

Alex D.

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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON LATIN AMERICA

I

Economic Tendencies

and Increased Imperialist Exploitation

(1) Above and beyond the national and regional peculiarities and conjunctural ups and downs, the economic tendencies operating at present in Latin America remain pretty much the same as in the past, the most negative features tending generally to become worse. The situation can be summarized as follows: In no country has there been an economic expansion which would meet the needs of real development and counterbalance the rate of population increase. Industrialization, even when it extends into new sectors, remains limited and partial. Investment is inadequate and in no case offers a basis for more balanced development and absorption of the unemployed and underemployed. The national debt is still a source of financial crises and budgetary difficulties. The draining off of profits from the Latin American economy (by American, but also, in part, European and Japanese imperialism) is continuing and increasing, as is the general unfavorable evolution in terms of trade. Agricultural production is deteriorating and proving in any case more and more inadequate with respect to the needs of consumption, which is growing, if only as a result of the increased population. The weight in the economy of low-profit or unprofitable sectors, far from decreasing, has risen still more. In most of these countries inflation remains a chronic or very frequent phenomenon.

(2) A relatively new tendency which has increased in recent years is a movement of foreign investment into modern, dynamic industrial sectors not directly linked to the processing of raw materials. This has resulted in two things. First of all, it has created economic sectors exclusively controlled from the start by imperialist corporations in lines traditionally reserved to the so-called national bourgeoisie. Secondly, it has produced a grave and imminent threat to national industries which though relatively developed cannot meet the competition of a much more dynamic technology and far more efficient organizational and managerial techniques, and which moreover need capital not available locally. This means that while continuing to bear the crushing burden of all the traditional forms of economic domination and exploitation, Latin America now finds even its most modern sectors facing the same sort of threat the European countries face (absorption, elimination owing to American competition, etc.). The consequence can only be new economic distortions and greater imperialist exploitation. This means that an economic develop-

ment in any way capable of solving this continent's tragic social problems is totally ruled out. This is all the more true because the Latin American bourgeoisies have proved incapable of carrying out even very modest attempts to develop regional "common markets," and at a time when it is becoming more and more clear that the dimensions of the present national states are too narrow to permit a real take off for modern industry.

II

Dynamics and Role of the Social Classes

(3) The economic and social processes, more especially in the past fifteen years, have culminated in important changes in the relative composition of the ruling classes. The most striking element has been the decline in the economic and political weight of the traditional layers of the big landlords, especially those less directly linked with the commercial and financial bourgeois layers. The more specifically urban ruling strata, linked to the new industrial sectors, to big business and to financial capital, have increasingly played the fundamental role, seeking to translate this economic and social reality into new formulas of political rule (for example, the Frei experiment in Chile, to a lesser extent that of Belaúnde in Peru).

However, the relative reinforcement of the industrial bourgeoisie in nowise means that a vigorous social class has developed able to play an effective leading role and to act independently. The economic consolidation of this class, its existence, is tightly bound up with the operations and interests of Yankee imperialism; or, in far fewer cases, to European imperialism. In the best of cases, it is more precisely joint ventures of foreign and native capital that is involved in which the native capitalists most often play a completely subordinate role and have no possibility of acting on their own. Thus, it would be absolutely incorrect to project the perspective of an increased role for the national bourgeoisie as a historical class capable of any kind of consistent struggle to free itself from imperialist tutelage (the bankruptcy of the Belaúnde experiment is significant in this regard, since Peru is one of the countries where there has unquestionably been a certain amount of industrial development).

(4) As a result of the well known phenomena of the last fifteen to twenty years, and especially with the growing urbanization, the new petty bourgeois strata -- white collar workers in various

government bureaus, trade, and the services, the liberal professions, etc. -- have gained strength. These are the strata where the ideological influence of imperialism is the strongest (relative success of propaganda for the model of the consumer society, for the American Way of Life, etc.), where it is most difficult to mobilize against imperialism, and where the government parties recruit their electoral clientele (for example, part of Frei's support in Chile, of Leoni's in Venezuela, of the old coalition parties in Peru). However, the position of these strata is quite precarious, either because they live off risky enterprises or get their incomes (at least in part) more from assorted expedients skirting the law than from the "normal" functioning of the economic machine. They are at the mercy of this or that clique or group in power, being the first in any case to pay the price for recessions, attacks of inflation, and changes in the ruling cliques. They have no perspective for any real security or substantial social advancement for their children (who swell the ranks of the students engaging in "confrontations"). This new petty bourgeoisie, then, can temporarily aid the political operations of the ruling classes and imperialism; but, in the last analysis, it is no social cement for the system; and, in critical situations, it can be swept by sudden flames of revolt.

(5) The peasantry represents a decreasing percentage of the total population and its specific economic weight is declining more markedly and more rapidly than its quantitative weight. Nevertheless, in absolute terms it still constitutes the majority and often the overwhelming majority of the population. It is still the social class which suffers the worst exploitation and oppression and which, in the existing economic and social context, has the least perspective.

The causes of the peasants' discontent and anger are manifold -- the traditional land hunger, the choking off of subsistence agriculture, conflict with the state administration which extorts taxes and appears most often as an instrument of repression in the service of the exploiters, disillusionment arising from the fraudulent nature of the official "agrarian reforms," fear of a comeback by the landlords in the countries where they have had to renounce certain privileges, difficulties arising from price and market problems especially for small independent farmers, unfavorable repercussions from prices on the world market, etc. But the outcome is always the same. Far from improving, the lot of the peasants remains tragic and is even getting worse. Hence the persistent impetus to struggle and revolt. This is all the more true because the peasants are less and less isolated from the international political and ideo-

logical currents; have assimilated the lesson of the Cuban revolution, whose fortunes they continually follow; have learned a great deal from the guerrilla experience and are not cut off from the student revolutionary movements, whose influence reaches them through a thousand different channels.

(6) The working class has not undergone any quantitative growth, despite the development of industrial production in certain countries. This is due to the fact that certain industrial advances have gone hand in hand with a crisis in the traditional sectors and have been based on technological innovations and rationalizations which involve a contraction rather than an expansion in manpower employed. Aside from completely exceptional cases, the tendency is by no means for the standard of living to rise but rather to stagnate and most often decline (in some cases, for example, Uruguay, to a dramatic degree). For both objective reasons (unemployment, underemployment, etc.) and subjective reasons (their subordination to the government, their bureaucratization, the control of pro-Soviet Communist parties, etc.), the trade union organizations are increasingly incapable of meeting this situation, even of exercising effective pressure within the framework of the system. Most often it is primarily the mechanism of inflation that depresses the workers' standard of living, cancelling out the wage gains that are occasionally made. Furthermore, from the social standpoint, the workers are usually the ones who often suffer the effects of the rural exodus, inasmuch as their very modest wages must provide the subsistence for groups of relatives and friends swollen by newcomers from the countryside (in exceptional cases, as for example in Bolivia during the crisis in the mines, the inverse phenomenon develops, namely, a partial return of workers to their villages of origin). Finally, the proletarian populace has not experienced any improvement in housing, living conditions, medical care, transportation, etc., or the possibility to assure a normal education for their children.

For all these reasons, the working class is absolutely not, and has no consciousness of being, even a relatively privileged layer -- as superficial theoreticians claim. Exploited and oppressed in manifold forms by the capitalist and imperialist system, they have not ceased in reality to be an explosive force, a motor force of the revolution. Powerful strikes in defiance of military dictatorships (for example, in Brazil), mobilizations accompanied by clashes with the repressive forces (Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, etc.), linkups between nuclei of workers and the student movement (Mexico, Brazil) constitute, moreover, significant symptoms of a

proletarian resurgence at the present time. If the broadest layers of the working class are still immobilized or neutralized and if the workers have not been able to play a substantial role in the revolutionary actions of recent years in certain countries, this is by no means a result of any degeneration or intrinsic weakness of the proletariat as a revolutionary force. It is the result of well defined concrete factors, such as the momentary prostration resulting from severe defeats and repression; the pernicious role of the trade union bureaucracies which are more and more integrated into the government structure, especially in certain important countries, the no less negative role of opportunist political leaderships enjoying prestige sometimes rubbed off from an international Communist tradition, the weight of unemployment which has continued to increase in recent years, and the danger of reprisals in the event of struggles or strikes -- which is a danger the workers are ready to face only if they see a real perspective for political change.

(7) As a result of the persistence, or even accentuation of the rural exodus, the concentrations of plebian masses on the periphery of the big cities are still growing. These masses can find no real openings in the basic economic structure and remain condemned to a poverty stricken and precarious existence (sometimes a meager wage must suffice for a whole group, sometimes they live literally from hand to mouth, most often they apply their "initiative" in the most diverse ways, from peddling and occasional services to theft and prostitution). The assignment of a part of this disinherited population to the service sector is an outright statistical obfuscation. Far from being a symptom of progress and modernization, the expansion of the "services" is only an additional expression of the economic and social decay, involving the extension of nonproductive activities and of strata with the most precarious and pathetic kind of income. For this reason the masses grouped around the big cities still represent an explosive potential which could be fully tapped in critical situations by the revolutionary forces. This potential, moreover, has already partially expressed itself several times in the course of the last ten years and in abrupt and violent mobilizations (for example, in Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago de Chile). More particularly, because of its essentially peasant origin and proletarian composition, this plebian element offers precious opportunities for concrete linkups between the working class and the peasantry and for the circulation of revolutionary ideas.

(8) The revolutionary student movement shook several Latin American countries simultaneously with the student upsurge sweeping Western Europe and the United States. Common objective causes

and subjective factors are unquestionably at the root of this upsurge which fits into the more general framework of the international revolt of the young generation. The common feature uniting all these struggles is the irresistible impulse generated by the ever deeper and more dramatic crisis shaking imperialism as a world system (which is concretized most specifically in Latin America in the influence of the Cuban revolution). It would be an error, however, to make too close an identification or analogy, forgetting in particular that:

(a) Students in the colonial and semicolonial countries have traditionally played a progressive and even revolutionary role since the beginning of the anti-imperialist struggles and they also played this role in powerful mobilizations for university reform in the twenties.

(b) The phenomenon of the population explosion in the universities and schools which is at the base of the crisis in the European countries has not assumed the same proportions. In certain cases, the university population has even diminished.

This does not imply any underestimation of the revolutionary role the student strata can play on a continental scale in Latin America. In any case the role of the students will be much more substantial than in the past and must no longer be conceived as simply a supporting force or source of cadres for the revolutionary organizations. The student movement must be understood as a political and social force capable of stimulating or deepening revolutionary crises by its intervention. This is true for the following reasons:

(a) The dynamics of the student mass movement is assuming an entirely different character than in the past because it no longer expresses the demands of strata of the national bourgeoisie for independence and autonomy. The student movement, whatever its point of departure, is becoming a consistently anti-imperialist and anticapitalist movement (reflecting, among other things, a change in the social composition of the student population with the access to education of broad petty bourgeois and even popular strata).

(b) The international and continental context has radically altered, opening new perspectives with regard to the radicalization and mobilization of petty bourgeois forces.

(c) The cadres and activists of the student movement have not suffered all the demoralization from the bad experiences of the old organizations and their leaderships and are not tied by any umbilical cord to the traditions of the workers

movement or the traditional national-revolutionary movement.

III

Political Situation and Perspectives

(9) The essential features of the political development can be summed up schematically as follows:

(a) Bankruptcy or profound crisis of the regimes which were presented as pilot models of the "democratic reformism" boosted with the propaganda send-off of the so-called Alliance for Progress (the fall of the Belaúnde regime in Peru following the bankruptcy of the most "progressive" wing of the national bourgeoisie, impasse of the Frei regime in Chile, deep erosion of the Venezuelan regime, which is incapable even of performing its repressive functions effectively).

