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ON THE CLASS NATURE OF YUGOSLAVIA

By M. Pablo

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## INTRODUCTION

In line with the decision of the Seventh Plenum of the IEC, we are opening the discussion in the International on Yugoslavia with this bulletin.

A second bulletin will soon appear containing the position taken on this question by other members of the IS as well as by the leadership of the German Section.

In the following bulletins, which we shall try to put out as rapidly as possible, we shall publish articles by comrades submitted through their sections. We can announce as of the present the publication of an article by Comrade Hunter of England, addressed to us last May.

The appearance of this first bulletin has been delayed due to financial and technical difficulties which the IS has undergone for some months.

The International Secretariat

October 1949

## ON THE CLASS NATURE OF YUGOSLAVIA

By M. Pablo

The progress achieved by the International in the last years, and particularly since the World Congress, consists among other things in the form of its internal discussions. Fortunately we have gone a long way from the days when most of our sections exhausted themselves in unmethodical and disorderly discussions, in which all questions were raised over and over again on every occasion. To some, this form of discussion appeared to be the expression of genuine "proletarian democracy." In reality, it was only the expression of the political immaturity of our organizations, of their leaderships in particular, of their faulty social composition, of their lack of actual ties with the proletariat and its struggles.

Today we conduct our discussions in an entirely different manner. We discuss a problem when it is posed before us, or when it is imposed on us, concretely, as a matter of necessity for subsequent action. Such discussions are therefore no longer artificial. They fill an organic need often arising imperiously in our party.

We are therefore opening the discussion in an organized manner in the International and we shall strive to conduct it in the most democratic atmosphere possible, naturally taking into account the technical and financial means at our disposal.

That is the way the discussions on the question of the buffer zone and of Yugoslavia are being conducted. The International has reacted like a living organism and not like a petrified sect in the face of this complicated and constantly evolving problem of theoretical but also of concrete, practical importance -- for our work in these countries, for our approach to Stalinist workers on the nature of these countries and their evolution. We have felt the need of a more rounded and more profound examination of this question.

The last plenum of the IEC therefore decided to open an organized discussion in the entire International on the resolution adopted on the buffer zone and on the case of Yugoslavia in particular. Personally, I consider this discussion one of the most serious our movement has ever engaged in. It will be one of the most profitable for our education, for it will inevitably revolve around the most delicate questions of the theory of revolutionary Marxism, which our movement alone has begun to probe.

### Preliminary Considerations

Actually, a discussion of the problem of the buffer zone and of Yugoslavia in particular requires us to treat a series of fundamental questions dealing with the concrete fate of the proletarian revolution and of the concrete workers' state.

Marx and Engels outlined the norm of the proletarian revolution and of the power it establishes. Lenin, in his works prior to the concrete experience of the Russian revolution -- particularly in his "State and Revolution" -- codified and further elaborated what had already been said on this question by Marx and Engels. In general,

he also only dealt with the norm of the proletarian revolution and of the proletarian power, the pure outline rather than the concrete reality. But Lenin, after several years of the experience of the Russian revolution, was able in his post-1918 works to speak much more concretely on this question. We shall have occasion to refer to what he said.

It was Trotsky above all, however, and our movement which deepened and enriched Marxist theory on the concrete unfolding of proletarian revolution and the proletarian power in the epoch of imperialism and within the framework of an isolated country. The extent and the importance of this advance are particularly striking and forceful when we compare, for instance, Trotsky's "Revolution Betrayed" with Lenin's "State and Revolution." Trotsky was not content with the norms established in Lenin's work for an understanding of the evolution of the USSR. He delved more deeply into the subject and studied in life what became of the proletarian power established in a single country in the epoch of imperialism, in a backward country surrounded by the capitalist world. He thus was able to give us an analysis, not of the normal workers' state, but of the degenerated workers' state. He was able to define the inevitable modifications introduced into the "norm" by conditions similar to those undergone by the USSR, modifications valid for a proletarian power that remains isolated for a long time.

These theoretical conclusions of the Trotskyist analysis of the proletarian revolution and the proletarian power established in the epoch of imperialism, valid on the scale of history, can be summed up as follows:

The proletarian revolution can triumph separately in a given country. It can establish a proletarian power on the basis of changes in the old property relations and the destruction of the old state apparatus. But this power will inevitably and rapidly become bureaucratized, and lead to a complete political expropriation of the proletariat if the revolution remains isolated in a country encircled by imperialism. Thus, in the historic period of the transition from capitalism to socialism we shall witness the rise not of normal workers' states, but of more or less degenerated workers' states, that is, states with strong bureaucratic deformations which can reach the point of complete political expropriation of the proletariat. These modifications in the norm of the proletarian power will diminish only to the extent that the basis of the proletarian power outgrows the framework of a single country and encompasses an ever more substantial part of world economy.

Is it therefore necessary to conclude that Stalinism is justified in the USSR?

Not at all.

"The Revolution Betrayed" concludes that the development of the bureaucracy in the USSR was inevitable under the conditions of isolation and of historic backwardness of this country, as it would be in every other similar case, but that the transformation of the Bolshevik party, and through it, of the entire Communist International, into organs of the bureaucracy, was not a necessary or inevitable process.

Here the concept of the permanent revolution and of the international organization of the proletariat are revealed in their deep significance and in all their importance: In our epoch, the proletarian power established in a single country will inevitably and rapidly become bureaucratized, and threaten to contaminate the proletarian party itself in that country. In order to combat this danger there is no other remedy than to bring to bear the weight of the world organization of the proletariat, of the International. It alone is capable of counterbalancing the corrupting influence of national isolation upon the party in power. In the long run, the importance and the effectiveness of the International must become manifest by its ability to extend the base of the isolated proletarian revolution, by the conquest of power in other countries. Socialism, as the ideological and political movement of the proletariat as well as a social system, is by nature international and indivisible. This idea is at the foundation of our movement and the only one on which can be built the conscious mass movement which will assure the socialist development of humanity.

But while bearing this in mind, it nevertheless remains true that in the whole historic period of the transition from capitalism to socialism, a period which can extend for centuries, we shall encounter a much more tortuous and complicated development of the revolution than our teachers foresaw -- and workers' states that are not normal but necessarily quite deformed.

Those who believe that history is made according to blueprints and ideal forms will plunge either into the mazes of vapid intellectual speculation, or into passive contemplation of the historic process, disappointed and even disgusted by the sometimes monstrous modifications of their ideal. But for revolutionary Marxists, it is a matter of understanding in order to act consistently by grasping thoroughly with their analysis the real and infinitely complicated process of the revolutionary transformation of society in our epoch.

The nature of the USSR, is incomprehensible for anyone approaching the question equipped only with the "State and Revolution" of Lenin. But the approach becomes entirely different for anyone who has studied and understood the theoretical essence of the "Revolution Betrayed." To understand the USSR and Stalinism it was necessary to get away from the norms and to take into account the concrete conditions in which the proletarian power was established and in which it evolved in the USSR; that is, in an isolated country with a low level of productive forces as well as of culture. Similarly, to understand what has happened after the second world war in the buffer zone, it is necessary to take into account Stalinism itself as a powerful factor in the formation of the objective process.

We are dealing here with social forms derived from secondary roots, of a transitory and deformed character, in which not only economic and cultural limitations played a part (small countries separated from one another by frontiers, low level of productive forces and of culture in general), but also the intervention of Stalinism; that is, the bureaucracy of a workers' state already enormously degenerated itself. This intervention of Stalinism in the buffer zone has imprinted upon the evolution of these countries a great complexity.

