

YOUNG PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST LEAGUE

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A Student Anti-War Quarterly

anvil

And Student Partisan

LIBERAL VALUES IN THE MODERN WORLD

by C. Wright Mills

View of British Labor and Rearmament

Samuel Morison: Historian in Uniform

The Role of History Under Stalinism

Negro Literature: Art and Oppression

New Foundations: Political Comic Strip

Ruth Reynolds: Victim of Colonial Justice

Editorials • Reviews • Poetry • Student News



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CONTENTS

Editorials	3
Liberal Values in the Modern World	5
C. Wright Mills	
The Role of History Under Stalinism	8
David Fineberg	
Negro Literature: Art and Oppression	14
Margaret Levi	
Toy Gods and Brute Faces: Two Poems	17
Manfred A. Carter	
Samuel Morison: Historian in Uniform	18
Bob Bone	
View of British Labor and Rearmament	21
A. J. Muste	
Ruth Reynolds: Victim of Colonial Justice	24
Conrad Lynn	
Further Violations of Student Rights	26
Before the Fifth Avenue Library and Washington Square	28
Tuli	
New Foundations: Political Comic Strip	29
Julius Jacobson	
From the Student's Bookshelf: The Hidden Heritage	30
Charles Thayer	

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Editorials:

Southern Terror: Clear and Present Danger

SELDOM HAS THERE been a more dramatic example of the true character of white supremacy than the "Groveland Case" which has recently brought the State of Florida into a position of world-wide prominence. Through a series of events — the original mob violence at Groveland in 1949, the frame-up trial of three Groveland Negroes and callous shooting of two of them by Sheriff MacCall, and, lastly, the dynamiting of the home of Harry Moore — all of the elements which make up the pattern of race relations in America have been exposed.

The original riots took place against the background of peonage which is practically co-extensive with citrus-growing in Central Florida. A better example could hardly be found to demonstrate the relationship between economic exploitation and racial discrimination. In this area Negroes are pressed into low-paying jobs through thinly veiled charges of vagrancy. Collective action to improve their position is prevented by constant terror and intimidation, of which the Groveland riots were but one instance.

The riots, which had been precipitated by the usual hysterical charge of "rape" resulted in one Negro being killed outright by a "posse." The subsequent conviction of three more Negro workers on the same charge exhibited the typical casual character of Southern justice wherever "colored people" are involved. The entry of the NAACP into the case, however, served to secure from the U. S. Supreme Court a reversal of the conviction of two prisoners condemned to death, on the basis of a "flagrant miscarriage of justice." The case of the third had not been appealed since he had only received a life sentence, and a retrial might have resulted in the death penalty.

The Outraged Public Officials

Throughout the case, the position of the public officials of Florida has never been in doubt. Governor Fuller Warren (the same who had refused to testify before Senator Kefauver's Committee) was quick to label Walter White a "hired Harlem hatemonger." This was in line with the Miami police chief's explanation of the hatred of Southern officials for the NAACP because "it stirred up the community." This same police chief had attributed the bombings of a Negro housing project and Jewish synagogues to a "Communist plot," while terming the Klan "a law-abiding organization."

But it was the action of Sheriff McCall which drew world attention to the case. This sadistic killer shot the two Groveland defendants who had been granted a new trial while they were lying handcuffed on the side of the road. Miraculously one of them lived to tell the tale. Russia's delegate, Vyshinsky, thereupon had a field day in the United Nations, excoriating a country in which two defenseless Negroes could be shot by a sheriff who remained unpunished. To top it all, the subsequent dynamiting of the home of Florida's NAACP secretary, Harry Moore, killing him immediately and fatally injuring his wife, added the important element of extra-legal violence which lies behind every case of racial conflict in the South.

As a result of its international implications in the cold war, the status of American Negroes has recently become a matter of interest to many who never before concerned themselves with the question. In the trite phrases of the State Department spokesmen and their liberal apologists, "the world-wide struggle for men's minds demands that the United States prove it stands for democracy at home as well as abroad." The episode in the United Nations illustrates America's vulnerability and ideological helplessness on this question when facing the delegates of Asia and Africa. Thus, it was not Warren Austin but Sir Gladwyn Jebb of Great Britain who had to undertake the main defense of the United States against the charges of Vyshinsky. And his reply was singularly unconvincing. As opposed to Russia, he maintained, where police terror and slave labor is an accepted fact, McCall's brutal shooting was a singular exception, and in addition, it had incurred the abhorrence of 99% of All Decent Americans. The only difficulty with this argument was that while his reference to Russia was unassailable, there were few facts to support his contention about either the uniqueness of the event or the state of popular and official feeling in America.

Why Washington Does Not Act

Given the present world situation, why is it that the Federal government, i.e. the Truman administration, does so little to "correct the abuses" which do the United States so much harm in the propaganda battle of the Cold War? Certainly the administration has the power to take many kinds of effective action. The same agency which dispatches cloak-and-dagger agents behind the Iron Curtain might

equally as well, and with far more effectiveness, dispatch a few Southward to collect evidence on peonage, violations of wages and hours laws, and the trespassing of civil rights statutes. The Justice Department, which spends millions investigating, indicting, trying, convicting, imprisoning and preparing to intern "subversives" might do well to spend a few of those millions suppressing the force and violence employed against a defenseless minority. The different defense agencies which have been so successful in eliminating "poor security risks" from government jobs, might become equally concerned with seeing to it that companies holding government contracts do not discriminate in hiring and upgrading of Negro workers. Indeed, when one examines the means at the disposal of the government, it becomes apparent that there is absolutely no reason whatever why a whole series of sweeping reforms could not be immediately instituted, which, if they would not eliminate racial prejudice, would go a long way toward abolishing the most flagrant aspects of discrimination and segregation. The question is: Why, with America's most vital national interests at stake, does the government refuse to act in this field?

Our answer to this is that the thread of racial exploitation is too tightly woven into the fabric of Southern society; it bolsters the waning power of declining social classes and political demagogues; it is used to divide Negro and white workers and as a barrier against the unionization of all workers. The interests which, regardless of America's global aims, seek to perpetuate a system of rank caste status for their own narrow ends happen to be the very ones which exercise political power in America's hinterland. It is not some backwoods governor or hill-billy sheriff who is at fault, but the system of marginal agriculture, social backwardness and cultural ignorance which produces these types.

The difficulty in effecting any change lies in the dependence of the government on the very forces it would have to attack. It has been apparent for some time that the most effective way of breaking the pattern of Jim Crow is through such federal action as FEPC provided to a certain extent during World War II. The Truman administration, however, has shown itself unwilling to completely alienate Southern Senators and forego potential Southern electoral votes by taking steps which are available to it without any new legislation.

Need for Immediate Action

Unlike those who favor civil rights only in order to strengthen America's international prestige, we advocate equality for its own sake and not as a convenience for Washington's world power position. However, we recognize that the present moment precisely because of America's sensitive international position is especially propitious for effecting a change in this area. To effect this change we must and can act vigorously to keep the question of racial discrimination before the public eye.

Student organizations have the responsibility of seeing to it that the campus be made aware of all aspects of the question, to the end that pressure can be brought to bear

on public officials in those cases where it can do some good. The Groveland Case is certainly one such instance. The E. V. Debs Society (SLID) recently initiated a campaign at City College of New York (Evening Session) on the Groveland Case, and we understand that it is to be continued through the entire next semester. It will collect petitions, raise money, hold meetings, and send protest delegations to public officials. Other student organizations, especially those supporting *Anvil and Student Partisan* would do well to emulate its example.

Buckley's Banter: A Warning Signal

THERE IS A NEW book on the market called *God and Man at Yale*. The contents of the book itself is not worth any serious consideration; it is a rambunctious reactionary revelation of all the sins of modern man including Keynes, godlessness and academic freedom. Its author is William F. Buckley, a recent graduate of Yale who found the respectable institute of Yale to be a spawning ground for evil and wicked thoughts. Buckley evidently believes in transferring the shock treatment technique, so popular in recent fiction, to the realm of non-fiction. In place of a tempestuous love scene or a cover with a maiden dressed in décolleté fashion, if at all, Buckley has increased the marketability of his product by uttering the most outrageous thoughts with glibness and arrogance.

What is interesting about the book is the reception it has received. It has been hailed as an intellectually stimulating and brave work by many critics. George Sokolsky, Max Eastman and John Chamberlain have conducted virtual campaigns to put Buckley across. And they have succeeded; for quite a while *God and Man at Yale* was to be found on the best seller lists. That Buckley, a staunch believer in intellectual terror, should have met with such success is indeed a reflection of the tenor of our times. It is a bolder and, in a sense, more honest presentation of the partially submerged views and aspirations of some of America's leading political personalities. Probably only a handful of the book's readers will go all the way with Buckley now and many readers have, no doubt, been scandalized by Buckley's fascist concepts. But even the fact that the book has created an interest among liberal and radical opponents, too, is itself symptomatic of the growing offensive against civil liberties and academic freedom. Ten year ago Buckley would have been appropriately dismissed as a crackpot. Today, however, his views achieve meaning only because of the danger we all face in the current drive against labor, students and unorthodox organizations. Thus, Buckley's banter must be taken as another warning signal.

His words should carry a special warning for students and faculty members as they are the special victims of his attacks. His book is a portent of what awaits us if we do not *organize* now to defend and extend our rights.

Liberal Values in the Modern World

The Relevance of Nineteenth Century Liberalism Today

MOST OF US NOW live as spectators in a world without political interlude: fear of total permanent war stops our kind of morally oriented politics. Our spectatorship means that personal, active experience often seems politically useless and even unreal. This is a time when frustration seems to be in direct ratio to understanding, a time of cultural mediocrity when the levels of public sensibility have sunk below sight. It is a time of irresponsibility, organized and unorganized; when common sense, anchored in fast-outmoded experience has become myopic and irrelevant. Nobody feels secure in a simple place; nobody feels secure and there is no simple place.

It is a time when no terms of acceptance are available, but also no terms of rejection: those on top seem stunned, distracted, and bewildered, and don't know what to do. But what is much more damaging to us: those on the bottom are also without leaders, without counter-ideas, don't know what to do, do not have real demands to make of those in key positions of power.

Whatever the political promises of labor and leftward forces 15 years ago, they have not been fulfilled; whatever leadership they have developed has hidden itself for illusory safety, or been buried by events it neither understands nor wishes to control. Organized labor in the 'forties and early 'fifties has been mainly another adaptive and adapting element. What goes on domestically may briefly be described in terms of the main drift toward a permanent war economy in a garrison state.

Internationally, of course, the world of nations has been polarized into two dead-locked powers, with no prospects of a structured peace, with a penumbra of variously graded and variously dependent satellites, puppets, and vacuums. For the first time in its easy history, the United States finds itself a nation in a military neighborhood, having common frontiers with a big rival. The United States is a sea and air power from an external position; wherever it turns, it faces a vast land-power with an internal position. In the meantime, Europe has become a virtual colony, held by military force and economic dependence. And neither in the West nor in the East do U.S. spokesmen seem to have ideas and policies that have genuine appeal to the people residing there.

Internationally and domestically, the death of political ideas in the United States coincides with the general intellectual vacuum to underpin our malaise. Insofar as ideas are involved in our political impasse, these ideas center in the nature and present day situation of liberalism. For liberalism is at once the main line of our intellectual heritage and our official political philosophy. I shall not here attempt a full analysis of liberalism's connection with the modern malaise; I only want to lay out some key themes,

which I believe must be taken into account in any examination of liberalism today.

I

Like any social philosophy, liberalism can conveniently be understood and discussed (1) as an articulation of *ideals* which, no matter what its level of generality, operates as a sort of moral optic and set of guidelines for judgments of men, movements and events; (2) as a *theory*, explicit or implied, of how a society works, of its important elements and how they are related, of its key conflicts and how they are resolved; (3) as a social phenomenon, that is, as an *ideology* or political rhetoric—justifying certain institutions and practices, demanding and expecting others. In these terms, what is the situation of liberalism today?

As a set of articulated *ideals*, liberalism has been and is a major part of "the secular tradition of the west." As a political *rhetoric*, liberalism has been the ideology of the rising middle class. As a *theory* of society, liberalism is confined in relevance to the heroic epoch of the middle class. These points are connected, for as a carrier of ideals, liberalism has been detached from any tenable theory of modern society, and however engaging in its received condition, it is no longer a useful guide-line to the future. For the 18th and part of the 19th centuries, liberal theory did clarify and offer insight; for the 20th century, it just as often confuses.

II

Liberalism, as a set of ideals, is still viable, and even compelling to Western men. That is one reason why it has become a common denominator of American political rhetoric; but there is another reason: the ideals of liberalism have been divorced from any realities of modern social structure that might serve as the means of their realization. Everybody can easily agree on general ends; it is more difficult to agree on means and the relevance of various means to the ends articulated. The detachment of liberalism from the facts of a going society make it an excellent mask for those who do not, cannot, or will not do what would have to be done to realize its ideals.

As a kind of political rhetoric, liberalism has been banalized: now it is commonly used by everyone who talks in public for every divergent and contradictory purpose. Today we hear liberals say that one liberal can be "for," and another liberal "against," a vast range of contradictory political propositions. What this means is that liberalism as a common denominator of American political rhetoric, is without coherent content; that, in the process of its banalization, its goals have been so formalized as to provide no clear moral optic. The crisis of liberalism (and of American political reflection) is due to liberalism's success in becoming the official language for all public statement.

To this fact was added its use in the New Deal Era when, in close contact with power, liberalism became administrative. Its crisis in lack of clarity is underpinned by its use by all interests, classes, and parties.

It is in this situation that professional liberals sometimes make a fetish of indecision, which they would call open-mindedness, as against inflexibility; of the absence of criteria, which they would call tolerance, as against dogmatism; of the formality and hence political irrelevance of criteria, which they would call "speaking broadly," as against "details."

We may not, of course, dismiss liberalism merely because it is a common denominator of political rhetoric. Its wide use as justification limits the choices and, to some extent, guides the decisions of those in authority. For if it is the common denominator, all powerful decisions made in the open must be justified in its terms, and this may restrain the deciders even if they do not "believe in it." For men are influenced in their use of authority, by the rhetoric they feel they must employ. The leaders as well as the led, and even the mythmakers, are influenced by prevailing rhetorics of justification.

Secular Humanism of Liberalism

Liberals have repeatedly articulated a secular humanism, stressing the priceless value of the individual personality, and the right of each individual to be dealt with in accordance with rational and understandable laws, to which all power is also subject. They have been humanist in the sense that they see man as the measure of all things: policies and events are good or bad in terms their effect on men; institutions and societies are to be judged in terms of what they mean to and for the individual human being. Liberals have assumed that men should control their own life-fates. It is in terms of this value that the entire concern with consent to authority and the opposition to violence should be understood. All loyalties to specific movements and organizations tend, for the liberal, to be conditional upon his own principles, rather than blindly to an organization. Liberals have assumed that there are rational ways to acquire knowledge, and that substantive reason, anchored in the individual, provides the way out.

As a set of such ideals, liberalism has very heavily contributed to the big tradition of the West, but it is not the sole carrier of this tradition; it is not to be identified with it. And it is a real question whether today it is the most whole-hearted carrier of it, for it is to be greatly doubted that, as a theory of society, liberalism is in a position to lead or help men carry these ideals into realization.

So, if as ideal, liberalism is the secular tradition of the the West, as a theory of society, which enables these ideals, it is the ideology of one class inside one epoch. If the moral force of liberalism is still stimulating, its sociological content is weak; it has no theory of society adequate to its moral aims.

III

The assumptions of liberal theories about society, have to do with how liberal values could be anchored, of how they could operate as guide to policy. The liberal ideals of the 18th and 19th centuries were anchored in several

basic assumptions about the condition of modern society that are no longer simple or clear:

(1) Liberalism has assumed that both freedom and security, its key values, flourish in a world of small entrepreneurs. But it is quite clear that one of the most decisive changes over the last hundred years is the enormous increase in the scale of property units. This has meant that the ideals of liberty and of security have changed: absolute liberty to control property has become tyranny. The meaning of freedom, positively put, has to be restated now, not as independence, but as control over that upon which the individual is dependent. Security, once resting on the small holding, has become, in the world of large property, anxiety—anxiety produced by the concentration of process and by the manner of living without expectation of owning. Positively, security must be group-guaranteed; individual men can no longer provide for their own futures.