(b) The collapse of the political equilibrium in those countries which for both historical and conjunctural reasons have known rather long periods of relative stability, and which represent exceptions with regard to the conditions prevailing on the continent as a whole (Uruguay and Mexico).

(c) A universal tendency toward the establishment of open or hypocritically camouflaged military regimes.

(d) A crisis of the military regimes themselves which are proving incapable of offering any solutions of the least durability to the crucial problems and as a result can maintain themselves only by the harshest repression (Bolivia, Brazil, etc.).

These conditions and tendencies as a whole, which in the last analysis reflect the economic and social tendencies mentioned above, create not only a continentwide structural instability but more precisely a prerevolutionary situation which is taking the form of both a more or less rapid ripening of profound social and political explosions (Brazil, Mexico, Chile), the outbreak of real revolutionary crises (Uruguay), and the emergence of a state of civil war in certain countries (Guatemala and partially Bolivia). The year 1968, in particular, was marked by a new revolutionary upsurge expressed in the mass mobilizations in Mexico and Brazil, the July-August crisis in Uruguay, the breakup of the regime and renewal of struggle in Bolivia a few months after the grave defeat of the guerrilla group led by Che, and the first symptoms of a revival of working class nuclei in countries which have undergone years of stagnation (for example, Argentina).

(10) In view also of the international context (involving primarily the

Cuban revolution's continuing to play its historic role*), the general perspective must be one of increasing and mounting social and political tensions tending toward the outbreak of revolutionary situations.

In the economic sphere, a major improvement and hence a reversal of the trend would only be possible, for example, under the following conditions: a substantial rise in agricultural production, industrial development capable of absorbing large masses of the unemployed or underemployed population; the creation of new jobs for the youths leaving the universities and schools generally; a favorable trend in the prices of certain products on the world market; the defense and expansion of outlets compromised or threatened, among other things, by the Common Market and the arrangements between the Common Market and certain African countries; and the development, if only very incompletely, of Latin American common markets. These are clearly unrealizable conditions in the present context, and thus the situation is hopeless for any economic solution, with all the inevitable implications this entails in the political field. In this context, then, the ruling classes will have no chance of forming coalitions or blocs on any even relatively stable base. In particular, this is so because none of the strata of these classes -- including the "new" national bourgeoisie -- can get any real popular support either in the cities or in the countryside; because, as difficulties mount, internecine struggles within these classes will inevitably multiply; and because American imperialism's margin for maneuver -- most of all in the economic sphere but also in the political -- is tending to shrink constantly.

This does not exclude possible oscillations in the most disparate leaderships, including new ephemeral pseudo-reformist attempts, political gambles, and even variants within the framework of military regimes (groups of officers are continually playing at "Nasserism" in

* It is not the purpose of this document to analyze the inner development of the Cuban revolution. However, it is obvious that the survival of the Cuban revolution and its maintaining its present role are dependent in the long run on an extension of the revolution in Latin America. The threat of imperialist military action against Cuba still exists and the crushing of the revolutionary regime would have very grave repercussions throughout Latin America. The danger of bureaucratization is not excluded. Objective factors favor such a development despite the conscious antibureaucratic campaign by a leadership which over a decade has given many proofs of its capacity.

several countries and the immediate import of military coups is not always the same in every given situation). But this will change nothing in the general, deep seated tendency: in a situation of chronic crisis and prerevolutionary tensions, the ruling classes will inevitably be impelled to adopt brutal repressive measures and utilize despotic and terrorist political regimes. Since these classes often are not very solid as social forces and cannot realistically contemplate solving their problems with popularly based reactionary regimes on the fascist model, military regimes remain by far the most likely recourse.

This is all the more so because the military strives to constitute a relatively coherent force united by common caste interests and characterized by a discipline absent from other social formations, thus able to function effectively as an instrument of leadership and political organization and even to outline an ideology of its own (which does not exclude the existence of perceptibly different currents among the military, reflecting in the last analysis different places in the hierarchy and different shares in the booty).

To the extent that the native conservative forces reveal their inherent impotence more directly and prove incapable of preventing the collapse of the system, American imperialism will finally be compelled to intervene militarily, either in direct form or in the guise of one of its "national" allies.

Thus not only in a historical sense but in a more direct and immediate one,* Latin America has entered a period of revolutionary explosions and conflicts, of armed struggle on different levels against the native ruling classes and imperialism, and of prolonged civil war on a continental scale.

IV

Criteria and Lines of a Revolutionary Strategy

(11) The fundamental dynamics of the Latin American revolution is the dynamics of permanent revolution, in the sense that the revolution is developing into a socialist revolution without intermediary stages or dividing lines. This does not mean that the revolution could not begin as a democratic anti-imperialist revolution in regard to its objectives and the consciousness of the masses participating in it. But such a possibility does not affect the inherent logic of the process with all its inevitable implications for the lineup and role of the social classes. Because a workers state already exists in Latin America, in an eminently revolutionary world context; because the broadest masses are

constantly impelled by powerful objective factors to struggle against the capitalist system as such and have made great advances in their social and political consciousness; and because the imperialists, after the Cuban experience, have clearly recognized the dynamics of the confrontation that is developing, the perspective of the permanent revolution is no longer only a historical tendency but a reality in this stage of the class struggle. The age of permanent revolution, in a direct and immediate sense, has already begun in Latin America. The fact that this conclusion is shared by the leadership of the first Latin American socialist revolution is a historic step forward. This leadership by its attitudes, its actions and generalizations has contributed in a decisive way to the maturing of a new vanguard.

(12) The first conclusion that follows from this analysis is that any perspective of collaborating with the "national" bourgeoisie or certain of its so-called progressive sectors must be rejected. Parallel to this, all equivocal conceptions or formulas on the nature of the revolution such as "national democracy," "people's democracy," or "anti-imperialist and antifeudal" revolution, which have been irretrievably refuted both positively and negatively by vital revolutionary experiences, must be rejected. In this area, too, what was true in general in the past is assuming a more concrete and immediate importance when, faced with the Cuban workers state, the bourgeoisie cannot help but align itself on the side of imperialism (leaving aside possible temporary diplomatic maneuvers) and is proving itself absolutely incapable of achieving a program of even the most modest democratic reforms. New or relatively new tendencies in industrial development (see points 2 and 3) do not justify any change in the basic evaluation. The national bourgeois strata linked to modern industry arise or develop by intertwining themselves completely within the imperialist structures and in strictest dependence on them. They are intrinsically incapable of the least independent action in either the economic or political fields.

(13) In a revolution proceeding according to the logic of the permanent revolution and in a worldwide and Latin American context, which necessarily forces a split between the fundamental classes from the outset, the leading role in achieving revolutionary democratic objectives belongs to the working class, which, by its place in the process of production, is the basic force antagonistic not only to imperialism but to native capital. This does not imply any underestimation of the role of the peasantry, especially of the poorest peasant strata and radicalized

petty bourgeois layers. In fact, in most of the countries the most probable variant is that for a rather long period the peasants will have to bear the main weight of the struggle and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie in considerable measure will provide the cadres of the movement. This means that the leading role of the proletariat can be exercised under diverse forms: either by the wage workers (industrial workers, miners or agricultural workers) participating at the head of revolutionary struggles, which will doubtless be the case in only a minority of Latin American countries; or indirectly, the leadership of these struggles being in the hands of organizations, tendencies, or cadres issuing from the workers movement; or in the historic sense of the term, by means of the program and theories issuing from Marxism. The completion of the revolution into a socialist revolution is in any case inconceivable without the mobilization and very broad participation of the proletariat.

(14) The problem now posed in Latin America is not primarily that of determining which are the driving forces of the revolution, a problem which for revolutionary Marxists has been resolved at the theoretical level. The working class, still representing a small percentage of the population in most of these countries, obviously cannot play its role without the fundamental and irreplaceable support of the peasant revolt. The events of 1968, moreover, have further clarified the role which radicalized petty bourgeois strata and the masses of student youth can play (among other things, they can serve as a medium for concrete interaction between the cities and the countryside, between the urban vanguard and the vanguard forming in the villages). Gigantic forces composed of millions of men and women in fact exist and can be mobilized in revolutionary struggle now or in the next stage. The real problem is to determine and to apply a strategy based on premises of general scope while being at the same time adjusted to specific and conjunctural needs, which could take advantage of all the existing potential, coordinate the different sectors, and strike the adversary effectively without running the danger of the movement being crushed. In the immediate future, the revolutionary vanguard must be aware of the grave danger inherent in the present situation, characterized, particularly in several countries, by a crying contradiction between the objective potential and the subjective will to struggle of broad strata on the one hand and on the other by the persistent weakness of the organized vanguard, even sectors which have played an effective role in major episodes of the most recent years. The danger lies more precisely in the possibility either of spontaneous explosions without a leadership and without clear perspectives, or premature and adventurist moves by

nuclei of courageous militants. In both cases, the result would be a quick and murderous repression which would decimate the vanguard and throw the movement back.

(15) The rich experiences in guerrilla warfare -- with its successes, its vital role in upsetting the political equilibrium, and even its grave defeats -- as well as the experiences with great mass movements, especially in 1968, which have revalidated urban struggles, against the generalizations of superficial theoreticians, but which have at the same time confirmed their limitations and their blind alleys, make it possible now to delineate more clearly an overall strategy, avoiding the sterile antithesis between conceptions based on the absolute primacy of mass work, which consider guerrilla warfare to be only a completely secondary point of support, and simplistic conceptions, according to which guerrilla warfare alone can unfailingly unleash a revolutionary process and assure its victorious development.

There is no universally valid formula which can be applied to surmount difficulties and contradictions which have real objective roots; even the adoption of correct basic guidelines offers no automatic guarantee against making mistakes in applying them. In other words, no generalization is sufficient to resolve the problems facing the revolutionary movement unless it is constantly tested and enriched by concrete analyses. The failure of certain guerrilla experiments (in Peru, for example) came about, in large measure, more from errors in assessing the situation, the trends, and the relationship of forces among the masses than from errors in conception.

In Latin America, the polemic between the advocates of the "democratic" and "peaceful" road and the advocates of the revolutionary road has been entirely outmoded; the first hypothesis does not have the least objective justification and can be defended only by naive and unrepentant utopians or by ossified bureaucrats who have lost all revolutionary perspective and inspiration and whose sole concern is to cover up their conservative, routinist practices with theoretical obfuscation. The problem which is posed is that of the concrete forms of the revolutionary road; it is necessary to guard against simplistic schemas on the one hand, but on the other, no concession whatever must be made to ideas according to which the armed confrontation, conceived as the culmination of a progressive rise and broadening of the mass movement, can in principle be reduced to a minimum.

The fundamental perspective, the only realistic perspective for Latin America is that of an armed struggle which may last for long years. This is why the tech-

nical preparation cannot be conceived merely as one of the aspects of the revolutionary work, but as the fundamental aspect on a continental scale, and one of the fundamental aspects in countries where the minimum conditions have not yet been met. It must not be forgotten that the armed struggle itself cannot succeed, in the last analysis, except on the basis of a correct political line, and that the application of such a revolutionary strategy requires first assembling a minimum of organized and politically homogeneous forces.