### Indispensable Reminders

Before approaching the central subject of our discussion, we consider it indispensable to remind ourselves of the attainments of our movement on two questions:

- a. Is the Stalinist bureaucracy capable of transforming property relations? On what scale and under what conditions?
- b. What is the method of analysis of the class character of a social phenomenon, and its application to the theory of the state?

It is naturally difficult in one article to go into detail on these two questions, and we shall be obliged to summarize the conclusions drawn by our movement in the past, thus running the certain risk of schematizing and oversimplifying certain ideas. But we shall have occasion later in the discussion in the International to return with further explanations on all points which encounter serious objections.

In 1939-40 L. Trotsky personally had occasion to take a clear position on both of the questions we have posed, in the course of the discussion which took place in the American organization during the struggle with the Shachtman-Burnham tendency.

- a. The action of the bureaucracy in the occupied territories.

With Trotsky, we assumed at that time that the bureaucracy is able and even forced, to change property relations in any area which it wants to occupy. Not because the bureaucracy wants to remain true to the socialist program, but "because it is not desirous nor capable of sharing the power and the privileges the latter entails with the old ruling classes in the occupied territories." (L.T., "The USSR in War.") The bureaucracy can accomplish this transformation only if the relationship of forces between it and the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and between it and the proletariat on the other, is favorable for it.

We also assumed that this transformation of the property relations, important though it is in itself, is not the same thing as a proletarian revolution, because the Soviet bureaucracy accomplishes it in a military-bureaucratic manner, also expropriating politically the masses and assuring its control over them by police measures. For this reason "in order that nationalized property in the occupied territories, as well as in the USSR itself, can become the basis of a really progressive, that is, socialist development it is necessary to overthrow the Moscow bureaucracy." (L. Trotsky, "The USSR in War.")

It is necessary for our discussion to add some special remarks Trotsky made at that time regarding the case of Finland.

Trotsky thought at the beginning of the war of the USSR against Finland that there would be an eventual occupation and sovietization of all Finland "in one or two stages" in order to realize its later

"unification" with the USSR. A "new administrative apparatus from among the toiling population of the occupied areas" would be necessary in that case, because we "should not think that the Kremlin is so stupid as to attempt ruling Eastern Poland or Finland with imported commissars." ("From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene"). The role of this "new apparatus" would be the "crowding out" of the native bourgeoisie so that the bureaucracy can occupy its place.

The occupation and the total sovietization of Finland failed to take place, according to Trotsky, because the international relationship of forces was unfavorable for Stalin and forced him to retreat at that time.

b. The Marxist method of analysis; its application to the state.

In Marxist sociology, Trotsky wrote, the point of departure for every analysis is the class character of a given phenomenon: state, party, philosophic tendency, literary school, etc. ("From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene"). It must begin with a class analysis, first of all, of the society in which the given phenomenon is produced.

A society is characterized above all by its productive forces and by its social relations, its property relations, its class relations.

"Classes are characterized by their position in the social system of economy, and primarily by their relation to the means of production. In civilized societies, property relations are validated by laws. The nationalization of the land, the means of industrial production, transport and exchange, together with the monopoly of foreign trade, constitute the basis of the Soviet social structure. Through these relations, established by the proletarian revolution, the nature of the Soviet Union as a proletarian state is for us basically defined." (Revolution Betrayed, p. 248).

Our movement has never maintained that statification of the means of production equals a socialist economy and society. But we have maintained that in order to reach that stage it is necessary to go through the statification of all the means of production, of transport and exchange, and that this statification can never be attained in a capitalist state. We have always rejected categorically the theories of state capitalism, according to which capitalism so-to-speak tends toward the statification of the means of production and the planning of economy, and in the light of which there consequently is no fundamental qualitative difference between the concentration of monopolies in the United States, for example, and the USSR.

Concentration of monopolies can attain the highest degree, the group of monopolists controlling the economy can be reduced to an infinitesimal number of magnates -- but it nevertheless remains true that these monopolists really control the capitalist state and that the ever more intimate fusion of the state with the monopolists does not signify their progressive expropriation for the benefit of some so-called collective state capitalism; on the contrary, it marks the complete submission of the state to a tiny group of monopolists.

Between the most extensive partial statification and total statification promulgated by law (and consequently, by the state) the difference is not quantitative but qualitative. The change from the one to the other is not a reform, but a revolution. In this sense our movement has maintained that the statification of all the means of production, transport and exchange (including foreign trade) constitutes the social foundation of proletarian power. To bring about this statification in a capitalist state, we have maintained, it was necessary to have either a real proletarian revolution or a military-bureaucratic intervention of the Soviet bureaucracy in areas it occupied and wanted to keep under its control.

Up to this point we have only dealt with the general class structure of a given society characterized by its class relations and property relations.

The political power, the state, is the organ of a given society. In bourgeois society, in line with its property relations, political power has often changed form, passing from one social stratum to another or from one bureaucratic caste to another without altering the social foundations. For the state always remained the agent of the possessing class even under such extreme forms of Bonapartism as that of Kerensky or of Cardenas, and even under the regime of the Fascist bureaucracy; that is, even when the relation of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie obliges the latter to leave the state machine in the hands of a group of men who have acquired considerable independence with regard to it and have partially expropriated it politically.

A class can run the state machine directly or indirectly and can even be more or less removed from the reins of government at times, without any direct damage to the property relations and without any change in these relations.

In the case of a Soviet society in an isolated and backward country, that is, where the property relations are characterized by the general statification of the means of production, transport and exchange, our movement has considered it possible -- and partly, even inevitable -- for the proletariat in power to be expropriated politically in part, and even totally. Power has passed into the hands of a bureaucracy arising from the ranks of the proletariat, which defends with its own methods the social foundations established by the revolution (or by its military-bureaucratic intervention). The political power of the bureaucracy is proletarian not due to the structure of the state (of the state apparatus, of the political state machine), but because of the property relations of the society run by the bureaucracy and because of the function of the bureaucracy, which consists in defending (in its own fashion, to be sure) these social foundations.

If we examine the state apparatus of the Soviet bureaucracy in itself, there can be no doubt that this apparatus, by its composition and structure, is much closer to a bourgeois and even a Fascist state apparatus than to a proletarian state apparatus. Trotsky thought that in case a bourgeois party in the USSR overthrew the leading Soviet caste, the ensuing purge of the government services "would probably have to clean out fewer people than a revolutionary party." ("Revolution Betrayed," p. 253).



This apparatus nevertheless remains proletarian in the broad sociological sense of the term, because it runs a society whose property relations are not capitalist but are acquisitions of the proletarian revolution; that is, property relations which are characteristic of the first stage through which the transition from capitalism to socialism must necessarily pass, economically and socially; and because this apparatus defends (always in its own fashion) these social foundations. We have characterized this power as Bonapartist in order to indicate, as in analogous cases in bourgeois society, its conditions of birth, its role as arbiter in the social conflicts within Soviet society, its dynamics, its estrangement from the working class out of which it arose, its increased independence with regard to this class (much greater than the independence of any Bonapartist regime within capitalist society).

When we speak of a Bonapartist regime we do not necessarily mean a regime outside of, or above, or between the classes. Bonapartism has a definite class origin and class function. There is no Bonapartism in general. There is a bourgeois Bonapartism or a proletarian Bonapartism. That is, a Bonapartism of bourgeois origin, in spite of the degree of its political independence with regard to the capitalist class, in the last analysis defends capitalist property relations. A Bonapartism of proletarian origin in the last analysis defends the statification of the means of production, transport and exchange.

