

A Student Anti War Quarterly

anvil

FBI and Civil Rights: A Symposium

***Eleanor Roosevelt, George Hartmann, Roger Baldwin
W. E. B. Du Bois, Irving Howe***

War, Realism and the "Lesser Evil"
by JULIUS JACOBSON

John Dos Passos: The Loss of Passion
by IRVING HOWE

Harry Gideonse: Academic Doublethink
by JEAN ENGERS

Myths on Radicalism and Neurosis
by MURRAY WAX and DON CHENOWETH

Horatio Alger and the American Worker
by LEWIS COSER

Science Fiction as a Pseudo-Art
by RALPH STILES

The Sophistry of Colonialism
by JEAN ROUS

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Facts and Figures

THE SPRING 1950 ISSUE has been exceptionally well received. We have received letters of praise from all sections of the country and from Europe, too. If space permits in the next issue we will publish letters offering criticism and advice.

The total paid circulation of the Spring issue has not been finally tabulated as yet. However, it appears that the figure will be around 4,000. Payments from bundle agents are on the whole good. But "good" is not good enough. We must have a prompt and full payment of bills if the magazine is to continue. There are still debts owed to us from Akron, Los Angeles, Youngstown, Newark and a few other places.

The price of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN has been upped to 20 cents. This issue is forty pages in length, however, which means that most of the extra nickel per copy is used up in cost. Every effort will be made to maintain the magazine as a forty-page publication. But this is possible only if bills are paid in full and promptly.

Subscription rates are now 75 cents for four issues. Those who have subscribed on the old rate will continue to receive the magazine despite the increase in price.

We are still asking clubs and individuals selling the magazine to return the full 20 cents per copy sold. Without this full payment it would be impossible to publish the only national anti-war magazine on campus. For those, however, who cannot return the full price of the magazine, bundles of ten or more can be had for 17 cents per copy.

There is not enough copy coming from students. Most of our student articles have been written on request. What we would like, too, is to have students submit articles to us for publication. They will be considered on their merits and not merely on their views.

There are any number of campus groups and individual students who should order ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN but have not done so yet. Order via a postcard or letter to the New York Student Federation Against War, 247 Lexington Ave., New York 16, N. Y. Your bundle will be sent within a week.

ANVIL and STUDENT PARTISAN ADVERTISING RATES

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Editorials:

The World in the Shadow of Atomic War

ALMOST NOBODY ACCEPTS Mr. Truman's characterization of the Korean war as a "police action." What is clearly involved is a test of American and Stalinist power. A political regime which had been sponsored, supported, and encouraged by America was being attacked by a government set up as one of Russia's "New Democracies." The forces were clear and there were only two choices: abandon Korea to Stalinism, or intervene militarily.

The war in Korea has even proved a convenience for the most conservative of Washington's "statesmen" in more ways than one. The opportunity was finally at hand to initiate an all out attack on democratic rights. The McCarran Bill could now be pushed through with ease. Workers could be blackmailed into restraint by demagogic appeals to their patriotism. Where blackmail doesn't work, intimidation is made easier. The war-time enterprise of exposing the enemy's atrocities in order to cover up our own is now working overtime.

A Reactionary Field Day

The conservative and reactionary press has been having a field day. On the one hand they blame the Administration for having propelled the country into an undeclared war; on the other hand they point out that our unpreparedness to fight stems from past emphasis on social welfare measures to the detriment of "national defense." Administration Democrats and their liberal fellow-travelers really have no answer to either of these points, since their whole position rests on the basis that it is possible to have both guns and butter in adequate quantities. Faced with the choice, however, they take their guns and let the butter go. We have no argument with those who identify the United States with the Christian Paradise and who believe monopoly capitalism to be the highest form of human society. They can have no doubts as to the truth of American's Democratic Mission. But among the supporters of our foreign policy they constitute a minority. They set the political line which the liberals follow, with reluctance, criticizing every "mistake" of the State Department and deploring every infringement of civil liberties.

The Liberal Argument

All liberal arguments in favor of supporting the present war begin

from the situation wherein military intervention became the only alternative to Stalinist conquest. If we hold that the "lesser evil" theory and its accompanying policy must be rejected, it is because we do not think it possible to isolate a situation at one particular time from all of the events which led up to it. The significant question is, in our opinion, not whether there is or is not a lesser evil at one particular moment, but how did we get to the point where such a choice appears to be "necessary." How did it come about that South Korea became a Defenseless Outpost of Democracy while North Korea was transformed into a militarily aggressive but otherwise typical Russian satellite country? If, as we hold, this was the inevitable outcome of an undemocratic, imperialist and reactionary American policy then it becomes impossible to support a war which can have no progressive consequences. For by doing so, one would sanction a whole policy of years duration, the content of which can simply not be defended by any democrat or any liberal. Concretely, we think it can be shown that the present war in Korea is the natural product of an American, as well as Russian, imperialist policy in its treatment of the Korean nation. But to show this a little history is necessary.

It was originally with the encouragement and support of Theodore Roosevelt that Japan imposed colonial status on

Korea. For forty years the Japanese exploited the country economically by drawing off its surplus wealth and leaving its people as backward as before. It excluded Koreans from political power and in totalitarian fashion suppressed all manifestations of discontent. In spite of the police regime, however, a strong independence movement flourished underground, with the Stalinists playing an important though not predominant role in the Nineteen Thirties and Forties.

The Hope for Independence

Leaders of the Korean independence forces saw in World War II the opportunity to finally achieve freedom from the Japanese yoke. The declaration at the Cairo Conference in 1943 that Korean independence was one of America's war aims in the Pacific led the Korean people to expect and prepare for an immediate end to their colonial existence and the fulfillment of their national and

The Anti-War Movement Must Be Built Now

The need to build the anti-war movement was never greater. There are thousands of students who are not duped by the busy propaganda presses of either war bloc. These students can be organized. They must be organized. As individuals there is little they can do but as part of a group they can be effective in making themselves heard and felt.

Anvil and Student Partisan reaches many militant students in colleges where no anti-war group exists. If you are one of these students, then we urge you to contact us immediately. We will give you all possible assistance towards establishing an anti-war club on your campus.

On many campuses anti-war clubs do exist. But they are isolated from similar groups in other parts of the country. We urge these clubs to take the following steps.

1. Officially endorse and circulate *Anvil and Student Partisan*, which will increase the prestige and sales of the magazine and aid the club in its work. These endorsements should be sent to us as soon as possible.

2. Initiate a correspondence with us concerning anti-war activity, information about other groups, exchanging views, etc.

Send all communications to *Anvil and Student Partisan*, 247 Lexington Ave., New York 16, N. Y.

social aspirations. When the Japanese surrender came, local committees sprang up throughout Korea and attempted to assume the governmental power. The subsequent fate of these committees and the treatment of Korea by the American and Russian occupation troops soon showed, however, that more weighty considerations of international military and political strategy took precedence over past promises to guarantee Korean independence.

When liberal spokesmen argue that whatever mistakes were made, there is now no choice but to fight aggression, they seek to arbitrarily separate the events of today from those of yesterday. In this way they manage to "forget" that at the very beginning America and Russia *jointly* decided that the military occupation of Korea was "necessary." These "mutually friendly powers" agreed to divide the country in a completely artificial manner at the 38th parallel, reducing each zone to virtual colonies. Both Russia and America *agreed* that joint military occupation was preferable to immediate independence, that the Korean people were not "ready" for a separate national existence, and that they could benefit by a period of tutelage in the ways of democracy under the beneficent protection of joint military occupation. If today Korea is divided into two warring camps, each the pawn of a great-power struggle, it is because in 1945 *both* of these powers put their common imperialist interests above those of the Korean people. They did not allow the Koreans to choose which side they wished to be on or if they preferred to remain independent. Had they been allowed such a choice there is every reason to believe that the Koreans would have followed the pattern of Indonesia and India, rejecting both American and Russian domination. If we can not believe that the United States is fighting for Korean independence, the maintenance of democracy, and the territorial integrity of small nations, it is because in the sordid post-war history of Korea, the United States has violated (and not just in Korea) the most basic principle of democratic practice: the right of self-determination. We have behaved as a typically imperialist power, primarily concerned in manipulating the government of a small country in the interests of our struggle against Russia. The country itself we have sought to preserve as a potential outlet for our economic expansion.

Now that the first military victory seems assuredly in the hands of the United States the initial Stalinist hypocrisy of "uniting Korea for the Koreans" finds its counterpart in the United Nations in Austin's rationale for a MacArthur unification by the sword: "The 38th Parallel has no logic, historical or otherwise." Hypocrisy upon hypocrisy, reactionary hand matching reactionary hand as the circumstance of advance or retreat dictates. And whatever moral indignation results from a following of the Korean events since 1945 must necessarily have, too, the amazement of stupefaction at this international exchange of duplicity.

If we speak primarily of the imperialist nature of American policy it is because there are very few who today do not understand the reactionary character of Russian imperialism, or the totalitarian nature of its satellite regimes. We, certainly, have nothing in common with the American Stalinists and their Progressive Party mouthpiece, which justifies the North Korean invasion (at the same time it denies that any "aggression" was involved) by dubbing the North Korean police state a "Peoples Democracy." That there is a difference, however, between the social and political systems represented by North Korea and its southern counterpart cannot be denied. An examination of these differences shows how they reflect basic differences

in the nature of their sponsoring powers, and the policies they adopt. Again a little history is necessary.

Following the Japanese Occupation

We have described how the defeat of the Japanese was quickly seized upon as the occasion to create local committees which took over governmental administration. In the South a central body, democratically convened and calling itself the Peoples Republic, assumed the function of keeping law and order and called upon the populace for moderation. So powerful was its authority that the Japanese gave it recognition as the genuine expression of the people's will. With the entrance of American troops, it offered its services in collaborating with the needs of disarming the Japanese and transferring power out of the hands of the old administration. From its composition and character, made up as it was largely of patriots released by the Japanese after their surrender, and by the response to it by the Korean people, there can be no doubt that the Peoples Republic was genuinely popular and enjoyed overwhelming support. While it included the Stalinists, the predominant forces were those of Korean nationalists and democrats whose primary concern was the establishment of an independent democratic republic. The American Military Government's attitude toward this power was typically brutal and reactionary. General Hodge, the military governor, stated with MacArthurian pomposity: "Military government is the only government in Southern Korea," and a month later issued an order that all attempted operations of the Peoples Republic as a government were "to be treated as unlawful activities." Instead of their own government, what the Koreans bitterly spoke of as "the interpreters government" was imposed upon them by the American forces. And because of the latter's fear of the revolutionary character of the democratic forces, it preferred to continue in power the old Japanese administrative apparatus. Naturally, this action was taken to mean that America feared the Korean people more than it was interested in crushing the remnants of Japanese rule. As a counterweight to the independence-minded, peasant-oriented Peoples Republic, the American authorities favored and helped the forces who were mainly the conservative, landlord-minded groups which soon gathered behind ex-exile Syngman Rhee. The initial supremacy of these forces was insured by building a police force which from beginning terrorized and suppressed the liberal and radical tendencies. "Elected" by the most flagrant violation of democratic principles (in many cases the local landlord "voted" his entire constituency), the Rhee government suppressed opposition political parties, placed thousands in prison camps, and smashed the independent trade union movement. All of this with the support of the American forces. The excuse for such measures was always given that they were necessary for the "struggle against communism." Their result, of course, was to strengthen the position of the Stalinists within the anti-Rhee camp, and to rally behind Stalinism the dissatisfied peasantry and working class.

Peasant Uprisings Suppressed

The domination of right-wing forces in the government insured the continuation of feudal relations in agriculture; no real steps could be taken toward the distribution of land. Tentative plans which were drawn up included provisions for burdening the peasants with long-range debts. But even these were not carried out and the tradition of landlordism continued, with the peasant in an extremely disadvantageous position. The result was innumerable local peasant uprisings, followed by their savage and bloody repression. According to South Korean government reports, over thirty-thousand casual-

ties occurred in 1949 alone, and at the time of the North Korean invasion, there were an estimated 90,000 guerrilla troops operating within South Korea, most of them willing and anxious to fight with the Northern armies.

How the Stalinist Dictatorship Operated

The Russians, in their sector, pursued a far different policy. Having initially a substantial base in the native Stalinist movement, they encouraged and stimulated the formation of local committees to which they handed over major areas of administration, keeping their occupation forces largely in the background. By relying on native Stalinist forces, they managed to create a local Stalinist government which could appear before the entire Korean people as a native movement, unlike the Rhee government which was universally acknowledged to be a puppet of the American military forces. More than that, from the very beginning the Stalinists undertook to carry out sweeping "land reforms," thus winning the immediate support of the formerly landless peasantry. Finally it could and did appeal for support among the South Korean population in its maneuverings to bring about a "unification" of the country under Stalinist hegemony. The result was that at the time of its invasion, the North Korea regime could rely on considerable support of its own population, and expect considerable help from the population in the South.

All of this is not to admit for one moment that North Korea possesses any more "democracy of content" than any other Stalinist regime. The Russian occupation assured the fastening onto North Korea of a totalitarian vise through which not one breath of criticism or opposition manages to escape. North Korea is first and foremost a Russian satellite, a part of that prison-house of nations which makes up the Stalinist empire. If the Koreans chose (as many did) to support Stalinism, that is not a credit to Stalinism, but a testimony to the efficiency of its totalitarian machine and to the social changes which it brings about. Because it is not committed to maintaining the old social order, because it seeks to create a new one, it can appeal to revolutionary sentiments. That these sentiments of millions, aspiring to a better life for themselves than capitalism and imperialism can offer, are doomed to frustration under Stalinism is the monstrous crime of Stalinism.

The Dilemma of Liberalism

What most pro-war liberals appear to forget is that up to now the United States has shown itself incapable of winning politically the support of the world's peoples. Liberal apologists of the Washington Administration have all kinds of "programs" according to which the government "should" act as if it were some kind of truly democratic state: it should devote its means to raising the standard of living in backward areas, it should not deal with fascists like Franco or support reactionaries such as Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee. If it were to follow such advice, the liberals say, our government would not be continually defeated by Stalinist movements. Which is the equivalent of saying: "if your grandmother had wheels, she would be a boxcar." The truth is that the United States in world affairs does not act like a democratic power because it cannot, and there is no reason to believe that it will change in the near future. This means that we can expect its policy in the future to be more or less an extension of its past policy, determined by the same aims and using the same methods. What then, can we expect to come out of it?

The dilemma of the liberals is expressed in the fact that the American government has no political program for the Korean war. It has no aims beyond, presumably, the re-establishment of the *status quo ante bellum*.

It has no answer to the political and social problems which gave rise to the situation other than the re-establishment of military government rule, and a permanent military occupation. Assuming an American military victory, the country would remain divided, with American troops and civil authorities detested by all Koreans. Any free election on a bi-zonal basis (such as is occasionally proposed as a UN function) would be likely to deliver the country directly into the hands of the Stalinists, with a consequent loss of prestige to the U. S. which would be impossible to bear, and hence impossible to carry out.

It is this historical failure of American policy, its inability to offer an acceptable and potentially successful alternative to Stalinism, that leads us to reject it. We remain convinced that only a policy of independence from both war camps, and of struggle against them provides an opportunity for the peoples of the world to free themselves from imperialist domination, whether it be Russian or American. And only in this way can our social aspirations, our common desire for a rational social order without war or the threat of war, finally be achieved. Thus today, in the midst of war in Korea, we reaffirm our opposition to war and call upon all students who agree with us to join us in an anti-war movement on the campus. For our function is not merely to speak and write against the war, but to organize the inevitable growth of anti-war sentiment on campus into more meaningful form.

The Concentration Camp Liberal

THOSE WHO LOOK TOWARD liberalism as the main defense against the anti-democratic encroachment on civil liberties must have had a rude shock during the Senate fight over the Mundt-Ferguson-McCarran Bill.

The Senate fight over the McCarran Bill reveals the new type of American liberal: the "concentration camp" liberal. Supposedly men of principle, opposed to the extremes of left and right, the Senate liberals criticized the registration features of the original McCarran bill as reactionary—and impractical.

But Senator Kilgore had the solution. He introduced a substitute bill to put the "Communists" in "detention camps." It ought to be clear to all that if the registration of "Communists" is reactionary, then throwing them into concentration camps is no closer to the democratic Jeffersonian ideal. Kilgore and McCarran, however, are not men who quibble, and the Kilgore proposal was woven into the McCarran bill. The "catch-all" bill was then voted upon in Congress. And who were among the supporters of this bill? None other than those champions of liberalism, the crusading knights of the Americans for Democratic Action: Humphreys, Douglas and that other eminent liberal, Morse.

The fact that these men voted to sustain Truman's veto of the bill which is now law does not for a moment diminish their responsibility for supporting this vicious bill.

The liberals are following through on their pro-war point of view. These politicians correctly see a conflict between their liberal ideas in the abstract and the realities of supporting the imperialist war in the concrete. They are making their choice, and without any hesitation. It is only to be hoped that those liberals who take their ideals seriously, who believe in the basic democratic rights of the people will not choose the path of their Senatorial spokesmen: the path of the Concentration Camp Liberal.

War, Realism and the "Lesser Evil"

The Socialist Attitude on the Problem of War

ONE OF THE GREATEST TRAGEDIES of a Third World War which is now drawing closer is the lack of organized opposition to it. The mass of people are not enthusiastically pro-war but they are resigned to it, while the organized social, political and cultural movements, with rare exceptions, are exerting their influence to create the necessary enthusiasm for the all-out Atom War. Military men with their national honor, business men with their funds, publishers with their journalists, politicians with their rehearsed inflammatory speeches, are all busily using their respective resources to instill an aggressive, chauvinistic mood into the American people. It is what one would expect of them. It is their profession—their way of life. Our attention is directed to them only insofar as they influence others.

But how pathetic is the "socialist" who invokes the good name of socialism as his own unique contribution to the impoverished intellectual arsenal of our bourgeois and liberal warriors. The bourgeois proponent and the liberal apologist of war may inspire our contempt but the "socialist" who embroiders American imperialism with his delicate needlework provokes stronger feelings.

Nevertheless, the arguments of the pro-war socialist must be met. They are, unfortunately, the dominant views within the socialist movement and all too frequently found in the writings and activities of non-socialist intellectuals and labor leaders.

More than 35 years have passed since the beginning of World War I. At that time the world socialist movement split into two distinct parts: the majority supporting their respective governments, the minority living up to the anti-war traditions of the socialist movement. The arguments presented by the anti-war socialists at that time are fundamentally sound today. This is not to deny the existence of new and more complex problems in a more complex world. These new factors which frequently form the basis for the pro-war position of former radicals will not be ignored, but dealt with directly.

New Aspects of a Third War

In the First World War we witnessed a struggle for the re-division of the world. Old regimes were destroyed and new states created, authority and power changed hands but international subjugation by a single nation was not achieved, never having been an objective of either the Allied or Central powers. A multiplicity of inter-imperialist conflicts among the victor states and later with the revived Central powers developed. America emerged as the strongest world power but England, Japan, France, later Germany, were far from liquidated as industrial, financial and political rivals.

Following World War II all but two great powers, Russia and the United States were eliminated as powerful independent world political forces. Two rival blocs were organized; in one the authority of Russia is unquestioned, in the other the dominance of the U. S. is more diplomatic and subtle, not as complete but, nevertheless, real. The Third World War then will be different from the First and the Second in that out of it can emerge only *one* great world power. That is, the U. S. and Russia *left to their own devices* will conduct that kind of war the consequences of which will be the elimination of the defeated bloc.

A second important distinction between an atomic war and World Wars I and II is that this impending war will be a struggle between two hostile, incompatible social systems. World War II saw an alliance between democratic capitalism and Stalinism on one side combatting fascist capitalism, on the other. The coming war will have no such mixed features. At stake will be not merely governments, but social systems. Russian totalitarianism is based upon nationalized property and the Russian ruling class asserts itself through its political control of the state. An expansion of the powers of the Russian ruling class can only be consolidated through extending its social system. Witness Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, to mention but a few countries where capitalist property relations along with individual capitalists have been substantially destroyed. A victory of Russia, then, can only mean tremendous encroachments upon the capitalistic organization of all of Europe and Asia. On the other hand, a victory of the United States would see the liquidation of Communist Parties as state powers, that is, their liquidation as a ruling class.

In the First World War the political "merits" of both sides were more or less equal. Kaiserism was autocratic but it was a democratic paradise compared to Czarist Russia; and the Wilsonian myth was exploded in 1917-1918 with the establishment here of Prussian-like government controls. In World War II this political equality between the warring blocs was no longer true. It would be absurd to equate the brutality of Nazi Germany with the inequities and injustices of capitalist America and England; but it must be remembered that allied with England and the United States was Russia, a totalitarian country, not one whit less brutal than Hitler Germany.

In World War III, at least initially, the political contrast will be more sharply drawn. On the one side, will be primarily the forces of democratic capitalism, leavened, of course, by a few South American military dictatorships and no doubt Franco Spain. And on the other, the armies of Stalinist terror. Within the former bloc will be nations with varying degrees of political liberty and with, at least, semi-independent labor movements; within the latter there will be no freedom and no labor movement performing anything more than state, administrative functions. This, then, is our third difference.

The final distinction is the atom bomb. Not since the invention of gunpowder has a military weapon been of such political importance. Its unbelievable destructive potential plays an important part in the diplomatic and military calculation of all nations. (The destructiveness of the bomb, however, has been exaggerated. The A-Bomb cannot destroy the world physically and it cannot destroy technology which has its foundations in indestructible human knowledge.)

The "Lesser Evil" Theory

The first three differences (global struggle, social war, political contrasts) have by now become stock arguments of many radicals who opposed World War I, and even World War II, but now accept the "lesser evil" theory for supporting the United States in a third war. According to this theory progress can best be served by a military victory of the American bloc. A victory of Russia, it is argued, would mean the total liquidation of political freedom and total state supervision of the working class. A victory of the American led forces will, at

least, leave socialists and radicals with a minimum of political latitude and the labor movement with some of its former independence and viability. Thus, it is argued, there is a conjuncture of interests between the American bourgeoisie, which may fight for its own imperialist ends, and the labor and left-wing movement which must fight to keep itself free from Stalinist enslavement. This theory is reinforced by the continual reminder that there is no organized alternative to either of the war blocs; the trade unions in the U. S. remain politically conservative and the socialist movement has only a fragment of the membership necessary for an effective third force. Therefore, it is concluded, radicals must be "realistic," "undogmatic," "get out of their ivory tower" and support the "lesser evil." Reforms, they claim, can still be fought for, but all within the framework of achieving the main objective—the winning of the war.

The above is a condensed, fair presentation of the "lesser evil" point of view. There are additional arguments given and they will be discussed in the course of this article. The "lesser evil" theory appears on the surface to be convincing, for, after all, it is so "reasonable" and so "realistic."

The Power of Stalinism

The point has already been made that a third war will be different in that it will be a social war. In a social war the question of ideology is of paramount political and military importance. The fact is, whether we like it or not, that the United States is incapable of offering an effective alternative to Stalinism in the eyes of the European, and particularly the Asiatic peoples. Stalinism demagogically speaks the language of the working class and of socialism. Its ability to pose as the defender of the oppressed and the fact that it is an opponent of the old, exploiting capitalist society lends it an authority among the people which can never be enjoyed by capitalism. More than that, Stalinism actually carries out a part of its promise. It promises the expropriation of the industrial capitalist; it carries out this promise. It promises the expropriation of the landlords and offers "land reforms"; it carries out these promises, as well. Up to a point, there is a seeming correspondence between the needs and interests of the European workers, the Asiatic peasants and the program and actions of Stalinism. Of course, these economic and social "reforms" are carried out within the framework of a reactionary police state. However, it is not the police state which the Asiatic peasant can see in Stalinism, but understandably though mistakenly, the opportunity to till his *own* soil. The Indo-Chinese peasant who is being won over to Stalinism is not impressed by American propaganda about Russian slave camps. Much more meaningful to him are the "land reforms" in adjacent Stalinist China and the weapons provided by Russia to expel French imperialism. Nor is Truman's newly made promise to supply the French with arms in Indo-China and the renewed promise of support to hated Chiang-Kai-Shek likely to win significant sections of peasants from Stalinism to "The American Way of Life." This latest policy of Truman is no accident. As the struggle between Stalinism and capitalism grows more intense, the older and less dynamic order must follow a policy which will increasingly alienate the European and Asiatic people. Those pro-war socialists who speak in the name of realism, and yet declare that America need not pursue a reactionary policy in Europe and Asia are the ones who have lost all sense of reality. It should be obvious that the United States cannot encourage militant, independent nationalist movements in Asia, and should be no less obvious that in Europe the United States must seek to restore an unpopular, debilitated capitalist order.

