

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

Volume XVIII, Number 7

October 1982

\$1.25

Contents

- | | |
|---|----|
| Party Building and the Turn to Industry,
Report to the May 1982 IEC meeting | 3 |
| Report on the Grenadian Revolution,
by Pat Kane, International Marxist Group, Britain | 12 |
| The Third Iranian Revolution and the Fourth International,
(A Criticism of "Draft Resolution on Iran"),
by Nader Afra, Workers Unity Party (HVK), Iran | 16 |

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

\$1.25

October 1982

Volume XVIII, Number 7

The International Internal Discussion Bulletin is the English-language edition of the internal discussion bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

It is published by the Socialist Workers Party as a fraternal courtesy to the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

Bulletin Department, 14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014

Contents

3	Party Building and the Turn to Industry, Report to the May 1982 IFC meeting
12	Report on the Grenadian Revolution, by Pat Kane, International Marxist Group, Britain
18	The Third Iranian Revolution and the Fourth International, (A Critique of "Draft Resolution on Iran"), by Nader Aza, Workers Unity Party (HWK), Iran

Party Building and the Turn to Industry

Report to the May 1982 IEC meeting

[The following report is an edited version of the oral introduction to the discussion on the industrial turn at the May 1982 meeting of the International Executive Committee. The report, given on behalf of the Bureau of the United Secretariat by comrade Frej, has been slightly edited in light of the discussion. Some passages left out in the oral presentation, mainly quotes from World Congress and other documents, have also been reintroduced and some comments which appeared in comrade Frej's summary of the IEC discussion have been included here.]

Introduction

To have a *special* point on the agenda dealing with the industrial turn has its advantages and its risks. It enables us to treat the turn to industry as a special organisational task which needs its own preparations and it allows a more concrete discussion. The reverse side of this coin, however, is a risk that it is discussed out of context, that it's treated as a panacea separated from our overall trade union and political perspectives. It seems to me sometimes to have been the case — in sections, in several interventions at the last IEC and partially also at the last World Congress. Let us then repeat once more: the industrial turn isn't and cannot be a strategy for our sections; it isn't and cannot be a substitute for a clear political line; it cannot and will not stop us from making political mistakes. It is a decisive organisational tactic which together with other organisational efforts helps placing us in the middle of our class. It puts us in the best possible position to refine our political line and make an efficient political intervention. It is a transitional measure in the construction of revolutionary proletarian parties and a proletarian Fourth International. It is a bridge to a next phase in the building of our parties.

I. The decisions at the last World Congress

At the last World Congress in the end of 1979, a decision was taken that "Fourth International cadres in many countries" . . . "who were recruited in a previous period" and who "have not become rooted in the industrial working class" . . . "should be led to make a turn in this direction without further delay."

This decision on an industrial turn was an integrated part of a resolution which analysed at some length the increased role played in all three sectors of the world revolution by the proletariat in general and the industrial working class in particular. The resolution pointed to the deepening economic, social and political crisis and projected a stepped-up level of class contradictions and class confrontations on a world scale, with the industrial working class more and more moving to the center of class battles.

Noting the glaring contradiction between the key importance of Fourth International sections being well implanted in the industrial working class on the one hand and a social composition where generally only a limited minority of the membership come from this background on the other, the Eleventh World Congress decided to make a conscious choice to move a substantial number of cadres into proletarian and industrial jobs.

In the 1979 *World Political Resolution* it was stated that "the current central goal of the Fourth International remains to recruit

and train proletarian cadres through deepening involvement in the class struggle. This centers on making a decisive turn to industry in order to continue our proletarian orientation." A series of reasons were given.

- From the base of jobs in industry, comrades participating in trade union fraction work can perceptibly increase the rate of successes of the party's political campaigns. Being in industry will facilitate paying the necessary attention to building class struggle left wings.

- It will also improve the progress of similar work in the mass movement and among the allies of the proletariat. It will help develop links with the struggles of superexploited — women, youth and the oppressed nationalities or immigrant workers.

- Making the turn to industry will give greater stability to the sections and their work and enhance sensitivity to the moods of the workers.

- On the internal level it will facilitate training leaders and solving organisational problems in all aspects of our work.

What comes out of this argumentation is a conception of the industrial turn as a necessary lever for our overall trade-union and political activity as well as our organisational efforts.

Several of these points were retaken in the *Resolution on Europe*, which especially stressed the role of the industrial turn for our possibilities to participate in working class activities, for the development of our class struggle initiatives and our ability to help building class struggle left wings in the trade-unions and workers movements as a whole.

The industrial turn was also the subject of a special report at the 11th World Congress: "*The turn to industry and the tasks of the Fourth International*" by cde Jack Barnes on behalf of the outgoing United Secretariat. The big bulk of this report consists of a further elaboration of the argument given in the World Political Resolution. It is also in this report that there appears the concrete goal that "a large majority of the members and leaders of the Fourth International sections should go to industry and into industrial unions." The priority is clear in the report: "It is inside the industrial working class that revolutionary parties will get a response to our program and recruits to our movement." It is explained that the industrial turn is a "universal one for our international movement in all three sectors of the world revolution," and one that we shall carry out "as a disciplined world party." It is a universal one — not only on a world scale, but also within the sections themselves: "There can be no such things as exempted jobs, or categories of jobs or exempted layers in the party." The report further makes a number of other points dealing with our experiences up to then, pointing to the leadership's role in pursuing the industrial turn, the need to professionalize our parties, the

role of our press etc.

These decisions on the industrial turn were supported by a very big majority at the World Congress although they were disputed by a minority consisting of comrades from several sections. The industrial turn was and remains a controversial issue.

The question of the industrial turn was rediscussed at the last IEC meeting in May 1981, the first after the World Congress. The discussion in the IEC commission set up and the IEC debate itself revealed some important nuances, also among comrades who belonged to the same majority at the time of the World Congress. There were differences on priorities — the importance of our industrial work relative to that in the social service sector. There were differences on the leaderships' role in leading an ongoing proletarianisation of our parties. There were differences in the approach to the role of women comrades in the industrial turn etc.

Nevertheless the key points made at the World Congress were retaken in the IEC political resolution, adopted by a big IEC majority. It stated:

“ — The transformation of the sections into parties having a real implantation and influence inside the proletariat, is tied essentially to two factors. The first is the maturing of the political class consciousness of the workers vanguard and of the working class. The second is their capacity to give a concrete response to the economic, social and political problems which the workers are facing in a situation of deep economic crisis and social/political instability.

“ — From this flows the imperative of a very big effort to root our sections in the main industrial sectors. Leaderships must lead the policy of the “turn” in a systematic and centralized way to ensure that a majority of the sections' membership will be in industry. This effort should place the objective needs and preoccupations of the workers at the center of the leaderships' attention, with all the consequences that follow for transforming the functioning of the sections. It should allow us to tighten our organic links with the working-class vanguard and facilitate united initiatives both in struggle and on the trade-union level. It must facilitate our intervention towards the parties and trade unions, making possible an effective combination between united actions, political debates, and programmatic confrontations.

“ — The proletarian implantation of our sections and their capacity to intervene on all questions being posed by advanced workers, permits us to win them to our battle. In this way the force of the challenge of this vanguard to the Stalinists, reformists, or national-populists will be able to be fully expressed.

“ — Rooting ourselves in the workplaces is even more important given that workers struggles against austerity are going to become greater and left tendencies will continue to develop inside the trade unions. Building our sections will progress in a qualitatively different way according to whether we are present or not inside the workplaces and the unions where these struggles are taking place and according to whether we are capable or not of developing this radicalizing dynamic of workers and trade unionists in the reformist parties.

II. Between two IEC meetings

The report and the discussion at the May '81 IEC meeting revealed that the 1979 World Congress decision had been applied in an uneven, multiform and — if we see to the F.I. as a whole — delayed and partial way. It also made clear however that the big bulk of the leaderships of the sections were engaged in concrete discussions and practical efforts, to a much larger extent than at the time of the World Congress. If the first one and a half years after the World Congress mainly seems to have been a period of sensibilisation of the cadres — especially in those sections where the industrial turn hadn't been initiated before — it now really began to pass from the level of ideas to concrete organisational projects. For the European sections the two Political Bureau meetings that were held between the World Congress and

the IEC apparently had spurred this process.

If we approach the still uncomplete figures in the answers to the questionnaire sent out this year, we can see that this unevenness and multiformity still exist. We tried this time to make the different categories in the questionnaire more clear and thereby more easy to compare between the different sections. We also tried to include questions that could give a picture of the degree of stability in our industrial implantation and the political results reached. We did this from the obvious consideration that figures themselves are less important than the political reality they try to capture. If we have a big number of comrades in one factory, who nevertheless haven't been able to build any stable nucleus and gain any substantial influence, there obviously exists a disproportion between the figures as such and the reality behind them. The contrary is also true, as can be illustrated by the example of the French LCR.

The LCR adopted a general congress decision to engage in the industrial turn only in June 1980, that is later than most other sections. This is partially explained by bad experiences in the League from an earlier effort in 1974-75 and the hesitance this created throughout the organisation. The main responsibility however lies with the belated and weak reaction of the leadership as is widely recognised today. It was thus only at the fifth congress in December 1981 that the League outlined more concrete projects for the organisation as a whole, as can be studied in the congress theses distributed to the IEC members. This has however given some positive initial results.

According to the LCR leadership 15 cells have been created in industry since the last IEC in addition to some cells that existed before. Among them cells at Renault/Flins, Renault/Billancourt, Rhone-Poulenc and the shipyard in Marseille have either been newly established or substantially reinforced. This has gone hand in hand with the creation of new branches in industrial areas and a division of labour among Central Committee members, so that the key cells can be directly linked to the C.C.

Since the last IEC 200 comrades are said to have been released to go to industry. Many of them are still in the process of picking up work skills.

This effort is still a limited one, but the result is positive and the effects seem cumulative.

Nevertheless we have to keep in mind the low starting-point. The percentage of comrades in industry is still very modest, — something like 15% which also means that the number of comrades *not* in industry is exceedingly high.

LCR's level of political influence is much greater though than could be expected from these figures. At the CFDT conference (CFDT is the second largest trade-union central), which occurs at the same time as this IEC meeting, the League has some 50 delegates participating in oppositional activities against the austerity and bureaucratic line of the CFDT leadership. At the CGT (the main union central) conference in June, the LCR might get half a dozen or more delegates (despite the very bureaucratic way of electing the conference delegates). This is mainly the result of earlier oppositional activities and the role the League was able to play in the mass solidarity movement with Solidarnosc after the 13th of December, a movement which finally included some 800 CGT unions, on local regional and national level, many of them industrial unions.

If all this can be achieved with some 15% in or on the way to industry, what couldn't then be achieved with a considerably larger number of comrades in industry? This is a substantial argument for continuing and speeding-up the “French turn.”

Now on the results of the industrial turn more in general.

Although some sections didn't fill in their answers to the ques

tionnaire, we can give a quite reliable general overview of the development since the last IEC meeting, as well as some concrete examples of how sections now approach the industrial turn.

1. *There is an overall — modest — improvement in the number and percentage of cadres and leading comrades in industry.* In Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland the sections have around one third of their members in industry or actively looking for industrial jobs. For the Swedish section it is the same percentage as last year, thus a numerical stagnation, although the cadres are better organised and the industrial intervention more consolidated. The Swiss comrades estimate that 25% of the membership have made the turn since the World Congress. Important progress has been made in Great Britain, where the percentage is now reported to be 25% of the membership. The West German comrades report a similar figure. The Dutch section has made a limited but significant progress. The Spanish organisation reports 30% comrades in industry and some progress in the metal sector in Barcelona, at General Motors in Zaragoza, in the mining areas in Asturias, at Renault in Valladolid etc. The Italian LCR reports that they have been hard hit by layoffs and unemployment, especially at Fiat in Turin, and that their present figure, 20%, is a step backwards which is not compensated by enough hirings and leadership efforts in other places.

The Australian and New Zealand organisations maintain two thirds and three fourths of their membership in industry. In Canada the figure has increased to 60%, if fired and unemployed members are included — which is only a relative increase however as the number of members as a whole has shrunk. In the USA 44% of the comrades are in industry plus 10% laid off, mainly due to the recession.

In Latin America, our sections and sympathising organisations generally have slightly increased the number of industrial workers. As a rule this is rather because of new recruitment than through sending cadres into industry.

Parallel to this numerical increase, the number of comrades who have been in industry and in the same factory for a longer period increases as well, which means a greater stability and efficiency in factory work.

