

# anvil

*a student anti-war quarterly*

***The Concept of Modern Imperialism***

by **BERT HOSELITZ**

***Celine: Disintegration of a Novelist***

by **IRVING HOWE**

***Franco Spain and Power Politics***

by **JUAN ANDRADE**

***Art and Propaganda of George Orwell***

by **AVEL AUSTIN**

***Senator Paul Douglas: A Case Study***

by **AL L. NIMSEY**

***Conference on Democracy in Education***

by **J. GROSSMAN, S. BOTTONE, B. CORNFELD**

***Editorials • Reviews • Poems • Letters***

and student partisan



Spring Quarter 1950

# anvil a student anti-war quarterly and student partisan

Volume II, No. 2



Spring Quarter, 1950

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## Facts and Figures

THE FIRST PRINTED ISSUE of ANVIL went over the top—way over. We anticipated a sale of three thousand. But three weeks after the magazine started selling on campus it was obvious that we would need at least another thousand. To make sure we weren't caught short again, a second printing of two thousand was run off. Of this number, half have been sold already and by the time this issue will hit the campus there will be only a few hundred left for our files.

Below is a breakdown of sales to date. Bear in mind that in several schools sales are still going on and at others they have just begun.

Brooklyn College Day Session.....	700
Brooklyn College Evening Session.....	200
Columbia University .....	550
City College Day Session.....	150
City College Evening Session.....	250
New York University .....	375
Off-campus bundle orders.....	300
Newsstand and neighborhood bookstores .....	250
Out-of-New York schools.....	1400
(Includes Chicago, Detroit, Oberlin, St. Louis, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Buffalo, Akron, Berkeley, Mexico City and at least a dozen other localities.)	
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>4175</b>

The initial press run for this issue will be five thousand. We have every reason to believe that ANVIL, which is now merged with STUDENT PARTISAN into a national anti-war magazine, will get the increased circulation it deserves.

The Editorial Board voted to keep the price of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN down to fifteen cents! We doubt if there is another student magazine in the country that can boast of so much for so little. Our accounts on the last issue are not complete but they indicate that we suffered a financial loss. We hope that this one solemn note will inspire our friends and all those who feel the need for the continued publication of our magazine at its present price to come to our aid.

There are any number of campus groups and individual students who should order ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN but have not done so yet. Order via a postcard or letter to the New York Student Federation Against War, 247 Lexington Ave., New York 16, N. Y. Your bundle will be sent within a week.

The editors of ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN wish to express their thanks to Tomorrow magazine for permission to reprint the article by Irving Howe, which has been revised by the author.

### ANVIL and STUDENT PARTISAN ADVERTISING RATES

\$50.00 for a full page  
\$25.00 for a half page  
\$12.50 for a quarter page  
\$6.25 for an eighth page  
(Copy must be received at least ten days before publication date)

## The Editorial Board Takes the Floor

### Comments on the H-Bomb, Academic Freedom, Spain

**THE DEVELOPMENTS DURING** the last month showed firm "progress" and a helpless reaction. The "progress" was a published proposal reprinted in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* advising that the uranium detonator on the hydrogen bomb be surrounded with lithium hydride because it should give twice as much energy per pound as fissioning uranium. The helpless reaction was from prominent physicists who publicly admitted that the bomb when used might destroy all civilization, but offered no proposal to prevent its development.

Scientists, despite their benevolent contempt for politics and despite their passionate thirst for "pure" knowledge, are being catapulted onto the political stage. They are being forced to reconsider their relationship to the rest of society. The sheer irony of the situation could be dwelt upon were it not for the intensity and pitch of the same political situation that causes the scientist his dilemma.

Russian, German, Austrian and American physicists, from the viewpoint of the outsider, seem to be completely without coherent political, social, or ethical values. The ease with which German scientists changed employers after Germany's defeat is breathtaking to anyone without the protective apparatus of today's cultural cynicism; some are now working for Russia, others for America and England. The well-disciplined American physicist is no more advanced than the scientists of fifty years ago who argued that the ends of science are determined by those who employ it. Generally speaking, the talented masters of the laboratory behave on the emotional level of science-fiction characters. Their ethical problems are primitive, naive and almost inarticulate from a cultural point of view. The best that can be said for their few utterances which try to place nuclear physics within some human perspective is that they exhibit a cultural split, a sort of scientific schizophrenia.

The arena for decisive action is left to the "statesmen." Of these, Acheson is probably the most sophisticated. Consider in this light his statement made in California that what separates Russia and the United States "is a moral issue of the clearest nature" or that it is a difference in philosophy between the view which claimed "a monopoly of the knowledge of what was right, and what was wrong for human beings" and a philosophy of freedom. These statements, in the light of what we know about the political, economic conflicts between Russian imperialism and American imperialism, sound like the statements of a schoolboy awkwardly combining ignorance with clumsy half-truths.

With the announcement of "total cold war" as a new feature of American foreign policy toward Russia, Acheson's fastening on to the ideological aspect of the struggle as prime cause can sound only a hollow note. It also reveals our own ideological bankruptcy: new policy but same words; same tired, old words to which only automata respond.

Humanity, suffering the indignities of these leading men who are unable to prevent their own steady march to an unheroic, unscientific physical and cultural extinction, goes through the motions of working and living in an atmosphere which no previous century in the recorded history of Western civilization could have understood.

Our small voice in the midst of this bedlam is not meant to be reassuring. It is meant to be sane, to tear away the brocade and stuffing tacked by cynical upholsterers over the framework of political, moral and cultural problems, and to think in terms of a humanistic science.

We do not have the fatalism which by now must be characteristic of Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Belgians, and all those European countries overrun by the boots of imperialist armies in two world wars. This makes the situation harder to accept, but easier to protest.

### anvil and student partisan

**ANVIL**, published by the New York Student Federation Against War, has been merged with **STUDENT PARTISAN**, published by the Politics Club of the University of Chicago. In addition, the Socialist Club of Roosevelt College (Chicago) is now a sponsor of **ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN** and is represented on the editorial board.

The merger of these student publications is just the beginning; an important initial step in the direction of reorganizing a militant, national anti-war student movement. We look forward to an ever growing number of supporters from individual students, college clubs and off-campus student organizations.

The success of **ANVIL** in terms of sales is graphic evidence of the perceptible rise of student interest in political affairs. The warm reception it received is no less encouraging. These successes will be expanded in our national publication.

The threat of war, the contracting job market for college graduates, the growing number of anti-democratic acts by college administrations will inevitably develop a wider and more sympathetic student audience for **ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN**. An increasing number of students will look upon the minimum program of the magazine's sponsoring clubs as a realistic program; one which is based upon the realities of political life and expresses the immediate needs of the student body.

There is no reason why all socialist, pacifist and other less narrowly defined anti-war clubs should not follow the examples of the University of Chicago Politics Club and the Roosevelt College Socialist Club. The program of **ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN** is broad, its pages are open for discussion of differences of opinion. Given these two factors, we are confident that in its next issue **ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN** will have a number of new sponsors.

# Lawmakers vs. Students

**THE ATTACK ON ACADEMIC** freedom is gaining momentum. The Feinberg Law has been upheld by the Court of Appeals; the frightful Maryland Ober Law has likewise been validated. An alleged Communist teacher is fired from the New York school system without a public hearing while a fascist instructor who committed overt acts against Jewish and Negro students in a New York school is white-washed by the authorities.

The issue of academic freedom is no longer between school administration and student body; it is more than that; it is between lawmakers and student body. Our legislatures are in large part composed of unusually stupid and bigoted men. The American politician has never been noted for his intellect but we will hazard the accusation that never have so many lawmaking bodies been composed of so many vicious and ignorant men as is the case today. These men are now assuming the responsibility of deciding what is to be taught, who is to teach and how students are to behave on campus. We object to this legislative army of occupation on the American campus.

The anti-student campaign is not an isolated phenomena. It is only one manifestation of a campaign against the American population as a whole. The Taft-Hartley Law is the national legislative counterpart of the Feinberg Law; the Ober Law has its parallels in the Smith Act and the Mundt Bill. And the lawmakers who are responsible for these various laws and bills have the same basic motivation: to get the nation to conform to the needs of the cold war.

However, the student body is being shaken out of its lethargy by the crassness of anti-student legislation. This encouraging by-product of legislative reaction can go a long way toward stemming the tide. Without an awakened student body the legislatures (and the conspiracy between them and many college administrations) can impose whatever they will. A live student body, on the other hand, is indispensable for smashing the authoritarian dictums of the politicians. Rallies, protest meetings, demonstrations, petitions, united front student committees to defend academic freedom are some of the techniques which will make the political hacks sit up and take notice.

There is also the need for united action of student and non-student who are being victimized in a similar manner and for essentially the same reasons. A more concrete suggestion to student organizations fighting for academic freedom is to seek support from and offer the same to the labor movement on civil rights issues. The labor movement is the largest organized progressive force in America which can be made to realize that the fight against the Taft-Hartley Law is also the fight against the Feinberg Law.

## Aid the Spanish Anti-Fascists

**ELSEWHERE IN THIS ISSUE** is an article written for ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN by Juan Andrade, a leader of the Spanish POUM (Workers Party of Marxist Unity). This article is more than a political analysis; it is a record of human suffering and it is an eloquent testimony to the ability of human beings to withstand the morally and politically corroding influences of personal tragedy and political defeat.

It is difficult for the average American college student to understand this kind of courage. He has not experienced physical deprivation, he is not homeless, his memories are not saddened and tortured by the names of friends and comrades killed in the civil war or suffering the indignities of a Franco jail. Perhaps no one can expect the American student body as a whole to understand this heroism.

But the least that we can expect is that the story of the Spanish resistance to Franco from within and without will help to dissolve the unfitting cynicism worn by many American students who have already joined the ranks of the super-annuated ex-radicals; young people who are "tired" with and by political activity and the "hopelessness of it all."

To these students we can only say: there is no moral justification for your refusal to engage in politics, there is no political justification for your final decisions that all is lost and hopeless. Evidence of our stand can be found in the thousands of Spanish anti-fascists who have risen above their defeats of the past and the bleakness of the immediate future.

A committee organized by the "Fédération Espagnole des Déportés et Internés Politiques" (FEDIP) has circulated the appeal which follows in full:

"A committee for the help and protection of Spanish democrats has been founded on the initiative of the Fédération Espagnole des Déportés et Internés Politiques. The sole object of this committee is to help the victims of a historical injustice, which is perpetuated through the complicity or silence of those who have the possibility to end it.

"The men who compose this committee feel that they have the duty to limit, as far as is possible, the effects of this injustice. Being unable, as yet, to re-establish freedom in Spain, they want, at least, to preserve Spanish lives in order to assure the future of this freedom. This is not a political question, but one of the solidarity of free men. The committee calls on these free men, whatever their viewpoint may be, to join it, so that an international force may be created which will help to preserve as much as possible of that Spain in exile or in the prisons, which is, for us, the real Spain."

On page 26 a form issued by the FEDIP for financial aid is reprinted. We hope that our readers will contribute to these political prisoners and their families.

That is the least we can do.

## FREE-FORMS

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# Franco Spain and Power Politics

## *Anti-fascism Sacrificed to International Diplomacy*

**THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFINITIVE**, official recognition of the Spanish dictatorship as the policy which the United States government intends to pursue with respect to the Franco regime was established in Mr. Acheson's letter of January 19 to American Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and with it the intention of rendering it economic assistance and the wish to integrate the Spanish autocracy into the "concert of democratic nations of the world." The essential considerations on which the American Secretary of State bases the new criterion can be summarized according to his own declaration as follows: "There is no sign of any other alternative to the present government. . . . The internal position of the present regime is strong and it enjoys the support of numerous persons who, although they might prefer another form of government or another chief of state, fear that chaos and civil war would be the consequences of measures adopted to overthrow the existing regime."

Diplomatic hypocrisy is rich in the imagination required to find new formulas to serve its needs. The argument used in behalf of Francoist Spain has the same validity for all totalitarian regimes of the Stalinist type, towards which the policy of Mr. Acheson is totally different. Obviously, there is "no other alternative to the existing government" because the popular will has no means of expressing itself and all political organization is prohibited. Nevertheless, for years there has existed a republican government-in-exile representing the continuity of constitutional legality which was suppressed in 1939 through the joint efforts of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Spanish generals. The anti-Francoists, both inside Spain and in the emigration, have proposed and continue to propose holding truly free elections to decide freely the destiny of the Spanish people as a solution to the Spanish problem. Mr. Acheson wishes to deny the latter possibility, the democratic way of ascertaining the real desire of the Spanish people. He wants to accept in fact the continuation of the existing Franco government as the only solution to the problem of Spain, and to aid it financially so that it can face its economic difficulties.

### **Spain as a Pawn of War**

It is evident, especially since 1945, that the "Spanish problem" is a fundamental factor in the preparation of the next war, and it is no less true that honest opinion on the freedom of the country is overwhelmed by the cold war of the two power blocs. Conscious of this situation, the Falangist camarilla bides its time and conserves its strength. All during this century, Spain has never freely decided its fate and its politics have always been determined from outside. The monarchy of Alphonse XII ruled peacefully by means of foreign financial influence. The *Compania de Rio Tinto*, or the Telegraph and Telephone Company, imposed its laws on the Spanish economy more efficiently than its successive governments. In the middle of 1936, this repression of the Spanish people was decided by force of arms. The country was converted into a proving ground: Germans and Italians in the Franco army; Russian officials and the NKVD in the republican camp. The

nominally democratic countries acted as spectators in the development of the conflict.

In actuality, all policies of the big powers with respect to Spain are determined exclusively by two objectives: first, the strategic situation of the country and the possibilities of its utilization in the next war; second, by the preponderant influence which Stalinism might obtain if a change took place in the Spanish political regime. The two considerations are outside the realm of the democratic and moral principle of free determination of peoples and at the same time fundamental political errors so far as the very tactic they wish to carry out is concerned.

In the first place, the past war has demonstrated that there are no natural obstacles to modern arms and that the step of the Pyrenees can be avoided in a peninsular country bathed by the sea on almost every boundary. The Francoist army displays all the characteristics of a Praetorian guard or that of an oligarchy which is internally strong but incompetent and ineffective for any encounter with a foreign army. Furthermore, an army which enjoys the hostility of the great majority of the country is an instrument destined to fall apart at the first threat of battle because its cadres are organized solely as adjuncts of internal policy. The American senators and generals who visited Spain may have eulogized Franco's military power, but it is not to be believed for a moment that the American General Staff relies only on this military power to stop the Red Army in the Pyrenees mountains.

If there is one country in the world where the workers' movement is genuinely immunized against any Stalinist designs, that country is Spain. The explanation is easy to understand: during the civil war the workers went through the experience of a regime led by Moscow and its agents and therefore they do not want to see repeated in any manner the reign of terror, assassination of dissidents, subjection through repression and the denial of all freedoms, including those of a trade-union character. This experience in itself has convinced the Spanish workers that the best means of combating Stalinism is to prevent it from occupying positions of power in the workers' movement and in the country, since once it has occupied them it is very difficult to dislodge.

However, in accordance with the developing international situation in relation to Spain, it is apparent that the state of mind among those workers who suffer the Franco tyranny directly, inside the country, differs from that among the emigration. Faced with the material impossibility of overthrowing Francoism by force and anxious to improve their conditions of hunger and misery, it cannot be denied that the workers and the people in general place certain hopes for settlement of the "Spanish problem" in an international agreement for self-determination of the peoples based on promises by the big powers. Faced with the reality of a policy which has as its only objective the consolidation of the Franco regime, many desperate and anxious workers allow themselves to be influenced by Stalinist propaganda and hope for assistance from the Soviet Union which will permit them to reestablish their liberties. Attitudes such as that taken by Mr. Acheson are the best propaganda Moscow could hope for to awaken a movement of sympathy towards it among Spanish opinion. On the

other hand, among what is referred to as the emigration, there is a better understanding of the international problem as a whole. The emigration knows that the Soviet Union never went so far as to recognize the republican government in exile in order that it might always have its hands free for a possible tactic of compromise with Franco himself. It also knows that, to Stalinism, the Spanish question is but another weapon in the cold war.

Since the defeat by force of arms in March 1938, the Spanish people have not ceased fighting for their freedom. Its struggle has taken different forms, from tenacious resistance behind the Falangist lines to constant guerrilla attacks and individual terrorist actions. The Spanish people in Spain have launched an extraordinary struggle with such inferior means that any tangible result is out of the question. There was never a better occasion for the defeat of Francoism than when the Germans were defeated in France and thousands of Spanish refugees, who had fought in the maquis, found themselves armed and even mobilized in battle formation.

From the moment the Allied forces disembarked in France, the real political center of the Spanish emigration shifted to the latter country. Just as the Communists alone had integrated their forces and maintained relations with the outside through the apparatus of the French Communist Party, they were also the only ones who made concerted efforts in a concrete sense, by raising the same slogan in France, America and Spain. In Mexico, where the official leadership of the party resided, they fed on propaganda designed to place all authority of the emigration under a so-called "National Spanish Union" (Union Nacional Espanola) which was supposed to speak for and represent abroad a so-called "Supreme Junta" which was said to operate inside Spain and to be composed of all parties, including monarchist generals and Gil Robles, leader of the Catholic party. The latter was a fraud invented in Mexico by the Central Committee of the Spanish Communists for the purpose of delivering the entire emigration to the Stalinist leadership on the basis of a supposed national antifranquist concentration. The slogan was: "All power to the Supreme Junta."

#### Question of the "Supreme Junta"

When one asked for explanations about the members of the aforementioned "Supreme Junta" the question was deemed a provocation "to try to expose those who, under constant threat of being assassinated by Franco, carry on the struggle in Spain." Inside Spain, nobody knew of the existence of this "Supreme Junta" nor of the "National Union." They heard only echoes from abroad.

As the German forces were defeated in France and the land freed of the occupation, the Spanish refugees who had been dispersed—some in prisons, others in concentration camps, many at forced labor for the Germans, more than a few working in the forests or as isolated peasants in small villages—began to make contact with their comrades and organizations. During the occupation, repression, fear or organizational weakness accounted for the fact that genuine leading bodies of the Spanish emigrants in France did not exist. Only the Communists had a leadership and an organization, that is, the party had disappeared as such for public activity and had been transformed into the "National Spanish Union." Towards the end of 1944 the time was ripe to exploit the psychological mood of the refugees in France, who were absolutely convinced that the end of the war would also bring the downfall of the Franco regime. The sentiment was strong among the refugees

that a pooling of efforts would be imposed in those moments and that thus the liberation of Spain was not far off. The "National Union" offered itself via Communist propaganda as this aspiration towards unity of all Spanish anti-fascists, all the more easily since its manifestos and publications were subscribed to by members of all organizations which the Communists had either deceived or corrupted. After more than four years of a very difficult life of constant danger and complete isolation, there were not a few anarchist and socialist workers who were taken in by the Stalinist chicanery.

It is only fair to recognize that the Communists had in principle raised the question of the defeat of the Franco regime in a more realistic and positive form than other parties and organizations. While the others waited for the Allied nations to liquidate Francoism "according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter," the Stalinists agitated for an army of Spanish emigrants which would take advantage of the European situation and use the arms they could obtain in France to enter Spain and impose the new regime. Subsequent information confirms that this was what the Spaniards on the inside were expecting; all were spontaneously prepared in 1944 to welcome and join the army of emigrants coming from France; the Franco regime would have fallen almost without a struggle. But the Communists prepared the whole action in agreement with the French CP and their agents in other countries in order to dominate the other parties and organizations and to prepare for their own domination in Spain.

