

December 19, 1975

To the Leninist Trotskyist Faction Coordinators

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed are the following items:

1. Material related to a poll of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction steering committee concerning the resolution on Portugal adopted by the last steering committee meeting. While not all votes have been returned, a majority have already responded concurring that the document "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" reflects the line adopted.
2. A report by Galois on the November 23-24, 1975, meeting of the United Secretariat.
3. Two motions adopted by the November meeting of the United Secretariat.
4. A letter to the United Secretariat from Mary-Alice Waters concerning the character of the IEC meeting that was called by a majority vote at the last United Secretariat meeting.
5. A December 12, 1975, letter to the Political Committee of the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière from Walter; and a reply.
6. A report by Galois on the October 4-5, 1975, meeting of the United Secretariat.

Comradely,

Caroline Lund

November 28, 1975

To the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed is a letter to the faction from the Political Bureau of the PST of Argentina, dated November 5, 1975. Some of you have already received a copy of this letter and its attachments.

Also enclosed is a reply to the PST Political Bureau from Joe Hansen.

As you can see, the accusation raised by the Argentine leadership is extremely grave. It calls into question whether the document published both internally and publicly accurately reflected the report, discussion, and unanimous vote for the general line of the draft document presented at the last faction steering committee meeting in August, 1975.

The coordinating committee of the LTF discussed the letter from the PST leadership at a meeting held November 22, and three motions were adopted.

1. The coordinating committee felt it had an immediate responsibility to express its opinion on this question. Had the majority of the coordinating committee agreed that the document published in the name of the LTF did not express the general line voted for by the steering committee, then members of the LTF on the United Secretariat would have been obligated to inform the United Secretariat immediately.

The coordinating committee adopted the following motion: The coordinating committee affirms that the general line of the document Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution accurately expresses the general line approved by vote of the last steering committee meeting. The vote was 8 for (Alan, Ed, Gus, Jack, Joe, Benson, Mary-Alice, Melan); 1 against (Mario); 1 not voting (Eddy).

Comrade Eddy explained that since he was not present at the steering committee he was not in a position to judge whether it accurately reflected the general line adopted.

2. Comrades felt it was of extreme importance to rapidly resolve any ambiguity concerning the status of the resolution by polling the members of the steering committee who were present at the last meeting. (This would include comrades who were seated with voice and vote to replace members of the steering committee unable to attend.)

The motion adopted unanimously was the following: that we immediately poll the members of the steering committee present at the last faction meeting and ask them if they concur that the general line of the document Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution is the general line approved at that meeting.

3. The coordinating committee also unanimously adopted a motion stating: Since the letter from the Political Bureau of the PST has already been sent by the PST to some members of the steering committee of the LTF, Joe Hansen's reply should be circulated to the same comrades who received the original.

For your convenience we have enclosed a copy of the motion on a separate sheet so that comrades can indicate their opinion and return the poll immediately.

As soon as the results are in we will inform the faction steering committee.

Meanwhile, the vote of the coordinating committee affirming that the resolution Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution is that adopted by the last steering committee stands.

Comradely,

Mary-Alice Waters
for the coordinating committee

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Buenos Aires
November 5, 1975

TO THE COMRADES OF THE LENINIST-TROTSKYIST
FACTION

Only last week we received a copy (sent from Mexico, because the copy that the Socialist Workers Party sent us did not arrive) of the document, The Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution, with the final editing given to it by the comrades of the SWP leadership after the discussion and agreements reached last August.

What was voted on unanimously was the initial draft presented by the SWP (which we published in our Boletín de Discusión Interno no. 2 with the addition of the criticisms of that document, which should have been turned into the final document, to have been drafted by comrades Hansen, Moreno, and Roberto. Because comrade Hansen was ill, that drafting commission could not meet. For that reason, we submitted our additions in writing, fundamentally the introduction, which summarized the essence of our position. (We published the Introduction and the additions in the BDI no. 3, pp. 14-17.) According to comrade Mario, this Introduction was approved by comrade Gerry Foley speaking for comrade Hansen, as he indicated in his letter of September 4, 1975. Prior to that, during the August gathering, comrade Moreno had read a letter from him dated August 21, 1975, to comrades Joe Hansen, Barry Sheppard, and Jack Barnes. That letter was to have been read and published at the meeting we mentioned.

The comrades of the SWP leadership told comrade Moreno that it was technically impossible to have the letter published, because there was only one day to do so and the necessary apparatus was not available. Moreover, the comrades said that it wasn't necessary to publish the letter since there was complete agreement on it. It was agreed therefore that comrade Moreno would explain the position orally during the faction meeting. The SWP would propose to the faction meeting the drafting of a final document, on the basis of the letter and the oral presentation by Moreno, with a drafting commission composed of comrades Hansen and Moreno. Afterwards, comrade Hansen suggested, and comrade Moreno agreed, that it be proposed to the faction meeting that the drafting commission be broadened to incorporate comrade Roberto onto it.

We are studying this document carefully, because after a first reading it appears to us that it does not reflect the agreements we believed had been reached--synthesized in the letter by comrade Moreno we referred to, and especially in the introduction, in the modifications of the text that were accepted, and in the oral explanations of comrade Moreno. We continue to be firmly convinced of the correctness of our positions, expressed in those documents. Inde-

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pendent of formal questions of editing or terminology, we have the impression that in the final document, drafted by the comrades of the SWP leadership, the essence of our position--with which the comrades seemed to be in agreement--is not put forward: The central strategy in Portugal today is to see how we are going to push forward the development and centralization of the embryos of dual power that have arisen, and how we are going to help in the creation of such embryos of organs of dual power among sectors that do not yet have them.

You have the pertinent documentation to be able to study the document, since we sent you all the materials from the faction meeting, which we published in our BDI nos. 2 and 3. This week we will also send you BDI no. 4 with the Spanish translation of the SWP document, the statement approved by the faction on the general situation of the Fourth International, a statement of the International Majority Tendency on the same things, and the summary of the oral presentations at and before the August meeting.

To facilitate a quick study of the resolution and its supposedly unanimous character we attach three essential additions or observations, which were apparently accepted by the comrades of the SWP leadership or by comrade Hansen, but which--in our opinion--have not been incorporated in the final document.