2. *There has generally been an increased leadership attention to the question of the industrial turn — reflected in discussions, assignments, jobs committees, concrete plans and organisational efforts.* Sections move more and more from general arguments and abstract goals to concrete projects dealing with the next steps in the industrial implantation. One rather typical example is the Portuguese comrades, who have set the following immediate goals, in order to speed up a turn that up to now has been too slow:

i. To organise the work in the district of Setubal (the third most important industrial district in the country); 5 comrades entered recently in each of the five main factories, being transferred from other factories and regions; two leading comrades will go there next October.

ii. To organise the work in Aveiro, where the comrades lead a trade union, which held elections a couple of months ago in which our slate got 1900 votes compared to 700 for the Portuguese communist party; a member of the executive committee will lead the work on the spot, trying himself to get a job there.

iii. To increase its recruitment efforts in those couple of factories where the PSR is already established.

iv. To attract workers to a special four days school that will take place in September this year for special education and discussions.

3. *In a number of sections the concept of the turn to industry has been broadened to include not only factory implantation, but also efforts to build new branches in industrial regions or areas as well as workers neighborhoods or "barrios".* Just to give a

few examples: the growing implantation in the working class suburbs of Mexico City; the attention paid to the "barrios" of Lima; the turn to Scotland and Wales in Great Britain; the "colonisation projects" for the mining and coastal areas in the north of Sweden; the French efforts to strengthen its organisation around Lille, Lyon and Marseille, etc.

4. *There seem to be an increased involvement of comrades from youth organisations and youth circles in the turn to industry, especially, but not only, in Great Britain with the Revolution Youth and since quite some time in USA with the Young Socialist Alliance. This aspect of the turn is especially important when one considers that the recruitment, integration and organisation of young comrades will be the decisive lever for the future, as explained further in the youth document prepared by the United Secretariat Bureau for this IEC.¹*

At the same time the low percentage of women comrades among the industrial cadres (with the U.S., Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and partially also the British organisations as positive exceptions) remains preoccupying. This necessitates special leadership attention (see last part of this report).

5. Some sections have gained a richer experience in *how to combine the factory implantation with fraction work inside the traditional workers parties.* The combination of CGT/Communist Party and CFDT/Socialist Party work in France, although very modest, is one example, the best one however being the trade union and Labour work in Britain. At the last IMG conference in October 1981, our British section decided three main priorities:

i. to fight for a majority in basic industry by the next conference (to date half that goal is achieved);

ii. to build up a majority fraction in the Labour party, led — where possible — by industrial cadres (slightly more than half of the membership in the IMG and the Revolution Youth is now inside the Labour party or its youth organisation);

iii. to deepen the commitment to building the youth organisation: the youth in turn decided as its medium term project to fight for the leadership of the Labour Party Young Socialists based on an orientation of mass campaigns to the youth.

For the British comrades the turn to industry is an indispensable precondition for the development of an effective political in-

1. Compare the following excerpt from "Theses on Building Revolutionary Youth Organisations in the Imperialist Countries":

"Building parties socially implanted in the working class capable of taking up all the issues of the class struggle means above all today orienting to the recruitment of young workers. It is recruiting these layers, educating them in the workers movement, creating a class struggle left wing, that is the basic perspective. . . ."

"Although all experience shows that at least in the countries in which the class struggle is most developed there are important possibilities today to build a revolutionary youth organization among working class youth, these opportunities will not be taken advantage of simply spontaneously. Furthermore this is particularly the case given the social composition of our sections as they start the turn to industry. Experience in a number of countries shows that a campaigning youth organization can fairly readily attract young workers around it. Without conscious measures, however, we will sink back into those layers which were the traditional base of our sections.

"Experience shows that conscious steps therefore have to be taken to maintain, or turn around, the social composition of the organization. Every organization left to spontaneous developments recruits in its own image socially — a student-based organization spontaneously recruits students, a white collar-based organization recruits white collar workers, etc. In order to reach out to working class youth, an organization has to take specific measures — allocation of comrades, from other sectors of work, to work among or directed towards — working class youth, comrades moving into industry and industrial areas where there are important concentrations of workers, etc."

tervention. With the present crisis of British imperialism the labour movement and particularly the Labour Party have been thrown into turmoil. There is already a beginning of a recomposition of the rank and file leaders in the unions. The tendency towards movements of democratic reform is apparent in one form or another in all the major unions and focused politically on the crisis in the Labour Party.

This whole situation gives a special character to the industrial turn in Britain.

For the British comrades, rooting the programme in organisations attracting young industrial workers creates the best possible conditions for the future; thus the three main priorities of the last IMG conference reinforce each other.

The problem of the turn in combination with fraction work is however not a new one for the Fourth International.

The Japanese comrades for example have explained how they made a similar move in the early '60s. At that time the Japanese section consisted of some 90% students. A major part of them joined the Socialist Party and the main trade union federation in the public sector, Sohyo, simultaneously. Through their intervention — which laid the basis for a new wave of trade union implantation in the early '70s and which was especially successful in the northeast of the country — a strong base was created among workers in the post, telecommunication, tobacco and railway services. It's here that we today, 10-13 years after, find a key component of the Japanese leadership.

* * *

The modest advance that can be recorded since the last IEC has been encouraged and will be further spurred by political developments in a series of countries and a number of concrete proofs that comrades going to industry and comrades with longer industrial experiences could play a role that is out of proportion in comparison with the numerical strength of the sections and their industrial cadre.

This was the case with the *Dutch* comrades at the time of the protest actions against governmental cut-downs in the social sector this spring. Thanks to a first implantation in a couple of factories in Rotterdam and in a shipyard and an airplane factory outside Amsterdam the comrades could play some active role in the movement to prepare a general strike. A modest but real example, especially compared to their earlier situation.

The *Peruvian* comrades — thanks to their implantation in the mining area in the center and in the biggest metallurgical plant in Lima, Moraveco, where they have the trade union leadership — have been able to strengthen their campaign for a united and fighting trade union federation.

The *British* comrades were able to play an important role in the recent 14 months long struggle by the Laurence Scott engineering workers against redundancies. With two full-timers permanently on the spot helped by good contacts and finally recruitment inside the factory the comrades were able to influence a major national political campaign that involved the Labour Party and ended up striking the first national blow in a reform struggle against the right-wing dominated Engineering union.

In rail, when one of the unions (ASLEF) took action against an attack on the 8 hour day — our comrades in key London depots in the other major rail union (NUR) were able to lead a solidarity struggle involving industrial action among groups of workers who had already had the same attack imposed on them by a sell out deal agreed by their trade union leadership. Besides the industrial action comrades led pickets, confronted the union leadership and were able to play a major role in establishing a London based Liaison Committee to continue the struggle.

At the British Leyland Trucks, comrades were able to establish themselves as a leading force in an Action committee against

redundancies.

In *Sweden* during the struggle this spring against governmental proposals to make severe cut downs in the sick pay, comrades were able to take initiatives through members and sympathisers in 25 plants and lead strike actions in a couple of them. This amounted to a high percentage, perhaps 1/3, of those plants affected by broader initiatives. In a couple of cases it led to such a big pressure on local social democratic organisations that they were forced to change their stance and call for a political strike against the cut downs.

In *Belgium* — with the comrades we have in the steel area and who in one region were able to get a majority vote for calls for a general strike against redundancies in the steel sector — we have also been able to play a vanguard role locally. Through their leading role in the teachers union comrades were able to take centralising trade union initiatives spurring action from the industrial unions. In *Australia* comrades could play a vanguard role in strikes in the steel and vehicle sector. In *Bolivia* comrades were able to step up their work in the metal sector thanks to new leadership efforts. In the *United States* the SWP comrades have been able to take the lead in fighting back against red-baiting and governmental harassment; they have used industrial cadres as a key force in a number of election campaigns and been able to defend discriminated layers from a base in industry. In *Canada*, the RWL/LOR comrades have been able to lead fights against discrimination of women workers. In *Italy*, the comrades played a vanguard role in the Fiat struggle in Turin and the LCR has now an intervention which allows some of them to appear as national, regional and district delegates in the metal workers federation FLM. In *Spain*, the LCR has been the main motor force in the first broad attempt to coordinate the classist national trade union opposition inside the workers commissions. With trade union leaders in a number of regions the comrades have been able to link up with the split-off from the Catalan CP, other excluded CP groups, and the MC (Movimiento Comunista). This minority achieved around 1/4 of the votes at the last conference of the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). *Japanese* comrades are strongly involved in a new workers bulletin project aimed at the regroupment of leftist currents inside and outside Sohyo.

The conclusion of all these examples is obvious: more of the same — more of the same through more comrades in factories and more leadership from the leadership!

* * *

It is clear that in spite of modest positive advances since the World Congress the industrial implantation today is still very unsatisfactory, especially in Western Europe where the political possibilities in this sector are so great. Having only a small minority of the cadres in industry means lost opportunities. It also means that a very big majority of them are not able to act politically from a base in industry. It means that the organisations to an unnecessarily large extent have to approach the working class from the outside. It means a lesser weight also in relation to other layers of the population. It means that a majority of cadres are not directly engaged in the key priority of the organisation. It increases the risk of misjudgement of what's going on. It means also that this minority in industry has less possibilities to influence and dominate the organisational life of the sections with all that that means for the possibility of recruiting, keeping and really integrating industrial workers.

So from this point of view the present situation is rather worrying and must be a key leadership preoccupation in the coming period.

Things are going in the right direction but they are going too slowly, especially with the present deepening political crisis, the challenges and the opportunities for building the FI.

In a political situation where the industrial workers are playing an increased political role and where the potential is fantastic, for our sections to be only marginally present in industry will create an accentuated crisis and organisational explosions in our sections and in the International.

But it is not only the belatedness in the industrial turn which is preoccupying it is also the continued and organised resistance in some sections which is worrying. In the LCR in France, in the IMG in Britain, whole wings of the leadership see the turn decision at the last world congress as one of the key elements in the problems their organisations are facing. They also claim that the partial, uneven and belated implementation of this decision is proof of its unrealistic, utopian and disorganising character. Of course the turn to industry can be utopian if it's based on unapplicable or adventurist projections. It is unrealistic if it's not led and organised properly. It is disorganising if it's started in a voluntarist way and carried through hesitantly. But none of these objections deal with the core of the matter, the fundamental reasons for the world congress decision. They deal in the best of cases with the problem of *how* the turn is carried through.

One can agree with a point made in the debate that a changed social composition through factory implantation does not in itself mean that the organisation is politically well implanted and influential in the industrial working class. But we don't claim that. The only thing we say is that the political influence cannot be but very marginal unless we have active, organised cadres in the factories and the industrial turn is a key element in overcoming the first obstacle in changing such a situation. Of course it would have been better from an abstract point of view to have factory cadres that were recruited a long time ago and who are already well established as natural workers leaders. This is however not so often the case. The main argument with the turn was exactly to overcome a situation where this is not the case: an abnormal answer to an abnormal situation. Making the turn is to consciously build a bridge or strengthen the bridge to the key workers leaders that we want to recruit and that we may recruit tomorrow, but whom we would be still more unable to reach out to without the physical presence of a first or second generation of revolutionary socialist cadres in the factories.

It has also been said in the debate that the industrial jobs campaign is artificial and inefficient way of overcoming our traditional weakness. The turn taken out of context, not being an integral part of an overall political development and maturation will create big tensions and disorganise the work as a whole.

To this one can only reply: The industrial turn is a necessary component of any party-building line for the Fourth International today.

Let us take two examples of this.

The Mexican comrades are strongly against dismantling their teachers fraction. Being in the leadership of a national 200,000 strong movement for democratisation in a union which counts 700,000 members and in a country where the teachers play a different role than in the imperialist countries, gives them a position to link up with other trade union organisations, including those in industry. This is certainly true but of course it does not substitute for a base in industry. Whatever role the teachers union can play conjuncturally, whatever role it can play as a bridge to the industrial working class — the key condition on which we can use our presence in the teachers movement fully to reach out to the industrial workers is that we have something at the other end of the bridge, in the industrial working class itself. If not the effects will be limited.

Another example. During the last couple of months the Mexican comrades have been able to build up an oil workers fraction of some 60 to 70 new members, 30 of them in Salamanca. That is important but of course no substitute for the turn. To be able to

really organise and integrate these new comrades, leaders and cadres must be sent to these areas, themselves making the turn to the respective factories and the industrial regions.

