "Peace is conditional on the liberation of the peoples."

The next Congress of Latin American Women will take place in Havana.

### FIRST CONGRESS OF LATIN-AMERICAN YOUTH

In November, 1959, a round-table conference of youth of various Latin American countries took place, in which it was decided to prepare the First Latin American Youth Congress, to be held in Havana in July, 1960. For this purpose, coordinating committees have been formed in various Latin American countries.

In Chile, one of these committees, including representatives of the Socialist Youth, the Communist Youth, the Revolutionary Youth of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (IVth International), and the trade unions was held. At the last minute, the Communist Youth struck, accepting bourgeois radicals and Catholic organizations, while rejecting the powers of the delegates of the P O R youth.

After this, the P O R appealed to the first plenary session, and with the support of the Chilean and Argentine socialists, Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente, the Partido Obrero de Argentina (Trotskyist) and the Movement of July 26 (Cuba), and other delegates, the representatives of the P O R youth were admitted to the Congress with all rights. Clotario Blest, President of the Central Unica

de Trabajadores (Chilean Trade Union Federation) had also strongly criticized the maneuvers of the Chilean Stalinist youth.

The Stalinists had to suffer another defeat. The ultra-reactionary Liberal youth and the "Congress for the liberty of culture" were excluded from the congress, so that its composition became proletarian.

After far-reaching and sharp discussions with the Stalinist delegates, who wanted a "broad Congress" with the participation of bourgeois youth, the proposal of the P O R youth to invite the political and trade-union working class and the student youth, was accepted by an overwhelming vote. Moreover, the proposal of the Trotskyist youth was approved, that the Congress should have a clear class and anti-imperialist character.

The position of the Trotskyist youth, this time represented by Chilean and Argentine comrades, will be strengthened next July by the presence of Trotskyist youth, delegates from Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru and other Latin American countries.

## Bolivia

## BASIS OF WORKERS-PEASANT ALLIANCE

The development of the situation in the countryside constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of the Bolivian revolution in 1959. A basic element in the government's control, hitherto, over the countryside has been the conflict between workers and peasants.

This situation is rapidly coming to an end, giving rise to one of the most serious factors in the instability and demoralization of the Siles régime, and opening a new and deeper prospect for the unfolding of the revolution in Bolivia.

The struggle received its initial impetus from the entry into the government at the beginning of 1959 of Vicente Alvarez Plata, "peasant" trade-union bureaucrat, as Minister for Agrarian Affairs.

This opened a wide gulf between the "doctors'" leadership of the peasants (i.e. their leadership by city smart-alecs posing as peasants. Editor), installed by the MNR, and the rural rank-and-file.

The government then raised to the Ministry José Rojas, biggest leader of the Central de Ucureña and of the National Federation of Peasants and himself a former peasant. With the help of Rojas, bureaucratic peasant trade-union boss in Ucureña, Siles believed he could contain the struggle in the countryside.

But in fact Rojas' elevation acted as a stimulant. For his departure from Ucureña gave the opportunity to his opponents to seize control of the movement there. Thus the translation of Rojas to the administration signified not the end of the struggle but, on the contrary, the beginning of a fresh wave of unrest. This in turn gave rise to fresh dissension within the peasant leadership between those who wanted to extend the struggle and those whose interest lay in a compromise with the Government. Thoroughly alarmed by the situation, Rojas left the Ministry and again plunged into the thick of the faction-fight. His intervention, however, came too late to be of much use to

his master, Siles; for by this time he was discredited before everyone except his own personal clique and certain of the most backward elements.

Following the discrediting of Plata and the departure of Rojas, the government introduced a basic change into its agrarian policy. Siles appointed as Minister of Agrarian Affairs a military man, General Pacheco, ex-Minister in the Villaruel government. The general lost no time in sending armed troops into the countryside. This had, of course, the effect of solidifying the ranks of the discontented and insurgent peasantry, causing them to seek new allies among other sections of the oppressed.