We consider it of fundamental importance that you read the documents of the SWP comrades, the comments about them from other comrades, and all our amendments and additions, so that we can adopt a position that is reliably documented.

For our part, we have voted not to approve or reject the document The Key Issues, . . . until we carry out such a study and our National Committee decides, because if what we fear is the case--that the agreements were not respected--we would find ourselves facing a new situation.

Given the gravity of the situation, we ask that you approach a study of all of the existing documentation as we are doing.

With fraternal greetings,
THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF
THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE
LOS TRABAJADORES

* * *

1) Excerpt from Moreno's August 21, 1975, letter to Joe Hansen, accepted by comrades Hansen, Sheppard, and Barnes, which, as we have already made clear, was not published at the August meeting for technical reasons. (see full text in BDI no. 3, pp. 9-12.)

"We believe we are in agreement--although the draft

does not say it explicitly--that since the putsch of April 25 of last year what we are seeing in Portugal is a workers' revolution in progress. That is to say, the stage that began mainly since the last coup in March is nothing more and nothing but the socialist revolution. Portugal has entered a stage of a few months or years that has occurred only as an exception in some imperialist countries every twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years. It is an exceptional situation. It is of no interest whether we define it as revolutionary or prerevolutionary. The important thing to confirm is that the workers movement with its mobilizations, accompanied by the mass movement as a whole, has achieved a power of mobilization that has the bourgeoisie and its representative, the government of the MFA, in check. Concretely, it is an acute prerevolutionary or a directly revolutionary situation because the working class together with the broad masses have begun a process of general mobilization for different objectives and necessities. Therefore, what is involved is to do the same thing that you did in your national document, that is, to point out the broad strategic lines for the stage that has begun--the stage of the generalized mobilization of the Portuguese masses.

"From a reading of the draft one could get the false impression that the big strategic objective of the stage that has begun in Portugal is the defense of the present Constituent Assembly, that is, defense of the highest bourgeois-democratic institution. We don't have to discuss whether we should defend it or not, because we are in agreement that it is a principled question to defend it, to promote it against the attempts of the MFA to liquidate or limit it.

"We don't think that is what you believe, but if you do, it must be stated with absolute clarity--the essential goal that we propose to the masses for the present historic stage is the establishment of a free, sovereign Constituent Assembly. If this were to be the position, we would have a difference.

"We believe that the Constituent Assembly, like democratic rights, is one of the primary or principled political goals--the only one or almost the only one--that can mobilize the masses at the present moment. But strategically, for the whole stage that has begun, our main objective is to push the masses toward forming their organs of power against the MFA and the bourgeoisie. This means to propagandize under all circumstances the possible organs of workers' power. Said in another way, for us it is a Trotskyist principle that, when you have a situation of generalized mobilization of the masses of a country, that is, when you have a revolutionary or prerevolutionary situation, the essential axis of our strategy is to push the masses to develop their organs of workers power, so that they can take power and make the socialist revolution.

"We believe it appropriate to point out in one way or another the following points:

"1. That this long-term principled Trotskyist strategy is the one that is applicable today in Portugal which is passing through a prerevolutionary or revolutionary stage.

"2. That there is no possibility to develop this strategy without a tactic designed to mobilize the masses around all of their present needs and aspirations.

"3. That the correct tactic at the present moment fundamentally is to defend democratic rights, to defend the rights of the SP, to struggle to establish a sovereign and free Constituent Assembly, and to break the pact. Without these political struggles there is no possibility of carrying out the strategy.

"4. That these tactical necessities should not and cannot make us forget the strategic necessity of developing the organs of workers power.

"5. Such a strategy for this stage is always combined with our fundamental historical strategy of constructing mass Trotskyist parties. We did not put this in the first point as our main strategy precisely because it is not the specific strategy for this stage--the strategy of developing workers power. Rather it is the strategy permanently existing above the different stages. In this sense we can say that in relation to the historic task of building the party, the strategy for the stage of developing the organs of workers power is a historic tactic and as such is subordinate.

"These points are of fundamental importance although they may seem very general and although the disastrous policy of the majority is apparently hidden behind such strategic affirmations. We should make our agreement about these points explicit. If there are no differences on them, it is not redundant to single them out.

* * *

2) Draft Introduction officially accepted in the drafting commission by comrade Gerry Foley speaking for comrade Joe Hansen (reproduced in BDI no. 3, pp. 14-15)

"What we are seeing in Portugal since April 25, 1974, judged by its dynamics and its perspectives, is nothing other than the first socialist revolution that has occurred in an imperialist country in the last 30 years.

"Like all revolutions of the workers, accompanied by the mass movement, it poses the urgent need for the masses to achieve forms of organization that express the revolutionary, massive character of its mobilizations and power. For the working class to be able to carry out the socialist revolution they must develop organs of power--be these soviets, factory or soldiers committees, revolutionary trade unions, workers militias, or whatever other form of revolutionary organization of the masses.

"The Portuguese revolution is no exception. Each stage in the mobilizations and victories of the workers and mass movement--first, against the fascist apparatus, later against Spínola's two coups--has advanced forms of workers and people's power, from the factory and vigilance committees to the assemblies and committees of soldiers and sailors. To encourage these or other forms that are expressions of the mass movement in struggle against the bourgeoisie and its government of the moment, as well as to centralize them so that when the moment arrives they can topple the MFA government and install their own power, is our main objective in the Portuguese revolution--an objective that we should have before us at every moment of our activity.

"Having said this, we should bring the application of this principled policy down to earth. It is not a question of debating our main objective of reaching out to build true soviets in Portugal. It is a question of knowing how, and with what policy we will attain the formation, development, and defense--if embryos already exist--of those forms of workers and people's power.

"And this need for a correct policy that would permit us to unify and drive the Portuguese masses forward--the only way to manage to express in organizational form the unity of the masses in struggle--takes on even more importance than ever. The Portuguese experience seems to confirm that of the Spanish revolution in the period before the war and the experiences that have occurred in the postwar period in the backward countries. The reformist parties, particularly the Stalinists, have learned from the Russian revolution, and they resist the creation of true soviet organizations, categorically opposing the development of the slightest attempt at autonomous workers' and people's power and organization.