For all the reasons outlined earlier we think the decisions of the World Congress not only have to be upheld but carried through in a much more serious and energetic way. To be able to do that however, it is absolutely necessary to engage in a very concrete discussion on *how to best implement the decisions at the last World Congress*. Such a concrete discussion in the national organisations and between them and the international leadership is also the only efficient way to break the resistance or skepticism that still exists in the International as to these decisions.

III. From one world congress to another

Looking back with hindsight we can say that the majority defending the industrial turn at the World Congress presented a series of fundamental arguments for the turn and formed an enthusiastic united front for this decision. But at the same time we have to admit that it didn't succeed in raising the profound discussion of how to carry it through under different circumstances and with the given traditions and characteristics in different parts of our movement. The discussion and argumentation stayed on a quite general level. It succeeded in giving a real impulse to our movement, but had a lack of precision (in itself rather understandable at that early stage). This helped to give the decisions taken and the perspectives outlined a voluntarist twist when later translated into national plans in some of the sections, underestimating the amount of education and preparation necessary and overestimating the speed with which the industrial turn could be carried through, thus giving unrealistic goals for some sections that had to be corrected over time.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, it should be said explicitly that the main problem has been and is the belated implementation of the turn decision — and that the need to give it a fresh start and speed it up after this IEC meeting remains the main task. But within this framework it is necessary at the same time to carry on a very concrete discussion of how the industrial turn decision could be best implemented. We have to take into account problems that have arisen in different sections. Otherwise it will be impossible to convince many comrades who were not convinced up to now.

We described in the beginning of this report the main considerations with the turn decision, one of them being that the turn should be a universal phenomena applied everywhere in the same general manner as explained in the special turn report.

While the wish to strengthen the industrial work through the conscious implantation of a large number of cadres in industry is and should be a universal one, there isn't and couldn't be any exact general rule of how to make it. Neither on the exact numerical goal, nor on the exact priorities, nor on the exact balance between industrial work and the importance given to other sectors, like the social sector or peasant work.

There is no single model of how to do the industrial turn, valid for Peru and Great Britain, United States and Japan, Australia and Mexico. The implementation of the World Congress decisions must be done in a concrete way, taking into consideration the peculiarities of each section and sympathising organisation. This places a big responsibility on national leaderships — and on the international leadership.

In Comrade Barnes' report at the World Congress one passage deals with the responsibilities of the international leadership in leading the turn to industry. The report states:

The leadership of the Fourth International, the International Executive Committee must lead the turn.

It must lead through political analysis, in order to situate the turn

in the unfolding world class struggle.

It must lead by more of its members going into industry.

It must lead through coordination of the turn on a world scale, facilitating the exchange of experiences and information among the national leaderships and comrades in industry in different countries.

This means that the IEC, like all other leadership bodies of our movement, will have to begin organizing its work differently. The agendas of its meetings will have to change. The questions it must consider and deliberate on will broaden.

For example, the next IEC meeting must concretely look at the statistics on the progress of the turn and assess their political and organizational implications.

The international leadership has generally not lived up to these tasks and to its duties in helping the national sections to implement the general decisions at the World Congress. It has to a large extent confined itself to general discussions about the turn — repeating some of the correct arguments of the World Congress and continuing to explain them, but without really helping the sections as much as they should have done.

In the last part of the report we will come back to this issue, indicating a number of immediate tasks for the international leadership in order to begin to overcome this situation. These are the single most important conclusions of this report.

It is *within this overall framework* that we want to take up several problems that are presently under debate in our movement, partially in polemic with some ideas most clearly expressed by American comrades. Doing this in no way of course changes our opinion on the service that the American SWP made to the whole International when it showed the necessity for a radical and conscious change of the social composition of the sections. Having made a radical turn themselves also meant that they gave the International a lot of new experiences, many of which were jointly assimilated at the World Congress.

But the further development and the explanations SWP comrades give to the way they are carrying through the industrial turn today must be integrated in the present international discussion.

1. *On perspectives*

At the World Congress — in the special turn report — one of the most substantial arguments for the turn was that the political radicalisation in the working class the world over makes it more and more urgent for us to “be there, in and part of the decisive sector of the working class” also before the coming showdowns occur.

It is true that we generally expect an increased level of class battles in the years to come as well as a *tendentially* increased role of the industrial working class in these battles in all the three sectors of the world revolution (a prognosis that also has been confirmed by the developments since the World Congress). But we shouldn't from this draw too one-sided and narrow conclusions. We shouldn't underestimate the role other layers of society can play as a spearhead or political catalyst or as allies to the industrial proletariat. And we must not give our cadres a too simplified view of the radicalisation process under way, that mixes up *tendential* long- or middle-term developments and *conjunctural processes*, that underestimates the many obstacles there exist for the big battalions of the working class to move into action and the unevenness in the radicalisation process. If we present our cadres with an overoptimistic analysis as the basis for our present party-building efforts we sow unrealistic projects and may very well harvest frustration or even demoralisation instead of more stable and lasting party-building acquisitions.

When we reread the turn report on behalf of the United Secretariat at the last World Congress from this point of view and with the present discussions in the International in mind (see following points), it seems clear to us that a passage as the following at least opens the way to such exaggerations and one-sided ap-

proaches to our party-building efforts:

It is [in the industrial working class] that we will meet the forces to build the Fourth International, to build workers parties. It is *there* that we will meet the young workers, the growing numbers of women workers, the workers of oppressed nationalities, and the immigrant workers. It is inside the industrial working class that revolutionary parties will get a response to our program and recruits to our movement.

All this is *increasingly* true if we see the Fourth International as a whole, but is not the whole truth and it will never be. Therefore it is misleading.

2. *On priorities*

In the number one of the French international Internal Discussion Bulletin (the same in the English version) there appears a polemic between the American and the French comrades on our goals in the turn to industry. This debate was initiated by the greetings made by cde Cindy Jaquith on behalf of the SWP leadership at the last LCR congress, where she stated:

In the United States we now have a little more than 50 percent of the members and leaders in industry, as blue collar workers. At the last convention, 90 percent of the delegates were comrades who have made the turn. But we think that 50 percent of the party in industry is not enough. We should have an overwhelming majority — perhaps 80 percent — the rest being made up of full-timers and retirees.

With this statement there obviously is an important difference in the International. It was not this line that we voted for at the World Congress.

One can discuss priorities, especially priorities in small sections who have to take very hard decisions to be able to achieve *anything* substantial at all. This relates to a concrete discussion of what importance we give to work in the social service sector in comparison to industry.

In Sweden, to take just one example, the section decided that a core of comrades working in the hospital sector in Stockholm should be liberated for industrial work. The comrades themselves were very motivated for this and had a lot of important trade union experience. We took this decision knowing well that it would substantially weaken our hospital work, as this was the best means available to give the industrial work in Stockholm a new fresh start. The choice was correct.

In Gothenburg and Uppsala however the fractions were retained and strengthened through recruitment. Contrary to Stockholm the comrades were well concentrated, efficiently organised and recruiting. Everybody agreed that industrial work was the key priority, including the hospital workers themselves. But the comrades also thought that they could use their trade union activity and their trade union posts to reach into other trade unions, including industrial unions. And especially in Gothenburg comrades were able to recruit in the huge hospital they concentrated on, recruits that were sometimes liberated for industrial jobs.

To give up the hospital work in Uppsala similarly would have meant to give up the by far biggest work place in the region and a promising activity.

Our overall goal is not only to have maximum number of comrades in industry. It is to build our trade union and political influence in the working class as a whole and its industrial core especially, which in turn requires an organisation capable of intervening in the main political issues that our class is faced with.

We cling to the notion that the industrial implantation is key to this and a number one priority. We also take into account that the industrial turn usually unavoidably will weaken our numerical implantation for example in the social or the teachers sectors, at least in the short run. Comrades going to industry are coming (or taken) from somewhere else and often they come from other

types of trade union experience which gives them a special motivation and a special leadership role. But our party-building efforts can not be *reduced* to our industrial implantation.

This is why we don't agree with the line implying that we generally dismantle trade union fractions outside industry, even in cases where they strengthen the overall political intervention of the organisation and help us reach out to new layers of industrial workers and industrial unions.

Instead of a general formula we need a concrete discussion on priorities here taking into account the political and organisational reality our sections live in.

But this is not just a question of hard immediate priorities. It also raises the question of what type of organisation we want to build.

Our perspective is not just to build organisations of industrial workers, retired comrades and full-timers, full-stop. Our idea is to build organisations that can intervene in the struggle of workers and toilers as a whole, that workers feel are representative for them, able to represent their interests in all aspects of economic, social and political life. Working class interests means interest in what is going on at the job, but not only that; it also means an interest in living conditions, housing, environment, milieu, what happens to their children at school or at child-care-taking centers, good transport, recreation, culture, etc. The organisations we want to build will have to respond to these needs, in relation to their overall strength.

The hard priorities we try to make today, given our size and the need to concentrate efforts to achieve a minimum of result, should be seen as an abnormal situation and not as a norm for the future.

The industrial turn will continue even after we achieved a situation where a substantial proportion of our cadres are in industry in the following sense. We will continue to recruit a large number of non-proletarians, many of whom can and will be convinced to look for jobs in industry. But this will be done in a calmer and more normal way, once we have a backbone of industrial workers in the sections. It will be part of the "normal life" of our sections. The industrial turn made in the form of the special organisational efforts that we are involved in now will not continue indefinitely.

This is not really a new discussion. It was raised and "aired" already at the last IEC. It needs however to be developed in the framework of the pre-world congress debate.

A debate on priorities which is new however compared to last year, is one which deals with our targets in industry itself.

This debate has come up at some international leadership meetings, in relation to the way the American comrades explain their turn to the garment industry as a national priority.

When the SWP turn was projected in '78, the priority was clearly to orient to the industrial workers in *heavy industry*. The comrades gave a many-faceted explanation for this: the economic importance of steel, automobile, oil, mining, etc.; the large-scale character of the work places; the tradition of radicalization in auto, steel, teamsters, etc; their racial composition; all of this was explained to show the potential political power of the workers in these sectors.

This was also how the priority was defined at the World Congress.

We will here not try to judge the concrete priorities of the SWP comrades. If there are openings in the large garment sector in big cities in the U.S. or if the comrades who have been fired from other industrial branches find politically useful jobs in garment instead, it is of course, up to the SWP comrades to take whatever step they find necessary and make whatever priority they feel correct.

This is not what we want to discuss here. What we want to de-

bate a bit is the argument that has been introduced in the international discussion to motivate the garment turn in the U.S. — and perhaps also in other countries. That is the notion that we now have to give priority to turn to the most oppressed layers of the working class, those who are least dependent on the capitalist society and have the least privileges to lose.

This deserves to be precised and discussed, in relation to the main criteria we have developed up to now.

The factories we choose as our target industries are those that i) serve a strategic role economically and politically for the bourgeoisie; ii) allow — through their structure as well as the level of radicalisation and organisation of the workforce — a real political training of a layer of vanguard workers, where our comrades can play an important role. (Compare the points in the preceding page.)

In relation to these criteria the notion of the "most oppressed layer" seems to us to be a quite subjective one and could open the way to very different and sometimes also very dangerous conclusions in the different sections.

3. *The industrial turn as a lever for our trade union and political intervention*

The industrial turn, as we have understood it, is intended to lay a basis for a long term and stable cadre implantation, the goal of which is to link up with and recruit vanguard workers and organise trade union fractions and currents that can begin to give the working masses an alternative to the corrupted reformist leaders.

We send cadres into factories and industrial regions to work and live in the midst of our class, to form a lasting unity with their fellow-workers. That also means that we are interested in and take part in day-to-day struggles to improve the working and living conditions of ourselves and our colleagues.

This line stands in complete contradiction to any *line* that implies incessant moving around of cadres as the *normal* policy or a super-campaigning attitude to the factory intervention which disregards the normal rhythm of political activity and political maturation.

With the present recession and constant threats of unemployment special attention also has to be paid to avoiding that comrades are unnecessarily fired, because we didn't take all possible measure to profit from the existing seniority or other rules or — when we find that useful — special jobs training to achieve a safer job which still is interesting from a political point of view.

Leaving one job to try to get another — which is more or less common in different countries — of course means losing seniority. If this is done in an excessive way it impedes the work of the whole organisation. All these problems must be discussed concretely now in the International — especially as the industrial turn implies different things and the relation between the turn and our factory intervention looks very different between for example the West European sections and the North American ones.