#### Spanish Refugees and Guerrilla Units

The action of the Communists in this sense began in France itself, especially in the South, where the great mass of Spanish refugees was concentrated and where the power of the French CP was absolute immediately after the liberation. It forced Spaniards of all tendencies to join guerrilla units, to take orders from the Communists and submit to its authority. It exercised a frightful terrorism on militant socialist, Poumist and anarchist workers and utilized the occasion to assassinate its opponents. The non-Stalinist and working class parties and organizations have in their possession lists of 800 refugees who were assassinated by the Communist-guerrillas during that period. In this tragic fashion, the refugees understood once again the fate that awaited them under Stalinist domination; the "National Spanish Union" farce was finished and the most favorable opportunity since the civil war to end the Falangist dictatorship was lost.

With this one possibility of direct action against Francoism gone, it is necessary to state that the complete interest of the Spanish people in finding a remedy for their situation centered in the efficacy of international political action. The generally democratic program with which the Allies justified World War II obligated the latter, in the opinion of the great mass of the Spanish people, to try to establish a democratic regime in Spain, all the more so since Franco had been linked completely to Hitler and Mussolini. In the Potsdam Conference held in the summer of 1945 and in the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco the same year, it was agreed that Spain could not be a party of the United Nations while the present government continued in power. This position was ratified by the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations held in London, February 1946. The Security Council in April 1946 and the Assembly General in December of the same year again resolved that Franco could not belong to the special bodies of the United Nations and that all the members of the latter should withdraw their official representa-

tives from Spain. But a profound change had already taken place in the General Assembly in November 1946, when a two-thirds majority opposed ratifying the 1946 resolution, although it was still not officially abolished. The latest declarations of Mr. Acheson have served to remove the equivocation and to demonstrate that the United States is going to reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Francoism and render the financial help it so urgently needs. The Spanish problem is again sacrificed to the imperialist interests of the power blocs en presencia. The Spanish people are still condemned to slavery and misery, in spite of all the sacrifice and effort made to free them from both and to reconquer their liberties.

### Foreign Capital in Spain

Profound changes have taken place in the Spanish economy with relation to foreign financial influence, which explain and clarify for us certain attitudes and interests. The preponderance of English and Franco-Belgian finance was decisive in Spain until 1936. American power showed itself almost solely through the Telegraph and Telephone Company which already at that time had a monopoly on telephones in Spain. By the end of 1939, the Nazis exercised real control of the entire Spanish economy and numerous German companies dominated the country's industry. In consonance with the international situation, a change began to take place in 1943, and American finance supplanted German domination. Today the power of American finance extends to absolutely all sectors of Spanish economic life: petroleum, metallurgy, mining, communications, hydraulic power, electrical materials, etc. The airport of Barajas, on the outskirts of Madrid, labelled "The American Gibraltar" by the Spaniards, and numerous other airports all over the country, are in the service of the American companies—beach-heads for the next European war. Is it not to defend and extend the financial interest of Wall Street rather than to avoid the havoc of a new Spanish Civil War that Mr. Acheson consolidates Franco's power?

Among his proposals, Mr. Acheson was not even inclined to favor what had formerly been the formula of the State Department: the reestablishment of the monarchy, resting on that part of the army opposed to Franco. This project, first Churchill's and later the Labor government's, had caused the Spanish Socialist party to make an agreement with the monarchists which seemed to offer a minimum solution to the "Spanish problem." It is undeniable that this compromise, even though opposed by all parties and organizations of the emigration, raised certain hopes inside Spain as a lesser evil which might move in the direction of greater liberties. It was the formula accepted by the conservative anti-Franco elements as the only method of transferring power by peaceful means. The American Secretary of State has disposed of the "Spanish problem" so that violent struggle is the only way out for the anti-Franco opposition. That is, by uttering his intention to avoid it, he provokes civil war. He has given the Stalinists a rallying cry which will be accepted by many disillusioned workers.

But what are the possible results of an intensification of armed struggle inside Spain? Without any demagoguery or exaggeration, and sticking to the truth, we can say that they are minimal. In the real situation in Spain, under an imposed police regime, there is no possibility of wide and extensive organization, no more than there was in Germany and Italy. The guerrillas who have been fighting in the mountainous

regions since 1939 have been disappearing, exterminated through repression, exhausted and demoralized by persecution. The propaganda carried on outside by the Stalinists about the actions of the "army of guerrillas" does not correspond to the truth. Assuredly, from time to time a few groups that still remain in the mountains make raids of reprisal and in the capitals they carry out terrorist acts. But these are isolated unintegrated gestures and on many occasions not politics, but acts of desperation.

An intensification of the struggle inside Spain would have a certain efficacy, but only on condition that it was also combined with an intensification of the international campaign. To accomplish the latter, a prior agreement among all the republican parties and the working-class forces on Spanish terrain would be necessary; in the international arena, it would require the will to carry out an intense agitation in all possible forms, in order to help in the struggle which would be unleashed in the interior of the country.

Is it possible to achieve this solidarity among the democratic and working-class organizations of the entire world? The Spanish Republic was overthrown because this assistance was lacking. At the end of the war we have pointed out how the European governments, in which Socialists and Communists predominated, were incapable of doing anything effective for the liberation of the Spanish people; the trade-union organizations have not seconded the boycott of merchandise sent to Spain, as was requested of all anti-Franco parties and organizations. In the present international political conjuncture, when everything remains inconclusive, and in the aggregate of maneuvers of the cold war in which the tactics of the two blocs dominate everything, the Spanish people is sacrificed anew in spite of the fact that it has known better than anyone else in our time how to fight first to preserve its liberties and then to reconquer them.

Juan ANDRADE

*Juan Andrade* is on the executive committee of the P.O.U.M. (in emigration).

Translated by Mary Bell.

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# The Art and Propaganda of George Orwell

## A Critical Analysis of the Late Writer's Works

**THE THEORETICAL ABSURDITIES** and contradictory actions involved in the short hard life of George Orwell cannot be explained entirely as personal idiosyncrasy. There is much of the ebb and flood tides of world politics in his writing. An intellectual writer might have been able to resolve for himself the vagaries of his epoch by imposing a form of critical analysis upon contradictory movements and by substituting logical system for natural chaos. Orwell's deep distrust of the intellectual was coupled with a feeling that physical courage did not often accompany rational sensibility. This may be the reason why Orwell's actions and opinions read like a chart of the twentieth century tides of popular feeling but often with unpredictable signs of a stubborn and independent personality asserting its individuality in the midst of social pressure. He fought against Franco's army in Spain during the nineteen-thirties. He wrote propaganda for the British during the nineteen-forties. He employed near-Stalinist arguments against British pacifists. But he was a courageous enemy of Stalinism long before anti-Stalinism became a popular profession. He rejected the concept of "proletarian literature" and at the same time believed that all "art is propaganda." His sincerity and simplicity, at times a towering strength, were at other times terrible weaknesses. Add to this the wide dispersal of his energies and his failure to adopt any one discipline completely, either of the revolutionist, the artist, or the intellectual and you have the key to a man for whom all issues were so simple, that often he himself failed to understand them.

His early books were significant primarily as clues to his development. *Down and Out in Paris and London*, journalistic in concept and diaristic in execution, was a simple, naturalist account of a sincere, sensitive young man confronted with extreme poverty for the first time. Its naturalism was of the most mediocre variety. Its details were trivia, inessential to any broader concept of the problems of life. A search for richer meanings such as are found in the journals or diaries of the contemporaries of Orwell would be totally unrewarding. Nevertheless, as a simple record of the poverty-stricken journalist in a cosmopolitan European city, it was readable and never dull.

With the publication of *Burmese Days*, a year later (1934) Orwell tried to provide some integration for the fictionalization of his life as a wanderer from the British colonial milieu. Dramatic and intense, it describes the existence of the Anglo-Indian colonial character in terms of caste and class. It might almost be said to fit the traditional concept of the novel as the comedy or tragedy of manners particular to certain classes of society. As the sensitive perception of a young man's world, it was Orwell's first experience with the brutality and callousness of those who take part in the struggle for social and political prestige. It was a limited view, however, and contained very little of the perceptive quality found in those other young men of the Twenties, Hans Castorp and Stephen Dedalus, although, like them, Orwell rejected the world of petty officialdom.

In 1939 *Coming Up for Air* was published in England. An artistic failure, it succeeded in one respect. It was the beginning of the conflict between middle-class meanness and the ideal of art, humanistic science, and the free and beautiful

human being in Orwell's writing. That this should happen twelve years after the translation into English of the *Magic Mountain* which developed the same theme, is a striking fact. It succeeds in placing Orwell in proper relation to his time. Honest, sincere, essentially true to his own thoughts, he did not feel himself to be part of the tradition of the intellectual novelist; he was more at home in that medium of naturalism which was content to record the trivia of the human situation without transcending it. He felt no need to identify himself either with part or whole of the British tradition in fiction: Austen, Eliot, Conrad, James or Lawrence. The tradition of emphasis upon the subtlety of the human relation evoked little or no response from Orwell.

Yes; but he *was* interested in Dickens! True enough. He was a champion of Dickens, the creator of grotesquery, the enlarger of distorted feature, and the exploiter of both the alms-house poor and the benevolent rich, wrapped up and tied with the twine of sentimentality. Dickens had the key to the Victorian mind. The middle-class would love and sympathize with his poor Toms, Nellies, Dorrits and Davids. Reduced to their heart-warming essences his poor folk were impossibly lovable. Straighten the ragged cap, press the untidy clothes, comb the hair and wash the face of a Dickens urchin and his blue eyes would reappear like the midday sky from behind a dirty rain cloud.

### Coming up for Air

In 1939, however, Orwell had not yet been tempted to use the grotesque for ironic purpose. *Coming Up for Air* employs as its narrator a simple, middle-aged insurance agent, imprisoned by occupation, wife and outlook. George Bowling is plausible because he is so commonplace, coarse and blatant. The story itself is acceptable for the same reason: the middle-aged man on a spree, unknown to his wife, with seventeen pounds won by gambling, is an everyday event, a newspaper paragraph blown up in the photographer's dark room. Picaresque in structure, it is a traveling commentary on English life, urban as well as rural. Its theme is the meanness of the lower class existence, replete with grime, stinginess and the careful gentility of the clapboard cottage.

In a matter of months after this novel, Orwell was confronted by the war. To combine one's sympathy for the poor and downtrodden with sympathy for British victory was a difficult or impossible chemistry for some British writers. Orwell made the defeat of German fascism his axiom and a semi-authoritarian slogan his logic. "He who is not with us is against us," say Stalinists and Fascists. Writing his London letter for *Partisan Review*, Orwell wrote "Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common-sense. If you hamper the war-effort of one side you automatically help that of the other." With this brush he tarred writers like Alex Comfort, George Woodcock, and D. S. Savage. Such dialectic, coming from an avowed socialist, is a kind of childlike oversimplification of issues (to say the best for it) which is plausible for a man who tries to reduce his century to its vulgar essentials. Even this is not enough to explain such thinking. Orwell is the victim of a century which saw a democratic working-



class republican army defeated in Spain by tanks, bombers and German generals. Sometime beforehand it had been emasculated by the Russian politicians and bribed with Russian bombers. Somewhere and sometime Orwell saw in the bomber the destiny of his time.

### Dickens, Dali and Others

In his discussion of art and life, he performs a similar reduction upon aesthetic principles. Published here in 1946, *Dickens Dali and Others*, primarily concerned with popular culture, reveals two important things about Orwell. He was critical of Dickens, but the criticism is mixed with intense admiration of a special kind. And he had a strong sympathy for the European concentration-camp literature. Both elements are vital to his later novels.

Why did Orwell love Dickens? He cannot explain it on aesthetic grounds. "There is no poetic feeling anywhere in his books and no genuine tragedy and even sexual love is almost outside his scope." But for Orwell "aesthetic preference is either something inexplicable, or it is so corrupted by non-aesthetic motives as to make one wonder whether the whole of literary criticism is not a huge network of humbug." In his criticism of Dickens it turns out that some of the fault which he finds with Dickens is actually the latter's good craftsmanship; but let us postpone this point for a paragraph.

He tries to explain his love for Dickens as a fond recollection of a childhood institution with all the associations accompanying such recollection. This explanation fails; but the essential reason emerges in an image of Dickens which Orwell conjures up from his impressions "It is the face of a man who is always fighting against something, but who fights in the open and is not frightened, the face of a man who is *generously angry*—in other words of a nineteenth-century liberal, a free intelligence, a type hated with equal hatred by all the smelly little orthodoxes which are now contending for our souls." If it is doubtful that Dickens can be characterized as a nineteenth century liberal, there is no doubt that Orwell sought to be such a liberal, strengthened by an ounce or two of socialism.

The best example of the fault he finds with Dickens is also the most revealing. He quotes the following passage from one of the stories: the story of a child who swallowed his sister's necklace:

Next day, the child swallowed two beads; the day after that, he treated himself to three, and so on, till in a week's time he had got through the necklace—five-and-twenty beads in all. . . . A few days afterwards, the family were at dinner—baked shoulder of mutton and potatoes under it—the child, who wasn't hungry, was playing about the room, when suddenly there was heard the devil of a noise like a small hailstorm. "Don't do that, my boy," says the father. "I ain't a-doin' nothing," said the child. "Well, don't do it again," said the father, "you'll find yourself in bed, in something less than a pig's whisper." He gave the child a shake to make him obedient, and such a rattling ensued as nobody ever heard before. "Why, dam' me, it's in the child," said the father; "he's got the croup in the wrong place!"

Orwell's criticism is that the detailed description of the dinner—"Baked shoulder of mutton and potatoes under it" is an *unnecessary detail*. A close examination of the paragraph reveals the opposite to be true. In the grotesque, unbelievable incident of the child rattling like a celluloid toy with buckshot inside, the utterly banal, solid English food simultaneously anchors the scene to reality and provides that one touch of contrast with the dull everyday world which makes the atmosphere around the incident a shade more comic.

What Orwell reveals in his criticism is not merely that he

himself is often unaware of the meaning of *unnecessary detail*, but that he is not at home in the complex forms, either of art or of politics. Dickens was a moralist, he correctly asserts, and follows this with the implication that to be concerned with morality is to be a propagandist. The conclusion of the syllogism: "All art is propaganda."

It is unfortunate that in this welter of comment, Orwell's best observations should be lost. He came closest to the truth about Dickens in his remarks about the Victorian's ability to enter "into the child's point of view." Dickens remains one of the classic writers of children's fiction. His tremendous talent as an entertainer, however, spoils him for the tradition of great fiction. His characters, his situations, his understanding of his own age are all oversimplified, as they would be in the mind of a child.

### Animal Farm

It is interesting, therefore, that Orwell's first triumph as a writer of fiction should have come with his publication of *Animal Farm* which was essentially a story for children. Orwell seized upon one of the better explanations, current in the forties, of the degeneration of the Russian state into a bureaucratic, exploitative society and turned it into a simple fairy-tale morality.

Here, for the first time as a writer of fiction, Orwell was in his element. The characters were grotesque reductions of political types. They lacked any political subtlety and did not require any emotional subtlety since the needs of this narrative form were not based upon the fine distinctions in human motivation. Any child, after reading this little fairy tale, could draw the parallels between the pigs and the Russian leaders. These parallels would be just as delightful to the child, and just as oversimplified, as fairies, witches, and candystick forests.

They would also, in a sense, be true. They contain the truth which child symbolism undoubtedly contains. A child seeing a bitter old woman, who shrieks or curses at children would recognize her as a witch, although never able to understand the human, emotional, or social process which transforms beautiful children into aged monstrosities. Orwell's success in the five years before his death can be traced directly to his qualifications as a writer of the simple parable. He wrote children's stories for liberals. The twentieth century liberal, unwilling or unable to understand the volumes of complex analysis of the source and rise of fascism, Stalinism, and other forms of bureaucratic degeneration, can understand Orwell perfectly. Orwell's writing is neither good politics nor great fiction and therefore avoids the complexities of both mediums.

His most successful attempt at this simple reduction was *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It was superior to *Animal Farm*, however, not only because it was more dramatic, but because it was more complex. Oceania was a broader canvas and its inhabitants were people; the more monstrous the people, the more clearly they stand out, as was very often true of Dickens' characters. What stands out most clearly about the novel, however, is its atmosphere of complete horror. This atmosphere was consistently maintained by invention, grotesque detail, and the combination of the familiar with the improbable.

Orwell found England to be singularly unable to deal emotionally with the problem of authoritarianism and "lacking, therefore, in what one might call concentration-camp literature," as he wrote in *Dickens, Dali and Others*. Whenever a book dealing with totalitarianism appeared in England and still seemed worth reading six months after publication, it had been translated. It was the continental European writ-

ers, Silone, Malreaux, Salvemini, Borkenau, Victor Serge, and Koestler who, he felt, were emotionally involved in this problem. Orwell, who had fought against Franco's army in Spain, identified himself very strongly with this feeling. He combined this identification with a strong pity and a warm sympathy for the poor, the downtrodden, the concentration-camp prisoners all over the world.

This sense of pity and this identification with the problems of all Europe brought Orwell to the edge of transcending himself as a writer of simple stories for liberals. His failure to do so, is due primarily to his lack of intellectual grasp and the sense of pity devoid of any sense of tragedy; precisely that which he found lacking in Dickens.

Nevertheless, his novels come very close at certain moments to many of the essential problems of mankind, to the near-tragic, to quasi-historical sense, to the clue to some broad failure of courage.

Language was a triple problem for Orwell; the effect of language upon the understanding of history, the novelist's communication with his reader, and the special language of propaganda. Winston Smith beginning his diary with a sense of despair at the futility of trying to reach future generations with his ideas; *Animal Farm* drowing out criticism by the rhythmic repetition of the slogan; in one sense or another each of his novels contains the language problem dramatized. The law and the sense of having violated it, in Oceania, is communicated by terror; the law being unwritten and the sense of crime having been made deliberately vague. The most effective of these inventions were Newspeak and doublethink, the satires on bureaucratic speech and Stalinist cynicism. The least effective was the attempted use of slogan effects in *Coming Up for Air*. Orwell's life, politically active and productive of a series of problem novels as well, was a heroic attempt to maintain the balance between language as a political medium and as an art medium. Both his failures and his successes must be considered in this light.

It is either this failure of communication or the mechanization, both so characteristic of the twentieth century, which create in Orwell's fiction the backward glance to rural England. In any case, pastoral elements loom large in his stories. This can be seen in the warm and leisurely life of George Bowling's village in *Coming Up for Air*, the early life of *Animal Farm*, and the return to a bed of grass under the saplings by the lovers of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. An identical pool of large fish, encircled by willow tree appears both in *Coming Up for Air* and in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In the first novel it recurs as a symbol and becomes the object of the hero's quest for peace. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* it lies very close to the grove of trees in which Winston Smith's first love act breaks the prohibition of Oceania. "It's the Golden Country—almost" Smith murmurs. This Golden Country is Orwell's pastoral retreat from which he returns to London, to Paris, to the later period of *Animal Farm*, to Oceania, and to George Bowling's suburbia as an exile and a wanderer.

