

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY  
WALTHAM 54, MASSACHUSETTS  
August 8, 1960.

Raya Dunayevskaya,  
4993 - 28th Street  
Detroit 10 Michigan

Dear R.D. :

I feel pretty bad for not having answered your various notes and letters, the main reason being that I am neurotically busy with my new book and equally neurotic about the slightest interruption. Please accept my apology. I am sure you will understand. I should even feel worse about it because I am writing you now to ask a favor. I may have told you that my new book with the tentative title Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, is some sort of western counterpart of Soviet Marxism--that is to say it will deal, not only with the ideology but also with the corresponding reality. One of my problems will be the transformation of the laboring class under the impact of rationalization, automation and particularly, the higher standard of living. I am sure you will know what I mean if I refer to the discussion among the French sociologists in Arguments and especially Serge Mallet's articles. It is a question of a changing---that is to say---a more affirmative attitude of the laborer not only towards the system as a whole but even to the organization of work in the more highly modernized plants. Mallet's field study of French workers in the Caltex establishment in France points up sharply the rise of a highly co-operative attitude and of a vested interest in the establishment.

Now, what I should like to ask you is first, your own considered evaluation as far as the situation in this country is concerned, and secondly, if it isn't asking too much---reference to American literature on this problem pro and contra. I know that your own evaluation runs counter to the thesis of reconciliatory integration of the worker with the factory but I would also like to know whether there is any sensible argument for the other side.

I hope that I do not intrude too much upon your time. How is your own work coming along?

With best wishes and greetings,

Sincerely,



hm/sg

9930

August 16, 1960

9931

Dear HM:

It was good to hear from you. (Your letter was delayed because you sent it to the old address; please note new one: 4482 -23th St.)

Your letter of the 8th came at an auspicious time since the special issue of NEWS & LETTERS, which will be issued as a special pamphlet, WORKERS BATTLE AUTOMATION, has just come off the press and should be of value to you both because you will see the workers speaking for themselves ~~about~~ on the conditions of labor and the alleged high standard of living. I know, from the time I last ~~speak~~ spoke to you, that you consider these views as being the result of my influence. While it is true that Charles Denby and some (by no means all) of the writers of this pamphlet are Marxist Humanists, you would make a serious mistake if you considered their views so exceptional that they did not represent the American proletariat. They represent a very important segment of the American workers and in all basic industries--auto, steel, coal--and the conditions they describe are what they experience on the line, not what some sociologists see in a "field study." I would like to call your attention also or especially to p.6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the monolith not only of Communists but radicals who think they must have a "united voice" when they face the public, workers here disagree openly. Angela Terrano, whom you may recall I quote in MARKISM & FREEDOM because she has raised the question of what kind of labor in the true Marxist sense, and who then used the expression that work would have to be totally different, "something completely new, not just work to get money to buy food and things. It will have to be completely tied up with life" (p.275) here rejects Automation altogether whereas the editor insists that if the workers managed the factory it would not be a House of Terror and works along the more traditional channels of workers' control of production, shorter workday, etc.

Secondly, I happen to know a Caltex engineer who says some very different things ~~than~~ than Serge Mallet. I had him add a special paragraph on the question you raised, but his study of "Oil and Labor" published in the FI in 1949 was quite a comprehensive one & as I doubt you have it I enclose that too. (But when you have finished please return at your convenience) At the same time I am not sure that you have my article in Arguments on "State Capitalism and Bureaucracy" which deals with some of the sociologists you no doubt have in mind as, C.Wright Mills, who speak on somewhat a higher level than the epiphenomenal "Organization Man", and contrasts that to a state capitalist analysis of the times we live in. Since it was simultaneously published also in English I am enclosing the Socialist Leader of January 2, 1960 which does so. I will also try to locate the "Two Worlds" article at the beginning of the year which dealt with the American economy in the postwar years as it goes from recession to recession.

Now then the American literature on the subject; I have long since stopped paying attention to sociologists who have rather degenerated into the school of "social psychology" which the workers in the factory rightly call "head shrinking" so my list cannot be exhaustive but I can give you the major references. Since the class struggle was never accepted in American sociology as the framework of analysis, your reference to those who speak of alleged cooperative attitude of worker to management and even "organization of work"(!), ~~you~~ must have in mind ex-radicals and near radicals whose recent toutings of the virtues of capitalism are sort of summed up in the person of Daniel Bell and his strung-out articles called a book, "The

End of Ideology" by which they mean, of course, the end of the class struggle. Certainly they are struggling no longer now that their philistinism cannot even assume the venter of the West European enders of the class struggle (Not only the French but even the British "New Left") but ~~is~~ the crassest apolo for State Department "culture". (Now, isn't that a better euphemism than "the line"?)

Perhaps the most solid of these is Seymour Martin Lipset. His "Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics" is ~~confronted~~ by his attempt to "document" the attenuation of the class struggle: "The modification of late capitalism by welfare legislation, redistribution by taxation, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ powerful unions and "Full Employment" legislation. Lipset's thesis is that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved; the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions to economic problems." (Even here the American is very different from the French who when they espouse the attenuation of the class struggle go for the Plan with a capital P while the American remains "the free enterpriser" altho the State Department itself when it is a question of export of ideology goes for "people's capitalism.")

A book that has recently gotten a lot of attention both because it is new and sort of summarizes in bright journalistic language some half century of sociology is "The Eclipse of Community" by the Princeton University sociologist, Maurice R. Stein. There are all sorts of shouting on "The End of Industrial Man" (Peter Drucker), the end of political man "The Politics of Mass Society by William Kornhauser." Now none claim that the end of this economic, industrial, political man, even as his thinking too has been taken over by the electronic brain, is happy or content with his work. In that respect the antivalence is seen clearer in Daniel Bell's "Work and Its Discontents" whose claim is that the attenuation of the class struggle has nevertheless occurred, ifnot in the factory, than by "the new hunger the candied carrot". How much have we heard of those TV acts and "occupational mobility" and David Riesman's flip side record from the Lonely Man to "Individualism Reconsidered" of the need "to increase automatization in work--but for the sake of pleasure and consumption and not for the sake of work itself." At least Bell has one good catch phrase that the descriptions that issue from the so-called "human relations" projects are "not of human, but of cow, sociology."