The composition and the structure of the state apparatus is of secondary importance in relation to the social framework and function of this apparatus. In the long run these factors (composition and structure) can naturally undermine the social foundations and make possible the return to the old property relationship. The existence of these factors signifies in reality that, within the social framework of the state characterized by statification of the means of production, transport and exchange, bourgeois relations in distribution continue to develop and are not progressively overcome, reduced or withered by a more rapid development of the socialist tendencies. Consequently, in the long run these bourgeois relations in distribution threaten to break down also the property relations characterized by the statification of the means of production.

The state established by the proletarian revolution in a country (especially in a backward and isolated country), we have maintained, is both proletarian and bourgeois: proletarian in its social foundations, in its property relations; bourgeois in its relation to distribution.

Our movement has explained this long enough and adequately enough so that, in my opinion, it is not necessary for us to dwell on it any more.

In the further course of this article we shall examine in the light of these general considerations the particular case of Yugoslavia and its relationship to the other buffer countries.

#### THE FACTS ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA

Of all the buffer countries, Yugoslavia actually represents a special case. It is special because of all the buffer countries only

Yugoslavia (with Greece next in order) has undergone a considerable period of civil war, intermeshed at first with the war against the imperialist invasion (1941-1944), and later on pursued quite clearly and quite thoroughly, up to 1947, against the remnants of the old ruling classes. The civil war was waged on the side of the peasant and worker masses by a deep-going and powerful mass movement -- the most important in all the occupied countries in Europe -- led by the Yugoslav CP. This movement gave this party the power.

In order to reach any conclusions on the case of the class nature of Yugoslavia, we must consider the facts as we know them and understand them, after more ample information and more mature reflection, on three essential points: the development of the civil war; the social transformations; the structure of the state.

### The Civil War

That there was a civil war in Yugoslavia as far back as the time of the invasion and that, more precisely, the struggle waged by the Yugoslav masses against the imperialist invaders was intermeshed from the outset with a struggle against the ruling classes in this country--- this we have had occasion to note and to point out at that time. (Among others, in an article on the "War of the Balkan Partisans" that appeared in No. 2 of the mimeographed Quatrieme Internationale, the theoretical organ of the European Secretariat.)

In the article devoted to "The Yugoslav Affair" we further stressed the fact that the Yugoslav leaders, as distinct from all the other Stalinist leaders, have always emphasized the combined character of the struggle they led during the invasion and that they boasted of having had a clear line on this question from the outset. Here, for example, is how E. Kardelj sums up their position in the Report he presented to the 5th Congress of the Yugoslav CP: (In the further course of this article, we shall have to refer often to this report, which best sums up the exposition of facts cited by all the other Yugoslav leaders. The quotations are naturally long. But we thought it best not paraphrase them because the facts are little known in our movement and because the line of reasoning of the Yugoslav leaders on these facts is also important in itself.)

"The struggle against the invaders signified the struggle against the main danger threatening the basis of any further development of our peoples. The struggle against the invader at the same time meant help by our peoples -- according to their possibilities -- to the Soviet Union and all democratic, freedom-loving and anti-imperialist forces.

"But the question of struggle against the invader for liberation of the country was also immediately connected with the question of what the new Yugoslavia to emerge from that struggle would be like. That is why our National Liberation Movement from the very first fought under the slogan of national liberation and the creation of a true, democratic order in new Yugoslavia. The great motivating force in the struggle for the liberation of the country was the consciousness of the masses of the people that the liberated Yugoslavia would no longer be a country in which a handful of big businessmen and bankers

are the political and economic dictators of the working people, that it would not be a country in which national inequality and oppression holds sway, that it would not be a country whose life interests are sold whole-sale and retail to foreign imperialists. This consciousness gave the struggle of the people against the fascist marauders a deep meaning, it brought about great activity on the part of the masses of the people, it inevitably had to give that struggle a revolutionary character."

Kardelj underlines further on:

"In other words: the iron, internal logic of the National Liberation War, headed by the proletariat with its vanguard, and the acute posing of the question -- for or against the invader -- quickly and thoroughly, one after the other, destroyed the bases and platforms of the open and disguised treacherous reactionary forces of capitalism in Yugoslavia."

The Yugoslav leaders describe the main stages of the civil war in their country as follows:

1st Stage: Struggle against the invader and against Mihailovitch's Chetniks, representing the Yugoslav bourgeoisie and "allied" imperialism up to the first half of 1943.

2nd Stage: Following the "decisive military, moral and political defeats" suffered by Mihailovitch's partisans in that period, the Western imperialists and a section of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie changed tactics and oriented toward a compromise, "with the idea in mind of placing in leading positions in Yugoslavia as many followers of the old order as possible, as many agents of the bourgeoisie so as to paralyze the further development of the revolutionary gains of the national liberation uprising and to prepare the terrain for annulling these gains."

3rd Stage: The period of the "compromise" following the Tito-Shubashitch agreement. The Yugoslav leaders explain that they accepted this agreement "primarily for foreign policy reasons," but that in no case could this agreement "effect the further development of the revolutionary gains of the National Liberation War. The agreement first of all did not weaken the leading role of the working class and the CP -- and this was basic in that phase of our struggle. On the other hand, the agreement strengthened the international position of new Yugoslavia and in the final analysis the people's authority as well. That is how the so-called tactic of 'compromise' that is, the tactic of the 'Trojan horse' met with failure. Our Party drove this 'Trojan horse' out into the open too."

4th Stage: It opens with the liberation of Yugoslavia and the formation of a united government "of democratic, federated Yugoslavia, into which entered such outstanding representatives of the old order in Yugoslavia as Shubashitch, Grol and Shuty." (The cooptation of certain representatives of the bourgeois parties and the formation of this government) "were followed by increased mobilization and political activity -- primarily outside the ranks of the People's Front -- of the reactionary, capitalist elements in town and country, on the

counter-revolutionary platform of the liquidation of the achievements of the national liberation struggle. These activities were masked behind the name 'democratic opposition' outside of the People's Front."

Parallel to the rising activity of this "legal opposition" an opposition was carried on "by the openly counter-revolutionary and traitorous forces which passed underground after the fall of Hitler's Germany went parallel to the activization of the so-called 'legal opposition.' All through 1945 attempts were made to gather together the broken chetnik forces of Mihailovitch, to reorganize the ustashi renegades and to transform them into 'crusaders' under the patronage and leadership of the reactionary Catholic clergy, to revive the Slovene white guard gangs. All these attempts were made upon the initiative of and in constant cooperation with various imperialist intelligence services."

This stage ended, however, with the defeat "of the capitalist reaction and its political representatives Shubashitch, Grol, etc." On the other hand, "the popular power in Yugoslavia" became constantly stronger.

"The national question in Yugoslavia was solved on the basis of socialist internationalism, and not on the basis of bourgeois nationalism, it was solved in the spirit of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin. The removal of the remnants of feudalism in Yugoslav agriculture, agrarian reform, giving the land from the big estates to the peasants -- all this was carried out in the interests of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the working peasantry, as the result of a series of restrictive measures calculated to limit, to crush the capitalist elements in the village.

"The entire process of the reconstruction of the war devastated Yugoslav economy unfolded through struggle for strengthening the positions of the socialist sector in the national economy, through merciless squaring of accounts with the saboteurs of reconstruction, with speculators, with war profiteers and other elements who wanted to enrich themselves at the people's expense. Such anti-people's elements were expropriated, arrested and sentenced. The laws brought at the III Session of the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, as the temporary national assembly, dealt a hard blow to the main bearers of reaction in Yugoslavia."