We would like to expand on this a bit, integrating and developing in this report some considerations that came out of the European Political Bureau meetings in 1980, as summarized by the United Secretariat Bureau at the time.

There is a political confrontation inside the workplaces, political combat between reformist parties and between reformists, centrists and revolutionaries. All our sections are confronted with the existence of mass workers organisations, parties and trade unions which are dominated by the reformists. That is why for us it is so important, and also complicated to know how to correctly combine our participation in the daily struggles of the workers, our work as basic organisers of the working class and our projection as revolutionary parties, which bring socialist political answers to the overall problems facing working people.

In making the turn to industry, *it is vital that, at one and the same time, we put the accent on projecting the political profile of*

our sections and that we take the greatest care in defining precisely our intervention towards and within the traditional workers parties — even more given the process of differentiation that is taking place there and inside the mass workers trade unions.

To win workers' confidence is a long-term task. It can only be achieved through a series of political and trade union struggles: workers will only join us to the extent that we can bring the living proof of the utility and necessity of the revolutionary party, through our intervention as comrades in struggle and as political militants.

In this sense, we always try to establish the bridge between workers' immediate struggles and the taking of power by the working class, and therefore in this manner, we defend the necessity of the socialist revolution, the adoption of proletarian solutions to the crisis of capitalism and are advocates for socialism, as a priority in the workplaces. It is naive and false to believe that it is not possible to discuss the most important political questions with our workmates in big factories. But it is even more naive and illusory to believe that we can win their confidence and convince them of building the Fourth International and its sections if we are not capable of responding in a practical way to their bread and butter problems, the political and trade union demands that concern them.

The essential thing is our capacity to combine our political intervention as a party with our intervention as workers who organise around them and put themselves at the head of the struggles. That is why without a policy for the transformation of the trade unions, which aims to stimulate class struggle currents, to encourage class struggle tendencies in a perspective of making trade unions revolutionary instruments, the turn to industry will only be an operation for changing jobs which could provoke a major crisis, in particular faced with the initiatives of the left reformist and centrist currents that are developing inside the traditional parties.

The function of the turn is to facilitate our sections beginning to modify the relationship of forces vis a vis the reformists, to substantially improve our means of implementing our policy of the workers united front, to reinforce the bases for a trade union class struggle tendency. The implantation in the heart of the industrial proletariat is necessary for us to really carry out the struggle we want to take up inside the mass workers movement.

In the conditions we are facing, we need, in most cases, *years in the same workplace* in order to become real mass leaders recognised as such by fellow workers. Our conception of professional revolutionaries must not be that of *revolutionary grasshoppers* who flit from factory to factory but as much as possible we should try and be *stable militants who maintain a continuation of the party in the main factories.*

To get comrades, in particular cadres, jobs, is indispensable for the turn (and the number of this is an excellent indicator of the turn's progress) but it is only the precondition: *recruitment and the transformation of our members into mass workers leaders in the main factories is another integral part of the turn to industry.*

I have heard the argument that it is not decisive if one or another comrade stays in one factory or moves to another one, to better suit the party's priorities. The decisive thing, according to this argument, is that the party operates through fractions that allow a collective intervention — the individual comrade can change his job, but the party fraction stays.

There is no difference on the need to build strong collective industrial fractions — neither does anybody argue that it is a merit in itself to stay 10 years in the same job, independent of changing objective possibilities.

But it's not true that workers in a factory will simply concentrate their confidence on the party as such and its fractions. There

is also a personal aspect to it, that comrades who themselves have made a real factory intervention are familiar with.

Any comrade who functions as a political militant at his or her workplace has a lot of ongoing discussions and joint activities with different workers and groups of workers, on different levels.

Even if we aim at training comrades and building a collective team, we must take into account that comrades have different experiences and different capacities, in different areas of work. You cannot just substitute one comrade for another. If some comrades are regarded by their work-mates as natural leaders they cannot transfer this to other comrades, just like that.

Finally, if we try to gain a real confidence it is not irrelevant how comrades appear in the workplaces. If one appears as a guest who has not really come to stay, but might any time be given another assignment; if one appears as somebody who is only sharing the conditions of life and work for some time, but can always resort to something else depending on the party's decisions — then there obviously is a problem that has to be taken into account.

4. *Our sections as propaganda organisations*

Different conceptions of the relationship between the industrial implantation and our factory intervention seems also to be linked to different party-building concepts more generally.

The SWP comrades for their part stress that the SWP as well as sections of the FI are propaganda organisations today and cannot substitute themselves for a real mass activity. It is correct that their main activity is propaganda activity, given their present numerical weakness and their extreme minority position inside the working class. But something more has to be added — it is not the perspective of our sections to stay as they are. And the many concrete examples given earlier in this report show that the sections are able to take political initiative that respond to and even widen political openings that arise as well as to lead struggles that are more than just propaganda activities.

The main idea behind the turn is exactly to overcome a situation where the sections are restricted to just propaganda efforts.

The economic, social and political crisis that the world capitalist system has entered in results in a deepening differentiation in the working class as well as the organised workers movement. In such a situation new opportunities open up for our sections, to which they have to answer through a combination of united front initiatives against the austerity policies and the imperialist war drive and well selected party campaigns. In such a situation a too narrow propaganda group concept — leads to missed opportunities and an unnecessarily self-limiting activity.

IV. *International leadership responsibilities*

As we have indicated earlier a number of sections today are involved in a series of more or less developed projects to push the industrial turn. But this whole effort with all its key implications for the building and the future of the Fourth International cannot just be reduced to a sum of national efforts. The international leadership has a decisive role to play in coordinating, strengthening and showing the way in the turn to industry. This can be done through a combination of several initiatives.

1. It can be done through presenting political background analysis in our press, showing what's going on in the world today, the actions and interests of the working class and the role of the sections in defending the interests of our class from within its midst.

2. It can — and must — be done through a much more active collaboration between the international leadership and the national sections to discuss their party-building projects and the industrial turn as a key one of them. This also presupposes an assignment of a group of comrades in the USEC who between now

and the next world congress work together to follow the activities of the sections in this area of work.

3. It can — and must — be done through a written and oral exchange of experiences at regional leadership meetings, through an integration of this question in international and national cadre schools, through an internal debate in preparation for the world congress and through two special internal bulletins which include reports and comments from national sections and the international center.

4. Two special problems deserve a special attention here (and should be dealt with in one of the two bulletins mentioned above, the other taking up the industrial turn in relation to our factory work): the special efforts needed to increase the number of women comrades involved in the industrial turn and our efforts to recruit and organise young workers, as part of the building of our youth organisations.

A special circular letter will be sent out in order to request all the necessary information on the role of women comrades in the turn to industry and practical efforts made by the sections to this respect. Concrete proposals will be presented to the United Secretariat and then taken up with the leadership of sections.

Parallel to this it is necessary that our press continues to run analytical and informational articles on the situation of the international women's movement and trade union initiatives in this area of work.

In the document on the building of youth organisations presented to this meeting, there is foreseen some internal coordination meetings on the development of our youth work. One of the key issues to discuss in these gatherings is exactly the role of the youth in the turn to industry.

* * *

Through these steps the international leadership will be able to take the responsibilities foreseen in the decisions at the last World Congress.

Post scriptum

At the May '82 IEC meeting two lengthy contributions followed this report. One was the counter-report given by cde Tyson and the other a quite extended intervention by comrade Abdul on behalf of the SWP leadership.

These two interventions — and especially comrade Abdul's concrete explanation of the line of the SWP leadership — verified that there really exist *fundamental* disagreements in our movement on how to approach and carry out the industrial turn and not only that: if the discussion on the turn is seen in the context of all the discussion at the IEC, it is clear that there exist in this and other areas different underlying party-building concepts that must be dealt with through a serious, deepgoing and prolonged polemic and clarification.

Rather than to try to introduce this overall polemic debate *here* (as was partially done in the IEC debate itself) — in a situation where comrade Tyson and Abdul's report have not been published and where the reporter has dealt with mainly only one area of our party-building activity today — this edited report tries to concentrate in a positive way on how the industrial turn should be tackled by the Fourth International today. It should be clear however that the problems and differences introduced in the last part of the report have just been indicated and that we need to come back very soon to this debate in further reports, discussion articles and above all in our efforts to put the World Congress decisions on the industrial turn into practice.

Report on the Grenadian Revolution

by Pat Kane

[The following report was adopted by the May 1982 meeting of the International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International. It is reprinted from the internal discussion bulletin of the International Marxist Group (IMG) of Britain.

[The vote on the report at the May IEC was: 22 for; 4 against; 8 abstaining; and 18 not voting.

[The following motion was also put to vote at the IEC meeting: "By basing itself on the mobilization of the oppressed and representing the interests of the workers and peasants of Grenada, the workers and farmers government formed by the N.J.M. has opened the possibility of the first workers state in a majority Black country." This motion passed by a vote of: 30 for; 2 against; 6 abstaining; and 14 not voting.]

On March 13, 1979, the masses of Grenada, led by their revolutionary party, the New Jewel Movement, overthrew the pro-imperialist dictator Sir Eric Gairy.

This revolution sent shock waves throughout the Caribbean. For the first time ever, a Black English-speaking island decided to reject the road of neo-colonial development offered by the imperialists. Westminster-style democracy was rejected, in favour of the direct involvement of the working people, through their own organisations, in the running of their country. The revolution not only overthrew Gairy, but its leaders decided to chart a completely new course of development — one which challenged imperialism and the domestic capitalists. They decided to reject the failed reformist road of Manley in Jamaica and Allende in Chile, and to follow the revolutionary road of Cuba.

This report deals with five points:

1. This was a genuine proletarian revolution.
2. This revolution smashed the governmental power of the capitalist class and installed a workers and farmers government.
3. This revolution is a model from which our movement can learn and enrich our programme.
4. The leadership of the New Jewel Movement are proletarian revolutionaries and they trace their origins in Marx and Lenin, something which we can confirm by their exemplary leadership role.
5. The massive impact of this revolution on oppressed peoples throughout the world, and its importance for the Fourth International.

Grenada is an island of 110,000 people, some comrades say it's tiny. Well, there are ten times more people than in the Malvinas, and it's just as close to vast oil fields in Venezuela and Trinidad. Imperialism has already spent billions of dollars in military manoeuvres against Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Thatcher and Reagan recognise what the leadership of Cuba recognised, that "Grenada is a big revolution in a small country."

Size does not remove fundamental problems of revolutionary strategy. To make a revolution you have to base yourselves on the revolutionary action of the masses; on small islands, trade unions have reformist and bureaucratic leaderships which have to be confronted and replaced; the repressive state power of the old regime has to be smashed; the creation of new agencies of workers power have to be planned beforehand; the military defence of the revolution has to be planned and organised; and most importantly, the type of government that the revolution produces has to be planned and installed by the revolutionary leaders.

These problems do not evaporate when you reach small islands. Britain is an island, and its reformist leadership will never lead a revolution. You could take them to Grenada or any other

island, large or small, and they wouldn't make a revolution there either, because they are reformist in their politics. The Grenadians are revolutionary, and they, unlike the British Labour Party, have confronted these problems of strategy before and through their revolution, and the result has been to strengthen their commitment to Marxist politics.

So, first of all, this was a proletarian revolution. When 47 members of the New Jewel Movement stormed the barracks of Gairy's army, and later seized the radio station, they were beginning the revolution. These militants judged three things before acting in such a bold manner. If they would have been wrong, they would all have lost their lives.

1. They judged that a majority of Grenadians would actively join the revolution.
2. They assessed that Gairy's minority political base would not oppose his overthrow.
3. They estimated that within the army and police, morale was so low that they would offer only minimal resistance.

They were right on all three judgements.

On March 12, 1979, Gairy left the island to address the United Nations Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee. He was a firm believer in Unidentified Flying Objects, and he spent more money on UFO research than on medical research. But, despite his eccentricity, he was given a knighthood for his services to British, and later American imperialism.

He left instructions that the leadership of the NJM had to be executed. Maurice Bishop, now the island's Prime Minister said later, "it was either them or us, and we didn't plan on it being us."

In late 1978, workers at Barclays Bank had struck for the recognition of their union, which was and still is led by militants of the NJM. This strike received huge support and solidarity, the result of years of agitation by the NJM which I will deal with later. It convinced the NJM leaders of the three judgments that I mentioned earlier. The time was ripe for revolution. The NJM moved forward — boldly — to seize the power, and forged their partnership with the Grenadian people which has survived three years of the revolution and is now stronger than ever.