If you take the economists, you also have a choice of the flip side so that Louis M. Hacker now touts "The Triumph of Capitalism" and while everyone is ashamed of such past as "The Decline of American Capitalism" which, like all so-called Marxist books from Corey to that Stalinist apologist who passes for "the" Marxist authority (even Joseph Schumpeter monumental but quite lopsided or, as we say more appropriate in Jewish "tsidreit", work, "History of Economic Analysis" refers to him as such) Paul Sweezy are one and all underconsumptionist so that, whether you take the period of the 1930s when "all" were Marxists to one degree or another and some serious works were done, or you take now when nearly the only works against capitalism are issued by the Stalinists, there really is no genuine Marxist analysis of the American economy either historically, sociologically or as economic works. But, at least, from the economists we does get figures and they do show that in "The Affluent Society" some are very much more affluent than others. Otherwise the sociological works, even before McCarthyism for whom way prostrate, were specialized studies of one or another

aspect, like occupational mobility by sociologists Reinhard Bendix and S.M. Lipset, or the Lynds' "Middletown" or Lloyd Warner's "Yankee City" or Louis Wirth's "The Ghetto" or Florian Znaniecki on the Polish peasant in America. Even the more broad dislocations as "Class and Caste in Southern Town" by Dollard had no comprehensive view of American society as a whole. When both the muckrakers before World War I (Lincoln Steffens' "Autobiography" if you happen not to have read it will do for that) and the specialized studies of the 1930s and some in World War II stopped flowing, we then went into the most famous Elton Mayo's Hawthorne studies on "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization", which were to replace, I suppose, the statistical studies of sharecroppers, breadlines, etc.

Now everything has moved to Automation. In addition to those I list in M&F, there is now "Automation and Technological Change", Hearings before Joint Comm. on the Eco. Report, 84th Congress, Wash, D.C./ H.S. Jacobson and J.S. Roucek "Automation and Society" (Phil. Library", C. Walker's "Toward the Automatic Factory" and "Automation and the Worker" by Floyd C. Mann and L. Richard Hoffman, which, despite its title, is not what the worker feels but a specialized study in power plants by the U. of Mich. There is a good bibliography, issued in 1959, ~~xxxxxxx~~ called "Economic and Social Implications of Automation: a Bibliographic Review, Michigan State U., East Lansing, Mich. I doubt any of these are really what you wish to waste your time on, but it is a fact that the new (since 1958) "The Society for the History of Technology" with its journal "Technology and Culture" (Vol. I, #1, Winter 1959) at least doesn't write with the glib complex that the sociologists do and therefore can both be somewhat more objective as well as free from the attempt to identify the end of its ideology with that of the "masses". Not being concerned much with the ~~xxxx~~ masses (their outpost away from the publishing center here at ~~xxx~~ Wayne State U. and its editor Melvin Kranzberg of Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, is really Chicago and the "Christian Humanism" of the sociologist-technologist U. Nef) it can pay attention to the technological base as it impinges on other fields. For example, it would definitely be worthwhile if your book is not going to press right this minute to ~~wait~~ gets its next issue which it promises to devote entirely to that monumental 5 volume study "A History of Technology", which is edited by Charles Singer and which series of articles on it, critical and otherwise, will be prefaced by him.

Now then, as you see, I could not give you the listing of the American literature on the subject without giving you my views as well. I wish now to summarize my considered evaluation not merely of books of the American society as I see, which differs very radically from your views. If I may, I would like to say that I hope at least that you have not, in your preoccupation with "the transformation of the laboring class" fallen into the trap of viewing Marxian socialism as if it were a distributive philosophy. I do not mean to insult you and put in the underconsumptionist category but such great revolutionaries as Rosa Luxemburg were in it, despite the fact that her "Reform or Revolution" was based precisely on removing the question of the class struggle from its ~~fact~~ reduction to a question of "personal fortunes" to one of production relations. Engels certainly wrote many works on production relations and never was even conscious of any deviations, and yet by not being the dialectician and humanist Marx was, wrote tracts that were far afield. Hilferding had undertaken his "Finance Capital" as a bringing up to date of "Capital" yet the "organized capitalism" with its "stability" inclinations reduced socialism to a matter of "taking over" not reorganizing from the ground up, least of all by the spontaneous actions of the workers. Of course, you may say that is exactly where Marx was "wrong" and you of course are not only entitled to your view but writing probably for many

years, and I may be doing you a great injustice since I do not have your NSS at hand (I do hope you will send it to me so that view can be concrete instead of based on assumptions) but I just have a feeling that this preoccupation with the alleged high standard of living shifts the weight from what you yourself state in the Preface to my book as "the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy;

~~Therefore~~ Therefore, allow me to recapitulate some fundamentals although all are familiar to you. First you no doubt recall that on p. 12 of M&F where I quote from CAP. VOL. I, pp. 708-9 on law of accumulation I argue against the popular concept that now that the worker is "better off" etc., pointing to Marx's statement that "in proportion as capital is accumulated, the lot of the laborer, be his payment high or low, must grow worse." (Emphasis added.) That his lot has grown worse is evidenced in the conditions of labor under Automation and in the unemployment it has produced. The "pockets of depression" may sound very incidental to those who do not have to live in them but when, in 1960, even a Jack Kennedy (now that electioneering is in the air) must stand appalled at conditions in West Virginia where actual cases of mothers selling themselves into prostitution to try to keep from starvation, isn't it time for the exponents of higher standard of living to take a breather and look into the lot of the 5 million unemployed who with their families make up 13 million. And it isn't only the unemployed, nor even the snail pace of the growth of the American postwar economy which has produced 3 recessions, but the so-called normal conditions under Automation. I have seen miners' shacks who had an outhouse instead of a toilet but had a TV on the installment plan but that did not signify either contentment or that they "chose" thus the "candied carrot", but only that TV could be installed whereas before plumbing could be it would need a great deal more than a \$5 down payment--you'd have to root out altogether those hovels, including the miserable excuses for roads leading to them in this most road-conscious industrially advanced free land.