(16) The great mass mobilizations of 1968 were extraordinarily important because they expressed the depth and explosive nature of the contradictions of Latin American society and its structures; because they swept away with one blow all the "theorizing" on the inherent corruption of the urban milieu and a fortiori all the lucubrations on the incapacity of the worker masses and the urban masses in general to play a dynamic revolutionary role; because they gave a powerful stimulus to the maturing of thousands of new cadres who will be instrumental in the victory of the revolutionary struggles which are being prepared. Nonetheless, revolutionary Marxists cannot conclude from this that the "classical" variant calling for a progressive rise and broadening of the mass movement and its structuring and re-enforcement through traditional organizational forms before it reaches the armed struggle has been revalidated. In the international context, after all the experiences of the last decade and in face of an increasingly brutal repression by the native ruling classes and imperialism, such a variant is not the most probable. In reality, the adversary is in nowise ready to allow a mass revolutionary movement to organize more or less legally or normally, not only because in the given economic and social conditions a general mobilization even for economic goals would threaten disastrous consequences for the system, but also and above all because the men in power no longer underestimate the dynamics of mass movements, even when they start off with limited objectives. The experience of Bolivia, where all forms of normal organizational activity are continually stamped out, as well as the experience of Peru, where repression continues rampant, especially in the countryside, are absolutely clear. The same holds for Mexico where the ruling class, reverting to its most barbaric traditions, did not hesitate to stage a full fledged massacre of the students (the Brazilian regimes official and "semiofficial" counterattack followed the same logic).

The exceptional variant of an explosive crisis involving the breaking up or paralysis of the state apparatus and a mass mobilization so impetuous that it could prevent or neutralize recourse to repression as a decisive measure, cannot

be categorically excluded, but a strategy on a continental scale cannot be based on exceptional phenomena, and in such a case imperialism would very likely intervene militarily (as happened already in the case of Santo Domingo).

(17) Even in the case of countries where large mobilizations and class conflicts in the cities may occur first, civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle, in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare, the term having primarily a geographical-military meaning and not necessarily implying an exclusively peasant composition of the fighting detachments (or even necessarily preponderantly peasant composition). In this sense, armed struggle in Latin America means fundamentally guerrilla warfare.

The strict selection of this central axis must be complemented by a very precise understanding that there will inevitably be a whole gamut of variants and that the different factors at work will combine in different forms according to the different countries and conjunctural situations. The two extreme possibilities can be indicated almost symbolically by taking on the one hand the case of a country like Uruguay where the armed struggle will be essentially urban and where the regime could have already been overthrown on the basis of a powerful urban mass movement if it had been technically and politically armed with such a perspective, and on the other hand by taking the case of a country of overwhelmingly peasant composition, without large urban concentrations, where the guerrilla war will be almost exclusively rural and peasant until the very eve of the enemy's final defeat. A variant that merits particular study is that of very large countries where armed struggle could result in the occupation of whole regions, geographically and socially favorable to this, for a prolonged period without bringing on the disintegration of the central power. In such cases the conception of mobile columns would not necessarily be contradictory to that of liberated zones.

(18) Under the perspective of a prolonged civil war with rural guerrilla warfare as its principal axis, even in the most difficult phases of severe repression and temporary prostration, the problem of liaison between the guerrillas and the masses will be a vital one.

In a situation of prerevolutionary crisis such as Latin America is now experiencing on a continental scale, guerrilla warfare can in fact stimulate a revolutionary dynamic, even if at the start the attempt may seem to have come from abroad or to be unilateral (which was the case with Che's Bolivian guerrilla

movement). But in any case it must be realized that without the active sympathy, the protection, and the solidarity of certain sectors of the masses, the chance for consolidating and strengthening the guerrilla nuclei diminish to the extreme and the political repercussions which the armed action is striving to provoke dwindle. Secondly, a major problem which no clear-sighted revolutionary leadership can sidestep is how to utilize all the explosive social potential (which for structural reasons cannot be channeled into the framework of the actions and initiatives proper to revolutionary minorities) during the whole struggle and not just at the culminating moment of the overthrow of the system.

Hence the necessity to:

(a) Take advantage of every opportunity not only to increase the number of rural guerrilla nuclei but also to promote forms of armed struggle specially adapted to certain zones (for example, the mining zones in Bolivia) and to undertake actions in the big cities aimed both at striking the nerve centers (key points in the economy and transport, etc.) and at punishing the hangmen of the regime as well as achieving propagandistic and psychological successes (the experience of the European resistance to Nazism would be helpful in this regard).

(b) Advance a program not just of immediate economic and political demands but also transitional demands able to mobilize and raise the political consciousness of the worker, petty bourgeois, and plebeian masses as well as the student masses and thus create growing tensions threatening the system (this would also make it more difficult for the governments to concentrate their repressive forces exclusively in the zones of armed struggle). An orientation and mobilization based on a transitional program conceived in accordance with the logic of an anticapitalist struggle would, moreover, help certain revolutionary organizations to overcome the difficulties arising from the fact that while having been formed for revolutionary combat and armed struggle, these organizations have been unable for conjunctural reasons to put their ideas into practice. They thus run the risk in practice of combining abstract revolutionary propaganda with mobilizations for immediate goals which do not involve a revolutionary dynamic, even if pursued by extraparliamentary and extralegal means. The determination of the themes of a transitional program for each given stage is clearly the task of revolutionists in the various countries.

(19) Such a conception of the revolutionary strategy of armed struggle and guerrilla war refutes not only the simplistic "guerrillist" idealizations (which re-

flect a lack of patience with regard to organized action and a hope of substituting improvisations for the whole, often onerous, labor of preparation and organization), but also the spontaneist theses which challenge the role of the party (most often on the basis of an arbitrary interpretation of and generalization on the Cuban revolution). Spontaneism, substituting abstract notions for concrete historical analysis, draws the conclusion, from the absolutely necessary critique of specific parties which bear a heavy responsibility for the manifold failures and prolonged prostration of the workers movement, that parties in general must be rejected as instruments of revolutionary struggle. From their very nature, such conceptions are incapable of providing an answer to the essential problem of the liaisons between the guerrillas, the armed struggle and the mass movement and the political development of the latter. Unfortunate experiences have been, in the last analysis, brought about or facilitated either by false or illusory solutions to this problem or a mystical confidence in the automatic nature of certain processes.

While it is necessary to reject the schematic and paralyzing conception according to which everything hinges on the preliminary existence of a genuine party with all its traditional structures (and the Cuban experience has unquestionably shown that under certain conditions it is possible for the political organization to develop and reenforce itself as the armed struggle unfolds), the two following fundamental facts must, however, never be long sight of:

(a) The existence and functioning of a revolutionary party, far from being an outworn schema of outmoded Marxists, corresponds to the concrete and ineluctable needs of the development of the armed struggle itself (this, among other things, is the lesson of Hugo Blanco's experience in Peru).

(b) The revolutionists must struggle for the most favorable variant: acting in such a way that when the armed struggle begins, if there is not already a genuine party, completely structured, with a large mass influence (a very unrealistic perspective in almost all of the Latin American countries) in existence, there is at least solid nuclei of a political organization, coordinated on a national scale. This means more particularly in the countries where the armed struggle is not on the agenda at present, not to choose the road of spontaneist or putchist temptations inexorably doomed to failure, but to take advantage of the breathing space.

V

Situation of the Revolutionary Workers
Movement and the General Lines
of Orientation

(20) The Cuban revolution, the conflicts in the international Communist movement, particularly the Chinese polemics, and the experiences of the struggle in recent years have produced profound upsets, new relationships of forces, splits, and multiple realignments in the Latin American revolutionary workers movement. The overall picture can be outlined as follows:

(a) The Cuban revolution continues to represent the fundamental pole of attraction, and on the level of ideological and political influence the Castroist current remains by far the strongest. However, this tendency has not developed any important degree of organization and in fact the OLAS likewise has not succeeded either in finding a solution to the problem of crystallizing and consolidating organized new vanguards.

(b) The traditional workers organizations have been undergoing an irreversible erosion and are being ceaselessly shaken by grave crises. In certain socialist parties (Chile, Uruguay), the Castroist influence is very strong. And this is true also for most of the Communist parties, especially those which have not yet suffered left splits and are compelled to engage in centrist maneuvers in order to capitalize, if only partially, on the prestige of the Cuban revolution (e.g., the attitude of the current represented by Arismendi and certain attitudes even of the Chilean CP).

(c) The revolutionary nationalist movements which played a key role for a whole period have definitively exhausted themselves; and where they retain a measure of influence (APRA in Peru, AD in Venezuela), this goes hand in hand with an outright reactionary policy. This does not exclude the possibility that tendencies or groups issuing from these movements can survive and still play a certain role, on condition, however, that they break completely with the old organizational structures and integrate themselves into the revolutionary left on the basis primarily of defense of the Cuban revolution (this possibility exists, for example, for left Peronist nuclei, Brazilian left nationalist currents, and groups in the PRIN and even in the left MNR in Bolivia). The problem of relations of the revolutionary organizations with such groups, moreover, is an aspect of the more general problem of the relations between the revolutionary vanguards and petty bourgeois sectors capable of being drawn into the struggle against imperialism and national capitalism.

(d) The revolt of the Catholic vanguard has now assumed considerable scope (Camillo Torres has become the symbol of a continentwide current). The importance of this rests fundamentally in the fact that it is an additional expression of the way the social and political crisis is tearing the ideological fabric of the system, driving toward the revolutionary pole plebeian and petty bourgeois strata who have been tied essentially by ideological bonds.

(e) The revolutionary left is going through a feverish phase of splits and restructuration with a whole gamut of results, going from the important advances in vanguard regroupment in Brazil (especially the formation of the POC) to the still very difficult situation of the Peruvian revolutionary organizations (where the Vanguardia Revolucionaria, which was hit much less hard by repression than the FIR, the MIR, and the ELN, has gained strength relatively), from new experiments on a centrist or left centrist basis (for example, the Argentinian student organization which came out of a split from the CP) to other experiences following a much more revolutionary direction (the Chilean MIR in particular). The birth and development of revolutionary groups and organizations have been stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, the continentwide pre-revolutionary situation, the anti-imperialist struggle in Asia and more particularly Vietnam, and, recently, by the repercussions of the international wave of student revolt. The temporary difficulties, the lack of experience, the inevitable failures, and the contradictory impulses coming from the international workers movement are causing a fragmentation which reflects in part the historic divisions in the working class movement and results in new variants and combinations which in certain cases represent a new level in the reorganization of the revolutionary movement (for example, the experiences of the POC and PCR in Brazil, the Castroist and pro-Chinese movements in Santo Domingo, the united Guatemalan guerrilla front).

While the revolutionary left starts off from a common acceptance of the general conception of armed struggle, a basic division repeatedly recurs over the characterization of the Latin American revolution, with certain tendencies still questioning its outright anticapitalist character, advancing the old formulas of anti-imperialist, antifeudal, people's revolution, etc., and thus leaving open the perspective of collaboration with layers of the "national" bourgeoisie (see in this regard the theses of the orthodox pro-Chinese organizations and the formulations of Douglas Bravo, etc.). A second cleavage emerges around conceptions advanced under the opposing form of a people's war

(most often based on the Asian experiences). Finally, differences arise continually over the analysis and assessment of gains and setbacks as well as over determining the tempos and forms of actions in preparation.

In conclusion, the problems of regrouping the revolutionary forces and giving structure to the new vanguards is far from resolved despite powerful objective stimuli, enormous advances in subjective revolutionary development, and the massive irruption onto the scene of the young generation. The necessary solutions can be envisaged, in the last analysis, only on a continental scale, but without leaving aside the manifold particularities and without any consoling illusions such as the automatic nature of the processes or the possibility that audacious subjective actions are sufficient by themselves (repeated experiences have shown that even the formation of a guerrilla nucleus is not automatically a positive solution, moreover the painful ups and downs of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement prove how many difficulties arise in the course of the armed struggle).

(21) The work of revolutionary Marxists in regrouping and organizing the vanguard must bear in mind the following very general criteria:

(a) Integration into the historic revolutionary current represented by the Cuban revolution and the OLAS, which involves, regardless of the forms, working as an integral part of the OLAS.

(b) Rejection of any a priori exclusionary attitude toward any revolutionary tendency, which, while not excluding criticism and polemics, implies the possibility of common revolutionary fronts making it possible to regroup forces and to collaborate in both the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle and the struggle against the conservative and bureaucratic tendencies of the workers and peasants

movement.