The support of the Rhee regime is not an accidental policy. American foreign policy has been consistent in its support and sponsorship of the most reactionary regimes. There is the American backed Quirino in the Philippines, Bao Dai in Indo-China, Chiang Kai-shek, on his Formosa retreat, Washington backed dictators in Latin America, Churchill in England, MacArthur's regime in Japan and a long list of other miserable regimes, reactionaries and aspiring tyrants aided and propped up by the American State Department. Whether a narrow minded Byrnes or a man with "social vision" such as Acheson heads the State Department the policy has been substantially the same. The reason for the similarities, i.e., consistency, in basic State Department policies can be found in the basically reactionary structure of American society. Those who think of changing the foreign policy by getting more enlightened officials in the State Department (such as the Senate liberals who voted for the McCarran "concentration camp" law?) have lost contact with the realities of the social issues involved in the Russian-American conflict.

The Results of American Policy

What better evidence can one find for our contention that Stalinism cannot be defeated by America in the ideological war—and this has important military implications—than the war in Korea. The war in Korea is a microcosmic preview of the World War to come. One of the first lessons our pro-war "socialist" should learn from this localized war is the inability of capitalism to achieve popular support for itself and the ability of Stalinism to increase its prestige among the peasants by pointing to such frightening and brutal methods as those enforced by the puppet Rhee government which frustrated the peasants' desire for land through terror and mass murder. The Korean peasants who were "liberated" in 1945 were by no means Stalinists, but as a direct result of American policy, they have been driven into the open arms of Stalinism, where they can only be crushed in a totalitarian embrace.

Project the Korean war on to a world scale and then judge the "realism" of the simple assumption offered by the pro-war radical. In a world war, American policy, now localized in Korea, will assume international proportions. Just as in Korea, American policy in Europe will leave capitalism isolated. The Stalinists will always be in a position to maintain their prestige among the working peoples so long as their *only opponents are the upholders of the old, corrupt regimes and those who defend those regimes as the "lesser evil."*

The American and South Korean troops have recaptured the territory lost in the first three months of the war. And what has been the reception in the "liberated" cities? Not even the press can hide the fact that the American troops are being received with attitudes ranging from coldness to hostility. The three-month Stalinist dictatorship in Seoul has not displaced the South Koreans hatred of the corrupt Rhee government which will now rule from a gutted and starving capitol. American policy is reaping its fruits in the growing animosity of the Korean people.

A military victory *may* be achieved by superior American techniques, in a world-wide war, but the fact that America will be isolated from the European peoples, and will continue to be plagued by a hostile and dynamic Stalinist movement (even if it will be underground or Titoistic) result in an increasingly reactionary policy on the part of the victors. The rationalization, let us remember, for support of the war by radicals is that an American victory will have as its causal effect the maintenance of some form of political and civil freedom. But if we accept reality, we can only come to the reverse conclusion: a

military victory of American led forces can only result in a chaotic and hostile world in which the military triumph can be sustained only through the use of occupation forces, reactionary puppet regimes and increasing political repression.

Lesser Evilism as an Aid to Stalinism

So far we have seen that the "lesser evil" theory is based on a false assumption: that the U. S. can defeat Stalinism by winning a military victory. It can defeat Russia but not Stalinism as a world force.

But this theory may have a dangerous consequence which its "realistic" exponents cannot foresee. *It may result in the military victory of Russia.* The military importance of mass support should be evident to everybody and for those who can not see too well it should have been made clear by the Korea fighting. The North Koreans were winning the war for two equally important reasons: they were equipped and trained by the Russians and, secondly, *they had won the support of a large section of the population.* In a third World War, if no third force with a program which can effectively combat Stalinism develops before or during the war, then the greater popular support of the Stalinists may well prove to be as militarily important in a general war as was the case in Korea. *If this proves to be the case then the "lesser evilists" will have to accept their refusal to develop an independent third force as their contribution to the victory of Stalinism.*

When does a "lesser evilist" begin to fight for the greatest good, i.e., socialism? In other words, when does socialism become the paramount objective to which everything else is subordinated?

If the United States stockpile of atom bombs does the trick and Russia is forced to unconditionally surrender, the conditions which give rise to "lesser evilism" today will continue to exist. Third force movements will not spring up overnight or the day after Russia is defeated. The main battle will continue between the American occupation forces and its puppet regimes on the one side and the Stalinist underground on the other. Won't we have to make a choice then according to our radical "lesser evilist"? Will it not still be true that the American forces, despite the fact that they will be using methods which are inimical to the best interests of democracy, will remain the "lesser evil" compared to the Stalinist underground? The answer is that the acceptance of the "lesser evil" philosophy in this war is a vicious circle and no one can logically escape its maze-like interior. To defend the U. S. on the basis of lesser evilism in the war can only mean to abandon the concrete and direct struggle for socialism *after* the war as well.

Post-War Democratic Movements

It has been argued that an American victory in the war would unleash the repressed democratic energies of the workers and peasants behind the Iron Curtain who have already gone through the hell of living in a totalitarian country. But if this is true in which direction will these yearnings for freedom develop? What will be the obstacles? Will this desire for freedom be satisfied by the American authorities? Does any one seriously believe that if a democratic movement developed in Eastern Europe following the collapse of Russian armies that its aspirations for land and freedom would be satisfied by the conquering American armies? Let us be realistic. A Poland or a Czechoslovakia or any Eastern European country "liberated" from the Kremlin yoke will have to overcome the American imperialists to achieve its objectives. The allies sought by the Americans will not be the Polish or Czech worker and

peasant but the remnants of the bourgeoisie and clergy within the country, and those in exile. These will be Truman's allies during and after the war. And they will make the claims on expropriated land, on nationalized industries, seek positions and privileges. They will be the trusted puppets. Whatever power is entrusted to native elements will be given to the old class enemies of the workers and peasants. The Stalinist puppet regime will be replaced by an American sponsored puppet. A democratic movement in Eastern Europe will have to fight immediately and directly against American imperialism. And what will the "lesser evilists" then say? Will they support an anti-imperialist democratic movement? Or will they be consistent and argue that reactionary American sponsored governments will have to be supported, only temporarily, of course, and the democratic movement suppressed, only temporarily, of course, until the Stalinist underground has been decisively crushed. For isn't it clear that if the Americans are engaged in battle with genuine democratic movements in Eastern Europe they will be weakened in their struggle against the greatest evil, Stalinism, which will continue to wage war, even if it is guerrilla and underground warfare, in Western Europe and all of Asia as well as in Eastern Europe and Russia.

Thus, if the prediction of the lesser evilists that an American victory will unleash democratic forces in Eastern Europe is correct, it is not a point in defense of their position for they must be in favor of frustrating such "premature" developments. And if a democratic movement is to develop in Eastern Europe will it not be in a much better position to achieve its objectives if it can seek support from powerful anti-imperialist, democratic and socialist forces in the rest of Europe and Asia. *But this necessary major Third Force can never develop on the basis of a "lesser evil" policy.* We have already demonstrated that subordinating socialism to the "war effort" means to abandon the very possibility of developing a Third Force movement and program which can gain the enthusiastic support of large numbers of people. It is during the war that radicals will have to develop this Third Force and it is only by clear cut opposition to both Russian and American imperialism that they have any chance of success.

This is looking at the problem realistically.

Socialism and Internationalism

Socialism is an international philosophy. It is politically and morally untenable to advocate a supposed socialist position in one country and a clearly anti-socialist policy in another. More than that, if a so-called "socialist" policy in one country logically leads to anti-socialist deeds in another then the error, from the socialist point of view lies with the original policy. A social science, too, must be consistent. This fact has real meaning for our discussion. If a pro-war radical can support Washington in a war, presumably in the interests of socialism, then what are the logical responsibilities of socialists in all other lands and how do these responsibilities correspond with the fight for democracy and socialism? To be more concrete, if a radical endorses the war then what does he tell his comrades to do in colonial lands where they are currently engaged in a fight against American, Dutch, English and French imperialisms? Does he press them to continue the fight for freedom against imperialism and its war-time allies or to abandon the struggle, (temporarily, of course) for national independence? To be consistent and honest he would have to insist that socialists and nationalists in colonial countries not only withdraw from but condemn and not only condemn but fight against any nationalist, democratic movement which continues

the fight to liberate their land from the grip of their imperialist oppressor. For nationalist movements were to carry on an armed struggle for their independence against, say, France or England, they might well deplete the military energies and morale of these important allies of the United States, thereby weakening if not eliminating them as military factors in an all out world war. It would be demanded of our "lesser-evilist" then, if he is to be taken seriously, that he attempt to dissuade or stifle the nationalists from their fight for national independence. Thus we can see that in regard to the colonial question, as with everything else, to support U. S. imperialism in the war develops a logic of its own which demands in the concrete the submission to imperialism. Also, we have already demonstrated how this appeal to nationalists would not only be ineffectual but would help to push the nationalists into the arms of the Russian demagogues.

The anti-war socialist is in no such predicament. He not only continues to encourage anti-imperialist movements but urges them to take advantage of every favorable opportunity to gain their freedom. For this policy would tend to strengthen democracy in the colonies, could prevent inroads into the nationalist movements currently being made by the Stalinists and would give an impetus to the democratic and socialist forces all over the world. These are the realistic consequences of an anti-war point of view.

War and Democratic Rights

But we need not go so far afield to see that support of "the war to save democracy" is self-defeating. Again, we have to ask ourselves what are the consistent responsibilities of the radical who supports the war to democratic rights at home. Democracy includes the right to speak, the right to organize, to strike, to leave a job and seek a new one, the right to belong to a political party of one's own choosing; these are some of the democratic rights for which socialists must fight. But these are the very rights which are being violated by the Truman Administration. They are liberties which are proving particularly cumbersome to Washington in the present crisis. Perhaps there are excesses committed even from a capitalist point of view, but the important thing to note is that the general movement towards an authoritarian America is *necessary* to a capitalist nation's preparation for the war and the trend must continue.

A capitalist war economy is an extremely sensitive structure. It can fissure easily; and fissures can become cracks which may grow to shattering proportions. The importance of high production requires that the labor movement be restrained. It must be tied down to the government through its bourgeois minded labor leaders and through anti-labor legislation. Democratic rights become a yoke. Criticism and opposition must be toned down and where they are not reduced voluntarily they will have to be subdued legislatively. Non-conformity becomes a menace to a socially bankrupt class engaged in a total struggle for its very existence.

These are more than dangerous possibilities. Local and national assaults on our democratic rights are already under way and are intensified daily as part of the military, political, economic and psychological preparations for war. It is not only the Communist Party which is persecuted. They are the most seriously affected, now, but it is apparent that all who oppose the war, who agitate for workers to strike for better conditions, who oppose reactionary legislation will be severely penalized. Even the "lesser evil socialist" who is tainted with non-conformism and a bad reputation he is trying to forget will suffer from the righteous fury of a crusading America—despite his martial opposition to Russia.

But what does a pro-war radical propose concerning the inroads made into the more democratic aspects of American life? Whether he likes it or not he must condone the general tendency, criticizing excesses if he wishes, but accepting the *necessity for this government* to prepare for total war *in the only way it possibly can*. If the main task is winning the war then political and labor activities which might limit America's military effectiveness must be curbed. This is the reasoning of Washington and it is correct from *their* point of view. But it is also correct from a pro-war "socialist's" point of view. To be realistic, he must condemn strikes in basic industries (no matter how justified he admits the workers' demands are); to be practical, he must advocate limiting the freedoms of speech and press for revolutionary socialists and pacifists since their anti-war agitation for the ideas of democracy may prove effective; to be level-headed, he should advocate Universal Military Training and compulsory ROTC immediately as elementary steps to prepare for battle with the Russian behemoth.

These planks are not the accepted program of most pro-war radicals—as yet. But aren't they required of them? Realism can not brook excessive timidity and a moment of realistic reflection will indicate that suppressing serious strikes, restricting and denying democracy for anti-war "troublemakers," is the responsibility of *any* pro-war individual. These are the only *means* whereby capitalism can fight Stalinism and the pro-war radical must accept the *consequences* of his willingness to fight Stalinism within the framework of capitalism.

The path trod by the pro-war radicals will be made tortuous by the thorns of conscience. Some who are confirmed "realists" will walk the path gingerly and conscience will give way to "practical considerations"; others who have started on this road will see that it becomes a one-way route, with no detours, to a reactionary and inextricable anti-democratic swamp, and will retrace their steps.

Socialism and the Class Struggle

The revolutionary socialist, i.e., the democratic socialist, has as his main task, at all times, the raising of the class consciousness of the working people. To make the poor, the oppressed, and the exploited realize that they are a class apart from all others; to convince them to act in their own interests—the interest of the overwhelming majority of the population; to educate them to the point where they not only think of themselves as an independent class, but as socialists who are prepared to educate their class brother. Once a socialist abandons this educational role he abandons socialism. Education not only refers to formal, technical media (classes, readings, lectures, etc.) but education in the class struggle itself. To educate in the class struggle means to deepen that struggle. It means to support unions in their organizing drives; to support the workers in all their fights for better conditions, to fight for their democratic rights, to urge them on to newer and more decisive battles. Socialism does not merely consist of explaining the merits of a future classless society or of making profound historical analyses. It means, above all, the support of the working class struggle in the immediate period.

This theoretical premise of socialism bears directly on our discussion. The pro-war radical, the "hard-headed realist," will usually withdraw in horror from this principle during war-time. He will argue that if the American labor movement fights for its rights too often it may have such a dire effect on the front that the only result will be a victory of Stalinism. Therefore, he suggests to the labor movement that it confine its activities to various labor boards, government agencies,

arbitration, etc. for the duration of the war. After the war, perhaps, strikes will be in order.

The argument is seductively plausible. It has the charm of frankness as with so many of the pro-war radicals' "realisms." But the realism is illusory. The argument is mechanical, based on statistics, not on any political understanding. What is omitted is an understanding of the change that will take place if a war-time American working class is willing to carry the class-struggle to such an extent. This will not be the politically backward working class of today which accepts the war. A working class which strikes during war-time will know the effect of these actions as well as its pro-war advisors. But they will also know that the war is not being fought for them, for it is completely unrealistic to think that the American working class will ever attain this degree of militancy without reaching a political maturity which will provide it with an understanding of the imperialist nature of the war. It will not merely engage in strikes, but will make its own demands on how the war is to be conducted; it will be a working class infinitely more sympathetic to socialism; it will be, in short, a working class which is developing a social program opposed to Stalinism and capitalism, and increasingly prepared to carry it out. It is the height of unrealism to think that the labor movement during wartime will function schizophrenically, developing a revolutionary fervor on the economic front without a parallel political development. The whole political complexion of the United States will change given a working class which is striking en masse. The union leadership of today will not be the same, the small socialist organizations of today will be considerably more influential if not powerful, the class struggle will clearly become a political conflict, and, as we have already pointed out, the workers themselves will have a much greater political understanding.

Thus the prosecution of the class-struggle provides the only realistic opportunity for conducting an effective fight against Stalinism, for peace and for socialism. That a striking working class may not be able to take political power, that it may be crushed by the capitalists and/or by the Stalinist armies is

always a possibility. Every progressive movement is faced with the possibility of defeat followed by greater reaction. But progress would never be made if this possibility became the prime political consideration.

There Is a Choice

In this article we have attempted to demonstrate that support of the American bloc in a war is impermissible from a democratic socialist point of view. Space limitation has forced us to assume that readers accept with us, the insupportable nature of the Russian totalitarian regime. The discussion has revolved around specific pro-war arguments in support of American imperialism. The answers to them are inter-related but they only demonstrate the fundamental socialist principle of the impracticability of a socialist taking sides with capitalism in any war fought for its preservation and extension.

A socialist does take sides, though. It is with neither combatant, but with the Third Camp as opposed to the two camps of capitalism and Stalinism. By Third Camp the socialist refers to all those whose interests are actually allied with socialism: the American worker fighting for a decent wage, the colonial fighting foreign rule, the Russian worker and Polish peasant made servile by a Slave State. The Third Camp is the camp of the dispossessed and exploited. We are on their side. And if they feel that they have common interests with either of the two war camps it is our responsibility to convince them otherwise. Perhaps we will not be successful. The socialist Third Camp is as yet only a potential force. But the organized labor movement is powerful throughout the world (except behind the Iron Curtain) and the traditions of socialism are strong. Nevertheless, guarantees can not be given to those who ask "How do I know the Third Camp will succeed?" We do know that neither capitalism nor Stalinism can succeed in solving a single basic social problem. We do know that the potential for socialism exists. More than that we do not need to know for making a political, realistic and moral choice.

Julius JACOBSON

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Villanelle

He goes knocking at the door of empty space;
In his room there are only three walls;
And when he knocks he raps hard on his face.

The womb's moon-mist, of his son not a trace;
A total eclipse in a heaven of burnt balls;
He goes knocking at the door of empty space.

When the sky trembles he leans hard to brace;
Birds snap by with allowing winglike calls;
And when he knocks he raps hard on his face.

He tries, fopped in cockade and feudal lace;
Sits on many mice and rides right to air falls;
He goes knocking at the door of empty space.

But doesn't even fall; then the aromatic mace
He whirls and hurls to clock his empty halls;
And when he knocks he raps hard on his face.

A battered and baseless man lost to a run race;
Turning, turning in a gyre of now sweet palls;
He goes knocking at the door of empty space;
And when he knocks he raps hard on his face.

Neil WEISS

Letter

Send me a fetish, darling,
something from a war,
a word sounding strange
and different, spelling
never seen before.

Send me an image, darling,
a cry, a coded foreign call,
something alive
yet rare.

This untimeliness that brings
the freakish names of places
holds me letter-close
and I need a fetish, darling,
something to love,
assure your safe return.

Simon PERCHIK

John Dos Passos: The Loss of Passion

Political Awareness and Literary Talent

NOT MUCH of John Dos Passos' early work now seems worth rereading, except as a prelude of things to come. Two of the four pre-U.S.A. novels, *Streets of Night* and *First Encounter*, are callow performances toying with the theme that the artist type, the sensitive and isolated perimeter-man, is in invariable opposition to humanity's dull bulk. In *First Encounter*, the protagonist, Martin Howe, views the war as a spiteful cosmic cheat; it has prevented him from enjoying the beauties of French cathedrals as, he knows, he alone can. The same feeling is suggested in the *fin de siècle* prose of *Streets of Night*. Actually, to speak of rigorously developed themes in these early novels would be a charitable exaggeration, since Dos Passos is not yet sufficiently alert to crucial social gradations and predicaments to be able to realize any theme in fictional depth. The two novels are rather protests of a jejune aesthete, from whose attitude Dos Passos cannot establish enough ironic distance to give his writing dramatic tension; the protests are simply there: raw, native, unworked.

Three Soldiers is generally considered a work of a different kind: a realistic war novel. Though certainly superior to Dos Passos' other early books and still worth reading, it is not primarily a realistic novel about war in the blunt sense that Zweig's *Case of Sergeant Grisha* or Stephen Crane's *Red Badge of Courage* may be taken to be. *Three Soldiers* is another lament over the sensitive young man's plight, this time aesthetically significant because worked into a tight form. The novel appears to trace the fates of three American soldiers in the First World War—a tough city boy, a naive farm boy, and Andrews, the sensitive young man—but one soon realizes that Andrews' desertion from the army is the novel's dominant line, in relation to which the stories of the other two soldiers are merely relief.

The novel suffers from a central weakness. A young writer's feeling that sensitive souls are trampled by society is not easily to be dismissed, if only because there is plenty of evidence to support it; but *Three Soldiers* never achieves the toughness and reverberating subtlety of first-rate fiction because Dos Passos sees the trampling as monotonously even-paced and unmodulated and the trampled victim as supine. Stendhal, too, understood that society would trample Julien Sorel, but is not the greatness of *The Red and the Black* at least partly in the spirited ingenuity with which Sorel resists society's boots? And is not the magnificence of that novel's resolution in the fact that by the time Sorel goes down he is no longer the victim but in the profoundest sense is beyond the reach of those boots? Andrews' defeat is sad and painful, to be sure, but there is not enough human recoil or self-growth accompanying his defeat to lift it from the level of pathos to that of tragedy.

What remains most impressive about *Three Soldiers* is the skill with which it has been organized. Dos Passos shows in it an ability to control and relate several plot lines without letting one get out of hand to destroy another. The novelist whose method is to accumulate vignettes of distinctive social types, as Dos Passos' is, must be able to subordinate them ruthlessly to some encompassing dramatic conception. And while that dramatic conception in *Three Soldiers* (the fall of Andrews) is not sufficiently overwhelming or sublime to arrange the vignettes into a completed pattern, it does provide a good deal of binding.

Manhattan Transfer has little or no binding. This last of Dos Passos' early novels is primarily significant as an attempt to make a locality rather than a group of people its center of representation, but it is an aesthetic chaos because it has no dominant narrative or personage; even one as weak as Andrews in *Three Soldiers*: If one discards his pejorative implications, Paul Elmer More's description of *Manhattan Transfer* as "an explosion in a sewer" is quite accurate. Bits of observations of New York life are juxtaposed to each other, but their relationship is fortuitous rather than organic; no doubt Dos Passos intended that the common futility of his dim characters should be taken as the novel's unifying thread, but by its end the book simply unravels. Its chaotic structure is the consequence of its having been written out of a serious confusion of attitudes, Dos Passos' native aestheticism seldom jibing with his enlarged social passions. As a specimen of a transitional novel in which all of a writer's problems are concentrated, *Manhattan Transfer*, has, however, an uncommon interest.

In these four early novels it is possible to find two contrary urges of feeling, which are worth noting here as being central to Dos Passos' literary career. He has always had a strong urge to the slightly decadent, the just a bit over-ripenly beautiful; his prose could easily slide into purple, as in this passage from *Manhattan Transfer*: "The rim of the sun had risen above the plum-colored band of clouds. . . . In the whitening light tinfoil gulls wheeled above broken boxes, spoiled cabbageheads, orange rinds heaving slowly between the splintered plank walls, the green spumed under the round bow as the ferry skidding on the tide, gulped the broken water. . . ."

But it should also be noted that, unlike the usual products of the *fin de siècle* writer, this kind of writing is oriented toward the mechanized city, its machine processes and ugly wastes, and seeks a hardness of idiom that would seem to deny—unsuccessfully, I think—its lush antecedents. The purple and the lean; the lush and the tough—these conflicting varieties of prose reflect a divergence between the decadent and the mechanical within Dos Passos' feeling.

On another level but rather similar in total effect is Dos Passos' feeling toward Spain and America. (The comparison is not exact, of course, for while America can serve as a symbol of the mechanical, Spain should not be equated with the decadent. It is possible, however, that some such equation did exist in Dos Passos' mind.) To the young Dos Passos, who wrote glowingly about Spain in his travel book *Rosinante to the Road Again*, Spain suggested the sensuousness, the easy rhythms of simple existence lost to those who live in an industrial civilization. At least until he discovered the New Deal scientist-bureaucratic type in the 1940's, he admired most the Spanish anarchists who believed in "free communities of artisans and farmers and fishermen and cattle breeders who would work for their livelihood with pleasure, because the work was itself enjoyable in the serene white light of a reasonable world." As against Spain, America: the machine world where life is dried up before it begins. But, for all his hatred of America's gadgets and life-dryness, they increasingly absorb Dos Passos and become the dominant force in his work; artiness gives way to sociality, the *I* to the *We and They*.