It is this Golden Country, a near-romantic concept, which separates his socialism from that of the positivist mode. He identifies positivism with the vulgar middle-class conception of progress and the devastatingly satirical manipulation of production figures by Oceania is the telling blow against this conception in the hands of authoritarian states. His non-positivism has also a contemporary source. "Since 1930 the world has given no reason for optimism whatever" he wrote in 1944. "Nothing is in sight except a welter of lies, hatred, cruelty and ignorance, and beyond our present troubles loom vaster

ones which are only now entering into the European consciousness. It is quite possible that man's major problems will never be solved. But it is also unthinkable. . . . So you get the quasi-mystical belief that for the present there is no remedy; all political action is useless, but that somehow, somewhere in space and time, human life will cease to be the miserable, brutish thing it now is." There are in his essays, however, some echoes of the traditional poetic concept that living is essentially tragic. "Perhaps some degree of suffering is ineradicable from human life, perhaps the choice before man is always a choice of evils, perhaps even the aim of Socialism is not to make the world perfect but to make it better. All revolutions are failures, but they are not all the same failure."

### The Unsuccessful Hero

None of his heroes is successful, nor able to snatch even a minute victory out of the ashes of defeat. This is not to say merely that the hero is doomed, as he is in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The death of a tragic hero, as in the case of Hamlet, may be accompanied by a complete triumph of his ego, and the destruction of those whose evil actions have led to his death. Precisely the reverse occurs in Orwell's novels. The heroes may be permitted for a time to live, but without joy. Oceania succeeds in extirpating Winston Smith's ego so completely that at the end he loves Big Brother. In *Coming Up For Air* the hero's quest ends in complete defeat. It is not at all necessary for us to read about such a man's end; the death of spirit is so final that physical death would be an anti-climax.

While in each instance the defeat is unequivocally the destruction of the personality by the community, the latter is also self-destructive. *Animal Farm*, Oceania and suburbia exist in the age of austerity. They are sick with self-denial. Like the Trojans, whose officers did not permit them to weep while burying their dead, although the heroic Greeks gave free vent to their tears, the authoritarian states consider grief, love and pity to be signs of weakness. Food becomes not merely scarce but void of any joy in its preparation or consumption. Objects, in the name of utility, are made without any beauty either of form or of color. When beauty is attempted, as it is in the houses of George Bowling's suburbia, it turns out to be false, pseudo-Tudor architecture with flying buttresses which buttress nothing.

The weakness of all his novels is that they are written not so much as fiction but rather as lively debates from the concentration camps of the world; yet, though they contain within themselves all of the bleak, bitter, subhuman atmosphere of the concentration-camp literature, they are leavened with a touch of humanity. This warm touch comes from Orwell's sympathy for the victims of deprivation. It would seem that he himself felt better away from the middle class comfort, from the smugness and political incompetence of the social circles in London. As he wrote in *Down and Out in Paris and London*, "I shall never again . . . enjoy a meal at a smart restaurant." Whatever the reason, when his own writing began to earn him comfortable sums, he retired to a Scottish island until his painful and tragic illness forced him into a sanitarium. Even in sickness and death he represented that identification with the dispossessed, the jailed, the political prisoners, the down-and-out European continentals with whom he sympathized throughout his brief and active life.

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# The Concept of Imperialism

## *A Discussion of the Shifting Meaning of Imperialism*

WHEN JOHN A. HOBSON, in 1902, composed his study of imperialism he began his discussion with an expression of concern over the obscurity and shifting connotation of the most widely used terms in political discussion. In this regard he was a follower of another English writer on colonial problems, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, who, in 1832, felt the necessity of giving precise and unmistakable definition to the most commonly used political terms. A recent investigation by UNESCO into the meaning of the concept of democracy is a telling proof that the problems faced by Lewis and Hobson still await solution. But democracy is not the only term with obscure and shifting meaning; nationality, self-determination, planning, and imperialism are but a few belonging in this class.

The terminological confusion of a concept like imperialism would not be serious, if it did not affect the theories and socio-political analyses utilizing the concept. In other words, as the connotation of the word imperialism changes, the theory of imperialism and of its political and social consequences changes with it. Thus, in the Stalinist terminology anyone who does not stick strictly to the party line is an imperialist. The United States as well as Yugoslavia, Britain as well as Finland are either protagonists or hand maidens of imperialism. Just as it was fashionable in Stalinist circles during the period of the popular front and the war to designate all adversaries and critics of the Soviet Union as fascist, so it has now become fashionable to call them imperialist. Thus Dean Acheson, Franco, Tito, and Kurt Schumacher all find themselves in the same class, and in Stalinist terminology the word "imperialist" simply designates any person or group opposing or criticizing the Soviet Union, its satellites, or its policies.

The concept of "imperialism" has also experienced another and similar extension in recent history. The term as originally employed by radical liberals and socialists designated the aggressive tendencies in modern capitalism. Hobson and Hilferding, for instances, applied the term in their discussions of modern Britain, France, and Germany, countries that had in the period before the first World War ceaselessly engaged in a competitive struggle for the acquisition of colonial territories. Conservative scholars and politicians recognized the damning connotation of the term and yet could find no method by which to eliminate its usage by radical liberals and socialists. But, the sting in the word could be removed by extending its denotation to cover all expansionist and empire-building activities in history. I do not mean to imply that the unwordly professors who wrote learned tomes on Macedonian or Roman imperialism consciously distorted the implied meaning which its originators had given to the word. They simply used a concept which had attained this extended connotation among their conservative friends, many of whom were more familiar with the power of words in political debate.

### **The Rival Meanings of Imperialism**

Once the rival meanings of imperialism were established a battle ensued as to whether or not the concept could be applied to any and all instances of empire building and aggression or whether imperialism was a peculiar feature of modern western civilization. On the surface, this question may

appear as a quibbling over words. But if we penetrate below the surface we immediately discover that a much more fundamental issue is raised. For, if one considers imperialism to be a particular phase of capitalism, if one sees it as being a necessary outflow of the economic organization of the modern western world, then any criticisms of, or any opposition to, imperialism involves at the same time a critical negation of the mode of production under monopoly-capitalism. And similarly, any support of monopoly-capitalism or of a great capitalist power implies, at the same time, support of imperialist policies. It is irrelevant in this connection whether one adheres to the theory of Hobson or to that of Hilferding or Luxemburg or Lenin; it is equally irrelevant whether one contends that imperialism is the result of underconsumption, of predatory finance capital, or of the struggle for markets. In all these theories imperialism is an integral form of capitalism, and more specifically, of its most highly developed form, monopoly capitalism.

If all this were written in 1920, one could stop here and examine the forms in which modern imperialism finds its most drastic expression. But in the intervening period the development of military technology and the intensification of the use and impact of the means of mass communication have created social conditions which make a redefinition of political terms necessary, in order to be able to describe the processes of modern political developments more accurately and realistically.

Like all other activities of mankind, warfare has been affected decisively by technological, organizational and political developments. The chief characteristic of modern war is not only its destructiveness, but from a sociological standpoint, above all, its all-embracing, its "total" nature. All major modern wars, certainly those of the 20th century have been total wars.

### **The Nature of Early Warfare**

Whereas most wars in antiquity, the middle ages, and even later affected only a part of the population, modern wars affect every person in the countries participating in the struggle and often also in "neutral" countries. Earlier wars were, in their majority, the affair of special classes or groups of people and in many of the dynastic or even "imperialist" campaigns only a special class of warriors was immediately affected, while the mass of the civilian population continued its accustomed life. This does not mean that there are no instances on record of wars in which an entire people was engaged. But it is significant that those wars in the past in which the large mass of the populace participated actively were wars which were fought over ideological issues. According to an old adage the religious wars, which were essentially civil wars, created the most deep-seated antagonisms and engaged the active participation of the most widespread layers of the population. In order to evoke mass participation a war must bring out the emotional response of the masses; it must be, or at least appear as, an ideological combat; its slogans must be stated in terms of a real or pretended conflict of the most cherished values of a people.

Now, since as a consequence of these developments, any

international armed conflict embraces all aspects of social life, and directly affects all citizens of a country taking part in the war, the aims of modern wars must be stated in ideological terms. Any war today is a war for survival, for the integrity and independence of all participating countries, since defeat does not only mean the loss of economic and other material advantages, but also ideological and political subjugation under the "heel of the victor." Whereas, therefore, in the 17th and 18th centuries dynastic or economic aims could frankly be stated as primary war aims, present day diplomatic terminology is couched in terms of integral survival versus utter annihilation. Hence, under imperialism, war propaganda is addressed to the masses; hence all military alliances and all aggressive steps are represented as measures of defence; hence the radio, press, motion picture and other tools of propaganda have become as vital instruments in the preparedness for war as war planes, guided missiles, and atomic bombs.

In these aspects the Soviet Union is in no way different from the main capitalist powers. In fact, the totalitarian bureaucratic rule, the destruction of civil liberties, and the complete regimentation of everyday life makes its measures for preparedness for war more effective and more threatening than those of its antagonists. To this must be added that Stalinist Russia has taken up the policy of political and economic expansion which Czarism had been unable to carry to its final end. It is not surprising that the German invasion in 1942 was not treated in any of its aspects as an attack on a workers state but as a threat to the national existence of the country. Since the end of the war bureaucratic controls have been enforced more strictly, the last remains of achievements of the Russian Revolution have been annihilated and the social structure in the Soviet Union is comparable in its effects to a rigid and almost caste-like class structure.

### Imperialism and Stalinist Russia

In view of these facts the term "imperialism" is, therefore, applicable to the foreign policy of Stalinist Russia. It is true that this image does not coincide with the classical definition of the term given by Hobson, Hilferding and Luxemburg. But changing conditions make necessary a change in the meaning of old terms, since they otherwise do not accurately describe existing conditions. In this new present day denotation then, we mean by imperialism a foreign policy in which a ruling group (a class or a bureaucratic elite) is capable of engaging the entire population of a country in the selfish struggles for aggrandizement of power of that ruling group in the world. It can do this because it holds the leading posts in the government, because it commands the key positions in the economic system of a country, and because it exercises a thoroughgoing control over the mass media of communication, the press, the radio, the movies, and the schools. Thus, since modern war, as a consequence of technological and economic developments, has by its very nature become a total struggle, the forms of expansionist policies and of aggressive propaganda are virtually identical in all countries with a modern technical and economic apparatus, and these external aspects make the Russian Stalinist imperialism indistinguishable from capitalist imperialism; in fact, as a consequence of the totalitarian controls exercised by the Soviet elite, the forms of Russian imperialism are more threatening and more dangerous to the peace of the world.

If we acknowledge this analysis of modern post World War II imperialism as correct, it is not difficult to see that the present foreign policy of the Soviet Union in all its major

aspects conforms to this analysis. Russia is rearming and remilitarizing Eastern Germany and is advocating the unification of Germany, not in order to establish a free workers' democracy in Germany but in order to push the Russian zone of influence to the Rhine and possibly to the Atlantic. At the same time Russia is attempting to extend its political, economic and military influence over parts of Asia, notably Iran, Korea and areas in central and southern Asia. The experience of Titoism has shown that Russian foreign policy does not follow an ideological or class orientation but has a purely nationalistic, expansionist, i.e., imperialist basis. The case of Russian imperialism is thus clear, even to the casual observer.

American imperialism is not so plainly visible on the surface. It is true, of course, that many orthodox Marxists as well as Stalinists and others repeat the Leninist assertion that the government of a capitalist country, such as the United States, is nothing but the executive committee of the bourgeoisie. But such an analysis is superficial and, in this simplified form, unacceptable. It has led to the charge that the Marxian theory of the imperialism of capitalist countries is a "scandal" theory in that it implies a governmental elite which is the handmaiden of big business either by means of corruption or intellectual knavery. Against this "scandal" theory it is pointed out that the bourgeois is timid and pacifist by inclination, that he prefers the security of domestic monopoly profits to the uncertainty of returns from venture capital abroad; that it is impossible to prove beyond doubt that the economic activities of business were primarily responsible for the diplomatic incidents and wars of the last decades rather than expansionist tendencies on the part of governments using business ventures as a convenient excuse for imperialist adventures; and, finally, that the picture of the vicious international banker and arms manufacturer is a bogey out of a socialist fairy tale.

With special reference to the present position of the United States it is argued, moreover, that even if it was possible in the past to speak of American imperialism, the United States finds itself, in view of the more vigorous dynamics of Russia, in a defensive position; that it has renounced its earlier practice of dollar diplomacy in the Western hemisphere and replaced it by the good neighbor policy; that the United States has shown through the Marshall Plan and the projected Point Four program that it is concerned with raising living standards and promoting democratic processes the world over; and that even the North Atlantic Pact is a defensive alliance to safeguard the integrity and independence of the democratic states bordering the Atlantic Ocean.

These statements invite two comments, one with regard to the role of the governmental elite in a democratic capitalist country, and the other with regard to American foreign policy in general and the assertion that the major aims of United States policy are defense and the raising of living standards.

The first point turns around the question of who are the holders of leading governmental posts, or in short the political elite, the ultimate decision-making authority in the field of domestic and foreign policy. In the United States this group is composed of the President and his cabinet, the chairmen and other ranking members of the major committees in Congress, the leading non-technical appointees in the executive, ambassadors, the general staff of the army and the judicial elite. All in all it is a group of men not exceeding a few hundred individuals. Any attempt at determining the nature of American politics must include an examination of the structure and class affiliation of this elite. This procedure does not imply

that we are wedded to Carlyle's conception of the role of heroes in history. It does not mean that if these men in the elite were replaced by others, American policy would necessarily change. On the contrary, only if we examine the typical career lines which lead to elite positions, only if we view the ladder leading to decision-making posts in the governmental hierarchy, can we determine what class affiliation is normally required to prepare a man for a place in the political elite of the United States. It helps us nothing to assert that the government of this country is the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie." In order to prove that the American brand of imperialism is conditioned by the monopoly-capitalist features of our socio-economic system we have to show that the men who attain power must, and normally do come from a layer of the population which is composed of the socio-economic elite of monopoly capitalism, or, at least, is representative in its entire world outlook of this socio-economic elite.

So far as I am aware, no such analysis has been undertaken with any degree of completeness. It would be well worth the effort, and a research project to determine the socio-economic characteristics of the American political elite would certainly be deserving of support by some research foundation. It is perhaps a significant fact that such support has not been forthcoming. However, although we have no complete data, and although investigations into the socio-economic characteristics of the American political elite are inexact, unfinished, and to some extent cursory, whatever partial studies have been made point strongly to the fact that a disproportionately large part of the American political elite is recruited from business executives, financiers, lawyers (corporation lawyers) and journalists. Close to eighty per cent of our cabinet ministers in the last fifty years came from these groups and the background of the leading congressmen, judges and diplomats is similar.

Thus, the hypothesis that the American political elite is composed primarily of men associated in class position and outlook with the socio-economic elite seems to be highly probable. As long as the typical class hue of the American political elite remains virtually unchanged, it is relatively irrelevant whether Truman or Dewey, Eisenhower or Douglas is President, and whether Marshall, Acheson or Vandenberg is Secretary of State. I do not mean to imply that any of these or any other member of the American political elite are dishonest, corrupt or evil. I do not mean to say either that they are consciously trying to embroil the United States in war. But as members of a particular social class, sharing the experience and the typical outlook of that class, and thinking in terms of the social and economic interests of that class, their decisions and their views are to a decisive extent colored by the role which their class plays in modern America. And since they have the power to make final decisions, to commit the United States to a particular policy, this policy is necessarily influenced by the interests of the socio-economic elite of this country whose basic monopoly-capitalist structure is not denied by any serious student of American society.

The position of those who scoff at any notion of American imperialism and term it a socialist bogey collapses before such an analysis. For it is irrelevant which particular group of individuals directly instigated an international incident, whether the business men goad on governments or vice versa. There exists a division of labor in the elite class among the exercise of political power, economic power, and ultimate control over means of communication. But it matters little what particular individual holds what particular position as long as the attitude and interests of the vast majority of the

members of this class is identical and as long as the positions in the political, economic and the communications elite are occupied predominantly by men of related social background.

Finally, a word must be said about the claim that American objectives are defense and improvement of standards of living. In an era of total diplomacy and total war the distinction between offense and defense falls to the ground. What can be observed empirically is a dynamic political situation in which both major antagonists are permanently moving for advantage. In such a situation a policy of defense is impossible, since any vacuum left by one power must immediately be filled by the other, in order to insure its "defense" position. Here the experience in the Near East, the episode with Tito who was regarded by the U. S. as a virtual ally as soon as his break with Moscow was definite and irreparable, are typical instances. The theory of defense and containment which is so heartily subscribed to by American liberals, who are much more afraid of a lone Bolshevik in the Siberian tundra than of all the American reactionaries put together, is therefore a self-delusion: in reality this policy is preparation for total war and any support of the American policy of defense puts our liberals into the sad and comic position of advocating a policy which by necessity must lead to that very result which they are so determined must not come to pass.

But just as the theory of defense is a chimera, the theory of higher living standards is largely a delusion. That more and freer trade is designed to raise living standards is granted. It is also granted that the United States has come out on numerous occasions in support of more and freer trade. Although these statements were couched in terms of general principles, it is not wrong to assume that our spokesmen really meant that the United States wanted more and freer trade for its own commodities. It cannot be expected that any country will use its economic weight in commercial negotiations to establish an abstract principle rather than to achieve a tangible economic advantage for itself.

But what about the Marshall Plan and Point Four? Again it cannot be denied that these programs have had and may continue to have beneficial effects on living standards abroad. But although advertised as the major purpose of the programs, these results are incidental. The major purpose of the programs is to strengthen the political and strategic position of the United States in the world and to contribute to the more profitable operation of American business. Here again the straws in the wind tell an eloquent story. The first two bills submitted to Congress in implementation of the Point Four program were ones providing guarantees by the U. S. government for American private investment abroad. Needless to say these bills—which have not yet been passed—have the strong support of American organized business.

On the basis of this analysis we must come to the conclusion that in their essential characteristics American and Russian imperialism are not very distinct. If our evaluation is correct that Russian imperialism is a danger to peace, then the same must be said of American imperialism. And from this follows, not the hopelessness of peace, but the futility of the liberal's hope that peace will result from any program advanced either by the American or by the Russian elite.

Bert F. HOSELITZ

*Bert F. Hoselitz* is Associate Professor of Social Sciences, and Executive Secretary of the Committee on International Relations, at the University of Chicago.

## At the Show of Berlin Paintings

Mark how clean their hands are  
note the stance, the feet well clad

in white. Do they live  
beyond the duress of their hour?

I doubt it. Well-affirmed  
the buckled swash of truncheon and arm  
with its black brassard and wide swing  
to clear the leather-cradled .45.

Politic, blitzed, the two MPs  
—for their gestalt is anti-art—

cover me with the ambush of an eye:  
*What will I do? Am I too A Thing?*

Strapt in equipment, brightly-webbed,  
aglow with red silk and three

ignorant stripes, four Hershey bars  
better than army fare,

the Shape of Force—a sacrificial power—  
towers like Tweedledum and Tweedledee.

Are they guarding? Or the Hals  
does it guard what men have lost?

The Steen, the Breugel of the two  
small monkeys fettered to a ring . . .

a sill with nut-shards and an arched  
window above a city of frail blue

into whose quiet port  
small vessels clearing the blockade  
enter like curving flowers

a quadrant moon

two Southern birds

Howard GRIFFIN

Howard Griffin has been published in *Accent*  
and other magazines.

## Invitation

It is dreadful, what happens  
when all tragedy is tame,  
when comedy prompts the snigger, the laugh,  
and the belly-laugh, but never shame.

See in the mirror, which is honest,  
the sly or too sanguine eyes, the brash  
or limply timorous mouth: not to excuse,  
but to laugh in that laughing face, abruptly to blush.

See also the dying youth,  
the runnel of blood in his home street,  
to be horrified, thinking how he was baffled,  
how he went crooked, and the bullet straight.