The answer of those who seem to take the opposite view is that, 1, they have never even bothered to build a LP, 2, the labor leadership they have they "deserve" since they wanted for the Reuthers, Meany's, Hoffas, and 3, that they are not "active", i.e., rechanging society this very moment. Strikes, wildcats, and organization of their own thinking seem not to count for very much. For the moment I'll accept this non-acceptable view and ask whether that is any more than the "bourgeoisification of the British proletariat" Marx and Engels so bemoan or "the aristocracy of labor" that Lenin saw as the root cause of the collapse of the Second Int.

This brings me to the second basic Marxian view, on the question of going to ever deeper and lower strata of the proletariat for its revolutionary essence. You may recall that on p. 187 of M&F I bring Marx's speech of Sept. 20, 1871, after the collapse of PC and the cowardly running even before then of the British trades union leaders. (I have seen that speech only in Russian, but it may be available in German I don't know.) I there also show that ~~Lenin~~ hadn't "discovered" this which he now called "the quintessence of Marxism" until he himself was confronted not only with the betrayal of the Second but with the ultra leftism of Bukharin who was thereupon ready to castigate not only the Second's leadership but the proletariat itself. It is the last par. on that p. 187 where I deal with Lenin's approach on two levels, the real and the ideal, that I would now like to call to your attention, if I may.

It is true that Automation and state capitalism are not only "quantitative" but qualitative changes in our contemporary society

and that that predominant fact would also affect a part of the proletariat. But a part is not the whole. Indeed, the fact that gives the appearance of an affluent society not only in the bourgeois ~~sector~~ sector but in the masses --the millions of employed so that the 5 millions unemployed look "little"-- does not show that those unemployed are predominantly in the production workers. No suburbia here. It is all concentrated in the industrial centers, among an organized but wildcatting proletariat and aggravated by the Negro Question which is by no means quiescent and among a youth that has shown that they are not rebels without a cause but with one. I know you do not accept my view that they are in search of a total philosophy and are not getting themselves ready for the dustbin of history. But it is a fact that not only among the proletariat and the million that were striking just when Khrushchev was visiting and Eisenhower wanted him to show American superiority in industry, not industry at a standstill, it is a fact that in just the few months that Negro college youth began sitting in the whole question of freedom and youth "coming up to the level of the West European" has been moved from the stage of the future to that of the present.

That will do until I actually see your book in manuscript and get the development of your thought. I should be very happy to write again then. Meanwhile, my work --and I still labor with the Absolute Idea despite the activist pressures you are free from -- moves slowly, but I do hope after Labor Day to get more time to concentrate on the book. Perhaps I'll get to Boston in winter--I did get there last March but I was there for only two days and two lectures and had no chance to try to contact you. If the invitation to speak will be repeated this fall, I will try to second talk with you.

John  
Raf

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY  
WALTHAM 54, MASSACHUSETTS

August 24, 1960

Dear R. D.

It was wonderful to get from you such quick and good help. I read at once the issue of NEWS AND LETTERS. Don't misunderstand me: I agree with practically everything that is said there, and yet, somehow, there is something essentially wrong here. (1) What is attacked, is NOT automation, but pre-automation, semi-automation, non-automation. Automation as the explosive achievement of advanced industrial society is the practically complete elimination of precisely that mode of labor which is depicted in these articles. And this genuine automation is held back by the capitalists as well as by the workers - with very good reasons (on the part of the capitalists: decline in the rate of profit; need for sweeping government controls, etc.; on the part of the workers: technological unemployment). (2) It follows that arrested, restricted automation saves the capitalist system, while consummated automation would inevitably explode it: Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, p. 592-593. (3) re Angela T.: you should really tell her about all that humanization of labor, its connection with life, etc. - that this is possible only through complete automation, because such humanization is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in the material production. Total de-humanization of the latter is the prerequisite.

But all this has to be discussed orally. I hope we can do so in the winter. And again, my great gratitude!

I am sending \$ 10.- to help NEWS AND LETTERS.

*Sincerely,  
Herbert*

9936

COPY (10/30)

*Richard, please return this to me R*

9937

October 16, 1960

Dear HM:

Dear HM:

I hope I may intrude upon you with some on the Absolute Idea. You may find it useful even for your present purposes since you are dealing with sociology and technology and Nikolai Bukarin is the father, though I doubt he would like that strange progeny of Mills, Rossiter, Mallet, of all menhantists, and these are my "enemies" as I proceed to work out the philosophic foundations (the Hegelian Absolute Idea and Marx's Humanism for the present day struggles for freedom in the underdeveloped economies, a sort of counterpart to MARKISM AND FREEDOM which limited itself to the present-day descent from ontology to technology, it should be to sharpen up the edges.)

At once I must make so bold with historic background as to include both the African and Hungarian Revolutions, even as, suddenly, without anyone bothering to explain why, Latin America too is included among "backward countries," although their populations are not African but of European stock, nor do they lack either an "educated class" or railroads or aeroplanes through "jungle country." The one element of truth in the designation of "backward" pertains to the economy but since I take man, not the "economy as such," as subject, I would like at once to make clear what is the "thesis" I use from Hegel's final chapter. It is to be found on p.467: "The self-determination therefore in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak." The self-determinations of people are, surely, no less important than the self-determination of the Idea. It is no accident that Nagy, the Petofi intelligentsia, and the Hungarian Workers Councils all fought its ideological battles by unfolding Marxist Humanism and this same discovery appears in Senegal where Leopold Senghor, for all his apologia for De Gaulle, unfolds the same banner. (I do not recall whether I sent you my review of Senghor's "African Socialism," but I'll find a copy somewhere and send it to you.)

Now, in detail, to the unfoldment of the Absolute Idea in Hegel's Logic, all the way glancing at which point in it, at the various historic stages in the development of the Marxist movement, the Marxists "got caught." The significance of that first paragraph on p. 466, for Lenin at end of 1914 was that the unity of the theoretic and practical idea applied not so much in action as "precisely in the theory of knowledge..." You may recall that just 5 pages before he reached that chapter, where Hegel dealt with "The Idea of the Good," Lenin stressed the actuality of the Idea and "non-actuality of the world" by writing: "Alas! Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world but creates it." But Lenin did not develop precisely that aspect, as we shall see, when we reach the end of the chapter.