The inescapable abstraction we call society becomes the center of Dos Passos' major work, *U.S.A.* This trilogy is re-

markable far less for the characters that populate it than for the ghosts that haunt it, such abstract and alien ghosts as *History*, *The Past*, *Europe*, *The Class Struggle*. In various ways, American literature has always been concerned with the relationship of America to Europe, for the history of this country has been written largely in terms of shifts in that relationship; but it is Dos Passos' distinction to have been the first American novelist who rested his work completely on the belief that the once socially fluid America, so often contrasted to a Europe carved into classes, no longer existed. Again and again *U.S.A.* shows America in the process of social polarization; what the Marxist economist Lewis Corey tried to prove abstractly in his *Decline of American Capitalism*, Dos Passos portrayed concretely in *U.S.A.*

Characterization in *U. S. A.*

U.S.A. is a novel in which the sense of history has become an absorbed passion—surely a rarity in American writing. The novel is not without considerable technical skill and manipulative cunning of the sort Dos Passos first showed in *Three Soldiers*, but it is Dos Passos' passionate historical consciousness that is the source of its ultimate value.

Often enough, the writing in *U.S.A.*, especially in the shuffling Camera Eye and the purplish biographies, is sentimental and not quite true to its object; Dos Passos' youthful weakness for prose-poetry that is neither prose nor poetry but rather a decadent pseudo-Whitmanesque rumble still corrupts his style.

The characters in *U.S.A.* are dim, transient, unblocked—and in that respect the novel is surely wanting. No one is likely to remember such wan apparitions as Richard Savage or Eveline Hutchins. In a sense, Dos Passos hardly tried to "create characters" at all, certainly not the full, multi-dimensional, idiosyncratic creatures of the nineteenth-century novelists; he was rather interested in sketching typical figures in outline whom one recognizes in much the same way as one can "place" people casually noticed in a restaurant. And even the narrative proper, which now seems better written than any of the adjuncts (the ersatz-Joyce of the Camera Eye, the Newsreel and the biographies), sometimes reads more like a hasty, harried outlined than a realized piece of fiction.

But it is the peculiar triumph of *U.S.A.* that when judged as a totality the weaknesses of its component parts seem inconsequential. The secret of this triumph is, I think, in the novel's pervasive passion, its author's uncontainable feeling rushing through it like a stream of blood. And if it be said that this is hardly a novelistic achievement at all, then it must in justice be added that seldom has the journalist done the novelist's work so well.

If ever a novel has been triumphantly redeemed by its author, it is *U.S.A.* It has been praised as a prime instance of literary "objectivity," the sort of writing in which an author does not intrude into his own book, but this is an opinion difficult to take seriously. For Dos Passos is in every corner and on every page of his novel, filling with his own emotion the vacuum left by his failures of characterization; he has identified himself with a nation in travail, a nation shocked by its loss of a dream of innocence and destroying itself by its quest for money and its removal from sentient life. The novel is his cross, the cross he bears for the violated nation he loves.

Passion—that is the key word for *U.S.A.* The sense of history and the release of passion—that is the meaning of *U.S.A.* After Dos Passos had worked for months to save Sacco and Vanzetti, he became a nay-sayer; "all right," he wrote, "we are two nations." Taken seriously, as Dos Passos did, that is an overwhelming conclusion. And from his unalloyed and supremely generous feeling of rebellion *U.S.A.* draws its life and

fire; the rebelliousness drives it, as only inspired novels are driven, binding and lifting and sustaining it. *U.S.A.* is one of the few books at hand in which a writer's direct feeling comes through despite its quite serious technical deficiencies. When a novel's form is unable to convey the feeling a writer wishes to put into it, his feeling usually congeals "outside" the actual work of art as a warrant of the writer's intention for or involvement with his subject matter, but also as a sign that he has failed to realize the intention and objectify the involvement in the novel itself. But in *U.S.A.*, Dos Passos' pressure is so insistent and powerful that his feeling makes, as it were, a forced entry into the book and becomes its dominant presence. The tricky sideshows now merely annoy, the characters limp, the prose sometimes grates—but the book lives.

It is thus not unlike one of its characters, Ben Compton, rebel and iconoclast, a man abandoned by society, by his former comrades, by his conscious self, but still rebellious. A creature of his creator's conscience, Ben Compton is the only character in the novel loved and grieved over by Dos Passos. In his failure and rebellion, in his hatred of official society and his rupture with its official opponents, Compton becomes the shadow of the book's meaning and of its author's intention. In retrospect, it hardly seems an accident that at the novel's end Ben Compton is also at the end of his rope.

Once Passion Has Been Lost

If, then, *U.S.A.* is a forced triumph, what will happen once the force behind that triumph declines, once, that is, Dos Passos' passion has been dissipated or left impotent?

The answer, not a very pleasant one, can be found in his latest novel, *The Grand Design*. *The Grand Design* is the third of a series of novels Dos Passos began in the late thirties after having denounced "the intricate and bloody machinery of Kremlin policy." Dos Passos then began a long political journey—rejection of Stalinism, abandonment of the anti-Stalinist radicalism at which he had temporarily stopped, and then a rapid shift to the right at the end of which he was defending, together with John Chamberlain and Eugene Lyons, the "free enterprise" status quo.

Now matters of doctrine have been far less important in Dos Passos' writing than has generally been assumed; what was important in his radicalism was the quality of its feeling rather than his quite negligible attention to Marxist theory. That Dos Passos denounced Russia need not have seriously affected his fiction, but what did change its tone completely was that he soon abandoned the rebellious attitude toward society that had been the major sustenance of his work. During the Spanish Civil War he did express strong sympathies for the Spanish anarchists who were then being squeezed by two totalitarian forces, but in a few years he was to write articles that had precious little in common with the ideas and still less with the spirit of his Spanish friends.

In the meantime, from the gall of disillusionment, he began his new series of novels. In 1939 he published *Adventures of a Young Man*, an extremely bitter story about a middle-class radical who is snared by the Communist Party, forced by a shift in its line to abandon workers he has led in a strike, and is then expelled by it for "deviations." At the novel's end, he dies a despairing death in Spain, murdered by his ex-comrades. In 1943 Dos Passos published the second novel in this series, *Number One*, in which an intellectual loses his soul by serving as a political handyman for a hillbilly demagogue.

Following on these two mordant but quite minor novels, *The Grand Design* is intended as a novelistic defense of liberalism, but it is weak as defense and worse as a novel. On a superficial journalistic level, it makes easy reading—it is gos-

sippy, some of its characters are easily recognized (Walker Watson, vain Secretary of Agriculture who wants to be president and dabbles in occultism), and its portrait of temperamental acedia in Washington's bureaucratic jungle glibly follows the prevalent American legend. But actually Don Passos has failed so completely at the novelist's job that his book seems more like the work of a raw beginner than of an experienced craftsman.

Structurally, *The Grand Design* is a false imitation of Dos Passos' earlier work. The Camera Eye and The Newsreel have been blended into prose-poems at the head of each chapter that are either painfully flat or embarrassing in their soft-bellied rhetoric. In the narrative itself, Don Passos continues the method of *U.S.A.*, a large number of characters casually wandering in and out of its pages. But while the grand architectural design of *U.S.A.*—a design aesthetically appropriate to Dos Passos' desire to show a whole nation in cross section—required the use of parallel plots, they are simply too heavy and cumbersome for the idea motivating *The Grand Design* or for the series of which it is a part. By arbitrarily retaining the plot design of *U.S.A.*, Dos Passos has given his novel a form that makes too many demands on his no longer very fertile sensibility.

Heroes Who Are Unheroic

A further serious difficulty in *The Grand Design* is that its "positive" characters, those whom Dos Passos would make the agents of his new opinions, are necessarily passive and weak. The closest thing to a hero in *The Grand Design* is Paul Graves, an apolitical scientist who works for the Department of Agriculture. His job is partly to tour the country helping small farmers (with the help of the usual pliant secretary provided by pliant novelists). Such men as Graves who know their job and do it well, Dos Passos intimates, will save the republic. But will they? When Walker Watson begins his unscrupulous drive for power, Graves refuses to take a stand on the grounds that he is a scientist, not a politician. But are heroes made of such indifferent clay? and is not Dos Passos' affection for Graves based on anti-intellectualism and the scientist's so fatal and so American specialization?

Still more objectionable, however, is Dos Passos' treatment of his "radicals." His bitterness toward the Stalinist movement has led him to manufacture crude caricatures which defeat his own purpose. I am as bitterly opposed to Stalinism as Dos Passos, if for rather different reasons, but it seems to me neither intellectually honest nor aesthetically effective to make the major "radicals" of a political novel a simpering homosexual who feels that "the only hope for a boy like me . . . is to lose himself in the international working class," a loutism bully with "red ears sticking out like the handles of a sugarbowl," and a sinister Lesbian. Whether the incidence of homosexuality in the Communist Party is higher than elsewhere I do not know; neither, I am sure, does Dos Passos. But if, as Dos Passos believes and I agree, Stalinism is a menace to human freedom, that has no relation to whether its supporters are homosexuals. To "smear" the Stalinists with the brush of homosexuality is to write dishonestly and, in a fundamental moral and political sense, to let them off too easily.

Dos Passos's reference to a character's ears, quoted above, is the sort of thing that passes for cleverness in certain kinds of popular journals, but one would ask: what is the relevance of unattractive ears to the novelist's job of portraying character, developing narrative and exploring moral conflicts? To see the author of *U.S.A.* indulge in this sort of poltroonery is sickening.

It is possible here to make an illuminating comparison between a novelist doing his job and one evading it. In his intro-

duction to *The Princess Cassamassima*, Henry James writes about his walks through the streets of London "with one's eyes greatly open," imaging something akin to the situation pictured in that novel. James never had any first-hand experience in the anarchist or any other radical movement, yet his imagination was so deep, so adventurous, so elastic that in *The Princess Cassamassima* he created a radical milieu and such radicals as Poupin, Muniment and Schinkel to whose validity anyone acquainted with politics can testify. Dos Passos, however, who has known both Stalinism and genuine radicalism at first hand, can only produce a soured and surly distortion. Is this simply because James is the greater writer? Hardly. The essential point, the point which gets at the core of the novelist's art, is that James, even though he disliked radicals, allowed—or forced—his imagination to grasp the truth about their experience; to create the illusion of verisimilitude he made the crucial imaginative leap which his social instincts, if left unchecked, would never have tolerated. That is why he created better fictional radicals than have most radical fictionists.

The Causes of Failure

But the final failure of *The Grand Design* stems from Dos Passos' own feeling toward the world and the relationship of his writing to it. The passion which bound *U.S.A.* and lifted it above its limitations is no longer available. Like a great many other contemporary novels, *The Grand Design* is the product, not of controlled or overflowing feeling, but simply of an absence of feeling. Life no longer arouses Dos Passos; he has ceased to react, which in his case means to rebel.

I do not wish to be misunderstood—I am not saying that only social rebels write good novels. Obviously, many good novels have been written by men without a spark of rebellion, while many rebels have written exceedingly bad novels. But for a writer like Dos Passos, feeling is everything. He does not depend on a lively, buoyant interest in the daily affairs and manners of social life. Dickens, for instance, pegged his novels on social themes, but did not allow them to depend on those themes: Micawber and Fagin outlive the ideas behind the novels in which they appear. Nor is Dos Passos the sort of writer who, like Melville or Conrad, can dig deep into the moral conflicts of human experience; his mind is too empiric, too impatient for that. As with Sherwood Anderson, his work rests completely on the quality of the feeling he can directly put into it. Once, however, Dos Passos' rebellious feeling, which had always buttressed the shaky structure of his novels, was gone, there was nothing to take its place except a dull, somber void. He had been let down; and as he kept writing it became increasingly clear that the recent novels were extracted by the force of will rather than eased by spontaneous imagination.

It is this, I think, which explains the decline in the quality of Dos Passos' writing since *U.S.A.* Most of the reasons usually adduced for the collapse of promising or achieved talents in this country have little relevance to his career. Money never enticed him, his integrity is beyond question. He didn't run out of material after a first autobiographed novel. He was not indifferent to criticism, he did not turn his back on the events of his day, he tried hard to learn from the contemporary masters. No, his failure was his own: he abandoned the life-view native and necessary to him, and once he had decided no longer to say nay he could not, as an honest man, say yea with conviction or power.

Irving Howe

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Harry Gideonse: Academic Doublethink

A Documented Portrait of a College President

Some of the finest speeches about training for citizenship are made by people who behave like autocrats when confronted with specific circumstances.—Harry D. Gideonse, Brooklyn College *Vanguard*, February 23, 1940.

HARRY D. GIDEONSE, President of Brooklyn College, B.S. Columbia 1923, M.A. 1924, Diplome des Hautes Etudes Internationales, University of Geneva 1928, does not fit any stereotyped version of a college president. He is not a reactionary academician of the Nicholas Murray Butler type; neither is he the liberal that Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence has proven himself. Any sharply drawn portrait of this handsome, youngish, inordinately eloquent and pontifical college president would not do justice to a man who is at the same time a self-proclaimed liberal and in reality a conservative; frequently a democrat verbally, more often an authoritarian in action. In his multitudinous public speeches he has often resorted to the verbiage of liberalism, yet his regime at Brooklyn College has been marked by a series of clashes with both the student body and members of the faculty, accompanied by rank infringements of academic freedom.

During the war, the phrase "totalitarian liberal", seemingly a semantic contradiction, was popular in radical circles to describe professed liberals who supported totalitarian actions. It was usually directed against liberal apologists for Stalinist Russia. Gideonse can hardly be described as pro-Stalinist, but the phrase is no less appropriate applied to him, because while proclaiming liberalism in general—even this with blatant exceptions—he has not hesitated to take authoritarian action when his personal power has been in question. George Orwell, in his recent book "1984" uses the word "doublethink" to describe the espousal of two contradictory opinions by the same person. Summed up in a word, the president of Brooklyn College epitomizes "doublethink."

The Master of "Doublethink"

It is on the question of academic freedom that Gideonse proves himself an expert in the art of "doublethink." Phrases which have an accepted meaning are suddenly imbued with a completely new significance. For Gideonse, academic freedom in no way involves students but refers to, and is reserved for, the faculty alone. Further on, we will see how even this conception is narrowed down to include only the elite among faculty and administrators.

Writing in *Vanguard* on October 11, 1940, Gideonse states:

The words, "academic freedom" are simply an English translation of the German "Lehrfreiheit." Since the students do not teach but are taught, this is a matter that concerns students only insofar as they are the principal beneficiaries of a free faculty or the principal victims of a gagged faculty. . . . In the United States the best statement of academic freedom can be found in the joint statement of principles worked out by association of college teachers and college administrators in 1925. . . . The text shows that it is entirely concerned with the teacher. (Emphasis mine—J.E.)

As we shall see Gideonse is true to his principles, insofar as he believes that academic freedom does not apply to students. More significantly, however, we shall learn that in practice he does not believe it applies to teachers either.

Academic freedom, it would seem, is entirely concerned with college presidents.

Gideonse As a Strikebreaker

From 1930-1938, Gideonse served as Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. In his well publicized controversy with President Hutchins, he espoused what is generally considered the progressive approach to education. The attack on Hutchins for his emphasis on traditional mysticism in education at the expense of modern science was correct from the liberal standpoint. But if this liberalism led to any warm sentiment for Gideonse on the part of the student body, it was short lived.

During his first year at Brooklyn College, Gideonse became a strikebreaker.

In the vicinity of Brooklyn College, the employees of a restaurant, Paul's Clam Bar, were striking for union recognition. An article appeared in *Vanguard* (March, 1940), the Brooklyn College newspaper, charging Gideonse and a few faculty members with having regularly crossed the picket line. The same issue had a reply from Gideonse:

Strikers have a right to quit their jobs whenever they please and I have a right to eat wherever I please.

To paraphrase a well known Russian "doublethinker": "Strikebreaking is a matter of taste."

The reaction on campus was so severe that Gideonse found it necessary to write another letter to the school paper, two weeks later:

The argument that the president's actions are a reflection of the college because "he is not only an individual but also the head of the largest educational institution in Brooklyn" should suggest the arid waste of conformitarianism into which such precedents would lead us.

This comment is particularly ironic since the administration used precisely this criterion of the effect on public opinion in criticizing student actions. His snobbish attitude toward student opinion is illustrated further on:

My final advice, therefore is to learn some economics before you echo empty slogans about a subject that has been studied with great care by well trained minds. . . . There have been at least half a dozen stories in the paper about this portentous event.

The use of such phrases as "I have a right", "the arid waste of conformitarianism" both of which are liberal in terminology but here used in defense of strikebreaking, is characteristic of Gideonse's "doublethink."

A letter to *Vanguard* by the secretary of the striking union on April 5, 1940 eloquently punctured his pseudo-liberalism:

In a letter to *Vanguard*, President Gideonse refers sneeringly to his crossing of the picket line as a portentous event. . . . On a salary of \$18,000 a year a picket line may be a matter of small moment, but to workers who are forced to work from 60 to 80 hours for wages of from \$4.00 to \$20.00 a week, the heartless violation of this picket line by the President of Brooklyn College is more than portentous—it is to them and their families a matter of life and death.

Those who have attended college during the past several years will find it difficult to imagine the tenor of campus life

ten or fifteen years ago. At Brooklyn College, which is tuition free for students of high academic standing, the radicalization process then affecting all schools to varying degrees was at its highest point.

Football playing rah-rah and fraternity ritual were inconspicuous. Here, students from homes which had directly borne the impact of the depression were conscious of the inadequacies of the status quo, and seriously concerned with building a decent world. It is only in this context that the bitterness evoked by Gideonse's strikebreaking action can be understood.

An "Historical Formulation"

The war years on campus, however, were relatively peaceful. School politics declined with wartime prosperity but there were occasional clashes between Gideonse and various student groups. The Stalinist controlled American Youth for Democracy (AYD) applied for college recognition. Although recognized at other New York colleges it was refused a charter in Gideonse's domain despite the fact that the student body voted in favor of chartering AYD by 1100-600. But as we have learned, academic freedom does not refer to students. Or in Gideonse's own words in the *New Leader*, May 1, 1948:

There is no "civil liberty" that assures any Tom, Dick or Harry the right to speak in any college or church and "academic" freedom does not in any historical formulation assure any group of students the right to organize on any campus.

The clashes between Dr. Gideonse and the students were not only over political matters. In 1946, a new program schedule was announced which discriminated against students who needed part-time employment. The reaction was one of universal protest. Gideonse, however, with his historical formulation of academic freedom was ideologically prepared. In the face of a claim by the Vice President of Student Council that 87 per cent of the student body was opposed to the change Dr. Gideonse rebutted:

You don't decide administration by counting noses. Democracy delegates authorities to do the job. . . . It is not the students' business to meddle in the administration, that is the job of the president. . . . Brooklyn College is suffering from the reputation of being a part-time college, a "scab" (sic) college. . . . Our present schedule encourages outside work when there is no need for it. . . . (*Vanguard*, April 10, 1946).

What a phenomenally "well trained mind" our President and economics expert displays when he can so facetiously decide that "there is no need" for students at a city college to seek part-time employment and that part-time work constitutes scabbing, Gideonse's doublethink terminology is particularly revealing. Together with blatantly reactionary statements about democracy he invokes the liberal argument that the college has a "scab" reputation. The hypocrisy of this argument is overwhelming when we remember his role as a strikebreaker. Scabbing, it would seem, is also a right reserved for college presidents. So blatantly unfair was the new schedule that Mayor O'Dwyer in a letter to the *New York Times*, August 22, 1946 decried the new program as not being in the best interests of the student body. The administration argued that these schedules existed at other city colleges. But in the case of AYD recognition, when it was similarly pointed out that AYD was permitted at other New York schools, this argument was dismissed as irrelevant. There is nothing like flexibility to ease the complications of a college president's career.

The following term, Gideonse, in his address to entering Freshmen, said:

On this campus last Spring, the college administration was taking the rap from a bunch of fellow travellers or Communists or call them what you will who charge that our new schedule . . . would prevent students from continuing their studies because they had to hold jobs (*Vanguard*, September 23, 1946).

Can we conclude from this that a majority of the student body, the Student Council, and even the Mayor of the city were Communists! Perhaps fellow travellers? Or do they fall into the "call them what you will" category?

The unique conception of democracy held by the Brooklyn College administration is reflected in the rulings passed in 1939 that no person who is under indictment can address a campus organization. In President Gideonse's passion of "historic formulations" he overlooks the old Anglo-Saxon democratic formula that "all men are innocent until proven guilty."

Under this law Howard Fast was banned from campus in 1947. In 1949 for holding an off campus meeting after administrative warning, featuring Harry Winston one of the indicted Stalinist leaders, the Karl Marx Society was suspended. Several of its members were suspended for varying periods. A group of about 125 protesting students who tried to see the Chairman of the Faculty-Student Committee on Student Activities were forced from outside his office by an unscheduled floor mopping. When business manager Arthur Hillary was asked to explain the mopping his obnoxious reply was: "Whenever we see dirt we clean it up." The size of the group may have been unduly large but this does not excuse the arrogance of the administration.

The suspensions continued. Three students were suspended for the term for addressing unauthorized meetings protesting the earlier suspensions. *However, students who favored the suspensions addressed unauthorized meetings, as well! Only those who were opposed to the suspensions were themselves suspended.*

In the face of these flagrant violations of students rights, Student Council called a class stoppage supported by ten campus organizations. One Dean Maroney then proposed to a sub-committee of five who had been delegated by Student Council to run the stoppage that they hold an on-campus meeting during club hours—when classes are ordinarily suspended—in place of a stoppage and deny the suspended students the right to speak in their own defense. This was a clever, successful move to split the sub-committee. The members and friends of the Students for Democratic Action (SDA), an organization always infatuated with legality, fell for the administration's proposal, made an about face and condemned the stoppage. This left matters pretty much in the hands of the Stalinists. The socialist Eugene V. Debs Society could do nothing but withdraw from what was sure to be a Stalinist affair from top to bottom. With student unity broken, the administration then suspended all those clubs which had supported the stoppage initially, including those which later withdrew, except for SDA. Gideonse sent letters to the faculty advisors of clubs which had originally supported the stoppage exerting pressure on these advisors to, in turn, exert pressure on the clubs. These clubs were reinstated only after a statement was forced out of the suspended organizations, promising to follow college regulations at all times. Thus, regardless of any Gideonse whim, spite or ultra-conservative policy which might be formalized into a college ruling, clubs will be forced to obey.

Gideonse is probably one of the hardest working college presidents in the country. In addition to his college duties, he loves to deliver after-dinner speeches and he is connected with innumerable organizations. His zeal is unbounded. Elections and appointments, normally left to subordinates are two of the president's favorite fields.

In a report prepared by the pro-Stalinist Teachers Union, Dr. Gideonse was charged with ignoring promotion and permissive increment recommendations made by departmental and college committees. He was further accused of using his power to appoint favored individuals, with the creation of administrative posts as rewards and creating a personal faction. In connection with the Men's Hygiene Department the union accused him of ignoring departmental opinion in his appointments.

In a sixteen page document Gideonse replied:

It is undeniably true that the president of Brooklyn College has from the very beginning of his administration in 1939 exercised considerable influence in the department of Men's Hygiene. In 1939 he found the friends of the so called Teachers Union in control of this department. . . . It has been the purpose of the present administration of Brooklyn College to frustrate these gentlemen. . . . When regular chairmen are ill or on sabbatical leave, the President of Brooklyn College asks the regular chairman to name his substitute and if the nominee is acceptable this name is sent to the Board. This insures administrative stability and it avoids all the discussion and electoral fervor of the nominating election for a period of a few months which would not lead to a discernably different result anyway, because the candidate whose name is finally sent to the Board must have the president's confidence.

If an election would not make any difference because the candidate must have the president's confidence then obviously all departmental elections become meaningless and hypocritical rituals.

Bombshell on Campus

This policy did not affect student life itself to any great extent until the Spring of 1950 when a bombshell exploded on campus. Gideonse refused to ratify the re-election of Professor Jesse D. Clarkson, popular Chairman of the History Department, although the department voted 12-8 to re-elect him. He had been chairman for 12 years and had been re-elected four times. Gideonse indicated that failure by the department to elect another candidate would force him to appoint the runner up. Rather than accept this dictum, those who had voted for Clarkson, elected another member of the department.