"As a result of this, the Portuguese Trotskyists will not have the enormous historical advantage that the Russian Bolsheviks had, of finding, from the beginning of the February revolution, a powerful soviet organization institutionalized and generalized throughout the whole of Russia, one that was recognized by the reformist parties as the organization of the masses as a whole. Everything seems to indicate that it will fall upon the shoulders of the Trotskyist movement and its program to develop and establish true soviets. There does not seem to be any possibility that we will be accompanied in this task, even for a short while, by the reformist parties of the Portuguese revolution. This obliges us to pose more than ever this task as the most important and fundamental one of this stage. At the same time we should not search for shortcuts or fool ourselves thinking that other parties--much less the MFA, agent of all wings of the imperialist bourgeoisie--are capable of carrying out this colossal historic task. It is more and more apparent that the soviets will be the mass organization of Trotskyism for the seizure of power. To this colossal disadvantage we must add another just as great or even greater:

The Portuguese Trotskyists like all other Trotskyist organizations in the world, are not as closely linked to nor do they have the prestige in the workers movement that the Bolshevik party had. While this was a party with tradition, truly rooted in the mass movement, our parties are--with a few exceptions--propaganda parties, recently organized and with no roots in the workers movement.

"These two disadvantages of the Portuguese revolution when compared to the Russian revolution basically come down to one: the lack of a strong mass Trotskyist party. When we say this we take into account the relationship that ought to exist between the organs of workers power and the revolutionary party. Without organs of workers power the revolutionary party cannot seize power. Without the Trotskyist party to give them a revolutionary orientation, the soviets, or any other similar formation, cease being the organized expression of the masses in struggle, and instead are transformed into a tool of the reformist parties or of the bourgeois state, that is, precisely the opposite of what they should be.

"This is what is happening in Portugal today. The MFA or one of its wings, the reformist parties, and the ultralefts are playing around with the beginnings of workers power that exist, and not satisfied just doing this, are using soviet slogans or slogans of workers and people's power to cover up attempts to impose a bonapartist government and to crush all the democratic and working-class gains that have been achieved.

"The attempt to make the whole of Portuguese political life revolve around the false alternative 'for or against workers and people's power' has two clearly counterrevolutionary objectives, despite the good intentions of the useful idiots of the ultraleft. The first objective is to divide and deflect the mass movement from struggle around its present needs and tasks--confronting the MFA government as its main enemy, defending the democratic rights and working-class victories already gained, preventing the workers from working more than ever in the imperialist 'battle for production.' The second is to conceal the most pressing need of the vanguard and the Portuguese masses--the construction of a mass Trotskyist party. This attempt is counterposed to the objective needs of the masses and their greatest subjective lack, the building of the party.

"Without mobilizing the masses around a clear program that responds to their most urgent needs at the present moment, and without building a mass Trotskyist party, there is no possibility that the embryos of dual power, which have arisen and which will continue to arise with the progress of the struggles of the Portuguese masses, can be developed, centralized, and take power. For that reason, any attempt to conceal or minimize the importance of democratic tasks, or the importance of confronting the counterrevolutionary plans of the government--including its left wing--is to go

against the possible development of the organs of workers' power, which will only develop through the struggles of the Portuguese masses to defend and extend their gains, particularly their democratic gains."

* * *

3) A fundamental modification of the original draft officially accepted in the drafting commission by comrade Gerry Foley speaking for comrade Joe Hansen, which was not respected in the final draft of the document.

a) The original draft, at the end of the next to the last paragraph, third chapter, said:

"The future of the mass movement depends on the way the present democratic gains are defended by the mass organizations of the working class and peasantry, utilized in struggles to better their conditions of life, and emphasized in educating the masses and promoting their self-confidence, and in developing revolutionary cadres."

b) The amendment accepted by the drafting commission said:

"The future of the mass movement depends on the way the present democratic gains are defended by the mass organizations of the working class and peasantry, utilized in struggles to better their conditions of life, and emphasized in educating the masses and promoting their self-confidence [so that they can defend, centralize, and push forward the embryos of power that exist (committees that exist, the SWP suggested) and develop revolutionary cadres that will make possible the seizure of power by the above named organs], and in developing revolutionary cadres."

c) The final draft of the paragraph is as follows:

"The political process in Portugal has centered on issues that became explosive because of the concern of the masses over their democratic right to freely consider all alternative points of view and to assert their will as the majority of the populace.

"The fight to defend and extend democratic rights in the factory, in the barracks, in society as a whole, is indispensable in advancing toward the establishment of a workers and peasants government. This fight for a workers and peasants government constitutes the decisive axis of struggle in Portugal today."

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New York
November 25, 1975

Political Bureau
Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores

Dear Comrades,

I did not receive a copy of your mimeographed circular letter "To the Members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction" until a few days ago, although it was dated November 5, 1975. Also I wanted to consult with the Coordinating Committee of the LTF. Hence the delay in replying.

Inasmuch as you were not present at the meeting of the Steering Committee of the LTF that discussed the draft of "The Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution," it is obvious that your judgment of that meeting is not based on your own personal experience but on the reports of the three members of the PST leadership who were able to attend. Even if their reports were unanimous in all details, it appears to me that before circulating your letter it would have been advisable to check with the other participants on what happened at that meeting.

If a misunderstanding was involved, it would have been much easier to rectify it if that procedure had been followed.

The main assertion of your letter is that an "agreement" was reached between Comrade Moreno and me on the general line of the resolution, and that after Comrade Moreno left I (or the "leadership of the SWP") broke this agreement.

However, you may not have given due weight to the following points:

1. For Comrade Moreno and me to make a secret agreement to vote for one line in a meeting and then replace it with a different line in an editing committee would be self-defeating. Leaving aside the violation this would represent of the most elementary principles of revolutionary Marxism, it is obvious that a general line can be put into practice only if it is thoroughly understood and agreed upon by all those for whom it constitutes a guide.

2. The same consideration would hold if the body as a whole had reached agreement on a general line and I individually had then sabotaged the decision, slipping a different general line into the edited resolution. All

the participants would have already begun to apply the line they agreed on; and they could not be switched by the publication of a fraudulent document.

3. It would have been the height of stupidity to think that upon publication of a false resolution such a swindle would not be seen immediately by those who were in attendance--about ninety comrades, if I remember correctly. The net result would have been to shatter the LTF instead of strengthening it, as was our purpose.

4. Aside from these three considerations, the trickery could be exposed by a very simple procedure: taking a poll of the participants at the meeting.