The government now lacked all confidence in the peasant leadership, subjected to tremendously powerful pressure from the rank-and-file. It could no longer rely even on the faction of the "doctors" (the "martyrdom" of Plata at Atahuallpani symbolizing the decisive repudiation of this group on the part of the embattled peasantry).

Thus began a new period of bloody struggle in the Bolivian countryside, in which the Siles government's only hope lay in the splitting and strike-breaking rôle of its agent in the working-class movement, the treacherous and criminal Lechinist leadership. The task Lechin and his gang were set was to carry forward the policy of Paz Estensoro: to divide the laborers and poor peasants of the countryside from the workers in the towns.

Thanks to the bold leadership of the miners' union and the work of the POR fraction in the COB (trade-union confederation), this design was thwarted. There is increasing realization on all sides, at the end of 1959, that the powerful worker-peasant alliance must be reestablished on the basis of a program uniting the immediate demands of both sections in struggle. The deepening of the Bolivian revolution into a new phase is now posed: a deepening made necessary for the very preservation of the revolution itself.



## Ceylon

## L S S P WARNS AGAINST RIGHTIST COUP, DEMANDS WORKERS' GOVERNMENT

Meeting on November 8, 1959 the central committee of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Section of the IVth International, reaffirmed its resolution of October 16, 1959 analyzing the present situation in Ceylon and adopted an addendum to the resolution outlining the Party's present tasks. The CC issued the slogans: Down with the usurping Dahanayake government! Down with the conspirators and all their reactionary allies! Victory to a L S S P government!

The assassination of former premier Solomon Bandaranaike, leader of the Shri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) of small capitalists and rural petty-bourgeois, has focussed the discontent already widespread among all layers of the Ceylonese masses on the government and person of W Dahanayake, reactionary Sinhalese communalist and renegade from Trotskyism who took office following Bandaranaike's murder. The assassin, a Buddhist monk, was linked politically with communalist and ultra-Right elements in both leading bourgeois Parties (United National Party and SLFP). The masses, horrified at the murder, rightly conclude that the composition and political links of the Dahanayake government preclude it from carrying out a genuine investigation of the forces behind the plot.

The government, of a makeshift and thoroughly un-

stable character, rests on the support of ultra-reactionary and communalist elements of the Buddhist priesthood, on the one hand, and the most Rightist section of the urban and rural petty-bourgeoisie, on the other. The former, enraged by the way in which Bandaranaike was "dragging his heels" in the enforcing of communal legislation, determined on his removal; the latter, tired of the ex-premier's flirtation with Nehru-type "socialist" concepts and his failure to deal firmly enough with his "Marxist" wing (the Philip Gunawardena group), are now ready to turn once more to an alliance with big capital (not necessarily in the form of a coalition with sections of the UNP, the open Party of big business, though this is not excluded) against the dreaded advance of the mass forces, seeking to extend the anti-Right offensive represented by the victory of Bandaranaike's MEP coalition in the elections of May '56.

Throughout the period of the Bandaranaike government, Dahanayake and his group were associated with the extreme Right of the MEP, and were the principal channel through which the capitalist and Sinhalese communalist pressure groups influenced the policy of the coalition. In spite of this, they are not regarded by imperialism and the Sinhalese big bourgeoisie as reliable agents, for three main reasons: they are too obviously the direct beneficiaries of

political bloodletting, and as such remain the obvious immediate target of the hostility and fury of the masses, aroused against the assassins; they are too closely tied to the Buddhist lunatic fringe, the Maha Sangha, openly embraced by the new premier as an ally at a time when the popularity of this sect is at its lowest for centuries; and, finally, they lack the basis for any kind of demagogic mass appeal, a basis provided in the first place by the Philip group (before its expulsion from the government in May 1959) and even, to a lesser extent, by the personality of Bandaranaike himself.