When the Grenadian people heard over the radio of the NJM's victory, thousands took to the streets. The call for a strike in support of the revolution was supported by nearly 1,000 of the island's workers, a majority in the capital city St. George's. Telephone workers seized the switchboards, and used the telephone system to track down Gairy's ministers. Then they went out in their own cars, and arrested them. There are hundreds of similar stories of mass involvement in the revolution.

Gairy stayed in America, a guest of the U.S. government. On

March 20, he announced his formal resignation. Two huge rallies were held in different parts of the island, on different days. Twenty thousand people attended each rally. They chanted "Freedom come — Gairy go, Gairy gone with a UFO." When asked to vote on the Declaration of the People's Revolutionary Government, every hand shot up. The Grenadian people had made their revolution. Revolutionary Cuba, who had inspired Grenada's revolutionaries, had a new ally. Fidel Castro announced "we are no longer alone," and told the Cuban people of this "big revolution in a small country." For only the second time in the Americas, the struggling masses had carried through a successful revolution which established, what we can call a workers and farmers government.

The tasks of a workers and farmers government were outlined in the "Theses on Tactics" adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. They are "to arm the proletariat, to disarm bourgeois counter-revolutionary organisations, to introduce the control of production, to transfer the main burden of taxation to the rich, and to break the resistance of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie." As we will see, the Grenadian government has done all these things, and many more besides in its three years of existence.

The NJM did not hold parliamentary elections. The new revolutionary government had an overwhelming majority of NJM supporters, and two members of the Grenada National Party, the main pro-capital party which had opposed Gairy. They were judged by the NJM to be "no obstacle to the revolutionary process." Immediately the government had to face the reaction of U.S. imperialism, who sent East Caribbean Ambassador Frank Ortiz to visit the PRG. Ortiz demanded that the new government cease all contact with Cuba. When asked for compensation for the years of Gairy's rule, he pulled out his cheque book, and made out a cheque for \$5,000 (U.S.) from his discretionary fund. He made it clear — no more aid while the government developed links with Cuba.

Despite the desperate need for aid, the Grenadians sent him home, and announced the next day across Radio Free Grenada that the Grenadian revolution would pick and choose its own friends, and that "Grenada was in no one's backyard."

A whole programme of legislation was embarked on which strengthened the organisation and confidence of working people. All Gairy's repressive legislation was repealed. The right to strike was established in law. It became compulsory for employers to recognise unions. Equal pay, maternity leave, and laws against exploitation were all passed. They were all included in the 1973 manifesto of the NJM.

But laws by themselves mean nothing. Proletarian parties have to organise to implement them. This is the crucial difference in revolutionary Grenada — it is a workers and farmers government that acts to use legislation and governmental power to advance the workers struggles, and defend them against the capitalists who still exist in Grenada. In every single dispute between capital and labour since the revolution, the government has intervened on the side of organised labour, women or the youth. The government has called on the trade unions to struggle to implement basic minimum wages and conditions in the small private sector.

At its founding conference in 1973, the NJM declared that after the revolution, the new government would rest on, and encourage the development of a new system of popular assemblies, which would eventually elect a national assembly of delegates to run the country. They viewed the government as a transition towards such a structure, with its immediate task of creating the foundations of this future system through mass involvement of all Grenadians in the affairs of the country. This government has kept its promise, and encouraged the development of local as-

semblies throughout the entire island. Workers, women and youth have additional geographically based meetings.

Trade unions have registered growth from 30 percent to 80 percent of workers and these new union members have had to confront the old leaders and remove them. This has been done by the NJM organising broad coalitions to democratise and involve the unions in the revolutionary process. The NJM consciously rejects economist views of trade unionism.

Agricultural workers were won to a new union after the revolution. Fitzroy Bain, President of the Agricultural and General Workers Union, explained to me their trade union policy. "We told the agricultural workers of the great importance of the relationship between government and trade unions. From the very first day, we told them that our path would be a revolutionary trade union, not a union of the past that works only on the economic side of life, but one that looks at the whole social, political, and all-round being of the worker. We do not believe that a trade union is one that goes every three years, and asks for higher wages, and you do not keep up with the cost of living or solve the workers daily problems — their children's education and things like that."

The struggle against the right wing, whether Gairyites or leaders who supported the overthrow but not the subsequent direction of the government, has been waged in all of the unions established under Gairy. In all instances, they have used methods to strengthen the democratic organisation of the rank and file, and have never resorted to repression or coercion.

Even when the right-wing leaders of the dockers union, who supported the overthrow of Gairy, organised at their third attempt, a strike against the revolutionary government, the broad masses were mobilised to isolate these right-wing leaders.

Counter-revolution has been organised, and terrorist attacks were frequent in 1981. The pro-worker stance of the government had angered the island's capitalists, who can see their power smashed, and their influence drain away. Sections of them supported these terrorists including a capitalist member of the government. They put him in jail, along with the terror gangs he supported. The old army has been smashed, and replaced with a revolutionary army based on the island's militant youth. The sight of black youths with Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, chanting anti-imperialist slogans in English, inspired me, as it inspires every black youth in London's ghettos who finds out about the Grenada revolution. Unlike Grenadian youth, if London's black rebels were given rifles, they would use them against the state. In Grenada the youth support their government and revolution.

The police force has been disarmed, and the most corrupt officers sacked. I once had occasion to call the police, something I wouldn't do in London, to intervene with a small car rental firm that was ripping off two of our Canadian comrades.

The policeman arrived, a member of the National Youth Organisation, and sided with us. He was worried that it would affect our view of Grenada. He thought we were tourists, until I gave him an *IP*. He said, "You have to realise, comrades, that the manager is a capitalist, and one day the revolution will sweep him away. Just now we have enough problems, but one day we'll get round to organising him." Again, given the choice, this young Grenadian revolutionary, like his government, sided with us, not the capitalist.

The terror campaign led the NJM to extend and strengthen the mass organisations, to ensure that the working class and its allies had the strength and clarity of political ideas to stand up to this type of destabilisation.

The National Youth Organisation, and the National Women's Organisation were turned outwards, and their membership increased by thousands. Their members became activists, fighting

to implement the gains of the revolution throughout the island.

Moral and political appeals were only one part of winning new links, and consolidating old links between the revolution and the broad masses. The masses had to be shown, in a practical way, that the revolution and its government was indeed different from other regional governments. The government had to provide the material basis to transform the living standards of the Grenadian people. That meant organising the economy in which capitalist relations still predominate. Social and economic advances in a developing country are very closely linked. Free milk, education, health care, the expansion of culture — all products of the revolution — have to be paid for. Grenadian capitalists are mainly confined to the service sector and to agriculture. Their importance in the economy is decreasing.

The state and government takes all the initiatives in the development of the economy, and last year 95 percent of investment in the economy was from the state. They now have the first-ever domestic bank, and state property is expanding rapidly to all sectors of the economy. It is not possible to discuss every aspect of this process of economic development, only its highlights.

What are they?

Well, today, Grenada is a country where any school child can explain economic terms like the social wage or the gross national product. The mass organisations, formed in the revolution and strengthened afterwards, are the cornerstones of this process. Grenada is an agricultural country, still dependant on and affected by the economic crisis of capitalism.

Yet they have introduced a whole range of welfare benefits never seen in the Caribbean and it all has to be paid for. Alongside this are their attempts to lessen the domination of their economy by the imperialist markets, and develop new markets and products. Imperialism grossly distorted the island's economic development, and squeezed it into its own international division of labour. This meant that a Caribbean island was prevented from processing its own agricultural products and from having a modern fishing fleet, and it took a revolution to end the situation where a majority of its fish was imported from Canada.

The PRG has demystified the process of economics, by involving the broad masses in every aspect of debate about the future of their island. Since the first days of the revolution, they have struggled to introduce planning and budget control.

This year they have now embarked on their first one-year plan, and this very minute they are working on their first three-year plan, to be introduced next year.

These plans do not descend from on high, but are the conclusion of a dialogue between the masses and the government. As the planning has been extended so has the number of people involved increased, until over 30,000 people took part in the discussions around this year's budget. This process attacks one of the pillars of capital, business secrecy. When the Grenadians use the phrase "opening the books," they really mean it.

During the budget preparations, all the local assemblies and workplace meetings received preliminary reports on plans for the economy. The government declared 1982 the "Year of Economic Construction." All the mass organisations elected delegates, including ordinary soldiers from the army units, to a conference to discuss the economy. 1,000 attended from a population of 110,000.

After the conference, every delegate reported to their organisation. Then the broader masses were involved again through the local assemblies, called Parish Councils.

As a result, a whole series of committees have been established in state workplaces to monitor and control production. The government has called on the unions to struggle in the private sector to establish similar committees. They have reduced taxation for workers by 25 percent, and have refused to increase

taxes to pay for the country's social wage. Instead, they have chosen to increase productivity and expand the economy. Capitalists who do not co-operate face a whole system of punitive taxes, introduced at the insistence of the masses during the Parish Councils. They call this the carrot and stick approach.

None of this could be possible without the existence of a revolution which is still moving forward, which has a revolutionary leadership, who exercise the power of organised working people through a workers and farmers government.

This revolution is a model from which we can learn and enrich our programme. It is a living example of the programme of our movement, and it has lessons for people struggling against capitalism everywhere. It is not only how an experienced leadership leads the government, but how revolutionaries can actually organise working people in democratic mass organisations. How we can mobilise and educate masses of people, and move them along the road to an understanding of the tasks of a socialist revolution. How to do this by standing firmly on their own organisations, engaging these organisations in activity, and through these actions raising and developing consciousness. The Grenadian leadership are constantly learning from the achievements of their people, and we should be doing the same.

The leadership of the NJM are proletarian revolutionaries, and there are lots of lessons for building our parties from their experiences. The revolution was the result of years of struggle by the Grenadian people. From its foundation in March 1973, the NJM had developed proletarian methods of struggle. Che Guevara was their hero, but they rejected strategies based on guerrilla warfare. Instead they organised mass mobilisations to confront the dictatorship, and extend the self-organisation of the masses.

Alain Krivine interviewed George Louison, a government minister and a central leader of the NJM, for the LCR's paper *Rouge*. "We have never hidden that we are struggling for socialism," Louison told Krivine. "This is our programme, and we consider our party to be a vanguard socialist party. Because of the anti-communist campaign carried out by the dictatorship against our party, a minority is still opposed to socialism. But the workers have confidence in us. Our relations with the bourgeois parties are non-existent. . . . We always preserved our independence as a party."

Bernard Coard, now the Minister of Finance pointed out "that kind of [elaborate] party organisation was forced on us by making our newspaper illegal, by refusing permission to use loudspeakers, by refusing to allow us to hold public meetings, to demonstrate and so on. The other side of that coin was that it forced us to be a disciplined a tightly knit security conscious party . . . to call on our people . . . and to move swiftly."

In April 1973 workers staged a huge strike against the police murder of a youth, one month after the formation of the NJM. On May 10, the NJM called its first mass rally. Ten thousand attended, 10 percent of the island's population. They organised a general strike that lasted 4 days, which revealed their weak links with the organisations of the urban workers. On November 4, they organised a second mass rally, bigger in size, and called on Gairy to resign. The general strike that followed was defeated through repression and the collaboration between the right-wing leaders of the trade unions and the regional supporters of imperialism.

The NJM drew a balance sheet — their organisation was only a year old. It had grown out of the black power movement. Its leaders were young professionals, who had been radicalised through their experiences in Britain and the United States. They decided to make a turn to consistent work amongst the urban workers and within their unions, towards establishing stronger links with the youth and women who had been in the vanguard of the struggle.

They stood for parliament, and used it as a platform to mobilise working people. They established a rank and file paper inside the unions called "Workers Voice" and challenged the collaborationist leaderships. They studied Marx, Engels, Lenin, Che and Castro. And finally, they developed a military wing under the control and direction of their party.

The Grenadian revolution is not some insignificant and isolated exception. Its importance is threefold.

First, it is part of the revolutions of the region. It has close ties with Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador. These other leaderships observe and participate as comrades in each other's revolutions. Grenadians are in Bluefields, on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, winning black English-speaking Nicaraguans to the Nicaraguan revolution through the literacy campaign. Hundreds of Grenadians are in Cuba, and hundreds of Cubans are in Grenada.

They learn from each other and compare their different processes. Most important is that they defend each other against imperialism and reject every attempt by the imperialists to divide them up.