If a particular ideal of freedom assumes for its realization the dominance of a scatter of small property, then, the social meaning of this ideal is quite different from a statement of freedom that assumes a situation of concentrated property. It is in its theory of society, tacit or explicit, that we find the political content of a social philosophy. If men assume the dominance of huge-scale property, and yet state 18th century ideals, they are off base. In the kindergarten of political philosophy one learns that the idea of freedom *in general* is more serviceable as politically irrelevant rhetoric than ideal. Twentieth century problems cannot be solved by 18th century phrases. Liberty is not an a-priori individual fact, and it has been a social achievement only when liberal ideals have fortunately coincided with social realities.

Order can be reconciled with liberty by an underlying common sentiment, or by a balance of harmoniously competing groups. Common sentiment can grow from slow-paced tradition or be imposed from a powerful center. Competitive balance can be maintained only if each faction remains small enough and equal enough to compete freely. But now there is no common sentiment, and there is no balance, but a lop-sided competition between and among dominant factions and midget interests.

Liberalism, in the 19th century epoch of its triumph, never really took into account the changing economic foundations of the political ideals and forms it espoused. That simple fact goes far to explain the decline of liberalism in authoritative cogency. This is the fact upon which Marxism has been correctly focused and upon which it has capitalized.

Classical Values in a New World

(2) Many classic liberals, perhaps especially of the Rousseauian and Jeffersonian persuasion, have assumed the predominance of rural or "small city states," in brief, of a small-scale community. Liberal discussion of the general will, and liberal notions of "public opinion" usually rest on such assumptions. We no longer live in this sort of small-scale world.

(3) A third assumption about society, characteristic of classic liberalism, has been the stress upon the autonomy of different institutional orders. In the beginning, as with Locke, it would split off religious institutions from the

political, so that the political justifications, whatever they may be, had to be secular. Later on, the economic order was split from the political order, in the classic case of *laissez-faire*, perhaps coming to a head in the early philosophical radicals in England. But that was not the end of making different institutional orders autonomous. The kinship order was also to be split from the other orders so that there was a free marriage market, just as there was a free commodity market.

Moreover, in each of these orders a similar principle was upheld: that of individual freedom of choice—as an economic agent; as a presumptuous political man, who had to be shown before he would obey; as a man on the marriage market making a free contract with his partner; and so on.

But what has happened is the fusion of several institutional orders; the coordination of the major orders has become the contemporary reality. We see in the United States today an increased coincidence and fusion of the economic, political, and military orders.

Shift from Individual to Institution

(4) A fourth underlying sociological assumption, probably the most subtle and far-reaching, certainly the most philosophically relevant, is that the individual is the seat of rationality. When liberals speak of rationality and “the increase of enlightenment,” they have assumed that the individual will be increased in stature and dignity because *his* power to reason and *his* knowledge will be increased. But the decisive fact here, as signified quite well by such writers as Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, is that the seat of rationality has shifted from the individual and is now in the big institution. The increase of enlightenment does not necessarily wise up the individual. This has to do with the distinction of substantive from formal rationality, in short, the growth of a bureaucratic organization of knowledge. The prevailing character as well as the distribution of rationality now lead to a whole set of questions to which we have no contemporary liberal answers. This modern weakness and irrationality of the individual, and especially his political apathy, is crucial for liberalism; for liberalism has classically relied on the reasoning individual as its lever for progressive change.

(5) Tied in with the belief in the growth of the individual's substantive rationality is the belief in the explicitness of authority. Men, as individuals or as groups of individuals, could learn to know who exercised power and so could debate it or obey. But today, one of the crucial political problems “for experts”, as for laymen, is to locate exactly who has the power.

Two Erroneous Conceptions

It is fashionable now, especially among those who have left what radical circles remain, to suppose that “there is no ruling class,” just as it was fashionable in the 'thirties to suppose a set of class villains to be the source of all social injustice and public malaise. I should be as far from supposing that some enemy could be firmly located, that some one or two set of men were responsible, as I should be from supposing that it is all merely impersonal, tragic

drift. The view that all is blind drift is largely a fatalist projection of one's own feeling of impotence and perhaps a salve of guilt about it. The view that all is due to the conspiracy of an easily locatable enemy is also a hurried projection from the difficult effort to understand how structural shifts open opportunities to various elites and how various elites take advantage or fail to take advantage of them. To accept either view is to relax the effort rationally to understand in detail how it is.

There are obviously gradations of power and opportunities among modern populations, which is not to say that all ruling powers are united, or that they fully know what they do, or that they are consciously joined in conspiracy. One can, however, be more concerned with their structural position and the consequences of their decisive actions than with the extent of their awareness or the impurity of their motives. But such analysis has not been part of the liberal tradition, nor does this tradition provide decisive help in undertaking it.

IV

The root problem of any “democratic” or “liberal”—or even humanist—ideals is that they are in fact statements of hope or demands or preferences of an intellectual elite psychologically capable of individually fulfilling them, but they are projected for a population which in the twentieth century is not at present capable of fulfilling them.

What is inferred from this depends, in part, upon what is seen to be the causes of this mass incapability, and, in part, simply upon the degree of sanguinity. In 19th century liberalism, the causes were seen largely as ignorance; so the answer was education. This was true of classic liberalism and, in part, of classic socialism, although the meaning and the further reasons for ignorance were more sophisticatedly worked out by socialist than by liberal writers. In the 20th century, serious thinkers have further developed this socialist view, whether or not they know it as socialist, and have come to see that the whole structure of modern society, in particular its bureaucratic and communicational systems virtually expropriate from all but a small intellectual elite the capacity for individual freedom in any adequate psychological meaning of the term.

The intellectual question for liberals, then, rests on the confrontation of the old individual ideals with new social and psychological facts: The old social anchorages of individual freedom and individual security of small scattered properties and small-scale communities are gone; the roots of these values in autonomously operating institutions are dried up; the seat of rationality is no longer unambiguously the individual; the centers of power are as often hidden as explicit. And so the question becomes whether the ideals themselves must be given up or drastically revised, or whether there are ways of re-articulating them that retain their old moral force in a world that moral liberals never made.

C. WRIGHT MILLS

C. Wright Mills is in the faculty of Columbia University's Dept. of Sociology. He is the author of *New Men of Power* and *White Collar*.

The Role of History Under Stalinism

Why Stalinism Needs to Rewrite Russian History

APOLOGISTS FOR THE Stalinist regime in Russia used to say, in reply to the oftmade assertion that the great Russian nationalism of the late 1930's was a betrayal of the original tenets of Marxism-Leninism, that this awakening of nationalist sentiment was necessary because Stalin was astute enough to realize that a war with fascism was inevitable, a war which would require all the resources of Russian society. This is, in its own peculiar way, ironic, because the people who advanced this "explanation" for Stalin's apparent betrayal of a time-honored doctrine did so with the feeling that, by giving him credit for foreseeing the great war that was about to submerge all Europe in blood, they were making his record all the more laudable. But, if we look deeper, we see that it has implications of quite the opposite character.

That the resurgence of great Russian chauvinism is an indictment of Stalin's own regime needs no elaborate proof. The immediate implication of the whole development was that the people of Russia were not prepared to defend "socialism," "collective ownership," "collective farms," or "Leninism-Stalinism," but would only fight when they were reminded that they were, first and foremost, not socialists but Russians. The regime was the first to admit, in other words, that their subjects might feel more reverence for Russia's ancient traditions than for the special achievements of the Stalinist epoch. The very fact that these traditions had to be magnified to the wild proportions which they suggest the intensity of the peoples' antagonism toward the regime, an antagonism which the regime hoped to overcome by calling up from the past Russia's great military heroes. In the long run, of course, it was not the chauvinistic propaganda but the ruthlessness of the German armies which made the Russian people defend their land so valiantly.

But the war is now over; the original explanation for the reintroduction of czarist and slavophile concepts no longer applies. Yet we find the chauvinistic content of Russian propaganda has not declined in the least, and has, in fact, intensified to such a degree that it has become the laughing-stock of the cultured world and frequently of great embarrassment to Stalinist parties everywhere. Chauvinism has become an integral part of the whole Soviet ideological structure; Marxist phraseology and Slavophil concepts have become inseparably intertwined. This makes it necessary for us to come to a more accurate and correct appraisal of the causes behind the whole development.

Chosen Heroes as a Political Gauge

Colloquially, it is said that you can tell a man by the friends he chooses. We can transform this adage into the realm of human history and assert that you can tell a regime by the historical figures (and symbols) it worships.

The teaching of history, then, is not a peripheral matter. While it may be true that in every society there is a small group of men with a genuine interest in the past *per se*, this group never has been, in any society, of any political or social consequence. For the vast majority the subject of history has little meaning outside its relation to the world in which they personally live and breath. For them history plays a living, social function. History is not taught in our high schools, for example, as is claimed, simply to give the younger generation "an appreciation of the past," but to give them a sense of that interpretation of the past which the older generation feels will best imbue them with those values it most cherishes. History, then, should give the younger generation a sense of identification with a long tradition into which, it is fervently hoped, they shall ultimately fit their lives.

To a degree, this is the function of all non-technical education. *The more a particular society depends upon this means of transmitting a tradition the more it indicates that the younger generation, on the basis of its own daily experiences, would not, on its own, follow it.* The sense of belonging to a time-honored tradition, then, must be injected artificially with the aid of the past. Thus one learns, in a drab classroom, those aspects of one's heritage which would not be gained from daily experience; in other words, that part of the heritage which does not actually inhere in the contemporary social framework. And only in this way does the great flywheel of human civilization achieve as much continuity as it does.

The degree to which this artificially created heritage is ingrained in the citizenry is put to its most severe test during wartime or national internal crisis. For when appeals to fight for home, job, family or government fail to arouse one, it is to this alleged heritage that the leaders must appeal. It is then that history plays its greatest role, in calling up those symbols of that heritage which stir men to lay down their lives for it. A healthy society, then, might be defined as one where, since the heritage and the present reality are not in conflict, the present reality itself is sufficient for rousing men to defend their country.

While it is true, as mentioned earlier, that many historians do not think of their craft in this manner, this is

history's chief *social* function. Thus, if we trace the development of a nation's historiographical science we have an index to a regime's relation with its people.

History as Taught in the Early Period

We can see this in its most clearly-defined perspective if we review briefly the condition of history in the early years of the Russian revolution. It is a period which has been characterized by a number of writers for its virtual "absence of history." History, as an independent science, almost disappeared from the social scene. Some of the old liberal historians of the pre-revolutionary era continued to practice their craft (although many had emigrated in 1921) but they had lost most of their social and political importance.

History, as such, was not taught in the schools. The only classes which in any way resembled "history" were called "current events" classes, in which an attempt was made to show how the contemporary world shaped up.¹ "For them," wrote the late Max Laserson, "in such hectic times, history had only one task: to concentrate upon the last decades of the capitalist world on the eve of world socialism, and to serve as a modern *ancilla theologae*. Even in the period between the death of Lenin . . . and 1934, this could not have been greatly changed."² Little attempt was made, in short, to link the early bolshevik regime with the distant past, with human currents stretching back into antiquity, to say nothing of the development of the Russian state.³

These were the rough beginnings of "socialist" history. Such a policy was followed not only because the policy-makers were socialists but, also, because the bolshevik leaders had, at that time, a keen sense of the special backwardness of their own country and felt, in fact, that the sooner they could detach themselves and their people from

¹ Much of the material presented here is from Max Laserson's study, *Russia and the Western World* (New York, 1945). The book itself has many failings but the chapter on the revision of history is excellent. Information on the subject will also be found in Mazour's *Russian Historiography* (Berkeley, 1939), in a monograph by Klaus Mehnert from which Edward Crankshaw quotes in his *Cracks in the Kremlin Wall* (New York, 1951). See also the journalistic but valuable book by George Backer, *The Deadly Parallel*. (New York, 1950). The American Historical Society conducted a session last year on distortions in Soviet History which also may be of interest to students.

² Laserson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 144.

³ To get an idea of where the emphasis was placed in the early years it is only necessary to note the difference in size between the two volumes of Pokrovsky's *Brief History of Russia*, the closest thing which the bolsheviks had to an official text of Russian history prior to 1934. (The book had Lenin's imprimatur in the form of a letter from him commending the work to all students.) The first volume, covering the years 800 A.D. to 1900 was 294 pages. The second volume, covering the years from 1900 to 1906 was 348! A comparison with the text now in use in Russian high schools (Pankhratova's), although not entirely fair since it was written much later, shows the difference: 545 pages for the pre-20th Century material, 75 pages for the 1900-06 period. But even if we add on 1906-48 the section covering the pre-19th Century era is far in excess of the 20th Century section.

their history the better. If there was an attempt to link the Russian people with any other group in history it was with the European proletariat and its slow (much too slow for the bolsheviks), painful efforts to rise to power. But even this was rather limited; the main emphasis was the current struggle and how from it socialism would conquer the world.

The world, in a manner of speaking, had begun for them in 1917. Only antiquarians would have any real interest in examining anything which had happened before that date. The theory was that an entirely new culture and range of values was going to arise from their struggles. A sense of continuity with Russia's peculiarly dark and dismal past was exactly what the bolsheviks wanted to destroy. Russia was experiencing, for a few brief and hectic years, a degree of freedom which, it was clear, had nothing to do with that dismal past, and was, in fact, an entire repudiation of it. The official history of Russia—Pokrovsky's—gave the reader nothing in Russia's history to cherish except the efforts of the revolutionaries to divert it from its deeply reactionary grooves and into democratic channels. Lenin had written:

We are filled with a feeling of national pride; for the great Russian nation has itself produced a revolutionary class, has itself demonstrated its ability to show humanity a great example in the struggle for freedom and socialism, and not merely great pogroms, great rows of gallows, great torture-chambers, great epidemics of starvation, and a great deal of sycophancy toward "popes," tsars, landowners and capitalists. We are filled with national pride, and for that reason we particularly hate our Slavish past (in which landowners and nobles led peasants to the shambles in order to strangle Hungary, Poland, Persia and China) . . .⁴

The early literature abounds with such statements. The old bolsheviks shared with Marx the feeling that the terms reaction and Russia were practically synonymous. As late as 1931 the branches of research prescribed for the highest institute of historical research in the USSR were these: Methodology of History, Sociology, History of Industrial Capital, The Epoch of Imperialism, Oriental History, The History of the Proletariat of the USSR. Two things stand out in this curriculum: 1) the great emphasis which was placed on events bearing a direct and immediate relationship to the present and 2) Russia itself is only treated as one of the six branches of historical research, and, then, at that, the only concern is with the development of Russia's proletariat, that class, which it was (vainly) hoped, had taken Russia away from its ancient traditions of absolutism. "For them," Klaus Mehnert has written, "the dawn of humanity began with the Bolshevik Revolution. And this was the official line of the Soviet Union until 1934."

Failure to Destroy Slavish Past

The early bolshevik hopes proved utopian, based upon an analysis of the world contemporary to them which bore only a distant relation to the actual prevailing conditions. They had taken in their hands a responsibility which they were simply unable to fulfill. The "Slavish

⁴ Quoted by Marcu, in his *Lenin* (London, 1928), p. 201.

past" of which Lenin spoke could not be so easily wiped from the consciousness of the Russian people. Much was still to be heard from autocratic Russia; and the way was being prepared for its resurgence all through the 1920's.

But this brief period of "absence of history" is still very instructive. The hope which the bolshevik policy implied—that men would learn of their culture by living in it rather than from books and teachers—had a trial period. The idea that the regime's validity should be tested by the people day-by-day rather than through mystical links with an untouchable past was briefly tested. Of course, this did not mean that the bolsheviks did not rely upon propaganda. On the contrary—they taught the world a great deal which it hitherto did not know about how words and symbols might move masses of men. But the point here is that most of the propaganda—like the history—concerned immediate events and immediate problems and made almost no references to the past. Even the revolutionary past was rarely touched upon and the rigid cannonization of it which the Stalinists have since achieved was very little in evidence.