The story leaked out from unofficial sources through *Vanguard*. The paper's faculty advisor warned the editor not to print the story until the Board of Education had received the nomination. He threatened to suspend the editor from his post if the story were printed and repercussions ensued. Instead of carrying out this threat, he resigned as faculty advisor, knowing of course, that college rules forbid publication without an advisor. A year previously, *Vanguard* had been permitted to publish without an advisor for six weeks. This time, however, the administration was out "to get" the paper, because it had printed the Clarkson story, plus an editorial criticizing Gideonse, no such laxity would be shown. The editors were informed that unless they had an advisor there would be no *Vanguard*. Finally, a member of the English Department agreed to act as advisor. The editor phoned the chairman of the Publications Committee to inform him that an advisor had been found. He refused to come to the phone. He was eating dinner and had to leave

immediately! A telegram was sent to his home informing him of the English instructor's acceptance. But the next day, she handed a letter to the *Vanguard* editor explaining that she could not accept the position. She had too many papers to review! Finally, a written certification from another instructor was obtained accepting the nomination of faculty advisor. At a special meeting of the Publications Committee, the faculty members refused to ratify his nomination.

The editors decided to publish an off-campus paper instead: *Draugnav*, i.e., *Vanguard* spelled backwards. No college regulation prevented them from doing so. Meanwhile, petitions were being circulated by the Young Republican Club of Brooklyn College asking the Publications Committee to get a faculty advisor for *Vanguard*. Over 2000 signatures were obtained, the largest amount collected on a petition in the history of Brooklyn College.

Five thousand copies of *Draugnav* were distributed outside the campus. That day, the Dean of Students ordered students out of the *Vanguard* office and a new lock was put on the door. The editor went to ask President Gideonse why he and his staff were dispossessed. "Do you know what this is?" Gideonse asked, showing the editor a copy of *Draugnav*. He then asked the editor whether he knew that *Vanguard* could not be published without a faculty advisor. The editor pointed out that *Vanguard* was not published. *Draugnav* was merely an off-campus paper, distributed off-campus and paid for by students. To which Gideonse maturely replied: "Oh, stop lying to me, man." He then stated that: "Even if the paper were distributed in Times Square you are still students and still subject to the disciplinary action by college authorities." The editor then, correctly repeated that no college regulations were broken. Gideonse's final word: "We are the ones to decide that—not you!"

The editor-in-chief of *Draugnav* received a five day suspension, four other editors and the business manager, a three day suspension and the fifty students whose names appeared on the masthead as staff members were officially reprimanded and placed on probation for the remainder of the semester. *All suspensions are entered on students' records.* The implication of this for future employment and graduate school students is as obvious to the reader as it was to Gideonse.

On Freedom of the Press

President Gideonse had previously given us his views on freedom of the press, again with the benefit of historical formulation. In a speech before Hillel, quoted in *Vanguard* of February 28, 1947 is the following:

Freedom of the press is historically associated with the right to compete in the establishment of publications. . . . Freedom of the press cannot have the same meaning as far as *Vanguard* is concerned, because *Vanguard* is a monopoly as a result of our college policy of chartering only one student paper.

One year after taking over the presidency, it was reported in *Vanguard*, of October 18, 1940.

He (President Gideonse), advised *Vanguard* to suppress the term "imperialist war", unless the article is paralleled with one expressing the President's view that it is not an "imperialist war."

In a *Vanguard* editorial of October 18, 1946:

Vanguard and council have been told point blank that if in the opinion of the administration they become "unrepresentative" of general student body opinion they will be cut off the maintenance fee and left to flounder for themselves.

In 1949, the Faculty Student Committee on Publications passed the following ruling:

A faculty advisor is authorized to suspend a student from his position on a staff, and from staff membership as well, if, in his judgment, such discipline is warranted for action detrimental to good journalistic practice.

In such cases as the suspension of *Vanguard* and that of the program change, where Gideonse's authoritarianism meets strong opposition, he becomes violent and vitriolic. Where his personal power is questioned, phrases about democracy and freedom which he sprinkles liberally over his after dinner speeches are stored on the shelf. He then reveals what he is essentially: an autocrat in a hall of learning.

The Rapp-Coudert Committee

Probably the single most important event in the political history of Brooklyn College was the investigation of alleged subversive activities by the New York State Rapp-Coudert Committee. In 1940, these publicity hungry ancestors of McCarthy conducted a witch-hunt in the New York school system for Communist Party members and sympathizers. The Committee's "findings" were seized upon by the yellow press with hysterical venom.

Contempt proceedings were instituted against 25 New York City teachers, 18 of whom were Brooklyn College staff members. The Committee refused them a public hearing, and further refused to give them a transcript of the hearing itself. A battle raged between the Committee and the Teachers Union over the latter's refusal to produce its membership lists.

In opposition to the investigation a "Student Committee to Defend Brooklyn College" was organized. During the course of the Committee's activities seven undergraduates were placed on disciplinary probation and declared ineligible to participate in extra-curricular activities for six months. One student was denied her diploma by Gideonse, three days before graduation. He charged that her testimony to the Rapp-Coudert Committee contradicted that of her fellow students. Perjury is a serious offense and a jury usually decides. Dr. Gideonse probably decided, however, that, as in the case of economics this was a case for "well-trained minds", or at any rate, one well-trained mind—his own.

Gideonse, the Communists and Morality

The logic of Gideonse's position on Communists in the school system is typical in that a clearly reactionary action is defended by liberal criteria. He is opposed to giving the Communists more rights than anyone else on campus. Therefore, if Communists lie about their affiliation, we should not use the double standard. They should be punished for lying as we would punish any other dishonest individual or organization. Thus, his role is merely that of an apostle of truth defending it against proven liars. The logic would be impeccable if we lived on Mars or some other region equally removed from the real world. On this planet, however, we cannot always accept the validity of statements made under coercion, nor can we always hold the authors of such statements responsible for them. Surely, President Gideonse did not condemn the anti-Nazi, living under Hitler, who refused to divulge his affiliations or those of his friends and co-workers to members of the Gestapo. The analogy is extreme; Gideonse is by no means a Nazi, and the Communists are far from our ideal of anti-Nazis. But this extreme example only serves to illustrate our concept that if Communists or others are forced to lie in order to protect themselves and their means of liveli-

hood, then, obviously, it would be sheer hypocrisy to be an absolute moralist.

President Gideonse in the *American Magazine* of July 1948 wrote an article entitled, with true academic dignity, *The Reds Are After Your Child*. This article illustrates the hypocrisy of which we speak:

I called a staff meeting to invite any teacher who was willing to admit open or above board membership in the Communist Party to consult me and I promised that I would use the full force of my position to protect his rights as a citizen to exercise any political option that was open to any other citizen. I made it clear that I would not myself knowingly endorse the appointment of a Stalinist or Bundist but that the legitimate civil rights of any present member of the staff would be protected.

If Gideonse would not knowingly endorse the appointment of a Stalinist, it becomes obvious why they conceal their affiliations. As for his promise to protect their civil rights, this is hardly a guarantee, even if accepted at face value, since he is not the only authority involved.

The final proof of this hypocrisy is the action taken on the Stalinist front group, the Labor Youth League (LYL) early this Fall semester. The LYL had been recognized and granted a charter from the proper school authorities late in the Spring session. Despite the fact that the LYL openly admits in its constitution its relationship with the Communist Party it was suspended as the present session got under way. The reason given had nothing to do with violations of school regulations but in the words of the dean (an echo, of course, of his overseer, Gideonse) the issue was "the United Nations' war in Korea and the world situation in general." Is this the way an individual or an organization which admits its off-campus political relations with the Communist Party is having its "legitimate civil liberties" well "protected" by moralist Gideonse!

In connection with the removal of the teachers investigated by the Rapp-Coudert Committee, Dr. Gideonse stated his position without ambiguity in the *Vanguard* of December 6, 1940:

What is needed is legal evidence that will stand up in court. I believe that the procedure of removal should be shortened and that's putting it mildly.

We hold no brief for the politics of the Stalinists who were persecuted by the Committee and Gideonse. We are concerned here, however, with two most important and vital democratic rights—freedom of political opinion and the freedom to teach without discrimination.

Gideonse's acceptance of a legislative invasion of campus life has gone even further than the matter of the Rapp-Coudert investigation. In 1949, the House Un-American Activities Committee requested colleges to send to them a list of currently used text books and reading lists. Gideonse complied, sending in a list of 161 titles with the assurance of full cooperation with the Committee. The request by the Committee was denounced by so conservative a figure as Dr. Tead of the New York Board of Education, as "educationally ominous."

Lynching, Oil and Imperialism

Even on the subject of suppressing the Communist Party, Gideonse does not behave or at least speak like a *complete* reactionary. Doublethinking reasserts itself when he states:

'Disinfectants' were worthless as a means of combatting communism unless accompanied by a disposition to grapple with the economic and social inequities that bred discontent with the existing situation. (Address to New York City branch of the American Association of University Women.)

A sound liberal statement except that in action Gideonse has done little but apply "disinfectants." As far as his disposition to grapple with economic inequities we find that he accused the Roosevelt administration through its policy of encouraging increasing organization of labor of poisoning the well springs of American freedom. He stated that by abetting the demands of organized minorities, the New Deal is paving the way for fascism. (*New York Times*, March 1, 1937.) The strength of his disposition to grapple with social inequities is revealed in his opposition to the Federal Anti-Lynch Bill.

While the President is opposed to lynching he thinks a federal bill with federal power to enforce it would perhaps lead to a violation of freedom. (*Vanguard*, March 12, 1948.)

We need no "historical formulation" of this type of freedom. Similar rationalizations abound in the statements of the freedom loving poll tax senators.

Nearly two decades ago Gideonse informed us that:

But in the present status of our society . . . there is much more to be gained . . . by making our students read some of the classics . . . than by teaching them a civics course or a social studies course that must always in the end be approved by groups representing the vested interests in our existing social order. (Proceedings of the Mid-West Conference of the Chicago Association for Child Study, and Parent Education—March 1932, P. 143.)

His criticism of vested interests disintegrated, however, in the face of a real and very non-academic issue such as vested oil interests. An example:

If some of our military and diplomatic officials are more interested in the Near and Middle East oil than they are in the fate of the new state of Israel we should remember that they are paid a salary by the American government to protect the national interest in the larger sense of the term. (*New York Times*, Oct. 28, 1948.)

When the vested interests of the Dutch colonial administration were posed against the Indonesian struggle for freedom, his passion for freedom, so manifest in his opposition to the Federal Anti-Lynch Bill, failed to assert itself as *he gave unhesitating support to the Dutch government.*

President Gideonse informs us that "It is well to remember that the wisdom of the fathers was the wisdom of revolutionary fathers." We fail to find on his part, however, except in abstraction, an application of revolutionary wisdom to political events. His amply documented opposition to the protective tariff and economic nationalism hardly casts him into the pale of non-conformity. His decrying of the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is eloquent but its effect is dissipated when we find that preparations for the next war in the form of ROTC at Brooklyn College are sanctioned by him.

Gideonse and Political Background

President Gideonse represents Americanism in the sense that the term itself is ambivalent. In American culture we find contrasted democracy and authoritarianism, institutional rigidity and a pioneer tradition, liberty and one man rule. The academic scene in America is a montage of these tendencies. The progressive approach in education is itself a product of the democratic aspects of our culture, the striving for training in scientific method in social inquiry. Gideonse, the democratic educator, Gideonse the authoritarian administrator, Gideonse the liberally gilded reactionary is in his personality contradictions an unfortunate product of the American social scene.

During the war Gideonse did not join the liberal alliance

with the Stalinists. Today, however, politics is coming his way. The liberals under the "clarifying" pressure of patriotism have discovered the real nature of Stalinism. The Fair Deal, however, is not only closer to Gideonse in its political ideology. The Trumanites put non-conformists in jail at the same time that they extend social security benefits. Gideonse's regime at Brooklyn College makes unmistakable efforts to raise the educational level of the college while suppressing the academic rights of the student body and faculty.

The gradual disappearance today of the borderline between liberalism and reaction creates a political arena in which Gideonse can cut a fashionable figure. The crass red baiter of the Hearstian type is making room in the American political scene for the sophisticated liberal who maintains theoretical attachment to civil liberties while he supports the filling of jails with political prisoners. Any doubts among liberals about President Gideonse's attitude toward democratic rights will be quelled as his attitude becomes theirs.

In its mounting drive against non-conformity the government will probably find President Gideonse of Brooklyn College exceedingly cooperative. Troubled over the possibility of a violation of freedom with the passage of a Federal Anti-Lynch Law, we are sure that Gideonse suffers no loss of sleep over the past and contemplated future violations of freedom originating from the President's office at Brooklyn College.

Jean ENGERS

Utter Me Quiet Green

Utter me quiet green those stems of folded love
Whose roots can tap me dark
And eyes through petals reel
The cups of song that wing my scan a dove.
I hear the triple winters sound my neck
Down the skylight of my seams
And grey will twig my hair
Before the twilight hoar shall clean the deck.

This no memory nimble on a word
When aural oceans chum
And dusk is keeled away
Like moment sagas drawing the yet unheard.
This the focal rend beyond the clocks of time,
Beyond the daily shiver
Frozen thumbs align
Dark to what the ploughing harbingers will rhyme.

Watch the flotsam chant of clay its whisper lea
Through whose budding loins
Poised to heave once more,
A swollen earth again shall chafe the sea.
Let's touch our seconds to that melting weave
And glean an autumn flower
Flung from where beyond
Utters me quiet green those stems of folded love.

Melvin ELATH

The Shibboleth of "Adjustment"

A Discussion of Radicalism and Neurosis

THE CHARGE IS FREQUENTLY made that radicals, all or at least the majority of them, are neurotic. This is a charge which has just enough truth to be plausible, and just enough ambiguity to permit the drawing of all manner of illicit inferences. In short, it is typical of the kind of charges that have always been made against radicals. Just as typically, it is more true of the attackers than the attacked. For if the radicals be neurotic, with their fantasies of change toward a better social order, what of the rest of society, which day by day advances in reality more closely to that holocaust which would make the aggressive day-dreams of most neurotics appear as Sunday-school picnics? Neurotics, at least, do not generally translate their fantasies into action.

The ambiguity of the charge rests, of course, in the use of the term "neurotic", which in this context may be taken to mean either deviant as compared to adjusted, successful as compared to unsuccessful, or healthy as compared to ill. Each of these meanings is linked to a particular psychological or sociological theory, whose content we must outline in order to evaluate the truth of our charge.

The heyday of social Darwinism in the late 19th century coincided with a period of rapid growth of capitalist industry and the consolidation of colonial empires. The majority of social scientists and social ideologists, typified by such individuals as Herbert Spencer, saw human evolution as a matter of the survival of the fittest human beings and the successive betterment of the human race. Competition within capitalism was neatly equated with biological competition, and from this analogy the conclusion followed that the upper class was the fittest class because it was on top, and it deserved to be where it was. Those who starved at the bottom of the heap were less fit and it was an immutable law of nature that they should be weeded out by this automatic, and in the long run, beneficent process. In the same way primitive cultures were compared to advanced ones. Usually, they were found wanting: if they were exploited by the leading imperialist nations it was because they were biologically less fit. If they were not, they would not be exploitable. Here again it was held that natural selection must be permitted to operate so that the fittest would survive. Against this view only a few individuals, such as Marx, thought that evolution in the human realms was primarily a matter of the progressive transformation of human societies with little or no emphasis upon individual selection.

Social Darwinism and Success

According to the social Darwinist theory, the neurotic was one species of those who were hereditarily unfit. For whatever reason, he could not or would not compete in the struggle for material success or for women. This was a convenient standard by which to judge radicals: they wanted to change the competitive nature of society. But, since competition, and in particular, capitalist competition, was an immutable natural law, their criticisms must be simply the complaint of the unsuccessful. They deserved no hearing.

Since that time social Darwinism has been thoroughly and repeatedly discredited, although it still persists among a few social groups. This is not the place to undertake a detailed

refutation, but one amusing contradiction in the theory may be mentioned. The theory should justify the superior economic and social position of the upper classes on the ground that they are the biologically most fit. But Darwinianly, the most fit are the individuals who have the most progeny and therefore determine the genetic composition of the succeeding generation. Since it is the lower classes and "inferior races" which produce the most children, it is really they who are the most fit. Further, if they are the most fit, it follows that they should rule, and there can be no objection to their seizing power! But, such an action would scarcely have been approved by the proponents of this particular theory.

It is not often realized how much Sigmund Freud was influenced by such Darwinist notions. It is true that he never accepted the more reactionary implications of these theories, such as racism or imperialism, but his contempt for the lower classes and his picture of social change is quite in accord with them. In his writings we find two quite different pictures of the non-neurotic or healthy person. One of these, we will consider later, but the other should be mentioned here: the healthy, civilized man is the one, who, within the restrictions of civilized life, is successful in the struggle for material success and sexual satisfaction. He is the man who can inhibit his instinctual needs when necessary, yet gratify them fully when there is opportunity. He is not bound by conventional morality, whether internalized as super-ego or externalized as father-authority figures. Yet, since he can secure adequate gratification within civilization, he is not hostile to it. He understands that renunciation of instinctual satisfactions is the price man pays for his biological success, and he, himself, aids in enforcing such renunciations upon the unwilling mass. Since rational thought is man's primary weapon in his struggle upward, the non-neurotic is distinguished by his lack of dependence upon religion or personal delusions, and by the success with which he enforces such rationality upon others.

Success As a Standard

Such a view of the healthy man is a far cry from the present ones of adjustment and normality! It is also a view by which radicals are neurotic only if they fail. If they succeed, if they "leave their mark upon the world", then *ipso facto* they are healthy.

It was the anthropologists who struck the main scientific blows against social Darwinism by shattering the theories of racism and of the simple, unilinear evolution of cultures. And, expressing the liberal spirit of the early 20th century, they propounded the doctrine of toleration toward backward cultures. Each culture was a unique effort to solve the problem of man, and incommensurable with any other culture. It could only be studied and appreciated, not judged. What then about social criticism? Some theorists violated toleration with one hand as they emphasized it with the other. In *Patterns of Culture*, for instance, Ruth Benedict exhorts her readers not to judge and condemn other cultures, while at the same time she urges us to adopt their good features. How they can have good features when they do not have bad ones is not explained. This is not intended as a sneer, for the doctrine of toleration has had many good effects, but is

merely intended to show the inconsistencies in its application.

There were not lacking social scientists to take the next step: cultures being unique, they can only be judged by their own values. He who criticizes his own culture is as wrong as he who criticizes another. Besides, cultures do not change as a consequence of the activity of critics, but rather according to slow, immutable laws which are beyond the control of any individual member. The domestic critic, far from being a force for social change, is simply a person who is maladjusted to his own culture. So originated the pernicious doctrine of "normality" and "adjustment". Radicals and other deviants, according to this view, are inadequate people who have failed in life and blame external conditions rather than themselves. The function of reform institutions and therapy is to adjust these people to playing "useful", "normal", roles in society. Put crassly, the creative but eccentric artist should be transformed into the normal and useful filing clerk.

Few scientists drew another, more logical, conclusion, namely, that deviancy is normal. Every society that we know of, primitive and civilized, has certain roles, or paths of life, which are adopted by the majority of its members. But, also, there are always certain paths adopted by a minority. Moreover, the society needs these deviants and without them it would be, so to speak, badly embarrassed. The deviant may be the epileptic who assumes the role of shaman or priest, and if he should be lacking, there would be no one to take care of religious observances.

Doctrine of Toleration

The social function of this liberal anthropological doctrine of toleration is clear. It portrayed the status quo as socially desirable and sanctioned the conservative's belief in the inviolability of such institutions as private property, the monogamous family, and the Anglican Church. As such it forbade any kind of searching criticism into the foundations of our culture. World War II was the final stimulus to the overhauling of this doctrine. Liberal social scientists could see that something was wrong with German culture under fascism, and that it was not something to be appreciated and studied as an unique effort to solve the problems of man. Once this was established, work proceeded apace. Japanese culture was discovered to be bad, and now Russian culture is likewise. The complete dethronement of tolerationism came with the publication of Cora DuBois's *The People of Alor*, in which a primitive culture was also found to be sadly deficient. Adjustment as a norm has begun to disappear, at least in the more sophisticated texts, and with respect to other cultures than America. And with its disappearance goes another meaning of the charge that "radicals are neurotic". For clearly, adjustment is a virtue and radicalism a vice only if the society is faultless or unjuggable.

Replacing adjustment as a norm is some concept of mental health. It is too early to criticize this new norm, for it has not yet become crystallized, but it is easy enough to show the problems which arise in connection with it. What are the criteria for health? The insane are obviously insane, although a number of important and creative historical personages might be so classified by contemporary standards. Obviously, symptoms are evidence of ill health, but again what are symptoms? Judged externally, a symptom cannot always be distinguished from a peculiarity or eccentricity which marks the independent and self-reliant individual.

Here, Freud's conceptions have been truly revolutionary

and of a grand character. With a faith in the individual man and in his power of reason which was in the highest tradition of Hellenic Greece and the Enlightenment; Freud proclaimed that mental health consisted in self-knowledge. He who knows himself is master of himself; he who is master of himself can do no wrong. In psychoanalytic terms, the healthy person is the one whose Ego is master, who has no amnesias, who is comfortable living with himself.

Similar views, sometimes held to varying extent in combination with Darwinian or adjustive ones, have been advanced by the majority of analysts. Because Freud's conception is so individualistic, however, it does not lend itself to facile social generalizations, such as "radicals are neurotic".

A study could be made in accord with this criterion of mental health. In general, it would ask such questions as whether radicals had more or less self-knowledge than non-radicals, as to the influence of psychoanalytic treatment upon political beliefs, etc. The reason that such a study will probably never be made is that from this point of view there can be no real interest in the question of the validity of the charge that "radicals are neurotic". Once such a radical individualistic standard as Freud's is adopted, it becomes impossible to dispose of critics by such charges as deviancy or maladjustment. Indeed, Freud's standard is itself a radical attack upon coercive institutions. "Radicals are neurotic" is true unequivocally, only if the meaning of 'neurotic' is taken to be "deviant", in which case the charge reads "radicals are deviants", i.e., "radicals are radicals". Those who make such charges are often not interested in truth, or in the mental health of radicals, but only in denying radicals a hearing. One does not have to treat seriously the argument of a radical, since he is mentally ill and does not know what he is talking about. In this way dissenters are silenced by "science".

Contact with Reality

One criterion for the judgement of mental health is the individual's contact with reality: does he perceive the world as it is, or is his view distorted by his own inner conflicts? If the term "reality-testing" can be applied to politics, then we observe that the attack has suddenly been reversed. If the radical's understanding of society is more accurate than the non-radical's then in this respect, at least, the radical is closer to reality, and hence more healthy, than his opponent. It is not possible to dismiss the beliefs of a radical on the ground that he is neurotic; rather, one test of his mental health is the correctness of his beliefs. But contact with reality sometimes imposes a severe burden; sometimes it is less of a strain for a person not to see his Freudian nose. For is reality the world as viewed by Christ, by Marx, or by Freud; by Hegel, or Nietzsche, or Kierkegaard? This can be answered only by looking at the world.

The question of the relationship of radicalism to neurosis assumes an entirely different character if we undertake to examine radicalism as a social phenomena, in relation to other social movements and forces. In its most general sociological sense radicalism is composed of a series of attitudes and sentiments directed toward some set of institutions or values. It stands for their abolition or replacement by some other set of institutions or values. The radical ranges from the individual with circumscribed ideas about sex, art, or religion to the critic of all basic institutions of our culture. Whereas the Rotarian can criticize all varieties of radicalism because he endorses Babbitt as an ideal type, his imitator is more likely to criticize only that kind of radical with whom

he disagrees. In this sense radicalism means favoring any change which is not considered good, by its opponent.

In its more specialized sense, however, radicalism is distinguished from other reform ideologies by the general aims and goals it espouses, and the way it seeks to achieve them. Its characteristic feature is the appeal to humanitarian and democratic ideals. The development of Stalinism has done much to obscure this basic fact, but the care taken to preserve the Russian Myth shows how much even the Stalinists realize its value. For the common denominator of all radical movements reduces itself to their espousal of the rights of the under-privileged, the appeal to majority rule, the attack on property rights in the name of human rights, and the militant prosecution of equalitarian principles. Considered solely as a set of principles, these ideas cannot be considered as anything more than the natural result of a societal structure which leaves unsatisfied the needs of people, and causes at least a portion of them to desire something better. Given such needs, and the failure of society to meet them, radicalism becomes an entirely normal and understandable phenomena.