* * *

In support of your charge, you have circulated the original draft resolution, amendments proposed by Comrade Moreno, an introduction submitted by Comrade Moreno, and other materials, including a contribution by Comrade Peng Shu-tse and one by Comrade Chen Pi-lan.

But this material does not prove the existence of two opposing lines or an agreement between Comrade Moreno and me to get together in the editing committee and adopt a line contrary to the one voted for by the participants. The documents published by you prove only that in the preliminary process leading up to the meeting some tentative positions were voiced on points of varying importance. This was completely normal, particularly on the assumption that the differences were not at all of a basic character and were subject to modification in the light of the discussion at the meeting.

Most important of all, the entire oral debate at the meeting itself must be considered. What was said there was decisive. It was this discussion and the vote in the light of that discussion that determined the general line.

Finally, by challenging the import of the discussion and the meaning of the vote you place yourselves under obligation to prove that your differences are in reality so deep as to constitute an opposing general line. This can be done only by analyzing the political differences and showing their depth.

* * *

The procedure followed at the August meeting of the Steering Committee was the same as that followed at all normal conferences of the Trotskyist movement:

1. We sought the maximum preliminary consultation with all the participants. As always the objective was to reduce--or to clarify--differences in advance of the meeting so as to help avoid surprises and to permit everyone to think over any points in dispute and either begin changing or begin marshaling the best arguments for whatever position one held. In this preparatory process, the representatives of the PST, of course, played an important role.

2. In the meeting itself, it was expected that the participants--in accordance with the norms of Trotskyism--would present whatever special points of view they had, especially those indicated in preliminary discussions, and defend them to the best of their ability. Comrade Moreno played an active part in this, convincing the body of some of his points and apparently conceding on others. That the discussion was fruitful was shown by the vote, which was unanimous on the general line.

3. In the course of the discussion, the reporters indicated what points they found acceptable and what points they found unacceptable for inclusion in the resolution. Their views were, of course, subject to challenge and to a vote.

Some items, it was agreed by the participants, could best be developed in articles rather than in the resolution. On some debatable items, it was felt that the comrades were free, if they wished, to express their views in signed articles. (An example was the position of some comrades on the class nature of the MFA, which they held to be a petty-bourgeois institution. This did not involve the general line, since they agreed that the MFA government was bourgeois in character.) This procedure was completely in the tradition of the Trotskyist movement.

4. Three participants were nominated to the editing committee, Comrade Moreno, Comrade Roberto, and me. Comrade Roberto had to leave immediately because of unexpected developments in his country; Comrade Moreno left for similar reasons within a couple of days; and I had a bout with a virus infection. As a result the bulk of the editing work fell to other participants, although I was able to go over the final draft.

The editing committee did what most editing committees do. Suggestions that were repetitious were either not added or were amalgamated. Points that had not been adopted by the body as a whole were rejected. New points that had been agreed upon were inserted where they logically belonged.

This is what happened with the introduction proposed by Comrade Moreno. If I recall correctly, I proposed that

such points in his proposed introduction as were not already in the resolution should be placed where they belonged in the logical structure of the resolution. Those points in his proposed introduction that were already included in the resolution should either be dropped or amalgamated. Although Comrade Moreno argued for including the introduction as such, I was under the impression that he left the decision up to the editing committee. If this was a misunderstanding on my part, I certainly did not have any idea that the introduction represented a general line different from the one in the draft resolution.

In light of the above considerations, I would like to suggest that the Political Bureau of the PST reexamine this matter. A clarifying statement could be issued to dissipate the atmosphere of scandal. And if you are of the opinion that conflicting general lines are really involved, then your views on this ought to be stated clearly and frankly so as to make possible a discussion and differentiation on the political level.

With comradely greetings,
/s/
Joseph Hansen

REPORT ON NOVEMBER 23-24, 1975 UNITED SECRETARIAT MEETING

by Galois

The most important aspect of the November 23-24 meeting of the United Secretariat involved the discussion and decisions taken on organizational questions. There are four main decisions to single out in this regard, involving the following questions: 1. Intercontinental Press; 2. IEC convocation; 3. The question of the IT; and 4. Publication of documents.

1. Intercontinental Press

This point was placed on the agenda by a decision of the October 4-5 meeting, which, by majority vote, had objected to IP's coverage of world events in the past period and decided to discuss what measures to take at the following meeting. (See mailing to Leninist Trotskyist Faction Steering Committee, November 1, 1975).

At this November meeting, a five-part motion was adopted by majority vote. It included some suggestions to the editor of IP which were unobjectionable, such as the decision to instruct the Bureau to regularly submit editorials and background articles. It also included unrealistic suggestions to the IP editor, including one saying that articles "which do not present the line adopted on these issues [that is, issues on which official bodies of the FI have made statements or resolutions] should be identified as contributions which are not within the framework of the orientation of the FI. They should be presented in their totality in such a way that from the point of view of balance, layout, etc... no contrary inaccurate impression could be given as to the general line of IP..." [For the full text of the IMT motion on IP, see the enclosed minutes of the November United Secretariat meeting, or the attached motions.]

Comrade Pepe, in his counterreport, pointed out that this would amount to placing a kind of editorial stigma on writers who are part of the minority -- not to speak of the manifold practical difficulties that could arise in attempting to employ such criteria. He also explained the origins and continuity of IP, from the period prior to reunification up through today. He explained how IP's policy on coverage of world events has been consistent from the beginning, including public presentation of different points of view within the framework of world Trotskyism. Challenges to this traditional policy were raised only as important political differences developed and deepened. At bottom, the dispute over this policy reflects a political divergence over the norms of democratic centralism within the world movement and its application under present conditions. Comrade Pepe then submitted the following motion: "That we see no need to suggest considering a change in the way IP is being edited, which remains in accordance with the norms followed since its inception." This motion was defeated.

2. IEC Convocation

In view of the deep political differences over Portugal and the sharpening of organizational tensions, it has become clear that the forthcoming IEC will be faced with many important decisions. For this reason, LTF members on the United Secretariat

argued that adequate preparation was required in order to hold an authoritative meeting. Among other things, time was needed to raise the funds to insure maximum participation by IEC members.