Lysander KEMP

Lysander Kemp is the author of *The Northern  
Stranger*, a collection of poetry. He is at present  
an instructor of English at the University of  
Buffalo.

## ...And Picasso Painted a Dove

And does the dove never dream of war?  
Do only peaceful intentions plump his feathers?

En garde! Nothing as brainless as a bird  
Is harmless; this dove  
Is dangerous brooding here.

I'll show you the future in a sheaf of newspapers:  
Who is the master-mind behind the helpless event?  
His is here, conjuring greater wars.  
And why? Obviously for the photo-finish  
When he wheels downward with a beakful of olive leaves.

For he is the star for whom the crowd swoons;  
He is the hero of the bloody show.

But come peace and the applause dies down,  
The audience goes gossiping away,  
And he is faced with settling down with a wife  
To the routine of nest and tending squalling children.

And if his public act is good, you can always be sure  
It's for the wrong reason. He is the ego-maniac.  
Psychoanalyze him? He refuses.  
He is maker of wars: Kill him, kill him!

And when you are picking your teeth, full and contented,  
Look around, there are many of the same, fat squabs  
Waiting to be eaten.

Edward FIELD

## Reflections

I wonder:  
Completely shocked and angry  
At the miasmatic doom that has encroached  
The perfection of simple being:

Endless echoes continuously scratch  
Against the sore wounds of recent  
Recollections, reverberating in the lonely  
Moments of the soul's exhaustion,  
Accompanied by the image of war's lecherous grip—

The old man with stooped shoulders and swollen belly  
Fiercely attacks the frightened virgin;  
The screams recoil  
From empty brick muted buildings  
Which lay diseased  
Beneath the chill grey morning's anxious touch;

The sterile scene, devoid of tragic content  
How pitiless the tears;  
There is only irony for this  
As I reflect upon the dangling bomb,  
The childlike fantasy—incredibly a fact,

Sad, unfortunate that we seek anxiously  
Our own destruction,  
That we wish the gorgon to obstruct  
Love's easily moving force;  
(And daily do I see this reconfirmed)

I still desire the soul's free excursion  
Into life,  
Yet realize that my destiny depends  
Upon each man's courage;  
(Reluctantly I now accept this truth).

Arthur GELLER

# National Student News

New York

Berkeley

Chicago

## New York Conference on Democracy in Education

**THE POLITICAL VOID** that has enveloped American student life since the start of World War II has in recent months shown signs of being filled. These signs are slight, it is true, but they indicate a pattern which gives hope for an extended development. More than that, they show the way for that development.

The fact that various political groups are active on behalf of their programs does not necessarily make for political life on campus. Reading from left to right, one can find, in somewhat weakened condition, as many political organizations as ever. What explains their weaknesses and what explains the qualitative as well as quantitative differences between pre-war and post-war politics?

Before the war there was a student movement: its basis was a struggle against war. The Oxford Pledge, whatever its efficacy, evoked a tremendous response. Students of all political beliefs as well as students never before active in politics were drawn into the movement. All campus politics were given shape by it. Political differences were not erased but rather took on new meanings. Each political wing operated in the general arena of the movement and attracted supporters on the basis of its own interpretation of the common struggle. In that sense the strength of the movement became the strength of its component parts.

Those of us who have been looking for the development of such a movement in the post-war period have gazed with perhaps too much envy at the powerful student movement of pre-war years. Has it not been our expectation that whatever movement would arise would be of the same character and program? Have we not been looking for the rebirth of the old movement rather than the creation of a new one? In doing this we have overlooked the importance of the growing concern of the student body with the infringements upon academic freedom and with the general decline of democracy in education. Campus reaction against legislation such as the Feinberg Law in New York and the Ober Law in Maryland; the widespread and popular campaign being conducted to eliminate the discriminatory practices in fraternities and sororities; the attempt of the CCNY students to force action on the Knickerbocker and Davis cases; the student strike at Olivet College—all these demonstrate that the sincere interest of the students in this problem can provide the basis for their political organization and education.

A recent and clear demonstration of this fact was the New York Conference on Democracy in Education. The original call for this Conference went out in October, 1949. It was issued by a small group of Stalinist students together with a few liberals. Their idea was to hold a series of planning meetings, after which the Conference proper would be held. It was obvious from the start that the Stalinists looked upon this as a vehicle for their own propaganda rather than as a genuine conference on democracy in education. They made no serious

attempt to involve the student body, but rather invited a small number of campus organizations. In this way they tried to insure their control. But things were soon taken out of their hands.

A member of the New York Student Federation Against War found out about the Conference, and representatives of several of the Federation clubs attended the December 4 planning meeting. Their suggestion that the main speakers at the Conference be drawn from organizations like the ACLU and Committee on Racial Equality was received coldly by the Stalinists. The criticism made shortly thereafter that the Conference was not representative and that an attempt should be made to involve more students was accepted with little more than a verbal shrug.

Taking the responsibility of broadening the Conference representation, the Federation arranged a meeting of all campus political organizations that could be convinced of the necessity to work out a program in order to keep the Stalinists from subverting the Conference to their own political ends. At the beginning this was not an easy task. The majority of the liberal organizations like Students for Democratic Action (SDA) and the Young Liberals were reluctant to participate because of a fear of Stalinism. The original participation of these groups was limited to two or three schools. It was only later that they entered on a city-wide level.

Two nights before the Conference was scheduled the anti-Stalinists held their first caucus meeting. This meeting accomplished several important things. It drafted a statement of principles for the Conference which exposed the Stalinist hypocrisy on the question of academic freedom.

Stalinist organizations on campus, like Stalinist organizations everywhere, are now engaged in a campaign to defend themselves against the attacks on their democratic rights. But they themselves have been willing to compromise and even join in attacks against the democratic rights of their political enemies. Similarly, they have always found it convenient to close their eyes to any infringements of democracy in Russia or among her allies. The statement of principles condemned the current wave of attacks upon academic freedom but at the same time pointed out that we must defend the rights of everyone; that we must speak for those who cannot speak for themselves. The statement went on to condemn violations of student and faculty rights throughout the world, whether they occur in Russia, Spain, Argentina or the U. S. A., but pointed out that it is with the U. S. A. that the Conference is primarily concerned.

The caucus also worked out a positive program which was embodied in a series of resolutions to be submitted to the Conference. It was in the working out of these resolutions that the most important accomplishment of this meeting was effected. Here, for the first time in years, representatives of many different political and non-political clubs from a dozen colleges were able to develop harmoniously an effective program on an important common problem. Members of AVC, SDA, SLID, NAACP, CORE, Socialist Clubs and Student Councils united to give leadership to the Conference. The caucus named itself the Democratic Coordinating Group.

The Conference, however, was not held on the scheduled dates, December 17 and 18. Several college administrations, heeding the reactionary attacks by several student organizations, refused the Conference the use of their facilities. At an emergency executive committee meeting called to consider the impasse in which the Conference found itself, members of the caucus again proposed a program to enable the Conference to proceed. They contended that the attacks of the reactionaries could only be answered by a committee which had the confidence of the students. They proposed the calling of another planning session to broaden the base of the Conference so as to secure the support of the widest representation of student organizations on all campuses.

The Stalinist-dominated executive committee refused these demands, but after a week's time it could no longer withstand the pressure. Another planning session was called.

Having by this time gained the additional support of the Young Democrats and other clubs, the anti-Stalinists were in the majority. They passed a motion for new executive committee elections and carried almost every position. Only three members of the old executive were re-elected and none of them were Stalinists. The statement of principles drawn up at the caucus meeting was adopted as a definition of the aims and the scope of the Conference.

The response on campus was immediate. Student organizations at several schools found out about the Conference for the first time and agreed to participate. Other student groups that had been wary of the Conference before now agreed to support it, and sponsorship of the Conference doubled in a short time.

From this point on the role of the Stalinists changed drastically. Finding that they could no longer control the Conference, they went out of their way to disrupt it. At the January 28 planning meeting, the Stalinists initiated a series of slanderous attacks on the majority. Attempting to exploit the legitimate democratic demands of the Negroes, the Stalinists tried to elect several of their people, who happened to be Negroes, *merely* on a racial basis. When these Negroes were defeated on the basis of their *politics*, the Stalinists then attacked the meeting as Jim Crow. Here was a shocking example of the Stalinist tactic of "rule or ruin."

Subsequent slanders upon the executive committee included the epithets "rotten white supremacists" and "apologists for the quota system." The Stalinists no longer controlled the Conference and therefore they were out to discredit it in the eyes of the student body.

After much difficulty in procuring adequate facilities, the Conference was finally held on March 11 and 12 at Midwood High School in Brooklyn. Following excellent keynote speeches by Roger Baldwin, former head of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Harold Taylor, president of Sarah Lawrence College, the factional struggle began.

On the first day of the Conference, the crucial point was the report of the credentials committee. The Stalinists, seeing that they were in a minority, attempted to pack the Conference by registering delegates from "organizations" which simply did not exist. There were nine "clubs" challenged, of which perhaps three were legitimate. The Stalinists indicated that they were willing to spend the entire two days arguing whether or not each "club" did exist.

At this time it was a question of whether the Conference was going to get started at all. Fearing that the Conference might collapse on this point, several members of the Federa-

tion voted for a blanket approval of the disputed "clubs" and that motion was passed.

After abbreviated panel sessions for discussion on the particular problems — economic difficulties facing students, discrimination against minority groups, and academic freedom — the remaining time was insufficient for the plenary body to act upon the many excellent resolutions that were reported out. It was evident that only a handful of resolutions could be voted on by the plenary session. Although there was general agreement on many of the resolutions it was evident that the mere reading of them would take far more time than remained (to say nothing of discussion and voting on each of the resolutions). The plenary session was held in a city school and a strict time limit was imposed on the session. Therefore the primary task was to elect a continuations committee that could carry out the work of the Conference. An essential task of this committee was to call another plenary session at which the voting on the resolutions could be completed.

A series of tabling motions were introduced to bypass panel reports in order to elect a continuations committee. It was here that the Stalinists proved themselves to be a disruptive, irresponsible minority. They tried every conceivable method to delay and prevent the majority from carrying out its program. The Stalinists succeeded in stalling the proceedings. It became impossible to elect a continuations committee from the assembled delegates because of time limitations. A blanket motion had to be passed electing the Conference executive committee as the continuation committee.

It is the duty and obligation of a minority to fight for its program, but there is also the question of the minority responsibility to the majority. When a minority acts in such a way as to prevent anything it opposes from being carried out the question arises whether it is possible to cooperate with this group in conferences of this type.

It may be asked of us: is it democratic to hold a conference in which the participating groups establish areas of agreement *prior* to the conference?

To this we reply:

It is perfectly democratic to establish a political basis for participation in a conference to insure the conference of successfully meeting the challenge to democracy in education. Every political organization or united front has the democratic right to determine its political boundaries. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union does not allow members of the Communist Party to join its ranks, and no one can accuse the ACLU of not being democratic, or of not fighting for civil liberties.

The important consideration is whether there will be the fight for a truly democratic education. One is under no *obligation* to include in the conference everyone. There is only the obligation to see that conferences such as the one under discussion fight for academic freedom and against all discriminatory practices.

The faction fight in the Conference on Democracy in Education had a curious effect on the liberals. They had agreed to participate in the Conference when its preparations were still in the hands of the Stalinists. But after the faction fight, when the Stalinists were beaten, the liberals didn't seem to know that they had won a victory. Many of them began to echo the Stalinist cry that "nothing was accomplished." The liberals did not understand that having beaten the Stalinists in a democratic manner and on a militant program showed the great potential of the democratic anti-Stalinist campus organizations. The liberal-controlled Continuations Commit-



tee should have been busy organizing a new plenary session to discuss the resolutions and perhaps elect a new Continuation Committee. Instead, worn out by the faction fight they have failed to meet their responsibilities.

The SDA, in particular, has failed to meet its responsibility. They have decided to pull out of the Conference! As a result of SDA's inconsistent and weak-kneed political line the Conference is all but dead. By not calling a new plenary session of the Conference to discuss and vote on resolutions the liberal majority in the Continuations Committee has played into the hands of the Stalinists. The CPers can now accuse the anti-Stalinists of killing the Conference because they are afraid to discuss.

The Federation members on the Continuation Committee pressed for a new plenary session for the obvious reason that in order for the Continuations Committee to act it is necessary to have a set of guiding aims and principles which only a plenary session of the Conference can give to its Continuations Committee.

This conference has to be viewed as the first city-wide meeting of diverse campus organizations fighting for a common objective since before World War II. Seen from this point of view the conference was a great step toward rebuilding a student movement centered about immediate campus issues. The broader associations of this fight with an anti-war perspective have yet to be made, but they are daily becoming more apparent.

Although failing to produce many resolutions, the conference nevertheless pointed out the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful fight for its objectives. It indicated the forces of reaction that stand in its way. On the one hand there are the reactionary groups like Common Cause that will attack every progressive development on the campus as a "Red-Front." And, on the other hand, there are the equally reaction-

ary Stalinists who will attempt to subvert the aims of any conference to their own political role as apologists for Russian totalitarianism.

Above all, this conference pointed out the necessity for the continued fight for democracy on campus. This first conference was just the initial step on this road. The immediate need is to prepare another plenary session of the present conference, followed by, if necessary, a conference of all democratic organizations. The first attempt was not the success that we worked and planned for—the next one will be.

S. BOTTONE, B. CORNFELD, J. GROSSMAN

S. Bottone, B. Cornfeld, J. Grossman are members of the Socialist clubs of N. Y. U., Brooklyn College the New School respectively. They are also members of the Conference Continuations Committee.

## Berkeley Faculty Fails to Lead Militant Fight Against Inquisitors

Our period is rich in grotesque capitulations. The University of California loyalty oath struggle is, to risk a motheaten phrase, a fantastic caricature of the strategy of declining "liberalism." It has left the campus fearful and passive and presents a lesson to the entire academic world, student and faculty alike, in how *not* to defend academic freedom.

The first act opened quietly in 1940 when the Regents proclaimed their rather ambiguous University Regulation #5, which, in effect, placed a political condition on University employment. This was understood as an anti-Communist move, but the faculty, having succumbed to a pre-war "national unity" (not unlike our present situation) put up no serious fight.

This policy, brought up to date a few years later, was considered sufficient unto its time and nothing more was done to combat the menace of free thought until, in March 1949, the Regents began to discuss ways of implementing their "anti-Communist" policy.

With a determination tempered by ignorance, they passed a motion on June 24, 1949 requiring that all University employees (from department heads to custodians) sign a special non-Communist oath, over and above the Constitutional oath sworn to by all State employees including the Governor.

This provoked a mild uproar, but the summer vacation intervened making effective opposition impossible. Many faculty members, either through fear for their jobs or lack of information, signed the oath, but a stalwart minority, composed of many world renowned scholars and teachers, refused to sign. The second act, thus begun, wended its weary way through the most ridiculous set of compromises and capitulations ever to beset the faculty of a great University.

The non-signers were the key to the situation. The faculty negotiating committee first came out for a *reworded* oath, but the non-signers would sign *no* oath.

The faculty spent fruitless months of endless negotiation with the Regents. They ran around like frightened children trying to find a formula upon which to sacrifice academic freedom. Their arguments against the oath were completely unprincipled. They argued that Communists would sign the oath anyway, that it was unconstitutional, that it "insulted" the "loyal and patriotic" faculty, etc., etc.

Their maneuvers were cut short by the Regents' ultimatum

## WE AGREE

"War itself is immoral."—Gen. Omar Gradley.

"As a practicing warrior for many years, I am convinced that war is completely futile."—Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault.

"(I am a) professional soldier who has made the disquieting discovery... that (my) profession has become almost too dangerous to be tolerated."—Gen. Carl Spaatz.

*Members of the War Resisters League agree that modern war is immoral, futile, and too dangerous to be tolerated. Therefore they have switched to war resistance—personal refusal to participate in war.*

We invite the generals and YOU to switch to war resistance. With men who know war best, it's war resistance 2 to 1.

Write today to

War Resisters League  
5 Beekman Street  
New York 7, N. Y.

..... I want to join the War Resisters League  
..... I want information about the WRL

of February 24th: *sign or out*. The third act began.

The incident immediately became national news. The slap in the face did not disturb the equanimity of the faculty negotiating committee, which, continued to reiterate with the monotonous regularity of a Buddhist monk, "there are no fundamental differences."

The student body had been completely passive up to this point. No one, from the faculty to the student government, had even asked its opinion on the matter. The extremely conservative student government (the ASUC) had offered the students no leadership whatsoever although the *Daily Californian*, continuing its liberal tradition, had consistently opposed the Regents the entire period.

The campus was rocked by charges, counter-charges and statements. The non-signers held fast and many important signers such as Joel Hildebrand promised to resign if one non-signer was fired for refusal to sign the oath.

The ASUC, which had passed a motion against the oath in October, was finally forced to call a general student body meeting in order to stave off a "save the University" protest meeting planned by the Graduate Students Association and the Non-Senate Academic Employees.

The much discussed "student passivity" vanished. Ten thousand of them trekked up to the Greek Theatre to attend an extremely dull *discussion* (not protest) meeting, chaired by the ASCU President, Dan Coehlo. The audience obviously supported the faculty and opposed the Regents. Coehlo, who is nothing more than an administration stooge, was vigorously booed for his neutral stand.

But the meeting was too late. A statement from John Francis Neylan, the Regents' spokesman was read. It completely switched the issue and caught the faculty in the neatest trap ever devised. The proposal was simple. Since both parties are interested in cleansing the campus of the virus of Communism, the faculty should *unconditionally endorse* the Regents policy.

The faculty had never previously *endorsed* the Regents' anti-Communist policy, but, at the best, had only *submitted* to an edict of their employers. Their position from the very beginning, however, had been agreement with the *purpose* of the oath but disagreement with the *method*. While the Regents' and the Hearst Press were ringing the tocsin of "anti-Communism," their feeble reply was, "We wish to oust the Communists too, but the oath is not an effective method." This milk-sop me-too-ism led to their complete undoing, for in the face of the Regents' "compromise," pressure from the San Francisco Chronicle and their other "powerful" supporters made it possible to put through a motion for a mail-in ballot on Neylan's proposal.

This is where the issue stands today. The faculty is expected to vote overwhelmingly in favor of endorsing the Regents' stand and substituting for the oath a statement on the back of the contract which affirms that the person is accepting employment *subject to* the non-Communist policy.

It is to this state that the faculty has been led by its entire policy of capitulation and compromise.

The non-signers, composed of many liberals and socialists, could have won the battle had they appealed directly to the student body and not relied on negotiation and pressure. The University has suffered a blow which may well ruin its standing in the eyes of the world and which is another blow at academic freedom in the United States.

Robert MARTINSON

Robert Martinson is a student at the University of California.

## Politics Club Campaigns for Abner

Politics Club members are taking a prominent part in campus and neighborhood activities in support of Willoughby Abner's campaign for State Senate. Despite the fact that Abner is running in the Democratic primary the Club, which has always stood for an independent labor party, voted unanimously to support him. The reason is that Abner, alone among CIO leaders in Illinois, took seriously the job of building a rank-and-file political action organization of workers, the 1st Congressional District CIO Political Action Club. He has expressed in speeches in the recent past his opposition to the notion of "capturing" the Democratic Party, and the present campaign is the logical outcome of the pressure from the members of his club to engage in a real fight against the Democratic machine as a further step in developing labor's own political apparatus. Far from being welcomed, the club's proposals ran counter to the desires of the Steel locals, and the ADA, each of whom had their own favorite liberal to try to sell to the machine. But as a result of strong pressure from the club, the only really functioning independent political organization in the area, the CIO, then the ADA, capitulated and fell in line behind Abner's candidacy.