Emotional Responses to Radical Ideas

If there is a rational foundation for radical attitudes, how about the irrational content, the emotional component. The practice of phrasing its ideas in the rhetorical language of value-judgements is so universal as to be characteristic. The street-corner agitator, the vituperative political polemicist, don't these examples prove that radical ideas subsist mainly as a superstructure to a basically irrational dreadnought? Such a criticism ignores the fact that because radical ideas attack such basic problems, they are bound to arouse emotion on their behalf. And from the institutions attacked they arouse equally strong feelings, so that in the ensuing conflict dispassion is not always possible. If radical sentiments are strong, the reaction is no less violent. For radical ideas threaten to destroy the material and intellectual foundations which are the source of security for many people, and the anti-radical is not unwilling to play upon this fear of deprivation. The basic criterion must be, not to what extent does a social ideology arouse emotion, but to what end that emotion is directed.

If society is not conceived as a purely static, unchanging thing, then radicalism becomes an essential concomitant of the process of social change. From this point of view, the personal characteristics of the people who bring such changes into being are irrelevant. Numerous studies used to be conducted which found that radicals compared with non-radicals were more repressed in expressing their aggression, more in conflict with their parents, and, conversely, more intelligent, more capable of abstract thought, more sensitive, with quicker reaction times, greater consistency of views, etc. But as Horace Kallen remarked, these discoveries "are vitiated from the point of view of social science in that they are attributed to a type of personality, attitude and behavior conditioned by the fact that it is in a combative situation, and that its manifest qualities are functions of this situation."

If we boil down to their essence all complaints about radicals being neurotic, we find that they reduce themselves to the single fact that radicals are different, they are deviants, they do not accept what is and seek to create what might be. Their behavior belies what the majority in our culture holds to be good; they insist on interesting themselves in politics where most people view politics as a topic of social conversation. They chose a path of life which subjects them to certain

types of ostracism, which inhibits their capacity to rise in the social or academic scale, which violates the canons of "common sense". But if there were no radicals would our society be better or worse off? Would it be richer or more sterile? For our part, we consider politics to be a vital part of the total activity of the whole man, one of the best ways in which the human personality can find expression, and the only way through which man can ultimately hope to assert mastery over his conditions of social life. And in terms of a genuine mental hygiene, social action provides the only answer to Fenichel's question: "Would it not be the first task of such a mental hygiene to provide work, bread, and satisfaction of the basic needs for everybody?"

All of this is not to deny that there are individual neurotics in the radical movements, nor even that neurotic conflict may lie at the basis of their choice of politics for acting out their personal difficulties. Many may find in The Movement that reassurance of an ever-present source of love and authority that other millions find in God, the Church or a sanctified Leader. (Since turnabout is fair play, it is equally probable that an individual's non-radicalism may also have neurotic elements!) There is undoubtedly a continuum of reasons why people become radicals, ranging from severely neurotic, unconscious motivations to the highly conscious, rational pursuit of socially oriented goals and political convictions. On the one end it is a reaction toward deeply disturbing impulses, and on the other it is a sublimated expression of our instincts through character. To the degree that an individual is neurotic, to that extent is his political role likely to be impaired. The rigid, inflexible thinker; the emotionally immature, easily influenced person; the flighty, irresponsible member; these are not people who function most adequately as radicals. Their presence may give a certain character to the movement they join, or the leadership they constitute, of a detrimental nature.

But even in this sense, we must take cultural conditions into account. In a country such as Germany between 1900 and 1923, a socialist was a respected person. Perhaps he was not admitted to the best bourgeois or aristocratic residences, but he had a feeling of power and security from the ever increasing strength of the movement with which he was affiliated. His deviancy—in being a socialist—was not one for which he encountered social persecution. Imprisonment in time of crisis, yes, but that was an honor, and involved no kind of conflicts.

In contemporary America, on the other hand, the socialist is a member of a small and powerless group, which has little support in the labor movement and small prospects of immediate growth. His position in the political world has never been an honored one and the tactics of the Stalinists have tended to make it a disreputable one. His position as a deviant is not easy, and it is very possible that as long as he attempts to maintain his radical insight, he will be troubled by symptoms stemming from his actual insecurity.

To the student radical the life of the frat boy sometimes seems easier. It is, but it is also impoverished. He has his symptoms, too, but they are not noticeable ones, for they are the norm. He is adjusted. And if in his adjustment he has lost his self, what of that. These days few people consider that to be a valuable possession.

Don CHENOWETH
Murray WAX

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Horatio Alger and the American Worker

Does Native Tradition Eliminate Class Allegiance

"IN THE UNITED STATES," wrote Lord Bryce in 1888, "public opinion is the opinion of the whole nation, with little distinctions of social classes. . . . What the employer thinks his workers think." "Classes," thought this profound analyst of the American political scene, "are not prime factors in American politics or in the native public opinion."

Half a century after Bryce no social scientist would deny any longer that there are considerable differences on the important issues of the day between various income groups and various occupational categories. The evidence is such that the social scientist must accept it as a basic datum and the politician can ignore it only at his own peril. Public opinion experts seem to agree that classes are key factors at least in certain areas of opinion since there are very important attitude and behavioral differences among people of different economic and occupational levels. Outlook on life tends to be shaped to a considerable degree by social and economic position. Though economic classes are by no means subjectively homogeneous, certain opinions and attitudes are more likely to be held by, say, manual workers than by managers or professionals.

R. H. Tawney once said that "the word class is fraught with unpleasing associations, so that to linger upon it is apt to be interpreted as a symptom of a perverted and jaundiced spirit." Although such attitudes are by no means dead, American public opinion in recent years has swung around to the view that preoccupation with class phenomena is not necessarily an un-American activity. Let us then attempt to probe a little deeper into the realities which underlie class phenomena and class consciousness in American society.

Though Marx's analysis of class differentiation is not the only, or not even the most elaborate one, some consideration of his theory of class stratification will provide us with a convenient springboard for subsequent discussion:

Marx and the Concept of Class

Surprisingly enough, Marx never clearly defined his concept of "class," although this concept plays a key role in his sociology. Yet we understand from the context of his work that he meant by a class a group of men whose life situation is determined by their economic function within the total society, and whose conditions are similarly determined by this economic function.

Marx also thought that if classes in general, and the working class in particular, were active historic forces, more than the simple existence of class differences had to be present. Though he assumed that men in the same class situation would generally react to economic and social situations in accord with their economic "interests," he stressed that a class would directly shape the social process only to the extent to which it becomes *aware* of its specific social and political interests. If the working class becomes aware of its position in society it will organize in order to realize its social and economic goals, which are different than and distinct from those of other classes in society. The frustrations which the worker experiences in his economic and social life will lead him to assert interests which he holds in common with all those who are similarly frustrated. Consequently he will develop specific working-class values, a specific working-class morality. The

workers will react with group solidarity to the pressure of factory life and poverty. They will move from economic organization to a political consciousness which aims at the abolition of their proletarian condition through a fundamental social and economic transformation of society.

If we compare working-class consciousness in pre-war Europe to American developments, we are led to the conclusion that in Europe Marx's theories corresponded to a considerable degree with the actual facts. But in the United States there is as yet very little reason to ascertain the existence of class consciousness in the Marxian sense. No wonder that many a disgruntled American Marxist is angry, to use one of Trotsky's favorite phrases, that the locomotive of history has passed him by.

The European worker had the feeling of belonging to another world than that of the "bourgeoisie." Working-class organizations and institutions often paralleled the official ones, so that the worker's contact with what he contemptuously referred to as "bourgeois culture" was reduced to a minimum. Workers' youth movements, be they of the socialist, communist, unionist or even catholic type, gripped labor youth at an early age and stage of development; transition from the youth movement to the adult political movement was almost automatic, and party and union work filled a great part of the leisure time of the more intelligent and advanced European worker. The unions involved large groups of workers in a kind of activity which not only fulfilled purely economic functions but in addition provided them with important emotional stimuli. All sorts of other organizations of specific working-class character enveloped the life of the individual worker: there were Labor Saving Banks and Labor Cooperatives, and even funerals were often handled by Workers' Burial Associations.

Cultural Life of European Workers

The European worker did not only have his own organizations but he also attempted to create his own culture. Very often the so-called working-class music and the labor theaters did not amount to much more than second-rate imitations of the "bourgeois" variety, yet in intent this was a different culture. The worker who listened to Mozart in his "own" auditorium had a different spiritual experience than one who would go to one of the "bourgeois" music halls. The worker footballer who played against a workers' team from another city or another country, felt that what counted was not only the simple physical exhilaration but the feeling of togetherness with "class brothers." At the working-class holidays such as the First of May, ceremonials and rituals served to instill and reaffirm the cohesion of the class. The worker felt that through the celebration of, say, the anniversary of the Paris Commune, he participated in a community of beliefs and values which was opposed to the official one.

Through life in different organizations and in a partly different culture, the European worker also developed specific sets of values. Solidarity of all workers, at least within the particular nation, solidarity in strikes and in every-day action within and outside the factory was expected as a matter of course. Set apart from the society which put a premium on competitive self-interested behavior, the worker was expected

to act according to a fundamentally different set of values; he was expected to sacrifice individual interest wherever it clashed with the collective interests of the workers. The working class developed its own code of honor in which attitudes that were highly prized in the "outside society" were looked upon with utmost scorn and contempt. Collaboration with the "bourgeois" police, social intercourse with a "renegade" or a strike-breaker, were contrary to working-class moral standards, and anyone who dared to depart from these norms would feel the full weight of ostracism.

With his institutions and in the culture that he felt to be of his own making, the worker found a sense of security and a source of strength that gave sense, structure and direction to his life and which provided relief from the overriding anxieties of his everyday life in the factory. Amidst his co-workers in his own organization he developed a new feeling of power, of individual worth and dignity. There he was no longer an "appendage of the machine," but rather an individual who had acquired a new self-image through concerted action with his fellow-workers.

The European worker had gained a new "time-perspective." His thoughts and actions were determined by his expectation of a socialist future which helped him to transcend the reality of the factory, helped him to turn misery and anguish of the present into action and hopes for the future. In this he was intellectually guided by a sociological and historical theory that gave the "scientific" validation for rejecting the existential condition to which he was bound.

The picture here drawn is of course an "ideal" picture. In fact, the workers were still influenced by the surrounding culture. The working-class personality was a composite of the influence exerted by their class position and that of the national culture to which they belonged and from which they could not withdraw completely. Although working-class organization accomplished much in patterning the conduct of millions who otherwise would have lost all sense of belongingness, it also but too often led to doctrinaire rigidity in thought and action. As Schumpeter said very well, the opponent was considered not only in error but in sin. Dissent was disapproved of not only intellectually but morally. And a rigid system of thought grew almost imperceptibly into myth. What Marx originally conceived of as a method of analysis degenerated into the dogma of a secular religion and a kind of intellectual totalitarianism.

Reasons for European Development

If we try to uncover the reasons for this development, the fact that looms largest is that European society was highly stratified and allowed scarce opportunities for individual ascent on the social ladder. The sharply delimited hierarchy of classes kept labor together by pressure from the top. Internal class solidarity develops almost automatically if the individual sees no chance for ever leaving his class through individual efforts. One was born into one's class and it was thought almost impossible to rise out of it. Thus the only hope one had to break class barriers was through concerted effort. What material improvement there was had been achieved through militant collective action. A "settled" working class developed cohesiveness in attitude and behavior patterns.

In European society economic issues became almost automatically political issues. The middle class had to fight a long and costly political battle against the remnants of feudalism, and labor was similarly—almost from the beginning of its organization—drawn into the political field of battle. At times, the struggle for the ballot overshadowed the wage struggle. Parliamentary representation seemed of utmost importance to

the extent that the increase of governmental interference with the laws of the market assumed major proportions. The more influence one could wield in parliament—so it seemed—the better one could influence the machinery of the state apparatus in a direction favorable to labor. Economics could not be divorced from politics and hence union activity was always linked with the political activities of the respective socialist parties. *The European worker lived within a particular nation without being fully of that nation.*

When a European labor spokesman is asked about the aims of labor, he is apt to launch into a long historical and philosophical discussion. When Samuel Gompers, the father of the American trade union movement, was once asked: "What does labor want?", he replied: "More." It would seem, indeed, that Gompers here admirably succeeded in voicing the basic philosophy of the American union movement, at least till the rise of the CIO. The American labor movement did not develop a philosophy of its own, it lacked almost totally the humanistic and idealistic content of the European movements. It was pragmatic, unemotional, matter-of-fact. It saw its purpose in the organization of the wage earners of various categories for the purposes of stabilizing job opportunities and increasing the wage level. "The province of the union," as Selig Perlman, historian and protagonist of this type of unionism has stated, "is to assert labor's collective mastery over job opportunities and employment bargains, leaving the ownership of the business to the employer." The labor movement viewed the political scene as one of conflicting interests between parties which do not question the validity of the total social system,—parties which wanted "more" for certain groups, propagating different policies, but did not envisage basic social change.

Different Conditions in the United States

In a country in which capitalism and the capitalist spirit have reached the highest and fullest development, there is hardly any class conscious organization in the Marxian sense. How can one account of this—to the Marxist—most startling development?

(1) While the chances of individual social ascent were almost completely blocked in European society, these chances still exist in American society—though no longer to the same degree as half a century ago. Although this is no longer a country of unbounded opportunities, though the hope to "grow up with the country," to move West, is scarcely held any longer and the economy has become "mature," there is still a relatively high rate of upward social mobility. Despite the increasing rigidity of the economy, ours still is an open-class system. The working class is not a "settled" wage-earning class cooped up for good in a lowly condition. Stratification has made considerable strides in the last 30 years or so, yet the situation is still fluid enough to allow a majority of American workers to persist in the dream of "getting a break," of "making the grade," of "getting ahead." If one is too old to hope to rise himself, one can at least hope that his children will go to college. The great democratization of educational opportunities in America certainly has been among the most potent influences in keeping the class system in relative fluidity.

Rigidity is on the increase; a great number of recent studies, from Lynd's Middletown to Warner's and Hollingshead's community studies, have amply demonstrated that class lines exist in the American community, and that they tend to harden over the years; it remains, however, that every working-class community can still point to some of its sons who have "gone

up in the world." Recent studies, such as that of Richard Centers, show that about one-third of urban fathers have sons who achieve higher occupational status, although two-thirds have either the same or inferior status.

(2) Next to the myth of the poor boy who got rich—which is held so persistently because it is reinforced by the economic opportunities still available to some—is the incohesiveness of the working class, brought about by recurring waves of immigrants. Until very recently, American labor was split along ethnic and craft lines. New immigrants from Europe, as well as Negro migrants from the South, were assigned the low-skill and lowest-paid jobs, thus making the earlier immigrants move up one step on the ladder of the skill hierarchy. After the frontier was practically closed, immigration provided the opportunity for social mobility.

Moreover, and in connection with this phenomenon, the old-stock American worker and earlier immigrant felt highly antagonistic to the newcomer and attempted to keep his monopoly on the better-paid and higher-skilled job by barricading behind the elaborate machinery of craft rules and regulations. Hatred against the newcomer who attempted to break craft monopoly was often more violent than opposition against the boss.

At best there could develop some kind of "job consciousness" under such conditions; no class consciousness in the Marxian sense can arise among a group of men who are so basically split not only by cultural and ethnic antagonism but by very real conflicts arising from opportunities as well as from immediate interests. The American working class has been a heterogeneous mass of people, separated by geographic, ethnic, and craft lines, highly mobile geographically and socially. Socialism and class consciousness developed among the recent immigrants as long as they were not fully integrated in American society. But as their sons became Americanized they grew out of their inferior social status—and their earlier socialist beliefs.

Effects of High Living Standards

(3) A correlate to this is the high material standard of living that the skilled, and a large proportion of the semi-skilled workers have reached in the United States. Though power and wealth may be inaccessible to workers, they have access at least to consumption goods from refrigerators to automobiles, and though the goods consumed by the lower class may be more shoddy than those destined for upper-class consumption, they are yet rather similar in appearance. America is the great democracy of consumption. Equality in the sphere of consumption makes for a considerable reduction in social distance and permits the "courtship between the classes (to use Kenneth Burke's apt phrase) that is so prevalent in American society. Status differences, mainly based on consumption patterns, are infinitely less pronounced in American society than even in the Britain of the Labor Government.

(4) All Americans alike share in the consumption of popular culture. The mass media, radio, movies, television, the comics, penetrate at all class levels; they serve as a bridge between the various classes and groups in our heterogeneous society. They allow vicarious participation in social and political life even to those who in reality are excluded from such participation.

The workers do not feel rejected by a semi-aristocratic official culture as in Europe; the mass media create a minimum feeling of belongingness to the nation as a whole. Popular culture performs a most important function of unification and is also an excellent instrument of social control. The European

worker, rejected as he was by the official culture of the society in which he lived, was powerfully attracted by attempts to create a working-class culture built in opposition to the official culture. No such motives can become powerful as long as the American working class shares the values that popular culture and the mass media propound.

(5) Another important reason for the lack of "class consciousness" among American workers is the fact that there is no tradition of political struggle similar to the European tradition. The middle class did not have to fight against feudalism, and only in exceptional circumstances in American history have political battles touched upon fundamental structural issues. The basic structure of society was never in question. The laborer didn't have to struggle for the ballot, except in the very early days of the Republic. Political cleavages were rarely sharp enough to allow the formation of parties along ideological lines. The American political tradition is rarely attracted to ideological warfare and, although labor has been organized as a special-interest group, it never has felt the need for the formation of a Labor Party based on a philosophy which opposes the prevalent liberal ideology. Whenever such enterprise was attempted, it usually saw its thunder stolen by one of the major parties, which took over some of its program and all of its adherents.

(6) The American intellectual tradition is one of matter-of-fact, common-sense thinking. American thought patterns are attracted little by abstractly formulated transpersonal ends and ideals. The prevailing ethos is pragmatic and instrumental, and there is no inclination to accept a *Weltanschauung* which demands sacrifices in the here-and-now. Eschatological visions which pervaded the European labor movement are foreign to the American temper. Utopia proves attractive only if it be of the Ham-and-Eggs variety. Edward Shils in a brilliant article,¹ to which I am indebted for some of the above ideas, states the matter excellently: "A certain irreducible sensitivity to doctrine is necessary for the political attitude which underlies that type of political party which is bound together by the common acceptance of a principle, such as was represented in the European Socialist movement."

Changing Attitudes of American Workers

For the European worker, daily life offered no hope. His time-perspective was provided through his ideology. For the American worker, his time-perspective lay in his hopes for opportunities, hence his ideology did not have to transcend the here-and-now.

Today the American worker has abandoned, to some extent, the hope of rising out of his class; the earlier optimism has been replaced in part by a desire for moderate security. Very sizeable proportions of the American working class now prefer a job that seems reasonably secure to one that pays higher wages.²

While the non-political worker in Europe lived in the immediate present since the future seemed to be beyond control, and the political worker restructured his time-perspective through his belief in a socialist future, the American worker today seems to have given up partly the optimistic ideology of his fathers without accepting socialist counter-ideologies. He

1. Edward A. Shils: "Socialism in America," *University Observer* for Spring-Summer, 1947, I, 2.

2. A Fortune poll asked factory workers whether they would prefer a job with a low income but which they were sure of keeping, or a job which pays a good income but which they would have a fifty-fifty chance of losing, or a job which pays an extremely high income but which would be exceedingly difficult to hold. The first alternative was chosen by 59.9 per cent of those asked, 20.9 per cent chose the second, and only 16.9 per cent the last one.

is skeptical and almost cynical about his chances of ascent, yet he hopes for a break; he supports social security, pensions and the like because he is afraid of the future, but he still believes that somehow, somewhere there is going to be a chance for him or at least for his children. He strives for security through job control, through union control of the available places of work and through an elaborate system of seniority, yet he lives mainly in the present, refusing to accept the postponement of present gratifications for distant goals, which the European Socialist worker accepted as a matter of course.

The American worker is likely to react with more or less "liberal" attitudes toward current political issues. Significant class differences in the expected direction are found in public-opinion polls on questions pertaining to the distribution of wealth, governmental control of industry, the "Fair Deal," legislation limiting the activity of unions, etc.; but the bulk of the workers will defend private property rights though they might protest against the power of monopolies.

There are no clear-cut dividing lines between the classes in present-day America. There is no separate and distinct labor philosophy or ideology. The relative fluidity of the American class system is matched by a similar fluidity in consciousness and opinion.

Recent years, especially after the birth of the CIO and the end of large-scale immigration, have shown clear indications of a breakdown of craft and ethnic lines separating the working class. Indeed, it is only during the last 15 years or so that one has begun to see the outlines of an American working class as a homogeneous body. The gradual breaking down of the hierarchy of skills in industry plays an important role in this respect; the proportion of highly-skilled, as well as that of completely unskilled workers, decreases, and the mass of workers becomes more and more uniformly distributed in the semi-skilled classifications. This process, as well as the gradual integration of Negroes and immigrants in the mass industries, makes for greater homogeneity of the labor force.

The labor movement has grown tremendously in strength. Where for many years it englobed at best a few millions, it now has organized roughly one-third of the total industrial working force of the country and has almost fully organized some of the key industries. Yet it is a long step from the kind of union solidarity that undoubtedly exists to a Marxian type of class solidarity and class consciousness.

The American worker still feels himself to be in and of American society.

The labor movement gradually moves away from the pure business unionism of Samuel Gompers toward a new type of unionism, perhaps at present best exemplified in the United Automobile Workers. The new type of union slowly encroaches upon some other institutions and seeks to encompass the whole life of its members.

This change in the function of the union is apt to culminate in far-reaching effects upon the consciousness of the union members, but whether political and social class consciousness will develop in the United States will ultimately depend on the degree to which the American social system will be able to insure a high living standard without disastrous slumps and wars.

Lewis A. Coser

Lewis Coser was on the faculty of the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago.

The Announcement of Winter

How silently autumn submits!
Is it because a woman no longer young
But crow-vein footed and social weary
Knows better the worth of love,
The absolute value of touch,
Can taste of the fruit with tears in her eyes
And feel a slight sense of chill
Till the last veil is drawn?

The wind scarcely sighs
And fingertip nervousness of leaves
Is a still-youthful anticipation,
And only partly the fear.
Her lover will be gentle.

Ralph MARCUS

And once hooked into space—
When I was a child
And strayed from my mother on Coney's sands
Voyaging between beach umbrellas and scallop'd shells
Scrambling along scrambling sands I stumbled.
I clutched at the sky as I fell
And hot sand scorched my throat
And through searing eyes I could see nothing but
the sky

the sand
the ocean
Three dragons belching space
And mommy! mommy!

Eye-clos'd at night in bed I would see the noon sky
And there would be a fiery string dangling from the sun
And I knotted screaming at its gnarled end—
Long ago—
The red-faced babe and the twisted cord—
O, so long ago hooked into space.

Paul ROSENBLATT

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The FBI and Civil Liberties

A Symposium on the Merits of Government Investigation

The following is a copy of a letter sent to a number of America's leading intellectuals, political figures, and labor leaders with the answers and comments to date. The number next to each answer corresponds to the number of the question asked.

Dear Mr. (or Mrs.):

In an article in *Harpers* magazine last year, Mr. Bernard DeVoto issued a private warning to the FBI that he would henceforth refuse to answer any question about his friends or acquaintances, their habits or utterances, their political activities or affiliations, when such questions were put to him by a government investigator. He stated that he would hereafter answer such inquiries only after being subpoenaed, and under examination in open court in the presence of the person in question or his legal counsel. Mr. DeVoto stated that he took this position because he considered the present system of government investigation, especially the fact that it is subject to no public control, or judicial review, as constituting a serious danger to traditional American freedoms and liberties.

The editors of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN are interested in securing an expression of opinion from persons who represent a wide range of general social and political viewpoints, toward the issues raised by Mr. DeVoto. To this end we have framed the following series of questions which may be answered by a single "yes" or "no." If you do not feel that such a brief response adequately covers your true attitude, you are invited to expand one or all of your answers by explaining them. We ask, however, that you try to keep the total number of words under five hundred. The editors of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN give their assurance that all replies received will be published, whether or not they are in conformity with their own views.