That same first paragraph of the A.I. contains the stopping point of today's African intelligentsia. If you are versed in their constant reiteration of the "African personality," you will recognize them easily enough in Hegel: "The Notion is not only Seele but also is free and subjective. Notion, which is for itself and therefore has not exclusive individuality, but is, for itself, universality and cognition, and in its Other has its own objectivity for object." Without that personality too would only be "error and gloom, opinion, striving, caprice, and transitoriness..."

All the Marxists of the 2nd International, (Lenin up to 1914 included) at very best stopped on p. 467 (if even we give them credit that is of having grappled with Hegel himself instead of some tertiary summary)



of him) when Hegel speaks of "the universal element of its form--that is the method." As to vulgarization of that "method" surely had not only the Cynics and Sphists in mind a few pages hence (p. 473) he says the dialectic "was often quite neglected by those who were fullest of him in their speech. The Second International not merely neglected the dialectic, but perverted it into a sort of polish for their organic Kantianism.

Because all Marxists, not excluding Marx himself, do like to stress method rather than AI, thus pinpointing the putting of Hegel right side up, "it is necessary to linger a bit here. Although he stresses (p.468) that "nothing is either conceived or known in its truth except in so far as it is completely subject to the method," he separates himself at once from those who would degrade method to a tool, as analysts do: "In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a tool, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the method relates itself to the object. In this syllogism the subject is one extreme and the object the other...The extremes remain distinct because, subject, method, and object are not posited as the one identical Notion..." (p.469)

In contrast, therefore, Hegel proceeds to define method for true cognition: "it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself and is the mean only because it equally has the significance of objective..." (p.469) The transition here is to get back to the determination of the method. "First we must begin from the beginning..." and the beginning, Hegel informs us to the consternation of philosopher and engineer alike, "must be inherently defective and must be endowed with the impulse of self-development."

The self-determination of the ~~IDEA~~ Idea, as that of peoples, far from being worlds apart, cannot be seen in their fullness, "in and for itself" apart from each other. It is in this respect that I just get fed up with Marxists who keep harping on "method" as if it meant opposition to A.I., or, better put, want "to throw out God and the Absolute Idea" so that Idea (ideas) too is buried. In "Historical Materialism," for example, Bukarin speaks of "society" as if indeed it was matter, dead matter. Perhaps I better follow the way of Hegel in this too and refuse to have anything to do with vulgarizers. His admonition that the vulgar refutation ~~is~~ "be left to itself" (p. 474) reminded me of the Ghost of Hamlet's father telling him all about the corruption of the court, the murder and the vengeance he should seek, nevertheless admonishes him against taking action against one of the conspirators, his mother: "Leave her to heaven." If only we had some "heaven"...

What is important, says Hegel, is the source of the "prejudice" against the dialectic, i.e., that it seems to have only negative results; and therefore what is of the essence is "To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition." (p.476.) It is here, where he deals with the second negative, (or mediated determination) the negative "of the positive, and includes the latter," where Hegel stresses the subjective "for the transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality and that unity which is the truth, rest upon subjectivity alone."

We are entering the whole section where even the Lenin of post 1914 found "not clear" and I believe that the fact that we live in 1960, not in 1914, and the fact that we witness both the advanced proletariat's battles with automation as well as the colonial freedom struggles, can help us break it down. I am not underestimating Lenin's conception of "the positive in the negative." One who led 1917 needs no minor League defenses.

Long before he read Hegel on subjectivity, Lenin saw "Masses as Reason." But if he saw that truth as long back as 1905, and was preparing to repeat that on a much grander historical scale, why then did this turning point of the movement of the Notion appear obscure to Lenin?

Hegel, on his part, hit out against the whole triplicity construction of the dialectic here, saying "If number is applicable, then the whole course of this second immediate is the third term... now, since the former (the first negative) is itself the second term, the third term may now be counted as fourth, and the abstract form of it may be taken as a quadruplicity in place of triplicity...." (p. 478) Lenin's note here: "The distinction is not clear to me; is not the absolute equivalent ~~is~~ to the more concrete?"

Yes and no, says Hegel, as I read him. It is concrete but it is equally subject: "The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete and the subject." It is subject he had in mind as soon as he had reached the turning point in the movement of the motion, but stressing that "transcendence of opposition between Notion and Reality, and that unity which is truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone." He first stressed that transcendence of contradiction which "is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit by ~~virtue~~ virtue of which a subject is personal and free." And as Hegel moves to the climactic, after method is extended to system, ~~and even though you must enter other spheres--Nature and Mind--he cannot refrain from saying that we have ended with transitions, have entered "absolute liberation" (p.485) "The transition here therefore must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in form of its determinate is utterly free...the Notion arises as free existence that out of externality has passed into itself; arises to perfect its self-liberation..." (p.486)~~ and even though you must enter other spheres--Nature and Mind--he cannot refrain from saying that we have ended with transitions, have entered "absolute liberation" (p.485) "The transition here therefore must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in form of its determinate is utterly free...the Notion arises as free existence that out of externality has passed into itself; arises to perfect its self-liberation..." (p.486)

Now all this

"personal and free" "individual," "liberation," "release," "utterly free", "self-liberation" cannot possibly mean only the philosopher finding his absolute, as he shows in the Philosophy of Mind when his own mind wanders to the struggles against slavery. (Nor do I feel like fighting with Hegel over whether Christianity or actuality brought freedom of man into the world; the Old Man was great enough & even if he did reside in ivory towers, they were awfully crowded ones--so much so that today's freedom fighters in Africa find room there too.)