Abner's race is being made in a district which is about 60% Negro. The White part of the district is middle-class but tempered somewhat by the liberal traditions of the University neighborhood which is part of the district. CIO workers by the hundreds have already been mobilized as precinct workers in the working class part of the district. In the white area work is being done by ADA, and by the Campus Committee for Abner. The Campus Committee was set up as a membership organization, and has recruited many unaffiliated students, as well as students from the three campus organizations that have endorsed it (SDA, Politics Club, United World Federalists). Precinct workers' training sessions, and campus activities to recruit campaign workers, have already taken place and now the voters are being canvassed. The campaign will reach a climax during the first two weeks of our Spring Quarter, election day being April 11th.

After April 11th, Politics Club members will turn their main attention to Campus Peace Week, April 16-22. This week was originally proposed by the Wallaceites in an attempt to capitalize on the Quaker proposals as the basis for a new "peace movement," which they of course could utilize effectively, their own organization being too well identified already as a Stalinist front. However, by the time the organizing conferences for Peace Week were over, it was no longer a week of agitation around the Quaker proposals for an American-Russian agreement, but a week of seminars and discussions on all phases of the war problem, with all viewpoints represented. The broad group of student organizations that came into the conference effectively forced the Stalinists and Wallaceites to content themselves with such a setup. Only SDA stayed out. Could it be that they feel that support of the Atlantic Pact would be hard to justify in the discussions?

A campaign by the Politics Club for financial aid to the Spanish Federation of Political Deportees and Internees is also on the books for the latter part of April. The Club also is arranging a debate, in which Irving Howe, author of "The UAW and Walter Reuther" will participate. All in all it looks like a busy quarter!

Saul MENDELSON

Saul Mendelson attends the University of Chicago.

# Celine: Disintegration of a Novelist

## Rebellion and Decay in a Philistine of Genius

**THE "UNDERGROUND MAN"** first enters European culture in the nineteenth century when, as rebel against the previously secure Enlightenment, he rejects the claims of science, the ordered optimism of the rationalists and the hopes of the revolutionists. He is tempted neither by knowledge, like Faust, nor by glory, like Julien Sorel—in fact, he is beyond temptation of any sort. He hopes not to reform the world, but to squirm out from under its pressures. Indifferent to all ideas and ideals, he rumbles with subterranean passions he can neither understand nor control. "Meek, tortured, uprooted, and living in the labyrinths of the pathological," he has, in the words of the critic William Phillips, "all the proportions of the 'anti-hero,' a deflated man, with an overwrought consciousness, who cannot cope with his predicament."

In Dostoevski's novels and stories he appears full face for the first time: sensualist, criminal and weakling, a tragic specimen of that moral disintegration Dostoevski believed must follow upon the loss of faith. Nietzsche, torn between the sacred and profane, is both fascinated and repelled by him.

But it is in the twentieth century that the underground man comes into his own, and like a rise of pus, breaks through the skins of traditional life. Perhaps, thus far at least, it is his century. In France, during the 1930's, there appeared two novels and several tracts that express to perfection the underground man's feelings about human life. But while in the past he may have seemed a mere creature of the literary imagination, related in some unclear way to his creator's personality, now he is running the whole show—he is author, central character and chorus. He has come out of his cave.

Louis-Ferdinand Celine's first novel, *Journey to the End of the Night*, picked up the story of his own life at the end of adolescence and carried it through to his middle thirties. While the sort of novels Celine wrote—long first-person reminiscences—presuppose an intimate relationship between author and central character, he described, not the actual events of his life, but their hallucinatory refraction.

*Journey*, as well as his subsequent novel *Death on the Installment Plan*, is composed of a series of loosely related incidents: grotesque skits, surrealist burlesques, manic fables and garrulous extravaganzas, all arising from, but not too often to be taken as a direct report of, Celine's personal experience.

### Parisian Argot and Literary French

*Journey* is written in a Parisian argot that makes it impossible to be read by one acquainted only with literary French. For just as its hero is utterly unheroic, so is its style the contrary of every literary and academic convention—an "anti-style." Frequently hysterical, voraciously obscene, it is a fierce and sputtering diatribe of the archetypal Parisian sod who can no longer contain himself. The underground man has found his voice.

The "I" of the novel, certainly Celine himself, is a sad little flea, quite beyond the perimeter of official society and its morality, and possessing only one virtue, but that remarkable: he seeks the truth. Since he would sneer at such abstractions

as "truth," it might be more accurate to say that he seeks always to be sincere, never to add to or subtract from his feelings, no matter how appalling they may be. Sincerity of feeling, in fact, becomes his passion, and like most passions unrefined by discriminations of the intelligence, his downfall.

The dominant motif of his life, as of the entire book, is one of irritated restlessness, undirected flight. From the novel's first pages, in which he crazily volunteers for the army, we see him constantly in flight, running from the terrors and apparitions that people his world.

Celine (or as he calls himself in the novel, Barmadu) is caught in the first world war and, unable to see it in any generalized dimensions, he refuses to take the war seriously even to the extent of opposing it. He knows only that bullets whistle and that he must run. Significantly, he is assigned to duty as a runner by a senile French general, a sign that official society also recognizes his talent for running. (That his feet smell as a result, Celine wryly remarks, is his only reward.) After running for the general, Celine comes to one of the major decisions in his life: if he is to survive, he will have to stop running for society and start running from it. Heroism is for Sundays; if the little man is to survive, he must exploit the resources of his cowardice.

### Celine on the Run

And so Celine runs—from the army to the rear, from one hospital to another; from France to a fantastic trading post in a rotting African jungle; from the African jungle to the jungle of industrialism in Detroit; from America back to France, where, still running up and down stairs to earn a few francs, he becomes an indigent doctor. (By far the best sections of the book are the descriptions of his flights to Africa and America.) The only peaceful spot he actually finds is, as one might expect, a post in an insane asylum. For "... when people are well, there is no way of getting away from it, they're rather frightening. . . . When they can stand up, they're thinking of killing you. Whereas when they're ill, there's no doubt about it, they're less dangerous."

Throughout the book Barmadu-Celine is on the lookout for a strange character named Robinson, even seedier and more demoralized than he. Eventually it becomes clear that this quest suggests the futility of all quests, the stupidity of believing there is anything worth finding in this world. When Robinson dies a purposeless death, the quest has come to its rightful end.

Images of death streak the novel; it is, in fact, a report on one man's apprenticeship to death. (In terms of such images, the African episode might be read as a journey to the death of archaic tribalism, and the American episode as a journey to the death of industrial civilization.) Celine is obsessed with the inexorability and stupidity of death: "... three feet below ground I . . . will be streaming with maggots, stinking more horribly than a heap of bank-holiday dung, all my disillusioned flesh absurdly rotting."

The flight from death ends as a flight to death. Perhaps, however, it is also, as Celine himself once suggested, a quest for love. Such a reading, comforting though it might be, must

be questioned: can the man who is so drenched with the smells of civilization's sewers, so allergic to ideas or ideals, so convinced of "man's viciousness," really be searching for love—or is it that he is searching for something to fill the vacuum created by love's absence?

In *Death on the Installment Plan*, Celine went back to his childhood and adolescence in order to complete the record of his experience. *Death* is an even grizzlier book than *Journey*, and is written in a fitful prose of dissociated insights that conveys the loathing with which the memory forces itself to return to the miasma of youth. The misanthropy of *Journey* ripens into outright paranoia: Celine is always the victim, and all he can summon against the world is his bilious rhetoric, the impotence of which he is the first to recognize. *Death* is a prolonged recital of cheating and betrayal; the child as the victim of his parents, his friends and his employers. While still a boy, he learns to hate the whole world: "It made me choke to think of it . . . of all the treachery of things! . . . all the swinishness! . . . the whole collection of ordures! Yes, God Almighty, I'd had my bellyful."

### The Quest for Solitude

Through *Death* there run two linked motifs: the richest account of retching in modern literature, and a constant yearning for solitude—both following upon the running motif in *Journey*. In describing retching, Celine reaches extremities of grotesque lyricism: "She brings up the lot . . . right into the wind . . . and I get it full in my face, the whole stinking stew that's been gurgling in her throat . . . I, who haven't so much as a crumb to bring up! Ah, now, yes, I find I have, after all . . . my stomach gives one more turn. . . ." This concern with vomit is linked to Celine's fruitless effort to disgorge the whole of his experience as he runs through the darkness of the night, to find release in "throwing up everything." If only one could start afresh, with nothing on one's stomach, rid of the materials of the past . . . but it cannot be done, there is always one more crumb of recollection.

The yearning for solitude, though present in *Journey*, is most thoroughly developed in *Death*. All a paranoic wants is "to be let alone:" he has no expectation of fulfillment or success. In the most brilliant piece of writing Celine has ever done, he describes a stay in an English country school, during which he finds a kind of happiness in taking long walks with a little idiot boy and a gentle, unobtrusive woman teacher, neither of whom disturb him with attempts at conversation. For Celine, the yearning for solitude is mixed with the pleasures of masturbation. The adolescent hero of *Death* masturbates regularly, not with the excited curiosity of an adolescent, but with the resignation of an old man. He feels that his pleasures can only come from himself and only when he is alone with himself. This is the ultimate act of isolation, the one solace that the underground man, grovelling in his dirt, can cling to with confidence.

It should by now be reasonably evident that there is a unity of attitude in Celine's two novels, which can be formulated in general terms and on the basis of which the meaning and quality of his work as a novelist can be established.

*The Nose and the Mound.* Celine's universe is irrevocably split. On one side is Celine himself, The Big Nose. This virtuoso of smells finds that his nose is the one organ that does not deceive him; by it one can know women, cities, nation's, destinies. "It's by smells that people, places and things come to their end. A whiff up one's nostril is all that remains of past experience." His trip to America is a prolonged exploration

in olefactory revulsion, climaxed by a visit to a New York urinal where he is simply awe-stricken by "its joyous communism of filth."

### The Human Mound of Excrement

As against the Big Nose is the world at large, that Measureless Mound of *Merde*. Celine is not merely overcome by the hideousness of modern life and the stupidity of modern society, he is in rebellion against the simple and invariable conditions of human existence itself. He is overcome not so much by the fact that man must die, but by the inescapable conditions of his life.

In *Journey*, he speaks of being "appalled by my realization of *biological ignominy*," these latter two words being, in my opinion, the key phrase in Celine's writings. He despises the sensual attributes of the least offensive human specimen: every time he sees a man engage in the physiological functions, Celine seethes with rage.

It is customary to consider the existentialist novelists as specialists in nausea, but by comparison with Celine they are rose-sniffers. Such writers as Sartre and Camus are concerned with the abstraction, the metaphysics of nausea, but they know nothing of Celine's gargantuan obsession with its sheer sensation. Had he lived in the immediate post-Christian era, Celine might well have found himself in a Manichaeian sect that rejected everything earthly and sensual as evil. Being instead a twentieth-century Parisian, he submits himself to the most extreme and humiliating debaucheries precisely because of his fury at being unable to escape life's filths and decays.

Part of the meaning of the running motif in *Journey* is now revealed. Celine is running not merely, as suggested at the beginning of this article, from society, but perhaps more fundamentally from the sight of every human creature. In *Death* he is always befouling himself as a child, an act that may be seen in relation to two possible poles of meaning. It is, first, the physical equivalent of his repeated assertion that he is only too ready to abandon his self-respect as useless, even dangerous, in this world; and it is his self-lacerating recognition that even he, the Big Nose, is inextricably involved in the very physicality he despises. For all the filth and obscenity in his books, Celine is a man entranced by the vision of purity.

This urge to escape the conditions of bodily existence may be related to several possible origins. In part, it may be due to his life-long migraine, the result of his war wounds and apparently painful enough to make anyone wish to escape the body. (If he had been able to sleep, he once remarked, he would never have written.) Or it may be seen, in terms of psychoanalytic concepts, as a delectation in forbidden filths that arouse unconscious recollections of childhood concerns with adult sexuality. Or it may be seen as an extrapolation of a social condition: the vileness of modern life abstracted into an emotional universal. Or as a combination of all these possibilities.

But in the face of so insistent a fact, explanation seems ultimately irrelevant. For the journey through the night continues, the Big Nose despairing to escape the fumes of decay, and searching for one corner of the world where there is a clean breath of air.

*In Distrust of Rhetoric.* Starting from Celine's premises, the search for sincerity must ultimately lead to silence. He remarks: "I grow foul as soon as anyone talks to me; I hate it when they prattle." Or again: "The very idea made me howl with terror. Having to talk again—oh, Gawd." All discussion of human institutions is drivel for Celine, unless it begins with

the admission: "I am . . . thou art . . . all of us are despoilers, cheats, slob." But once that has been said, in no matter how many different ways, what remains to be said?

*The Zest of Comic Nausea.* A philosopher expounding Celine's ethics might very easily have become something of a bore. But what saved Celine as a writer was that he approached the world's filth with such zest, he so enjoyed roaring his invective and belly laughs from the sewers, that he made his nausea into something deeply comic. There is in his novels a constant antiseptic suggestion of incongruity; between incident and comment, between language and thought, between the narrative itself and the emotional temper from which it issued.

In talking about the war, Celine solemnly observes that "horses are lucky. They go through the war, like us, but they're not asked to . . . seem to believe in it. In this business they are unfortunate but free." During his visit to Africa, after suffering the most sickening afflictions in the jungles, he remarks that he is especially out of luck because he does "not like the country." In *Death*, his boss, a bogus scientist, launches a typical Celinesque comic diatribe after having failed at a piece of chicanery: "I'll get them right this time. . . . Their bellies, Ferdinand! Not their heads, but their bellies. Their digestions shall be my customers. . . . I'm through with the spirit for keeps! We're onto the bowels now, Ferdinand, the grand alimentary canal."

It is this distinctive stance of comic nausea which accounts for most of the vividness of Celine's novels. His hatred of abstraction led him to relish the specific incident and to trust nothing else. Using noisy sputtering verbs and cascades of unrestrained adjectives, he sought to appeal to the sense organs. The total effect resembles something like a colorful but bawdy carnival.

Strictly speaking, Celine is not a satirist in the way Swift was; he is neither intelligent nor serious enough. His metier is a kind of savage burlesque. The nausea that makes him recoil from experience is linked to the comedy that makes him relish the experience of recoil—that is the basis of Celine's gift.

*Failures of Sensibility.* Both of Celine's novels begin to lag about halfway through, for which there are rather important reasons. Celine does not really write novels. His books are more like collections of grotesque skits or burlesques. Once, however, the "punch line" of a skit is known, there is little point in waiting for its end. And in Celine's novels, after what has happened in their beginnings, what worse could befall their unhappy creatures afterward? Certainly nothing better. By its very nature, the skit or burlesque cannot be sustained over too long a period of time; it is essentially a virtuoso device, and virtuosity holds the attention largely on the basis of an initial shock.

Sometimes one suspects that Celine is really without any genuine attitude and that he adopts the pose of cynicism as a convenient strategy for coping with aspects of experience he cannot understand. At such points the novels seem like a charade, indulging in the gestures of life without conveying its content. Driven by his own insufficiencies and indiscriminateness of feeling, as well as by his simplistic ethics, to ever greater assertions of cynicism, Celine sometimes falls into the opposite fatuity of sentimentalism. The whole subject of emotion, the subject of the novelist, is, in all its fine particularities, beyond Celine's grasp. When he does announce himself in love, it is with a sentimentality that is appalling. Let a little Detroit prostitute show him an ounce of kindness and the suggestion of a friendly thigh, and he moons like a boy. Neces-

sarily so; for anyone who has so insufficient a notion of human feelings will not be able to react intelligently to even a rather flimsy instance of them.

### Tragedy and Minor Nuisance

But what I find most unsatisfying in Celine's novels is his inability to distinguish between kinds and degrees of evil, between a bit of dust and a really overwhelming mound of filth. With his undeluded description of the present-day world I would not quarrel, but I find it intolerable in a novelist of scope that he cannot distinguish between a nuisance and a tragedy. It simply does not do always to send the same cascades of invective hurtling through page after page, regardless of the cause. Celine is too overwhelmed by his demon of Evil properly to distinguish discrete evils in human conduct and institutions. Here we have his ultimate failure of sensibility and intelligence. For all his sense of affliction and all his gift for comedy, Celine remains a philistine—a philistine blessed with genius—but a philistine nonetheless.

The most perceptive essay on Celine was written by Leon Trotsky in the *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1935. Celine, he said, after analyzing *Journey*, "will not write a second book with such an aversion for the lie and such a disbelief in the truth. The dissonance must resolve itself. Either the artist will make his peace with the darkness or he will perceive the dawn."

Trotsky's timing was a little off, since Celine did manage to write another novel with the same attitudes as those in *Journey*, but the essential prophecy was correct. In 1936, after he had achieved world fame, Celine took a trip to Russia. Shortly thereafter he wrote a little book called *Mea Culpa* in which, together with some shrewd observations about Stalin's dictatorship, he indulged in a wild, incoherent harangue about man's inherent and inescapable bestiality.

At this point, there began what must now be called Celine's intellectual disintegration—that is, at the very point he started to try to express ideas. In 1938, he published a fantastic book called *Bagatelles pour un Massacre* (Trifles for a Massacre), a long anti-Semitic tract in which he blamed the Jews for everything from the defeat of Napoleon to the rise of surrealism, the corruption of the French language, and the Sino-Japanese war. Among those he called Jewish were Cezanne, Lenin, Montaigne, Stendhal, Vatican officials and Mrs. Wallis Simpson—"representatives of our great culture [who lie] on all the pallets, in all the garrets of the official Jewish brothel. . . ." When André Gide first reviewed *Bagatelles*, he thought it a satire, but now this charitable view seems difficult to support. During the Nazi occupation of France, Celine was accused by the resistance of collaborating with the Nazis.

Today Celine lives in Denmark, where he now denies having been a collaborator. He is said to have written other books, but it is difficult, for me at least, to look forward to their publication. For Celine, as novelist and "thinker," has had his say; henceforth only anticlimax is possible. Celine went as far as a philistine of genius could, and then he "made his peace with the darkness." From the depths of the underground man's soul he brought forth all its effluvia so that the world would see what was simmering there. But now his work is done, his genius sealed, his ignominy unredeemable.

Irving Howe

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# Senator Paul Douglas: A Case Study

## National Security or Social Reform — The Liberal's Dilemma

**PAUL HOWARD DOUGLAS** occupies a unique position on America's political scene. He has attained the penultimate elective political office, that of U. S. Senator. Simultaneously he enjoys a reputation as honest and yet supported by the Democratic machine, as a liberal champion and yet extolled by the conservative press, as principled and yet willing to compromise. In addition he is obviously able, intelligent, and erudite.

Douglas achieved his Senatorial position in the Fair Deal landslide of 1948, when, aided by Illinois' organized labor, Americans for Democratic Action, and Democratic ward heelers, he trounced the Republican troglodyte, C. Wayland ("Curly") Brooks. His behavior, once elected, has conformed remarkably to his largely liberal campaign promises. The *New Republic's* voting record of November 14, 1949 gave him a perfect score; the CIO's record of January 2, 1950 gives him but one demerit on 16 issues, and that vote was in accord with his promised economizing. To be sure, readers of *ANVIL* may not agree with the *New Republic's* plus for the North Atlantic Pact, but Douglas' attitude here still falls within the modern denotation of that much-abused word "liberal." Douglas has occasionally fallen from grace in the eyes of his left supporters, but these falls have called forth only kindly admonition or, rarely, surprise and hurt.