We therefore submit to you the following questions for your answers and/or comments:

1. Do you think that the method of certain investigative agencies, of gathering information on the basis of personal conversation and hearsay, is a threat to individual liberties?
2. Do you think such procedures are justified in the light of the present world situation?
3. Would you give information about a friend or acquaintance to an agent of the FBI?
4. Would it make any difference whether this person were a Communist? A Fascist? A Trotskyist?

We would like to thank you for your attention to this matter and look forward to hearing from you before July 30th.

Sincerely yours,

Julius JACOBSON, Editor

From ROGER BALDWIN

Former Director of the American Civil Liberties Union

1. No.
2. Yes! any time.
3. Of course and do.
4. No.

Comments: Mr. DeVoto's attitude is unrealistic. Governments must have investigative agencies and they must get information required by law. Some of the requirements verge on the areas which government should not invade—namely private opinions and associations. But even these are permissible in investigations of the good faith of conscientious objectors (whom the FBI investigates) and of federal employees in security positions.

A long experience with federal investigation agencies forces the conclusion that the abuses are exceptional. Army and Navy Intelligence are much cruder than the FBI—which is probably the most scrupulous in observing civil rights.

From W. E. B. DU BOIS

Progressive Party Candidate for U. S. Senate

1. Yes.
2. No.
3. No.
4. No.

From GEORGE W. HARTMANN

Chairman, Department of Psychology,
Roosevelt College

1. Yes, but not *inherently*; the danger exists only when definite *safeguards* are absent. If *fact-gathering* is done by *trained* social scientists and interpreted by a *competent* and humane commission, the three can be reduced to the vanishing point in a *genuine political democracy*.

2. Reluctantly, I must say *yes*, with the qualifications implied in 1.

3. Yes—and I have done so on a few occasions, merely because this seemed to be one of the obligations of citizenship. Since the cases concerned individuals within my profession, the inquiries took on a *vocational fitness* cast.

4. No—to all 3 subquestions. My conception of ethics leads me to expect that everyone will reveal frankly his *public* or social beliefs and affiliations wherever such a declaration is relevant. I am a democratic Socialist and a Christian pacifist. Any interested person has a right to know that about me and I certainly see no basic objection to acknowledging what appears to be the facts about my views, even where this has meant economic or other *disadvantages*.

From ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

U. S. Delegate to United Nations

1. Yes.
2. No.
3. Yes.
4. No, but as far as I know I have no such acquaintances.

From IRVING HOWE

Co-Author of "U.A.W. and Walter Reuther"

1. Yes, of course. Wiretapping, intimidation, promiscuous political accusations, fat headlines and tiny items denying; an atmosphere in which it is possible to pass legislation providing for war-time concentration camps;—these are the boils of the basic disease of our day: the trend to the "liberal" garrison state. And this is a threat.

2. No. The only time you have to worry about preserving liberties is during "emergencies."

3. In my short lifetime I have had various occupations. I once worked in a toy factory for \$16 a week; I have been a sheetmetal worker's apprentice; a clerk on NYA; copywriter for a dull publisher; and underpaid labor journalist. I have even written book reviews; and once, under duress, I was required to shovel human excrement. All of these occupations have had one or another degree of unpleasantness, humiliation or shame. But a stool-pigeon—that is too much.

4. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and I are not in the same profession. I am concerned with ideas, sentiments and liberty; Mr. Hoover is a policeman.

No one, I think, should be persecuted or even listed in Mr. Hoover's secret files because he expresses an unpopular opinion. Those files are said to be full of unverified gossip. If Mr. Hoover is willing to show publicly that his files are not used for the purpose and in the manner often charged, I would be very interested in examining his evidence. In the meantime, I must insist that Mr. Hoover do his own legwork.

Some people excuse Mr. Hoover's secret lists by saying that the Stalinists keep themselves hidden behind "Aesopian" fronts and therefore have to be publicly exposed. But it is sheer hypocrisy to denounce Stalinists for not appearing openly in public as what they are when all of the government's legislative and executive agencies are set to penalize them if they do so.

Insofar as the FBI is interested in spies, I must modestly protest that spies are not my line. To my knowledge, I have never even seen one. The FBI (I take it, is gifted at capturing spies, and so is the Russian equivalent of the FBI. If, by some wild stretch of the imagination, I did know of a Stalinist

spy in the U. S., that is, a GPU agent, I would expose him in the public print, just as GPU man Mink who was involved in Trotsky's murder, had previously been exposed.

It is unjust even to list Trotskyites in the same question with fascists and Stalinists. The latter two can sometimes be spies of foreign imperialist powers; the Trotskyites, agree with them or not, are interested only in expressing their ideas. If Mr. Hoover wrote a polemic against those ideas I would read him with eagerness; but any other interest he might have in the Trotskyists or in the other left-wing groups would seem to me excessive.

From BERNARD DE VOTO

Author of the article on the FBI in Harper's.

The following is the response quoted in full, from Mr. DeVoto:

Gentlemen:

Please take my name off your mailing list.

Moses barely saw the Land.
Lenin's bridge collapsed in sand.
Jesus left but such a tiny band
To carry out his dreamwork: love.

Today the land a bare and bloody womb
But Lenin has a big and mighty tomb
They recently enlarged the Pope's small dining room
(More orders from above)

.....
But yet! hear the corn grow from that land
The sounds of freedom from Saigon unto Witwatersrand
And soft! as in blue moonlight flies the dove
I think I hear my lover calling—softly calling
Love!

TULI

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The Pseudo-Art of the Atomic Age

The Present Status and Potentialities of Science Fiction

Controlled imagination in this sphere can be a very valuable exercise for minds bewildered about the present and its potentialities.

—DR. OLAF STAPLEDON, *Last and First Men*

THE SUBJECT MATTER and purpose of science fiction, which concerns itself with a future world whose life has been shaped by the expansion of scientific knowledge, generally remains misunderstood. This literary form has been, for the most part, unobserved in its development; however, more recently it has been gaining in prominence and attention, and since its major patterns and ideas contain political overtones, it offers itself for analysis.

I

The most widely held notion concerning science fiction is that its stories are merely "space operas" with "Western-style" ray-gun battles. Such a misconception, among others, has been built up and reinforced by several factors in the development of science fiction. This literature, because of its intrinsic technical nature, has had an isolated growth. It is a newcomer to the organized literary market: magazines devoted exclusively to science fiction were born in the late 1920s. On this level science fiction is a social phenomenon of the last two decades. Also, most of these early pulps featured, and many still do, lurid and sensational covers with matching adventure stories. Against this background of isolation, newness and crudeness, the whole field of science fiction became evaluated in terms of Buck Rogers.

To be sure, even today the majority of science fiction stories are standard adventure tales in an interplanetary setting, written not much above an adolescent level. But in comparison with past decades, the better science fiction has matured from what was always a specialized type into a special type. And this is the point. A certain uniqueness and stability as a genre has been achieved; there has been a steady increase in quality accompanied by a growing audience of educated readers. In 1938, the magazine, *Astounding Science Fiction* was revitalized and it orientated itself in the direction of maturity and quality. Representing today's science fiction at its best, this magazine has assumed leadership in the field and in its pages is to be found the distinction and real difference between genuine science fiction and the childish, comic-book stories best known to the public.

II

A science fiction story is usually a narrative about an imaginary future world molded by far-reaching developments in the sciences. Many of today's social forces, such as religion, imperialism, culture, conflict, are realistically treated as to their conceived development under imagined future new conditions. *The vital component in science fiction is the imaginative projection of what is usually the most advanced scientific thought and material.* This scientific form is filled with fiction content of prophecy, philosophy and adventure. The imaginative fiction unwinds from scientific concepts which are either already demonstrated or projected out of the writer's imagination into future space and time.

When science fiction is distinguished from fantasy literature (with no necessary reflection on the latter) it is seen that it is

a new literary genre. The latent origins of science fiction are to be found in fantasy literature but the proliferation of scientific inventions during the last half of the 19th century and the influence of the Marxian and Darwinian theories of historical and biological evolution gave to science fiction a base for growth and development into a distinct literary form.

No arbitrary line can be drawn between fantasy and science fiction as they overlap at a certain point. In fantasy, the story is given "scientific" embellishment to strengthen the usual thread of horror, terror and suspense. The "science" is a mere excuse for wonders that are beyond explanation. In poorer and pseudo-science fiction, on the other hand, there is little or no imaginative projection of scientific ideas, only the setting is somewhat "scientific" as a device either for fantastic adventure or satirical Utopianism. The two forms are distinct in this decisive respect: in fantasy, both the author and the reader know that the story is not true, that it didn't happen and that it will not, cannot happen; in science fiction, the author tries to create a story which will impress the reader as being fantastic *now* but one which *could* and probably *would* happen. Science fiction is written in this context of certainty and reality; the author rationalizes his new inventions, discoveries and conditions in terms of the possibilities of science.

This highly specialized subject matter is enough to distinguish science fiction from any other of the pseudo-arts and is at the same time its appeal and limitation, its strongest and weakest points. Within this frame, science fiction can be adequately criticized and possibly even be damned as literature. But there, too, understanding of what science fiction is, is necessary.

Science fiction's claim for validity does not depend upon its truthfulness, either; that is, upon what can be proven. Its domain is the *possible*. It realizes today, in the form of stories, what might otherwise only be prophesied. It prophesies and realizes its prophecy at one and the same time, on the basis of possibility and the elimination of any dividing line between applied and theoretical sciences. Whatever the questions raised and answered (Is protoplasmic life the final form? Is time a dimension or a reality?) the answers and reasons are predominantly rational and naturalistic; and whatever strains there are of philosophical idealism, whatever threads there are of a mental primacy over physical laws, these are reduced to muffled voices in the general tone.

III

The described transition of science fiction seems necessarily to have been at the price of relegating it to being a minor cultural phenomenon with interesting implications. The first thing that impresses the reader is the almost absolute absence of significant literary artists writing in the field today, whereas previously there was a full roster who, at one time or another, created in or close to the form: Jules Verne, Conan Doyle, Ambrose Pierre, Jack London, H. G. Wells. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and E. M. Forster's *The Machine Stops* are not genuine science fiction at all. When these typical artists turn to quasi-science fiction it is almost always for the purpose of satirizing their idea of what future "utopias" will be like. Unfortunately, doing so is more a restatement of their being

modern authors with sophisticated sensibilities than anything else. It would be wrong to describe this literature as a sensitive reaction to Stalinism. The Stalinist stalking-horse cannot be dragged in here. For at the same time that these writers condemn utopias without humanity they also reveal themselves the less sophisticated country cousins of the social theorists who always posit and never prove an immutable human nature. Griff Conklin, a science fiction editor, aptly describes this method of envisioning future societies as "given today's social infirmities and tomorrow's scientific skill in accentuating them."

Not only are most science fiction writers not literary men but most of them are not even professional writers. Some of them, of course, are, and some of the best, too, but the category of hobbyists begins even within the group of professionals. Representative of this tendency are: Murray Leinster, the science fiction pen-name of a magazine writer, Isaac Asimov, a research chemist, Robert Heinlein, a plastics research engineer, J. A. Winter, a doctor, John Taine, the pen-name of a leading American mathematician, and John W. Campbell, Jr., the editor of *Astounding Science Fiction*, who is an M.I.T. trained engineer.

The readers of *Astounding Science Fiction* fall predominantly into the professional, scientific, managerial and white-collar categories. They are overwhelmingly male and young, their average age being about thirty, and have a college degree although many are still in college. This close correspondence between the writers and the readers of science fiction is at least as important as the overall composition of both groups. Besides cohesiveness between creator and audience being desirable in any of the arts, an identification by the spectator with the artist is necessary for empathy and for the vitality of that art. In the field of science fiction, the devoted reader, who has often been reading science fiction for eight years can also be thought of as a writer-equivalent because he often makes the transfer in position himself, not only by putting himself in place of the author but occasionally by doing his own writing.

IV

The unique fluidity of this situation in science fiction is its strength and weakness, just as the more important distinction and limitation of science fiction lies in its specialized material. Here, the question of science fiction as art becomes unavoidable. The chief limitation of science fiction is in its literary quality and is usually felt precisely at the point where the interest in the material cannot bear the full weight of the narrative. Then, too, science fiction is akin to other forms of popular culture in its concept that formula equals form. In science fiction the stories are variations of this simple formula: Man (the scientific intelligence) against a new (and/or destructive) natural phenomenon. If the destructive agent doesn't appear on earth in a known environment, then either the struggle occurs in some unexplored part of the globe or else scientific man is exported to another planet to a totally alien environment.

Two more criticisms derived from the decisive importance of the material in science fiction can be made and both are basic. Like every other writer, the writer of science fiction has the problem of securing his reader's belief, or if it is a matter of "willing suspension of disbelief," then the problem of making certain that the reader isn't continually reminded of it in the course of reading the story. In both instances, the same technical problem exists and practically never does the science fiction writer succeed in solving it.

The greatest drawback in science fiction is that with its prime interest in concepts and discovery, there is little or no interest in the human personality which, unlike great literature, is not the fundamental domain or interest of the science fiction writer. Humans are treated with, and exhibit, all the coldness of the laboratory. The tone of genuine science fiction is intellectual rather than emotional with love, romance and humans having no intrinsic place and remaining but the remote referent. When humor is employed it is merely grim irony, the humor of the superior intelligence. One result is that science fiction characters are types rather than individuals, static and immemorable because there is no development of personality under the impact of events. Great stories have people to whom something happens, not mere convenient incidents attending the birth of a new star.

V

Science fiction, predominantly concerning itself as it does with future societies, necessarily has political currents running through its material. Basing themselves on conceived projections of science, science fiction authors have not been able to escape expressing, in some form, views on the political, economic and social forms and contents of the future societies which serve as the setting for their stories. The extent to which political ideas and opinions are to be found in science fiction has more or less varied with world conditions, and today the accent is sharp. In this respect alone, science fiction today is a far cry from the Jules Verne tales of adolescent adventure. And while the basic structural themes have remained fairly constant over the years, the important factor which has varied has been the meaning and significance of the stories.

The wavering but slowly developing trend toward forms of political expression in science fiction has come into relatively full view since the close of the Second World War. A literary form so directly concerned with science could not avoid being decisively influenced by the epoch of world upheaval in which science has played so key a role. Increasingly, science fiction writers are weaving into their stories the urgent need for social controls over society's physical powers. More and more, the authors are discussing what inventions are doing and will do to the political, economic and cultural structures of society.

Naturally the development of atomic energy has been the greatest single influence on science fiction thought. Since the close of the war, many of the writers are using science fiction to explore psychological, moral, ethical and philosophical problems arising both from the implications of the atomic bomb and science in general. One can notice serious attempts to foresee the shape and content of the new world which science is constantly creating. Of course, most science fiction is still non-political and most of those which are vaguely political are confused and groping. But there is an increasing trend toward political expression which will be intensified by world developments.

However indistinct science fiction's political philosophies are today, it is possible to make some analytic generalizations. The minority of stories which contain some definite descriptions are inferences about the form of future society, largely favoring some form of collectivized economic system. The few writers who have done so have commented in their stories unfavorably upon capitalism and the world condition of depression and war. There are strains of contempt and dislike of the stupidity, inefficiency and anarchy of present day activity.

Many science fiction stories of recent years concerned themselves with some of today's more pressing problems. The form

The Sophistry of Colonialism

A Refutation of Rationalizations for Colonial Exploitation

WHAT IS THE GOOD, say certain well-meaning apostles to the colonial peoples, what is the good of conquering an outmoded independence. We are in the epoch of interdependence. This is a truth which the colonial people perceived long before any one spoke of interdependence for them. For decades they have been subject to this very special kind of interdependence known as colonialism. So that the problem is not to know whether or not we are advancing toward interdependence, but if this interdependence will consist of slavery or, on the contrary, become a higher form of freedom. But precisely in order to have true interdependence within a confederation, there must first of all be the necessary independence for each people; that minimum, indispensable independence needed to allow one nation to associate with another. It is quite true that progress now consists in allowing each nation to abandon a part of its sovereignty for the benefit of a higher collectivity. But to give up this part of one's sovereignty, one must first have it, i.e., have independence. Furthermore, it is significant that colonialism leads the opposition to true federalism. For example, in North Africa, countries whose culture, language, and geography are akin, like Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco aspire to form a North African Union. But there is no worse adversary of this form of supranational solidarity than the colonial administration dividing and isolating these three countries, preventing relations between their respective national movements and attempting to play off Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans against each other by submitting them to different treatment. In Tunisia, trade union rights are granted to the natives. Relative freedom of the press exists. In Morocco, trade union rights are rigorously proscribed for the natives, under threat of fines, and the nationalist press is severely censored when it can appear. In Algeria, the most important nationalist movement cannot even publish a simple weekly newspaper. It cannot even issue it in Paris, without it being seized. What motives are invoked in defense of this inadmissibly undemocratic attitude? Essentially, containment of Arab nationalism. Sophists who claim to counterpose freedom and democracy to independence have forgotten to explain to us why, in reality, all freedom and democracy are suppressed under pretext of opposition to the people's desire for independence. Clearly there is no contradiction between democracy and independence in essence. At bottom, it is a matter of one and the same thing for the colonial peoples, and the best proof, to give again the example of North Africa, is that the desire for independence is the number one demand in the program of all the national movements: A sovereign Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage without distinction of race or religion, which will permit the people to determine the regime of their own choice and permit the nation to decide freely whether to associate with other nations.

There remains the objection according to which this independence activity flowing from nationalist doctrine would risk engendering among the people who engage in it a kind of chauvinist deviation and nationalist narrowness propitious to all kinds of reaction once national liberation has become an accomplished fact. Such an argument is not without foundation.

But it turns against those who use it to oppose the demand for independence of the colonial peoples, preferring to the latter a democratic policy which, detached from any national context, is no more than a form of paternalism or assimilationism. Indeed, what is it that provokes the national explosion of the oppressed countries? In the first place it is the racism and colonialism of their colonialist oppressors. The latter, by their repression, force the colonial people to become conscious of their individuality. Thus, in Algeria, one can say that it is colonialism that impelled the Algerian people to consciousness of its national tradition and existence. Undoubtedly realism demanded accepting the Algerian nation as it exists today. A return to pure Arabism would have no more meaning than the pure and simple return of France to the Roman tradition. But the return to Berberism favored by colonialism out of a desire for disunity is as absurd as Celtism would be in France. During a whole period of Algerian life, the Moslems demanded essentially French nationality. Who refused it to them? The big colonialists. To the point where the French mayors of Algeria resigned in 1936 to protest against the French government's grant of French nationality to 30,000 Moslems out of the 8,000,000 in Algeria. Under these conditions, thrown back on themselves, the Algerian Moslems have been impelled to self-reliance. Today, in conclusion, all the national movements, whatever their tactical disagreements, demand an Algerian Republic elected by universal suffrage. It goes without saying that this republic will not be racist, since it will include a strong French minority which, by its economic, cultural and technical quality could play a determining role. French nationalism is truly the principal opponent of a true Algerian democracy. The only way to permit this democracy to blossom is to resolve first the national question. This solution holds for the colonial problem as a whole. The danger of chauvinism and reactionary nationalism is the by-product of colonial oppression. To avoid the posing of this false problem it is necessary to grant independence as soon as possible to countries like those of North Africa. Then this independence will be merely the ante-room for the search for true interdependence and the foundation of real democracy.

If the Struggle Fails

Another sophism of colonialism consists in rejecting the demand for national independence on the pretext that the peoples concerned, once independent, would risk falling under the rule of native feudalists and consequently would move toward social reaction instead of progress. In Madagascar, for example, proceeding from this argument, the administration, supported at first by the Socialist and Communist Parties, created a social party, the Party of the Disinherited (P.A.D.E.S.M.) to oppose the nationalism of the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renovation (M.D.R.M.). The latter had elected *all* the deputies from the native electorate to the French National Assembly and had behind it the overwhelming majority of the population. What happened in practice? The so-called social party played a miserable role toward the Malagasy people and became a mere instrument of the administration against popular demands. Why was it that?

is quite often a future-time analogy which is similar but not identical with today's situations. The following representative examples are from *Astounding Science Fiction*. On the development of science, a character in *Person From Porlock* by Raymond Jones says: "We aren't concerned with advancing your science. It is progressing rapidly enough, too rapidly for your social relationships, which would benefit by some of the energy you expend on mechanical inquiries." On the danger of war, the theme of *Target* by Peter Cartur is "Sometimes, quite accidentally . . . [one] can come right near to starting a major war. A minor misunderstanding of something. . . . It's happened on Earth more than once . . ." On imperialism, the theme of Isaac Asimov's *Mother Earth* is "The logic of empire building has always in the past led to the decline of the mother country and the rise of the colonies. Now in the future things will be—different or not?" And on the role of the military in the bureaucratization of the state, the theme of *Death Is the Penalty* by Judith Merrill is that "as science becomes the primary weapon for war, the scientist becomes the primary target of his own military's stupidity [sic]." Also, more recently there have appeared stories which have delved more into the social sciences, perhaps indicative of a coming greater exploration of the relation of man to himself, society and ethics as affected by science.

The world of science fiction is so rational that by comparison the reality of capitalist society is challenged. However, as was mentioned before, the readers and writers of today's best science fiction fall mainly into the technical-managerial strata of the "new" middle class. In view of this, the variants of collectivism found in the world of science fiction are the vague and groping expressions of the concepts of technocracy. This seeking of a rational society and its criticism of the inefficiency and anarchy of present-day life is often confused and identified with socialism. But in a technocracy this technical-managerial strata would form the ruling professional bureaucracy. Science fiction is particularly vague as to the political forms of future society, favoring, if anything, a benevolent bureaucratic despotism. This hypothesis as to the latent philosophy of science fiction is strengthened when we frequently see science fiction scientists, in the role of societal hero and savior, preventing or stopping wars, leading humanity to a world of peace and prosperity. Just recently, Robert Heinlein's *Gulf* featured a league of mental supermen who deliberately throw overboard the concepts of democracy. As this league rationalized the problem, if the world is to be saved, they, who know what must be done, cannot be hindered by the slow-moving and ignorant public.

The quantity and character of politics in modern science fiction, however vague and obscure it is now, is certain to develop under the pressure of social events. In the main, the consciousness of politics comes from the direct political implications of nuclear fission research. Today the consciousness, as expressed in the stories, is frantic and ague. The young scientists and their older compatriots have had many adjustments to make: not only the adjustment every human must make to the world of the atom bomb and the "cold" war, but the additional adjustment of the scientist to the presence of the F.B.I. in the laboratory. It will be interesting to observe what clearer and sharper ideology will be developed by this strata of middle class intellectuals, socially rootless, repelled by the anarchy and inefficiency of capitalist society and its inability and unwillingness to give full rein to his special talents.

This politicalization is all the more important as science

fiction appears to be on the threshold of significant growth. The same forces and developments that since the end of the war have propelled "science" to the forefront of the times have also powered a relatively tremendous growth of science fiction. This literature is now regularly reaching the public for the first time via radio, movies, established book publishers, "slick" magazines as well as through the regular science fiction magazines. All indications are that this trend will accelerate in the next few years.

This growth will have important implications for the literary form science fiction will take as it accommodates itself to the mass market. Science fiction has always suffered from coterie writing. It has had isolated and small growth because of its inherent scientific nature. Thus it had a small range of interest and audience. The reader-writer interchangeability only served to make this literary form more marginal and sectarian.

However, if science fiction is to have any large commercial and propagandistic success, it faces the sizeable task of making several important technical reforms. Science fiction will have to become less involved, develop "more realistic situations which take less for granted or at least more skillfully conceal what is taken for granted." It will have to become less intellectual and more emotional. If the past history of its development plus its first entrances into the mass market are any guide, this task will indeed be sizeable. Almost whenever science fiction has previously deviated into the above mentioned paths, it has noticeably declined in quality. Science fiction so far has always shown to best advantage when written according to the standards of its small group-audience.

Future developments, which will mold the literary form and political content of science fiction, will also influence an evolution of more significant importance for practical affairs: the active political role of the scientists and their technical managerial associates. If sharp and clear political ideas are formulated in their fiction literature, it may well serve as a gauge of this strata's transformation of political theory into political action. For this group finds itself in the very center of the struggle on whether science will be employed as an executionary tool leading mankind to barbarism or as a liberating tool leading humanity to progressively revolutionized material conditions of prosperity and freedom. They themselves will help decide the future validity of their own attempts "to invent a story which may seem a possible, or at least not wholly impossible, account of the future of man."