How History Is Made

The man put in charge of the creation of a "socialist" school of history was the brilliant marxist, M. N. Pokrovsky. He became, in the mid-twenties, the "administrator" of Marxist History. His task was the organization of the "historical front" (this terminology was not being employed in 1925, when he assumed office, but shortly it was incorporated into the struggle.) It was becoming more and more apparent that the bolsheviks could not depend, as they once more-or-less had, upon the natural and spontaneous response of the people to the events of their time. Not only were the people in great (not always silent) discontent, but sharp criticisms were arising in the Communist Party itself. A rigid "line" by which to test orthodoxy had to be developed to maintain "order."

The historical "line" which Pokrovsky took, and imposed upon his students, was precisely the same "line" which was held in the earlier, freer days. But, because he had to impose it, with state-support, the seeds of the new history were sown. For, what it showed was that, in contrast to earlier days, history, even ancient history, had become a concern of the state. First it was an issue in the fierce factional struggles, and then it became one as the state began to face the people. In Pokrovsky's *Brief History* (the posthumous edition of 1933) there is appended an attack on certain historical views which, being related to the Trotsky-Bukharin-Stalin factional fight, he had to repudiate. *History had again become a weapon in the political struggle.* The issue was, at that time, only loyalty to Stalin; soon it was to become loyalty to the state itself.

Until 1935 the anti-nationalist line of Pokrovsky held firm. But, underneath, changes were taking place. As early as 1931 Stalin hinted of his intended use of Russian nationalism for his own political purposes. It was in that famous speech in which he warned the Russian people that unless they catch up with the capitalist nations they would go down to defeat, *like their many ancestors*, whose defeats he dramatically recounts. It was the fact that he

identified the Russian people with *their ancestors* which is of such interest to us. (In later year Stalin emphasized the victories rather than the defeats of the Russian rulers.) In 1931, moreover, the first veiled attack on Pokrovsky appeared. The government declared that historians were putting too little emphasis on the "political" factors in history as opposed to the "economic" factors. This idea was to be greatly enlarged upon in later years. In 1934 Pokrovsky's whole school was officially denounced:

The teaching of history in the schools of the U.S.S.R. is unsatisfactory. The textbooks and the teaching itself are permeated by an abstract, schematic character. Instead of teaching civic history in a vivid and interesting way, by presentation of the most important events and facts in chronological sequence, and with characterization of historical personalities, the students are given abstract definitions of social and economic formations. Thus, instead of a coherent exposition of civic history, they get abstract sociological themes.⁵

This particular document, the most important in the development of Russian historiography, is amazingly frank. No more honest and clear-cut disavowal of Marxist historiographical methodology could be asked for. Marxism traditionally rejected as misleading and superficial "Civil History;" it shied away from simple "chronological sequence;" it always deemphasized the independent role of "historical personalities;" and most Marxist histories have been, more or less, "abstract sociological schemes."

But this pronouncement opened the gates for the new history. The traditionally vigorous anti-nationalist attitude of the bolsheviks could now be demolished without hindrance from Marxism methodology. The culmination of the attack on the Pokrovsky school was the book, *Against the Historical Conception of M. N. Pokrovsky*, published in 1939, a violent tirade against everything for which Pokrovsky had stood (except party-mindedness). Laserson sums up their criticisms: he was attacked for "(1) forming his own conception of historical science, quite different from Marxism; (2) subordinating politics to economics and characterizing of the latter as the deciding factor; (3) underestimating, and even completely negating, the subjective factor and the role of personalities; and (4) distorting the genuine historical process of the development of Russia."⁶ Thus, the road was paved for the glorification of heroes, the deemphasis of vulgar "economic factors," and, above all, the wholesale reorganization of Russian history with regard to the new demands of the Russian state. This development was not solely motivated by Stalin's pronouncement of a new war; it coincided with similar developments in every field of Russian thought—psychology, education, wage-payment systems, and, above all, law.

And these changes were not mere theorizing, but had their reflections in actual Soviet policy: In history, the accent is placed on the "subjective" factors (Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin etc.); in social relations, the accent is placed upon competing individuals. This is expressed, of course, in the Stakhonovite move-

⁵ Mazour, Op. Cit., p. 87.

⁶ Laserson, Op. Cit., p. 152.

ment, the justification for the wide range separating Soviet wages, the reinstatement of a strict grading system, etc.

Reasons for Shift to Nationalism

The traditionally Marxist focus had become, in short, inconsistent with the new Soviet ideology. But this did not necessarily indicate a shift toward nationalism. In fact, the shift took place in 1937 three years after the first important attack on Pokrovsky. But, in retrospect, we can see that the one led quite naturally to the other. In order to see this connection two things should be noticed:

1) The nature of the new Soviet state, emerging in the 1930's under Stalin's evertightening hold, was such that imperialist developments were not only possible but quite probable. It was not a great step from the domination by the new Stalinist bureaucracy of the masses of Russia to its domination of the masses outside Russia. An ideology to justify this new role was necessary. The social superiority of "socialist" Russia would undoubtedly be part of it, but it was really insufficient for these purposes. The justification had to be more profound. Socialism was too much of an international concept upon which to base the domination of one nation over others. But the innate greatness of the Russian people, which, it was to be claimed, goes back over a thousand years in human history, was a perfectly adequate doctrine to take up the ideological slack. That, in any case, these imperialist developments precluded the continuation of the old bolshevik "internationalism" was quite clear.

2) The collectivization of agriculture and the depression of the standard of living of the Russian masses in the early thirties⁷ not only destroyed the remnants of the prestige the Leninists had had with the Russian people but made large sections of the Russian people the government's constant enemy. The few gains of the revolution had not only been taken away from the masses but a new, and, in many ways, more dreadful, slavery had been imposed upon them.

Certainly, under these conditions it was impossible for the regime to appeal to the people solely on the basis of the immediate, day-to-day conditions under which they lived. The masses could not be expected to display genuine enthusiasm for a regime whose sole claim to their allegiance was the Russian brand of socialism! Loyalty had to be elicited through some other means. If the regime could not give the masses goods, services, or a sense of mastery over their own fate, they might give them words, beautiful words, and slogans. These words spoke of a glorious past, of a specially endowed people, of great heroism, of a special type of Russian immortality. The hope, we can assume, was that the Russian masses would identify themselves with this heroic and allegedly glorious past and thus be distracted from the wretchedness of their present life. And, by identifying the modern regime with this glorious past it was hoped that the masses would show toward the regime the same reverence and awe the regime had instilled in them toward the Russian heritage.

⁷ See Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 537-40, (New York, 1950) for some of the vast amount of data which has been laboriously accumulated on this question.

There was, too, another important consideration, related to the last one. In the pokrovsky interpretation of Russian history the only groups which are portrayed sympathetically are the revolutionaries. Obviously the revolutionary virtues—hatred of authority, independence of mind, disrespect for the law—were not those which the Soviet authorities wished their people to imitate. While it is true that the 19th Century Revolutionary Movement is handled in great (if often distorted) detail in the current texts, it is often suggested (especially in popular versions) that the culmination of these efforts, the revolution of 1917, had as its chief historical merit the carrying on of the work of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, and other great rulers, whose exemplary rule was temporarily interrupted by the reign of a number of bad and anti-Russian czars such as Nicholas II.

On the other hand, the virtues of despotism—obedience to authority, servitude, and ruthlessness—these are things which the Russian people might do well to come to appreciate.

Glorification of Despotism

The new history centers itself around the allegedly "progressive" role of the great despots of Russian history. Unquestioning obedience to the "good" czars is made to be the greatest virtue. Stalinism, in a sense, is fortunate for having first developed in Russia. The history of no other nation so easily lends itself to the glorification of despotism, and the Stalinist historians have taken full advantage of this fact.

There is a grain of truth to the Stalinist historical interpretation of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Pokrovsky is very rough in handling Peter but it is undoubtedly true that Peter's contribution to the building of the Russian state was enormous. The same thing is true of Ivan the Terrible. Wipper,⁸ the Soviet historian may well be right in saying that to remember Ivan the Terrible simply for his cruelty is to obscure his true historical role. His cruelty, though it may have had a sadistic or pathological side to it, did play an important part in carrying out his historical "mission," the strengthening of the czar and of Muscovy.

However, this does not settle the issue. The Stalinist historians do much more than to simply assert that it is a mistake to dismiss Ivan as a pathological creature. He has been selected, out of all the great despots of Russian history, as the historical prototype of the modern "bolshevik."⁹ He has been lauded, not only for his times, then,

⁸ The new conception of Ivan the Terrible was first expressed in the famous Eisenstein movie. Wipper's book (Moscow, 1942) is the scholarly documentation of it, written during the war. Wipper was a Latvian scholar who had long been interested in Ivan. When the Russians overran his country in 1940 he transferred his operations to Moscow where he was given facilities for further study on the hypothesis for which he had been contemptuously denounced by Russian historians when he published his first essay on the subject in 1922.

⁹ They used to tell, in Moscow during the late thirties, a joke about a little boy who asks his father, after having seen one of the ultra-patriotic films about Russia's great czars, "Daddy, were all the old czars bolsheviks?"

but for eternity. The same characteristics, in other words, which made Ivan a successful czar are the ones which, it is implied, make a successful Bolshevnik today. Those characteristics were:

a) He never flinched from resorting to the most severe and dreadful means in achieving those ends which he knew to be historically necessary and just. (The very idea that Ivan had any consciousness of historical development is, of course, an imposition on history; the Stalinists make many.)

b) He organized around himself a closely-knit body of followers who were completely dependent upon him and wholly obedient to him, who, themselves, performed the most bloody deeds to further his ends.

c) He was of an extremely suspicious character and kept a continuous eye out for spies and wreckers, especially agents of conniving foreign powers (chiefly the Poles).

d) He never swerved from his first and foremost duty, that of strengthening his own position and thereby that of the State of Muscovy.

That the Kremlin, in boosting Wipper's book, is not simply interested in proving an obscure historical point hardly needs repeating. It should be mentioned, incidentally, that the Stalinists are not wholly consistent in their appraisal of Ivan. While, on the one hand they justify Ivan's ruthlessness, on the other, they attempt to soft-peddle references to actual instances of it. But while the portrayal may be internally inconsistent it squares with the conception of Stalin which is fostered today: a man who is ruthless but yet of infinite kindness, gentleness and loving.

So much for Ivan. The cult which the Russians have constructed around Alexander Nevsky has a similar political purpose and is worth analyzing.¹⁰ Nevsky was the 13th Century Prince of Novgorod, an able military leader whose victories over the invading Teutonic Knights won him a certain renown in his times. According to the current texts, Nevsky's chief virtue lay in the fact that he "recognized" the importance of having a strong central government during wartime; only thus was he able to defeat the Germans in the Battle of the Narva. After the battle, however, he got into an argument with the citizenry and abandoned the city. The Germans took advantage of his absence, invaded again, and the citizens, terrified, begged Nevsky to return and lead the Novgorodians in the famous battle on the ice.¹¹

Actually, Nevsky did not leave Novgorod voluntarily after Narva. He was exiled by the irate Novgorod population because he was trying to limit the powers of the Novgorod semi-republican government—not during the war alone, as the texts would have it, but even after the war was over. His anti-republican activities are hardly mentioned. Moreover, the battle of the Narva was not,

¹⁰ The author has recently had his attention called to the fact that the famous Nevsky prospect, the main street of pre-1917 Petrograd, which was renamed the Street of October 25th in 1918, has been changed back again to its old name.

¹¹ This is taken from the Pankhratova account, *Op. Cit.*

as it is now printed, a mass-struggle, but, according to Bernard Pares, a battle fought by Nevsky's own personal troops. Another distortion in the current texts is the minimizing of the fact that Nevsky himself was the chief vassal of the Tartars; and the fact that he made four pilgrimages to Batu to pay his respects (and tribute) to the Tartars is not mentioned at all.

But these distortions are quite minor; we have come to expect them. What is of extreme interest to us is the attempt by the Stalinist historians to create a link in the contemporary Russian mind between present Russia and the small commercial city of Novgorod 800 years ago. Novgorod itself never even entered the main stream of Russian development and was, in fact, crushed, utterly sacked, by Ivan the Terrible's Opritchnicki in the 16th Century. There is, then, no conceivable connection between 13th Century Rubublican Novgorod and 20th Century Russia. But the Stalinists are busily engaged creating one.

Russian History: Preparation for Stalin

It is an accepted fact, among most historians, for example, that the type of nationalism with which we are so familiar today is a very recent phenomenon (having emerged during and after the French Revolution). Thus to speak of "patriotism" and "treason" when dealing with pre-1800 events, without qualifying exactly what one means, is to seriously mislead the reader. The ease with which many well-known figures transferred their alliance with one country to another in the pre-1800 history of Europe is well known. The further one goes back the more this becomes the case. To have made an alliance with another country in order to defeat one's own (for personal gain) may have been considered treachery but it was not always morally reprehensible, and not "treason." That the Stalinists term Alexei, (Peter the Great's cowardly son who may or may not have been a rallying point for anti-Petrine forces), a "counter-revolutionary" merely reveals that the Stalinists are preaching 20th Century patriotism and consequently they must impose upon their past a 20th Century frame of values. This is another sense in which the Stalinists have completely abandoned that sense of historical perspective which Marxism helped pioneer for western civilization.

There are other difficulties which the Russians have in representing Russian history as a long, continuous preparation for the Stalinist state. Suvorov, the great 18th Century military figure, is painted (not without some validity) as a general with an extraordinary sympathy for the common soldier. But to make this picture fit their purposes, his role in ending independence must be minimized and his role in crushing the Pugachev Rebellion entirely neglected. Kutuzov, the Russian general in charge of Alexander's troops during the Napoleonic War, is given a new face. His well-known tendency to fall asleep at meetings with his staff is transformed into an indifference to the squabbings of his petty officers (when, in truth, he was extremely lazy, though admittedly shrewd.) Eugene Tarle

had to rewrite his history of the War of 1812 to fit the new conception.¹²

These distortions are but a sampling of the hundreds with which the current texts abound. Whether this desperate attempt to make up for deficiencies in present Soviet life with references to a distant past has been successful or not we can only speculate.

Russia's Post-War History Factory

The post-war period has been characterized by an intensification of this trend which has startled the entire world. Each new step the Russian historians take in changing their history rouses new signs of amazement. But in a totalitarian state there can be no check upon these developments. The basic social tensions which produced the first, halting nationalistic notes in the middle thirties are still in existence, and ever-consolidating. That the chauvinism will intensify more than it has already does not seem an unwarranted conclusion.

Already the post-war developments have astounded us. The revision of the histories of the non-Great Russian nationalities right after the war was what we first noticed with alarm. Previously, the various national rebellions against Moscow rule had been hailed as a step toward their liberation. But that this had dangerous implications for the present nationalities policy of the Soviet government is abundantly clear. The term which the bolsheviks so often applied to Russia—the “prisonhouse of peoples”—was, to the new history, a great misnomer. That all progressive-minded nationalities in the czarist era understood that servitude to the great Russians was a progressive and forward-looking condition seems beyond question. Great Russia, it is said, brought civilization to the backward peoples of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Ukraine. That such a justification might hold too for British or French colonial policy is, of course, vigorously denied by the Kremlin's historians.

It is now claimed that the general orientation of American foreign policy has been, throughout its history, chiefly anti-Russian. This was, it is said, what lay behind the American purchase of Alaska in 1867 (the Russian foreign minister is excoriated for this “betrayal” of his country. The truth is that the Russians sold it to the U. S. to keep it from falling into the hands of the British!). The assertion that American foreign policy has always been primarily anti-Russian is simply absurd, but it is very revealing: if America opposed Czarist Russia it could not have been on ideological ground; that is not hard to see. The implication is, consequently, that America's present opposition, being no greater than that of the 19th Century, is also not ideological. This, of course, the Stalinists would not admit. The mad criss-crossing of contradictions which

¹² Tarle's about-face on the question of the War of 1812 is perhaps the most famous in recent historiographical developments. In his 1936 book, *Napoleon*, he made quite a point of proving that, in no sense, could the War of 1812 be considered a “National War”. In 1938, just two years later, he wrote a 400 page book the sole purpose of which was to prove the exact opposite thesis.

results from this wild extension of Russian chauvinism is, in its way, fascinating as well as frightening.

The post-Versailles era has been reevaluated. Whereas the bolshevik antagonism to the Versailles Treaty of 1919 was based upon its belief that Germany had been treated too harshly the current attitude is that Versailles was nothing more nor less than a pro-German conspiracy against the Soviet Union. Consistent with this the German-Russian friendship and military semi-alliance of the mid 1920's is entirely erased from history.