But the *New Republic*, the *Nation* and the *CIO News* are not the only periodicals to laud Douglas. Recently, *Time* magazine bestowed upon the Senator its accolade of "Picture on the Cover and Profile within." *Business Week*, too, has saluted him. And America's family magazine, the *Saturday Evening Post*, has implied that Douglas would make an able President. That this is not idle magazine chatter becomes clear when we add the Dixiecrats to this list of admirers. They are not, of course, ardent, but they would probably not object to him as strenuously as they would to other prominent Northern Democrats, for reasons we shall adduce.

### Douglas as Economics Professor

What makes this man the favorite of such diverse political tendencies? To begin with, his intellect and erudition far surpass those of the backwoods lawyers who make up the bulk of the U. S. Congress. A distinguished economist, Professor at the University of Chicago, former President of the American Economic Association, author of a half-dozen texts on questions ranging from the narrowly empirical to the broadly theoretical, past consultant to numerous state and federal agencies concerned with unemployment and relief problems, utilities regulation, social security, and so forth, Douglas brings to his position a scholarly reputation far exceeding that of the mediocre Woodrow Wilson and a practical experience probably unequalled by any single person in elective office. Douglas, likely enough, is the only member of the Committee on Banking and Currency who understands many of the difficult economic problems at issue.

But intellect and erudition are not Mr. Douglas' only qualifications. He is, as we have indicated, a liberal. But to understand this liberalism, we need to know more than his campaign platform and voting record. We must know something of his systematic viewpoint, how he came to formulate it, and how

he now attempts to realize it. If we are to believe popular accounts, Douglas began his political career as a fiery college radical who espoused unpopular causes and who was, according to a classmate's recollection "rather to the left of Debs." Whether Douglas was or was not a militant socialist, we do not know. In any case, during World War I, when a strong anti-war sentiment existed and when hundreds of labor radicals including Debs were being imprisoned, Douglas went through a long period of soul-searching and eventually volunteered to help make the world safe for democracy. He was rejected for poor vision. This youthful action (he was then in his mid-twenties) certainly indicates no radicalism, but it still falls within the range of liberalism. (John Dewey, with far less soul searching, was pro-war.) After the war, Douglas joined the Society of Friends, and called himself a pacifist.

The major index to Douglas' social viewpoint is his work on economics. It is, of course, highly technical, but a brief indication can be given here. In 1926 Messrs. Hart, Schaffner and Marx sponsored through a committee of distinguished economists an international competition for the best original treatise on the theory of wages. Douglas won the prize of \$5,000 and the essay he submitted was published in modified form as *The Theory of Wages*. In this book the author sets himself the task of discovering how wages and interest are determined. Using a marginal-type analysis, Douglas shows that wages are determined by the final increment to production made by the last hired laborer, similarly for capital. That is to say, the price of labor is determined by what labor contributes to the creation of the total social product.

The author states that his analysis is scientific and independent of one's moral evaluation of capitalism. This is true, but there is an important assumption made in his analysis that has powerful moral overtones. This is the assumption that capital does really make a contribution to the production of the total social product, and that interest does then represent its reward. This assumption has been criticized by socialist economists, notably Marx. Marx did not deny the contribution to production of the machine, the capital good, which for him was congealed labor, but he did deny that capital made any contribution to the social product. Capital, for Marx, was economic power; it was the power of the business enterpriser to hire others to work for him, under his direction, and surrendering all rights to the ensuing product. Capital was, thus, not a factor in production, entitled to compensation, but a socially legitimated and historical form of exploitation.

### The Economics of Wages and Interest

This is not a verbal quibble. Marx's analysis lead him to the realization that for man to become free, capitalism must be destroyed, and that the agent of this destruction will be the proletariat. Douglas' analysis, based on the seemingly hard facts of "wages" and "interest," does not look critically behind these categories to an even harder set of social facts having to do with power. And because of this, Douglas did not and does not see the potential forces for social change in the conflict of class interests. His analysis leads him to the belief, slurred over in his early work, but implicit in his present posi-

tion, that there should be a just balance in the share of the social product which each productive element, capital and labor, receives and that when this balance is out of line, government should help to correct it. While, at times, labor may be disadvantaged, at others it is possible for labor to have too much bargaining power.

While his technical work betrayed a fundamental social conservatism, his concomitant political thinking could not be so easily characterized. In 1924, Douglas supported La Follette; in the next two campaigns, Norman Thomas. Answering in 1928 the question, "Why I am for Norman Thomas?", he responded that it was necessary to "build through the years an independent and aggressive political party and not to run constantly from one of the old parties to the other for those short run gains which are largely illusory." Douglas was in favor of a new party, about which, in the early thirties, he wrote *The Coming New Party*. In this book he sees "political corruption and dominance of the capitalist class in both of the two old parties," and he decries "the natural tendencies of ambitious men to identify themselves with those political parties which alone seem to be able to give them offices and emoluments in that immediate future in which they are completely concerned."

And, in 1933, as editor of *The World Tomorrow*, "a journal looking toward a social order based on the religion of Jesus," he expressed himself:

The Democratic Party is the chief obstacle in the way of a third party of farmers, wage earners and white collar workers, developing on American soil, and its destruction would be one of the best things that could happen in our political life.

Since then, Douglas has obviously changed his mind about the Democratic Party, but this change, though significant, is not major. The criticisms expressed are far from revolutionary. The call for a third party is a familiar one in American politics, and was particularly so then in a period of depression radicalism, when few self-respecting liberals could vote for the party of Tammany and Southern Bourbonism. Moreover, concerning the Socialist Party, Douglas wrote:

The Socialist Party has in the past been a force for good in American life and it is now in a far sounder, if numerically weaker, position than before. It has abolished the former requirement for membership that one must believe in the class struggle and has substituted for this a more general clause. . . . By the secession of the communists it has purged itself of its lunatic fringe and it is no longer liable to be swept away by the extremists.

Douglas himself never joined the SP but belonged instead to the Conference for Progressive Political Action, composed of intellectuals standing between the SP and the Democratic Party. There is no doubt, however, that he then believed that "society should ultimately be organized on the basis of public service rather than private property," and that it was necessary to organize a new party in America.

### With the Nash-Kelly Machine

His first step on the road to political power came in 1932 when he accepted the Kelly-Nash machine's invitation to run—with no strings attached—on the Democratic ballot for alderman of Chicago's Fifth Ward. With or without strings, Douglas thereby helped the machine win a tough municipal election by swinging some of the reform vote. In return, Alderman Douglas had the privilege of needling the machine in City Council by his demands for economy and his attacks on municipal corruption. (Attacking the machine is a customary and naive tactic of reformers. As Lincoln Steffens pointed out so many years ago, the machine is a reflection of an essentially undemocratic society. Its strength rests in the functions it per-

forms: it enables the upper classes to by-pass the legal process and it moderates the political and economic oppression of the lower classes. This is not to condone the machine, but to recall the fact that reformers have never succeeded more than temporarily because they cannot find a legitimate method to perform these functions or to obviate the necessity of performing them.) Douglas attempted to build his own machine with idealistic college youth and cheap-government elements. This worked fairly adequately in the predominantly middle-class neighborhood of the University of Chicago. But these forces could not carry him beyond the Fifth Ward. When, after a sojourn in Washington, Douglas ran in 1942 for the Democratic nomination for senator from Illinois, his machine opponent trounced him soundly.

Douglas' decision to run for the Democratic nomination was another step away from his third party beliefs. It is true that no third party had come into being and that with the development of a mass industrial trade union movement any such party would of necessity have been predominantly working class in composition. Avoiding as he did any affiliation of a strictly class character Douglas might never have joined a labor party. He was, however, never given the chance. The Democratic Party remained the only instrument for political action, and becoming its candidate meant making peace with the machine. In his book Douglas had pointed out the close tie-up between the then Governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Tammany. He learned that the support of Kelly-Nash was necessary to win. When Douglas ran again in 1948 it was with the machine's backing.

Douglas paid a price for this support by whitewashing the machine. To a Democratic picnic in 1919 he claimed that the Democrats of Cook County had "wiped clean the shame that tainted the life of the county and state for a whole generation after the First World War (under Republican administration). . . . As members of the Democratic Party we have every reason to be proud of what we have done for this city, state and nation. And we also have every reason to be grateful to Colonel Jack Arvey, to whose patriotism much of what we have been able to do can be directly traced."

A few weeks after Douglas spoke these words Colonel Arvey was revealed as one of a four-man syndicate that had profited to the extent of \$300,000 by reselling a small piece of real estate to the city on a highway deal. Douglas may not have known about *this* transaction, but very few people in Chicago are unaware of the close connection between the river-ward precinct captains and the crime and gambling syndicates. Nor has the ADA, which interests itself in such matters, been able to report any rift between honest Democrats and those . . . not so honest. But we are running ahead of our story.

The day after his 1942 election defeat Douglas joined the Marines. Eschewing the privileges of experience and education and disdaining the disabilities of age (50) and physical condition, Douglas insisted on enlisting as a private. The average age of his platoon was 19. He requested overseas duty, was sent to the South Pacific, rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and was wounded severely. After 14 months in hospitals, he returned to Chicago. This military record has been made much of by his admirers, including the *New Republic*.

Recuperated and returned, Douglas ran for senator against the Republican incumbent, "Curly" Brooks. This gentleman is, with Ohio's Senator Bricker, one of the few remaining "native American" isolationists whose political inspiration is the *Chicago Tribune*. Overcoming stiff competition and by sheer dogged perseverance, Brooks had managed to pile up one of the

most reactionary voting records on domestic issues of any man in Congress. For Douglas the campaign must have been sport, for he had a lot of fun debating with an empty chair, which Brooks wisely chose not to occupy. Brooks had opposed the arming of Guam, the early draft law, and wanted to withdraw our troops from Germany. In addition, he opposed soil conservation, school lunches, minimum wages, monopoly control and other essentials of the "American way of life." Curly had his World War I military record, but Belleau Wood was old stuff compared to Pelelieu and Douglas had joined the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars. When, in desperation, Curly tried a little red-baiting, Mrs. Douglas took to attending his meetings, offering to match Paul's war wounds with his. So that there could be no possible misunderstanding here, Douglas spent a good deal of time attacking Wallace and calling for a strong policy toward Russia. The result: Truman carried Illinois by a bare 30,000; Douglas by a substantial 408,000.

We have reported that in terms of his Senate voting record Douglas has fulfilled the expectations of his liberal supporters. But there is more to congressional activity than a voting record; and some of these extra-roll-call activities seem to have perplexed his supporters. Far from acting the part of a militant liberal ("I want to be half as good as old George Norris"), Douglas has shown a tendency to compromise, to compromise not merely after an issue is joined but long before, and not merely in terms of a particular bill but in explicit concessions of principle.

A few examples of this tendency will suffice. In his election platform, Douglas called upon the federal government to subsidize the building of fifteen million homes. In the Senate, Douglas was on the committee that formulated a housing bill. What went into the committee was an administration proposal to spend a little over two billion dollars; what came out was a bill to spend half of that—to build 815,000 houses over a period of several years. Douglas explained on the Senate floor that he had been *in favor* of this cut so that the measure could enlist the honest support of as many Republicans as possible. The majority in favor of the bill, however, was so tremendous that there seemed little justification for spending only one-half of the amount for public housing to pick up a few more votes.

It is his penchant for economy that won for Douglas the praise of smalltown newspaper editors. His speeches against porkbarrel bills made good reading, but like all speeches against sin, had about the same effect. Some people thought he was grandstanding. More reprehensible was his action in sponsoring with Senator Taft a resolution calling for an overall budget cut of five per cent. As *The Nation* had to point out to him, such a proposal was not only politically irresponsible, it wielded an indiscriminate axe against worthy service agencies as well as among the overstuffed military bureaus. Douglas argued that the cost of living had declined sufficiently to permit economizing, and that if that meant a pay cut, then government girls could dispense with marcel.

Another nice thing Douglas did was to cut the ground from under the administration's long-standing Murray-Dingell-Wagner health insurance. Because it goes too far, for Douglas, he substituted his own part-payment plan to cover only "catastrophic sicknesses." That such an action will make it more difficult to get any kind of health bill passed is obvious to anyone not intent on coming to an agreement with the opponents of all health measures.

A more disgraceful episode occurred during the long and

drawn out fight to get a rules change that would eliminate the filibuster. After a fine and effective speech in favor of the rules change, Douglas was challenged by Senator Russell of Georgia, a leading Dixiecrat. Pointedly Russell asked, what did Douglas think of Mayor Kennelly's action in killing the Carey ordinance? (The Carey ordinance, then before the Chicago City Council, would have prohibited segregation in publicly supported housing projects. It stood an excellent chance for passage until Democratic Mayor Kennelly cracked the party whip.) Confronted with this stickler, Douglas defended the action of the mayor, an action denounced by every Negro leader of Chicago. Douglas "explained" that Kennelly did not wish to frighten away the big insurance companies which were to pay part of the cost of construction. Russell then aptly retorted:

It seems to me that the Senator's argument cannot possibly be consistent if he is willing to permit the city of Chicago, in order to promote the building of public housing, to impose a pattern of segregation which was denounced when we in the South tried to prevent in our cities race riots and bloodshed . . . etc.

Douglas replied:

I want to say to the Senator from Georgia that we are not proposing to abolish segregation in the South. . . . We are not proposing to abolish it in housing, or in the federal aid to education bill. We are not proposing to abolish it in the schools. . . . The Senators from the South are seeing ghosts. We do not want to impose rules against segregation on the South. . . . Speaking for myself, I believe that so far as jobs are concerned . . . it should not be denied to any man because of his race, his creed, or his color. I am not insisting, however, that in the social relations which men have with each other, they must be forced to mingle. That is an individual matter, and in many cases a matter for local decision.

#### The Compromise on Anti-Racism

Russell was well aware of the importance of the ideological concession which Douglas had just made. All the South wishes is to have segregation and discrimination left in local hands.

Russell replied:

I wish to thank the Senator from Illinois for his very frank and forthright statement. I do not think that he and I are so far apart in this case. We might have some difference in the approach, but our basic feelings are the same.

Russell now pressed his advantage. Dixiecrats do not like to have it said that they are seeing ghosts. It makes them sound superstitious. As proof that this was no haunted house he had been wandering in, Russell held up a copy of the report of the President's Civil Rights Commission and inquired if the Senator knew that this report called for "the cutting off of all federal aid to Southern states, all old age assistance, aid to schools, etc., unless these states abolish laws which permits segregation in any place, including restaurants?" He hadn't read

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the report, but that was mere ectoplasm implied Douglas: I moved out of that house long ago. Little Southern boys should not go wandering unescorted through deserted liberal mansions. "That is not the program of the Democratic Party. Our civil rights plank contains merely [1]four planks . . ." which he went on to the list as (1) abolition of the poll tax. (2) anti-lynching legislation; (3) equal treatment in the armed forces for "colored" troops (the term is Douglas); and (4) FEPC. Regarding the latter, he explained:

I should like to see if we cannot sit down together and work out an arrangement which will protect people of all [!] races, creeds and colors, and which at the same time gives a maximum of local self government.

And later:

We of the North are only urging the Democratic platform which was adopted in Philadelphia. We are not urging the program of the President's Commission on Civil Rights. . . . What is wrong with the program to which I have referred?

Russell:

I have no enthusiasm [for these planks], but if the platform were all construed as the Senator from Illinois is construing it, I should feel much better about the future.

Russell, however, was not to be fooled so easily. He knew that Douglas did not speak for the administration, for he continued about the movement for equal treatment in the armed forces:

The Senator well knows that the purpose behind the movement is to cause an intermingling of race down to the squad level.

Russell was seeing no ghosts; the Army Air Corps and Navy shortly thereafter did order such intermingling (with what effect we do not know). But Douglas it seems was the one moving slowly, for he responded:

It is not necessary at all. The Democratic platform [for an ex-third-party man, Douglas sticks rather closely to the Democratic platform] says "equality of treatment." There can be separate battalions and separate regiments.

Douglas did not explain why, after seventeen years of Democratic Party administration, during which Negroes were organized into separate battalions and regiments, there still had to be a campaign plank advocating "equal treatment." Nor did he explain why everyone else in the country, Negroes, the President, the armed services and the Dixiecrats, interpreted the term "equal treatment" to mean "an intermingling of the races down to the squad level."

We regretfully draw the curtains on this selection from that stirring drama, "Fighting Senator Douglas," in order to do a little interpretation. "Why," the puzzled liberal asks, "does Paul Douglas do these things? Why does he make such concessions of principle?" We invite the reader to our answer.

Let us eliminate two simple motives. It is true that Douglas stands a chance for the Democratic nomination for the presidency, say in 1956. It is also doubtless true that Douglas realizes this and that he knows his chances would be greatly increased with the support or acquiescence of conservative and reactionary groups within the party. But we are not inclined to believe that Douglas would subvert his basic principles for that reason alone. Also, we are not inclined to believe that Douglas has altered his earlier opinions to the extent of thinking, for instance, that the status of Negroes should not be immediately improved, to the fullest possible extent. But we do think (1) that he is bound by the formal process of the law and (2) he is subordinating reform to "national security."

These two motivations of Douglas appear clearly in his round table discussion early this year with Louis Wirth, sociologist, on the topic "Can We Solve the Civil Rights Issue Now?" Throughout the discussion Wirth, who is no radical, kept hammering that civil rights legislation must be passed

quickly. Wirth has studied racial tension, and although he does not say so explicitly, one can see in the back of his mind the notion that if civil rights legislation is not passed, Negroes are going to create disturbances, ranging from civil disobedience to marches on Washington.

### Civil Rights and Question of Unity

Douglas is oblivious to these implicit considerations and in his rebuttals to Wirth seems to be asking, like Napoleon of the Pope: "How many congressmen does the civil rights group have?" Few, clearly, and because his allies are few, Douglas is prepared to compromise and compromise again in an effort to get a little legislation passed. The fact that disturbances could grow to the point where a recalcitrant Congress would be forced to pass suitable legislation does not enter his thinking. Or rather the only disturbances Douglas envisages are those created by the Dixiecrats in the form of filibusters, and concerning these his repeated response in the discussion is "We are going to do it (fight for civil rights) in a spirit which will not destroy the unity of the United States."

This reference to "unity" is at first not clear (after all, the South cannot very well secede) but it becomes clear when Wirth refers to "our position in the world." Douglas closes the discussion with this statement:

Wirth has touched upon a point which I think we all have thought about a great deal in these last months. The Communists are now making a vigorous attack against the United States in all corners of the world—a very unjust attack to my point of view, but still a vigorous attack. And we are now engaged in a struggle as to whether the people of Southeast Asia and of India will line up with the democracies or whether they will go over to the police state of communism. It is important that we remove race discrimination from American life in order to strengthen our position. I appeal to the people of the South, who are extremely patriotic, to see that there is a national interest involved and that some of their states' rights be waived in return for the national interest.

This, we think, is the cornerstone of Douglas' present social philosophy, the defense of America against Russia. For this defense we must have "unity" and Douglas is prepared to compromise with conservatives of all types in order to insure this unity. Interestingly enough, he always states this position in the opposite way: reform will strengthen the country, hence reactionaries must accept these reforms.

Liberals who "justify" reforms in the name of national security often think that they have the conservative over a barrel: after all, the conservative prizes national security above all; he must grant these reforms. But in practice the right wing usually places class interest above national interest and is skeptical of the strengthening value of reform; the liberal does not perceive the importance of his ideological concession, nor does he perceive the strategical and tactical consequences.