In all fairness to Lenin, I must here jump to Khrushchev and his state philosophers who are supposed to have, according to Wetter and Klein and all the specialists in "Soviet Survey," "reconstituted" the law of the negation of the negation, "which had been thrown out as a feature of the dialectic" by Stalin. No doubt it is true that "negation of negation" was too close for comfort to a totalitarian society--for Khrushchev as much as for Stalin, ~~however~~ however. What is of more specific note is that Soviet science, in Stalin's time, had not yet achieved that break through that it had need of that law to justify "acceptance of theory of relativity and rejection of idealistic interpretation in Bohr." With missile thrust and automated production achieved, they have need of the law for the natural sciences as they practice them.

Copy

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Science is not my fort, and in any case, subjectivity is not for the vulgarly materialistic. The self-developing "subject"—the proletariat—not just negation of negation "in general" is the enemy, and when Karpushin asked that the Early Essays of Marx be once again included in the Complete Works of Marx, it was not to "re-establish the law of the negation of negation", but to attack, pervert, destroy if he can Marxist Humanism where Man, not Absolute Idea, became the subject of all humanity's development and the dehumanization of Ideas be once and for all stopped when even so great a philosopher as Hegel must perforce return to positivism.

11/17\* Now then to return to Lenin—the jump to Khrushchev's Russia was only to show what can happen to a non-worked-out aspect of dialectics—Hegel made him see all the leaps where there was gradualness, all the self-movement where there was external reflection of the "International" or established socialist party the value of a theory of knowledge that has within it "all the world-connections", the motive force in the ideal as well as the real, but the individual, the "personal and free", how could that arise as concrete until after 1917 did not bring a new world social order? Something has to be left for our age, no?

11/21\* In any case, where Bukharin remained in teleology, Lenin passed on as saw Hegel laying the premises for historical materialism—the transformation of the subjectivity of purpose by means of working upon, negating object; opposition of subjective and to external object was only first negation, while second negation takes place through the means. In this relation between first and second negation, indeed, resides the relation between vulgar and dialectical materialism, for the vulgar materialist never gets beyond opposition of subjective end to external object. But the materialist in Lenin so overwhelmed him at this point of historic revelation that, you will recall, he wanted to stop where "Hegel stretched his hand to materialism" as he "ended" with Nature. Since that was so in the Smaller Logic, but there was another very important paragraph to go in the Science of Logic, the dividing point for our epoch is precisely on this free, individual, total liberation who show, both in thought and struggles, what they are aiming us and thus compelling me in any case to read and reread that Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea, Absolute Mind as each developing struggle on the world scene deepens.

I'll stop at this point and tell you that if you are interested and wish to comment on this, I'll continue to forward various thoughts-in-process as I work on my new book—and am just "dying" to go to Africa.

Yours,

Rayax

Nov. 22, 1960

Dear HM:

Talking out loud alone is certainly no substitute for a dialogue, but the fact that you are in Mass. and I in Mich. is permitting me the illusion that some one is listening. In any case I feel impelled once again to return to Nikolai Bukharin's "Historical Materialism." My phrase that Bukharin treated society as "dead matter" sounded slanderous and so I turned to his chapter (IV) on "Society" and there (p.84) read: "We encounter not only simple bodies, which at once impress us as constituting units (for ex., a sheet of paper, a cow, John Smith), but also meet with compound units, intricate quantities."

Incredible it sounds when a revolutionary Marxist speaks in one and the same breath of "a sheet of paper" and a human being as a "unit", but it is the actual, irresistible ultimate from one "who never quite understood the dialectic" (to use Lenin's phrase). If society can be turned into such an abstraction, it shouldn't surprise us that science too is made into an abstraction under which human activity is subsumed. Hegel had the right word for that method: "For this reason determinism itself suffers from an indeterminateness which forces it to go on to infinity; at any point it may halt and rest satisfied, because the Object to which it has passed over is rounded in itself as a formal totality and is indifferent to determination by another." (Chapter on "Mechanism", Science of Logic, p.352)

In place of self-activity, Bukharin, as all good determinists, looks for states of equilibrium, "laws" of development, uniformity. Indeed, his hostility to self-determination is so absolute that he conceives of 2 forms of uniformity, teleology and causality, and causality, for Bukharin, is one event, cause, being followed by another event, effect. His thinking is confined within intellectual planning or what Hegel would call "self-determination applied only externally" (Ibid, p.391)

Having defined science as objective content in and for itself, NB can classify "bourgeois" science and "proletarian" science according to the abstract universal of usefulness or what would nowadays be called "neutrality." His choice of "proletarian" science is therefore quantitative -- it is more "far-sighted". Even as today's Soviet as well as American sciences, Bukharin's ~~mathematics~~ keeps using categories of a lower order, particularly mathematical categories which preclude self-movement and transformation into opposite for he seems not very oppressively aware of the fact that specific contents have specific forms of movement, and man's self-activity cannot be subsumed under science, whether that is "near sighted" or "far sighted." Not only far distant but completely unapproachable with Bukharin's categories stands the young Marx: "To have one basis for life and another for science is a priori a lie."

I need not tell you that, in contrast to Bukharin's (mechanical materialism (which characterizes present-day science), dialectics sees the subject as an in-and-for itself determinateness which has appropriated objectivity: "Consequently, the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination: it aims rather at positing its own determination, and by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality." (Logic, II, p.461)

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The fact that present-day scientists and sociologists cannot shine Bukharin's shoes only further emphasizes the fact that once you identify men and things you fall into the trap of the fundamental alienation of philosophers in class ~~xxxxx~~ society from the ancient Greek dichotomy of form and apeiron, philosophers and slaves to its culmination under automated capitalism where, as you put it, ontology has been transformed into technology.

Let you consider my contrary stress on subjectivity as "pure" idealism, will you permit me to sum up what it is I have been doing since 1953 when I became so preoccupied with the Absolute Idea? The ~~xxxx~~ essence of those May letters was that there is a movement from practice to theory as well as from theory to practice. The reason that it stirred up such a fuss in the sectarian movements is that heretofore is that this statement of fact was made equivalent to instinct: workers, of course, had the "right instinct" and Marxism, "of course," had correctly generalized this instinct into a revolutionary theory, but...without Marxist theory the revolutionary practice would get "nowhere." Above all, it was stressed, only Marx could have seen this where Hegel's idea of practice was for the theory of knowledge "only." Therefore, to deduce this movement from practice from Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, ran the argument against me, is sheer abandonment of the real world for that of ivory towers, a return from the world of action to that of talk of "philosophers". The "philosophers", on their part, were as little inclined to bend their ears to the earth and listen for any new impulses for theory, ~~xxxx~~ A short month after my letters were dispatched the first revolt from behind the Iron Curtain started ~~xxxx~~ so that both the man on the street and the philosopher, not to speak of the vanguardists, had to change the question: Can man gain freedom from out of totalitarian stranglehold to Will he?