5th Stage: It is characterized by the formation of "a 'democratic opposition' within the People's Front itself against the leading role of the Communist party." Kardelj describes this stage as follows:

"After failure and defeat in the open struggle against the People's Front and the achievements of the national liberation war, the internal reactionary cliques and foreign interventional reaction transferred their activities to the People's Front itself. It is clear that the internal development of our country in the direction of strengthening of socialist measures by the people's authority had to bring about a certain seething in the People's Front, an activization of elements that were linked with the capitalist system, an activization of politicians in the service of foreign elements. The bearers of the resistance in the People's Front to the lines of the

Party and the government were all sorts of kulak ideologists of the type of Dragoljub Jovanovic, people who kept under cover during the war so that they could insinuate themselves into the ranks of the People's Front.

"Relying on support from abroad, Dragoljub Jovanovic attempted to establish an 'opposition block,' the so-called 'peasant block,' in the framework of the People's Front but in alliance with the reactionaries outside of the Front. Governed by the kulak theory of the essential antagonism between the interests of the working class and the peasantry as a whole, he attempted to break up the People's Front and to split up the working class and working peasantry."

"He was quickly driven out into the open by the concrete measures of the people's authority directed towards smashing the positions of capitalism in our economy and on suppression of the capitalist elements. Especially during the discussion in the National Assembly on the bill for nationalization of economic enterprises in December, 1946, Dragoljub Jovanovic was finally unmasked not only as an ideologist of the rich owners in the village but also as a herald of all internal reaction and as an agent of foreign imperialism."

6th Stage: It opens in the year 1947 which was marked on the one hand by "an important turn in the development of Yugoslavia on the road to socialism" through the adoption in April 1947 of the first Five Year Plan, and on the other by "an aggravation of the class struggle."

"The great successes of the people's authority in the reconstruction of the country, in smashing reactionary groups in our country to their foundations and in breaking up the renegade gangs and other bases for foreign imperialist intervention in Yugoslavia -- all this forced reaction in the country and outside of it to resort to new forms of struggle against the new Yugoslavia."

"Many people who were sent to Yugoslavia in 1944-45 as 'friends of the national liberation struggle' had their masks torn off and were shown to be common spies of foreign imperialism. They got in touch with the remnants of broken reactionary groups and together with them set up spy centers and supplied enemies abroad with 'information' about Yugoslavia; they fabricated slanders, attempted to organize diversionary actions and sabotage under the direct leadership and help of foreign imperialist intelligence centers, hired terrorists and attempted to organize renegade groups. The main task of the foreign imperialist agents in our country after the war was and is: to give moral, material and organizational support to the remnants of the former ruling classes in Yugoslavia, to interfere as much as possible in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, to gather all necessary information for their foreign masters."

Kardelj does not believe that this stage is finished. He says, on the contrary:

"Although we have achieved great successes one must not, however, forget that the enemy has not been liquidated by far. Capitalist elements are still strong here. They depend on the moral and

material support of foreign imperialists and reactionaries. That is why one must always keep in mind that although our successes in the realization of the Five Year Plan are undermining the foundations on which capitalist elements rest and renew themselves, nevertheless the process of struggle for a socialist path of development is inevitably accompanied by the sharpening of the resistance of classes that are receding from the historical scene. This resistance is also reflected in various forms and by various elements within the People's Front, and even in the Party itself. These are mainly people who are in some way linked up with the exploiting strata (like certain strata of the intelligentsia), either through force of habit and tradition, through earlier social position or in some other way, or who have been frightened by the difficulties that must be overcome. The sharpening of the class struggle on the basis of socialist development gives birth to irresoluteness, hypocritical behavior, tendencies to desert to the camp of the enemy among such elements."

Summing up this whole evolution of the class struggle in Yugoslavia, Kardelj says:

"From the above, it is apparent that a process of people's revolution was taking place through the national liberation war in our country which had more and more of a socialist character. From the beginning up to the present, the constant revolutionary struggle passed through several phases determined in the first place by the development of the national liberation war against the fascist aggressors and their aides in the country. But what gave that process, from the beginning of the national liberation uprising up to today, its main characteristic was the leading role of the working class headed by the CP and ever closer grouping of the masses around it.

"From the very beginning our Party kept in mind the inevitability of such a process and it was on this perspective that it formed its policy during the war. The question of preparations for and development of the socialist revolution were for the Party indivisibly connected with the question of the development of the national liberation uprising. Our Party would not be the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working class had it not put these questions thus under the given conditions. The CPY formed its policy on the perspective that the treacherous capitalist class would be stripped completely bare before the masses of the people as an ally of the invader. Under such conditions, the national liberation uprising had to turn not only against the invader but against the traitorous bourgeoisie as well. And this further means that, under such conditions, the masses of the people had inevitably to rally around the working class, around the CP, and the bourgeoisie, increasing its ties with the invader, had to become ever more isolated from the masses of the people."

This is the version given by all the Yugoslav leaders on the combined character of their "revolution." It remains to be seen if this reasoning of the Yugoslav leaders corresponds to reality, to the actual social relations and the actual structure of the state.

### The Social Transformations

In the course of the war itself, the Yugoslav leaders maintain, "it was impossible to bring about important changes in the solution of the tasks of the socialist revolution within the economic sphere." What was solved in the course of the war, however, "was the fundamental problem of the socialist revolution, the problem of overthrowing the capitalist bourgeoisie and the establishment of a popular power in which the working class held the incontestable leadership."

The economic and social transformations in reality began only after the war. The Yugoslav leaders make a distinction between two stages in this process which correspond to two stages in the relationship of the social forces in Yugoslavia and in the international situation:

a. The period from 1944 to the middle of 1946, called the "reconstruction" period, when "the reactionary bourgeoisie, although unmasked within the country, found support in world reaction" and "when a struggle was waged for international recognition of Yugoslavia, for the consolidation of its international positions." For this reason the party at that stage took care not to "get ahead of itself by premature measures." Nevertheless some essential measures were taken in that period, consisting of the following:

"1. collaborators with the invader, traitors and economic collaborators were expropriated. This was carried out partly during the war and partly after the war;

"2. the property of foreign capitalists who served the invaders was sequestered;

"3. war profit was taken away from all those who made that profit through doing business during the occupation;

"4. a whole series of measures were undertaken in 1945 which practically liquidated the private banking system and enabled the state to take over the entire banking system;

"5. measures of state control over foreign trade were undertaken which meant, practically, state monopoly of foreign trade;

"6. agrarian reform was carried out which liquidated big landed estates and feudal remnants in land relationships, while simultaneously dealing a blow at village capitalist elements, restricting land possessions to a maximum of 30-35 hectares and making it legally impossible for private persons to have more than the maximum amount of land;

"7. a whole series of other measures was undertaken which meant essential restriction of capitalist elements such as, for instance: currency reform which dealt a hard blow at those having big stocks of money, to war speculators and to capitalist elements in general; the restriction of private ownership of real estate (land) by various measures all the way up to the prohibition of transactions without a permit from the state organs; a tax system on the basis of a progressive tax scale, etc."

b. The second period, 1946-1947. This is the period of the elaboration and the application of the Five Year Plan which "boldly brought Yugoslavia on to the road of building socialism." To carry out this plan, it was necessary to "activize the nationalizations," which was done by the law of December 1946:

"Nationalization was well prepared organizationally and was carried out in such a way that sabotage and damage were made impossible. All enterprises in the entire country were taken over on the same day and almost at the same time without the stopping of production. Our working masses welcomed the nationalization as a great step forward in the struggle for socialism, in the struggle for the liquidation of the exploitation of man by man, for a better future for our working people. This nationalization thoroughly liquidated the private sector in industry of federal and republican significance, in banking, in transportation and in wholesale trade, while the state took over 70% of local industry.