Secondly, it is a revolution of the Caribbean, but because of its historical development has strong links with the freedom fighters of black Africa. It is a different model of development and hundreds of Africans visit to observe and learn from the revolution. Grenada is itself deeply committed to international solidarity with Africa and the region's revolutions. Bishop sums it up as a "beacon of hope, and alternative to neo-colonialism and colonialism, to nineteenth-century capitalism" for the whole region. This is the first workers and farmers government, with a Marxist leadership, in a major black country.

Thirdly, it is an ex-British colony, and hundreds of thousands of Grenadians live abroad in Toronto, New York, and London. But more than this obvious link, it is seen by the Grenadians as an international revolution, and they identify with struggling people everywhere. The struggles of the Grenadian people inspire black and oppressed people throughout the world, including in the imperialist countries. Our task, as an international, is to ensure that wherever working people fight oppression they are told the truth about this big revolution in a small island.

So what conclusions can we draw from this? There are the massive opportunities this revolution opens up for party building, by being able to show to workers the positive example of working people seizing their own destinies and moving forward. If a tiny island like Grenada can confront imperialism, we can also participate in the anti-imperialist struggle and draw strength and inspiration from their struggles. Everywhere we have carried out solidarity or propaganda work, the experience has been overwhelmingly positive, whether in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, America, or in Britain itself.

In Britain, our identification with the Grenadian revolution is bringing us closer to the black youth who have been in the vanguard of the fight against Thatcher. The same is true for the work of the YSA in the United States. I was standing waiting for friends coming off a train, and next to me was a group of black railworkers. I overheard them talking about Maurice Bishop. Two of them were from Grenada. This is in the same area, and 100 yards from the depot where our comrades have recently got jobs. One of these workers had attended the third anniversary celebrations. The political impact was incredible on everyone who attended, and this worker was no exception. Through our turn to industry, we are linking up with more and more of these workers.

Every section who has taken this work seriously reports similar incidents. Solidarity, and identification with the revolution will win us a whole layer of black workers.

Finally, how do we characterise this leadership? They share with Lenin an orientation to solving problems through the mobilisation and involvement of the working people.

They promote class independence and reject class collaboration. They create huge organisations which elect their own leaders, are self-financing, and have no material ties to the state. They see their future through the international extension of their revolution.

Today, British imperialism is at war in the South Atlantic. War is the acid test for revolutionaries. In Britain, the Labour leadership were in favour of sending the fleet, but against it being used. They could only give Thatcher advice on how to conduct the war, not how to stop it.

The centrists of the Militant Tendency within the Labour Party, who were a split from our movement, are in favour of a federal socialist republic of the Malvinas, Argentina, and wait for it, capitalist Britain!

The IMG, in our resolute stand against our ruling class, and in support of the Argentinian demand for the Malvinas, is not alone. The black youth don't like Thatcher, or her wars. A few weeks ago, on a demonstration in commemoration of the murder of Bobby Sands MP, hundreds of youth of Irish descent sang, to the tune of Evita, "We're supporting you, Argentina," which is more than could ever have been said for Evita herself.

But most importantly, the government and people of Grenada share the same line as us. Lech Walesa, at the time of the signing of the Gdansk agreement, answered his ultra-left critics by saying, "it's easy to be un-compromising when there's no compromises on offer." Every day, imperialism offers the Grenadians either compromise or aggression. Their price would be their principles. They have passed another test of their political principles in their attitude to the Malvinas. Thatcher's navy has to come home, and it passes Grenada. It wouldn't be the first time that British warships have pulled into the harbour of St. George's to crush a revolution.

Imperialist military activity in the Caribbean is massive. Thousands of French troops are in Martinique. The American military is pouring into the pro-imperialist islands, and the CIA is overtly active. Reagan and Thatcher constantly make attacks on Grenada, because they see Grenada as an example for working people everywhere.

Comrades, you can't lead a revolution through all the twists and turns without a strategy, and the strategy of the NJM can only be described as revolutionary, using a general framework which is similar to ours. They are revolutionaries, firmly committed to Marxism. And this is what makes the Grenadian revolution such a huge event for our movement, for the Grenadian revolution broke the isolation of the Cuban revolution. It is the same for us. Comrades, the Grenadian revolution along with Cuba and Nicaragua, means that we also are now not alone. And this is something which should be shouted, loudly, by every section of our movement.

Immediately after the March 13 revolution, both British and American imperialism discussed, and fortunately rejected, overt military action against Grenada. On June 6, 1979, the *Washington Post* revealed that the U.S. National Security Council had discussed the idea of blockading Grenada. This committee is the most powerful military committee in the world today. They recognised the importance and example of the Grenadian revolution. Yet it has taken over three years for our own leadership, through the United Secretariat of the International Executive Committee, to organise a discussion.

Our IEC should agree with the positions of the IMG, recently adopted by our Central Committee, that "by basing itself on the mobilisations of the oppressed and representing the interests of the workers and peasants of Grenada, the workers and farmers government formed by the New Jewel Movement, has opened the possibility for the first workers state in a majority black country."

The Third Iranian Revolution and the Fourth International

(A Criticism of "Draft Resolution on Iran")

by Nader Afra

[This criticism was based on the second draft of the "Draft Resolution on Iran" discussed in the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. The final draft of this resolution, adopted by a majority of the United Secretariat, appeared on page 1258, Vol. 18, of *Intercontinental Press*, under the title: "The Evolution of the Iranian Revolution."]

The events of the past two-and-a-half years in Iran have attracted the attention of the world working class. We are talking about one of the greatest revolutions of the imperialist century: The Third Iranian Revolution. For the fighters of the Fourth International, this is not a question of criticism in retrospect, but a question of making an active intervention into events to help advance the revolution to final victory and prevent a catastrophe.

We have few forces in Iran. But the advantage of a revolution is precisely that even a small group can become a great force in a brief period of time, provided it has a correct prognosis and raises the correct slogans in a timely way. This applies not only to our section in Iran, but also to the other sections of the Fourth International in relation to the Iranian revolution. Because as the revolution advances, it will draw even more attention from the workers around the world. The test of different political lines will take place before the vanguard of the world proletariat. If the power of Trotskyism is its correct revolutionary conception, then we must show this strength especially sharply in a revolutionary crisis. If we are truly internationalist, we must do this work on an international scale.

We must pose two central questions and answer them:

- (1) The question of the general character of the Third Iranian Revolution and the strategic line that flows from it; and
- (2) The question of the correct conjunctural use of slogans and revolutionary opportunities.

Above any other question, the crisis in the Iranian section reflects itself in the incapacity of the leadership to answer these two central questions. This political incapacity has opened the way to every possible ultraleft-sectarian and opportunist deviation. As a result, the leaderships of the HKE (Revolutionary Workers Party) and HKS (Socialist Workers Party), two public factions of our section in Iran, have failed politically in their national and international duties.

The Draft Resolution on Iran written by comrades Duret and Rovere, which was submitted to the July 18-20, 1980, meeting of the United Secretariat, must be viewed in this context: the political incapacity of the leaderships of the two public factions (the HKE and HKS) in shouldering their principal national and international tasks, and the efforts of some comrades in the leadership of the Fourth International to solve the political problems of the Iranian section on the behalf of these leaderships.

However, the resolution is lacking in three principal aspects:

- (1) It fails to put the Third Iranian Revolution in its international context, and neglects the centrality of the imperialist counterrevolution.

- (2) In effect, it does not take into consideration a central aspect of the February insurrection, i.e., the overthrow through the mass action of the Iranian workers and toilers of the Pahlavi dynasty, which was built by imperialism. This resulted in heavy blows to the bourgeois state apparatus and the coming to power

of a popular bourgeois-nationalist government and the formation of new institutions by this regime.

- (3) Therefore, it does not view the revolution from the standpoint of the Iranian proletariat in its historic and strategic march towards a workers and peasants government and the socialist revolution. It does not flow from the depth of the revolution, and as a result the tasks of the proletariat are not portrayed in a concrete and living manner.

Centrality of the imperialist counterrevolution

The resolution does not place the Third Iranian Revolution in its international context. This is especially crucial when it comes to a resolution dealing with a process of permanent revolution: a revolution in a semicolonial country that has yet to achieve national-democratic tasks, one central task being the question of national independence, i.e. overthrowing the imperialist yoke. Therefore, the resolution belittles the *central enemy, the main counterrevolutionary force* that the revolution is faced with — world imperialism.

The resolution wrongly *starts* from the internal contradictions of the regime, and while it mentions many of the imperialist counterrevolutionary measures against the revolution, including military actions, it does not draw the necessary conclusions.

Mentioning the forward march of the masses, the deepening and development of the revolution and the crisis of the regime, the draft resolution states:

In this context imperialism tries to strike blows against this revolution which had rallied behind the figure of Khomeini in order to smash the Shah's regime, which had been set up and supported to the end by Washington. Many measures are being used by Carter at the present time: economic blockade, freezing of Iranian credits, diverse aid to plotters and partisans of the old regime (Bakhtiar, Oveissi, Palisban), increasing the military presence in the area leading up to the failed 25th April raid (which was organised in liaison with a plot inside the army), an international diplomatic offensive to isolate the new regime and a press campaign to slander the revolution. American imperialism, with the aid of its Western allies and the help of the reactionary regimes of the area (Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Iraq) are making *numerous maneuvers* to achieve their aims. (Emphasis added.)

However, the resolution does not see any immediate and fundamental danger to the revolution coming from imperialism and its allies. In fact, it neither accepts any form of major confrontation between imperialism and the Iranian Revolution right now, nor predicts such a confrontation in the future. The views of comrades Duret and Rovere on the revolution and the perspective of class struggle in Iran in the immediate period have been put forward clearly in the resolution:

The perspective in Iran, outside of any conjunctural fluctua-

tions, remains that of great instability, class struggle, of an interaction between the mobilisation and struggles of different layers of the exploited and oppressed and of an accentuation of the crisis of the bourgeois political leadership with the centrifugal effects that result from that, which could even end in civil war.

The resolution simplifies the imperialist attempts against the Iranian Revolution to "numerous maneuvers" and negligible "conjunctural fluctuations." The real axis of future struggles, according to the projections of this document, is the confrontation between the mass movement and the government, with no explainable relation to imperialism.

Despite mentioning the repeated counterrevolutionary attempts of the imperialists, the general line of the resolution subordinates these attempts to the confrontation between the mass movement and the government. Even in the tasks section of this document — the only section where a serious possibility of the imperialist danger is considered — this danger is mentioned in an abstract and academic form.

But this is an inverted analysis of the revolution in semicolonial Iran. The resolution basically does not clarify the difference between the character of the revolution in semicolonial Iran, in imperialist Russia of 1917, or in imperialist France of 1980. The strategic line of march of the revolution is distorted through the denial of the reality of the confrontation with imperialism.

However, even the facts mentioned in the resolution are sufficient in themselves to prove the centrality of the danger of imperialist counterrevolution. The most fundamental aspect of the Iranian revolution is the open confrontation between semicolonial Iran and U.S. imperialism. This was put forward for the world to see after the revolutionary occupation of the ex-U.S. embassy, currently named for what it really was by the revolutionary masses of Iran — the "Spy Den." This central fact — the confrontation between imperialism and the Iranian revolution — must be the axis of any resolution that strives to encompass the strategic line of march and the dynamics of the Iranian revolution.

For 80 years the struggles of Iranian workers and toilers have been waged against domination by imperialism and its native allies, including the monarchy. The struggle against autocracy in the period leading up to the February 1979 insurrection was combined with the anti-imperialist struggles, especially against U.S. imperialism. The overthrow of the monarchy had become the focus of the class struggle, because the masses correctly saw the Shah's throne as the bastion of world imperialism headed by the U.S.

Due to the political and organizational weakness of the proletariat, after the overthrow of the monarchy political power fell into the hands of a nationalist leadership that supports capitalism. However, the struggle against imperialist domination not only did not end, but has been exacerbated. The mass democratic struggles and the struggles of the workers proceeded in a direction counter to the efforts of the bourgeois politicians for a compromise with the U.S., and Washington's efforts against the Iranian revolution led to the occupation of the Spy Den.

The confrontation of the proletariat and its historical allies with imperialism and its allies and internal bases of support was transformed into the focal point of the struggles of all the exploited and oppressed of Iran, and later of the entire Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The firm determination of world imperialism to strangle the Iranian revolution was indicated through its intention to overthrow the nationalist Islamic Republic government, a fact that unfortunately was not even mentioned in the resolution except in an abstract and academic way in the tasks section of the document. From the strategic point of view of the revolutionary proletariat, the role of the Islamic Republic in the revolution and its relation with im-

perialism, the capitalists, and the big landowners can only be understood and analyzed in this context.