The forces of big capital are therefore searching desperately for a political alternative to the crisis-ridden and highly unstable Dahanayake régime, whose internal dissensions and external unpopularity are such that it may at any moment go to the wall. These forces, faced with the (for them) extremely alarming prospect of an early general election, bringing with it the strong possibility of a triumph of the LSSP, have examined, and for the time being seemingly rejected, the prospects of a Right UNP government (Sir John Kotelawala) or a coalition of the Dahanayake wing of the SLFP and the "Left" of the UNP (Dudley Senanayake.) For them, the most likely move is the attempt to push through a "cold" (i.e. "legal" and parliamentary) coup on the de Gaulle pattern, with the ubiquitous Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, governor-general and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as "constitutional dictator." Goonetilleke, like Kotelawala and Senanayake (and indeed like Bandaranaike himself) was a high-placed civil servant and reliable stooge of the British before political "independence" was conferred on Ceylon by the Soulbury constitution of 1946. In this he was typical of the Ceylonese bourgeoisie which, unlike that of India, did not at any stage in its history wage even a partial struggle against imperialism. There is no doubt that he still retains the confidence and strong behind-scenes backing of the American and British embassies.

It is against this danger that the LSSP warns. The Party, solidly at the head of the industrial working class and with strong support among other important sections (Indian plantation laborers, a big part of the salariat and urban intelligentsia and, above all, broad elements of the Tamil minority, attracted by the bold anti-chauvinist line

of the Party during the communal riots of 1956 and 1958-1959), is seeking to canalize and extend the anger aroused by the murder to the whole field of policy of the reactionary Dahanayake government. For the first time, in effect, there are serious chances of the Party opening a road for itself to the middle peasants and the rural poor, until now the prey of communalist elements of both communities and particularly of the Philip Gunawardena grouping (as Minister of Agriculture in the pre-May 1959 MEP government Philip had introduced the popular Land and Paddy Act.)

With greater support and wider forces at its disposal than at any time during the last 25 years, the Party of the Ceylon proletariat, the LSSP, which from the day of its founding has so gallantly and unswervingly upheld the banner of class struggle and international proletarian solidarity, of Marxism, prepares to reap the harvest of its years of patient and effective mass work. On the threshold of stormy new events, the Party is preparing its cadres for three eventualities, the most likely in the present conjuncture: a) A Rightist coup by the reactionary forces, fearful of the victory of the LSSP in country-wide elections, against the danger of which the Party continually warns the masses; b) A victory of the LSSP in the general election, imposing on the Party the responsibility of mobilizing the masses in extra-parliamentary action in support of the workers' government and in the defense of that government against the frenzied resistance of all reactionary elements; c) The possibility of an armed uprising of the workers and peasants to prevent the imposition of a Rightist dictatorship of a police-military type on the Burmese and Pakistani pattern, to which imperialism and the bourgeoisie may resort as a last desperate measure.

In the context, first of all, of the LSSP's fight for an electoral victory in March, perhaps on the basis of partial agreement with other opposition groups (the CP and Philip, who now calls his group the MEP), it is the task of Trotskyists in every country to begin immediately to mobilize the widest possible knowledge of the situation in Ceylon and support for the LSSP among the broadest layers of the Left.



## Norway

### DEATH OF JEANETTE OLSEN

From Norway we have received the sad news that Comrade Jeanette Olsen has died in Oslo after a long life of service to the socialist movement. Since 1900, when she was 27, she had been active in both the Norwegian and the international revolutionary movements. Even in her last years, when it was no longer possible for her to be active, she remained for the Norwegian Trotskyists the banner-bearer of the old revolutionary Marxist traditions, to which she remained loyal to the end of her days.

Jeanette Olsen was among the pioneers of the Norwegian labor movement. Even before the First World War, she was secretary of the Norwegian fishermen's union and a municipal councillor in Oslo. From 1918-1923 she was a member of the leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party, then in the Third International. As a delegate from this Party she participated in the Second and Third Congresses of the Communist International, when she had long discussions with Lenin and Trotsky on the relationship of the NLP to the International. After the break of the

NLP from the Comintern, she became a leader and foundation member of the Communist Party of Norway, member of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau.