(c) Elaboration of a revolutionary strategy, based on the continental experience and the general principles outlined elsewhere in this document, corresponding to the concrete needs and potential of each country or group of countries at a given stage. This also implies the need for a political program under which broad social layers can be mobilized with the aim of continually deepening the contradictions of the existing regimes at all levels; in other words, a program which, without ignoring immediate economic and political demands (the importance of which was confirmed, for example, by the events of the summer of 1968 in Mexico), would stress objectives and slogans of a transitional nature, able to mobilize the masses at their present level of consciousness in a struggle, the dynamics of which would necessarily collide with the system as a whole.

It is the job of the various national revolutionary Marxist organizations to translate this general orientation into concrete formulas and guidelines. They must, in any case, understand that they cannot measure up to the height of their tasks in the dramatic stage which is opening, if they prove incapable of building more solid organizational structures on the basis of substantial political homogeneity, of adopting methods of work corresponding to the necessities of a struggle conducted under conditions of repression and strict clandestinity, of combining detailed empirical analyses and tactical flexibility with firmness in criteria and general conceptions (the prerequisite for avoiding any impressionism and hasty generalizations), of assuring much more than in past years international and continental coordination by more genuine integration in the International, including the level of its centers of leadership and theoretical work.

November 1968

AN INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENT

By Livio Maitan

Rome, May 15, 1968

If urgent tasks had not prevented me from undertaking the job during the next weeks, I would have liked to explain in detail the reasons that led me to abstain at the time the U.S. adopted the first draft for discussion at the world congress ["The New Rise of the World Revolution"]. Unfortunately I must limit myself to the substance of it by reproducing the text of a letter which I sent to the U.S. on May 15.*

First of all some remarks of a methodological nature. We were in agreement that it was necessary to prepare some theses, whereas the draft does not have that character (except, to a large degree, the first chapter, which, moreover, is by far the most satisfactory. Even abstracting from the lapses in editing, which are very bad, on which I am not calling as much attention as appears to me to be called for, we are confronted with a descriptive document, in which conjunctural appreciations are very frequent and which from this fact give it rather the nature of a general resolution. I do not have any objection to the congress adopting such a document in addition, but we need something else now. I thus suggest reaffirming the decision to adopt theses aimed essentially at arming or rearming the movement on certain major questions which are posed at this convulsive stage of the world situation.

Within this framework, I believe it would be useful to base our generalizations not on general appreciations but on analyses of certain typical cases, or typical in representing a tendency (for example, the experience of recent years in Czechoslovakia, the Syrian experience, the guerrilla struggle in Thailand).

I will take this up in the different chapters. I will indicate my opinion on certain problems, at times by following more or less what is said in the draft.

(I) It was clear to us from the beginning what were the causes and the limits of certain defeats suffered by the colonial revolution, particularly beginning in 1964. It was not a matter of a structural evolution unfavorable to the revolutionary tendencies (nowhere in the world has there been any stabilization whatsoever of the economic and social structures of the colonial and semicolonial countries), but of the interaction of the two following fundamental factors:

(a) The crisis of the imperialist system and the maturing of the revolutionary forces on a world scale operated in such a way that the growing over into a socialist revolution became more and more a problem of the immediate future, a concrete imperious necessity. This pointed to inevitable dramatic confrontations, in which the outcome was determined essentially by the lapse in the subjective factor (which only in certain cases can be explained as owing to reasons pertaining primarily to the economic and social structure).

(b) The victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba and the disintegration of the colonial system in Africa were a major lesson for American imperialism, which adopted a line that took the offensive much more than in the preceding decade, demonstrating its determination to exploit to the fullest extent its enormous military potential and its political and economic weight. The new economic expansion in the U.S., while not the most direct cause of the imperialist counter-offensive -- as some people have held -- was unquestionably one of the essential conditions for unleashing this counter-offensive and for its partial successes.

The war in Vietnam was, from all the evidence, the culmination of this more aggressive policy of imperialism. It cannot be denied that in the first phase it permitted imperialism to score considerable gains, above all preventing the Vietnamese revolution from gaining a complete victory on a national scale, which would have been perfectly possible in the immediate future in the absence of foreign military intervention. The Indonesian affair was also, at least in part, a by-product of this same intervention.

But as the test of strength became prolonged and deepened and the Vietnamese organized their extraordinary reply, the war became a verification of the overall relation of forces. The imperialists ran into an outcome that was exactly the opposite of what they wanted; namely, they revealed for the whole world to see their incapacity to liquidate the Vietnamese revolution, despite the timorous and wait-and-see attitude of the USSR, and, in fact, China also, thereby suffering a historic setback. At the same time the limits of the receding of the colonial revolution in 1964-67 was confirmed by the clearer and clearer fact that the regimes set up by counterrevolutionary coups (particularly Brazil and Indonesia) proved absolutely incapable of achieving any economic and political stabilization that was at all

* It should be noted that in my letter the numbering of the chapters does not correspond to the numbering in the final document, which added Chapter II on France.

durable, having to once again confront the threat of considerable mass movements and active nuclei of guerrillas.

After a certain respite, the crisis of imperialism has once again become aggravated and the most probably tendency unquestionably is that of further aggravation:

(a) The unfavorable relation of forces on a world scale, revealed particularly by the last phases of the Vietnamese conflict, will continue.

(b) It has been proved once again that "reformist" solutions of the problems of the so-called underdeveloped countries are objectively impossible.

(c) The interimperialist contradictions are becoming sharper and sharper on the economic level (crisis of the monetary system, etc.).

(d) The economic power of the United States itself is running into more and more substantial limits (crisis of the dollar, etc.).

(e) Last but not least, a radical change has already developed -- and is going to develop more profoundly in the future -- with regard to the domestic situation in the United States, which for twenty years has represented an essential element of the power of imperialism.

If all of this is true, if the fundamental perspective is that of a coming aggravation of the crisis of imperialism even within the near future, then it must be emphasized that a possible solution -- through a partial compromise or through a prolonged truce -- of the Vietnamese conflict would, upon the whole, have a secondary importance (except, perhaps, in the event of a compromise very unfavorable to the Vietnamese, a hypothesis which seems to me completely unlikely). Revolutionary struggles would continue in any case on a broad scale, particularly in Asia, other explosions would occur and other conflicts would break out and there would probably be other points where things came to a head, replacing Vietnam in this regard.

(II) A whole part of this chapter, "The End of the Long Imperialist Boom," seems useless to me because it only repeats -- in a very cursory way, moreover -- what we have already said in several more rounded documents (it is from here on, moreover, where the tone and rapid comment of an article becomes predominant). I think it is necessary to center the analysis on the central points; namely, the aggravation of the interimperialist competition, the new explosion of financial and industrial concentrations which mark the growing internationalism of capital and the monetary and financial crisis. It is

correct, in my opinion, to stress the importance of the greater synchronization of the cycle in the different capitalist countries and in this respect richer and more concrete elements must be brought into the analysis.

On the other hand I do not think it would be useful to insist on '29 as the essential point of departure. It is quite improbable that such a dramatic blowup will occur within the near future, if we consider only the strictly economic aspect. But it would be a mistake to forget for a single instant that the world context today is incomparably more critical, more revolutionary, and thus even economic phenomena more limited in themselves could have much more explosive social and political repercussions. (To mention only one aspect, would the working class of the advanced capitalist countries, including that of the United States, be inclined accept at the present time, after the improvement it has experienced in its standard of living for fifteen to twenty years, even a part of the sacrifices imposed during certain periods in the thirties? It appears to me absolutely improbable...)

There is another problem which the document mentions in passing and which ought, instead, to be treated a little more amply. This is the question of the outlets which imperialism can obtain through economic agreements with the workers states. It is essential to indicate the real meaning and trend of agreements of this nature. Politically there is no doubt that the agreements already reached, for example, between the USSR and Fiat, have been advantageously exploited by the bourgeoisie (this goes still more for the agreements concluded by the bureaucracy with the oligarchical Latin American governments). But, in the final analysis, the other aspect of the problem is more important, because it is a question of verifying whether this could constitute a new safety valve for the imperialist economy in its difficulties (if only a safety valve of limited efficacy). On this level, I agree with the opinion expressed in the draft, but it should be insisted on a bit more. In addition, it should be stressed that the international context makes such operations more difficult and uncertain.

(III) The chapter, "The New Stage in the Crisis of the Bureaucratic Regimes," etc., does not correspond to our present needs in analysis nor to the demand to give a clear response to some questions that are being posed at this stage among broad layers of the revolutionary left. The stress in the draft is rather on refuting the "optimistic" interpretations of the economic reforms.

But in the circles of interest to us the prevailing criticisms are "ultra-left," stimulated among other things by

the massive propaganda of the Chinese. For us then it is a question of:

(a) Critically examining the analyses that claim that the democratic reforms imply the restoration of capitalism or a serious drift in that direction.

(b) Stating as correctly as possible the consequences of the "reformist" course on the structure and internal differentiations in the bureaucracy and on its ideological evolution.

With regard more particularly to Yugoslavia, it is time to draw a balance sheet that is not based on merely recalling the analyses of the fifties (a valuable contribution in this respect was offered in the article which appeared in the QI in November 1966). Personally, I do not believe that Yugoslavia has reverted to a capitalist state; but the problem actually posed is: It is necessary particularly to indicate the meaning and significance, among other things, of the following phenomena:

(a) The substantial development of a capitalist accumulation in the countryside.

(b) The presence of foreign capital to a not insignificant degree in the industrial sector as well as in the tertiary sector.

(c) The suppression or close to it of the monopoly in foreign trade.

(d) The growth of the petty bourgeois layers who draw their income from tertiary economic activities strictly dependent on support from abroad.

By precise and serious analytical replies on all these questions -- which are of concern, I insist, not only to the "grouplets" of state caps or the remnants of Bordiguism but to very broad sectors of the revolutionary youth -- we will be able at the same time to score points on the methodological level, refuting all kinds of impressionistic concepts and any more or less "new" theory based on an abstract utilization of economic categories independently of concrete social categories.

As for China, there will be a separate document on the big internal crisis and I do not propose that it be taken up likewise in the general theses. But there is an aspect concerning the influence which China and the Maoist current are exercising in the world situation and in the revolutionary workers movement which should be examined here. I believe that we should not forget or brush aside what we were the first to stress; namely, that the evolution of the Chinese leadership and its polemic against the Soviet leadership and the majority of the Communist par-

ties could not fail to have absolutely important consequences. This aspect has been rather neglected by us in our most recent phase in which we were often occupied in polemicizing, correctly, against the apologetic interpretations of the "cultural revolution." But, despite the attitude of the Chinese in the Vietnamese affair, despite their responsibility in Indonesia, despite the lamentable bankruptcy of almost all the orthodox Maoist groups, we must not lose sight of:

(a) That the international line of the Chinese remains objectively more progressive than the Soviet line and there is no ground for equating them.

(b) That China is aiding and stimulating some sweeping guerrilla movements in several Asian countries.

(c) That the Chinese criticism has had an incontestable effect in the revolutionary ripening of broad layers of the new revolutionary left in the advanced capitalist countries.

(d) That despite certain traits of the "cultural revolution," the attitudes and conceptions of the Chinese leaders continue to operate objectively in a direction diametrically opposed to that of Stalinism. (The comrades will obviously understand that I am utilizing the term Stalinism here in the more specific sense of the word and not as a synonym for bureaucratic concepts and praxis in general).

(IV) ("Resumption of the Colonial Revolution," etc.) With regard to this chapter, I will limit myself to stressing:

(a) That in a document of this kind conjunctural appreciations on the possible outcome of negotiations over Vietnam should not be introduced.

(b) That the part on Latin America should be left aside until the special document is ready.