"The December nationalization made the socialist sector of our economy the leading sector in the economic development of our country."

Throughout this period "the organization of the network of state and cooperative trade and the liquidation of private retail trade also went on." (Boris Kidric, "The Building of the Socialist Economy in Yugoslavia," Report presented to the 5th Congress of the CPY.)

By March 31, 1948 private business houses were already down to only 1.78%, while the state firms had attained 39.91% and the cooperatives 58.31% of the total retail trade.

Summing up the results of all these economic and social transformations, Kardelj describes the social foundations of the new Yugoslavia as follows:

"1. the socialist sector includes all of industry, the entire credit system, transport, wholesale trade and almost all retail trade;

"2. the capitalist sector in the cities has been reduced to remnants which can no longer exert a serious influence on the development of our economy while it is still an important factor in agriculture; the people's authority has a policy of constant restriction of capitalist elements in the village in that respect;

"3. small scale production in the village and in the towns is linked up with the socialist sector through cooperatives and various other forms; the cooperative sector has strengthened considerably in the village..."

It is interesting to study the following table, to which the Yugoslav leaders refer in order to show that, due to special conditions, they went much faster and much more extensively into the sphere of economic and social transformations than did the USSR itself during the first decade of its existence and up to "the year of the great turn, 1929."



U.S.S.R.

<u>Years</u>	<u>Industry</u>		<u>Wholesale Trade</u>	
	<u>Socialist Sector</u>	<u>Private</u>	<u>Socialist Sector</u>	<u>Private</u>
1924 - 1925	81%	19%	58%	9%
1926 - 1927	86%	14%	68%	32%

"In our country," the Yugoslav leaders say (Boris Kidric, Ibid.), "in the first year after the liberation, 55% of industry was already in the hands of the state, and 27% was under state requisition which amounted in practice to nationalization in every respect. At the end of the second year after the liberation, the state sector already included all federation-wide and republic-wide (Yugoslavia, under the new constitution is a Federation of autonomous Republics -- Tr.) industry as well as 70% of all local industry. The state sector already includes all banking institutions, all big business, all transport and means of communication and 90% of all retail trade. Foreign trade is completely a state monopoly. In 1948, all industry, all wholesale trade, all the banks and the overwhelming majority of retail establishments are in the socialist sector, while all remaining private trade is in the process of liquidation."

In the sphere of the distribution of the national income, the social transformations in Yugoslavia are expressed as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Income</u> (in billions of dinars)	<u>Capitalist</u> <u>Elements -</u> <u>Urban</u>	<u>Capitalist</u> <u>Elements -</u> <u>Rural</u>	<u>Workers</u> <u>and Em-</u> <u>ployees</u>	<u>Small</u> <u>and</u> <u>Middle</u> <u>Rural</u> <u>Exploi-</u> <u>ters</u>	<u>Anti-</u> <u>state</u> <u>&amp;</u> <u>Others</u>	<u>State</u>
1937	44.2	30 %	16 %	14%	19 %	5%	16%
1947	133	3.4%	11.7%	25%	22 %	2%	36%
1948	_____	1.5%	10 %	25%	23.5%	2%	38%

There is still the agrarian policy applied since the "liberation" in Yugoslavia, to go into. It tends (a) to set back the capitalist elements in the countryside; (b) to prepare the conditions for the collectivization of agricultural economy.

The Yugoslav leaders maintain that there has been no nationalization of the land in Yugoslavia because, in contrast to Czarist Russia where the peasant was a tenant and demanded the per capita division of the lands confiscated from the big landowners, the Yugoslav peasants in 1945 possessed the land in the following proportions; more than 50% of the land belonged to small and middle proprietors holding less than 10 hectares (25 acres); then came a category of more

well-to-do middle peasants and then one of rich peasants holding up to 30 hectares (70 acres); only 10% of the land belonged to proprietors possessing more than 30 hectares.

The agrarian reform has brought more than half, that is 52.73%, of all land holdings, within the state sector or within rural work-cooperatives, and less than half, that is, 47.27% has been given to individual peasants.

The agricultural work-cooperatives resemble to a great extent, in form as well as in content, the Soviet Kolkhozes whose property, it must not be forgotten, "differs little from group ownership." "In the collective farms, cooperative or group ownership is combined in various proportions with state and private ownership. The land, although legally belonging to the state, has been transferred to the collectives for 'perpetual' use, which differs little from group ownership." (L.T., "Revolution Betrayed" p. 234.) In reality, "within the agricultural work-cooperatives, which represent the highest form of agricultural cooperation, the peasants contribute their share of small holdings in order to set up big collective farms; they till the soil in common, utilize the means of production in common, apply planning methods and conform to modern farm technique." (Yugoslav Information Bulletin--in French-- July 1949.)

As of January 1, 1949 there were 1,318 such cooperatives in Yugoslavia. By the end of March 1949 more than 2,800 new work-cooperatives were registered, taking in 110,000 families and disposing of about 510,000 hectares (1¼ million acres) of land.

In June 1949 the Congress of peasant cooperators held in Belgrade adopted new model statutes regarding the development of agricultural work-cooperatives of a higher "purely socialist" type, in which not only the means of production but the land as well become common property, and in which remuneration is based solely on labor applied.

As to the remaining individual peasants and the general struggle against the redivision of the land and the enrichment of the Kulaks, the following measures have been taken:

Any increase in land-holdings above 30 hectares is prohibited by law.

"Furthermore, any purchase or sale of land, above 30 hectares likewise, is prohibited without authorization of the popular authorities. Finally, all land distributed according to the laws of agrarian reform must not be sold before a lapse of 20 years, nor rented or mortgaged, either entirely or in part. We must also cite in this connection the second paragraph of article 14 of the Constitution which declares that 'all mineral or other wealth under ground, the waters, including mineral and medicinal waters, the sources of natural power, the means of rail and air transport, the postal, telegraph, telephone and broadcasting services are all people's property. It is also necessary to mention in this connection that the law of expropriation permits the state to expropriate any land necessary for the development of our industry, our communications, etc.'" (Boris Kidric, Report to 5th Congress).

"Land speculators who do not fulfill their obligations to the state incur severe penalties extending, in the most serious cases, to the confiscation of their property. The latest decree of the federal government concerning obligatory grain deliveries and trade based on tied prices is an important new step toward the curbing of the capitalist elements in the villages. By the terms of this decree, the rich peasants must sell the state at fixed prices a much greater part of their wheat stocks than they had to deliver up to the present, that is, from 80 to 95%. Furthermore, only working peasants, agricultural work-cooperatives and farms of the general cooperative type can in future sell their products at tied prices, while rich land holdings are excluded from the benefits of this measure." (Yugoslav Information Bulletin, in French, July 1949).

All of these measures lead the Yugoslav leaders to draw the conclusion that

"as to preventing the enrichment of capitalist elements in the countryside and the possibility of the middle peasant becoming a capitalist speculator by means of land purchases, we have practically accomplished what had been intended by the nationalization decree of 1917, and the same thing as that put into practice by the Soviets in the Baltic republics where, it is true, nationalization was proclaimed but the land at the same time was turned over to the possession of the peasants." (Boris Kidric, Report to the 5th Congress).