In 1928 she broke from the CPN, together with Scheflo (see Trotsky's *Stalin's Crimes*). In 1936 she defended, in a pamphlet with a mass circulation, the victims of the Moscow trials, on the basis of her own knowledge of the persons involved. In the period of the worst Stalinist slanders, she declared for Trotskyism. She was the popular representative of the Trotskyist group in Norway, an editor of the paper *October*, published jointly by the Danish and Norwegian Trotskyists.

The greatest events in the life of Jeanette Olsen were the Russian revolution and her meetings with its leaders, Lenin and Trotsky. With the death of Jeanette Olsen the international workers' movement has lost a remarkable personality, uniting the traditions of the Second, Third and Fourth Internationals.





## Indonesia

## PARTAI ACOMA JOINS THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The Indonesian Partai Acoma has decided to join the IVth International. The 22nd plenum of the International Executive Committee of the International enthusiastically welcomed this decision and unanimously declared itself in favor of recommending to the coming 6th World Congress that it should include the Partai Acoma in its ranks as the Indonesian section of the IVth International.

The Partai Acoma originates from the communist youth, which — with weapons in hand — fought both Japanese and Dutch imperialist occupation. When the PKI (Indo-

nesian Communist Party) declared itself in favor of collaboration with Dutch imperialism, and even supported the shameful Linggardjati agreement, the Acoma youth decided to continue the struggle and formed an independent organisation, which later became the Partai Acoma.

Ibnu Parna, leading comrade of the Partai Acoma, is a Member of Parliament. He recently finished 11 months in prison, owing to his opposition to the military clique, headed by Nasution.

## USA

★  
A MAJOR TRIAL OF STRENGTH

The 116-day steel strike was suspended by Eisenhower under the injunction provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law.

It is generally considered to be the most significant working-class struggle since the formation of the CIO and the sit-down strikes of the thirties.

It has clearly turned into a major trial of strength between the trade unions in general and the capitalist class, supported by Congress and the administration. The steelworkers, who entered the struggle in a confused state, without leadership and adequate preparation, quickly consolidated their ranks when they understood that the steel magnates were determined to strike a decisive blow against their organization and to take away work practices which had been agreed to and negotiated over the years.

They have consolidated the union to such an extent that they are now, in spite of being obliged to work, more ready than at the beginning of the strike to go all out again on January 26 when the injunction expires. As is well-known, the union obtained a first, partial victory when the firm of Edgar Kaiser broke the united front of the steel industry and thus tacitly disproved persistent corporation claims that the union demands were too costly for management. Another claim of this latter was invalidated by reports, including official ones, concerning payments to the steelworkers.

Thus the report of the Secretary of Labor, Mitchell, issued on August 15 clearly demonstrated: a) that the basic steel industry average gross pay fell from \$5,350 per worker annually in the prosperous year of 1957 to \$4,840 in 1958; b) that over 40% of the steelworkers earned less than \$4,800 in 1958 — below the minimum income set by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for an urban four-person family.

This is in sharp contrast to the profits of the employers.

According to the same report and other sources, operating at 87% of capacity for the first six months of 1959, the steel companies' margin of profit was so great "that a 15-cent increase in real employment costs, combined with a price reduction of about \$7 a ton, would still have left net profits after taxes at the level of the all-time record steel profit year of 1957."

The most controversial point in the arbitration negoti-

ations now taking place between the representatives of the unions and the employers and Federal Mediation Director J F Finnegan, is that management must justify rule changes in local work and that the union has the right to protest via grievances any changes they consider unwarranted.

The bosses are now demanding that the union accept all changes "in the interest of efficiency" — the final judge of what constitutes "efficiency" to be management itself.

The workers must now decide by a secret ballot starting on January 11 and to be completed by January 18 whether or not to accept the bosses' latest offer.

It is predictable that they will reject it by an "overwhelming majority" (according to the union by "more than 90 %").

What will happen after that?

According to the steelworkers' president, David McDonald, the union might reverse its historic pattern of industry-wide walkouts and start a partial or selective strike against one, two, or three of the largest steel producers, so as to split their front.