(c) That the part on the Arab revolution is absolutely insufficient, and particularly the appreciation on Syria, insofar as it is outlined, is too limited. (I hold, in contrast, as I mentioned above that the evolution of this country merits a separate analysis.)

(d) That the part on Africa, which contains inexactitudes, moreover, should be developed on the basis of what was achieved in the document at the previous congress.

(e) That it is correct and imperative to call attention to the capital importance of the Indian revolution, but the paragraphs of the draft are far from being satisfactory.

(V) ("On the Imperialist Countries, the Crisis of the Workers Movement," etc.) The document should be centered more clearly on the following questions and ideas:

(a) We are in a phase of major crisis for the Social Democracy in Europe as a whole. If one recalls the objective and even subjective role which the Social Democracy has played in the past decade as a stabilizing force owing to its influence on the working class in most of the capitalist countries of Europe, its decline and the serious diminution of its grip appear as an important factor of social and political disequilibrium.

(b) The explosion of the student movement on a mass base never before seen in the advanced capitalist countries (the roots and threads of which should be explained broadly) has shaken the political equilibrium of countries like France, Italy, and Germany and created grave difficulties for the traditional bureaucratized parties and unions. We have entered in reality into a new phase of the historical crisis of the workers bureaucracies.

(c) If one considers the cumulative effects of the economic tendencies outlined in the draft, of the major crisis of the Social Democracy and to a more limited but not less significant degree up to now by the CP bureaucracies, of the explosion of the student youth and the more and more marked appearance of militant layers of the workers youth (the latter phenomena not remaining without effect on the layers of workers in general), if one recalls the almost generally recognized profound erosion suffered by the postwar bourgeois democracy and the Gaullist regime itself, and if, of course, one does not forget for a single instant the fundamental features of the world situation, it follows that we are moving in a series of European countries towards growing economic, social and political disequilibrium and toward major confrontations even within the relatively near future. The prognoses on the possible outcome of such confrontations can naturally vary from one country to another and there is no doubt that within certain countries at least (England, Belgium, for example) the perspectives at the present time do not warrant any optimism. But it is necessary above all to ascertain whether the fundamental tendency which I am indicating really exists, and, in case of a positive answer, to draw all the consequences.

(d) If the hypothesis advanced in the preceding point is well founded, the tactical rearming of our European movement is not only a necessary task but also an urgent one. We will discuss this question within the framework of the debate on the draft concerning the tactical orientation, but I will say right now that the

line expressed in the report at the last IEC requires substantial rectification. The orientation which we have followed, more or less in all the countries of western Europe, beginning in 1952, is visibly outmoded and it is necessary to indicate as soon as possible for each country, the lines and new forms of our activity.

(IV) ("The Construction of a New Revolutionary Leadership") It is correct to begin, as the document does, with two essential facts:

(1) In a general objective sense, the situation has never been so favorable for the construction of new revolutionary Marxist leaderships.

(2) Despite this, we are running into multiple difficulties.

I believe, however, that Walter bypasses a little certain crucial problems. My remarks, thus, are partly in agreement with the document and partly independent of it.

(a) It is necessary without doubt to reiterate our reply to concepts of the Marcuse, Sweezy, etc., type. But it is necessary to round it out a little better, by recalling more rigorously certain basic methodological criteria while at the same time providing more specific analytical elements. With regard to the subject of the united front, I admit that I do not understand the usefulness of advancing it here in this form. If the draft is directed against spontaneist deformations which are being propagated here and there in our ranks, I am in agreement on the need to take up the question, but the axis must be considerably different because of the fact that the source of the deformation does not reside most often in an opportunist conception of the united front (on the contrary, the united front is criticized most often from a sectarian angle among broad revolutionary layers), but in a passive adaptation to pressures exerted by new mass movements.

(b) In order to explain where, in my opinion, the gravest difficulty ahead of us now lies (I will speak here of the new difficulties in the dynamic sectors, leaving aside all the traditional difficulties which, while in decline still weigh heavily), here are some quite empirical examples. In Italy, our organization ran into difficulties beginning from the time when the vanguard movement of the new generation acquired the breadth of a mass movement, and it recently happened that people who agreed with the general concepts of Trotskyism and with our fundamental analyses on Italy, did not accept the invitation to join up with our ranks because, in their opinion, revolutionary Marxism has now become a common heritage

of broad revolutionary layers and the existence of a specific Trotskyist organization is no longer necessary. In certain countries of Latin America, some militants freely maintain that Castroism has accepted, in practice, concepts of the Latin American revolution and the world revolution which the Fourth International has traditionally promulgated. They appreciate our activity and are ready, if necessary, to collaborate with us, but just the same they do not consider it necessary or useful to join our movement (such attitudes exist, for example, in the Chilean MIR). In the United States, I heard the comrades affirm -- I suppose with good grounds -- that the SWP used to have a considerably greater number of black militants than today.

I do not believe that the essential cause of our difficulties in recruitment and gain in influence in sectors such as those I have just mentioned lies in our subjective deficiencies. There was an unquestionable delay in the Italian section in understanding the dynamics of the student movement, but the fundamental orientation was correct, the organization was active and rather dynamic, and, in any case, our errors were never at any time graver than the errors of other competing tendencies. As for the SWP, the honor due it on the Afro-American question is absolutely unassailable and I consider that in truth the interpretations and the orientations that our American friends have expressed on this capital question -- in the beginning with the help of Trotsky -- from the thirties, represents one of the most notable theoretical and political heritages of our movement as a whole.

The explanation must be sought in the following direction: on the one hand certain present movements which are being unleashed, by their very scope go beyond the present possibilities of our restricted organizations; on the other hand -- and above all -- these new movements, which are breaking through or passing over every "traditional" organizational framework and in which the militants often display a tendency to consider us, too, as part of the "traditional" left, exercise a powerful attraction in circles where formerly we were alone or almost alone in speaking a revolutionary language. In other words: to the degree that the weight of the ideological factor in the choice of political alignment decreases (in the cases indicated from the very fact that a series of ideas have become, more or less, common property), it is understandable that some layers of militants and cadres prefer, at least at this stage, to merely join mass movements rather than become linked organizationally with the Fourth International or national Trotskyist organizations.

I am not at all ignoring or under-

estimating other factors operating in the same direction. I am convinced that the subjective weaknesses and inevitable inexperience of new layers contribute to the indicated tendencies, and, it goes without saying, I hold that we must not make any theoretical concession to spontaneist concepts. But the actual situation, a difficulty that is real, a serious problem that is posed, must be recognized.

(c) Under what conditions will we be able to overcome these difficulties and exploit to the fullest at a later stage the enormous objective possibilities existing for the revolutionary movement?

Our capacity for political analysis and overall theoretical generalization -- which is based in the final analysis on our international organizational structure -- will be a major trump card in the future, too, naturally on condition that we prove capable of constantly renewing and enriching our patrimony. More particularly, our role will be appreciated at its true value by the new movements if we are in position to express in time and better than any other current their real needs and to outline solutions to the problems which they raise. It goes without saying -- in addition -- that we must continue to apply in the most supple way our basic criticisms through integration in the real movements and avoid any kind of political sectarianism or organizational fetishism. We should not forget what we must do now in many countries with people who are ultrasensitive on this subject.

But it is only by successes or revolutionary struggles at the head of a mass movement in one or several countries that we will be able to surmount our difficulties and present contradictions. What is expected from us from now on is that we demonstrate in practice the historical value of our movement and we will be judged essentially on this basis. This can appear, at bottom, to be an elementary truth, but it is a question of inspiring our whole activity with this recognition. It is a question more precisely of determining in what countries we have the best chance of a breakthrough and subordinating everything to the elementary necessity for a success in these countries, and even, if necessary, in a single country. The rest will come later.

There are, in fact, several countries where we at present have possibilities for an important breakthrough (youth movement in France, antiwar movement and youth movement in the United States, South Africa with a certain time) and we must unquestionably make an effort in the direction of India, but we must place everything above all on a sector of Latin America and you know very well which one. We must exploit the preparatory period of

the congress to convince the entire movement to operate in practice, every day, with this perspective. Permit me to express myself a little paradoxically: it

is necessary to understand and to explain that at the present stage the International will be built around Bolivia.

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August 20, 1968

It is evident that parts of my letter have been outmoded by events, but I consider that certain ideas remain valid. Taking into account, in addition, the final editing of the draft, I would like to add the following:

impression must not be given that we think the essential cause is the "ideological bankruptcy." The contrary is true: the "ideological bankruptcy" is nothing but the outcome of objective contradictions which the bureaucracy is incapable, in the long run, of surmounting and which also prevent it from assuring either an international coordination of socialist construction or projecting a revolutionary strategy corresponding to the objective needs of our epoch.

(a) The chapter on the May revolution in France is obviously weak -- this is due in large measure to the time when it was written -- and I propose that the discussion not be limited to the draft, but take into consideration all the contributions which the different sections and different comrades have made on this subject. I likewise hold the characterization of the May events as a "revolutionary upsurge" to be faulty. In reality, France underwent a genuinely revolutionary crisis with the objective possibility of taking power and afterward there was an ebb in which it is necessary to evaluate precisely its extent and possible duration (I do not wish to examine this problem here, but it must not be conjured away through a term which, at the same time, minimizes and simplifies things). I will add that, for my part, I do not like formulations such as we find on page 7 of the French text ("se rapprocheront beaucoup plus de la norme classique des révolutions prolétariennes") ["will draw much closer to the classical norm of proletarian revolutions"] which on the one hand does not offer any help at all to understanding the real processes, and on the other provides arguments for those who seize on anything to "demonstrate" our so-called dogmatism.

(c) With regard to the chapter on the colonial revolution, I remain convinced that it would have been preferable to avoid introducing paragraphs on Latin America without the special document having been prepared. What was written, in any case, is quite insufficient and involves a certain number of loose formulations, which could give rise to misunderstandings. As for the paragraphs on the Arab revolution, I question the opportuneness of indicating very clearly the perspective of a Pan-Arab revolutionary party (such, at least is the impression that can be given by the text). I do not deny that such a perspective would be the most desirable variant, but I doubt that it is realizable within a reasonable period. I think that it is necessary to deal with this subject in a more supple way.

(b) In the chapter on the workers states, the remarks which I made and which I still consider valid were only partly taken into consideration. In particular, I consider certain formulations on page 21 to be highly debatable from the methodological point of view. For example, the formulation: "La faillite idéologique de la bureaucratie s'exprime également dans la crise croissante au sein du 'camp' socialiste et due mouvement communiste international" ["The bureaucracy's ideological bankruptcy is manifested also in the growing crisis in the 'socialist camp' and the international Communist movement."] is at least unfortunate, the same as the formulation: "La faillite idéologique de la bureaucratie se double d'une crise politique intense." ["Thus, the bureaucracy's ideological bankruptcy goes hand in hand with an intense political crisis."] The

(d) Finally, I believe that in this document or in another one, the world congress ought to stress very clearly the organizational implications of the analyses which we have sketched out and which point, fundamentally, to the conclusion that we are on the eve of new confrontations on a world scale or in numerous regions of the world. I am, in particular, convinced that we will be obliged to adopt forms of illegal activity, even in countries where we have enjoyed relative legality for a rather long period. Our foes have undergone some important experiences -- from their point of view -- they are resolved to defend themselves by all means and they have learned to track down even the "splinter" groups, the new vanguard. Our movement, which still remains very weak organizationally, must take all the necessary measures in time to avoid lengthening the already very long list of victims of the repression. We need courageous and devoted militants; but, even more, militants in condition to fight as long as possible.

Livio Maitan

THE RELATIONSHIP AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
MAO TSE-TUNG AND LIU SHAO-CHI

By Peng Shu-Tse

(The text of an interview given to Antonio Farien by Peng Shu-Tse July 6, 1967)

Q. Since my last interview with you (January 20, 1967; see World Outlook, vol. 5, no. 6) the development of events has become more and more serious. The struggle between the two factions -- anti-Mao and pro-Mao -- has become more and more violent.