Ralph STILES

Ralph Stiles is a student at New York University.

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60c

**The Psychology of
Nudism**

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Because in this domain one cannot put the cart before the horse. Every nation occupied by a foreign power (France underwent this sad experience for four years) must first recover its national freedom before fruitfully attacking the social problem. Does this mean that in the struggle for national liberation we must neglect social reforms and the preparation of social liberation? Certainly not. However, the second task cannot be counterposed to the first without the most dangerous confusion. It is desirable for every national movement to be accompanied by a national trade union as is the case in Tunisia. That is certainly a good formula for struggling against the economic aspect of colonialism and for producing the necessary counterweight to the native feudalists. It is significant that, when the colonial peoples follow this path, they find the colonialist administration their principal obstacle. For example, in Morocco it is the Resident-General representing the French government who opposes the creation of a national trade union by the national movement (Istiqlal) and suggests impossible solutions (partly between Europeans and Moslems, when the latter represent 8 million and the former 300,000).

Lastly, colonialism uses in support of its social sophistry the argument of the chaos that reigns in recently liberated nations (India, Middle-East). There also the argument turns against its users for this chaos is essentially the result of the colonialist policy which has been based on the feudalists against the people. Very fortunately, despite all the vicissitudes it involves, national liberation above all has had the merit of permitting the democratic and social problem to be posed. Thus in India, beside the feudal survivals encouraged by imperialist survivals, people fight to build a democratic and social republic. Having passed the national stage, the Socialist Party, which includes some of Gandhi's best disciples, works resolutely for the democratic and social revolution. What would be happening now in India if national independence had not been given to that country? It is sufficient to pose this question to oneself in good faith to denounce ipso facto the perfidious "social" sophistry of colonialism.

The "Brotherhood" of Racism

Colonialism likewise wraps itself in the flag of brotherhood and declares that its interventions are dictated by the desire to prevent one race from oppressing another in a given country. Thus, in Madagascar, for example, the colonial administration at first declared that the revolt was the result of a plot to assure the domination of the race of Hovas inhabiting the great plateau over the former slave peoples of the coast. Once this sophism was launched, it is true, it was refuted in France by the more modern specialists of the governmental parties. The latter demonstrated that the Malagasy revolt had started on the coast and that the Hova regions were generally quiet. Besides, the policy of colonization had consisted essentially in basing itself on the Hovas and favoring them. These arguments of good sense were further confirmed by the events and it was seen, on the occasion of the great Malagasy trials, that the race problem did not arise inside the national movement which had among its cadres and functionaries Malagasies of all origins. Furthermore to the extent that there is racial friction in Madagascar, the colonialist hand stirs it up. Certainly some racial differences remain, but real racism is a colonial product.

The Seretse agair which took place under England shows to what extent a government can succumb to racist pressure even though it is better than the French government by rea-

sons of its working-class origin and Laborite policy. It was undoubtedly only as a concession to the sinister Dr. Malan and his abominable regime in South Africa that the English government deliberately crushed the will of the Bamangwato people who had chosen Seretse as chief after considering and accepting his marriage to a young English woman. To those who think that the colonial peoples should be protected against racism by the tutelary intervention of the colonial administration, the Bamangwato tribe has given a noble and worthy lesson. It is evidently colonialism which supports racism. In the liberated countries, while admitting that racism persists, it will be easier to fight it and eliminate it. As long as a country is colonized, racism will remain the thousand-headed monster.

Colonialism decorates itself very freely with the tinsel of civilization. One of its essential sophisms is that it carries Western civilization. We certainly do not contest the benefits (principally technical, material, scientific, humane) of Western civilization and the necessity of benefiting all the peoples of Asia and Africa by it. What we dispute is that this civilization can be carried by colonialism. To realize a fecund exchange between different civilizations, it will be necessary to find other methods. Henceforth, colonialism can no longer carry anything but barbarism; to choose only the most eloquent, the examples of Viet Nam, Madagascar and Malaya testify to this. In Malaya, under pretext of fighting against a Communist insurrection and against terrorism, they carry on punitive expeditions against villages and shootings of hostages absolutely unworthy of the democratic nations. In Madagascar, to judge even by reports of moderate deputies admitted as well-founded by the French National Assembly, the police had recourse to tortures comparable to those of the Gestapo. The number of victims admitted at the press conference of the French High Commissioner was 60,000 to 80,000 Malagasies and about 200 French. In Indochina it is the French newspaper *Témoignage Chrétien*, directed by Father Chaillet and advised by M. Mus, director of the Colonial School, which affirmed on the basis of a report by one of its reporters that in every command post of the expeditionary corps there was a torture apparatus: "the machine to make talk." And the magazine "Esprit" [Left Catholic-S.M.], evoking the Nazi atrocities symbolized by the punitive expedition of Oradour-sur-Glane, was able to write: "In Indochina there are Oradour-sur-Glanes by the dozens". Undoubtedly excesses call forth excesses in return. Yes, it is time to put an end to colonialism if one wants to draw the correct conclusion from this victory against Hitlerism that permitted the notion of "crimes against humanity" to be established. Henceforth, any government which persists directly or indirectly in colonial methods will no longer have the right to claim to be civilized. We deny to French colonialism the right to invoke a liberal and democratic past as glorious as that of France. It is in the name of this past and essentially in the tradition of the great French Revolution that we condemn colonialism.

Colonialism and Stalinism

From a democratic viewpoint one cannot contest the right of the colonial peoples to adhere to the ideology of their choice—nationalist, socialist, communist. In this sense it is their right to seek to adapt each of these ideologies to their national situation. On this point there is no difficulty. Where difficulty arises is in connection with the possible junction between the struggle of the colonial peoples on the one hand and, on the other hand, that very special form of communism

which consists of intervention in every country of a party at the service of Russian strategy and which we call more commonly Stalinism. Given the acuteness of the conflict between the blocs, one of the principal sophisms of colonialism consists in trying to persuade the Western and Atlantic nations that the colonial peoples and their nationalist movements are in the hands of the Stalinist parties. To know how circumstantial an argument this is, it undoubtedly suffices to recall that colonialism knows how to utilize Stalinism as an agent against the national movements in the colonial countries. In Algeria for example the Stalinist party was in the vanguard of the persecutions against the national movements in 1937 and 1945 [as part of the Communist Party's collaboration with French coalition cabinets—S.M.]. And recently, the two weeklies—*L'Algérie Libre*, organ of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (led by Messali Hadj), and the *République Algérienne*, organ of the Friends of the Democratic Manifesto, recalled the about-face of those that they call the "patriots to extinction". This patriotism to extinction has permitted Stalinism to benefit from certain favors which are denied the national movement itself. In Algeria and Morocco liberty of trade union organization, of assembly, of press is complete for the Communist Parties. But it either does not exist, or in the best of cases is severely limited for the nationalist movements. All this does not prevent colonialism from pretending that these movements are in the pay of Moscow. However, we enter a situation characterized by the fact that Russia has put support to the colonial peoples on a plane of priority, while America, on the contrary, appears in certain situations a supporter of accomplices of colonialism (Viet Nam for example). This situation may permit Stalinism to infiltrate the national movements with greater facility than heretofore, and, after having obtained undeniable successes in Asia, attack Africa. But who is to blame? Who gives Stalinism its springboard if not colonialism by following the policy of the lesser evil and the most evil of policies. It is clear that all those who want each people to have free self-determination according to the rules of democracy and according to its national destiny must in the first place sweep clean their own house by putting an end to colonialism. Attachment to democracy is proven first by example and one cannot defend democracy if one defends colonialism.

Propaganda and Action

It does not suffice to denounce the sophisms of colonialism by propaganda and by writing. That is why we have created an instrument of activity on an international scale—the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism. At the present time all the great movements of the colonial peoples have this assembly with the exception of those that have preferred solidarity with a strategic bloc to solidarity with their oppressed brothers on an autonomous and independent basis. It was indeed indispensable at the very first to disengage the struggle for the liberation of the colonial peoples from any sort of mixing in political conflicts foreign to this essential and immediate objective. We certainly do not contest that these peoples have a perfect right to choose a bloc or to remain neutral. But before choosing they must exist as peoples, that is to say as a nation. In this sense, the minimum position of the Congress of Peoples is not abstract or in search of an impossible equilibrium. On the contrary it is the indispensable life-line permitting the struggle for colonial liberation to preserve its autonomy and authenticity. It is a guarantee destined to insure that the emancipation of the colonial peoples shall be

above all the work of the colonial peoples themselves whatever may be the conjunctural circumstances that may favor it.

Thus we find justified the fundamental objective of our program—to struggle for the right to independence and the right of free self-determination of peoples.

The existence of our international organization is precious not only in its own right, but also in the sense that it foreshadows by its very actions and by the links that it creates between peoples that interdependence which will be promoted by acquired or reconquered independence. The Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism represents the interdependence of the various national movements of the colonial countries, an interdependence not verbal but living, in action. That is why we have had no objection to accepting very willingly the invitation to participate in the next conference of the World Movement for World Government since it is recognized that this world government will consummate interdependence in the liberty and not in the servitude of peoples. In fact this movement recognizes the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination and to the election of governments of their own choice.

Democrats of the entire world who seize the occasion for disinterested collaboration with the colonial peoples, if they are truly imbued with the democratic and humanist ideal, if it is truly the triumph of this ideal that they seek above all and not the service of some admitted or camouflaged privileges, will be repaid a hundred-fold. For immense new resources for democracy and for human and social liberation can be found among these peoples who strive towards life. To uncover these resources, it is first necessary to liberate these peoples.

Jean Rous, Secretary-General

CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLES AGAINST IMPERIALISM

Translated by S. Mendelson.

Jean Rous, in addition to his activities with the Congress of Peoples, is chief editorialist of the independent Paris daily, *Franc-Tireur*. The Congress includes as affiliates the nationalist movements in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gold Coast, Cameroons, Uganda, Sudan, the Socialist Party of India, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party of Ceylon, groups in Viet Nam and Indonesia, organizations of Viet Namese workers and students in France and of African students in Britain, and European internationalist socialist organizations.

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California Oath Fight

It is impossible in one article to go through the entire history of the battle for academic freedom at the University of California; it is much too complex. (Suggested reading for those interested in the faculty view of the matter is George R. Stewart's little book, *The Year of the Oath*.)

In the last issue of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN, we reviewed the situation leading up to what later became known as the "compromise of April 21."

This "compromise" was as follows: The Regents were to agree to replace the loyalty oath with its almost literal equivalent in the University's employment contract, and in exchange for this "concession" those who refused to sign the contract would be afforded the opportunity of presenting their reasons before the faculty's Committee on Privilege and Tenure (the campus equivalent of a "loyalty board.")

The faculty had already agreed that "Communists should not be allowed to teach," so, in affect, it had taken the Regents' red-herring unto its bosom and would now police its own members. The Committee dutifully carried out its bargain, and inquired into the sacred and private beliefs of that "insidious minority" which had shaken the world by refusing to sign the oath. The gallant non-signers bared their thoughts to their sheepish Committee and repaired to the classroom convinced that their victory would go down in history.

But events make fools of even the best intentioned of compromisers. On August 25th, after having carefully and cynically surveyed the wreckage, the Regents renewed their demand of February 24th: *Sign or get out*. The weary spectacle had completed itself by a spiral which left the faculty in an infinitely worse position than before.

In place of the "special" oath (which many thought to be unconstitutional), they now faced the prospect of having to refuse to sign the University contract containing the same words.

The Results of the "Compromise"

The cries of "betrayal" were deafening: "The Regents have betrayed us." "They have repudiated their agreement." "They have not acted in good faith," said the faculty, wringing its hands in despair. "What compromise? What agreement?" replied the Regents, indignantly: "Are you intimating that the Regents of the University of California could cynically maneuver on the question of civilization versus barbarism?" The faculty's answer didn't have a chance, for that very issue, to their similar way of thinking, was being decided in Korea.

What's the damage? As of today the essential power over the political views of the faculty has passed to the Regents. The by-product of this exchange has been the dismissal or resignation of over eighty teaching assistants, and twenty-one (the figure was originally over 300) members of the academic Senate.

The university has furthermore been blacklisted by the American Psychological Association, and will be investigated by the American Association of University Professors.

It is the fate of this heretofore excellent institution to be

dismembered and ruined in the name of fighting Communism, while the Stalinists who have signed the oath, look on gleefully and through their front groups speak of academic freedom to the bewildered students.

Such is the pitiful record of liberalism and compromise in this once great institution. Other universities will now be offered the same stew, again in the name of clearing the remnants of Stalinism from our schools and universities. The battle for academic freedom is on. The defense of the rights of Stalinists, and all other minorities, to teach is the key to this battle. If we learn from the mistakes committed here we can be successful, otherwise the fight is lost before the first gun is fired.

Robert M. MARTINSON.

Robert M. Martinson is a student at the University of California.

Anti-Militarism at Wisconsin

ON MAY 11 DURING the annual federal inspection of the University of Wisconsin ROTC unit, nineteen students conducted an anti-militarist demonstration. While the ROTC parade was being held at the stadium, the students displayed anti-war and anti-compulsory training posters before the reviewing stand. The university police, with some violence, attempted to evict the student group; the picketers maintained their right to remain in the stadium, but offered no physical resistance, and were then escorted from the grounds.

The board of regents of the university demanded an investigation and the students were summoned individually before the Student Conduct Committee made up of faculty members and deans. The Committee placed eighteen of the students on disciplinary probation for the remainder of that semester and the next full semester. The pickets thereupon decided to appeal the decision to the University Appeals Committee; three of them did so during the summer. They did not contest the decision, but appealed on the basis that, since they would not be in attendance at the University of Wisconsin next semester and would have no way of carrying out the committee ruling, they should be removed from disciplinary probation. Their appeal was denied.

Compulsory ROTC, after an absence of many years on the campus, was instituted for first and second year college students during the Second World War. A referendum on the issue of compulsory ROTC was held and the students voted more than two to one against it. A bill to eliminate compulsory ROTC was introduced into the state legislature, but was not passed. Meetings, debates, lectures, etc., had been held by various campus organizations, and the picketing was intended as an additional public protest.

Realizing that the legality of their action might be questioned, the students had checked municipal ordinances, state statutes and university regulations and had found no prohibitions of peaceful picketing. The Student Conduct Committee disagreed with this, stating that, "... statutes would have been found, which to say the least, throw grave doubt on the legality of what was done." However it cited no such statutes

in its report. The committee's decision was based on the claim that the students interfered "... with regularly scheduled university classes or with officially authorized public exercises or ceremonies." But "interferences" which was compatible with the regents or "popular" desire had gone uncensured in the past: a demonstration on the same stadium grounds during an official ceremony against an unpopular coach and the booing of President Truman in 1948, in the University Stock Pavilion. It is most probable that a pro-ROTC demonstration would also have been patronized as "youthful enthusiasm."

Press Reactions

The committee's action was characterized by Madison's liberal paper, the *Capital Times* on May 24 as follows:

The simple and ugly fact of this decision is that it came as a result of the kind of pressure the reactionary board of regents has been putting on the university for years. . . .

The regents, through a faculty committee that refused to stand up in defense of the university traditions, has struck another blow against fundamental American rights as the university.

The faculty committee decision touched off a series of other protests. Student Board, the student government at the university, unanimously asked the committee to reverse its decision "from disciplinary probation to a more reasonable punishment not to exceed a public reprimand. The *Daily Cardinal*, the student newspaper stated in an editorial of May 24:

We don't think that the committee's harsh sentence is at all consistent with their statement that students have the right to "express protest through peaceful picketing." The penalty will only indicate that the pickets were tried on more than poor manners, that their basic rights were under fire.

We urge that the Appeals Committee abolish the disciplinary probation sentence.

The Social Action Committee of the Madison Council of Churches in a statement released on May 27 said it regretted that the

... university finds it necessary to employ its police force against students who incite no riot who apparently have violated no laws. Our chief concern about this incident is that the handling of it might possibly intimidate students in the future and dissuade them from protesting against that which their conscience cannot tolerate.

Both Madison newspapers carried several editorials. The conservative *Wisconsin State Journal* said on May 13:

The ROTC had been granted the use of the stadium for its own ceremony. The invading paraders had no right, legal or moral, to try to break it up or to turn the occasion into an 'incident' for their own propaganda.

In another of its editorials, *The Capital Times* stated on May 17:

It is not surprising to find the present big business board of regents of the university voting in the same meeting to turn down the faculty report on human rights on the campus and then voting to set up an inquisitorial board to hound and harass a group of students who exercise the right to free speech to demonstrate against compulsory ROTC on the campus. . . .

In this case the students had the courage and spirit to speak out against the mad rush to compulsory militarism in this country. They were justifiably concerned with the destruction that will inevitably come if the world continues its present insanity. After all it is they who will be doing the fighting, not the members of the board of regents. . . .

The action taken against the students is another indication of the undemocratic procedures of university administrators against free thought and expression on our campuses. The sad comment in this case is that the public press recognized more strongly the need to condemn the regents' reactionary

behavior than did the student body at large, which seems to consider ROTC as something to vote against but not to actively protest and condemn.

A University of Wisconsin Student

Socialist Anti-War Publication

ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN has received the latest issue of *Spark*, a neat mimeographed publication distributed on Los Angeles campuses by the Westwood Socialist Club (U.C.L.A.) and several other California college socialist groups. The position taken by these socialist clubs on the war is particularly welcome. The following is quoted from *Spark's* lead article on the war.

"As Socialists we cannot support the Korean war. It is a war between two imperialist forces and the people of Korea will lose regardless of which side is victorious. We condemn the Communists of North Korea for playing upon the social needs of the people to put forward a program of military aggression against South Korea. We also condemn North Korea for its domestic government which is a totalitarian regime. But we cannot support the war by the United States because it is a war to establish a government as corrupt and as reactionary as the Communist government. We condemn the United States for establishing and supporting the fascist regime of Syngman Rhee. We believe that it is just such support of fascist and reactionary regimes throughout the world by the United States that forces the people into the Communist hands and makes possible such aggression as is now taking place in Korea. Though we cannot support either side in Korea we believe there is still time to save the rest of the world from going to war for the same reasons.

"We believe that if we were to recognize the democratic and socialist forces in the world we could bring to a stop the advancements the Communists are making among the free peoples of the world. The United States support of Nationalist China and its loan to Franco Spain are, in our opinion, the actions which enlarge the world Communist movements. Support for the national aspirations of the people of French Indo-China and Indonesia are the type of actions which we believe are most effective in stopping the growth of Communism."

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Campus-World

Outlook

IT IS ADMITTEDLY difficult to judge the Students for Democratic Action's (SDA) *Campus World* or the Student League for Industrial Democracy's (SLID) *Outlook* on strictly their own merits, both of them being echoes of political lines more highly articulated in the commercial press, in the university and other more official institutions. (This in spite of *Outlook's* fine-worded, overly humble editorial entitled "A Quest for Understanding" which was unfortunately placed opposite a table of contents including among its notables Sidney Hook and Mark Starr.) And while it would be wrong to judge either of the magazines only on the basis of its politics, it must be remembered that both are political magazines. Thus the task of the critic is not to avoid political evaluations, but rather of guarding against their becoming the total of his criticism.

Poor but Welcome

It should be said, too, that it is less than vindictiveness if feelings a little stronger than disappointment are mingled with those of original welcome. And whatever the proportion of feelings, one of the first of our working principles remains unaltered: the more student publications, the better; the more student political activity, the better.

In its format and style, *Campus World* looks like *Newsweek* with just a little bit of *Time* (not thyme, *Time*) thrown in. It is imitative of these journals in size, in its three columned pages with casually captioned pictures of national celebrities, in the use of "department" headings, in its chit, in its chat, and in its attempt to give the phrase just . . . the . . . right . . . a-mount . . . of a-turn

There are differences, though. *Campus World* has Principles, liberal (i.e., contradictory) principles. On page one of *Campus World* we find under the heading of "Our Principles":

Freedom of inquiry on the campus is a basic tenet of American democracy. Students and faculty members must be protected in their right to pursue the truth. Our only guide to a teacher's competency is his ability to present subject matter with accuracy and without deliberate distortion.

We stand behind President Truman's program for civil rights. . . .

We recognize the threat of the spread of totalitarianism in Soviet expansion . . . [and therefore] . . . back the Administration's present foreign policy of a firm preparedness. . . . The Atlantic Pact is, we feel, a military necessity . . . [but] . . . Over any appreciable period, it will be the winner of the ideological battles who will come out on top in the cold war.

The Necessity for Consistency

Now SDA and *Campus World* may think they've welded a consistent program in this sequence of principled points, yet, within the sequence itself there are contradictions reflecting a cruder, less pleasant reality. If the "ideological" war must be won; if that grossest of military alliances, the Atlantic Pact, is to be supported in the name of "necessity"; if there is mounting evidence that as the war thermometer rises from "cold" to "hot" it is a "necessity" for government and institutional authorities to adopt undemocratic practices in dealing with "subversives," then what happens to those scholastic distinctions between the Atlantic Pact and the growing attack on democratic rights led precisely by the framers of the Pact?

On Page seventeen of *Campus World* there is a report on the Conference on Democracy in Education by Ted Sherris, entitled "Popular Front Flops at NY Conference." There is no need to more than note Mr. Sherris' improper use of the term Popular Front to describe the Conference. We can chalk this up to the author's political naivete. However, we cannot be so kind in judging Sherris' motives for failing to mention SDA's befuddled role in the Conference. (For details see Spring 1950 issue of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN.) He credits SDA with creation and consolidation of the Democratic Coordinating Group, the left-wing anti-Stalinist participants in the Conference. This, to be held about it, is an untruth, as all who participated in the Conference should know.

The Unanswered Questions

One question, the question, remains, and had Mr. Sherris answered it many who earnestly participated in the Democratic Coordinating Group would have forever been grateful to him. Why, after the political and organizational defeat of the Stalinists, didn't the liberals with their majority on the Continuations Committee press for a new conference, instead of allowing the whole thing to die on its feet?

We all know about the Stalinists' tactics, but the answer to this question we have yet to learn.

We have been sharply critical of this first issue of *Campus World*. Despite that, we look forward to its continued publication with the added hope that it will improve in content and thus aid in the politicalization of the campus.

In *Outlook*, the new SLID publication, the articles written by students, whatever their limitations, are three, four, five times more stimulating than those of the guest contributors. This fact may mean no more than the bankruptcy of contributions from certain quarters, but we are willing, perhaps anxious, to regard it as hopeful.

The two best articles in the issue are Gabriel Gersh's "British Labor and German Cartels" and Lou Lauer's essay on D. H. Lawrence, "The Logic of Wonder," Gersh's

article is a short tracing of the British Labor Party's change in policy from support to the German trade unions in the socialization of basic industry to their approval of returning industry to private capitalist hands. But with later developments, such as the British policy of dismantling competitive German industry, Gersh's article is somewhat dated.

Essay on Lawrence

Lou Lauer's essay suffers from what might be called the method of getting the "A" paper. Concerned with ranging Lawrence's "mystic materialism" against his own naturalism and culling quotations from Lawrence for comparing the two systems and reconciling them on the social level, a frame is created that doesn't contain Lawrence but which he only passes through. Lauer's initial insight is neither extended nor maintained and the only crucial question raised "to understand the reasons for his rejection of this philosophy [scientific materialism]"—not only becomes subsidiary to the author's main interest in Lawrence and naturalism, but receives for its brief answer what is little more than a repetition of the question: "Like Bergson, he refused to accept the mathematization of nature. And he did so because he believed it was inconsistent with the preservation of the sense of wonder, because he believed it destroyed what Wordsworth had called 'unknown modes of being.'"

Of the other articles to be noted, John Dewey's benign reprint from *The New Leader* makes the reader in the course of its short length sleepy from nodding his head in agreement. Titled "Creative Democracy," it deals exclusively with "democracy as a personal, an individual way of life." Moral to the nth degree, democracy is cut away from time to become a philosophical absolute. Professor Sidney Hook's article, "The Anatomy of Disillusionment," appearing in about its third form, remains a sort of preview-synopsis of *The God That Failed* and is left completely vitiated by that book. All that is left for the critic to do is wonder about the Olympian holier-than-thou attitude pervading and identifying Professor Hook's writing and tone. Given his subject and his present "liberal" norm for judging political conduct, past and present, one has only to throw in a few of Professor Hook's own past political affiliations and the distance maintained between himself and his subject matter becomes no longer disingenuous, but downright questionable. But that of course would be delving into personalities.