But at the same time, without an agreement, demands for "strong measures such as a compulsory arbitration law seem certain to be renewed" (*New York Times*, December 27, 1959).

According to other rumours, Eisenhower may call for an extension of the injunction.

The union leaders, while declaring that the struggle is a decisive one, fought by "the reactionary forces, who seem at the moment to control the entire American scene" (Meany), against the entire American working-class movement, still do not seem disposed to wage a coordinated class action of the organized workers' forces to combat the de facto united front of the bosses, the administration and Congress.

But the mounting pressure of the rank-and-file could give rise to a new course which will set labor on the road not only of united trade-union action, but also independent working-class political action. The class struggle is hardening in the United States in proportion to the decline of the economic and financial power of American capitalism on a world scale.

January 1, 1960

## POST-SCRIPT

A compromise favorable to the demands of the workers was reached on January 4, 1960, following the persistent intervention of Nixon especially.

The workers received an hourly increase in wages higher than the employers' last offer.

The latter dropped their claim for arbitration on the complex work-rules issue. Doubtless they will add the in-

crease granted the workers on to the price of steel.

The agreement marks an important success for Nixon, favorite candidate in this year's Presidential election.

It in no way lessens the intention of Congress and the Administration to enact new, drastic anti-union legislation as soon as the election campaign is over.

January 5, 1960

## USSR

## TOWARDS AGRO-TOWNS

From December 22-25, 1959, the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union again examined the situation in agriculture.

The grain harvest all over the Soviet Union has been worse this year than in 1958, partly because of drought, partly because the work in harvesting was "badly organized."

In Kazakhstan, a large part of whose agricultural production comes from "virgin lands," the total amount of grain harvested is thought to have been about five million tons less, and deliveries to the state have fallen by 26 %.

Output of meat and dairy produce has apparently risen considerably. Output of butter per head has for the first time exceeded the American level. The Seven-year Plan for meat production of 16 million tons would be met ahead of schedule in 1963.

The central committee called on workers to produce four to five million tons of meat over that figure in order to catch up with per capita production in the United States. But the most important aspect of this central committee session consists in the new proposals adopted, put forward by Matskevich, the Minister of Agriculture, concerning the structural reorganization of agriculture. These

proposals would extend a system of wages and bonuses which now apply in the state farms to the collective farms, besides accelerating their amalgamation and their purchases of machinery.

They are intended as an important step toward assimilating conditions on the farms to those in industry, toward making each farm a factory, with wages for the employees and profits to be ploughed back into the business.

Among the 55,000 kholkhoz now in existence, pilot enterprises are already to be found where conditions for remuneration do not differ from those in the sovkhoz, and where the village has been rebuilt on the model of an "agro-town."

The Soviet leaders hope that a transformation of this description, when fulfilled, will raise the rate of productivity in agriculture (now half that in industry) and at the same time free the manpower necessary for the future expansion of industry.

We shall comment at an early stage in a more profound way on these new measures, which accentuate the transformation now under way, of Soviet agriculture, up to now the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy.

*Now Off Press*

# THE ARAB REVOLUTION

By MICHEL PABLO

Especially at the moment of de Gaulle's new proposals concerning Algeria and the critical vote on the question of the Algerian war and Algerian independence at the United Nations, this 72-page pamphlet is particularly timely. But its value transcends any particular component, however important or timely, for it constitutes a complete survey of the whole subject of the *entire* Arab revolution. One section provides the necessary historical background of liberation movements, another analyzes the economic structures of the whole vast region extending from the Atlantic to the Euphrates, and a third explains, as against the fatal errors of unprincipled Stalinist zigzags, what should be the policy of revolutionary Marxists on the steadily unfolding Arab revolution. To the main text, consisting of Comrade Pablo's Report to the XXIst Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, as reproduced in our issues 5 and 6, there has been added an extensive introduction that updates and increases the impact of the original report.

*Price: 35 US cents, or 2 shillings. Orders to:*

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