From 1953 to 1956 (Hungarian Revolution) we were confronted, on the theoretical front, by the sudden attacks of Russian Communism on Marx's humanist writings which turned out to have been used by "revisionist" Marxists as the banner under which they fought Communism not only in Western Europe but in far away Africa where, on the practical front, the most significant revolutions of our epoch were unfolding. As my ideas on the Absolute Idea got worked up in MARXISM AND FREEDOM they were quite general. It was clear I was walking gingerly not because I found myself outside any "recognized" movement but because I was dealing more with Marx's age than ours. More than a 100 years divide our age from the period when the founder of Marxism first stood Hegel right side up and very nearly dismissed Hegel's compulsion to go from the Absolute Idea in the Logic to Nature as "boredom, the yearning for a content," on the part of "the abstract thinker who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to abandon himself and to substitute his otherness, the particular, the determined, for his self-contained being, his nothingness, his universality and his indeterminateness." (Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic) Nevertheless the young Marx cannot stop there and does follow Hegel from Nature to Mind, breaking off, however, in very short order.\*

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\*Curiously my letter on Philosophy of Mind began with par. 385, without my having been aware that Marx had broken his MSS off at par. 384.

From then on the Marxian dialectic is the creative dialectic of the actual historic movement and not only that of thought. The continuation therefore resides in the three volumes of CAPITAL, the First International, the Civil War in France and the Critique of the Gotha Program. A rich enough heritage not to get mummified, but the objective world has its own way of magnetising so to speak a single point in thought.

Only with the collapse of that world does Lenin feel the compulsion to return to the Hegelian origins of Marxism ~~without~~ the Russian Revolution has a world to remake and no time for abstract discussions on the Absolute Idea. (Lukacs limits Hegelianism to the single field of consciousness as organization, or the party as the proletariat's "knowing". In any case the period between 1923 and 1953 is a period of standstill in theory so that the movement from practice finds no theory to match it even as the new stage in production finds only in the workers battling automation any new points of departure for theory as for practice.

Now those who stop with "knowing", whether they are neutral partisans of a technology sans class nature or thought embodiment, or Communist adherents to partinost, (be it idealistically a la Lukacs or cynically a la Kadar), fail to grasp that both in Hegel and in Marx the question of ~~thought~~ cognition is not an abstract question but a concrete, dialectical-empirical one of the how thought molds experience or gives action its direction. If the Whole governs the Parts even when the whole is not yet fact, then surely, whether Hegel knew it or not, the pull of the future on the present also tugged at his "system" with such overwhelming force that he could not escape it, ivory tower or no ivory tower, any more than personal capitulation to the Prussian State could compel his philosophy to stop there to genuflect instead of rising out of it and even out of religion into the absolute or the new society he as person could not envisage.

Somewhere D. H. Lawrence says of the relationship of artist to the work of art: Artists are the biggest liars and are not to be taken at face value. But that art, if it is really great art, is truth and will reveal both society and the vision of the artist he buries in his explanatory lies. It is even truer of philosophers in general and Hegel in particular. Subjectivity as objectivity absorbed is not for the philosophers, but for the masses and it is they who are writing the new page of history which is at the same time a new stage in cognition. Even as every previous great step in philosophic cognition was made only when a new leap to freedom became possible, so presently the new struggles for freedom the world over will certainly shake the intellectuals out of the stupors so that they too can create freely a new "category." While I may not be waiting breathlessly for these ideologists, I am for the "developing subject" that is the "negative factor." You can't really mean that you are "giving up" the masses, can you?

Yours,

9943

From  
Herbert  
Marcuse  
in Absolutism

December 22, 1960

Dear RD:

I do not want the year let go without thanking you for your letters. I read them several times, but I am unable to discuss them in writing - there is just too much to say.

To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new Subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the technological Aufhebung of the reified technical apparatus.

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But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to say what you want to say. Surely you do not need it in order to demonstrate the Marxien content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage. Certainly you can "translate" also this part of Hegel - but why translate if you can speak the original language??

Please don't mind my all too brief and inadequate reaction. I am still too much absorbed by these and other problems. But one day soon I hope there will be more.

With the very best wishes for the new year,

Yours,  
HM

9944

January 12, 1961

Dear H. M.:

I was glad to get your note of December 22nd and sorry you had no chance to develop your ideas at greater length. I am looking forward to seeing you and have you expand on this in person. The January lecture in Boston fell through, but I do have a series of three in Springfield the last week in February and the first week in March. Please let me know where I can reach you by phone and when I get there I'll make it my business to come up to Boston for at least a day, and while that won't exhaust the Absolute Idea, will make a little dent in it.

I should like to divide what I have to say into two parts, the first dealing with your question as to why I "need the Absolute Idea... why translate if you can speak the original language?" I disagree with you when you say that "The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage." It was not the pre-technological stage that impelled Hegel to the Absolute Idea, although he certainly lived in a pre-technological era, it was the fact that the French Revolution had not brought about the millennium--Reason, Freedom, Self-Liberation--which impelled him towards the Absolute Idea. As we know from his First System, he couldn't accept the fledgling proletariat as that absolute negativity which would reconstruct society, but he didn't just "give up" when he stopped short with that work. Insofar as he compromised with the Prussian State, he seemed to have accepted the State as the Absolute and the opportunist in him, no doubt, did. ~~However~~ Marx, in fact, was transformed from the petty bourgeois intellectual into the Marx we know by so profound a critique of the Philosophy of Right that the materialist conception of history was born. But, in all fairness to Hegel the philosopher, he just couldn't stop either at the State or even Religion or its Art (Forms) of the Spirit, but proceeded on to the A. I. Why? Why, when you consider that he had broken with all preceding philosophy and had no use whatsoever for the empty Absolute of Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi?