A debate on the welfare state, an analysis of "The Press and the Peekskill Riots," fairly meaningless in its conclusions, a "History of the SLID" and you have its thirty-four pages. And don't forget the introductory editorial: "A Quest for Understanding," an editorial which in effect admits: "The facts of social horror we know, but of their meaning we can't be sure."

D. LUCAS

New Populist

AS PART OF ITS anti-war program, ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN consistently opposes all bureaucratic and militaristic invasions of the democratic rights of liberal, radical, labor and all non-conformist organizations. In the present period it is encouraging to discover others who take a stand against such encroachments upon political freedom. The *New Populist*, a student quarterly published at the University of Chicago, avows this position as the principal reason for its existence. Yet, in spite of the high moral quality of the axioms of its political system, *New Populist* fails to supply the reader with conclusions of corresponding effectiveness.

We first become aware of the formal logical structure of *New Populist's* position in two editorial statements in its first issue. Here we find the two basic beliefs and the fundamental conclusions which professedly guide all its thinking on political questions. The editors start with the idea that "the single great notion that has marked the growth of western civilization . . . [is] . . . the notion of personal political freedom." There is a second "great notion": "that man is fallible, and that this malady is characteristic of all groups and classes." The conclusions, in political terms, that are to be drawn from these moral postulates, are found in the second editorial—a discussion of the problems of democratic method. And here, all we can find is that "centralization . . . and the resultant bureaucracy is often the antithesis of democratic method" and, what is more important to the problems dealt with by *New Populist*, "we must give loyalty oaths to everyone we work with in a coalition, or accept any one, on good faith. We prefer the latter."

Approach to Politics

We prefer something more than a closed rigorous axiomatic system as an approach to understanding politics. Moreover, we prefer to find something in our understanding that will enable us successfully to enter into and shape the character of political events. Of course, the *New Populist* realizes "that our ideology is unformed and that anyone may contribute to it" and therewith includes a section of three articles entitled "Morals, Nineteen-Fifty" by a University of Chicago professor, an editor of the *Catholic Worker*, and a professor of philosophical theology at the Union Theological Seminary. But these excursions into the realm of nebulous universalities as means of demonstrating the "unformed ideology" of the editors in no way alters the structure of their political analyses, though it may one day provide them a road to the camp of confirmed Stalinists or confirmed American imperialists. For the inadequacies of a position which oscillates between these camps becomes more obvious as the hostility between them is made clear for all to see.

The material in the *New Populist* then that is important to our thinking is found in another section of three articles entitled "Power, Nineteen-Fifty," particularly the report of the last CIO convention where the expulsion of the Stalinist led unions began, and the report of the last AVC convention. It is in the consideration of such real prob-

lems that the position of *New Populist* becomes clear, that the contradictions of a position that is at once Stalinoid and "democratic liberal" betray themselves.

Article on CIO

The major conclusion reached by the author of the CIO article is valid. It asserts that a dangerous precedent of dealing with opposition by expulsion has been set. Yet the author seems to share the view that the CIO, "as the best hope for a liberal answer to the Marxist appeal to the workers," was compelled to take action against a minority representing "the ideology of communism . . . a threat to American trade unionism." Nevertheless, we find that throughout the article the author presents the Stalinists as the only defenders of democracy. He concludes, however, only with "the hope that is in the hearts of the friends of CIO . . . that the role of the rank and file in the decision making processes . . . will become increasingly more important" What basis such a hope has in reality is not stated.

The article fails from the beginning to grasp the nature of the split by omitting to explain why the "threat to American trade unionism" had to be met just now. The cooperation of the Murrayites and Stalinists during the New Deal and the last war is presumably the happy result of the beautiful workings of democratic tolerance, for the author sees the real solution to the CIO situation only in an amalgam of the two bureaucratic forces. Unable to see that the Murray machine must collapse if it remains welded to the government machine and that the CP exists simply as the organ of the Moscow machine, the article never understands that securing democratic control requires an independent, anti-Stalinist labor program in opposition to the bureaucracy.

A similar criticism can be made of the AVC article. Here, the barren centrist position of the author is even more evident. In an eight-page article he discloses only a hopeless effort to keep astride the line between conciliation and expulsion of the Stalinists. He criticizes those who consistently fought right wing policy while refusing to be dragged into an alliance with the Stalinists. Yet, the author apparently considers observations of the tone and spirit of conventions pervaded by a fervor for broad cooperation more important, for he fails to justify in any broader political terms a policy which led to working agreements with the Stalinist forces.

Evasion of Basic Issues

We cannot claim, of course, that the viewpoints of the various authors are those of the editors (though the AVC article was written by the president of the editorial board), but the general structure and result of its thinking is nevertheless clear. The type of articles it solicits and their relation to the editorials show this. This thinking is dominated by its ambivalence toward political Stalinism, and its program lacks through the absence of a conception of its true reactionary character.

They have an organizational aversion to Stalinism but if they hold any basic political disagreement with the Stalinists about the "progressive" character of Russia, they remain silent on the question. This silence and the failure to discuss Stalinism and its power struggles in any political

terms broader than those of their moral postulates cancel any value their sentiments about democracy may have and point out the inadequacies of a political program so conceived. It is this alone which prevents them from moving toward a consistent anti-war position.

BILL WITTHOFT

Bill Witthoft is a student at the University of Chicago.

Upstream

NEARLY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ago a student publication, *The Dove*, made its initial appearance at Kansas University. Its articles were written with the fiery sarcasm and passion of that popular debunker, H. L. Mencken. The magazine grew in notoriety, gaining for itself the enmity of the local press in Lawrence, Kansas, and praise from Upton Sinclair, Bruce Bliven, Norman Thomas and H. L. Mencken. It could not be sustained, however, and after several years of regular publication it virtually collapsed, appearing only occasionally in the Thirties.

In the post-war years *The Dove* was revived and six issues came out during the 1946 and 1947 semesters. It was inspired mainly by veterans and when they graduated the magazine was once again discontinued.

A new student political and cultural magazine was founded two years later which was, in part, designed to carry on the better traditions of *The Dove*. This magazine, *Upstream*, has appeared regularly since February 1949. Its contents are divided among local college events, cultural articles and political discussion. It is by far one of the best student magazines this reviewer has read.

Organized political activity at Kansas University is limited. There is a chapter of the Committee on Racial Equality and a growing student Co-ops movement. This relative political quietude at the university makes it all the more remarkable that a radical political (at least, semi-political) magazine can keep going.

Upstream's editorial policy is not easily defined. Perhaps it can be described as militantly liberal and socialistic. It repudiates Stalinism as a reactionary and totalitarian force at the same time that it warns its readers against placing their faith in the American bloc.

In its March 1950 issue the editors sum up their views of the American-Russian conflict as follows:

What we are concerned with, here, is the fundamental problem that underlies the political struggles of our world. As we see it, the issue is not, capitalism versus Communism, laissez-faire versus socialist economy. It goes deeper than that, it is the conflict between two different approaches to politics, to the whole of the life of society. The issue is mass civilization versus cooperative living, rule of the few (elected or not) over the many who do not know what is going on and are not concerned about it—or responsible participation of all.

The conflict is not between Adam Smith and Marx, or Herbert Hoover and Joseph Stalin. The conflict is between Jefferson, English Labor, most of Euro-

pean Socialism on the one hand, and Hamilton, Stalin, and the extreme corruptions of authoritarianism in Greece and in Spain.

However, the entire editorial is not as ludd as the above. In the same article the Stalinists in France and Italy are favorably referred to as being "very often the only efficiently organized opposition to the trend toward the clerical, reactionary policies of the Catholic parties." This is followed in the very next paragraph by, "Experience seems to teach, however, that once in power the Communist parties forget their concern for freedom, for the dignity of each human being, and so on, and ruthlessly march toward the setting up of an extremely efficient machinery that will build up a powerful state, and mould the people into Communist conformity." The error made by the editors is in not fully understanding the connection between the superficial "positive" quality of European Stalinism out of power and the role of the Communist parties once in power. Stalinism cannot be politically judged unless the logical connection is made between its "positive" appeal, where it has no power and its true totalitarian character once in power. For within this connective framework Stalinism can be seen as a consistently reactionary force which must be politically fought against and exposed at every turn.

An article in the same issue of *Upstream* to be highly recommended is a factual and cogent political analysis of Franco Spain by one of the magazine's editors. Considerable information from the Spanish press is culled by the author giving the reader a closer view of the Franco dictatorship. The article concludes with an appeal against an American alliance with Franco which is contemplated in Washington's diplomatic circles:

Must the errors of the past be repeated? Is it always necessary to compromise a good cause by dubious alliances? For it is not possible to ally oneself to Stalins and Francos and still keep up the pretension to fight for democracy. A war in which an American unit would fight shoulder to shoulder with a phalangist unit is no more a war for democracy; it is nothing but a struggle for supremacy between governments, in which all ideals and higher interests of humanity are disregarded or betrayed.

Upstream and ANVIL STUDENT PARTISAN can each contribute something to the revitalization of political life on the campus. The similarity does not end there. Despite differences in approach both magazines represent a current among student opinion which will not buckle down to the war aims of the American camp and is opposed to the camp of totalitarian Stalinism. Both publications feel the need for a third political force which will consistently battle for democracy and thereby necessarily maintain its independence from Washington and Moscow.

It is to be hoped for that the students at Kansas University who support *Upstream* will not restrict their efforts to that school alone but will seek out and cooperate with all student organizations of similar persuasion and outlook.

Julius JACOBSON

From the Student's Bookshelf

THE COCKTAIL PARTY

by T. S. Eliot

Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1950.

THE COCKTAIL PARTY fails on many levels. The verse itself is limp, having neither the lyric grandeur nor the psychological wit of that in *Murder in the Cathedral*, neither the colloquial elegance nor metaphoric gaiety of that in *Sweeney Agonistes*; line for line, it is even worse than that of *The Family Reunion*, and often goes well below the nadir established by portions of *The Rock*. In Mr. Eliot's historic effort to bring the poetic drama back to the popular medium, he has tried to meet it on its own terms in *The Cocktail Party* by crossbreeding dramatic poetry with brittle drawing-room comedy. I believe that he has not succeeded in this fusion. It is easy, on the other hand, to concede what is only obvious: he has written a comedy with enough theatrical banality and character-stereotyping to create a Broadway success that is a "prize play." But these vulgar elements, like the clever acting which went straight to the hearts of Broadway theatre-goers, are of critical importance only to those whose profession or affection it is to be optimistic about "the theatre."

Let us confine ourselves here to the author's better part, such as it be. A characteristic device in Eliot's poetry has been the phrase or situation resonant with overtones and echoes of the literary past. The author of *The Cocktail Party* has not abandoned the artistic method that made him famous and attracted the admiration of refined sensibilities; he has, however, modified that method here in a most unhappy way. To take a famous example, the lines from *The Waste Land*,

A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many
I had not thought death had undone so many,

evoke that scene in Dante's *Divine Comedy* depicting the fate of those whom not even Hell would receive since they are neither good nor evil, being unrelated to the religious consciousness. The evocation adds a terrifying overtone to the scene Mr. Eliot describes, and not for one moment do we think about the inferiority of *The Waste Land*, as a total work, to *The Divine Comedy*. Such a comparison is not in question. We are made to feel what Mr. Eliot wants us to feel, not that his poem, but that our world, our time, is inferior to the world and time of Dante.

An Artistic Failure

In vain may the literary "resonances" of *The Cocktail Party* be searched for those rewarding reverberations that have made the study of most of Eliot's work heretofore fruitful. What such expanding meanings now make us feel, what they mercilessly underline, is the failure of *The Cocktail Party* as a work of art. Two very available examples support this harsh conclusion. In Eliot's play, Lavinia Chamberlayne has left her husband, Edward. The

semi-mythical party guest, Sir Henry Harcourt-Riley, promises Chamberlayne that he will return his wife to him. He cautions him, however, to greet Lavinia as a stranger, as if she were from the dead. Inevitably evoked is Euripides' *Alcestis*, for Sir Henry's caution is just what Heracles imparts to Admetus after bringing Alcestis literally back from the dead in Euripides' tragedy. What is the significance of the modern overtone? We remember the reunion scene from the antique play and await the reunion of Lavinia and Edward Chamberlayne. When it comes, the insipidity is appalling. Of course, Eliot means the scene to be touching, mysteriously moving, and the "resonance" is probably intended to confer an affectionate irony on the whole play. But it is a special failure of Mr. Eliot's art, I believe, that this should be his calculation. The key to the failure is not far to seek. In *The Waste Land*, the poet does not love the people flowing over London Bridge; he despises, he pities, but he does not love them. In *The Cocktail Party*, he has decided to love people whom Dante, I feel sure, would not have put in Hell because their sins are not vital or interesting enough. The love their author has for them (through his surrogate, Sir Henry) is of a restricted, almost pedantic kind; he loves them just enough to give them advice, and the advice is not to change but simply to be more of what they already are. What Edward and Lavinia Chamberlayne "already are" involves another outstanding overtone of the play.

Passivity as a Valve

This is keynoted by the almost supernatural identity of that curious ecclesiastic in the guise of psychiatrist, Sir Henry Harcourt-Riley. His mysterious control over the machinery of the plot is reminiscent of the Duke's like control in *Measure for Measure*. The Duke brings his couple together again by a ruse: he gets them unknowingly to sleep together. Sir Henry tells the Chamberlaynes they should continue together because they should be "content to be the fools they are." That is, "fools" should not have love affairs outside matrimony, "fools" should not quarrel with each other, "fools" should not separate. Once married, "fools," regardless of inescapable dullness and feelings of frustration, should live with each other without hope of alteration and be as pleasant with each other as it is possible for fools to be. This, in substance, is the advice which effects the reconciliation between Eliot's passionless pair. Written out thus, it is hard to believe that Sir Henry is not intended to be a farcical character, a sort of latterday Polonius, but it is the unhappy truth that he is the animating, all too crucial intelligence of the serio-comedy. The great Duke of *Measure for Measure* is earnestly philosophical, questioning profoundly the relation of Judeo-Christian morality to human passion. Set reverberatively against the Shakespearian character, the drawing-room figure of Sir Henry is more didactic and smug, has more

the ring of a Noel Coward with his collar on backward, than he would otherwise have had and have been. His overt recommendation of moral passivity as a value—something which by modern standards would be considered a doubtful condescension—seems, in the spotlight of the literary past, a subtle and far-reaching depravity.

For many years, Eliot has tried to evolve a Christian doctrine that would be orthodox, personal, and widely serviceable. His labors, by now, have brought him to the most vulnerable point of his art and ethical dignity. Patently, Sir Henry Harcourt-Riley represents a pseudo-philosophical pastiche of clergyman and psychiatrist whose dramatic purpose is to discredit the serious rational element of psychiatry, which assumes that religiously dedicated marriage should not stand in the way of sexual adjustment. Above all, implies Mr. Eliot's controversial moral, any human attempt "to adjust" must not be *rational*, for man's rational wisdom can never, according to theology, approach God's "irrational" wisdom, which is absolute, implicit, and unquestionable. The Christian doctrine of man's foolishness when confronted finally by Divine Wisdom has produced some beautiful poetry (notably some by Yeats) but in Sir Henry's mouth, the poetry amounts to no more, at best, than prose which sounds at best, pretty.

The greatest failure of *The Cocktail Party* lies securely at the core of its explicit morality. Sir Henry states:

Neither way is better.
Both ways are necessary. It is also necessary
To make a choice between them.

This choice presented to human society (supposedly by God himself) is to be a fool or a saint. The arbitrary limiting of the possibilities of human experience and achievement is easily the most morally vicious thing in the play. Celia Copplestone, the character destined for the saintly choice, is martyred while proselytizing primitive aborigines to bring them into the Christian community, where, according to Sir Henry, they will have the same limited alternatives of being fool or saint. Our awareness of this formal plan negates any tragic effect of Celia Copplestone's death, so that what should be noble—and it is she and her death that really matter to Mr. Eliot—becomes trivial and irritating. The play is more self-destructive than it knows when its characters raise their Martinis and Manhattans to Celia Copplestone's memory. The gesture may be Park Avenue and Mayfair chic, but it isn't artistic or theological cricket.

To appreciate the best in Mr. Eliot's play, which is very little indeed, it is essential to be a Christian. But a point which Mr. Eliot does not consider is that, after all, there are other, and very traditional, ways of being a Christian, even a Christian dogmatist; for example, being a George Herbert or a Jacques Maritain, a poet or a philosopher. Even if neither priest nor poet nor philosopher, one might just try sincerely to be reasonably intelligent, and to apply rational methods to the solution of inter-personal problems. The basic truth is (however unflattering to the Chamberlaynes of the world) that it isn't necessary to be dumb suburbanites, divided or apart, to be fools before God.

CHARLES THAYER

A FIELD OF BROKEN STONES

by Naeve

Libertarian Press, 1950

PRISON ETIQUETTE

An Anthology

Retort Press, 1950

FEW PEOPLE, I THINK, could read this terse account of over four years in American prisons without responding to the fidelity, precision and earnestness of the author who was arrested in 1940 for tearing up his registration card and refusing to become a part of the army system. Naeve hails from a small Iowa farm and his pacifist ideas spring from very intuitive feelings (both his parents disapprove of the stand he takes). He bucks the war because of this straight, ice-clear, unintellectualized conviction: *I should not kill anyone*. Subjectively rooted and very strong, this belief compels him to do what he does.

In Danbury, Naeve goes on hunger strikes and employs different tactics (such as running around during count period, going limp, erecting barricades) in order to gain for himself and others certain "concessions"—a longer exercise period or the abandonment of Jim Crow—but I feel a deeper sympathy with him when he does something much simpler during an interval between jail terms. Expecting to be resentenced, he goes to the U. S. Court House steps. Sitting down in a central position he begins to describe to all who will listen—passersby, government workers—his experiences in Danbury, his intention to hungerstrike, beatings that occurred; in short order he has a crowd that around him listening avidly. That he was quickly silenced by anxious cops proves he was on the right track here. Naeve's comment: "How efficiently protected are the U. S. attorneys and other officials from public criticism (free speech)." Indeed.

Much might be accomplished if people would courageously pause in public places here and there and speak honestly of their public-private lives... One of the wonderful things about *The Pilgrim's Progress* is the way Christian goes forth, pack on back, and talks openly to everyone he encounters. He even tries to communicate to such iron-clad creatures as Mr. Worldly Wiseman and Obstinate and Presumption. The point is: he talks directly, simply to everyone; the Nazis were wise to be terribly afraid of people who talked, who contrived to pass around the good word, *even who whispered*.

Activities in Prison

With great vividness and—almost—nonchalance, Naeve presents his story, often detaching himself from prison incidents with the neatness that one takes a bandage from a wound. He is at his best when he gives the uninventable detail: the gum-label with the slogan FREEDOM NOW that the prisoners stick to their cells; the episode of the pill; the tangible feeling of time. In two places he declares "I just wanted to be let alone to live my own life." Nothing balks the state more than this hard self-rooted type of individualism. No one of course ever remains alone to live his own life; he is connected by steel-strong Lilliputian threads to everyone else (a fact that

Naeve knows and puts into action, for in prison his group-solidarity grows and he puts himself out on a limb for others).

It is interesting to see these slim connective ties work in the segregation cells—an unknown man glimpsed in a distant window becomes the signal for near-riot. Toward the end Naeve parts from his friends; one by one they are transferred or released. When his own time gets short, he decides to refuse the monetary dismissal gift of the government. The reader has the impression that Naeve has developed an inextinguishable—or almost—core of resistance. Hopkins said (and I think Naeve might also) "I find myself something most determined and distinctive, more distinctive and higher-pitched than anything else I see. I find myself with my powers and experiences more important to myself than anything I see. When I consider that taste of myself which is more distinctive than ale or alum... I see that nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch." Naeve (and Dave Wieck, his collaborator) deserve credit for showing us that individuals with this richly-stacked sense of self still exist.

Part of the excitement of *A Field of Broken Stones* lies in watching a consistent line of development; seeing Naeve struggle to decide what to do from one hardly-gained point to the next. Since *Prison Etiquette* is an anthology written by inmates who often seem to have little in common, it cannot offer this type of excitement. But out of its score of contributions come a variety of insights. Howard Schoenfeld sensitively reports a war objectors' strike and cleverly investigates radical-versus-liberal psychology. With wry humor and tense emotion Curtis Zahn writes about the specialized ethos of the Tucson Road Camp. Bernard Phillips' paper analyzes the process of prisonization and gives perhaps the best overall picture. I can add a little to his section *Individualism*.

A friend told me that whenever he was conducted from one cell-block to another, the guard would go through a set procedure. Reaching a door that had to be unlocked, he would step back and let his prisoner precede. Although he did this as a safety-precaution, of course, each time my friend would punctiliously half turn, bow and in an ironic voice say, "Thank you." By this means he managed to express as much contempt as the human voice could hold for the need to obey orders and his two words also composed a symmetrically beautiful reversal of courtesy.

When I was in the stockade at Dix, a group of us got into a general discussion; the talk turned to capital punishment. A Negro said with great emphasis: "No man was meant to know when he'd have to die. That's a thing God wouldn't do to an animal."

Prison Etiquette should be widely read. A good epigraph for it might have been T. S. Eliot's remark: "Man rightly plumes himself on being the only rational animal but he overlooks the fact that he is also the only irrational animal."—That goes for guards, inmates and Prison Board....

Howard GRIFFIN

Howard Griffin's poetry has been published in *Accent* and in other magazines.

PROGRAM of the **NEW YORK STUDENT FEDERATION AGAINST WAR**

The primary aim of the New York Student Federation Against War is to organize all students opposed to the war drives of Russian and American imperialism which threaten the very existence of world civilization.

We aim to prevent the polarization of the American student into the reactionary war camps of either Russian or American imperialism.

We do not believe that the threatening war is inevitable. We believe that a militant anti-war student movement can be an effective force to prevent a Third World War.

I. AGAINST WAR PREPARATIONS

We oppose all social, economic, and political preparations for war on the part of Russian and American imperialism.

Therefore, we oppose:

1. The 15 billion dollar war budget.
2. Conscription, Universal Military Training and the ROTC.
3. The use of atomic energy for war purposes.
4. The growing militarism of the American government.
5. The North Atlantic Pact and the American subsidization of the military machines of Western Europe.
6. The bolstering of reactionary regimes in Greece and Turkey.

Therefore, we favor:

1. Repeal of the draft.
2. Withdrawal of all occupation troops throughout the world.
3. Colonial freedom and the right of self-determination for all oppressed people.
4. Letting the people decide; a national referendum on war.
5. Granting amnesty and restoration of full civil rights to all those imprisoned or who lost their civil rights because of their opposition to World War II.

II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The assault on academic freedom and civil liberties is a part of American imperialism's preparation for war through methods which resemble the totalitarian techniques of the Russian police state.

Therefore, we oppose:

1. The attempt to straight-jacket the American campus through legislation like the Feinberg Bill.
2. All forms of racial and religious discrimination among students and faculty as attempted through the quota system and segregated schools.
3. Faculty and administration supervision of student organizations.
4. The suppression of political minorities through the use of such legislation like the Smith Act.

Therefore, we favor:

1. Effective student government of student affairs.
2. Complete freedom of political expression for students and faculty members.
3. The right of students to organize on campus for their political opinions.
4. The abolition of all government subversive lists, loyalty oaths, and such bodies as the House Un-American Activities Committee.
5. Passage of a Civil Rights program and the repeal of the Smith Act.

III. EDUCATION

1. For a free state university.
2. For a universal free college education.
3. For the right of students and faculty to organize and strike.

IV. LABOR

1. The NYSFAW seeks to establish close ties with the labor movement and to actively cooperate with all sections of the labor movement in the fight against the drive to war.
2. We oppose all efforts to destroy the independence of the labor movement, and therefore are in favor of the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and all similar legislation.

Interest and Membership

If you are interested in joining or receiving more information about the *New York Student Federation Against War*, fill out the blank below accordingly and mail to the Federation at 247 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

I WANT TO JOIN I WANT MORE INFORMATION

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247 Lexington Ave. New York, N. Y.