In a sense the great Russian chauvinism represents a certain fanatical madness on the part of the Stalinist rulers. As we have pointed out, once the totalitarian state embarked on its nationalist road there could have been no halt to the lengths to which it would take them. The road, in fact, stretches to infinity. It is quite conceivable, for example, that in the near future Russia's participation in the first World War will be justified and the revolution will be interpreted from the point of view of continuing the war. There are no limits. Lysenkó's theory may be applied directly to the political scene and it will be asserted that, due to their unique historical experiences, the Russian people are innately superior to the heathen outside. None of these developments are impossible.

But, there is a certain method behind the madness. The ideological development must closely correspond with the developing political-economic conditions. As the Russian hold over their satellites grows stronger the means by which the subject people can express the inferiority of their position must also grow. Furthermore, as the class-lines tighten in Russia and the exploitation of the masses within Russia becomes more pronounced the leaders have to rely more and more upon propaganda of this sort in order to maintain what genuine and spontaneous sympathy the people may still have for the regime.

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Inscrutable His ways are and immune
To catechism by a mind too strewn
With petty cares to slightly understand
What awful brain compels His awful hand;
Yet do I marvel at this curious thing:
To make a poet black, and bid him sing!

— Countee Cullen

THE NEGRO POET, Countee Cullen, realized that "To make a poet black and bid him sing" was an irony. The irony is intensified by the fact that the black poet has *sung* and will *continue* to do so, but the circumstances of his very blackness, in America, has produced a song—an art—whose scope is yet too narrow.

The objective conditions of American life have caused the phenomenon of a Negro art which has been, and still is, circumscribed by the historical and social experiences of the American Negro as a *group*. The Negroes are unique among American cultural groups in having so psychologically compelling and pervading an experience as that which is produced by the pattern of discrimination. This decisively important social behavior syndrome, which has been called caste, sets limits and directions for Negro art as for all of Negro life.

The Negroes are often thought of, in the terms of the "social pathologist," as one of a number of America's minority problem groups. However, the barriers which American society erected against the acculturation of Jews, Irish and Italians were not insurmountable; and these minorities experienced a gradual breakaway from narrower group psychology and expansion into identification as "Americans." The Jews, of course, are considered the second biggest minority "problem." But, without a distinctive color, with a continuous high culture and a different historical connection with the American economy, the Jews can overcome their mark with greater ease than can the Negroes.

Negro art, like all art, has been an expression and interpretation of experience, and the subjective experiences of the Negro artist has foisted upon him the necessity for a defensive, almost exclusive, psychological identification with his race. From the beginning, the very force of circumstances militating against his race has made him *react and create as Negro artist* rather than as *artist*.

Negro Spirituals and Ballads

Among the American Negro's important cultural achievements are those which have been created in a more or less communal manner. The first important artistic

achievement, the spiritual, was created at a time when any open protest by a slave might well have cost him his life. But the slaves found a guise for their protest on many levels. There is considerable evidence that the religious imagery of some spirituals was merely a disguised means of communication between slaves and members of the Underground Railroad who helped them escape. It is well known, for instance, that Harriet Tubman usually sang "Swing Low, Sweet Chariot" as a means of telling the slaves that she was near. The "home" in the line, "coming for to carry me home" was a code word for the North. Further evidence* reveals that other references common in Negro spirituals, such as "Jordan," "Heaven," "Queen's Land," and "The Land of Milk and Honey" were also code words meaning the North and freedom.

Aside from aiding in actual escape plans, there was the psychological reward of maintaining a secret communal contact through open song.

Even those who reject the above evidence can hardly ignore the reflection of the slave's plight in another aspect of the spirituals: their constant reference to personal woe. Lines like "Keep a inchin' along, lak a po' inchworm," and "I'm rolling through an unfriendly world" are common. And the continual invocation of the kingdom to come, whether it be genuine religious sentiment or not, reveals the same pitiful frustration which has been for ages symptomatic of a repressed group.

The slave seculars are more bitter than the spirituals. Such lines as the following are a far cry from the gentleness of Stephen Foster's "Massa's in de Cold Cold Ground":

Naught's a naught, figger's a figger,
All fo' de white man, and none fo' de nigger.

The ballads similarly reveal a complexity of psychological reactions against the dominant civilization. Many of them are clear and simple songs of protest against Southern injustice: in the "Bad Man Ballad," the verdict of guilty is arrived at in five minutes; "Poor Lazarus" tells of the cheating of Negro sharecroppers by the plantation owner and finally the shooting of Young Lazarus, one who protested; and Negro chain gang and prison songs have roots in such bitterness that it is extremely difficult for any outsider, especially a white man, to obtain the songs. (Alan Lomax finally succeeded—one of the results being Josh White's "Chain Gang" album.)

* There is much testimony to this effect in autobiographies of runaway slaves, including that of Frederick Douglass.

At least one Negro ballad speaks of an interesting and subtly defiant device—that of inscrutability. In "Me and My Captain" there is the line,

Got one mind for white folks to see
Another for what I know is me.

It is hard to escape the observation that the widespread celebration of fugitives and outlaws and of physical strength of Negroes in the ballads is a form of compensation. It is as if "Railroad Bill," "Long Lost John," "John Henry" etc. are symptoms of aggressive retorts to the myth of Negro inferiority.*

What is omitted from the songs has significance as a reflection of racial history, too. The sundering of ties of group and family identity was accomplished by various selling devices of the slave trade. As a result, the songs contain reference to *mother* and *child*, but seldom to *father*; to *mountains* and *rocks*, but seldom to *home*.

Social Pressures and the Negro Artist

For the individual Negro artist, perhaps on a higher level of intellectual consciousness than the communal creations, the pressures of race were, and remain, strong determinants. These pressures vary in emphasis and intensity with the changing historical circumstances of American Negro life.

The first American Negro writers (both 18th century), Jupiter Hammon and Phillis Wheatley, are atypical, primarily because their life experiences were atypical of their race. They were both highly privileged slaves, the latter being practically one of the family in the Boston household in which she lived. Both felt little or no identity with their people because they shared none of the experiences which made the rest of the group cohesive. Both wrote poetry which was completely non-racial. Hammon's poetry was merely religious doggerel, while Phillis Wheatley, by far the better artist of the two, wrote poetry which was clearly influenced by such leading movements of the day as the Wesleyan Revival, neo-classicism, and the spirit of the American Revolution. (When Phillis Wheatley wrote of liberty, she spoke not of her own race in bondage, but of the American nation.)

Since their time, however, with practically no exceptions, it has not been possible for Negro artists to reflect so rarified an atmosphere in their work while still maintaining their artistic integrity:

From 1840 to 1865, anti-slavery propaganda in America was at its height. The South countered with a barrage—sociological, philosophical and literary—in an effort to show Negro inferiority. For the free Northern Negro intellectual, both the attack and the defense (with its philosophical basis) were highly personal. Negro writers (among them James M. Whitfield, James Madison Bell, and Frances E. W. Harper) turned chiefly to anti-slavery

* It is ironic that the Negro folk tales of Uncle Remus, which have been identified with white chauvinism, are in reality, vivid examples of the same type of compensation — and, in addition, of retaliation. The symbolism in the tales of an oppressed and despised Brer Rabbit always outsmarting the supposedly dominant characters is obvious.

poetry.* And it is poor poetry, indicative of little more than a mass of direct pressures from the white man's world. To refute the widely peddled myth of inherent racial difference and to prove their race capable of "culture" these Negro intellectuals produced poetry which was unnecessarily decorative and faithfully imitative of the approved American and English writers of the day. Thus, they made their point. The same concern for white opinion prevented them from portraying the Negro people in any multi-dimensional way. Their poetry shied away from anything less secure than the abstractions: Good vs. Evil — Freedom vs. Slavery.

Reactions to Post Civil War Racism

By the end of Reconstruction, the Southern aristocracy was ready and determined to regain its power; racial supremacy was to be firmly reestablished and maintained. By the middle of the 1890's different forms of racist propaganda reappeared in great quantity. The myth of Negro inferiority was formally and "scientifically" stated by sociologist-anthropologists Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard and Houston Chamberlain.

One product of this was what is known as the "plantation tradition" in Southern literature. The novels, stories and plays of such notables as Thomas Nelson Page, George W. Cable and Sherwood Bonner dealt with the idyllic nature of life on the old plantation. The masters and mistresses were kindly and handsome, and were tended by piously devoted mammies and frolicking buffoon Negroes who possessed the happy mentality of puppies. A more vicious type of literary propaganda portrayed the Negroes as inferior beasts, robbing and raping; capable of the desecration of all for which the pure white South stood. Three books which were most bitter in their portraits and which had a tremendous amount of influence upon the mind of the North were Thomas Nelson Page's *Red Rock*, and Thomas Dixon's *The Leopard's Spots* and *The Clansman*.

Negro writers reacted in various ways, but they always reacted. The main reaction, however, was a defensive one. In the works of Pauline Hopkins, J. McHenry Jones, Sutton E. Briggs and Albery Whitman, all of the Negroes are portrayed as idealized heroes and heroines, and all of the whites as evil. The quality of some of Charles Chestnutt's work was diminished because of the effect which the myth had upon him. The *truth* of his portraiture shrank to nothing because he felt compelled (in *A House Behind the Cedars* (1901) and *The Colonel's Dream* (1905)), to create Negro characters who were practically identical with those of the stereotyped "master race."

A second reaction was that of escapism. The onslaught of Southern propaganda was so fierce and influential that many Negroes ran away from its humiliating portraits.

* It is interesting that in a period as early as this, Frances E. W. Harper recognized the need for universalism in Negro thought and herself supplemented her anti-slavery poetry with poetry dealing with moral standards and similar matters. But the attempt at this time was understandably as abortive as would be a call for better Paris hat designers in the midst of a proletarian revolution.

From 1890 to 1915 there was an extremely high incidence of Negroes passing as whites. A large number of intellectuals denied that the difference in culture and experience resulted in any psychological or emotional differences between Negroes and whites. They denied, too, that racial material had any importance as art. The Negro bourgeoisie established its own social elite in complete imitation of white "society". All racial reference was consciously eliminated from the lives of these people. The poets and writers from this group produced poetry entirely without racial content. Among these writers were William Braithwaite, Angelina Grimke, Jesse Fauset and (for a short while) James Weldon Johnson. The "universal reference" achieved in the work of these people hardly constituted artistic progress. It was only through a *conscious* escape from the Negro world that this "universalism" was achieved, and the result was a literature whose very core had been emasculated. If art is an individual's interpretation of experience, then the art of artists like Grimke must be considered as sham showing little cultural growth.

The third reaction to the "plantation tradition" was a conformity to the stereotype; for many this path is always the easiest and the most secure. People like James Weldon Johnson (before 1915) wrote dialect humor for minstrel shows and dialect poetry which strengthened the *buffoon Negro* concept. Even Paul Lawrence Danbar, some of whose dialect poetry sharply and sympathetically brought the qualities of his race to life, was unhappy about the tendency to the stereotype which the rest of his dialect poems possessed.

Revolution in Negro Life and Art

Then came World I and with it a revolution in the Negro psyche. The war necessitated a cheap labor supply for Northern manufacturers, who encouraged a mass Negro migration from the South to the relative freedom of the North. Black workers were employed alongside of whites in key industries; Negro soldiers were told that they, too, were fighting "to save the world for democracy;" an increasingly important liberalism gave staunch support to Negro rights. The result of these developments was an immensely heightened self-assurance on the part of Negroes. The white world reacted in the postwar period with a new outburst of prejudice, lynchings, and other mob action. Coming upon the Negro's newly acquired self-assurance and respect, this violence touched off a fierce militancy in the Negro people. These factors, in turn, impelled the "qualitative leap" popularly referred to as the *New Negro*.

The main characteristics of the New Negro movement were a strong race pride and independence. On the general scene this was reflected in the formation of the Garvey movement, Negro labor unions, a Negro theatre, and a rejection of the NAACP and Urban League as being *for* Negroes but not *by* Negroes.

The New Negro artist and intellectual can be defined mostly in terms of contradictory and kaleidoscopic aspects. The restraint Negro writers had set for themselves because of the fear of what white people would think of any truthful self-analysis was gone. And the new freedom from creating an art which was merely a straitjacketed reaction to

the white myth was largely responsible for the multiplicity of interest and opinions shown by their work. The Negro intellectual began to carefully examine the roots of his own culture, and the sociology of his own people.

Sociological Interests of Negro Writers

The new racial pride and interest in their folk heritage produced the colorful and sensuously primitive racial poetry of Langston Hughes, James Weldon Johnson, Jean Toomer, and many others. Even Countee Cullen, who so strongly asserted he was a *poet* who *happened* to be a Negro, wrote such poetry as "What is Africa to Me." Mirroring the new sociological interest, novels dealt with such objective, if not pretty, facts of Negro life as "passing," social disorganization in the Negro family, and vice and immorality on certain levels of Negro living.

A combination of these two major trends produced a violent reaction among some of the more bitter and cynical Negro writers, resulting in a portrait of their people as no more than degraded savages. This trend reached its most intense pitch in the portrayal of lower class Negro life in the works of Claude McKay; *Home to Harlem* and *Banana Bottom* achieve even a shock appeal in their portraits of degradation and perversion.

The defeatist attitude of McKay found an extension and more subtle delineation in the novels about the Negro bourgeoisie. Walter White's *Fire in the Flint*, Wallace Thurman's *The Blacker the Berry*, W. E. B. DuBois' *Dark Princess*, and Nella Larsen's *Quicksand* and *Passing* dealt cynically with problems and dilemmas of the Negro middle class—the conflict between the lure of escape and the counter pull of their racial heritage; and that ironic counterpart of the white world, the caste and color line within the race itself.

Current Trends in Negro Art

Important aspects in the phenomenon of the New Negro are still with us. But the 30's gave them a sharp new direction. For the first time in any major sense, Negro artists were influenced by the same forces affecting white artists, and reacted to them in the same way. The impact of Marxism and other forms of scientific social intelligence upon American artists was tremendous. Negro intellectuals as well as white joined the Communist and Socialist parties and later worked in various New Deal agencies. The social realism of Steinbeck, Farrell and Dos Passos had its parallel in the Negro world. The most important element of the Negro novel of the 30's and 40's was the tradition of social realism applied to the race question. Among the more important Negro novels of the period were William Attaway's *Blood on the Forge*, Chester Hime's *If He Hollers Let Him Go*, and, of course, Richard Wright's *Native Son*.

Negro writing since World War II has not yet been thoroughly explored. But, in spite of possible new trends appearing in this work, an at least cursory glance reveals no significant change from the general pattern of the 30's and 40's.

Thus, the major currents in American Negro literature have, from the first, been almost exclusively reflective of

historical and sociological conditions of the race. Negro literature has been varied and rich with achievement, producing in its course such outstanding writers as Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Countee Cullen, Richard Wright and Langston Hughes. In spite of all this, however, American Negro literature has not yet produced a masterpiece. A main cause of this is closely connected to an important reason that Gide will outlast Steinbeck and why *Ulysses* and *The Remembrance of Things Past* will be read after *U.S.A.* and *Studs Lonigan* have been forgotten:

If the content of literature is to have more than an historical and narrow sociological value, it must be constructed of the *stuff* which runs throughout history and society, rather than that which is confined to one group in one epoch. Although *Hamlet* can be understood as reflecting a particular new historical emphasis upon man, the play is considered a masterpiece centuries after it was written, largely because it penetrates the basic and timeless problems of all men. But it is already difficult to feel an identification with the Joads and the same thing may well happen with Bigger Thomas a few decades from today. This is not to deny that the major "proletarian" novels and the best Negro novels and poems are good literature. They are. However, if they were to be rated on a scale, they would stand far below the works of Joyce, Proust, Mann and Eliot, if only for the reasons just mentioned.

Dilemma of the Negro Artist

The "proletarian" novelist *was*, and to a much greater degree the Negro novelist *is* confronted by a particularly serious barrier to breadth and complexity in his art. The *particular problem* compelling these works looms so large and has such immediacy that many aspects of life which are touched in the writing become dwarfed and depthless beneath the huge shadow of the "problem."