When American liberalism was a younger and a fighting philosophy, its tenets were accepted on their own ground. That labor should receive adequate pay and have decent working and living conditions, that people should not be discriminated against because of race or color—these tenets were regarded as self-evidently true. Their justification lay in a humanistic ethic, naturalistic or religious. And if a nation such as America was worthy of defense in a war, it was because that nation possessed more liberty and more democracy than its opponent, and because the consequence of its victory would be a spread of these libertarian and democratic practices. National security did not justify reform measures; it was the existence of reforms that justified participation in national security.

But once national security is posited as a higher value than human rights, it becomes possible for the conservative to slip

the barrel beneath his opponent, as in the last war. The struggle for reform will cripple the war effort, it is argued, and quite correctly. At this stage the committed liberal cannot suddenly backtrack and state: "There is nothing left to defend." This is not all; there is still a more bitter pill to swallow. The liberal discovers that, to his horror, the upper class does not accept its own ideology.

**Douglas Represents False Argument**

It may appear that our criticism of Douglas' actions today is irresponsible, that we are ignoring the terrible threat of Russian tyranny and imperialism, and that by this device we can snipe at an honest and able man who is attempting realistically to cope with the problem. This is not the case. We recognize the merits of Paul Douglas, and if we single him out for attack, it is because he is the best representative of a position we hold to be false and wrong.

*Douglas puts national security above all other values.* In its name he espouses the liberal ideas of better treatment for minorities and slum dwellers. But Douglas is afraid of the conflict and opposition that any real effort to eliminate discrimination or reorganize the economic structure would arouse on the part of the presently-privileged classes. This would endanger "national unity." At the same time he is afraid of any radical move or mass action on the part of the working class for precisely the same reason. And this reinforces his essentially conservative views on the possibility of conciliating class interests, and if necessary, suppressing manifestations of the class struggle. This was revealed clearly in a speech Douglas made before the Catholic Labor Alliance in Chicago in 1946. Speaking of strikes in vital industries, such as coal, he said:

To paralyze the country by shutting off essential materials and services is a sure way to hurt the great mass of citizens, stir up internal hatreds, and so weaken ourselves externally that we can

... (not) command the respect of the other powers which are eyeing us closely. . . . The more of us who are employers on the one hand and members of trade unions on the other can exercise internal restraint and put our country first, the more differences can be settled peacefully, and the less legislation will be needed. But if we do not do this . . . the community . . . will have to try to integrate society by more stringent measures.

We have seen how Douglas' liberal philosophy breaks down in practice because he accepts the present power structure and because he makes "national unity" his supreme value. This is why he is willing to compromise on every issue. But perhaps national unity is not the way to defeat imperialism, Russian or American. Perhaps imperialism can only be defeated by the revolutionary and democratic energies of those who suffer from imperialism. Douglas can envision such a possibility only as utopian.

In his university classes, Douglas used to express a great admiration for Robert Owen: Owen, unlike other socialists and reformers, was a man who got something done, who showed that he could be a success. But in the period when he "got something done," Owen was a benevolent despot. New Lanark was the prototype of the paternal company-town, pre-saging even the modern psychological techniques of "adjusting" the worker. Yet Owen still failed to enlist the support of his fellow members of the upper class. Douglas, of course, will find America's upper class more willing to make concessions to America's workers than Owen did his English contemporaries. The welfare state, controlled from above, is calculated to ensure national unity. But where, as so frequently happens, national security comes into conflict with reform, a choice must be made between them. Douglas has already made his choice, and it is reform that suffers.

Al L. MIMSEY

*Al L. Mimsey* is the pen name of two graduate students at the University of Chicago.

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# From the Editor's Mailbox

IN ITS LAST ISSUE, ANVIL featured a debate titled "World Federalism vs. Socialism." As students who are both socialists and federalists, we feel that ANVIL made a mistake in its statement of the question. The opposition of world federalism and socialism as *alternatives* precludes any serious consideration of political cooperation between the two movements. It is easy to show, as W. Walters did, that official United World Federalist (UWF) theory is superficial, inconsistent with Marxism, and does not correspond to reality. We can easily see that it is reactionary in its "toleration" of Stalinism and capitalism, but it is another problem to determine the attitude of socialists to the federalist movement, especially in building an anti-war movement.

## The Situation Today

Any discussion of building an anti-war movement must begin with the admission that we are starting with far fewer forces than in the thirties. There is not a trace left on the campuses of those several large organizations which were the basis of the anti-war movement, and which began by being anti-capitalist in orientation. Only the Stalinists are left, but they are now so thoroughly discredited as reactionary Russian apologists that they warrant no consideration.

Autopsies of organized socialism in the United States are common enough. Superficially it is sufficient to mention the prosperity with which American capitalism emerged from its last war. The accumulated purchasing power of American consumers, the wide open world market, and the armaments race have served to maintain a high level of production and the highest standard of living in history and to give many students the hope of adjusting capitalism for a better world. Further, the coming of the cold war has been accompanied by the increase in national chauvinism, witch hunts, and all the hysterical concomitants of war preparations which are necessary to mobilize the people behind World War III. Seldom in the history of modern capitalism has there been more social pressure for belief in the official myths than in America today. Students are almost as conscious as anyone of the danger of being radical in the face of loyalty oaths and subversive lists.

Finally, the reactionary role of the Stalinists and the now obvious fate of the Russian Revolution have disillusioned many who otherwise would have had the courage to risk the hazards of nonconformity. Still others have been diverted by the apparent success of New Dealism politics in reforming the contradictions of the present system.

## Socialism As Anti-War Force

But perhaps the most important reason for the absence of a strong socialist movement is the absence on the world scene of any real socialist force capable of presenting an alternative to Russia and America. The working class is defeated, demoralized, sometimes seduced into Stalinism; it lacks adequate leadership, and looks completely im-

potent in the face of the Stalinist and capitalist camps. Socialism is not now an effective anti-war force and we cannot prove it ever to have been one, so the sophisticated can snicker at the mention of "socialist revolution." Most students look elsewhere than to socialism for means to avert war.

Whatever sentiment to change the world there might be despite the prosperity of American capitalism, the witch-hunts and disillusionment in the "Russian experiment" is due to the realization that we have finally reached a situation where the stability of the social order is just the problem. The present system has failed to solve the first; we face the possibility that our rulers will destroy us along with themselves in a new conflagration.

Traditional methods of power politics have proved a failure (and their variations in the League of Nations and United Nations have gone the same way). People are looking desperately for some innovation which will do better than its predecessors.

## The Program of World Federalism

World federalism proposes to combine existing national states into a supra-national government which would merely suppress armaments and intervene in economic matters only where they directly threaten violence between national governments. Utopian as such a program appears, it is distinguished from most others by the fact that it represents an attempt to find a solution outside the framework of customary power diplomacy. Looking at the situation today, it sees that international wars are waged by "sovereign" nation-states, and concludes therefore that what we must do to abolish war is to take away this sovereignty; once the units that wage war are "abolished" war itself will cease to exist.

World federalism originated and remains today largely a movement of upper-middle class quasi-intellectuals without prior political experience, but with a genuine fear of the consequences of war. The greatest contributing factor to its popularity in America is its respectability. Since it does not challenge the economic bases of capitalist society, it is not under the intense hostile political pressure which socialists must bear. By ignoring current political and economic issues, the world government movement has been assured of ample contributions from the wealthy, and support from politicians and ideologists of the capitalist order who see in world government a plausible plan for stabilizing the status quo, or who find it a cheap way of winning political support without committing themselves to anything concrete.

With its program, the movement attracts primarily middle and upper class elements who are as anxious as anyone to avoid war, but who cannot, for obvious reasons, advocate a thorough going change in the structure of society. Its avoidance of any position on immediate social problems; however, means that it can make little headway among the working class, even its most pro-capitalist segment.

The world federalist movement, however, is not a homogeneous tendency, particularly in the student division of UWF. One of its virtues is that it is reasonably democratic, and allows the free development of opinion within its ranks. It tolerates the existence of dissident minorities which can publish their own periodicals and gain slight but increasing influence in the organization. Under the impact of events there is growing in certain sections of the movement an understanding of some of the shortcomings of orthodox federalism. There is an increasing recognition of the role of economic factors in deciding war and peace, and of the basic incompatibility of economic exploitation and economic cooperation. A section of the movement shows signs of coming to the conclusion that any kind of international federation will have to be accomplished against the will of, rather than through, the world's ruling classes. Once having achieved this perspective, they will be faced with the same necessity as the socialist movement . . . to carry their program to the people rather than to politicians.

## The Student UWF

But this means linking it with popular and progressive struggles of all kinds. Evidences of this development are not difficult to find. There is a growing tendency to side with the struggles of colonial peoples for national independence, (even UWF as a whole officially supported the Indonesians) and working class struggles at home. Individual federalist chapters have become concerned with civil liberties. In Illinois, for instance, the two largest student federalist chapters in the state played an important and courageous part in the movement which defeated a series of witchhunt bills. On one campus, the UWF chapter was the only organization which actively opposed the bills, which were supported by the president of the university. The chapter had to hold its protest meeting off campus, and then were raided by a group of legionnaires.

Even more heretical from the point of view of orthodox federalism is one student chapter's active participation in a campaign in the primaries for state office to elect a Negro trade unionist run by the CIO against the Democratic machine candidate. This same chapter is participating in a united drive to end racial discrimination in business establishments near its campus.

## The European UWF

While student federalists are finally outgrowing their ivory tower attitude here in the United States, the problem has never existed abroad. The World Movement for World Federal Government, to which UWF is affiliated, is made up largely of groups which have some sort of liberal or radical philosophy. The movement in England is headed by a group of Labour MP's, and members of the ILP are prominent in World Student Federalists, the student international. Moreover, the concern about the modification of the UN and the intense fetishism of legitimacy and officiality which characterizes the movement in the U. S. is lacking abroad. The conservative tendencies in the World Movement are kept alive only by the financial strength of the American section. Uppermost in the program of the European movement is the demand for a

"peoples world convention" to be convened independently of national governments, and at which popularly elected delegates would frame a world constitution.

#### Socialist Direction Possible

The growing strength of these tendencies in UWF indicates a leftward development within its ranks. The complete development of such a tendency would bring it parallel to, rather than in opposition to the aims of socialists.

The typical world federalist is beset by numerous contradictions. He wants a democratic world government; he sees that Russia could not participate in any such organization, yet what kind of a world government is it which excludes one of the great threats to peace? He claims that a world government would not alter economic systems; he admits that if it is to succeed that the world government must solve certain minimum economic problems, yet he cannot explain how it can do so without being based itself on some economic system.

Once the fact that Russia cannot be included in a federation is recognized, the world federalist eliminates these contradictions in one of two ways. He can put his faith completely in American imperialism, seeing in American capitalism the only safeguard of democracy in the world. Federalism then becomes a program for a sort of glorified Atlantic Pact, a tool to aid the U. S. in the cold war, and an ally in eventual real war later. Harold Urey's widely publicized resignation from UWF is a typical example of this development.

#### UWF and Socialist Politics

On the other hand, federalists rejecting hope of Stalinist participation in world government, can also reject the U. S. Upon taking this step, the world federalist in America will find that his tasks have changed considerably. His political activity will be directed toward the trade unions and the everyday struggle for a better life, rather than toward politicians and diplomats. His first concern will be the things which concern socialists . . . labor, politics, civil liberties, etc.

Moreover, socialists should not think of the idea of an international federation, even of existing states, as an alien one, nor as contradictory to the right of self determination. Federation of countries of equal status has never been opposed by socialists, and in the form of an "independent western union" is even today advocated as a means of helping to create a third force not subject to either Russia or America.

We think that the movement described will continue, and that world federalists must continue to revise their program toward an essentially socialist orientation. We feel that, rather than being opposed, the two movements can collaborate in the building of an anti-war force which need not be explicitly pro-socialist, pro-pacifist, or pro-federalist.

Mary COLEMAN, Chairman, University Chicago UWF.

Arlon TUSSING, Program Director, Politics Club, University of Chicago.

## From the Student's Bookshelf

### The Coming Defeat of Communism

by James Burnham

John-Day, New York. 1950

#### JAMES BURNHAM, AUTHOR OF

*The Coming Defeat of Communism*, is no newcomer to the political arena. During the Thirties he functioned as one of the leaders of the American Trotskyists movement, breaking with it shortly before the America's entry into the Second World War. Since that time he has followed a spiralling movement to the right and now remains firmly implanted at the opposite end of the political spectrum, brandishing the tattered if still hallowed banner of anti-Communism. Since this article does not purport to survey all of his work it is merely necessary to note that the central thesis of his most recent book, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*, can be considered as a continuation of his first and most important work, *The Managerial Revolution*, only if attached with a string of safety pins.

#### First Book and Afterwards

In his first book, Burnham analyzed modern society as evolving toward a managerial state; a state in which the government bureaucracy, managers, technicians, etc., would emerge as a new ruling class. He described Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia as the most highly organized managerial states in existence and pointed to New Deal America as a developing managerial society. He then offered the interesting, if forgotten thesis that Germany and Russia would band together and win world domination.

In the past few years we have heard little from Burnham about his social discovery, the managerial societies. Burnham has now, in the best spirit of Henry Ford, turned from theorizing to practical politics, offering the American people a practical program for the defeat of Communism. But if society is moving toward a managerial form, if Russia is a highly developed managerial state and therefore only mirrors our own future, then why should we be interested in fighting it? If "the line's been changed" than an explanation is due.

The reason Burnham has offered no explanation lies not so much in his dishonesty but because he is no longer interested in his former readers. The people who were interested in the managerial revolution were for the most part, intellectuals, radicals and ex-radicals. This book, however, is a popular book; it is written for businessmen, businessmen's wives and generally middle class people of the Rotary variety. It is a book which is good subway reading, not too long and purports to be eminently practical; something that will stir a businessman's heart like the rustle of dollar bills on a warm Spring afternoon. With all the fire of a Fourth of July oration, he declares: "I have no sympathy and little patience with those inverse Philistines—my fellow

intellectuals, often the junior sons of the creatively wealthy, who sneer so easily at business and businessmen. Business and businessmen have opened and built this continental nation, on the perspective and scale of Alexander Hamilton's unprecedented vision, and they are therefore to be honored." (P. 251)

The formulation of an American policy for the defeat of communism is the primary objective of the book. Burnham describes American policy toward Russia as the "containment of communism" and indicates that this is inadequate as a program because Russia is bent on world revolution. The current aim is better than the appeasement policy which preceded it but is still insufficient because it is essentially defensive. In reviewing American foreign policy in the post war period he points out that America has won no really major victories against Russia. Titoism was only a half-victory and did not come about as a result of American policy. It is incomparable as a victory to the advance of communism in China. However, although we have won no major gains, still the trend is now in our favor and, more significant, we now recognize the danger of communism and have rejected appeasement. He points out that an important reason for our failure to progress more rapidly in the anti-communist crusade is our lack of a formulated series of demands. The elucidation of a body of such demands on Russia would provide a central point for America-Soviet relations and would indicate to the rest of the anti-Communist world the seriousness with which we view the struggle. The demands which Burnham considers the minimum basis for a deal with Russia are:

- (1) The liquidation de facto of the Communist 5th Column.
- (2) Cessation of Soviet-directed propaganda in furtherance of communist world domination.
- (3) Total withdrawal of all Soviet personnel and institutions to pre-1939 Russian borders.
- (4) Free choice of government for peoples who have been subject to Soviet control since 1939.
- (5) Sufficient modification of the internal Soviet structure to guard the world against secret and irresponsible militarization.

Concurrent with the presentation of these demands America is to wage warfare on all levels against Communism, except the actual fighting. This includes outlawing the Communist movement in America and making friendly overtures to all regimes and movements which are interested in doing the same. America must use propaganda, economic aid, build up an anti-Communist labor movement and generally mobilize the world under its leadership for the crusade against communism.

That the defeat of Stalinism is necessary for the preservation and advancement of democracy is obvious to all who are not blind to the totalitarian nature of the Stalinist governments. The question with which we are concerned however is whether

we can defeat Stalinism by the support of capitalism.

The power of world Stalinism is not based solely on force of arms; Stalinism has a popular, political appeal for the working-class. The many-millioned Communist parties in Western Europe have obtained mass support because they are *anti-capitalist* and appear to the masses as the party of socialist revolution. They have been able to capitalize on the hatred of peoples for a system under which they have suffered for decades. In this they represent a far more dynamic ideology than capitalism because their support exploits the emancipatory impulses of masses of people who are opposed to the status quo and who cannot be won back to its support. A French worker in the Communist party may be dissatisfied with his party, he may disagree with some of its policies but he sees no acceptable alternative in pro-capitalist parties.

#### Would Suppress CP Bureaucratically

Burnham's policy of outlawing the Communist Party is inevitable given his inability to substitute political ideas as a political weapon. He is a supporter of American capitalism and is therefore unable to find a road to those large groups of people who are fundamentally anti-capitalist. Thus, he fights the Stalinists by aping their own methods, by suppressing them bureaucratically—a method which will enhance their prestige and allow them to pose as the party of anti-capitalism. Capitalism for all its atomic weapons and power has lost its appeal, particularly to the working class which because of its strategic position carries the most social weight. This is not so apparent to those who live in America where relatively speaking we are in the age of plenty. (The duration of American prosperity however is a question which many capitalist economists are loth to answer). In Europe and Asia, however, the social bankruptcy of capitalism is more than apparent. Burnham proposes that we start a huge advertising and propaganda campaign abroad to win the world to his holy crusade. The power of advertising for a soap manufacturer may be great but in politics it has social limits. The people in Europe and Asia who have turned to Stalinism did so because they believe it represents a way out of their present situation and because they mistakenly believe it is the party of socialism.

The greatest failure of American policy in the post-war period was the victory of the Chinese Communists. One would expect that a book which offers a practical program for the defeat of communism would treat this at length pointing out our mistakes and offering an alternative program. Yet an analysis of the debacle in China is completely absent from "The Coming Defeat of Communism."

"The disaster in China has gone too far for formulas however adroit. Nevertheless even if the communist armies reach the southern and western borders, China is not altogether lost. There remain and will remain, firm friends and potential friends in China. . . . Even if the State Department's White Paper is correct in arguing that Chiang Kai-Shek could not under any circumstance have maintained a national government all over China, Chiang is still as I write, in spite of his abandonment by Wash-

ington, fighting Communists. His record of the past fifteen years does not particularly suffer by comparison with the records of the other leaders of that period." (P. 206)

From the point of view of practical politics however it is not Chiang's abandonment by Washington that we are interested in but his abandonment by China. It is not the merits of his record that interests us but his inability to fight Stalinism. (For the moment we will leave aside the question of whether or not a democratic choice exists between the two). It is here that the real dilemma of American policy becomes apparent. Despite the millions of dollars and years of effort spent in supplying Chiang with arms and supplies, the Communists have scored an overwhelming victory. The Chinese peasants and workers flocked to the Stalinist camp because it alone promised an overturn of the status quo. Yet because of the political limitations of his position Burnham's only suggestion is . . . a continuation of the same policy which has proven unsuccessful. Thus, the much vaunted practicality of Burnham in the most important practical situation in the post-war period can present no alternative course to failure.