The government

After the overthrow of the monarchy in Iran, all the forces that opposed the revolution and were organized around the ex-shah looked to the White House for leadership.

An important sector of the Iranian bourgeoisie (the industrial capitalists and bankers), many of the big landowners, the army generals, and those with high posts in the bureaucracy escaped from Iran, so that they could return once the relation of class forces had changed qualitatively. They are the direct and open agents of world imperialism.

At the same time, that section of the army brass that has remained in Iran and has escaped the grip of the revolution's revenge — through their cooperation with capitalists, big landowners, ex-SAVAK agents, the government bureaucracy, and sectors of the well-to-do urban petty-bourgeoisie who are disillusioned with the revolution — constantly tries to prepare a coup in collusion with imperialism. They look to Bakhtiar, Oveissi, Madani and others for a solution. They are the social base of counterrevolution inside Iran.

The government of the Islamic Republic, which came to power after a year of anti-autocratic, anti-imperialist mass actions and a mass insurrection, is a crisis-ridden, unstable capitalist regime with a bourgeois nationalist leadership. This is a popular government that has been identified in the popular consciousness with the revolution and derives its power essentially not from its repressive forces — something it has failed to construct or reconstruct — but rather from the support of the masses. This is not a puppet government brought to power by imperialism. Under the pressure of the masses, and in self-defense, it does take anti-imperialist steps. However reactionary its intentions and deeds are, this government is incapable of imposing a bloody defeat on the working class. This regime cannot stop the workers from moving forward and is unable to roll back the revolution. This regime is an obstacle, although an unstable and shaky one, to imperialism. All these are reason enough for the imperialists' antagonism towards this government. These are also the reason for all the counterrevolutionary political, diplomatic, economic, and military steps of world imperialism and its allies on both sides of the borders to overthrow this government, to defeat the toilers of Iran, especially the working class, and to impose a bloody proimperialist puppet regime.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic government is a capitalist government that is incapable of breaking its ties with the capitalists and big landowners; therefore, it has to maintain relations with different sectors of world imperialism. As a result, the Islamic Republic government is neither capable of leading nor does it intend to lead the revolution through its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist course. This government is an obstacle to the revolution and stands in contradiction to the demands of workers, poor peasants, oppressed nationalities, women, the urban semi-proletariat, youth, soldiers, and all oppressed layers of society. When this government takes a step to consolidate its rule, to rebuild the repressive state apparatus, to reestablish and reinforce capitalist relations against the revolution, it is supported by the ruling class and by the imperialists. The government of the Islamic Republic has already more than once proven its desire to reach a compromise with imperialism. The negotiations between Tehran and Washington to receive arms and military spare parts in the summer of 1979 to use in crushing the revolution in Kurdistan illustrate this fact.

The development of the revolutionary process accentuates the class polarization to the right and left of this government. The

well-to-do middle classes tend to move further away from the revolution and rally around personalities like Bakhtiar. In this way, the social base for counterrevolution around the capitalists and big landowners takes shape. Workers and toilers lose their confidence in the government and its capability to further the revolution, and feel the need for independent organization and action in order to defend and further the revolution. The governmental crisis, as well as the steps taken by different factions of the Islamic Republic, also occur and become comprehensible in this framework.

The draft resolution distorts this duality in the character of the government in the context of the battle by imperialism against the Iranian workers and toilers. While the conflict between the government and the workers and toilers is played up by the resolution, it is not placed in the context of the fundamental confrontation between imperialist counterrevolution and the revolution of the workers and the toiling masses. As a result, the confrontation of the government and the mass movement is posed abstractly, distorting the proletarian strategy for taking power. By obscuring the character and the strategic course of the Third Iranian Revolution, the resolution is unclear and confusing about the conjunctural possibilities for the proletariat in its historic march to replace the capitalist regime by a workers and peasants government and to carry through the socialist revolution.

Proletariat in the midst of the revolution

The Iranian proletariat, for reasons mentioned in the resolution, was not able under the favorable conditions of the class struggle that led to the armed mass insurrection of February 1979 to take political power and replace the monarchy with a workers and peasants government, opening the socialist revolution in Iran and the Middle East. Although the proletariat was not in a condition to lead the mass movement, the revolution placed it in a much more favorable situation to organize itself and enter the scene as the only social force capable to lead the revolution in accomplishing all its original goals.

The coming to power of the Khomeini leadership, on the other hand, signified the deep crisis of the Iranian bourgeoisie. Imperialism and the ruling classes were dealt a heavy blow as a result of the February insurrection. The regime of the Islamic Republic, while pointing up the weakness of the proletariat and the crisis of leadership of the working class on a national scale, also indicates the worldwide crisis of imperialism and capitalism. The revolution, which began around historically postponed democratic demands and in the context of the crisis of leadership of the two main classes in capitalist society, has continued its uneven development under petty-bourgeois leaderships and through many channels. This fact has, on one hand, turned the revolution into an extremely uneven and complicated revolution and, on the other hand, provided many openings for the proletariat to organize and intervene and to prepare for taking power.

After the overthrow of the monarchy, besides the movements of the specific social classes and oppressed layers, general movements developed in continuation of the anti-imperialist struggles prior to the insurrection. The most notable of these were the movement to arm the revolution, the movement to reconstruct the villages, and the literacy movement. The central role in all these movements was played by the anti-imperialist youth, who are in solidarity with the Islamic Revolution and who have illusions in the government of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Association of Students (IAS) and the Organization of Moslem Students (OMS) organized an important section of such youth and took it upon themselves to build these movements. While the proletariat was not ready to politically lead these movements, and while broad masses of people and leaderships on different

levels identified the Islamic Republic government with the revolution, the government tried to intervene in these movements in order to control them. Therefore, as the revolution developed, these movements took shape in forms like the Imam's Committees and later the Sepah Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards Corps), the Army of 20 Million, Baseej-e Mostazafin (Mobilization of the Disinherited), all of which came under the government's control. In some cases the government has tried to utilize the revolutionary energy of the youth who are active in these movements in order to prevent the development of the revolution and to stabilize its rule. The use of Pasdars against the oppressed Kurdish nationality is a clear example of this. However, despite governmental intervention and the lack of a program on the part of the anti-imperialist youth, under conditions of the growth of the revolution and under the influence of the class struggle, these movements are still alive and developing. Their revolutionary dynamism is continuing, and the militant youth organized in these organizations take different initiatives in the direction of advancing the revolution outside the framework of governmental projects.

The specific movements of social classes and layers, through the national anti-imperialist struggle, have become intertwined with the movements to defend the revolution and reconstruct the country. The proletariat in order to join them with its own struggle needs to pay attention to these mass movements and the movements of its historic allies paving the way to a workers and peasants government and the overthrow of capitalism in Iran. In the context of its confrontation with imperialism, the proletariat must put forward its own program and policy for all these movements and compete with the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois nationalist leaderships and the government of the Islamic Republic in order to take the leadership of the revolution on a national scale. The resolution is almost devoid of mention of all these national anti-imperialist movements in the city and countryside. The only reference made in this context is as follows:

In a context of a revolution that is going forward, given their origin and composition, these bodies that have been set up by the "Islamic revolution" can occasionally oscillate, become divided and be affected very directly by pressure of the mass movement. That is how some *pasdaran* groups have participated in land distribution — which earned them a severe reprimand from the Islamic Republican Party and the Council of the Revolution.

By paying little attention to the national and anti-imperialist struggle and the need for defense of the revolution and reconstruction in face of the danger of the imperialist counterrevolution; by overlooking general movements of the anti-imperialist youth in the city and countryside; and by disregarding the link between these movements and that of the workers and toilers, the resolution is incapable of proposing specific and concrete demands that can coincide with the reality of the class struggle in Iran. Even though the document refers to the tasks of the proletariat with regard to its historic allies, these tasks remain merely at the level of general demands from the transitional program. As a result, the specific tasks of the proletariat, as well as the practical tasks of revolutionary socialists, remain unclear.

The test of class struggle

On the eve of the United Secretariat meeting of September 28-30, where the resolution was to be rediscussed, U.S. imperialism, with the aid of its allies, took another decisive step towards overthrowing the Islamic Republic regime and drowning the revolution in blood. The Iraqi "maneuvers" turned into a full-fledged war against the Iranian workers and toilers. At the same time, in complete contradiction to the reality of the class struggle in the Middle East and Iran, the resolution presented the follow-

ing perspective for the discussion of the leadership of the Fourth International:

The perspective in Iran, outside of any conjunctural fluctuations, remains that of great instability, class struggles of different layers of the exploited and oppressed and of an accentuation of the crisis of the bourgeois political leadership with the centrifugal effects that result from that, which could even end in civil war.

Despite a reference to "the debacle of the American raid at Tabas and the failure of the plots hatched in concert with the western secret service agencies," (here it means the coup planned by the army commanders in cooperation with Bakhtiar in June 1980), the resolution does not foresee the continuation and exacerbation of the imperialist offensive against the revolution. The imperialist-backed coup in Turkey and the war by the reactionary Iraqi regime against the Iranian revolution are not in accord with the general line of the resolution and do not fit into the framework of the proposed perspective in this document.

The proposed perspective in the resolution is not the logical conclusion of the facts mentioned in the document itself. For example in the section on oppressed nationalities we read:

The Iraqi regime had been shaken by the impact of the Iranian revolution among the most disfavoured layers of the population, who are Shi'ites, while the Ba'athist clique in power is Sunni. In addition, in Iraq there is an old conflict between the Shi'ite hierarchy and the regime. Besides that, the latter has made a readjustment on the diplomatic level and is making advances towards the Gulf States. The use of maneuvers by Iraq against the Iranian revolution, as well as the aid given to partisans of the old regime is based in this crisis of the Ba'athist regime which is racked by internal tensions.

However, the political conclusion of this fact is not drawn with regard to the perspective of the Iranian revolution, nor has it been drawn on the question of the revolution in Kurdistan.

Material defense and political preparation

Instead of a confrontation between the mass movement and the government, a full-fledged war by the Iraqi regime, with the aid of imperialism, has begun against the Iranian revolution. Its stated aim is to overthrow the government of the Islamic Republic, despite the projections of the draft resolution. This reality points to a new stage in the confrontation between world imperialism and the Iranian revolution. What is the task of the proletariat in this war? Despite the general line of the resolution, the tasks section of the document indicates a correct general line: "All sections of the Fourth International must continue the campaign of support to the Iranian revolution focusing on the slogan: 'imperialist hands off the Iranian revolution.' "

The proletariat is not indifferent to the imperialist-backed Iraqi military attack on the Iranian revolution. The proletariat aims for the defeat of the Iraqi offensive and the victory of Iran in this war. The world proletariat will struggle against the efforts of imperialism to overthrow the Islamic Republic government, which is a government chosen by the workers and toilers of Iran.

The tasks of the revolutionary Iranian proletariat under such decisive conditions of class struggle must be completely clear and concrete. The question of war poses the military policy of the proletariat. In this context, the draft resolution presents the following general ideas:

Faced with a reactionary coup d'état or imperialist military intervention, revolutionary Marxists in Iran will participate in the struggles of the workers, peasants and oppressed masses, for the defense — *through their own means of action and organization* — of the present regime. It is not a question of political support, but of military defense. In a situation where the proletariat and its allies are not capable of replacing the present regime with a superior

form of government — a workers and peasants government — this military defense is necessary.

In this war, the Iranian people consider the Islamic Republic government on the same side of the war as they are, and as long as the working class is not ready to take on command of the war, it will defend the revolution under the military command of this government. It is in this context that the working class, the social force capable of guaranteeing a victory in the war and the revolution, will struggle for the establishment of a workers and peasants government, through maintaining its political and organizational independence, and through counterposing a proletarian program to the insufficient and divisive policies of the capitalist government. It will also struggle for military and political mobilization of the masses. It is on this basis that the unity of the class can be assured and the proletariat can attain the leadership of the toilers and the oppressed on the basis of a revolutionary democratic program.