Is the answer, therefore, for the Negro writer: "Go out and feel free to write literature with universal meaning!"? That, unfortunately, cannot be the answer until he is relieved of the weight which his Negroeness carries for him. The bitterness and humiliation felt by and constantly reinforced for the sensitive American Negro can hardly leave him free to observe and interpret broader aspects of humanity. Artistic freedom, in this sense, can be acquired by most American Negro writers only at the expense of the most important ingredient in art—truthful expression.

This dilemma can only be resolved when conditions exist wherein the psychology of the Negro writer is not shaped by oppression; when he can create with an unaffected and true universality. The history of American Negro literature, however, is testimony to a society which *was* not and *is* not at that stage.

MARGARET LEVI

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Toy Gods

I dangle gods along my killer plane
 And boast that they will bring me safely back.
 They do not raise the sun or drop the rain,
 But they replace the larger God I lack.
 I wish that I could know why I am here,
 Where names erase along the morning sky
 And time is lived between the hours of fear—
 Without the comfort of a fighting lie.

These toy gods dancing in illusive sun
 Are brightly cheerful dolls of hidden fate;
 They seem to say that day is just begun,
 And that my coming life will linger late.
 It is a hard thing when a modern war
 Can't tell a man what he is fighting for. . . .

MANFRED A. CARTER

Brute Faces

There are brute faces in the fog-wet night,
 Dark strangers from the everlasting swamp
 That stretches back beyond recorded sight,
 Where all the massive lizards play and romp.
 This fog is like cold steam on some lost moor,
 And those eyes are as blind as ancient ghosts;
 They follow on a warm and blood-stained spoor—
 Our deeds make us the unintended hosts.

We shriek and call them Eastern brutes, and fear
 The grimace at our clouded window pane,
 But they would never find us waiting here
 Except for that hot blood along the lane.
 We left a jungle trail for any beast,
 Still uninvited to the modern feast.

MANFRED A. CARTER

Samuel Morison: Historian in Uniform

A Famous Historian at the Disposal of the State

SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON has reached the very pinnacle of the historical profession. From his dizzy heights as Jonathan Trumbull Professor of American History at Harvard University, he scaled the last remaining peak in 1950, by being elected President of the American Historical Association. Perhaps best known for the popular Morison and Commager textbook, *The Growth of the American Republic*, Professor Morison is currently at work, as an official historian of the United States Navy, on a multi-volumed history of American naval engagements during World War II. If an impartial jury were to select the three most eminent living American historians, Professor Morison would surely be named as one.

In 1942, Professor Morison was commissioned as a Lieutenant-Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, "with the sole duty of preparing a History of United States Naval Operations in World War II." In 1945, Lieutenant-Commander Morison was promoted to the rank of Captain, in recognition of meritorious service with the pen. Thus the designation, "Historian in Uniform," applies quite literally in his case. The present article, however, is not concerned with the direct influence of the military in American education. We are rather interested in a broader cultural conflict, which would exist whether Professor Morison were a naval officer or not, — a problem which faces not only historians, but all social scientists today: To what extent will they sacrifice their professional integrity to the needs of the war-making State? To what extent will they become "social scientists in uniform?"

One Professor With Two Conflicting Views

Both horns of Professor Morison's dilemma are visible in his presidential address to members of the American Historical Association.¹ On the one hand, he assumes the role of a militant champion of historical objectivity. He calls upon his fellow historians rigorously to suppress all subjective bias, and, in their role as scholars, to transcend petty loyalties of faction, class, or nation. The historian, as an impartial seeker of truth, should attempt to reconstruct the past "as it really happened," letting the chips fall where they may. Throughout this address, Professor Morison takes up the cudgels against historical relativism, particularly as espoused by the late Charles A. Beard, whose writings are singled out as examples of biased history "consciously written to shape the future."

On the other hand,—one might even say "on the very next page,"—Professor Morison presents an opposing view. He complains that revisionist history (that is, historical research which revealed the imperialist character of World War I) "rendered the generation of youth which came to

maturity around 1940 spiritually unprepared for the war they had to fight." Historians, he continues, "are the ones who should have pointed out that war does accomplish something, that war is better than servitude, that war has been an inescapable aspect of the human story." This latter task is presumably the one which Professor Morison sets out to accomplish in his naval history of World War II.

History As a State Weapon

The totalitarian implications of this second view of history are clear: history should serve the utilitarian ends of the war-making State. Historians should prepare youth "spiritually" for future wars they may be called upon to fight. If the facts uncovered by historical research are not such as to inspire youth to lay down its life in war, so much the worse for the facts! Extrapolated into the world of "1984," we have the Records Department, whose function is continuously to *alter* history, in light of the current political requirements of the State.

Frazer once remarked in *The Golden Bough*,

Unless we allow for the innate capacity of the human mind to entertain contradictory beliefs at the same time, we shall in vain attempt to understand the history of thought in general, and religion in particular.

Professor Morison's dilemma derives from the fact that he wishes to be at once an objective scholar, and a spiritual guide to the nation's cannon-fodder. Stated another way, he is torn between the cultural values of truth and survival. Consequently he holds two mutually exclusive views of the function of history. Furthermore, he holds them simultaneously, and apparently without recognizing their logical inconsistency, for he advocates both views with conviction and sincerity within a few pages of the same address.

On the level of individual psychology, Professor Morison's ability to maintain contradictory valuations without visible difficulty reflects a sort of controlled schizophrenia, which never lets the right hand know what the left is doing. On the level of American culture, we may state the value-conflict as follows: "some historical research (though true) weakens the warlike spirit of the nation's youth." The mechanism by which this conflict is resolved, and the offending historical research disposed of, may be observed in Professor Morison's treatment of the World War II writings of Charles A. Beard.

Morison Turns His Guns on Beard

Two of Beard's books became special objects of Professor Morison's opprobrium: *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, (1946), and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, (1948). These books are Charles Beard's major contribution to undermining the morale of the future soldiers of World War III. Professor Morison attempts to discredit them in an article called "Did Roosevelt Start the War?," or "History through a

¹ "Faith of a Historian," *American Historical Review*, LVI, Jan., 1951.

Beard."² The title is a fair indication of the objective spirit in which Professor Morison approaches Beard's work. We will first review Beard's thesis briefly. Then we will trace Professor Morison's progressive deterioration, from shaky attempts to refute the thesis, through suppression of facts and outright falsification, to innuendo bordering on slander.

Problems Raised and Analyzed by Beard

The basic issue raised by Beard's two companion volumes is the lack of coordination between American public opinion and American diplomacy. *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* is concerned chiefly with President Roosevelt's public pronouncements on foreign policy from 1932 to 1940. The burden of argument is directed to the following proposition: at some point during these years, the Roosevelt administration abandoned its avowed policy of neutrality, in favor of a different policy. At some point these statesmen became convinced that if Britain fell to the Nazis, America's position in the balance of power would be untenable. What, then, was their proper responsibility to American public opinion?

Whatever these men may have thought of their responsibility in the abstract, there can be no doubt whatever of their practical decision. At some point, the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration underwent drastic reorientation, but with minor exceptions, this new orientation does not appear in the public statements of the administration's chief spokesman. In plain language, the administration decided to dissemble with respect to the dangers which they saw facing the American people, and with respect to their own intentions, until public opinion was prepared for war. No other conclusion is possible from a reading of President Roosevelt's public pronouncements on foreign policy from 1932 to 1940.

President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War is devoted to muck-raking the "stab-in-the-back" interpretation of Pearl Harbor. The essential argument of the book is that the United States did not go to war because it was attacked in the Pacific. On the contrary, the United States invited attack in the Pacific, because the Roosevelt administration had *already* decided that it was essential to America's security to participate in the war. Indeed, some months before Pearl Harbor, the President had already initiated warlike activities in the Atlantic, including the seizure of Portuguese territory (the Azores) by American armed forces, and an order to US naval commanders (Sept. 26, 1941) to sink on sight German and Italian vessels which appeared West of the 26th meridian.

Beard's Thesis Corroborated by Facts

Max Lerner once wrote of Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, "Beard drove his thesis home with spikes of documentation. . . . No one has been able to undo it." Nor has anyone been able to undo the main thesis of these two books. On the contrary, the researches of Morgans, Sanborn, and others have tended to corroborate the evidence presented by Beard. The latest reluctant convert is Professor Samuel (wave-the) Flagg Bemis of Yale,—a careful scholar, and an authority in the field of American

² Atlantic Monthly, August, 1948.

diplomatic history. Professor Bemis is well known for his conservative and chauvinistic views, and can hardly be accused of partiality toward the revisionist thesis. Yet after examining Sanborn's *Design for War*,—a book whose main thesis is substantially that of Beard,—Mr. Bemis makes the following judgment:³

Certain conclusions seem warranted. One is that Mr. Roosevelt did not tell the truth to the people before the election of 1940. . . . When matters came to a crisis at the last moment he let them strike first. In fact, as Mr. Sanborn shows, he maneuvered to invite a glancing blow in the South Seas, but unexpectedly and irresponsibly got almost a knockout at Pearl Harbor.

Pressed slightly, Mr. Bemis might also concede that the President did not tell the truth to the people upon the occasion of Pearl Harbor either, for Mr. Roosevelt said nothing about a glancing blow which he invited, but which landed in the wrong place. On the contrary, he calls Dec. 7, 1941, "a date which shall live in infamy," because of the "unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan."

Such a startling conclusion as that of the conservative Professor Bemis demands an explanation. Why did Mr. Roosevelt invite attack in the Pacific? Obviously as part of a series of complicated moves to prepare the population for war. Again in plain language, it was part of the administration's policy of dissembling to arrange an "outrageous" attack upon the United States, for the benefit of those citizens who did not understand the niceties of power politics.

Morison's Guns Don't Go Off

Shortly after the publication of *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, Professor Morison stepped forward publicly to "refute" it. In a book of some 600 pages, he managed to find some ten factual errors of a minor nature. Of course he offers these as a *sample*, indicating that it would take an entire volume to cover the ground. But he doesn't fool even himself. He knows that his ten best are none too good. That is why he speaks of the book as "a rather ignoble, but most painstaking investigation," and elsewhere, as "a coldly passionate argument." That is why he begins his article by saying, "Nobody can laugh Beard off."

On more than one occasion, Professor Morison is forced by the weakness of his argument to shift his ground. On page 96 of his article he states,

By harping on a rather unfortunate use of the word *maneuver* in the diary of Secretary Stimson, who, unlike Beard, is no expert in semantics, the author tries to prove that Japan was prodded and pushed into the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Next Professor Morison quotes the relevant passage from Stimson's diary,

"The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot, without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

He then continues,

Why should this caution be regarded as iniquitous? Throughout modern history Western nations in danger of war choose to await the first blow rather than give it.

³ New York Times Book Review Section, Feb. 18, 1951. *Design for War: A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941*, by Frederic R. Sanborn. Reviewed by Samuel Flagg Bemis.

We will pass over "caution" (which cost the United States half a fleet!), and the pious statement about "Western nations" (which includes Germany, no doubt), and ask Professor Morison a simple question: Is the point at issue a mere matter of semantics, or isn't it? Did the President, or did he not, "maneuver to invite a glancing blow," as Professor Bemis phrases it?

Similarly, Professor Morison, initially suggests that Roosevelt made his campaign promises of 1940 in good faith, but was released from them by altered circumstances. Later in his article, however, he retreats from this position: (p. 94.)

Even his stoutest supporters will not deny that President Roosevelt failed to take the American people into his complete confidence. . . (The reader will recall in 1940) a climate of opinion which compelled the President to do a good deal by stealth. The American people were still bogged down in the most pacifistic anti-war phase of their history since 1806.

A Measure of Morison

In his presidential address to the American Historical Association, Professor Morison espouse the highest standards of professional integrity:

No person without an inherent loyalty to truth, a high degree of intellectual honesty, and a sense of balance, can be a great, or even a good historian.

Let us see, in the remainder of Professor Morison's article on Beard, how he measures up to his own criteria.

1. Inherent loyalty to truth.

Professor Morison ascribes Beard's anti-war views to the following motivation:

Since his youth, when he tried to get into the summer frolic of 1898, Beard has detested war and has done his best to ignore war, to minimize its results, and to deride military men. . . To leave war out of any general history of the United States is an evasion of essential truth.

It is true that Beard, while still a student at DePauw University, tried unsuccessfully to enlist in Teddy Roosevelt's crusade to liberate Cuba from the Spanish yoke. On the other hand, Professor Morison encounters certain difficulties in interpreting Beard's anti-war views as the "Sour-grape" rationalizations of a trust rated patriot. If Professor Morison should take the trouble to read any of Beard's writings during World War I, he would find that, far from detesting the war, Beard actively supported it.

Unfortunately, the second half of Professor Morison's statement is, like the first, "an evasion of essential truth." Without doubt he found Beard's interpretation of war, which lays stress on economic and political factors, lacking in a proper appreciation of military glory. But ignore war Beard certainly did not,—least of all in a general history of the United States called *The Rise of American Civilization*. Both in practice,—as applied to specific wars in American history,—and in a sheaf of theoretical writings, Beard developed an economic interpretation of war which is not the least of his contributions to American historiography.

II. Intellectual honesty.

At one point in his article, Professor Morison characterizes Beard as an economic isolationist. In discussing the

Beardian concept of "an open door at home," he writes:

Foreign trade would be controlled by a National Trade Authority with an eventual purpose of attaining complete economic isolation, (my emphasis—B. Bone.)

Beard specifically warns against this interpretation in *An Open Door at Home* (p. 214): "This conception does not mean, as hasty critics may declare, an absolute elimination of foreign trade." In point of fact, what Beard proposes is a Foreign Trade Authority, which, upon democratic determination of American import needs, will obtain these imports in the best available foreign markets, in exchange for suitable American exports. It amounts, in short, to a governmental purchasing agency for goods from abroad. Unfortunately for Professor Morison's thesis, the name of Beard's agency (*Foreign Trade Authority*) is somewhat embarrassing to the claim that Beard intends to abolish foreign trade. But after all, what's in a name?

III. A sense of balance.

Three examples of Professor Morison's sense of balance will suffice. The first illustrates the practice of reducing the arguments of one's opponents to absurdity. "Off he goes," Professor Morison writes of Beard, "like Don Quixote, to prove that the Japanese did not attack us at Pearl Harbor, FDR attacked them." The second example derives from the undeniable fact that Beard wrote most of his foreign policy works in residence at his Connecticut farm. After referring to "Beard, aloof on his Connecticut hilltop," Professor Morison suggests "Perhaps the answer is that isolation breeds isolationism!" The third example is not merely unhumorous: it has a decidedly ugly twist: Beard's "open door at home," writes Professor Morison, "had a disquieting resemblance to the economic autarchy practiced by Hitler."

Methodology of a Historian in Uniform

Would Professor Morison hit below the belt in this manner, if he had more substantial punches to throw? Out of sheer desperation, this eminent scholar has fallen to the degrading level of an intellectual "skid row." This is the tragic price of an unquestionably sincere desire to prepare youth spiritually for the next war, *through the writing of history*. Professor Morison hopelessly confuses his role as historian with his attempted role as patriotic propagandist.

It is Professor Morison's personal problem to resolve this role-conflict as best he can. But it is a terrible thing to slander the reputation of another in the process. As most politicians know, it is usually safe to tell people what they want to hear, without being seriously challenged. It may therefore be years, if ever, before Beard can be dug out from under the pile of distortion, error, and innuendo contained in Professor Morison's article. In the President of the American Historical Association, this is the height of professional irresponsibility. His loss of integrity moreover, will be the fate of any historian or social scientist who metaphorically dons a uniform and lends his services as a scholar to the uses of the cold war.

BOB BONE

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View of British Labor and Rearmament

A Pacifist Opinion in an Open Letter to Aneurin Bevan

THERE ARE FEW problems in our society which are strictly national, parochial, or personal. The problem of war and peace is certainly not one of these. It is international and global in character. What the United States government does about it matters to Great Britain and the rest of the world, and I fully agree with you and your colleagues in thinking that what it does is bitterly unhelpful. By the same token, what the government of Britain and the leaders of various sections of its people do about the issue of war and peace matters greatly to us over here. That, plus the fact that without exception trained American commentators agree that the most important development during the recent election campaign and in the election results is the showing of support for you and your program among large sections of the British people, justifies this letter from one who is a personal stranger to you.