The IMT rejected our arguments and voted a motion in the United Secretariat calling for an IEC meeting in the middle of February, 1976, with an agenda of Portugal, Angola, Spain, IT, world congress date, and election of the United Secretariat. Furthermore, the motion that was passed specified that participation in the IEC meeting would be restricted (to an as-yet-unspecified number of IEC members). We rejected this proposal, pointing out the difficulties in organizing an authoritative meeting for February, and stressing that the United Secretariat did not have the authority to limit attendance at the IEC, which is a higher body than the Secretariat. Our motion for an unrestricted IEC meeting as soon as financially possible (at the latest by the end of the summer) was defeated.

3. The question of the Internationalist Tendency

The report on the IT by Hovis attacked the good faith of the SWP leadership, charging that the number of former IT members readmitted into the SWP so far was too few, and that the process the SWP had decided upon (leaving it up to the branches to decide on the basis of their experience with the individual applicants) was taking too long. As a result, he said, there had been no implementation of the IEC decision, and at this point it had become impossible to carry it out. In the discussion under this point, other IMT leaders said that the highest tensions would exist in the international so long as any ITers who applied to join the SWP were not taken in; that the supporters of the LTF in other countries where they are in a minority would "pay for this;" and that there would be no clear political discussion on Portugal, because it would be obscured by IMT initiated discussion over the IT.

A three-part motion, written during the discussion itself, was presented at the end of the discussion. Among other things, it said that the United Secretariat "strongly condemns the attitude of the comrades of the SWP leadership..." [See minutes or attachment]. Faced with this surprise motion, we pointed out that it would constitute the first time since reunification that an organization in the world Trotskyist movement had been formally condemned, and we proposed to refer the vote to the next meeting, so that comrades could consider the implications of such a motion, and a countermotion could be prepared. Our proposal was rejected, and the condemnation was passed by majority vote.

4. Publication of documents

Several proposals for publication of documents were proposed under the Bureau report. In a significant departure from past norms, some proposals were rejected.

a) Public publication of the LTF resolution on Portugal.

This question came up as a result of a dispute that arose after the October United Secretariat meeting. At that meeting we had proposed that the LTF resolution be published publicly, given its nonpolemical character. No objections were raised, but some

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comrades wanted to think it over, so the proposal was referred to the Bureau for decision. Afterwards, the bureau discussed it, and agreed that the resolution should be published publicly, suggesting that IP publish it in English and Spanish, and Quatrième Internationale publish it in French. IP published it immediately. Afterwards, the IMT comrades claimed that a procedure for publication had been decided on in the bureau, and that this had been violated: that they had agreed to publish the LTF resolution only on condition that it first be presented to the United Secretariat or IEC for a vote. Comrade Johnson, the LTF comrade present at the bureau meeting in question, reports that no such procedure was decided upon.

Given the dispute over what had been decided by the bureau, and given the IMT leaders' assertion that they objected only to the procedure, not to the substantive question of whether or not to publish the LTF resolution, we submitted the question to a vote at this meeting. The IMT majority rejected the proposal to publish the LTF resolution in Quatrième Internationale, and voted to defer the question to the next meeting.

b) International Internal Discussion Bulletin.

A similar dispute had arisen since the October Secretariat meeting over the publication of the appendix to Jack Barnes' report to the August, 1975, convention of the SWP, "The Portuguese Revolution and Building the Fourth International," IIDB, Vol. XII, No. 6. Part of the report included a discussion on the overtures to the FI made by the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International. In his report and summary (at which IMT leaders were present) Comrade Barnes had stated that the correspondence with the OCRFI would be included as an appendix to the report when it was published. When the report was published, after being accepted for publication in the IIDB by the October Secretariat meeting, the IMT comrades objected to the appendix, saying this was never agreed to. So, to set the record straight, we proposed formally publishing the documents and correspondence relating to the OCRFI for the information of the membership of the FI. This proposal was rejected by majority vote. The motion passed by the majority said that publication was rejected "in order to clearly demonstrate to the minority that the practice of unilateral decisions and accomplished facts is not only inadmissible but also counterproductive..."

A statement for the minutes by Celso, commenting on the above motion, said: "The suppression of material that members of the Fourth International are entitled to read in order to 'teach the minority a lesson' tells much about the IMT's views on the norms of democratic centralism."

We also proposed for publication in the IIDB a letter to the SWP on Portugal by Murry Weiss and Myra Weiss, two former members and current political opponents of the SWP, and a letter to them by Pierre Frank. (See November 1, 1975 mailing to the LTF Steering Committee, or SWP Internal Information Bulletin, No. 3 in 1975.) In his letter to them, Pierre Frank says, "You are correct when you write to the SWP that '[their] methodology, analyses and political conclusions...propel you, however unexpectedly or

unwittingly, into the camp of American imperialism.'" Our proposal to publish this material in the IIDB was rejected. A motion passed by majority vote defined Frank's letter to the Weisses as private correspondence which could not be published without the consent of the author.

The decision by the IMT to suppress material such as the above marks a serious new departure from democratic norms. It is significant that not all IMT comrades could accept this completely. Comrade Jones voted to publish both the OCRFI correspondence and the Frank letter, and Comrade Claudio abstained on both.

After these grave decisions were taken, the IMT comrades agreed to two additional proposals that we made: 1. It was decided to publish the Foley-Hansen-Novack article publicly in French (along with a reply). 2. The LCR leaders present agreed to publicly correct two errors which appeared in a French pamphlet on Portugal containing several articles by Foley and Hansen plus the first Frank-Maitan-Mandel polemic: namely that the selection of articles by Foley and Hansen was made without consulting them, and that the overall title given to the Foley and Hansen articles, "Military Dictatorship vs. Bourgeois Democracy," was not their title and does not reflect their point of view.

Other Questions at the Meeting

1. Invitation to attend OCI convention. The OCI has invited the United Secretariat to attend its forthcoming congress, scheduled for the end of December. It was decided unanimously to consult the leadership of the LCR, and to take a decision at the December meeting of the United Secretariat. It was also agreed to investigate and document the facts on the reported use of violence by the OCI against other political groups in the workers movement, reportedly including members of the LCR. (We suggested that it would be useful to raise this issue and to denounce such methods at the OCI congress itself if the facts bore out the accusations). Although there was agreement on the motion that was passed, several IMT comrades spoke in a very heated and factional manner under this point, suggesting that the tensions generated by the IMT were threatening to escape control.