Let's approach this from another way--Marx' constant return to Hegel and constantly breaking from him. After Marx Critique of the Philosophy of Right came the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic. There, where he breaks with the Absolute Idea--and he had to break from it or the discovery of the Materialist Conception of History would have been just empirical, rather than dialectical, comprehensive, total and human--it is no longer just material foundation vs. super-structure; it is against the de-humanization of the Idea, and while he is at it, he rightly rejects the philosopher as the yardstick without forgetting, however, also to break with Feuerbach's anthropological materialism and vulgar communism. By that time he has barely mentioned Absolute Mind when the whole essay breaks off. With the 1848 Revolutions, Marx certainly has no further "use" for Hegel, and yet in 1859 he is back again. If you contrast the "copying" of Hegel in the form chosen for Critique of Political Economy and in the language of the Grundrisse with his recreation of the Dialectic from the life of the historic period, 1861-67, you see at once that this break from Hegel, the final transcendence of the Absolute reappears but is this time split into two--for capitalism.



the general absolute law of capitalist accumulation, and for "the negation of the negation" the new passions and new forces. And when he returns to Capital after the French Revolution (P.C.) and inserts changes of independent "scientific value" both in Chapter One on the Form of value and in the part on accumulation its ultimate development in the concentration of Capital in the hands of a single corporation, he at the same time makes the "purely technical" change of eliminating Part Eight as a separate part, subordinating it to a chapter following capitalist accumulation. That is to say, the historical tendency, the whole movement from primitive accumulation through capitalistic to the expropriators being expropriated, now is not just a negation of the negation "in general" but the specifically self-developing subject, in its logical philosophical, historical and individual development. You will remember that he makes some cracks at the "pre-technological" proletarian--the artisan--to the fully-developed individual who will have absorbed the technological achievements and we will get to this Subjectivity when we return to Hegel again.

Again, why the Absolute Idea, only this time tracing it through with Lenin's need. It would, of course, be nonsense to consider that without "a transformation into opposite" that he found in Hegel, Lenin wouldn't have known what to do about the betrayal of the Second International. That man never wavered for one second on what to do with or without Hegel. But the need to break with his own philosophic past, that vulgar materialism to which his "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" gave the green light, the need for self-liberation in thought must have been overpowering for him to have felt so very much at home with that idealist Hegel, and indeed he learned that the freedom, the year to freedom one gets from a generalization is a release from the imperial, the factual, the dead to where one truly reaches a new human dimension. Think of his writing, and all to himself at that, "man's cognition not only reflects the world, but creates it".

I will take only one single sentence from Hegel from the Absolute Idea chapter which so preoccupies my every waking moment, and "translate" it and you will see at once that though all translations are "correct" and surely historical, they are by far from exhausting what Hegel meant, and therefore, the constant compulsion to return to him. The sentence is, "The self-determination in which alone the idea is to hear itself speak". If any man understood self-determination in the Marxian sense of self-determination of nations, it certainly is Lenin. At least there you would have thought he would have no need for Hegel. Yet, if you contrast what self-determination of nations meant to Lenin pre-1914, when it was merely a principle, to what it meant post-1914 when life and theory and philosophy combined, it will be clear that two different worlds, not contradictory perhaps, but different, are at issue there. For, by 1916 when the Irish Revolution had occurred, self-determination wasn't something that was being given by principled Marxists, but something that the masses were getting and giving to Marxists, a new beginning for their revolution which had been betrayed, the bacillus that would bring onto the stage the proletariat in action once again; and after 1917, when it is the Bolsheviks who had to be doing the giving, and when a Bukharin was willing to take liberties with it, because now we were at a "higher" stage, how that revolutionary dialectic Lenin hit out, and in the Will he was to remind the world that Bukharin never truly understood the Dialectic. Isn't that something

for a reigning statesman to bother himself with on his dying bed? (Did you know that 1922 Lenin once again read Hegel's Logic and with it that religious philosopher Ilyin, who, in his Commentary on the Logic was so illuminating on the question of concrete, that he insisted that Ilyin, the reactionary, be freed from jail?)

Now all that meant self-determination in 1914-24 and if I took only the political translation, how was I to have seen the humanism in the self-determination of the African Decade, 1950-50? "The self-determination in which alone the Idea is in to hear itself speak", and it speaks with a different voice now, and to be able to hear it there is a necessity not only for the practice of hearing today's masses, but the theory of Hegel's philosophy.

If I must further justify myself, I would say that, frankly during the 1940's, when I first became enamored with the Absolute Idea, it was just out of loyalty to Marx and Lenin; Hegel was still hardly more than gibberish, although by now the music of his language got to me even if I couldn't read the notes. But once the new technological period of Automation got to the miners and they started asking questions about what kind of labor, the return to the early Marx meant also the late Hegel. As I said, I do not agree with you that the Absolute Idea relates to a pre-technological stage. [So long as classes still exist, the dialectic will, and A.I. will forever show new facets.] What I do agree with is that once on the world scale, we have reached the ultimate in technological development, then the responses of the masses in the pre-technological under-developed economies are the spur to seeing the something new in the Absolute Idea. Be it backward Ireland in 1916, or backward Russia in 1917, or backward Africa in 1950, somehow that absolute negativity of Hegel comes into play.

One final word on why "translation" is no substitute for Hegel. It has to do with the limits of the age one lives with, which creates the concrete, but also exhausts it and there is need for return to the abstract, the new universal which will become the new concrete. For example, for Lenin's age "transformation into opposites" was the category, while cognition, not only reflecting but creating, was left alone. To get to a new relationship of theory and practice, on a new foundation, there was a new concrete in life to create a new stage of philosophic cognition, a return to Hegel was necessary. Or at least I needed it.