While the proletariat defends the Islamic Republic government against imperialism materially and unconditionally, it must make use of every real opportunity to pose concrete demands aiming towards overthrowing imperialism, establishing a workers and peasants government, and the final destruction of capitalism. For example, the proletariat, confronted with conspiracies by the army commanders, must call for control of the army by councils of Pasdars and soldiers. This is especially important if we consider the anti-coup role of the Sepah Pasdaran during the experience of the aborted coup of June 1980. In such a situation, the popular and immediate demand for the control of the army command by the Sepah Pasdaran can be raised in the above-mentioned context. At the same time, the grass-root mass organizations for action, coming out of the heart of society, such as neighbourhood councils and the Baseej-e Mostazafin, pose real possibilities to arm the masses against imperialism and its allies. Such a course will undermine the government's hold on these organizations; it points in the direction of a workers and peasants government.

The resolution, because it does not emanate from and is indifferent to the rich reality of the revolution, cannot propose clear and concrete tasks of the revolution, either in regard to material defense of the government which is under attack by imperialism, or towards an effective political preparation by the proletariat to take power. In this sense, the tasks proposed in the document are not in agreement with its general line, and even though the tasks section presents a correct framework, it is not concrete and — considering the incorrect analysis — it leaves room for a sectarian interpretation.

This reality stands out concretely in the case of the revolution in Kurdistan, which is taking place in the midst of the Third Iranian Revolution.

The document correctly states the following in defense of the right of self-determination of the Kurdish people:

Any refusal, when faced with the "external threat," to defend the right of self-determination will end up in fact in dividing the ranks of the exploited and oppressed faced with the external enemy, in facilitating the repression being unleashed by the Khomeini regime, in increasing the field of action for the bourgeois nationalist currents (in both Kurdistan and Azarbaijan) and in creating the conditions favouring the maneuvers of the plotters and their Iraqi allies.

However, the document remains silent on the right of self-determination of the entire Iranian people oppressed and threatened by the danger of imperialism (or the Iraqi "external enemy"), which is also intervening militarily in Kurdistan. As a result, the tasks of the proletariat in Kurdistan are not concretized. Whereas the tasks of the proletariat in defense of the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination are clear, the task of the proletariat

concerning the military intervention by Iraq in Kurdistan remains unclear.

The document does refer to the "need for unity in action against imperialism, Iraqi pressure and the plotters," but the need for the Kurdish nationality to unite in action through its own organizations that support the Iranian revolution, along with the rest of the Iranian people and the military forces of the central government, against the danger of imperialism and the military attacks of Iraq is not even mentioned. As a result, first of all, it is not clear whether or not the resolution calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of military forces of the Islamic Republic government from Kurdistan under the conditions of war between Iran and Iraq. Secondly, does the right of self-determination of the Kurdish nationality have priority over the right of self-determination of the entire Iranian people, and are these two in contradiction? Thirdly, could and must we call for the creation of a military anti-imperialist united front in Kurdistan in defense of the right of self-determination of the entire Iranian people on the basis of defending the right of self-determination of the Kurdish oppressed nationality?

The resolution has no answer to these crucial questions. In the context of the lack of clarity on the tasks of the proletariat and the failure to understand the importance of the central danger of the imperialist counterrevolution, room is left for a defeatist position concerning the Iraqi war against Iran in Kurdistan.

The Third Iranian Revolution and the Fourth International

In Iran, the Fourth International is facing some of the most favorable conditions of class struggle on a world scale for building a mass Leninist party. The workers and toilers of Iran are in the front lines of the struggle against world imperialism and, despite the crisis of leadership, they have been able to improve their standing vis-a-vis imperialism and capitalism. The Iranian revolution has penetrated beyond national borders and has had an impact on the toilers of the Middle East, and it has opened the possibility for a socialist revolution in this important area of the world. A correct understanding of the Iranian revolution, and deriving the immediate tasks of the proletariat from it, are central for the Fourth International and its section in Iran.

The resolution does not have a correct understanding of the dynamic of the Iranian revolution. It ignores the contradiction between the revolution and imperialism, and the reality of the centrality of the danger of imperialist counterrevolution, which is the basic national and international context in which the development of the Iranian revolution takes place. As a result, the

conflict between the workers and toilers and the capitalist government is posed abstractly and outside this framework, and the class struggle in Iran is abstracted from its international context. The political line and the perspective offered in the document, therefore, are not based on reality and do not help advance the struggle of the proletariat to champion the struggles of its allies leading towards establishing a workers and peasants government. This also includes the document's ignorance of important movements in defense of the revolution and reconstruction of the country. The resolution, therefore neglects concrete possibilities and tasks of the proletariat in attracting its natural allies. Therefore, the document remains incomplete, eclectic, and the tasks mentioned are not the logical conclusion of the analysis and the general line, and remain abstract and general. As a result, the resolution, despite the good intention of Comrades Duret and Rovere, is unsuccessful in its attempt to help solve the political crisis of our movements in Iran or to aid the Fourth International in understanding the Iranian Revolution.

The full-fledged war of the Iraqi regime against the Iranian revolution, while it has already shown the inadequacy of the general line and the immediate perspective of the resolution, necessitates concretizing further the immediate tasks of the proletariat. The document "Theses on the Iranian Revolution," which was adopted prior to the war by the Faction For Trotskyist Unification and the Marxist Faction,¹ presents a counterline which has stood the test of class struggle and the war. (See page 641, *Intercontinental Press*, Vol 19.) The "Theses on the Iranian Revolution" is a document prepared by Iranian revolutionary socialists on the basis of experiences gained in the midst of the revolution and a process of collective discussion and thinking. It can solve the political crisis of the Iranian section and help toward understanding the revolution on an international scale. The present critique of the United Secretariat draft resolution will only be complete through a careful study of the "Theses on the Iranian Revolution." The key to the victory of the proletariat in the very favorable conditions of the Third Iranian Revolution rests with solving the crisis of proletarian leadership, that is the building of a mass Leninist party. "Theses on the Iranian Revolution" shows the way to Iranian revolutionaries in carrying out this vital duty to build the Iranian section of the Fourth International.

November 18, 1980

1. These two groups of Iranian Trotskyists, together with the Trotskyist Faction of the HKS, formed the Workers Unity Party (HVK) in January 1981.

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

Volume XVIII, Number 1, April 1982 (\$2.50)

- The Deepening Proletarian Turn in World Politics: Part I, Resolution adopted by the 1981 National Convention of the Socialist Workers Party, United States
- New Steps Toward Resolving the World Crisis of Working-Class Leadership, by Steve Clark, SWP, United States
- Greetings to the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) of France, by Cindy Jaquith, SWP, United States
- Some Thoughts on Some 'Greetings,' by the Political Bureau, Revolutionary Communist League, France
- The Nicaraguan Workers and Farmers Government and the Revolutionary Leadership of the FSLN, by Jack Barnes, SWP, United States
- Poland: An Exchange of Views — How to Aid Workers' Struggle, Letter by Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, and Ernest Mandel, and a reply by Steve Clark, George Novack, and Larry Seigle
- Criticisms on the U.S. SWP's Opinion on Cuba, by Peng Shu-tse, Revolutionary Communist Party, China

Volume XVIII, Number 2, May 1982 (\$2.50)

- A Contribution to the Debate on Castroism and the Fourth International, by Jerome and Matti, Revolutionary Communist League, France
- Debate on the Origins of the Indochinese Crisis, by Pierre Rousset, Revolutionary Communist League, France
- A Reply to Steve Clark, by Segur, Clelia, Revolutionary Communist League, France; and Frej, Socialist Party, Sweden
- HVK Thesis on the Iranian Revolution, Theses adopted by the 1981 convention of the Workers Unity Party, Iran
- War and the New Stage of the Iranian Revolution, Resolution adopted by the 1981 convention of the Workers Unity Party, Iran
- On the Present Political Situation in Iran, Statement by the Socialist Workers Party, Iran
- The July 1979 Revolution of Nicaragua — Its Class Nature, the Specificities and the Major Problems, by Chan, Revolutionary Communist League, Japan; and Jaber, Revolutionary Community Group, Lebanon

Volume XVIII, Number 3, June 1982 (\$2.50)

- Call for the Twelfth World Congress, Sixth Since Reunification, of the Fourth International
- Celebrating the October Revolution
- On the Fourth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution, by V.I. Lenin
- How Lenin Saw the Russian Revolution, by Doug Jenness, Socialist Workers Party, United States
- The Debate Over the Character and Goals of the Russian Revolution, by Ernest Mandel, Revolutionary Workers League, Belgium
- Our Political Continuity with Bolshevism, by Doug Jenness, SWP, United States

Volume XVIII, Number 4, June 1982 (\$2.50)

- Workers States and Stalinism After the Second World War, by Y. Sakai, Revolutionary Communist League, Japan
- How Sectarians Misrepresented Trotskyism in Cuba, by José G. Pérez, Socialist Workers Party, United States
- For an Independent, Federal and Socialist Afghanistan, Resolution adopted by the May 1981 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International
- Against the Attacks of the Reactionary Forces and the Imperialist Maneuvers, Fight for an Afghan Workers State! Resolution rejected by the May 1981 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International
- The Vietnamese Communist Party and the Leaderships of the Colonial Revolution: Old Debates and New Ones, by Roman, Revolutionary Communist League, France
- The Basis and Contradictions of Cuba's International Policy, by Claudio, Revolutionary Communist League, Italy

Volume XVIII, Number 5, June 1982 (\$3.25)

For a Workers and Farmers Government in the United States, by Jack Barnes, SWP, United States

Appendix I: Introductory Note to 'Workers and Farmers Governments Since the Second World War,' by Joseph Hansen

Appendix II: Letter from Joseph Hansen to Robert Chester (1975)

Appendix III: An Exchange of Letters Between Joseph Hansen and Robert Chester (1969-70)

Appendix IV: On the Character of the Algerian Government, 1964 statement by United Secretariat

Appendix V: From Blanqui to Moncada, by Joseph Hansen

Appendix VI: Resolution on Workers and Peasants Government, Adopted at the June 1923 ECCI Plenum

Appendix VII: Zinoviev's Report at the June 1923 ECCI Plenum

Appendix VIII: The Social Transformation in Eastern Europe, China and Cuba, by Joseph Hansen

Appendix IX: From 'Two Proposals' by George Breitman

Appendix X: A Proposed Change in Transitional Slogans, 1967 motion by SWP Political Committee

Volume XVIII, Number 6, September 1982 (\$2.50)

Effective Solidarity with Polish Workers and the Struggle Against Imperialism, by Ernest Mandel, Revolutionary Workers League, Belgium

Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, Resolution adopted by the May 1982 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International

Report to the May 1982 IEC on the Building of the Fourth International and the Crisis of International Revolutionary Leadership, Presented for the Bureau of the United Secretariat by Comrade Segur, Revolutionary Communist League, France

Building Revolutionary Youth Organisations in the Imperialist Countries, Resolution adopted by the May 1982 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International

How to Order

Send U.S. dollars to cover the cost of the bulletin(s) you are ordering. To establish an account for future bulletins, please send US\$30 deposit. Make checks or money orders payable to SWP, 14 Charles Lane, New York, New York 10014.

Name _____ Address _____

City _____ Country _____

Please send me the bulletins indicated below.

Bulletin	Quantity	Price
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Enclosed is US\$30 for an individual standing order for future *International Internal Discussion Bulletins*. Please send me one copy of each bulletin as it is published, and notify me when I have used up my deposit.

1979 World Congress of the Fourth International: Major Resolutions and Reports

Intercontinental Press published a special 200-page bound supplement containing documents and reports from the 1979 World Congress of the Fourth International.

The contents of this volume are:

Introduction

By Mary-Alice Waters

World Political Resolution and Reports

The World Political Situation and the
Tasks of the Fourth International

Report on the World Political Situation

By Ernest Mandel

World Congress Statement on Iran

The Turn to Industry and the Tasks of
the Fourth International

By Jack Barnes

Resolution on Latin America

Resolution on Women's Liberation

Resolution on Europe

Report on Youth

Appeal for Solidarity with Nicaragua

By Youth Organizations of the Fourth International

Building Revolutionary Youth Organizations

By Margaret Jayko

Resolutions on Nicaragua

Revolution on the March

Thesis on the Nicaraguan Revolution

Counterline Amendments to 'Revolution on the March'

Statement on Nicaragua

Resolutions on Indochina

The Sino-Indochinese Crisis


New Advances in the Indochinese Revolution
and Imperialism's Response

Resolution on Indochina

Resolutions on Socialism and Democracy

Socialist Democracy and Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Socialism and Democracy



How to order your copy

Send US\$4.95 per copy. For airmail outside the United States, add an additional \$US1.00 for postage. Make checks or money orders payable to Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, 10014

YES! Send me _____ copy (ies) of the special supplement.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Postal Code _____

Country _____