2. The Political Discussion. There were four main political questions discussed at the meeting: Portugal, Angola, Britain, and Spain. No major new issues came up, and only two points need be singled out here.

a. Under the Portugal discussion, the IMT comrades continued to defend the LCI's participation in the FUR as a useful tactic to advance a workers united front -- despite political differences with many of the FUR positions. The next meeting will discuss Portugal further, and invitations to participate will be made to Portuguese comrades. Also to be discussed will be complaints made by the current LCI leadership about the factional activities of Comrades Aubin and Duret in Portugal.

b. Under the Angola discussion, the majority adopted a statement placing the FI in the camp of the MPLA in the civil

Galois/5

war. Several LTF comrades argued that there was insufficient justification for taking such a position at this time, and that the FI should issue a statement along the axis of defense of the Angolan revolution and against the imperialist intervention in Angola.

c. LTF position on Portugal. At the beginning of the meeting, Comrade Domingo reported on a recent trip to Mexico and Central America. He said that in Costa Rica a debate had been arranged between him and a PST comrade in front of a group of Trotskyist sympathizers. He stated that he was surprised, because he was prepared to argue against the positions of the LTF resolution published in IP, but the PST comrade stated that he would not defend those positions, and that they did not represent the views of the PST.

December 3, 1975

Motions Adopted at the November Meeting of the United Secretariat

The following motion by Aubin was adopted by majority vote at the November 23-24, 1975, meeting of the United Secretariat:

"Whereas the commitments made by the leadership of the SWP at the January 1975 IEC, contained in the resolution adopted at that IEC meeting, have not been lived up to;

"Whereas to date only an insignificant number of comrades (three or four) have been reintegrated since the expulsion of the IT;

"Whereas the National Committee plenum of the SWP and the last SWP convention did not reintegrate the IT comrades and did not even discuss the question seriously;

"Therefore, be it resolved that the United Secretariat:

"1. strongly condemns the attitude of the leadership of the SWP;

"2. renews its commitment (contained in its resolutions at the IEC) to carry on a determined fight to enforce democratic rights for tendencies in the international and the reintegration of all IT comrades unjustly expelled from the SWP who are asking to be reintegrated and are actively and loyally collaborating with the SWP;

"3. states once again its intention to respect the letter of the International Control Commission and IEC recommendations and thus to consider all these IT comrades as loyal Trotskyists who would be members of the FI were they not prevented from this by reactionary American legislation."

The following motion by Duret was also adopted by majority vote at the November meeting of the United Secretariat:

"The U.S. recommends to the editor of I.P. consideration of the following points:

"1. Articles dealing with issues on which official bodies of the FI have made statements or resolutions (in particular those issues which are in the news, such as Portugal and Angola) and which do not present the line adopted on these issues by the leading bodies, should be identified as contributions which are not within the framework of the orientation of the FI. They should be presented in their totality in such a way that from the point of view of balance, layout, etc. . .no contrary inaccurate impression could be given as to the general line of IP.

"2. Official documents of the F.I. should be presented clearly as such and not mixed in with various other texts under the heading of 'documents.'

"3. The Usec instructs the bureau to regularly submit editorials and background articles presenting the official line of the F.I., which will be signed by a body of the International or by its members.

"4. In accord with the Leninist tradition, the USec reaffirms its intention to conduct a public discussion, the conditions of which are to be determined by the regularly elected bodies of the International. This discussion will be submitted to I.P. for publication.

"5. None of these suggestions should be interpreted as implying any obligations for the editor contrary to the stipulations of the reactionary Voorhis Act."

The following counter-motion by Pepe was defeated:

"That we see no need to suggest considering a change in the way IP is being edited, which remains in accordance with the norms followed since its foundation."

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December 16, 1975

Dear Ernest,

As you know from the discussions at the November meeting of the United Secretariat, we are deeply concerned about the character of the projected meeting of the International Executive Committee that was decided upon by a majority vote. Members and observers on the United Secretariat who support the Leninist Trotskyist Faction discussed this problem after the last meeting. We want to explain our opinion concerning the IEC, and urge the comrades of the International Majority Tendency to reconsider their decision.

The United Secretariat does not have the right to call a meeting of the International Executive Committee and at the same time arbitrarily deny some IEC members the right to attend that meeting. The United Secretariat is a body subordinate to the IEC, and accountable to the IEC. It cannot exclude members of the IEC from a meeting of the body to which they have been duly elected by a world congress.

This would be comparable to the political bureau of a section or sympathizing organization calling a meeting of their central committee with the proviso that only some of the members would be permitted to attend and that those would be selected by the political bureau. No organization adhering to the Fourth International would tolerate such a usurpation of authority by its political bureau.

Several leaders of the IMT have stated their opinion that the last world congress elected too large an IEC. This may be true, and the next world congress may elect a smaller one. But in the meanwhile, we are bound by a world congress decision that remains in effect until the next world congress.

When the idea of holding a restricted meeting of the IEC was first broached by you last summer, we agreed that the financial problems of the sections and sympathizing organizations of the international made it imperative to consider the possibility of organizing a gathering that would be smaller than the last IEC meeting. However, it appeared self-evident to us that the IEC meeting could not be reduced in size by the United Secretariat instructing certain comrades that they would not be permitted to attend. The only way attendance could be limited would be by strictly limiting the character of the agenda and the organizational authority of the meeting. There seemed to be agreement on this at the time, at least implicitly, since we were in initial agreement on a limited two-point agenda: 1. an initial discussion and balance sheet on Portugal in order to prepare written material for the opening of the internal discussion; and 2. convocation of the world congress. With such an agenda, some comrades

December 16, 1975/page 2

might have voluntarily decided that it was not necessary for them to attend the gathering since they would be able to make their views known through the IIDB, and the problem of reducing the size of the IEC meeting would have taken care of itself.

The agenda now proposed by the IMT for the February 1976 gathering, which includes several highly debatable political and organizational points, is such that every member of the IEC will undoubtedly feel obligated to make the utmost effort to attend. Consequently the United Secretariat becomes obligated to find the resources to make this possible.

This holds all the more in light of the character of the organizational motions adopted by the IMT at recent meetings of the United Secretariat and the sharp tensions that were generated by these moves.