#### The Structure of the State

We have already had occasion to point out that all the Yugoslav leaders who maintain that their revolution had special characteristics refer above all to the "popular" and "revolutionary" character of the "new power" which they were able to establish in place of the old state apparatus even in the course of the "war of liberation." Kardelj writes:

"An especially important characteristic of our national liberation uprising is to be found especially in that the National Liberation Army as a revolutionary armed force of the people grew out of it, on the one hand, and on the other hand that it gave rise to the national liberation committees as organs of true democracy, new people's authorities. Through the entire war, our Party considered the National Liberation Army and national liberation committees as the two greatest achievements of the national liberation uprising. They are, in the final analysis, one and the same thing: the people's authority and its armed forces, that is, the armed force of the people without which the people could not be in authority. These achievements were defended perseveringly by our Party during the entire national liberation uprising and after it, repelling all attacks by reactionary force which directed their main blows especially against them."

"Our people's democracy, as it has been built up under our conditions, is actually one that is proletarian in form, that is, a socialist democracy."

The Yugoslav leaders already held these views in July 1948, and even long before.

The People's Committees in Yugoslavia appeared "in our liberated towns and villages, as early as the first days of the national liberation uprising," that is, from 1941 on. At that time they were considered "not only as organs of the people against the invaders, but also as organs of authority on the liberated territory." The masses themselves, the Yugoslav leaders acknowledge, filled the committees with such a content; and the merit of the party, according to its leaders, lay in having understood from the outset the twofold importance of the committees and in working for the consolidation and the development of these committees.

From the outset, the reactionaries concentrated their main attacks against the committees, but without success. On the contrary, in the course of 1942-1943 the People's Committees grew stronger, expanded and "linked up" also "vertically."

"The II Session of the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, in November 1943, finished the process of linking up the national liberation committees as regards principle and organization into a unified system of people's authority and laid the foundation for its leading executive apparatus."

Here is a more detailed description of this "new state apparatus" which was built up during the war and which, in the words of the Yugoslav leaders, permitted them "to carry out in a very short time the purge of the remnants of the old apparatus and to pass through very rapidly the crisis of organization." (Kardelj):

"Leading the masses of the people in the destruction of the old apparatus of authority and in the building of the new people's authority, our Party was governed by basic Marxist-Leninist principles in regard to the state and revolution and also by the rich experience from the development and work of the Soviet authorities in the USSR. The basic principles of the building up of our people's authority are principles of the building up of Soviet democracy, naturally, not entering into the differences as regards class essence. This, further, is not a question of differences of principle but differences in the forms of application of these principles. Our national liberation committees were, from the very beginning, just like the Soviets, set up as directly elected and recallable organs of the people's authority, as 'the permanent and only basis of the entire state authority, of the entire state apparatus.' (Lenin, Works, XXIV, p. 13). And our people's authority, like the Soviet, is a 'united, constituted local soviet in a general state organization.' (Stalin: Questions of Leninism, p. 42, Kultura Pub.). The system of our people's authority (the national committees and national assembly, both republican and federal with their executive organs) has been built on the principles of unity of authority both on the local, republican and federal levels. The direct self-government of the people is also simultaneously reflected in national liberation committees; through them our working masses, through their representatives, directly participate in the work of all branches of state administration and control them. On the other hand, our people's authority from top to bottom is firmly linked into one unified system on the basis of vertical ties between the various branches of state authority and administration and the lower organs whose duty it is, within the framework of the competence of the higher

organs, to carry out all tasks which they put before them. The federative system at the same time, fully insures national equality, undisturbed, comprehensive development of all our peoples, uninterrupted development of their culture in the spirit of socialism, that is, culture which is national in form and socialist in content. Such principles of the building of our people's authority enables them, on the one hand, to link themselves more firmly with the masses of the people and to attract them more and more into participation in all branches of state administration, and on the other hand, to insure the systematic qualitative elevation of the state apparatus, constant improvement of methods of work and continual struggle against bureaucracy."

It is necessary to cite the criticism which the Yugoslav leaders themselves had to make of their "Soviet organization" and which shows in what sense they intended to intervene in this sphere:

"In the further building up of our people's authority we must constantly keep in mind the task of making the national committees, on the one hand, truly people's committees, that is, enabling the full control and participation of the working masses, of their representatives, in the work of state administration and on the other hand of increasing their technical qualification so that they can carry out their tasks better. In that connection I should especially like to emphasize a few concrete and immediate tasks.

"1. It is necessary to develop and strengthen side by side both the horizontal connections of individual branches of the state administration on a local scale with the executive national committee, and their vertical connections with higher leadership of the state administration, that is, with the ministries. In this regard mistakes are made here by going from one extreme to the other. Some comrades have fallen into a kind of petty bourgeois, formal democracy which consists in a one sided orientation only towards the closest possible horizontal connections of individual local leaderships of the state administration with the executive people's national committees. If we should go along this line alone we would destroy unity of state authority, destroy the principle of democratic centralism, split up the state authority into a splintered network of disconnected national committees which would not only obstruct the development of the national committees themselves and their qualitative improvement but would weaken the state in general.

"On the other hand some comrades have the tendency to neglect, to underestimate horizontal connections of individual branches, state administration with the executive national committees, tendency to divorce the national committees, as much as possible from the business of administration and to have them develop in the main only along vertical lines. Practically, this means that such tendencies weaken the role of the national committee in general, and of the executive national committee altogether. These are tendencies of bureaucratic centralism which have no connection with creative democratic centralism which is an absolutely necessary base for the development of state apparatus, and state leadership. Such tendencies lead to the return of bourgeois forms of authority, to the liquidation of the control of

the people over the state administration, and transform the national committees into common representative organs without a real role in carrying out authority. This means that such tendencies hit at the basic principles on which our people's authority is built.

"It is clear that energetic measures must be taken against both deviations. The principle of double responsibility of individual leading organs of the administration in the national committees, that is, responsibility to executive national committees and to higher leadership of the corresponding branch of state administration, for instance to a ministry, must be unconditionally put into effect in such a way that both quick and direct leadership of the higher organs of the state administration and direct organizational leadership and control of the national committees are ensured."

In June 1949 Kardelj presented to the National Assembly a report dealing with a law on the People's Committees which, he declared, "modifies and in fact amends to a considerable extent the existing law on the People's Committees" (that of 1946).

We have not, unfortunately, been able as yet to obtain the complete text of this new law. But from Kardelj's long speech at its presentation it appears clearly that the new law takes into account the criticisms formulated previously by the Yugoslav leaders; that is, that their "Soviet organization" must become both more democratic and more centralized, so as to be able to increase the participation of the masses in the conduct of the state but at the same time bring about greater efficiency.

"By its profoundly democratic character and its concrete organizational elaboration," Kardelj declared, "this Law constitutes an extremely powerful stride forward for the development of our socialist state structure and, as such, this Law is at the same time an important contribution to the theory and practice of socialist development. It has been our intention, in full harmony with the principle of unity of authority and democratic centralism, to give the broadest possible expression to the profound democratic aspiration of the masses in relation to self-government, to participation in government of the state, which has always been the characteristic of all genuinely popular governments in the world and must indeed be characteristic of the revolutionary proletariat and of socialist democracy." (Information Bulletin of the Yugoslav Embassy, June 7, 1949.)

In the further course of his speech Kardelj delivered a closely reasoned polemic against the conception of "people's democracy" as a distinct stage of capitalism and of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a conception held until their recent turn in December 1948 by the "theoreticians" of these so-called people's democracies and one which has never been shared by the Yugoslav leaders.