For the most part the commentators just referred to regard your growing importance and popularity as an ominous and distressing thing. I am not convinced that this is so, but neither am I convinced that it is not so. Which it is to be depends, as I see it, upon a decision which you and your colleagues have yet to make. It is just possible that upon that decision may largely depend whether or not World War III is prevented.

C. L. Sulzberger in a dispatch to the *New York Times* of October 27 points toward the question which is yet to be decided when he writes that on the continent of Europe parliamentary debates will now be followed "with acute interest because of the known desire of Mr. Bevan and his supporters to reduce the *pace* of Western rearmament." (*Italics mine.*) It is not your contention, that is to say, that "armament" and all this implies is to be discarded. It is, rather, that the pace of Western armament will have to be slackened because Great Britain probably cannot bear the burden involved in the arms program as it now stands, and certainly not without a cut in the social services and the standard of living which ought to be regarded as inadmissible. Furthermore, the pace of Western armament may safely be slackened in your opinion because U.S. policy is needlessly belligerent and inflexible and there is reason to believe, on the other hand, that an understanding, which would result at the very least in a decided easing of international tension, can be reached with Soviet Russia. To put it another way, it is your opinion that there must be a certain ratio between "defense" appropriations in the British budget, on the one hand, and appropriations for social services, on the other; only not the one Mr. Gaitskill

and Winston Churchill advocate. Great Britain must continue to operate as a power, though no longer a first rate one, and at the same time the standard of living must not be further reduced.

The Decision That Must Be Made

The decision you and your group have still to make, it seems to me, is that there is no "ideal" or "sound" ratio for these two types of expenditures—not at any rate under contemporary conditions. To attempt to find such a ratio is like trying to add four apples and five elephants. They are simply not commensurable. If you do reach this conclusion and decide to put peace and the welfare of the peoples first, then a new factor will be introduced into the international situation and new possibilities will open up for us all. If you do not, the fate which overtakes fence-sitting politicians in a revolutionary age will overtake you.

Let us get down to cases. If a nation in the contemporary world wishes to continue to function as a military power, the answer to the question of how big its appropriation for military purposes must be is always to use a phrase which American industrialists employ in another context: "all that the traffic will bear." The international power game has reached a terrific pitch. It is being played for keeps. Two immensely rich, ruthless, and desperate gamblers sit in on the game. You in Great Britain have already experienced some of the humiliations of the less wealthy competitor. Do you think that your part in the game will be determined by anything other than an icy cold calculation of how many chips in the form of bombers, atomic weapons, etc., you are able to buy? Or that—if you remain in the game at all—there is anything for it but to buy all the chips you possibly can? The United States has just bought something over seventy billion dollars worth of chips with its defense budget.

An Analagous Situation

Let us face the fact that the contest of power and arms proceeds mechanically now, or like a natural phenomenon. In this context—as long as men and nations accept it—they have virtually no choice. I have just been reminded of the passage in Thucydides in which the Athenians razed the little city of Melos, traditional ally of Sparta but so far neutral in the war, put all their men to death, and sold the women and children into slavery. When the men of Melos protested against the Athenians' ultimatum, the latter said they would not try to prove their ultimatum just. Justice obtains between equals, "but if one is strong

and the other weak, that which is possible is imposed by the first and accepted by the second." To the suggestion that the gods would be with Melos since its cause was just, the Athenians replied: "As touching the gods we have the belief . . . that always, by a necessity of nature, each one commands wherever he has the power. We did not establish this law, we are not the first to apply it, . . . we abide by it as something likely to endure forever. . . . We know quite well that you also, like all the others, once you reached the same degree of power, would act in the same way." This is the sad hour for Britons, and especially for their leaders, to remember that the "iron law" of power is not suspended on behalf of those who are not as strong any more as they once were.

It is essential, I think, to bear in mind that in so far as the contest of power has become a mechanical or "natural" phenomenon, this applies in the same way to all the contestants and especially to each of the leading gamblers. They are equally out to win; otherwise they would not be sitting in on this kind of game. There is a point, therefore, in the speeches and writings of those who point to the dizzy pace of American armament and to the self-righteousness, provocativeness, belligerency, hysteria, of American policy and American leaders. There is a point and a certain justification, provided they do not succumb to the temptation to rationalize and idealize Soviet or Kremlin policy, utterances, and behaviour. This is what I think you and a good many Britons tend now to do. You are disliked by, probably, the majority of Americans because you thus rationalize about the Kremlin. They like your political opponents, because the latter rationalize about the Pentagon and its role. Thucydides and the Athenians had a more objective view of these things. I have said elsewhere in connection with my refusal to pay income taxes for American war preparations that one reason for this refusal is that I do not want to help arm Stalin. We might as well give Stalin half of all the war stuff we make and he might as well return the compliment. Each gambler will match the other's move. In other words, the lesser powers are always limited, so long as they stay in the game, to "appeasing" one or other of the big powers—or else.

Our Moral Responsibility

On the higher or more human level this means, of course, that compassion for all who hold positions of influence and responsibility in such an hour as this, including ourselves, becomes us. Dr. Barrington Moore, Jr., of Harvard University's Russian Research Center and author of a recently published illuminating study, *Soviet Politics—the Dilemma of Power*, has reminded us that we need "a sharp perception of the forces generated by a world-wide power struggle. These forces transcend both Russian and American society and limit closely the choices open to the leaders of each." Over here we very much need to cultivate compassion for Stalin and Molotov and for all Western European critics of American policy such as yourself. Though I am myself an extreme opponent of their policies, I dare to plead that compassion be extended also to men like Truman and Acheson, Churchill and Eden. The devil theory of politics, as both Jesus and Marx in their respec-

tive fashions have taught us, is idiotic whether Stalin or Truman or yourself is assigned the role.

There is but one other comment on your approach and program, before a closing observation as to the alternative before you and us. It is your contention that Britain should move forward on the road to radical social change rather than retreat. Without intending or pretending now to pass judgment on the specific issues in this field which are before the British workers, the unions and the Labor Party, I am in agreement with your general orientation. I do not believe that the Western world can avoid the necessity of making basic changes in its social and economic set-up. The only real question is whether the right changes shall be made, or whether ruin in war shall overtake us.

But it is hardly possible for a nation to go through a radical social change, involving a basic shift in the power relationships within the nation, without at least temporarily diminishing its ability, in terms both of material resources and psychological disposition, to wage war, whether cold or hot. When a capitalist society is threatened with a grave crisis, its leaders "resolve" the crisis by engaging in war production. The attention of the masses is diverted from the internal problem to the foe across the border, and progressive, labor and socialist leaders are persuaded not to "rock the boat during the storm." Is it not clear, when we look at the problem from this angle also, that the risk of military weakening must be taken or the hope of anything in the nature of a democratic and socialist society must be abandoned? Do we need more evidence than that provided by the history of four decades, including two World Wars, and by the contemporary scene, to convince us that the alternative for labor and social democratic forces, if they fail to take this risk of regarding military weakening as "the lesser evil," is eventually to be crushed between the millstones of Stalinism or some form of "National Socialism" and for western civilization to be consumed or utterly debased by militarism, totalitarianism, and war?

The Need for a Peace Program

There remains, then, the possibility that you will give leadership to a movement which accepts the fact that preparation for modern war and provision for the popular welfare cannot go hand in hand, which is, therefore, prepared to abandon the armaments race and to pursue intensively a program aimed to secure the welfare of the British, the colonial and other peoples. Such a program must necessarily be one of peace.

I understand there are already in England persons whose integrity and competence cannot be questioned, who hold that even from a military point of view this is the better, perhaps even the only rational course for Britain to take, since a Britain which serves as an American base and whose troops are in effect American mercenaries is almost certain to be destroyed in an atomic war. There will not be lacking in your own country and elsewhere people who would cry that it was craven and cowardly thus to "refuse to fight." But for most people it will not be necessary to prove once more whether the British have the courage to fight. What needs now to be demonstrated is that they and other peoples have the courage to risk sanity.

To pursue a course which accepts the virtual abandonment of the British military position will, of course, have drastic consequences in the Middle East and elsewhere. But here again indications multiply almost daily that the choice is not a simple one of holding on to the British power position or relinquishing it. The choice is really between being forced to relinquish it—always too late—under conditions which favor the spread of Communism and the expansion of the Russian power sphere; or holding on by means of American support and at the price of increasing subservience to American policy; or voluntarily abandoning the suicidal effort to hold power, for the sake of giving leadership to the masses of the people in the building of a new social order and a peaceful world.

For a Genuine Third Force

There can be no halting between two opinions here. As we tried to say in the beginning, mere temporary reduction in the *pace* of British rearmament accompanied with somewhat less of an American and more of a Russian orientation, will just be playing into Russian hands. If Britain strives to retain her place in the power race, she will eventually be driven to stand unequivocally with Russia or the United States. Either way would mean war. But realists in Britain must know that when it comes to the final show-down, Britain will be on the American side. If you strive to avoid this—to keep Britain indefinitely balancing between Russia and the United States or to give its policy a Russian orientation—it seems certain that you will encounter deep currents of interest and feeling which will prove irresistible, and eventually Churchillism will prevail decisively. It is imperative to recognize that we cannot “trust” a Russia arming to the teeth to make peace any more than we can “trust” a United States arming to the teeth to do so. Each is so tragically in need of therapy that, short of a conversion experience, it cannot undertake the role of therapist. A *genuine* “Third Force” is needed.

But to be the nucleus of a “Third Force,” Britain must refuse to bow to the conditions of the power struggle; she must leave her seat among the gamblers at Mars’ gaming table, not proceed on the assumption that she can be a luckier or cleverer gambler. It must be borne in mind in this connection what in theory all admit, viz. that ultimately Communism must be met on the spiritual level. A faith and a spiritual dynamic comparable to that which Communism has generated must come into being. Governments or people who are absorbed in the military struggle will never really be able to have the confidence that they provide a clearly preferable alternative to Communism, and therefore will never have this faith and spiritual vigor. But a people actually making peace, instead of talking peace from behind atomic stockpiles, as both Russia and the United States do, would have confidence in itself and would be trusted by others. It is not likely that the Kremlin fears nothing so much as having peace break out. And on the other hand, this might mean salvation for Russia also.

What, finally, about the United States? Almost certainly the great majority of Americans would hate you at first, if you adopted some such course as I am suggest-

ing. They would denounce you as a revolutionary, a lunatic, more dangerous than Stalin himself. It is even likely that many of the bitterest denunciations would come from our pro-armament, anti-Russian “liberals.” But it would not be possible for the United States government to force rearmament on you. Under the circumstances, it is not likely that Western European countries could be induced to go on with the rearmament program, nor could rearmament be imposed upon them by main force.

Political Shock Therapy

I do not think one can be at all certain as to what the reaction in this country might then be. It would be a terrific shock for us to discover that we could not rearm Britain and Western Europe. It is probable that the breaking out of peace would be as embarrassing to the men in the Pentagon, White House, and State Department as to the men in the Kremlin. But to them also, and to the American people, it might be a saving shock. Deep down Americans also hate war, and they do not really want to shoulder the vast burden of destroying or running the world. It may be that no people are in a better position than the British at this very moment to remind us that even a white, Anglo-Saxon, “Christian” nation cannot succeed where Tyre and Nineveh failed.

The man who gave leadership toward the end and in the spirit we have tried to describe would be on a world-scale such a revolutionary statesman-saint as Gandhi was for his own nation. All so-called statesmen who follow the program of power struggle are, willingly or unwillingly, gamblers and destroyers in disguise. Neither the pseudo-revolutionary nor the counter-revolutionary gamblers and destroyers, however, might prevail against the true revolutionaries of brotherhood and peace.

A. J. MUSTE

A. J. Muste is National Chairman of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

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Ruth Reynolds: Victim of Colonial Justice

Exposing the Attempt to Victimize an Anti-Imperialist

PUERTO RICO, NEAREST of the Greater Antillean Islands to Europe and North Africa, commands the approaches to North America from the South and the East. The U.S. government has studded it with naval, army and air bases. It has become a formidable outpost of American power.

On July 25, 1898, General Nelson Miles landed at Guanico, ending abruptly the autonomy Puerto Rico had won from Spain after four centuries of conflict. The population soon learned that exploitation by an imperialist republic was not one whit different from exploitation by a monarchy. Puerto Rican industry and trade were destroyed. North American finance capital converted most of the island into sugar plantations owned by absentee landlords, and the majority of Puerto Ricans received home relief, while the upper class collaborators among them received subsidies for "industrial development."

As has occurred in every other country overrun by imperialism a strong nationalist movement sprang up in Puerto Rico, primarily concerned with national independence. The leader of the party, Don Pedro Albizu Campos, promulgated the idea that the United States would never grant Puerto Rico autonomy; the imperialist master, he felt, must be ejected by force. In 1936, he was convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government and sent to Atlanta Penitentiary. Mass persecution of his followers ensued.

In the early '40's Campos contracted tuberculosis at Atlanta and was sent to Columbus Hospital in New York. There he was sought out and visited by many prominent American liberals, among them, Norman Thomas, John Haynes Holmes, Roger Baldwin, J. Holmes Smith and A. Philip Randolph. There, also, a young midwesterner, Ruth Reynolds, fresh from graduate work at Northwestern and a short period of social service on Chicago's South Side, visited him. It became apparent to the Nationalist leader that this young woman was seriously disturbed about Puerto Rico and anxiously seeking a solution. She had begun to work in the Harlem Ashram, a Gandhian living and social service center in East Harlem where she was becoming acquainted with Puerto Rican immigrants. If they seemed so ready to live piled in rickety tenements in Harlem and to compete for sub-standard wages, what must their homeland be like?

In 1944, with J. Holmes Smith, A. Philip Randolph, Rachel Davis Dubois, Donald Harrington and Richard Walsh, Ruth Reynolds founded The American League for Puerto Rico's Independence; she became secretary of the organization. Thereafter, she devoted herself to a systematic study of the island's problems. In 1945, Ruth Reynolds testified before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs on the Tydings Bill for Independence of Puerto Rico; in 1947, she testified before the

House of Representatives subcommittee on Insular Possessions on the Bill for an elected Governor of Puerto Rico.

That same year, Don Pedro Albizu Campos made a triumphal return to Puerto Rico. He was hailed at the docks by 40,000 admirers, and immediately proclaimed an intensification of the struggle against North American rule. On April 14, 1948, his adherents at the University of Puerto Rico asked him to speak at a celebration in honor of Jose de Diego, popular Puerto Rican patriot. The University administration forbade the meeting. Violence ensued and students were clubbed by soldiers stationed on the campus to break the demonstration. Scores of students were expelled. The American League for Puerto Rico's Independence requested the American Civil Liberties Union to investigate apparent violations of civil liberties. After considerable hedging, the ACLU refused. In the fall of 1948, Ruth Reynolds was sent to Puerto Rico by her organization to investigate conditions there. It was her second trip to the island.

She decided to hold open hearings in the Ateneo, the public forum of San Juan. When she discovered that students and faculty members were afraid to visit her, she interviewed them in their homes. The increasing hostility of the government bureaucracy forced her to spend more and more of her time in the homes of the Nationalists. She actually lived in one Nationalist home after another.

Meanwhile, youth members of the Nationalist movement were being jailed by the American government for refusing to submit to military conscription. The Nationalists maintained that the United States was at war with the people of Puerto Rico, was, in actuality an occupying power preventing self-government by force. Therefore, its sovereignty was not recognized. Nationalist followers were bound by oath to refuse to submit to induction in the armed forces of the enemy.

Political Activity of Ruth Reynolds

Ruth Reynolds was an ardent pacifist. She belonged to the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Peacemakers. In 1942 she had walked to Washington from New York along with 15 others, including the writer of this article, in a 15 day demonstration of the Gandhian technique. She had to decide whether to aid the Nationalists in their fight against conscription. They were not pacifists, but they were refusing to submit to conscription, and Ruth Reynolds opposed all military conscription.

On December 18, 1949, the Nationalist Party held its annual convention at Arecibo. The leadership was preoccupied with the apathy of the rank-and-file. Six hundred dollars was needed at once to finance the appeal to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston. Pedro Albizu Campos made the principal speech. He bade the audience: "Stand up! All who are Nationalists—true Na-

tionalists—those who are ready to give their lives and fortunes for this cause—the cause that should continue over the bones of Albizu Campos.” Most of the audience stood up, including the government detectives scattered around the hall. Ruth Reynolds, dependent on the charity of her hosts for subsistence, unable to make any financial contribution, did not stand up. The meeting culminated in the raising of the needed funds.