On the one hand, since Mao openly called on the army to intervene in the struggle to help the Red Guards to seize power, the Maoists have occupied the government and party offices in Shanghai and in the capitals of Shansi, Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. This struggle for power has now extended into the provinces of Honan and Szechwan, as well as many other cities and districts, such as Chichi, Heilungkiang, Suchow, Kiangsu, Pinhsiang, Kiangsi, etc. The situation in Honan and Szechwan is of special significance, since according to Le Monde of June 14, 1967, during the night of June 7-8, a large scale, bloody clash took place in Szechwan in which over 300 were killed and several thousand wounded. In Honan similar clashes were supposed to have taken place, and the opposition captured the key positions of power. It was reported over the Honan radio that the oppositionists openly supported the position of Liu Shao-chi. These events demonstrate that the possibility of the struggle between the two factions breaking out into a national civil war is becoming increasingly greater. In fact, the present clashes already constitute civil war on a local scale.

On the other hand, immediately following the publication of an article in Red Flag by Tse Peng-yu (April 1, 1967), huge demonstrations of Red Guards took place in Peking, Shanghai and other cities against Liu Shao-chi, openly accusing him of being "the top party person in authority taking the capitalist road," and shouting the slogans "Down with Liu Shao-chi!" "Down with the Chinese Khrushchev!" "Down with Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Tao Chu!" and "Bury the Black Dynasty of Liu's Family!" These and other such slogans were spread about as widely as possible by the Maoists. The Peking radio even broadcast newspaper articles attacking Liu Shao-chi by name, and reported all the news about the demonstrations and meetings which were held in order to denounce him. Judging from these events, it seems that Mao had decided to prepare public opinion for the removal of Liu, Teng, and other opposition leaders from their posts. This development is, of course, not surprising, since it stems logically from the

earlier developments. However, many people who are interested in China, and concerned with her fate, find it difficult to understand why and how these two factions have reached such irreconcilable positions. In other words, it is very difficult to understand just what the basic political differences are which separate the two factions, making all compromise between Mao and Liu impossible. Can you explain these differences and how they developed?

A. Because of the Stalinist traditions of the Chinese Communist party, the nature of all essential differences is kept secret, and it is very difficult for anyone outside of the party to understand these differences. However, owing to the wall posters and the many newspapers of the Red Guards which in recent months have openly attacked Liu Shao-chi, we can see much more clearly what the essential differences between Liu and Mao are. For example, an article, "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," published in the Red Guard newspaper, Ching-Kan-shan (reprinted in Ming Pao Monthly, January 18 and 19, 1967), and another article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi," published in Red Guards in the Capital (February 22, 1967), which, despite the most malicious attacks on Liu and his past activities, reveal some important facts which may be used to judge the underlying historical differences between Mao and Liu.*

However, before one can understand the present differences between Liu and Mao, one should first know a little about their past, that is, their different posts and activities, both inside and outside the party, as well as the two men's past relationships.

Q. Generally speaking, Mao Tse-tung's past positions and activities are fairly well known. The history of Liu Shao-chi is still relatively unknown and very unclear. The past relationships between Liu and Mao are even more obscure. Therefore, it would be of great interest

* It should be pointed out here that some of the facts revealed in the Red Guard newspapers have never before been known outside of the ruling echelons of the party. Therefore, it is quite evident that these articles were written, if not by, then under the direction of some very high officials close to Mao, directing the "Cultural Revolution," such as Chen Po-ta, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, etc.

if you could describe and explain some of the past history of Mao, and especially of Liu, as well as the relationships between them.

A. After attending the founding congress of the CCP in 1921, Mao was sent to Hunan as the secretary of the provincial committee, where he was active for about two years. In 1923 he was elected to the central committee, at the 3rd congress of the party, and was assigned to the post of organizational secretary. It was during this period that the Comintern ordered members of the CCP to join the Kuomintang and to collaborate with it, and Mao was appointed a member of the Kuomintang's Shanghai Municipal Committee, where he did all of his work, neglecting his work in the CCP.

In the autumn of 1924 Mao returned to Hunan and participated in the peasant movement, after which he went to Canton and began to work in the headquarters of the central committee of the Kuomintang as a secretary of the propaganda department and as editor of the Kuomintang's weekly magazine Political Weekly. Towards the end of 1926 he again returned to Hunan, and it was during this time that he gathered the information for his famous article on the peasant movement.

In the spring of 1927 Mao became the president of the Provisional National Federation of Peasant Associations. He held this post until the defeat of the revolution in July 1927, when the members of the CCP in Wuhan were purged from the Kuomintang.

Liu Shao-chi's work during this same period is quite different. After returning to China from Moscow in the summer of 1922, all of his work was done in the workers' movement. His first activities were among the coal miners in Anyuan, where he and Li Li-san led huge strikes and organized several trade unions, and Liu became one of the most important leaders.

In the summer of 1925 Liu went to Shanghai, where he participated in the May 30 Movement and helped in the organization of trade unions. In the latter part of the year he was sent by the party to Tsintien to help in the organization of the workers' movement there.

In the spring of 1926 Liu went to Canton, where he organized, together with Li Li-san and Teng Chung-hsia, the 3rd Congress of the National Federation of Trade Unions (NFTU), and he was elected secretary of the Congress and a member of the NFTU Executive Committee. After this Liu became well known, and one of the most important leaders in the trade union movement.

At the end of 1926 Liu went to Wuhan as a delegate from the NFTU in order to lead the workers' movement; he remained there until July 1927, when the Kuomintang purge took place.

From the above brief descriptions of the two men one may say that, generally speaking, up to mid-1927 Mao's main area of work was in the Kuomintang and with the peasant movement, while Liu's work was entirely in the working class movement. Therefore, we can say that during this period there was no direct working relationship between Mao and Liu.

After the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution, the policies of the Comintern changed from opportunism to adventurism. It was during this turn that Mao began to play an important role in carrying out the party's line by organizing the peasants into guerrilla units and carrying out the "Autumn Harvest Uprising." After the failure of the "Uprising" he became one of the most important leaders of the guerrilla and soviet movement in Kiangsi until 1934. Nevertheless, during this period Mao was still under the leadership of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming -- ideological leaders of the Central Committee of the CCP -- who criticized him very severely, especially the Wang Ming group, which dealt him a very severe blow after the Central Committee moved to the soviet base in Kiangsi in 1933. All of Mao's powers were, in reality, taken away from him, and he was left with only the name of "Chairman of the Soviet Government," while the vice chairman Hsiang Ying took over almost all the responsibilities.

The situation only changed for Mao at the meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP held in Tsunyi during the Long March, where Mao took over the leadership of the party. Yet, he did not control the whole party and the army, because the followers of Wang Ming captured many leading posts, and because a part of the army remained behind in Kiangsi, Anhwei and Chekiang led by Hsiang Ying, who was a follower of Wang Ming and refused to accept the leadership of Mao. It was not until the 7th Congress of the CCP in 1945 that Mao was able to gain complete supremacy over the party.

This same period (1928-1945) found Liu Shao-chi in much different circumstances. After 1928 Liu's work was mainly inside the party. Until about 1931 he worked in Peking and Manchuria, and then in 1932 he was sent to the soviet area in Kiangsi, where he was assigned to the workers' movement.* He arrived just about

* In reality, he had no work there, since there was no workers' movement in the soviet areas.

the time when Mao lost all of his powers.

In the autumn of 1934 Liu was sent north where he again began to work for the party in Peking, and became the secretary of the party's Northern Bureau. It was during his work at this time that he helped to launch the anti-Japanese movement of September 9, 1935. It was from this movement that Liu, along with Peng Chen* and others, was able to win many new, young and talented recruits to the party, such as Liu Lan-tao, Chiang Nan-chiang, Lu Ping, Teng To, etc.

At the beginning of 1938 Liu was recalled to Yen-an to participate in the work of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP, where for the first time he collaborated closely with Mao Tse-tung.

In 1938 Liu, as secretary of the newly created Central Area Bureau, was sent as a special representative from the Central Committee to the region occupied by the New Fourth Army (NFA).** This army had been organized out of the many small guerrilla units in the south which had not made the Long March. The commander of this army was Yeh Ting, and the vice commander and political commissar was Hsiang Ying.

At this time there was a dispute taking place between Mao and Wang Ming over the question of collaboration with the Kuomintang, and since Hsiang Ying was in agreement with Wang Ming, it was Liu's mission to try and reduce the influence of the Wang Mingists in the New Fourth Army.

In January 1941 the New Fourth Army was attacked by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and Yeh Ting was captured and imprisoned by Chiang; Hsiang Ying was killed in action. Afterwards, Chen Yi took over as commander while Liu Shao-chi took Hsiang Ying's place as political commissar. Liu also dissolved the South-Eastern Bureau, of which Hsiang Ying had been the secretary, and incorporated its jurisdiction under the Central Area Bureau, of which he himself was secretary. Liu then became the party's most important leader in those areas under the influence of the Kuomintang and those areas occupied by Japanese imperialism. During this time he greatly expanded the influence of the party throughout these areas, and at the same time increased the numbers of the New

* Peng Chen, the Mayor of Peking who was purged by Mao in June 1966, was at this time a member of the Northern Bureau and in charge of the student movement for the party in Peking.

** The army in the North was the New Eighth Route Army.

Fourth Army, destroying in the process all the influence of Wang Ming's group. In other words, he brought the entire NFA under Mao's direction, since before, while under the influence of the followers of Wang Ming, the NFA had not always obeyed Mao's directives. This was a great contribution to Mao and his position, and there followed a very close collaboration between Liu and Mao.

In the autumn of 1942 Liu returned to Yen-an to work in the Political Bureau, and he became recognized at the party's number two leader after Mao.

During the next few years Liu helped Mao to discredit Wang Ming and his supporters in the Central Committee. He also helped Mao prepare several documents, such as the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" (adopted by the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1945) and "The New Statutes of the CCP" (adopted at the 7th Congress of the CCP, April-June 1945).

In the first document, all the defeats which the CCP had suffered were blamed on Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, and especially Wang Ming and his group.* This document justified Mao's work as always having been correct, and praised Liu for his position from 1928-1932. The second document, which was probably written by Liu Shao-chi and which was reported on by him at the 7th Congress, stated in the preamble that "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from the practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution," united with Marxism-Leninism, are the "guiding principles of all its (the party's) work." Liu's whole report was along this very line, praising Mao's thought as the supreme guide of the Chinese Revolution.

The Congress ended by electing Mao as the supreme leader of the party, and Liu as one of its top leaders, while almost all of Wang Ming's followers were either removed from the Central Committee or set back to candidate status.**

Following the Congress, Mao and Liu

* Ch'en Tu-hsiu was blamed for the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution; Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san were blamed for the defeats during the adventurist period; and Wang Ming was held responsible for the defeat of the Red Army in Kiangsi, which was followed by the Long March. The Comintern was never singled out for any rebuke whatsoever.

** There were 44 members and 19 candidates in the new Central Committee. Wang Ming and a close collaborator of his were elected members in the next-to-last and last position.

collaborated closely in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. With the victory of the CCP in 1949, Mao became the chairman of the Peoples' Republic of China, and Liu its vice chairman; the ensuing close collaboration between Mao and Liu is well known.

Q. When did the differences between Mao and Liu develop, and over what questions?

A. During the period which I have just described, there were, of course, no major political differences. According to some of the recent news, major differences became apparent over the question of the agricultural cooperative movement. From 1955-1956, for example, the newspaper The Red Guards in the Capital reported, "Liu Shao-chi openly and frankly dared to sabotage the movement of cooperativization. In 1955 he helped Teng Tsu-hui* to cut off the formation of 200,000 cooperatives." This accusation is, of course, far from concrete. Yet it is sufficient to demonstrate that a major difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1955.