Under the circumstances, we believe that the only responsible decision is the one we proposed at the November United Secretariat meeting: to call a meeting of all full, alternate and consultative members of the IEC who are able to attend; to immediately begin a fund drive to raise the necessary resources; to set early September as the outside date for the convocation of this IEC.

We hope you will consider this problem carefully and adopt the necessary motions at the next United Secretariat meeting.

Comradely,

/s/

Mary-Alice Waters

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December 12, 1975

To the Political Committee of the LSA/LSO, Canadian section of the F.I.

Dear Comrades,

We have been informed that you have decided to invite to the pre-convention discussion and the Christmas 1975 convention of your organisation the Canadian group affiliated to the so-called "O.C.R.F.I."

We don't know whether that information is adequate and whether it was taken in full knowledge of the October 1975 USEC decisions. Please let us know as soon as possible whether this is the case or not.

We wish to draw your attention to the fact that at the October 1975 USEC meeting, two motions were adopted in relation with the so-called "O.C.R.F.I.", one of which has the following content:

"That sections, sympathising organizations and organizations in political solidarity with the F.I. should take no initiative in relation with the O.C.R.F.I. or its sections, without prior consultation of and approval by the USEC".

If under these circumstances the Canadian group affiliated to the so-called "O.C.R.F.I." indeed is invited to your convention and (or) pre-convention discussion, without prior consultation of and approval by the USEC, in spite of the above quoted resolution and after your having unambiguously been informed about it, this would mean an open and deliberate defiance of the organisational integrity and structure of the Fourth International, and a clear breach of discipline.

Please let us know your opinion on the matter. We will put the question on the agenda of the December 22-23 USEC meeting, if the information indicated in the first paragraph of this letter shows itself to be correct.

For the USEC/Bureau,

Comradely yours,

Walter.

Copies to: RMG/GMR
SWP National Office
Jack
Alain

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December 18, 1975

United Secretariat
Brussels, Belgium

Dear Comrades,

As you know, we have been unable to attend the meetings of the United Secretariat in recent months. And we did not receive any record of its meetings until yesterday, when the minutes of the September, October, and November meetings arrived simultaneously, one day after the letter from Comrade Walter. The delay may have been caused by this country's postal strike, which has only now ended. In any case, we were unaware that the United Secretariat had adopted the motion quoted in Walter's December 12 letter. After reading his letter carefully, we believe that it can only be based on a misunderstanding of the facts of the matter.

Our invitation to members of the Groupe Socialiste des Travailleurs du Québec [GSTQ] has nothing to do with relations on an international level between the United Secretariat and the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International [OCRFI]. Nor does it involve relations between the Canadian section and the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste, the French affiliate of the OCRFI. We have been dealing with the GSTZ as a political organization within Canada. Often we find that we are working in the same areas as the GSTQ -- in the student movement, or in the unions, for example -- and that its members show interest in our activities. It is not a question of collaboration with another international current, but rather of a concrete opening for party building within Canada, a question of national tactics.

This opening has increased significance because of the GSTQ's weight as a political organization in Québec. It has a size and influence roughly comparable to that of the Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire and to the Québec forces of the Canadian section -- the two organizations of the Fourth International in Québec. In addition, the GSTQ has members in leadership positions in two major Québec unions, and it has broader influence in the organized labor movement.

To be sure we have many political differences with the GSTQ but detailing them is not to the point in this letter. More relevant is the fact that in the recent period, the GSTQ has collaborated with us on an increasing range of projects where areas of political agreement exist. This has made common work between us fruitful in a number of instances. To cite a few examples:

--The September 22 protest against the murder of eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores in Argentina, signed by political groups and labor leaders in Québec. Signatories of the protest included leaders of the GMR, LSO, and GSTQ. (Although the signature of the GSTQ was

omitted in the text published in the English edition of the October 9 Inprecor, it was included in the French edition.) The editors of Inprecor considered the initiative to be exemplary, stating: "We urge other comrades around the world to follow this example of the Québécois comrades. . . ." It should be added that the collaboration of the GSTQ was indispensable in securing the signatures of the labor leaders.

--Our work with the GSTQ in winning support for a strike of Montreal public transit workers, a strike in which GSTQ union members played a leading role.

--The GSTQ's role in securing labor endorsements for a struggle against the rise in transit fares (a struggle in which the comrades of the GMR also participated).

--Opposing repression in Spain following the assassination of opponents of Francoist tyranny. In this case, once again, the protests carried the signatures of the GMR, LSO, and GSTQ among others.

--Collaboration in the labor movement in opposing supporters of the bourgeois Parti Québécois and promoting proposals for independent labor political action.

--We have also had a good experience with a few members of the GSTQ who live in English Canada.

We have kept the GMR informed of our initiative towards the GSTQ and have sought to work jointly with them in bringing the GSTQ closer to the Fourth International. We also pressed the GSTQ to invite the GMR to its coming convention.

While the development of common work in some areas has not eliminated other differences we have with the GSTQ, it has helped in Québec to cut across the slander that the Trotskyists are a group of warring sects, more concerned with fighting each other than with promoting the class struggle.

The participation of the GSTQ in some common activities has reinforced the positive image of Trotskyism for the radical public. In addition, practical cooperation has produced important concrete gains.

Our intent is to push forward this process. We want the GSTQ members to get to know us better and we seek more exchanges with their leaders and with their membership. The goal is to win them to membership in the Canadian section of the Fourth International. We believe that this is possible and that a positive beginning in this direction has been made.

We have invited a broad range of our contacts to attend our December convention. Our policy is to make available copies of our preconvention bulletins to all those invited to the convention.

Clearly, then, what is involved is our relation to a political organization inside Canada. Our actions are designed to strengthen the section, increase its effectiveness in the class struggle, and hopefully win new forces in Canada to the Fourth International. In other words it is a question of a tactical orientation of a national section.

Whatever our differences on other matters, all members of the leading bodies of the international have affirmed that these bodies do not attempt to dictate tactics to the national sections.

Since you cite the motion passed at the October Secretariat meeting concerning relations with the OCRFI, and since you include a reference to "the organizational integrity and structure of the Fourth International" we can only conclude that you thought that the invitation of the GSTQ to our convention is in some way connected to the United Secretariat's relation with the OCRFI. We trust that our outline of the facts qualifies that this is not the case.