Seldom missing any of the Nationalist public celebrations which kept the national spirit alive by commemorating all the patriots and martyrs of the independence movement, Ruth attended a meeting at Fajardo in honor of General Valera, on October 26, 1950. After the meeting, her friend, Burgos Fuentes, offered her a ride back to San Juan in his car. She consented and rode in the car with four men. In Rio Piedras, the police halted the car and searched it. In the trunk they found dynamite bombs, Molotov cocktails and some old rifles. The group was arrested. At the preliminary hearing, the men were held for illegal possession and transportation of firearms. Ruth was instructed to return the next afternoon for questioning. She appeared and convinced the magistrate that she knew nothing about the firearms in the car. She was unconditionally released. Two days after the Nationalist revolt of October 30, 1950 she was arrested again.

It was not until almost two months later, on December 27, 1950, that an indictment was returned against Ruth Reynolds. In the intervening period she and the other political prisoners had been held in solitary confinement with a diet restricted to rice and beans. Her trial did not begin until August 17, 1951.

“Law 53” -- Puerto Rico’s Smith Act

On that first Monday the constitutionality of “Law 53” was exhaustively debated. The Puerto Rican legislature had obediently passed this translation of the Smith Act as a local measure. The central issue of the trial became—how far could Law 53 be stretched! in the trial of the 11 Communist Party leaders the prosecution devoted a major portion of its effort to demonstrating that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the United States government by force and violence. In the Reynolds’ case the government experimented with dispensing with proof of a conspiracy. Its strategy on the first count was simply to show that Ruth Reynolds attended the meeting in Arecibo, on December 18, 1949—that she stood up and took a pledge—that the revolt of October 30, 1950 was the outcome of that gesture. On the second count the government satisfied itself with placing Ruth Reynolds in the car in which explosives were found on October 26, 1950 and showing the closeness in point of time of that incident with the revolt four days later.

At no time was any effort made to show that she was plotting revolt in the Nationalist homes or with the Nationalist leaders at the public celebrations or in the Nationalist headquarters.

Finally, the prosecution decided to clinch its case by exhibiting to the jury the tragic effects of the revolt. Police and National Guard officers testified about the policemen and troops who had been slain in the uprising. Wounded combatants exhibited their maimed limbs. The

Molotov cocktails, the dynamite bombs fashioned out of beer cans, assorted rifles and shot-guns were all introduced to influence the jury. Protests of defense counsel were unavailing.

A dramatic counterpoint to the trial was played by a group of North American Peacemakers who arrived in Puerto Rico at the opening of the prosecution. They were three Ohioans—Ralph Templin, Wallace Nelson and Ernest Bromley. Templin, a friend of Gandhi and a former missionary in India, was shocked by the parallel with India in the squalor and destitution of Puerto Rican life. A few days after he arrived he commenced a fast of penitence for the evil American imperialism had done to the island. His companions went about the island spreading the gospel of uncompromising, though non-violent, resistance to the overlord. Puerto Rico had not been favorably impressed by the pacifism brought to them by other North American guests whose crusading had usually ended when they had secured relatively lucrative jobs with the imperial or insular governments in the island. But they soon recognized that these three were of a different breed. When Ralph Templin took the stand at the trial on behalf of Ruth Reynolds on the sixth day of his fast, he lifted the case for the defense to its highest level. Already Ruth had made plain the underlying issues of colonialism, war and oppression in testimony on her own behalf.

But the verdict was foreordained. Before the jury returned its verdict Ruth Reynolds observed two jurors walking out of the District Attorney’s office. Ruth was acquitted on the charge of promoting the revolt by being in the car with explosives on October 26, 1950. She was found guilty of promoting the revolt by taking an oath on December 18, 1949 and sentenced to two to six years hard labor in the penitentiary.

A word should be added on the conduct of the standard civil liberties defense organizations in this country. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People avoids the case on the ground that the Puerto Rican people do not acknowledge themselves to be Negroes. The Civil Liberties Union is not quite convinced that a civil liberties issue is present. At this writing the Emergency Civil Liberties Defense Committee originating at Princeton has not made up its mind. The shunning of the case by the “defense” organizations is matched by a blackout of the press. Murray Kempton, labor columnist of the New York Post, and a member of the Ruth Reynolds Defense Committee, has not yet been able to publish a story on the case. A small committee of personal friends of Ruth Reynolds are carrying the burden alone.

CONRAD LYNN

Conrad Lynn is Defense Counsel for Ruth Reynolds.

The Ruth Reynolds Committee needs your financial help. All sympathizers are requested to send contributions to:

Julius Eichel, Treasurer
Ruth Reynolds, Defense Comm.
769 St. Mark’s Avenue Brooklyn, New York

Further Violations of Student Rights

Need for Restraint in University Of California "Victory"

JUDGING FROM MANY campus and liberal newspapers, the recent removal of the loyalty oath by the Regents of the University of California is being celebrated as a real victory over the prevailing anti-red hysteria. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The hosannahs of triumph should be restrained by a bit of sober analysis, or a completely false picture will be created.

Admittedly, faculty members never reconciled themselves completely to that "damnable" oath. They continued to grumble, to complain, to leave the University for more palatable situations. The exodus created embarrassing rents in the curriculum and jeopardized the university's academic reputation. It was a persistent and irksome problem for the Regents and provided good ammunition for the not-inconsiderable opposition among the students.

Yet the removal of the oath was largely a pyrrhic victory since it produced no real change in the prevailing atmosphere of fear and suspicion. And for good reasons. In the first place the Regents' action was not the consequence of pressure by aroused campus community. It was directive from above. The power position of the faculty *vis-a-vis* the Regents was permanently damaged by its abject capitulation two years ago.

But even more important, the professors' temporizing arguments about the discriminatory character of the oath were met with the introduction of the infamous Levering Act. Under its provisions, *all* state employees are turned into "civil defense workers" and must swear that they are not now, and have not been for five years members or sympathizers of any "subversive" organization. To decide what constitutes a "subversive" organization one must, in the words of California's Attorney General, "consult his own conscience." A mistaken self-analysis by a professor would not, in this case, result merely in the loss of employment. The maximum penalty—this for mere perjury—is seven years! The removal of the "special" oath thus takes on the character of meaningless gesture and indicates no real change in attitude on the part of the Regents.

Socialist Leader Barred

If this is not enough, then the recent Shachtman case should dispel any remaining illusions for it is the beginning of an even more serious attack on fundamental student rights.

The official student Forum Council invited Max Shachtman, national chairman of the Independent Socialist League, to debate Professor Francis H. Herrick from Mills College on the British elections. Under the Univer-

sity's Rule 17, both sides must be represented when discussing such "controversial" subjects. All the technical arrangement had been completely when Dean Hurford Stone suddenly vetoed Shachtman as a speaker on the grounds that his organization was listed by the U.S. Attorney General as "subversive" and "communist." (The fact that Mr. Shachtman is a bitter opponent of Stalinism didn't prevent Stone from referring to the Regents' "anti-communist" policy.) Thus the Regents removed the oath and the administration imposed the subversive list all in one week, without prior consultation with the faculty or the students.

Although many were disheartened and silenced by the loyalty oath defeat, this new event called forth a storm of protests, mostly in the form of angry letters. The *Daily Californian* continued its excellent civil libertarian tradition by two bold front-page editorial blasts at the new "subversive" list criterion. The students responded by packing Barrington Hall co-op to hear the originally scheduled debate, now under the sponsorship of the local YMCA, Wesley Foundation, Barrington Hall and the Cloyne Court co-op. They even turned out, 200 strong, to gleefully applaud Shachtman at a Sather Gate rally held under near hurricane conditions the following day.

Although far from equal to the great, sustained battle put up against the oath, the response in this case was spontaneous and far from silent. Once again it was proved that students cannot be *convinced* that the destruction of academic freedom is in their interests.

The political problem which now faces the campus is how to organize on behalf of its sentiments. The problem is now being approached thru the formation of an unofficial, off-campus united action committee which is preparing a petition campaign. If this is successful, it will strengthen the tradition of organized student action so long a part of campus life.

BOB MARTINSON

Bob Martinson is a student at the University of California.

University of Chicago Proves Students Can Win Rights

THE INTENSITY OF the current drive against academic freedom is indicated by the fact that it has finally hit the campus of the University of Chicago, long a stronghold of civil liberties. The first manifestation of this repressive tendency occurred this fall with the arbitrary firing of the editor of the campus paper, the *Maroon*, and the suspension of that publication. The editor was fired by the Dean of Students in complete violation of

the Student Bill of Rights, a document accepted by the same dean less than one year before, which guarantees control by Student Government of all extra-curricular activities including, specifically, the campus newspaper. According to the administration, the editor's "action in sponsoring and attending the East Berlin Youth Festival demonstrates [his] lack of qualification to edit a free and independent newspaper."

Two or three years ago such an action would have been virtually impossible on the Chicago campus and if it had occurred would have been met with a tornado of protest. Today, the unfortunate fact is that student apathy prevented the kind of action from being taken that would have defeated the administration. This apathy is due to the war in general and to the students' disgust with Stalinism in particular. Stalinist control of the newspaper has been disastrous so far as competent journalism and accurate coverage is concerned. The Stalinists handled the *Maroon* in their accustomed crude and hackneyed manner and thereby earned for themselves the enmity of the vast majority of the student body. Nevertheless, many students recognized that in this case the issue was not Stalinism but student rights and the freedom of the student press, and made a vigorous attempt to combat the administration's action.

Policies of Protest Committee

The protest took organizational form with the founding of the Committee for the Preservation of Student Rights. This committee announced its policy as being opposed to Stalinism but went on to state the real issue and demanded the reinstatement of the regularly elected editor and the lifting of the suspension. It collected several hundred signatures on a petition containing a statement of its position. The *Maroon* itself sponsored a rally on campus at which over one thousand students demonstrated their opposition to the administration.

The executive committee of Student Government adopted a statement of principles urging that the suspension be lifted and that the editor be reinstated. However, Student Government as a whole was unable to reach any agreement on action to achieve this goal. The student protest against the administration action, though notable, was insufficient and led only to a compromise. The ousted editor facilitated the compromise by remaining in eastern Europe beyond the beginning of the quarter, thereby enabling Student Government to request the *Maroon* to declare a vacancy. This was done, a new editor elected, and the suspension was lifted. Unfortunately this solution left the situation very unclear. The question of whether the administration had the right to fire the editor was left undecided.

With this partial victory behind them the administration proceeded to another attack on civil liberties. The latest victim is the Labor Youth League, the Communist Party's youth organization. Malcolm Sharp, professor of law at the university and faculty sponsor last year for the LYL, advised the university administration and Student Government that, in view of the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the convictions of the eleven Stalinist

leaders, there is some question about the legality of the LYL and that the university may be incurring some legal risk by according official campus recognition to that organization.

The decision in this matter lies in the hands of Student Government, at least theoretically, and the Government as in the *Maroon* case has been wavering and postponing action. Student Government may, it seems, capitulate to the tremendous national pressure for uniformity. In fact, it seems to be taking the initiative out of the hands of the administration in the campaign against "subversives." It has, without any prompting from the administration, decided to hold up the recognition of the Socialist Youth League on the grounds that the SYL may be in the same boat, legally, as the LYL.

What will be the outcome of this struggle remains to be seen. It should be pointed that the *Maroon* issue caused a split in the campus party which had an overwhelming preponderance in Student Government last year. This organization, the Independent Students' League, was an all-inclusive party united only in its opposition to Stalinism. During the *Maroon* fight the more conservative members, those who supported the administration, split and formed the Independent Coalition. In the elections which followed closely after the *Maroon* fight the ISL gained a narrow majority. Due to the split, the ISL is more homogeneously liberal than it formerly was and therefore should be more sensitive to democratic pressures. If these pressures are successful, then Student Government will play the role it should play, that of primary defender of student rights, and a victory for academic freedom will be won. This would be highly encouraging in view of the national trend toward abridging civil liberties and could serve as a healthy example to students on other campuses. Victories for democracy are not impossible even today.

AYPA Is Reorganized

THE AMERICAN Youth for Political Action (AYPA) was, until recently, the youth section of the Prohibition Party. Originally this party was not limited in its approach to social questions: the alcohol problem was one among a number of issues which actively interested the Prohibition Party; the party had been among the earliest pioneers for woman suffrage, the graduated income tax, direct election of U. S. senators and other reforms later adopted. The party also once declared itself in favor of public ownership of utilities. The AYPA has continued the best of these early progressive traditions of the Prohibition Party. But while AYPA has maintained its militancy, the party has grown conservative in its social outlook and organizational methods. At its recent national convention in Indianapolis, the Party read its youth section out of the organization. It could not tolerate the militant program of the youth which called for full employment, world government, FEPC, and similar political measures. Another source of conflict was the youth organization's opposition to the party's narrowing down its program to the alcohol problem to the exclusion of most other planks.

At the convention a number of old party leaders who

have worked for years in the party defended AYPA on the floor against unjust attacks. A former National Chairman of the Prohibition Party, Virgil Hinshaw, Chairman 1912-1924, who then had sought to bring about a merger of the Prohibition, Socialist and Teddy Roosevelt Progressive parties, sought in vain to have AYPA reinstated. Parliamentary maneuvers were successful in preventing A.Y.P.A.s reinstatement.

After the convention A.Y.P.A. leaders met and considered and approved a plan to re-organize AYPA into "Democracy Unlimited." "Democracy Unlimited" would continue A.Y.P.A. support of peace, racial equality, economic democracy, solving of such social problems as the alcohol problems, as well as its opposition to Communism, Fascism, militarism, imperialism, etc.

But there are three basic changes embodied in the re-organization. (1) is the restatement of the principles in

terms more suitable for 1952. (2) "Democracy Unlimited" is not limited to youth, but rather is to include persons of all ages as full active members. (3) AYPA is not committed at present to any political party, but is looking to the formation of a new federated political party, consistent with our democratic principles. In the meantime members are free to support and work within whatever political alignment they feel is consistent with these principles. A later referendum would be necessary before any change of this policy would be enacted. Those desiring more information about "Democracy Unlimited" are urged to write Mr. F. Warner Fischer, 7532 Parkdale, Clayton 5, Missouri. Subscription-memberships cost \$1.00 for one year of \$2.00 for three years.

ROBERT GEMMER

Robert Gemmer is National Chairman of American Youth for Political Action.

Before the Fifth Avenue Library

(There are so few,) there are so few such spaces
In this our gathered city.
Undelicate ferns of fibrous hearts
Have threshed the soft articulate faces
From off the city's promised bodies
Afloat with loveliness and atilt with tensile graces.

Rather now see the city jammed with houses
Like a shelf of books in a stacked library.
The titles have been crushed in meaning
And no free people, like twisting leaves in sun
Step like diamonds down the flight of years
Nor throw their oscillate shadows
Across their ebon longing and their brilliant tears

TULI

Washington Square

1.
Poor and prosed
The cabbage butterfly
Turns on the law like leaf.
The agile lovers miss the disengaged eye.
Tramps of feeling are about to cry
That always in the almost they always found
Alas-themselves-squatted in the summer mirror
Silvering; and image bound.
Caught in passion like the voice in sound.

2.
The Bohemians have gone into the sand-pit to drink sand.
O how each day strikes its end

From tower to snub-lit tower.
Nor no artists light to make amends
(Across the polar park I hear the tropic scream of friends)

3.

He dares the pipes that underground do flow
Drinks deep the cornet-spined air
That wafts the crenelated lilacs of his undespair.
Yet knows: Upon this mighty oak the early merchants
hanged their thieves
And left all love to dry: September sap upon the
sham-of-April leaves.

TULI

New Foundations: Political Comic Strip

Stalinist Student Magazine Fires a Dud at Anvil

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN the rational need of the real world and the propaganda of Stalinism has formed the basis of much political humor. It is often humor which, far from de-emphasizing the tragic consequences of lurid "trials," "confessions" and purges, serves as a bitter reminder of the anti-human terrorism of totalitarianism. On some levels and under certain conditions, however, Stalinism almost reaches the heights of pure humor. In situations where it has little effect or influence on human beings or political events, the political schizophrenia of Stalinism can almost be enjoyed. Their weird choice of words, their utter indifference to logic or consistency, their unblushingly told lies are ingredients of humor, precisely because they are so detached from the fundamental norms of language, logic and moral responsibility.