Moreover, stressing the differences which still exist between the system of power established in Yugoslavia and that which characterizes the other "people's democracies," Kardelj sums up these differences as follows:\*

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\*Boris Kidric, in his report on "The Building of the Socialist

Economy in Yugoslavia," has devoted an interesting passage to the "fundamental difference" between the other so-called people's democracies and Yugoslavia. Here it is:

"There is a fundamental difference between the other people's democracies and us. This difference is that the revolutionary processes which were concluded by us with the final liberation and the developments following immediately after the war were only begun by them with the liberation.

"This fact, naturally, is evident from the rhythm, the form and, for a given period, the character of their economic development.

"In the given economic and social conditions of development we distinguished ourselves above all in this:

"a. That in our country the people's power was born and triumphed completely in the course of the war of liberation, which was led by the C.P.Y., while in the neighboring countries the people's power began to grow and to crystallize only after the liberation. From the economic and social point of view this difference took such form that we were able very rapidly to undertake the building of the socialist economy because we had established a consolidated people's power on a revolutionary basis, while the other people's democracies still had to give their attention to the questions of power. Compared with us, that naturally retarded considerably their economic measures of a socialist character.

"b. That our people's front, organized and led by the C.P.Y. during the war of liberation, took on the character of a unified mass organization of the laboring population -- which became even more evident after the liberation -- whereas the people's fronts in the other people's democracies still include today strong coalition elements and thus express as a consequence, the influence of manufacturers, tradesmen, Kulaks, etc.

"c. That we were able, in view of the above facts, to proceed very swiftly, energetically and systematically to the liquidation of the last vestiges of the old state apparatus and to the systematic organization, socialist in form as well as in content, of the state apparatus, in its administrative as well as in its economic sector; while in the other people's democracies this process, once again in view of the above facts, took on the much slower tempo of purging the old state apparatus.

"From the social and economic point of view this difference is so evident that our economic measures against the capitalist positions have very quickly assumed a purely socialist character, while in the other people's democracies this process is much slower."

These differences are real. But to what degree can they justify a qualitative difference, a difference in class nature, between Yugoslavia and the other people's democracies? That is a subject I do not wish to go into in this article. The discussion in the International will most probably give us occasion, and even force us, to come back to it.

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There still exist in these countries remnants of the old bourgeois state which are evident: in the survival of parliamentarism, the divided authority, the absence of local organs of the people's power, in place of which are functioning organs directly dependent upon the Ministry of the Interior. Where such organs of people's authority (councils) exist, these are appointed from above. Thus, for instance, in Bulgaria local authority was exercised until April 1948 by mayors and clerks, local and county chiefs, all appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. In Rumania, up to the beginning of this year the municipalities, districts and county were administered by functionaries appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. The law on people's councils in Rumania only dates back to January 1949. In Hungary "the old bourgeois system of division of authority is almost full in force." In Poland also there are still (June 1949) no elected councils. People's councils were created after the liberation with the participation of representatives delegated by "all democratic parties and organizations."

Kardelj explains these vestiges of the "old bourgeois regime" still existing in the other people's democracies by the fact that, contrary to Yugoslavia where there was a revolutionary mass movement "under the leadership of the C.P.Y.," in the other countries "there was no broad participation of the masses in the struggle for power," and for that reason the old state apparatus could not be destroyed completely from the beginning.

The extension of power accorded to the people's committees by the law of June 1949 is explained by the Yugoslav leaders as the consequence of the extension of the "socialist" conquests in the country.

Tito, in his speech to the 5th Congress of the party, had already spoken of the necessity "that at the first occasion" the text of the constitution itself, adopted in January 1946, should be "partially modified, especially (in the part) concerning the social and economic organization" of Yugoslavia, in order the better to give expression to the development of the social and economic structure of the country "which had already gone so much further" since that time.

"In several respects," Kardelj concluded his speech on the presentation of the new law on committees, "life itself has overtaken the first Law on the people's committees, adopted in conditions when the socialist construction of Yugoslavia was in its infancy.

"The socialist sector, at that time, embraced only big and middle industry, wholesale trade, banking, etc., while the sector of local economy remained in the main in capitalist hands.

". . . Now, however, the socialist sector predominates in local economy and trade as well and has begun to assume broad scope in agriculture too. The people's committees have become direct leaders in all the work of economic, cultural and social construction."

#### Criticism of Facts and Conclusions

The civil war in Yugoslavia was intermeshed with the "national war of liberation" and was waged by the peasant and worker masses,



led by the Communist Party, against the possessing classes and their armed forces.

This civil war, going on for a number of years, naturally did not at any time assume the aspect of a genuine proletarian revolution. For two reasons: (a) because it arose as a natural and necessary extension of the war waged against the invaders; because it developed under the special conditions of the imperialist war in a country already occupied; (b) because the mass movement in which the poor peasant element predominated was led by the Communist Party, indoctrinated with Stalinism and conforming more or less to the political line of the Kremlin during the second world war.\*

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\*We say more or less because, in reality, the Yugoslav Communist Party was able to vanquish only to the extent that it was not a Stalinist party like the others and did not execute the general line of the Kremlin like the others. The Yugoslav leaders have revealed that even during the war the Kremlin directives on Yugoslavia conflicted with their own line on more than one important point. Thus, in the article by the Yugoslav leader Tempo on the policy of the Greek CP published in Borba September 12, 1949, he discloses that in 1944 the Kremlin "advised" the Yugoslavs "to dissolve the party organizations into the army, to abolish the political commissions, to remove the red stars from their caps...in order not to furnish international bourgeois reaction with arguments and thus not to weaken, so to speak, the anti-Hitler coalition forces." The Kremlin even went further: it "advised" them "not to solve the question of power in a revolutionary fashion, but to reach an understanding with the traitorous counter-revolutionary reaction grouped around Draja Mihailovitch, to 'temporarily' recognize the monarchy and to solve the question of power by parliamentary methods of struggle after the liberation of the country." The Yugoslav CP succeeded only because its course was in reality fundamentally different from this line.

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The conjuncture of these two conditions of necessity deformed the free development of the civil war to a great extent, affecting its forms, its organs, its ideological and political line and disfiguring its transformation into a genuine proletarian revolution.

The Yugoslav leaders, who lay such stress on the special characteristics of the revolutionary process in Yugoslavia, who claim to have had a clear line on the final objective of the struggle waged in Yugoslavia from the outset, who emphasize the creation of the people's committees as organs of the new power, at the same time also boast of their struggle against "sectarianism" by "combining the forms of unity with the masses from below with the forms of coalition at the top." (Kardelj Report.)

"It is true," they hasten to add, "that these forms of coalition never played an important part, but they helped create a broad mass base for the front of national liberation." Furthermore, they say, these coalitions helped in establishing the international position

of Yugoslavia and in safeguarding the unity of the international "anti-Hitler front" led by the USSR.

In truth these coalition forms were part of the line imposed by the Kremlin upon all the Communist parties and furthermore helped the bureaucracies of the different parties in the occupied countries, including Yugoslavia, to firmly control the mass movement and to prevent this mass movement from developing freely and independently of the bureaucracy itself.

Nevertheless, despite these restrictions and these obstacles, there can be no doubt that the civil war in Yugoslavia assumed a scope which went far beyond anything produced in the other occupied countries, including Greece, and that the Yugoslav CP played a role which conflicted on more than one point with the line of conduct of the other Communist parties.