Your letter arrived as we were making final preparations for our convention. It is not possible for us to participate in the December United Secretariat meeting, to be held four days from now. To insure that you receive this letter in time for the meeting, however, we are transmitting the text to Comrade Stateman, who will present it at the meeting.

Comradely yours,

Art Young
for the LSA/LSO Political Committee

cc: GMR
RMG
Alain
Jack
SWP N.O.

REPORT ON THE OCTOBER 4-5, 1975, UNITED SECRETARIAT MEETING

by Galois

Organizational tensions dominated the October United Secretariat meeting. None of the major questions around which tension was the greatest were placed on the agenda prior to the meeting. They all appeared under "Miscellaneous." There were three other questions of interest on the agenda: Portugal, report on the Socialist Workers Party convention, and the situation in Britain.

1. Portugal. The IMT comrades explained that the events since the installation of the sixth provisional government confirms the previous analysis of the IMT. The main leaders of the IMT also stated that the LCI's participation in the FUR was correct. They argued that our aim should be to attempt to win the leadership of the FUR. However, it was incorrect to sign the August 25 agreement, and signing it had made it more difficult to win the leadership of the FUR. Similar formations will occur in other European countries in the future, they asserted, and we must be prepared for this.

The IMT leaders also reported on the internal situation in the LCI. At the LCI conference in early August, four tendencies appeared. The largest of the four, which received slightly over 30 percent of the votes of the delegates, received the absolute majority of the incoming Central Committee. This tendency is the only one of the four that does not support the IMT. The IMT leaders stated that they did not agree with nor accept responsibility for the political positions of the present leadership of the LCI. The two major disagreements they raised concerned what they claimed were illusions of the LCI leadership about the character of the Portuguese CP and a sectarian attitude toward the Portuguese SP. It was further stated that the LCI leadership had reported that the United Secretariat supported their political positions and this was not true. Comrades Aubin and Duret were attending a Central Committee meeting where they would attempt to correct this error.

2. SWP Convention. Alan Jones reported on some of the points in the convention which impressed him: The development of a large cadre, especially the Black cadre; the ability of the SWP to respond to political openings, for example, the desegregation fight and the developments in the NAACP; and an open attitude toward discussion where comrades could speak out and make criticisms and suggestions. He stated that the turn of the SWP was based on the American situation and was neither too soon nor too late. He said he disagreed with some of the positions of the SWP, but that he thought there was an atmosphere where you could have a discussion among revolutionists.

3. The situation in Britain. Jones reported on this and the preparations for the coming IMG national conference. At the September National Committee meeting of the IMG the differences between tendencies A and B became sharper. That NC meeting requested that the United Secretariat assist in preparing two documents for the IMG conference: one on the political situation in Britain and one on organizational norms.

The members of the Tendency at the Secretariat meeting opposed this procedure. Adair explained that a similar procedure was adopted in 1973 and did not help to lessen the divisions. The debate shifted to how to interpret the document and the document was used in the tendency struggle inside the IMG. He explained that the elaboration of the organizational norms of the IMG and its political perspectives are the tasks of the IMG leadership. The members of the LTF at the meeting voted against the proposed procedure of the United Secretariat drafting the key documents for the IMG convention.

The three items under Miscellaneous around which organizational tensions were heightened were: 1) the discussions between the United Secretariat and the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International, 2) the dates for the next meeting of the International Executive Committee and 3) Intercontinental Press. Since none of these items had been included in the agenda sent to the United Secretariat members prior to the meeting, we proposed that they be postponed until the next meeting. The correct leadership procedure is to inform all members of what will be discussed and what proposals are being considered.

1. IEC meeting. The IMT proposed that the next IEC meeting be held in February 1976. For financial reasons it would not be possible to hold so large a gathering as the 1975 IEC, and therefore some formula for limiting the size would have to be proposed. We proposed delaying the IEC for several months. The IMT rejected this saying that it was necessary to adopt a position on Portugal and to call the next world congress and therefore could not be delayed.

The IMT leaders said that the formal decision would not be made until the November Secretariat but wanted a letter to go to the sections stating the most probable date was February and to begin planning accordingly. They made it clear that they had decided on a February date.

2. The discussions between the US and the OCRFI. The IMT presented the motion which you received in the November 1, 1975 Steering Committee mailing. LTF members spoke against the motion for two reasons. First it criticised the SWP for its invitation to the OCRFI to attend the open sessions of the SWP convention, after the United Secretariat had refused to express an opinion on this question at its July meeting. Secondly the motion was an expression of weakness, stating that the mere fact of having discussions with the OCRFI threatened to create or deepen divisions inside the Fourth International.

However, the concrete proposal that the relationships with the OCRFI be handled through the United Secretariat after discussion and approval, rather than unilaterally, is correct. We therefore attempted, unsuccessfully, to get a common agreement and resolution on a course of action. To do this it would have been necessary to eliminate the motivation and criticism of the SWP contained in the first paragraph of the IMT motion. This they refused to do, so no common motion was adopted.

3. Intercontinental Press. The IMT presented the motion which was sent out in the November 1, 1975 LTF Steering Committee mailing. They stated that the motion had to be adopted to explain to people that they considered the situation with IP intolerable and were going to discuss at the next meeting how to correct it. Thus the decision that IP is not being edited responsibly was taken without discussion and without even informing the editor that this question would be on the agenda. They made clear that the discussion at the November meeting was not to be, is there something wrong with the editing of IP, but rather how will the editing of IP be changed.

We proposed that Intercontinental Press be placed on the agenda of the next meeting and that the editor be informed of this. The IMT rejected this proposal and adopted their motion.

The most disturbing aspect to these discussions was the character of the discussion itself. On each question the IMT had clearly had a prior discussion and decided what it wanted to do. There was no serious discussion at the meeting itself. They had decided on an organizational confrontation on each question.

We considered each worthy of serious discussion, and that the members of the Secretariat should have been informed that they were to be discussed and what proposals there were.

An example of the procedure followed occurred at the close of the meeting. With a part of the discussion on the OCRFI and all of the discussion on IP remaining, a leader of the IMT proposed that a time limit of twenty minutes be adopted for the rest of the meeting because people had to leave. An LTF member proposed that if that were true, then we should place the remaining items on the agenda of the next meeting and adjourn now so that we could have a thorough discussion of the two questions. The IMT limited the meeting and discussion to twenty minutes.

November 12, 1975