As a case in point, we have two recent attacks on *Anvil and Student Partisan* in the Stalinist student publication, *New Foundations*. Entitled, in their author's unenviable attempt to be scintillating, "Anvil Chorus" and "Anvil Refrain," they are highly recommended for lovers of humor — and students of political psychopathology. The charges launched against *Anvil* are so absurdly false, the language so foul and the organization so magnificently jumbled that to present a detailed, analytical reply here would be, we fear, both a Herculean and unprofitable task. Everyone we approached to write a reply to *New Foundations'* formidable assault was overwhelmed by the problem of how to compose a serious reply to something so unreal, i.e., to pure Stalinist humor. Thus, in place of a "serious" reply we offer our readers some excerpts from *New Foundations* (with a comment or two which we cannot resist). If these quotations prove useful as research material for a student thesis on Humor in the Political Jungle, then, they will at least have served some practical purpose other than our reader's amusement.

The Anvil Program a la New Foundations

The second article begins as a confession. The first referred to us as racist, reactionary, war-mongers and just about everything else that is found in the Stalinist lexicon. It appears, though, that the author failed to castigate *Anvil* as a "Trotskyite" publication. This was an unpardonable sin. Thus, the author, must recant in her second article whose first paragraph abjectly notes:

I seriously failed to show that the line followed by *Anvil* is one of Trotskyism, from the contents of the magazine to the actions of its publishers.

We wonder if Miss Charlotte Goldberg, who signed the above confession, realizes how fortunate she is that such an "error" was not committed by her in the Russian paradise, she might not have gotten off so lightly.

Let us look at the author's summary of *Anvil's* program and activities:

Anvil would have students give up every vestige of democratic rights. They label every group of students who wage any battle in defense of their right as "Stalinists." *Anvil* tries to reduce students to its own level, to become willing fomenters and accepters of war. They would try to lead students down the path of accepting war and fascism and become allies of the reactionary forces, just as *Anvil* is. They do this while hypocritically saying they are anti-war. Their verbal gymnastic are used to conceal their actual activities. *Anvil's* sponsors are enemies of students who want to act for their rights and for peace. They must be rejected.

Thus, *Anvil* is exposed as fascist, war-mongering, hypocritical, etc. Good. We will not argue with Miss Goldberg. But we must admit our alarm over the very last sentence just quoted: "They must be rejected." Its tone and brilliant conciseness reminds us so much of a popular Russian expression—"They must be liquidated!"—that for a fleeting moment our physical security seemed threatened.

The Bigger the Lie. . .

They deny the possibility of peace and slanderously attack all students who are concerned with peace or who act for peace.

* * *

Their red-baiting has as its aim to slander and discourage any proposal or action that can remotely have an effect in preventing war. Their slanders encompass the entire American people when they speak of their "political backwardness."

* * *

If ANVIL is an anti-war publication, why have they refused to demand the withdrawal of troops from Korea and a cease-fire?

* * *

It is also quite evident that ANVIL does not believe in socialism, for not only does it attack the Soviet Union, the only Socialist state in existence today, but it attacks the very theory of socialism when it condemns "Stalinism, which is based upon the elimination of private property" or the Eastern Democracies, Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, "where capitalist property relations . . . have been substantially destroyed."

* * *

The contents of ANVIL and the anti-democratic actions of its publishers serve fully to prove they are Trotskyites. Like all Trotskyites, their violent hatred of the Soviet Union leads them to collaborate with all reactionary forces striving for war, witness their alliance with the German and Japanese fascists.

* * *

The contents of ANVIL, from its editorial to its poetry, reflect its Trotskyite character.

Some Random Quotes Quoted at Random

Somewhere in one of the two articles (there is no need to quote in any special order) *Anvil* is exposed as pornographic:

Its one article on women is entitled 'The Sexual Initiation of Women.' In *Anvil* women are dealt with only in the context of pornography and have meaning only in regard to sex. It is here, of all their articles, that Negro women are mentioned, and only as sexual objects. This characterization of Negro women indicates the depth of their white supremacist, racist thinking.

May we suggest to Charlotte that she be a bit more candid. After all, this is the age of psychology, and if the above is her genuine reaction to Simone de Beauvoir's study, we fear that she has needlessly exposed herself, or possibly this is her adaptation to the new Russian prudery. As for our "white supremacist, racist thinking"—Miss Goldberg is obviously in disgrace and being punished by having to recite the Stalinist litany.

Elsewhere in Miss Goldberg's bit of creative writing we are told that:

The Soviet Union is a socialist state ruled by the working class in alliance with the peasantry. (6)

The (6) is a footnote which is going to establish the scientific truth of this statement. Travelling down the page to find footnote (6) we read:

Constitution of the Soviet Union, Article I.

Poor Charlotte. She tried so hard.

Putting our hand in the pot, we pull out the following:

Nowhere in their issues do they have a program for student rights.

But what about the program which is printed in the magazine every issue? One can disagree with it, but how can one deny its existence? To deny the existence of physical reality, Miss Goldberg, is a heinous crime for it is anti-materialist and mysticism of the most monstrous variety. And the printed word, in this case, programs on student rights, editorials and articles on the same subject, is physical reality. Watch out Charlotte, or you will be confessing again.

To save space and time, then, all collectors of non-sequiturs, fairy tales, ghost stories, thrillers, chillers and spell-binders can add to their studies by looking at the box on the previous page.

JULIUS JACOBSON

From the Student's Bookshelf

THE HIDDEN HERITAGE

by John Howard Lawson.
The Citadel Press 1950.

JOHN HOWARD LAWSON gives us a real impression, a distinct configuration of what, in mental terms and in human terms also, a modern man can be made into by a certain kind of moral climate: we are given a sense of the terrible depths, the nearly unalterable depths of human misunderstanding.

Had *The Hidden Heritage* not been a Stalinist book, primarily, it might have been a good book; and to the extent that it is not Stalinist, it is a good book. Kenneth Burke defined a book that is good as one which is the expansion of a single true sentence, and a great book as one which is the expansion of a single new sentence. Certainly Mr. Lawson's sentence is not new, but it is true. This sentence concerns money. Everything he has to say about money is to the point, except when it deals with art, myth, and magic. But let us examine the book.

Lawson Bewitched by Witchery

The "heritage" that is presumably "hidden" from us is the history of the class struggle, and the art and myth that have registered a significant impression of that struggle. Mr. Lawson wants us to see the richness of the revolutionary illumination throughout history, specializing in the years from 1075 to 1628. However, as the subtitle indicates, ("A Rediscovery of the Ideas and Forces That Link the Thought of

our Time with the Culture of the Past"), great stress is laid on resemblances between recent events and history, and as one might easily imagine, the recent events usually have something to do with Stalinist activities in America. The best example of this concerns witches. As we know, the Stalinists are very fond of the phrase "witch-hunting." There is, of course, a real witch-hunt going on, they never use the expression to describe purges behind the Iron Curtain, but reserve it for attacks made on Stalinists by Congress or the press. To make my point directly, Mr. Lawson has come to believe that all witch-hunts are inspired by lies and that witches do not exist, that witches have never existed, that all documents that concern them are lies, that actually these so-called witches are the noblest elements of the working class. Mr. Lawson must have reached his conclusions along some such lines as I have indicated because there is no other way to explain his fantastic attitude toward the witches of the Middle Ages.

There are elaborate records of the past and elaborate theories of modernity that point irrefutably to the prevalence of witch cults in the Middle Ages, of black magic and the black mass. Sir James Frazer has not come and gone for nothing. The Universal Church at that time analyzed these phenomena as Satanic in origin and opposed them accordingly. But as Mr. Lawson sees it, the Universal Church was slandering the anti clerical proletariat, much the same as the Stalinists are slandered, no doubt. Not witches, but folk dancers! In the most price-

less phrase in the book we are told that "what was said and done may have been quite simple." I wonder if Mr. Lawson would dare describe, and he would have to if he were to be consistent, certain Voodoo ceremonies in Haiti that Mr. Leaf has photographed, ceremonies typical of magic ritual in all ages, in which the worshippers dance on burning coals in frenzied ecstasy, as being "quite simple." No one can deny that they are "anti-clerical," but they are hardly "peasant organizations" protesting against the clergy.

Mr. Lawson is disinclined to recognize the character and development of ancient magical societies, for whom human and animal sacrifice was essential; from their flowering in antiquity to their degeneration into hobgoblins cavorting on the Medieval heath, or their popularity in all phases of growth and decay with the peasantry. This is because Mr. Lawson is sentimental about the peasantry; he cannot attribute any depravity to it. The peasants, to him, are indeed folk dancers, sturdy and gay, innocently gathering together to assert solidarity and protest. And they are slandered as witches!

On Lawson on Faust

Even more far-fetched is Mr. Lawson's Faust, that great friend of the working class, martyred by clerical libels. Excellent research has been done on Faust (one need mention only Miss Butler's book)* and although there is a vast difference between the legendary and the real Faust, the real Faust could not possibly be interpreted as a proletarian hero. He was what I think we would call

* The Myth of the Magus.

in our day a "con man," although of a low order. Faust, as did Marlowe, became the subject of contemporary sermons, and it is to the more imaginative divines of the day that we owe the wholly inaccurate picture of their lives and deaths. Both men, however, have been got at by research, and now we know them: Marlowe the dissolute playwright, Faust the dissolute fake. Neither had anything to do with bettering the conditions of those who toiled around them. Both were lusty and irresistible, met bad ends, and were excellent material for object lessons in cruder theology. It is true that certain ecclesiastics did exaggerate their sins to excess, but I think both men would have been pleased; their vanity would have been delighted. I do not think either of them would smile on Mr. Lawson for degrading Faust to the level of decency.

In the two examples I have shown, our author's technique, instanced by his disregard of facts and his devotion to doctrine, is indisputably Stalinist. The curious thing about Lawson, of course, is that it was not necessary for him to take such intractable examples. There are excellent examples in history. There is no doubt that the working class has heroes. There is no doubt that the proletariat has been slandered. Therefore, what sensible reason could John Howard Lawson have had to invent these absurdities? None. Except that he is a Stalinist and that that is how Stalinists think; monolithically. That is what being a Stalinist involves.

An Economic Interpretation

Society has not evolved by the spontaneous magnanimity of the ruling classes, but rather by the strenuous objections of those ruled, even to the point of violence and revolution. The ruling classes are notoriously devoted to the ascetic rigors of making money, and an exquisite disregard of the exploited. There are few events in history covered by **The Hidden Heritage** that are not intimate with the motives of "primitive accumulation." When Mr. Lawson focuses on this, always in sight of authentic documentation, his work is excellent. I prefer his account of the activities leading up to the sailing of the Mayflower, and the details of the Pilgrim colony, much more than any straight history I know, or even the very poetic interpretation by William Carlos Williams in **In The American Grain**.

The contrast between the accounts of Lawson and Williams, in fact, are most interesting; you would hardly think they were talking of the same voyage, the one being all money and the other all swash-buckle: but the thing is that they do describe the same voyage, and thus we see the limitations of both methods. I prefer Lawson's account because it is more sophisticated and establishes, as he intended to do, the economic pattern character-

istic of this nation right at the beginning, where sentimental patriotism has distorted it. Ezra Pound was always maintaining that we should "study money." Mr. Lawson's study of it is excellent; excellent because of its limitations, its sharpening to the dynamic core of that acquisitive thrust through the centuries that is responsible for so many events about which we too often see only the surface ramifications.

"The Line" on Homer and DaVinci

It is when Mr. Lawson seeks, in myth and art, documentary responses to this all-out pursuit of wealth that his book becomes irritating. He has no liking for art and no intuition of myth. As I say, it is good to take a limited approach to history, as he does with his financial interpretation, and one can accept it; it is ridiculous to rewrite history for the purposes of spurious propaganda, and one can laugh at it; but it is misinterpretation of art that is the pernicious thing. For it is in the very nature of art and myth to be open to interpretation. Lawson cannot be refuted by records, by facts. He is on the open sea devoid of

instincts or instruments. What can one say if all he can see is that "Homer's Iliad recounts the warfare for possession of the strategic Dardanelles," or if he finds the relationship between the kings and the gods "confused"? I am sure that that is all he has seen in Homer. His interest must hardly have been the most intense, and one wonders how he ever read it.

What can one say to his "explanation" of the Mona Lisa: "Lisa's enigma is that of the upper class woman who has learned to conceal her emotions"? Or when he goes on to say that she is the archetype of "the scheming women caught in the net of bourgeois property relationships"? Happily, others have seen more in art and literature than that. The aesthetic experience may be rich and real and mysterious, and anyone who can write of two of the greatest art works of all time with such insensitivity should not pretend to more culture than he can actually feel. Culture is feeling. It is a gift that many persons are not endowed with. Mr. Lawson is emphatically among the ungifted.

CHARLES THAYER

Socialist Literature

LENIN AS PHILOSOPHER, by Professor Anton Pannekoek, left-wing but anti-bolshevik Marxist, is the first important criticism of Lenin's "contribution" to the materialist philosophy of socialism. It reveals Lenin's philosophy as the ideological basis of the new Russian ruling class. 6"x9", 80 pages, 50¢

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PROGRAM of the NEW YORK STUDENT FEDERATION AGAINST WAR

The primary aim of the New York Student Federation Against War is to organize all students opposed to the war drives of Russian and American imperialism which threaten the very existence of world civilization. We aim to prevent the polarization of the American student body into either of these reactionary war camps.

We are irreconcilably opposed to the totalitarian tyranny which rules over such countries as Russia, her Eastern European vassal states and fascist Spain. We advocate the overthrow of these regimes by democratic forces from within these countries and enthusiastically endorse all such forces. At the same time we do not accept the rationalization and apology for the war drives of American imperialism on the basis of militarily stopping Stalinism.

In the United States, today, all of our democratic rights are seriously menaced. Above all, local and national government and big business have reached a political affinity in their attempts to stifle labor and radical organizations, and to virtually outlaw the Stalinist movement. This political reaction has its parallel in the academic world where one university administration after another has initiated campus witch hunts.

Racial and religious discrimination and persecution remains the shame of the nation. Jim Crow, in particular, remains largely unabated. The murder of Negroes in the South, their discrimination in Northern industry, the segregation policy in academic institutions have, by now, become characteristic of the social psychology of America's industrial and political leaders. It is the aim of the New York Student Federation Against War to conduct militant struggles for the complete social, political and economic equality of the Negro people.

The growing political reaction at home finds its counterpart in America's foreign policy: bolstering reactionary regimes in Spain, Greece and Turkey; the North Atlantic Pact and the subsidization of the military machines of Western Europe and support of German rearmament.

The New York Student Federation Against War

does not believe that war is inevitable. We are convinced that the drive toward war can be eliminated by building democratic political and social structures in place of America's growing garrison state and Russia's rapacious imperialism. It is to this end that we are dedicated.

As a student organization in the United States we have the following special and immediate role to play in building a just and democratic world:

1. Education: *As students we will make every effort to stimulate political and social thought on campus; to attempt to instill among the student body a sense of responsibility and self-confidence; to encourage discussion and debate of political issues and local campus political problems.*

2. Organization: *To present the particular views of the New York Student Federation Against War we urge all sympathetic students to make every effort to organize recognized college clubs; and, similarly, we urge all existing clubs sympathetic to the views of the Federation, and not already affiliated to it, to take immediate steps to join the Federation.*

3. Activities: *In addition to general political education the Federation proposes to its constituent clubs that they participate actively in daily campus political activity; to enter all struggles for the defense of student rights, to guarantee the right to organize on campus and to hear speakers of a club's own choosing; to fight against faculty or administrative supervision of student activities; to fight for an end to racial and religious discrimination on campus and in fraternities.*

4. Federation Activities: *In addition to local campus activities the Federation proposes intercollegiate campaigns to fight for democracy and peace through meetings, petition campaigns, education, etc. The Federation will conduct city wide actions in behalf of the fight to end Jim-Crow and to turn back the increasing assault on civil and academic liberties. The Federation will also seek out other student groups in an effort to conduct joint campaigns on such issues.*

BUSINESS OFFICE NOTICE

Individual students or clubs which wish to order bundles of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN to sell on campus should write the magazine's business manager for rates and conditions. All correspondence concerning business should be sent to the following address:

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