Mao proposed his plan of agricultural cooperativization in 1955, and insisted that it be completed in a very short time. His plan called for the completion of 850,000 cooperatives before the end of the year. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Tsu-hui and others, probably basing themselves on some of the past experiences of the Soviet Union, as well as on some of Lenin's ideas concerning collectivization,** advocated a much more prudent policy of long term collectivization. They were able to secure the majority of the Political Bureau for a program that called for the completion of cooperativization only in 1967. Mao was against this decision, and over the head of the Political Bureau he called a conference of municipal, provincial and regional secretaries which decided that the agricultural collectivization should be completed in 1957.

This was the first major difference between Liu and Mao, and it is clearly and closely connected with the later differences over the "People's Communes."

Q. In the last interview you explained that the most important difference

*Head of the party's Agricultural Department.

**Liu was reported by a Red Guard newspaper to have said, in a speech given at the Conference of National Propaganda Workers in 1951, that "Some comrades think that socialism in the countryside can be realized through the peasant mutual aid groups and cooperatives. This is, however, impossible. It is the utopian idea of 'agricultural socialism.' The realization of socialism in the countryside, i.e., collectivization, without industrialization, is absolutely impossible." This statement tends to indicate that Liu has studied some of Lenin's works on collectivization and industrialization.

was over de-Stalinization. You explained that while Mao was opposed to de-Stalinization, Liu seems to have been in agreement with it. Are there any facts to substantiate this?

A. Yes, it is true that this is the most serious difference between Mao and Liu. The Maoists have openly called Liu the "Chinese Khrushchev." The origin of this label is precisely over the question of de-Stalinization. The article recently published in the Red Guard newspaper Ching-kan-shan entitled "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," stated that at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 Liu revised the statutes of the party, changing the sentence from the preamble which I quoted earlier: "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution," united with Marxism-Leninism, are the "guiding principles of all its (the party's) work," to read simply, "The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism as its guide to all actions." Thus, any reference to Mao and his thought was deleted. The author of this article considered this to be proof that Liu was in most malicious opposition to the the great leader, Chairman Mao.

The 8th Congress of the CCP not only revised the statutes of the party, removing the reference to Mao, but also emphasized that any personality cult must be prohibited. This can be seen very clearly in the report on changing the party statutes, which was given by Teng Hsiao-ping*: "The significance of opposing the personality cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world." And, "The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results." And, "The personality cult is an old, historical and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently and with determination the directives of the Central Committee against individual prominence and personal glorification."

It is very clear that under the impact of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and de-Stalinization, the majority of the Central Committee accepted the ideas of opposition to the personality cult; hence the removal of the reference to Mao and his thought from the party statutes and the prohibition of his personal cult.

* Teng Hsiao-ping became the General Secretary of the party at this congress and has, along with Liu, been attacked as one of the "top leaders in the party who are taking the capitalist road."

It is necessary to point out that the words of Teng about the personality cult reflecting itself in the society and the party are very important, as this was in direct reference to Mao Tse-tung himself. Since the 7th Congress in 1945, and especially since the CCP took power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung has deliberately established his personal cult, and has considered himself as "The Sun in the East," and "The Chinese Stalin." For example, there is a song, "The East is Red," which has the following verse: "The East is becoming Red, The sun is rising and Mao Tse-tung appears in China, He works for the well being of the people, He is the Great Saviour of the people."

After Mao's talks with Stalin in Moscow in 1950, a new song was composed, "Mao Tse-tung and Stalin are like the Sun shining in the Sky." These two songs have been scored for orchestration, and at the beginning of important meetings, and especially when Mao was in attendance, one or both of these songs were played, while everybody stood and afterwards shouted, "Long Live Chairman Mao Tse-tung!" This became almost a religious ceremony. After the beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR, however, this ceremony was discontinued in China.

The effects of de-Stalinization in China constituted, without a doubt, a severe personal blow to Mao, and under the pressure of existing conditions Mao was obliged to make certain concessions, tolerate the changes -- if only for the time being -- and wait for more favorable circumstances in order to reassert his own cult.*

If one compares the 7th and 8th congresses of the CCP one can see clearly the decline of Mao's prestige. At the 7th Congress Mao made the political report, and with Liu's help Mao's "thought" was incorporated into the party statutes, thus establishing his personal cult. At the 8th Congress, however, the political reporter was Liu, and Mao's "thought" was removed from the statutes, and measures were taken to prohibit his personal cult. This shows what a tremendous effect

* At the 8th Congress Mao made a speech in which he declared, "The Soviet Party not too long ago held its 20th Congress, and it worked out a number of correct directives criticizing a number of existing shortcomings. One can say that their work will have a great effect on the future.... Our experiences are lacking; hence we must study as much as possible the experiences of our forerunners, i.e., the CPSU." This demonstrates that Mao at this time could not oppose the anti-cult atmosphere, and that it was only against his will that he tolerated the anti-cult actions of the party.

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization has had, and it is clear why Mao became so hostile towards Khrushchev, as well as towards Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

Q. Earlier, you stated that the differences between Mao and Liu on the cooperative movement were closely connected to the differences concerning the "People's Communes." Could you explain the differences on the question of the "People's Communes"?

A. Until recently, Liu was thought to have been a supporter of the "People's Communes" idea launched by Mao. However, the recent facts have revealed that this is not true. In the article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi" it was stated, "At a meeting called by the Central Committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he (Liu Shao-chi) made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the "Three Red Banners"* and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes -- 30% due to natural disasters, 70% due to artificial disasters. He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightists as being excessive and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy, and that party life is a 'brutal struggle' and a 'pitiless fight,' attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the Central Committee." From the many attacks against Liu, one can conclude the following:

1) Liu opposed the "Three Red Banners" policy, that is, he opposed the "People's Communes" launched by Mao. This stems logically from his opposition to Mao's cooperativist movement.

2) Liu considered the economic difficulties as mainly the result of artificial disasters; that is, he felt that the economic troubles from 1960-1962 were a result of the "People's Communes" and "Great Leap Forward" policies.

3) Liu's opinion that the party was mistaken in the struggle against the Rightists of 1959, and in the purging of Peng Teh-huai**, Wang Keh-ching and others, means that he felt their criticism of the "People's Communes" was correct, and therefore he felt they should be rehabilitated.

* The "Three Red Banners" are (1) General Line, (2) Great Leap Forward, (3) People's Communes.

** Minister of Defense until 1959, when he was purged as the leader of an opposition to the "Great Leap Forward" program, and especially to the "People's Communes."

4) Liu's charges that the CCP lacked democracy, that the party life was "a brutal struggle" and a "pitiless fight" mean that Liu felt that Mao's purge of Peng Teh-huai and the others was a very dangerous symptom.

These four points show that very serious differences existed at that time between Liu and Mao.

Following the failure of the "People's Communes" and the economic disaster, Mao let Liu take over the reins of the party and deal with the serious difficulties. Liu, along with Teng Hsiao-ping, put into effect a rectification campaign which included many reforms, such as re-establishing private plots, a free market, personal ownership of livestock, and doing away with most of the public kitchens, public nurseries, etc. All the reforms met with a very favorable response from the great majority of the people, and therefore Liu won their respect and support, as well as that of most of the party cadres.

Q. Are there, or have there been, any differences between Mao and Liu over questions of literature, art and education?

A. Differences between Mao and Liu do exist over these questions. Your interview with Ch'en Pi-lan (see World Outlook, volume 5, number 26, July 14, 1967) explained some of the differences which exist between Mao and the opposition as a whole. The fact that Chou Yang was one of the main leaders of the opposition in the cultural field shows that it was under the influence of Liu Shao-chi. One can find proof of this in an article in the People's Daily, April 25, 1967, entitled "Crush the Counter-Revolutionary Program of Peaceful Transition -- Expose the Words of the Chinese Khrushchev Concerning the Problems of Writers." In this article it was stated that in March 1953 Liu Shao-chi asked Chou Yang and others to discuss with him questions concerning the writers. During these discussions Liu was supposed to have advocated the necessity of writers having more time to study, allowing them to write freely, and not interfering with their creative freedom.

These same ideas were expressed by Liu in his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, September 1956, and the Congress adopted a resolution based on Liu's report. This resolution stated that "In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and the arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of the 'Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools Contend' policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts." This shows that Liu's ideas on these questions are much different from those of Mao.

When Liu took over the reins of the party (in 1960) he carried out a much more moderate policy in the fields of literature, art and education, allowing much more freedom to the artists and writers. As a result, the work in the cultural fields improved to a certain degree under Liu's direction of the party. This, combined with the improvement in the economy, rallied to Liu's side most of the cultural workers, as well as the party cadres. The Peking Municipal Party Committee, led by P'eng Chen, is a good example. This turn of events led to the increasing isolation of Mao, and he even felt that his leadership position had been brought into question.

Q. What was Mao's reaction to this situation?

A. Mao saw the hopelessness of waging a struggle inside the party; he therefore turned towards the army. After 1960 Mao, through Lin Piao, Lo Yun-huan and Hsiao Hua, launched a broad movement in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to study Mao Tse-tung's thought, under the pretext of "correcting the mistaken line of P'eng Teh-huai and Wang Keh-ching."

Lin Piao proposed to the Central Military Committee a resolution entitled "The Correct Handling of Four Questions in the Political Fields of the Army." In this resolution Lin placed his emphasis on the importance of the role of man, politics and thought. Some time later, the Military Committee adopted a "Resolution Concerning Political Work in the Army." This resolution set forth 14 provisions. The first one stated that "It is necessary that Mao Tse-tung's thought be in command in all spheres of the Army." Before this, the slogan had been "Politics in Command," but now openly, and probably for the first time, this was spelled out clearly to mean Mao Tse-tung's thought in command.

It was following the adoption of this resolution that Lin Piao demanded "Everyone must read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, work according to Chairman Mao's instructions, to become a good fighter of Chairman Mao."

An editorial published on January 1, 1966 in the Liberation Army Daily even stated that "every word of Chairman Mao is truth... We must firmly support and carry out everything conforming to Mao Tse-tung's thought and we must firmly resist and oppose anything which does not conform to Mao's thought." The reasoning behind such statements is very clear. No longer were the directives of the Central Committee, headed by Liu Shao-chi, to be followed, if they did not correspond to Mao's own personal thinking.

Mao also attempted to purge Liu's

supporters in the party. In September 1963 Mao proposed a resolution entitled "Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas" (the 23-article document). This resolution was not adopted by the Political Bureau; nevertheless, it was circulated throughout the party. This document then formed the basis of the "Four Clean-ups Movement," i.e., "The Socialist Education Movement to clean up politics, ideology, organization and economy." The main purpose of this movement was to purge those cadres who supported Liu, but the movement met with strong resistance, and in many places was sabotaged. The movement had no great effect except for the purging of some lower ranking cadres in the "People's Communes" and the district party committees. Therefore, Mao became even more dependent upon the army, and put forward a theory to carry on the struggle outside the party. The foundation of this theory was the idea that the class struggle continues after the victory of the proletariat and is reflected inside the party.

In a plenum of the Central Committee in September 1968 Mao put forward the slogan "We must not forget the class struggle!" This same plenum issued a communique, on Mao's insistence, which said, "During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism...the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie still exists. The struggle between the two lines of socialism and capitalism still exists." "This struggle is inevitably reflected inside the party...We must take heed in time, and we must firmly struggle against the different types of opportunist tendencies. The significance of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, in August 1959 at Lushun, is the clashing victory over the Rightist tendency, that is, the crushing of the attack by the revisionists." Here we can see that Mao is directly attacking Liu's defense of P'eng Teh-huai and Liu's suggestion that those who had been purged should be rehabilitated.