#### The Question of Democracy

Implicit in Burnham's writing is the thesis that the offensive against communism is based on the necessity to maintain our free institutions. Because of this necessity we must outlaw the communist movements which threatens them. If Communist movements must be outlawed because of the danger they represent to the struggle with Russia then what of other non-conformists who for other reasons oppose the war drive. What of the radicals and pacifists who are in opposition to the policies of the U. S. government? Burnham knows full well that such movements exist. Perhaps he is not sufficiently interested to care one way or the other. By now we have a pretty good idea of the limitless nature of the anti-Communists drive. It will not stop with Stalinism but will proceed to the victimization of all non-conformists. The disintegration of free institutions under pressure of a campaign of repression into a police state is the logical culmination of a process which is going on at this moment. The fight against the Stalinists which apes its methods is today the greatest danger to democracy in America. Burnham discusses this question which all liberals and socialists are today thinking about in a three sentence footnote:

"There is no demagoguery in calling this "the democratic side". Democracy is a matter of degree, not an absolute. In spite of the fact that "our side" includes reactionaries and dictators, and in spite of the fact that it may be compelled to restrict freedoms further "during the course of the struggle, it is and will remain incomparably more democratic, more free, than the communist side."

We are not enlightened however, as to why we will remain fundamentally more democratic. Capitalism has all variants of political form from democracy to dictatorship. In the anti-Communist camp there are many governments whose political methods do not differ essentially from that of the Stalinist police state.

Since the anti-Communist drive has begun, in the atmosphere of loyalty purges

and witch hunts we have become less democratic. Every reactionary prejudice can seek expression in an anti-red drive. Who can say that in the recent Peekskill riot anti-Negro prejudice was not at least as strong among the rioters as anti-Communism?

If the program outlined by Burnham results in a deterioration of democratic institutions, then the fundamental thesis that we must adopt this program in order to defend our free institutions becomes invalid.

#### A Criterion for Friendship

The cultivation of political friends abroad is an integral part of Burnham's program. But not once in his criteria for the selection of these "friends" does he raise the question of their democratic nature. This is quite natural since their democratic ideals are, to say the least, questionable: De Gaulle, the Catholic Church, Mohammedanism, and, in Germany, splinter groups which he leaves unnamed. Burnham writes at length of the political ineptness, the indecisiveness of the French and Italian governments. This may be true but they are nevertheless elected governments. By no democratic criterion can the U. S. government intervene in these countries to "stimulate" different political choices.

"To reach out, within other nations, beyond the official layers, is apt to be offensive to the local officialdom. But it can be done; and the officials themselves can become firmer when they feel the pressure of firmness upon them."

The local officialdom may be insulted but what of the sensibilities of the European people themselves? In their democratic aspirations for self-rule they may be more than a little irritated when they hear the clink of American gold in their election years. Burnham's proposal to send young labor leaders abroad to organize an anti-Communist labor movement is in the same vein. Imagine the attitude of the European workers who have been through decades of fascism, war and misery toward the well-fed American college graduates who come as missionaries of the State Department.

Burnham predicates world acceptance of U. S. leadership in the anti-Communist offensive on an economic aid program of greater volume and longer duration than the one now being pursued. This program is doomed to failure. European stability can only be afforded by the resumption of a favorable position on the world market by European businessmen. Yet this means the crowding out of American businessmen in the struggle for world markets. A capitalist America cannot restore the world to economic stability because to do so would be to cut the ground from under its own feet.

American policy here is in a singular impasse. In order to struggle effectively against Stalinism it must bring about world economic recovery. Yet the healthy functioning of world capitalism means cutting off American business from its markets and capital outlets. Already there are complaints from American manufacturers about European competition. Yet in order to keep Stalinism from penetrating economically depressed areas it has to do this. Here is the dilemma of American capitalism.

If it is true that such a struggle is not practical, if we cannot fight Stalinism

effectively by supporting American capitalism, if we cannot maintain free institutions abroad and at home then we must seek a different alternative.<sup>1</sup> We must fight the Stalinists politically. We can do this only by offering a genuine social alternative to Europe and Asia. To do this however we must not only oppose totalitarian Russia but American capitalism as well in its struggle for world domination. By developing a program that meets the needs of the people and by firm opposition to the status quo we have at least the possibility of building a strong popular anti-Stalinist movement.

The Third Camp is today tiny and isolated but it is potent in its ideas. It is well to remember that military power alone is not the prime mover in history. Ideas which correspond to human needs are in a long term sense more powerful and it is when these ideas inspire masses of people to social action that decisive moments in history are reached.

Gladys INGERSOLL

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1.—This does not mean that in a war between America and Russia, America will be doomed to failure. On the contrary, in a military struggle America will have the advantage. What we are discussing is the practicality of a program which seeks to mobilize the peoples of the world under American leadership and the changes to democratic institutions of the type Burnham outlines. From a practical point of view the task at present is to prevent a war which may very well destroy the victor and the loser.

## American Freedom and Catholic Power

by Paul Blanshard

Beacon Press, Boston, 1949

**THE CONSISTENTLY** reactionary role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the development of western civilization is a matter of historical record. An objective presentation of the historical past clearly indicates that the church hierarchy has continually utilized the intense religious devotion of its members in its fight against progressive political and social change. Unfortunately most studies of church policy and method have been undertaken long after their attempted and often successful implementation. In many instances the hierarchy has had sufficient influence to prevent wide dissemination of anti-church literature. The value of *American Freedom and Catholic Power* by Paul Blanshard is augmented in that this exposé of present-day Catholic political and social policy is also a clarion call to the fight to preserve basic democratic freedoms against encroachment by the Catholic Church. That the hierarchy realizes this is evidenced by the pressure it has put on many department stores to remove this book from their book counters. Last year the *Brooklyn Tablet*, a neo-fascist Church organ, initiated a campaign which culminated in the banning of *The Nation* from public high school libraries for featuring a series of articles by Blanshard on the social policies of the Roman Catholic Church which were excerpts from his book. Blanshard adequately supports his

main thesis that the Roman Catholic Church is a dangerous and reactionary political and social force in American life with documentation drawn to a large extent from official Catholic documents and statements of "accredited" Catholic apologists. This method of documentation, i.e., drawing on Catholic sources wherever possible, immunizes Blanshard from that odious stratagem often utilized by the Church, of calling all active opponents of Catholic social policy "anti-Catholic." (Cardinal Spellman used this technique recently, when he subjected Mrs. Roosevelt to much vilification for her support of the fundamental American concept of separation of Church and State during the Barden bill controversy. He publicly stated: "For whatever you may say in the future, your record of anti-Catholicism stands for all to see—a record which you yourself wrote on the pages of history—which cannot be recalled—documents of discrimination and unworthy of an American mother." So far the Catholic Church has been successful in preventing passage of the Barden bill which would give federal aid to education in accordance with the principle of separation of church and state.

### The Monolithic Church Hierarchy

The ability of the Roman Catholic Church to hinder wide dissemination of a great deal of material critical of the church or in conflict with church policy and its effectiveness in forcing many Catholics and non-Catholics to conform to certain church dogma resides in the monolithic, authoritarian nature of the church hierarchy. The relation of the individual worshiper to the Catholic church is that of subject to master. The spirit of unquestioning obedience permeates the entire church. In the Jesuit constitution one finds:

... let those who live in obedience allow themselves to be disposed of at will of their superior like a corpse which permits one to turn and handle it any way one pleases. . . .

The supreme expression of unquestioning obedience is the dogma of papal infallibility. Any functionary of the church who questions this absolute power of the Pope is liable to excommunication from the mother church. With such servile officials and with its enormous wealth, the church is equipped to carry on a propaganda campaign of unequalled magnitude against any legislation which contradicts the dogma of the church universal.

### Opposition to Social Legislation

Blanshard accuses the Catholic Church of combatting legislation which affects the entire public body and thus forces members of different denominations to conform to its dogma. All accusations are sustained by documentation. The church has not only fought birth control legislation but its front groups such as the Catholic War Veterans have disrupted birth control meetings. Backward divorce laws are perpetrated because of church opposition to more intelligent legislation. In many small communities where the church organization is powerful, it exercises a virtual veto over what textbooks are to be used in the public schools. In one instance a book maintaining that "good health" was a question of "science," and discrediting the superstitious practice of knocking on wood and carrying rabbits

feet was removed from circulation on the basis that: The concept that health could be understood purely on a scientific basis "destroys the faith of the child." The Legion of Decency has been successful in preventing public showings of films on venereal disease on the ground that it would be in "poor taste and an affront to God-fearing Americans who avoid the filthy disease not because of man made laws, but because of the laws of God." Such instances of the church or its "front groups" activity are usually coated with a veneer of moral propriety by Catholic spokesmen.

### Method in Inconsistency

The question of federal aid to education is a case in point. The moral base on which church opposition to federal aid to education rests is "preservation of the parent's right to educate their children as it sees fit." "Federal aid implies federal supervision." Blanshard quickly disposes of this hypocrisy by examining the Catholic school structure. Under canon law of the church any parent sending a child to public school sins gravely if he may send a child to parochial school. An attempt must be made even if it is a financial hardship. In the parochial school itself the curriculum to be followed, the texts to be used, and the teachers to be employed are determined by the bishop in the diocese.

Moreover, church opposition to federal aid to education is not a principled opposition. The church is in complete agreement with the concept of federal aid and supervision of education wherever it has political power sufficient to exercise supervision over the public school system; witness Spain and Argentina. In these nations "parents' rights" are somehow "lost in the shuffle."

The chapter entitled Fascism, Communism and Labor contains a wealth of informative material. A strong indictment of the moral Catholic Church for its immoral activities is presented. The bestial fascist invasion of Ethiopia was given vigorous support by the Vatican. Cardinal Shusk of Milan stated:

On the plains of Ethiopia the Italian standards . . . carry forward in triumph the Cross of Christ, smashes . . . the chains of slavery and opens the way for the missionaries of the gospel . . .

### The Church Tries an Answer

In a pamphlet, "Is the Pope Fascist?" printed under the imprimatur of Cardinal Spellman, an attempt is made to neutralize this devastating case against the Vatican. The best available evidence is marshalled to support the contention that the Pope was "The leading world figure opposed to fascism." It falls flat. In not one quotation from the paper are the basic aspects of Fascism condemned, neither political dictatorship nor the corporate states. The quoted criticisms of Fascism are counter-attacks upon Mussolini for his encroachments upon the educational and political preserves of the Catholic Church. One could justifiably assume on the basis of past history that the only reason a 1950 Lateran treaty does not exist between Stalinism and the Roman Catholic Church is because of the structural similarity of the two. Both are authoritarian but with mutually exclusive origins and ambitions.

One important criticism can be made of an otherwise excellent book. Unfortunately Blanshard establishes "categories of ultimate value." All policies of the Roman Catholic Church which are undemocratic Blanshard relegates to the category "un-American." These categories—American and un-American—are employed throughout the book. More accurate categories would be "democratic" and "authoritarian." It is quite

fashionable in American articles to abuse a proponent of democracy as un-American while the authors of anti-democratic legislation, e.g., the Smith Act and the loyalty oaths, are hailed as "good Americans."

Victor KAPLAN

Victor Kaplan is president of the Eugene V. Debs Society of Brooklyn College.

melodramatic aspect of the picture. But neither the city of Vienna nor the moral situation are merely subservient. Given their unintegrated presence and the failure to use them to raise the story to a work of art with a melodramatic level, they become, in their isolation, continual reminders of what *The Third Man* fails to achieve.

Ralph MARCUS

## The Film Review Forum

### THE THIRD MAN

ONE OF THE FACTS of cosmopolitan sociology is that "the discriminating moviegoer" never manages to discriminate beyond three movies a month. And when we understand that membership in this cult of sophistication rests mainly upon a preference for the more "mature" European product, the fact then becomes a bridge to esthetic criteria. But the bridge does not lead to virgin land. The real reason "the discriminating moviegoer" prefers the English, French and, most recently, the Italian movie, is not because of any attempts to utilize the art medium, but because the European pictures does exactly the same thing Hollywood does—only better.

*The Third Man*, a product of assorted English, American and Austrian talent, is a most literal example of this truth. It has four big stars (count 'em: Joseph Cotton, Valli—spelled like a ribbon, Orson Welles, Trevor Howard), a script by Graham Greene, a writer of more than usual hack talent, and is produced and directed by Carol Reed.

In the course of the movie's hundred minutes Reed exhibits just enough knowledge of the film medium to constitute the movie as a declaration of his own corruption as an artist. And if the usual relationship in the movie industry between the producer and director is that of buyer and seller of talent, then with Reed we have the amazing spectacle of a man selling himself to himself.

It is not simply because Reed insists upon revealing his schooling in the basic film technique by his incidental usage of it throughout the picture that criticism from a more exacting standard is invited; it is because by merely incidental usage the medium becomes a vehicle for the gimmick and is degenerated into a series of clichés. Thus while many of the movies have "the chase," if not through Vinnese sewers then across Western plains or up and down the Statue of Liberty, Reed also has the villain spend the last moments of what was otherwise an extremely articulate life by groping through the grating of a sewer exit, the camera intent upon his hands and catching every yearning of the fingers. Again: at the beginning of the Ferris-wheel sequence, when the hero, Martins, meets his friend Lime, there is a single shot of the bars of the ferris-wheel at rest. Taken as it is from the wheel's narrow dimension, the image is beautiful in that it seems to express all the possibilities of motion. But unsustainable because the exigencies of the plot demand a discussion of morality by the two charac-

ters, the filmic aspect of the sequence is left to become just another amusement park cliché.

Another difference between Reed and other big movie directors which serves only to show their essential similarity is Reed's use of a single instrument, the zither, for the picture's music. The fact is that Reed's "solution" to the problem of music in the film is but another of his gimmicks. That the larger problem of the relationship between sound-track and the image exists and has never been completely solved is known to Reed. It is not only the problem that is known to him; he is also aware of the type of solution necessary because it is consciously employed once during the picture for the shortest of single moments. Needless to say, the momentary solution given is not dependent upon any use of the zither. Reed's opportunistic use of the instrument demonstrates only that it is just as easy for a single instrument to obtrude upon the screen as any hundred-piece orchestra.

Aside from the specific manner in which the zither is employed and its dampening result, the motivation for using it in the first place stems from its association with Vienna. Vienna in turn is utilized for "atmosphere," for the realism that becomes increasingly desirable with every twinge of the director's artistic conscience. With this crass assumption of the city in the attempt at realism, we reach the main reason for the failure of *The Third Man* in any terms: filmic, literary or as photoplay. The picture is a failure at realism, not because the necessary ingredients are not present, but because they are manipulated and through manipulation offset one another.

William Dean Howells defined realism as being nothing more than a truthful presentation of reality. Although a tautology, the definition had meaning when it was coined because it was directed against the romantic literature of the preceding period. The definition continued to retain meaning insofar as it was able to distinguish between realism and naturalism, between realism and melodrama. Today it serves in that it enables the distinction to be made between realism and *The Third Man*.

The fact is that there is no necessary relationship between the theme of the story and the streets of Vienna as exploited by the camera for melodramatic effect. Greene presents a significant if not very profound moral problem, and he created two credible characters in Martins, the sternly naive American, and Anna, for its main carriers. But their situation and their decisions become subservient to capturing the head of the black market syndicate, that is, to the

### THREE CAME HOME

ONE IS LIKELY to have misgivings about the usual Hollywood film in spite of the blessings bestowed upon it by the more careful movie reviewers. Even the skeptic must admit, however, that *Three Came Home* gives one or two assurances that Hollywood is capable of dealing simply, honestly, and artistically with a difficult theme. Like many contemporary movies, which are almost good, this motion picture has some glaring failures and also some brilliant touches.

The plot involves the experiences of the novelist, wife of a minor British colonial official, who, with her child, has been placed in a Japanese internment camp. Schooled in the niceties of middle class society, most fully at home with bridge parties or teas, she is suddenly plucked from all of this and thrust into a work camp. Together with hundreds of women of her own type, she endures the lonely, tedious days while waiting for the war to end.

Notable departures from the Hollywood customs are apparent. The Japanese soldier, in one of the few instances since 1941, emerges as a human being with recognizable and understandable emotions rather than as a lower form on the evolutionary scale. In this respect the film follows the book closely and the author is not likely to be surprised by character and incident which has been added to his title. Most of the characters remain refreshingly genuine and are not exaggerated. The film is not intellectually provocative or profound; but it is a touching and well told story.

One of its best touches is the mood or tone of the situation. A feeling of general helplessness pervades prisoners and guards alike; caught in the meaningless web of war, both are thrust into a mutually unnatural and undesirable situation. The night sentry sleepily listens to songs coming from the women's dormitories and quietly hums "God Save The King" with them. The Japanese colonel asks the author for an autographed copy of one of her books. These are just as much the victims of war as are the prisoners. The lankey adolescent in uniform and the pudgy middle-aged father soldiering by compulsion; what part had they in all of this? Was this their war and is this what the army caste meant by victory here in this jungle hundreds of miles from home?

The answer is implied in the situation. No character triumphs over his circumstances. All are defeated, as if by some monstrous joke of history. All of them, including the Colonel, are essentially little people and completely frightened by the exigencies of life.

Bernard CORNFELD

Bernard Cornfeld is a member of the Brooklyn College Socialist Club and is on the editorial board of ANVIL and STUDENT PARTISAN.

# **PROGRAM of the** **NEW YORK STUDENT FEDERATION AGAINST WAR**

The primary aim of the New York Student Federation Against War is to organize all students opposed to the war drives of Russian and American imperialism which threaten the very existence of world civilization.

We aim to prevent the polarization of the American student into the reactionary war camps of either Russian or American imperialism.

We do not believe that the threatening war is inevitable. We believe that a militant anti-war student movement can be an effective force to prevent a Third World War.

## **I. AGAINST WAR PREPARATIONS**

We oppose all social, economic, and political preparations for war on the part of Russian and American imperialism.

*Therefore, we oppose:*

1. The 15 billion dollar war budget.
2. Conscription, Universal Military Training and the ROTC.
3. The use of atomic energy for war purposes.
4. The growing militarism of the American government.
5. The North Atlantic Pact and the American subsidization of the military machines of Western Europe.
6. The bolstering of reactionary regimes in Greece and Turkey.

*Therefore, we favor:*

1. Repeal of the draft.
2. Withdrawal of all occupation troops throughout the world.
3. Colonial freedom and the right of self-determination for all oppressed people.
4. Letting the people decide; a national referendum on war.
5. Granting amnesty and restoration of full civil rights to all those imprisoned or who lost their civil rights because of their opposition to World War II.

## **II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES**

The assault on academic freedom and civil liberties is a part of American imperialism's preparation for war through methods which resemble the totalitarian techniques of the Russian police state.

*Therefore, we oppose:*

1. The attempt to straight-jacket the American campus through legislation like the Feinberg Bill.
2. All forms of racial and religious discrimination among students and faculty as attempted through the quota system and segregated schools.
3. Faculty and administration supervision of student organizations.
4. The suppression of political minorities through the use of such legislation like the Smith Act.

*Therefore, we favor:*

1. Effective student government of student affairs.
2. Complete freedom of political expression for students and faculty members.
3. The right of students to organize on campus for their political opinions.
4. The abolition of all government subversive lists, loyalty oaths, and such bodies as the House Un-American Activities Committee.
5. Passage of a Civil Rights program and the repeal of the Smith Act.

## **III. EDUCATION**

1. For a free state university.
2. For a universal free college education.
3. For the right of students and faculty to organize and strike.

## **IV. LABOR**

1. The NYSFAW seeks to establish close ties with the labor movement and to actively cooperate with all sections of the labor movement in the fight against the drive to war.
2. We oppose all efforts to destroy the independence of the labor movement, and therefore are in favor of the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and all similar legislation.

### **Interest and Membership**

If you are interested in joining or receiving more information about the *New York Student Federation Against War*, fill out the blank below accordingly and mail to the Federation at 247 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

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