The mere fact of the creation, development and consolidation of the people's committees, no matter how bureaucratic we consider these, distinguished the revolutionary process in Yugoslavia in essence from that in all the other occupied countries.\*

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\*In Greece, for instance, despite the extent of the civil war and the enthusiastic participation of the masses in the struggle, the Greek CP pursued a line deliberately opposed to taking power, holding the view that this country belonged to the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence. This line was expressed, among other things, in the failure to create people's committees as organs of power -- as the Yugoslav leaders point out today -- on the territory controlled by the Greek CP and in the mere renovation of the old municipalities coupled with the organization of popular tribunals.

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These committees were indisputably embryos of a new state apparatus, with a different class content. The fact that they were rapidly bureaucratized, that they never became free mass organs of power merely expresses the bureaucratic Stalinist character of the political leadership of the revolutionary mass movement, of the C.P.Y., which made sure both of the political and economic destruction of the old ruling classes as well as of its control over the masses.

But these committees, despite their bureaucratic deformation, filled a precise social role: they destroyed the political and economic foundations of the old ruling classes in Yugoslavia; they made possible a change in property relations concretized in the statification of all the means of production, exchange and transport, as is now the case in Yugoslavia, as well as in the regime that characterizes its agriculture; they replaced the old state apparatus by a new type which, up to the present, defends (in its own fashion), consolidates and extends the new property relations.

The facts indicate that there was actually, fundamentally, throughout the civil war and with the development of the people's

committees, a destruction of the old state apparatus and of the old property relations. The resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the IEC does not, by the way, deny this fact.

Was there a reconstruction of a new bourgeois state later on? The comrades who tend to pose such a question must not forget to bear in mind the following considerations: As we indicated in the course of this article, property relations in Yugoslavia changed fundamentally in the period 1945-1947 and not before then. The more advanced measures to transform agriculture in a collectivist direction and to strike at the Kulaks economically began in 1947 and continue to be extended at present. Does the accentuation of these measures square with a bourgeois restoration?

As to the state -- the state as political apparatus has not ceased to be based on the system of committees, and this system, far from being held back, is growing and increasing its functions. At least that's the sense, as we have noted, of the new law of June 1949 on the people's committees.

Naturally, in this evolution of the state it is necessary, in my opinion, to distinguish between the strengthening of its anti-capitalist character and its bureaucratic character, the real administrators of this state being the bureaucracy (young as it is) which arose mainly from the ranks of the revolutionary mass movement, of the Yugoslav CP in particular.

This bureaucracy bases itself on new property relations and, in this sense, it is anti-capitalist. In order to defend, consolidate and extend this base, it requires a new state apparatus capable of controlling and holding in check the remnants of the old possessing classes that have fallen from power. That is the role of the people's committees. But, on the other hand, the bureaucracy is an expression of the fact that bourgeois norms of distribution still exist in Yugoslavia and that it must defend these against the masses themselves. For this reason the bureaucracy which maintains these committees tries to control them bureaucratically.

However, even on this plane, it is possible to support the thesis that the Yugoslav state apparatus is at the present time far less bureaucratic as yet than that in the USSR, by the fact alone that it has only just arisen from the ranks of the masses and that it does not yet possess the extensive material base possessed by the Soviet bureaucracy.

The fact that the state (state apparatus) remains bourgeois in its function of maintaining and defending the bourgeois norms of distribution, and partly also in its social composition and in its structure, conducted as it is by a bureaucracy studded with many elements of the old state apparatus, is a factor which in the long run will have a destructive effect on the property relations. But only the actual destruction of these property relations will indicate the reestablishment of capitalism in Yugoslavia.

To say that there is no genuine proletarian state apparatus in this country is not sufficient as a refutation of the anti-capitalist

class character of Yugoslav society, which arose from the transformations of the civil war and which is characterized by new property relations which no capitalist state can attain by its own development.

To be sure, we know that the nature of political power in a workers' state is indissolubly linked to property relations, and in this concrete sense:

Trotsky explained in the "Revolution Betrayed" (p. 250), in discussing the USSR, that in a capitalist regime political power can only aid or impede capitalist development, while the productive forces based on private property and competition work automatically -- as it were -- in their own favor and, thanks to their productive superiority, render impossible a feudal restoration. On the other hand, within the framework of an isolated workers' society, the property relations established by the revolution "are indivisibly bound up with the new state as their repository."

The state apparatus, the political power, must be firmly on the side of the proletariat and its socialist tendencies if the petty bourgeois and bourgeois tendencies which continue to exist and to be reborn within the framework of the new property relations are not to submerge the socialist tendencies and not to destroy in the end these property relations themselves. That is, the political power must throw its weight into the economic sphere and actively support these socialist tendencies.

In the long run, naturally, the socialist tendencies can only be victorious if the revolution extends its base and embraces an ever greater sector of world economy. In any case, these considerations lead to the conclusion that the question of the character of the political power is not decisive for the class character of a society but only for its future, genuine socialist development.

The class character of a society is determined above all, let us repeat once more, by its class relations, by its property relations.

In Yugoslavia, the existence of a state apparatus, a political power, which is not genuinely proletarian, and the lack of a material base (much more limited even than that of the USSR) to permit planning (which is constantly and seriously compromised by dependence on the capitalist market) as well as a sufficient development of the productive forces capable of giving state property a socialist character -- these are two factors which jointly will have the effect of throwing Yugoslav society back toward capitalism once more, much more quickly than in the case of the USSR, in the event of continued isolation.

What is the final conclusion of this analysis regarding the class character of Yugoslavia?

In my opinion, the present Yugoslav society is the product of revolutionary transformations brought about by the mass movement that the C.P.Y. led and which resulted in: the destruction of the old capitalist property relations and their replacement by the almost total statification of the means of production, exchange and transport as well as by the regime in agriculture described above; the

destruction also of the old state apparatus and its replacement by a new apparatus based on committees led and controlled by a caste forming into a bureaucracy, which itself arose in its great majority from the revolutionary mass movement.

Yugoslav society has consequently ceased to be capitalist. This seems to me, by the way, to be the logical conclusion which the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the IEC also ought to reach, differentiating as it does constantly between the case of Yugoslavia and that of all the other buffer countries and emphasizing as it does the revolutionary character of the mass movement as well as the destruction of the old state apparatus by this movement.

Shall we call Yugoslavia a workers' state?

In that case we would have to add a workers' state deformed from its birth, for at no time has the revolutionary process of its formation taken on a purely proletarian aspect. I know that the term deformed workers' state will not satisfy those who like categorical formulas, nor those who tie property relations to the existence of a genuine proletarian political power.

But I must refer once more to what has already been said in the introduction of this article. We are living in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism, an epoch in which the revolutionary process is moreover enormously hampered and distorted by the actions of the USSR and of Stalinism. This epoch presents us with highly complicated, transitory and intermediary phenomena.

The social facts we are examining do not have precise outlines and do not square with the schemas of theory. The definitions we employ are perforce conventional and we choose the most convenient to best express one aspect, that which we consider the most essential, the most fundamental, of a more complicated phenomenon.

The term workers' state (degenerated or deformed) is employed by the orthodox Trotskyist tendency in a very precise sense: to designate a society whose formation was not (and is not) possible without the revolutionary action of the masses (and occasionally, within given conditions and limits, comes about by the military-bureaucratic action of the Soviet bureaucracy), and whose property relations are characterized by a general stratification of the means of production, a stratification which capitalism can never attain by its own evolution and which constitutes the first phase through which the socialist transformation of the economy must pass. Yesterday that was the case in the USSR; today, in Yugoslavia. Within the framework of a workers' state, defined in this sense, can be contained for a long time a partially bourgeois content both in the sphere of distribution norms as well as in several aspects of political power. The ultimate fate of such a transitional society will be finally decided by the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois tendencies on the national as well as on the international arena.

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