During 1963 and 1964 the Central Committee of the CCP published 9 articles criticizing the CPSU. The ninth article was entitled "On Khrushchev's Pseudo-Communism and the Historical Lessons for the World" (July 14, 1964). This article maintained that under the leadership of the revisionist Khrushchev the USSR had been transformed from a socialist to a capitalist state. The implication was, of course, that it was necessary to unleash a struggle inside the party against all revisionists, otherwise China herself would "change color."

At a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles in June 1964 Mao made an address in which he gravely warned that "In the past 15 years, these associations and most of their publications have for the most part failed... to carry out the policies of the party....

In the recent years, they have even verged on revisionism. If they do not make serious efforts to remould themselves, sooner or later they are bound to become groups of the Hungarian Petofi-Club type." These words were a frank warning to those cadres working in the cultural fields under the influence of Liu's leadership.

All the arguments elaborated by Mao, such as those mentioned above, were a preparation for the purge of "those people in power who are taking the capitalist road" which was to follow.

Recently, Red Flag and the People's Daily published an article entitled "A Great Historical Document" (Hung-ch'i no. 7, 1967), in which they stated "Lenin saw that after the proletariat had taken power, the defeated bourgeoisie still remained stronger than the proletariat, and often attempted a restoration.... Therefore, in order to deal with this counterrevolutionary threat, and to overcome it, it was necessary to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship over a long period. There was no other road. Unfortunately, Lenin died too soon. He could not have solved this question in practice. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist who actually eliminated a great number of the counterrevolutionary bourgeois representatives who wormed their way into the party, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, and their like."

These words not only demonstrate that Mao tries to justify his purge of the opposition led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping on the basis of Lenin's theory, but also justifies his purge on Stalin's famous frame-up trials in the 1930's. From this one can see clearly what Mao has in mind for Liu, Teng, and the rest of the opposition.

Q. Are there any differences between Mao and Liu on foreign policy?

A. In the last interview I pointed out that the position of the opposition on foreign policy questions is much more difficult to determine, since there is less material from which to judge, and up to now I have been unable to find any new facts. Nevertheless, the position of Liu on foreign policy is different from Mao's extremely sectarian attitude. Foreign policy is almost always an extension of domestic policy. Therefore, in my opinion, Mao is responsible for China's extremely sectarian foreign policy, which would be in agreement with his extremely sectarian domestic policies. Liu, on the other hand, probably advocates a more moderate foreign policy, in line with his domestic policy. Since Lo Jui-ch'ing has been attacked as one of Liu's strongest supporters, we can almost certainly say

that Liu's attitude towards the USSR and the united front with the various socialist countries over the Vietnam war is identical with that of Lo.

Q. You have explained how reference to Mao's thought was included in the party statutes at the 7th Congress, and how it was removed at the 8th Congress, as well as the campaign carried out in the army on how everything was to be done under the guidance of Mao's thought. Now, in the "Cultural Revolution," Mao's thought stands out as one of its most prominent characteristics. Other than the personality cult aspect, can you briefly describe what Mao's thought actually is?

A. Broadly speaking, Mao's thought boils down to nothing more than the practical application in China of Stalin's theories. The essence of Stalinism consists of opportunism and adventurism, the revolution by stages, socialism in one country, and bureaucratic centralism which finds its most pronounced form in personal dictatorship. All these things can not only be found in Mao's theoretical works, but also in his actions. Here I will only give a few examples.

You will recall some of the things I have already said about the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" adopted by the Central Committee in April 1945, in which Mao laid all the blame for all past defeats on Chen Tsu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san. Mao never analyzed or even pointed out the opportunist or adventurist policies of the CCP during and after the 1925-1927 revolution, which had been forced on the CCP by Stalin. That is, Mao accepted Stalin's role and policies of opportunism and adventurism as being correct.

Mao's most important theoretical work is "On the New Democracy." When the party adopted the new statutes at the 7th Congress in 1945, which stated that Mao's thought should be the guide to all the party's actions, the party congress was basing itself on this work, written by Mao in January 1940. At this congress, Lin Po-ch'u, an important member of the Political Bureau at that time, said, "The theory of 'New Democracy' is the most brilliant manifestation of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism combined with the concrete revolutionary practice in China. This theory is the sharpest weapon the party and the Chinese people have in the struggle for victory." Chou En-lai said, "We are dependent on the brilliant leadership of our party's leader and comrade Mao Tse-tung. He has shown us the direction to follow in 'New Democracy.'" With such praise, we should examine the contents of Mao's 'New Democracy.'

ic revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was a "new bourgeois-democratic revolution." In this revolution, the national bourgeoisie remained a revolutionary class, and hence it was necessary to carry out the "united front" of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie -- the bloc of four classes -- in order to destroy the imperialists and feudal forces, and to establish a "new democratic republic." That is, Mao advocated the establishment of a coalition government of four classes, as well as a "new democratic economy."

The "new democratic economy" meant the nationalization of only "the big banks, large industry and large commercial enterprises" by the state. "One must not nationalize the private property of other capitalists, and one should not prohibit the development of capitalist production which cannot control the national economy and the people's life....The rich peasant's economy in the countryside should also be permitted."*

All this is, of course, self-explanatory, and demonstrates clearly Mao's opportunism. Mao's theory of revolution by stages is clearly manifested in the following sentences: "The present tasks of the Chinese Revolution are the tasks of struggling against imperialism and feudalism. Before these tasks have been accomplished, it is not possible to speak about socialism. The Chinese Revolution must be divided into two steps. The first step is that of new democracy, and the second is socialism. The period of the first stage is relatively long."

Nor is any comment needed here, and in Indonesia, where Mao applied the theory of revolution by stages, the revolution has suffered a greater disaster than did the second Chinese revolution which Stalin led to defeat with the same theory.

Here it should be pointed out that Mao's "On the New Democracy" is still considered as the center of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The "16-Point Decision" adopted by the Central Committee last August 1966 put "On the New Democracy" as the first work to be studied in studying Mao's thought. The Liberation Army Daily published some articles explaining the contents of "On the New Democracy," encouraging all the cadres in the army and the party to study it.

In Yen-an, at a party school in May 1941, Mao made a speech entitled "The Reorganization of Our Study," in which he said, "The Brief History of the CPSU is the highest synthesis and summary of the world communist movement in the last 100

According to Mao, after the October Revolution in Russia the national-democrat-

* Selected Works, Volume 3, p. 120, International Publishers, 1965

years. This is a model of theory combined with practice."* It is very well known that the Brief History of the CPSU is a "model of theory combined with practice" of Stalinism, because it contains the theoretical justification of Stalin's theories of revolution by stages and socialism in one country, as well as the justification for Stalin's adventurist policies of collectivization, industrialization and the foreign policy of the third period, the famous purges in the 30's of the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Bukharinists and other oppositions, the cult of the personality and Stalin's own personal dictatorship.

As far as Mao's methods are concerned, one can really find no difference between him and Stalin. Mao has always imposed his own opinions upon the party, and the present "Cultural Revolution" is the best example of Mao's bureaucratic methods against the great majority of the party in order to maintain his own personal dictatorship.

Q. What has been your personal relationship with Mao and Liu, and what is your personal appraisal of the two men?

A. Because my work and posts in the party were different from Mao's, I did not have much of a working relationship with him. I did have some personal contacts with him, however, only two of which I will describe.

In May 1926, after Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'etat of March 20, I went to Canton as the Central Committee's representative to discuss with Borodin, the Comintern representative. During my stay Mao visited me twice. One time he asked me to address his peasant school. The other time he brought an article he had written on the different strata among the peasantry, on which he asked my opinion. In his article he had divided the peasantry into many different strata according to the amount of land they owned. I then told him that in Lenin's opinion the peasants were divided mainly into three categories -- rich, middle, and poor -- depending upon the amount of land they were able to farm and what they needed in order to maintain their families. Mao did not reject my criticism and seemed to have accepted it.

In June 1927 I saw Mao for the last time in Wuhan. At that time he was very disappointed with the revolution, although he never discussed with me how the revolution could be rescued from the dangerous situation which existed. He was only concerned with finding a safe place for his family, and he asked my wife, Ch'en Pi-lan,

if she could help him.

My contact with Liu Shao-chi is somewhat different. In Shanghai in 1920 I studied Marxism and Russian together with Liu, and our relationship was quite close. From 1921-1922 we studied together in Moscow, during which time I was able to recruit him to the party.

After returning to Shanghai from Moscow in August 1924 all my work was in the party itself, and especially in the Political Bureau, as head of the Propaganda Department. I therefore had no real working relationship with Liu, although I saw him several times during my stay in Canton, and again in Wuhan during the summer of 1927. The last time I saw Liu was in the summer of 1929. At this time Ch'en Tu-hsiu and I had started to organize the Left Opposition. Liu, of course, understood my position in relation to the party, yet nevertheless he visited me at my home. During this visit we discussed the party's policy, and I criticized the party's present policy of adventurism as well as the bureaucratic organizational methods of the leadership. I also pointed out that during the workers' and peasants' uprising in the spring of 1927 the party should have then organized soviets in preparation for the taking of power. With all these criticisms Liu expressed his agreement, but could not bring himself to join the Left Opposition and struggle against the leadership. Liu was considered in the party at this time as a "reconciliator."

As far as my personal appraisal of the two men goes, I would say from a political point of view that both of them are Stalinists. After the defeat of the second Chinese revolution, neither of them accepted the lessons of the defeat, and they remained in the Stalinized CCP following Stalin's line on all fundamental questions. Nevertheless, from the point of view of character and personal experience, the two men are quite different. While both men are very strong willed, Mao is very arbitrary while Liu is much more considerate.

Due to Mao's experiences of working in the Kuomintang, and especially his work in organizing the peasants and guerrilla warfare, his arbitrary character has been reinforced. Hence, upon coming to power in 1949, regardless of the opinions or well being of the majority, Mao deliberately established his personal cult and practiced his personal dictatorship. The cooperativization, the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and the present "Cultural Revolution," as well as China's sectarian foreign policy, are all the result of Mao's arbitrariness.

* Selected Works, Volume 4, pp. 19-20, International Publishers, 1956.

Liu's life's work, however, has mainly been among the working masses, and

at times under very difficult circumstances, such as after the defeat of the 1925-27 revolution when he worked for the party in the underground during the reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek. These environmental conditions reinforced his basic thoughtfulness, since he was obliged to listen to the opinions of other cadres in the party and workers' movement who reflected the opinions and aspirations of the masses. Hence, in his dealings with people, he is more capable of reaching a balanced solution, and this is the origin of his personal differences with Mao on cooperativization, "People's Communes," etc., as I have already explained.

Q. What, in your opinion, will be the future of China under the leadership of the two men respectively?

A. The above analysis of Liu and Mao shows clearly that Mao represents a more hardened and extreme form of Stalinism. Regardless of the circumstances or the will of the masses he has carried out his adventurist and sectarian domestic policies. While on the other hand, Liu represents a much more moderate and reform-

ist tendency in the party. He attempted to a certain degree to correct Mao's extremist policies, in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences.

In my opinion this same analysis is valid in the present struggle between the two men. If Mao should win, it would be at the expense of all the left and revolutionary elements, and he will embark China upon a most reckless and cataclysmic course, in which the Chinese Revolution would be placed in grave danger. If Liu should win, China's domestic course will most likely be similar to that carried out when the party was under Liu's leadership, with China's foreign policy becoming less sectarian and possibly resulting in a united front with other socialist countries, including the USSR, to aid the Vietnamese and their struggle.

In a China under Liu's leadership there would definitely be more freedom in the party and society, although the overall question of the Stalinist bureaucracy would not be solved. Nevertheless, Liu's victory could be a first phase in the development of a real revolutionary struggle for socialist democracy.