Now to the second reason for this letter. I am glad you agree that a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice and the notion of a new Subject is the key. Without a new formulation, the second negation could be diverted, as it is by the Stalinists, to mean a new object--a technique, a sputnik, even an ICBM--instead of the self-developing subject. Of course, technology means the conditions for universality, but without a new subject one would automatically relapse to the state of "balance" doing it. I do not know whether you happen to have read the latest issue of "Technology and Culture" (Winter 1961) where A. Zverokine, the Editor-in-Chief of the Russian Review of the History of World Civilization is attempting to do the same thing with technology that Leontiev and Ostrovityanov did with value, that is to

say, denuded of its class content. I am writing the Journal a letter, which I will enclose for you. The point I want to make here is that vulgar materialism, which rests upon a contemplative attitude toward reality, has, when it is in power, a very vindictive attitude to the self-developing subject. This it tries to hide, either by disregarding the subject or transforming the object Science into "Subject".

A new beginning must be made, needless to say not from the Object but the Subject. That, I hope, is what you mean by "the self-transcendence of materialism". Let me return once again to Hegel and that key-passage on the Second Negation and Subjectivity: (Page 477) "The negativity which has just been considered is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone."

To overcome the <sup>1</sup>dogmatism of taking the given concrete to be the real one had to do more than just to contrast essence with appearance. Lenin, in his notebooks, is happy when he gets over the final section on Essence (Causality) because it permits him to break with inconsistent ~~dogmatism~~, which includes the limitations of the scientific method, that is to say, the category of causality ~~to~~ explain the relationship between mind and matter. The categories by which we will gain knowledge of the objectively real, Lenin says, are Freedom, Subjectivity, Notion. These, then, are the transition, or better yet transcendence, of objective idealism into materialism, as well as of vulgar materialism into true subjectivity, which has absorbed the object. And yet, it is precisely from the passage of Hegel which I just quoted that Lenin writes that this play over whether there is a triplicity or quadruplicity in the dialectic, is unclear to him.

(Incidentally, quadruplicity, instead of triplicity, had also a special, though a secondary interest for me because I used to be quite at a loss to understand why Hegel, in the Encyclopedia, lists three Attitudes to Objectivity, which excludes the Hegelian dialectic, since from Kant you go, not to Hegel, but backward to Jacobi. It would then mean that there is a retrogression in history and the famous triplicity of the dialectic must really become a quadruplicity before we finally reach the Freedom of the Absolute. But here, in the Science of Logic, we are dealing not so much with attitudes to objectivity as to self-development of self-activity. In any case, the real point to us here is the "immanent determination"--the "self-mediating" movement and activity" (Page 479).

The following and last pages are all on self-relation, "personal and free", free release, self-liberation, and it is all done via the three movements of Universal, Particular, and Individual, which has characterized the Science of Logic as a whole, as well as in each of its sections. Let me retrace my step once again to Page 479: "The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete, and the subject"

And yet, the dialectic method, "the method of truth", has here extended itself into a system. Unless one fully holds on to the fact that it is only because the result has been "deduced and demonstrated" (Page 430), he is like to give up at this point and say that's where Hegel must really be stood on his head because he is nothing more than an idealist, after all, who has yet one other system to present as the "Absolute", and his own at that. But, neither the "system" nor the foundation is any longer a mere assumption, and we have not stopped going to the objective for proof. It does not come out of the philosopher's head at all, although "each new stage of exteriorization (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity" (Page 437). No doubt, Lenin here again took heart and near the very next sentence, "the richest consequently is also the most concrete", referred us back to Capital. Indeed, it is at this point most likely when he wrote so frantically to the Grand Encyclopedia, asking whether he couldn't after all still add something on the dialectic, even as he had concluded to himself what no Marxist in the past half-century had understood - Capital, which it is impossible to understand without the whole of the Logic. History, however, putting barriers even before a genius like Lenin, he remained happiest when he could pretend that the Logic ended with Hegel's extending a "hand to materialism," because as a totality the unity of Notion and Reality, after all assumed ~~the~~ the form of Nature, which Lenin "translated" as "Practice".

I am certainly all for the practice of the 1917 Revolution. But even as Lenin had to live also with what "happens after", 1917-20, so we who have lived with what "happens after" for nearly four decades must find the self-developing subject, the new subject, and now, not only in a country and regarding a specific layer in the proletariat (as against our "aristocrats of labor" and for Marx' deeper and lower "strata" that have continued the revolutionary impulse), but new that embraces the whole world. That is why it is impossible to look only at the advanced economy; that is why it is necessary to look also at the most backward; and that is why the world must be our country, i.e., the country of the self-developing subject. Back then to that final paragraph of the A. I., the insistence that we have not just reached a new transition, that this determination is "an absolute liberation", having no further immediate determination which is not equally posited and equally Notion. Consequently there is no transition in this freedom. The transition here, therefore, must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is utterly free--the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity."

1718 You see I am not afraid either of the "system" of Hegelian Philosophy, nor of the idealism of the Absolute Idea. The A. I. is the method of cognition for the epoch of the struggle for freedom, and philosophic cognition is not a system of philosophy, but the cognition of any object, and our "object" being labor. The unity of object and subject, theory and practice, and the transcendence of the first negation

will come to realize itself in our time.

One minor word on the question as to why Hegel continued after he "ended" with Nature, which is the way he ended the smaller Logic and which is the logical transition if you ~~transform his Science of Logic into a system as he did in the Encyclopedia~~ transform his Science of Logic into a system as he did in the Encyclopedia and move from Logic to Nature to Spirit or Mind. Marx, too, had three volumes to his Capital and likewise was going to end the first volume "logically", i.e. without entering this sphere of Accumulation. When he decided, however, to extend ~~the~~ the book to include the Motion, not as mere "summit" of all that preceded, but, to use a Hegelian phrase once again, "the pure Motion which forms a Motion of itself", he also included an anticipation of what Volumes II and III would contain. Volume II, as we know, is far from being Nature; on the contrary, it is that fantastic, pure, isolated "single society" ("socialism in one country," if you please, only Marx thought it was state capitalism). It was so pure and so logical and so unreal that it completely disorganized poor Rosa when she contrasted that phantasmagoria to the rapacious imperialism living off all those under-developed countries it conquered. And, finally, he tells us also that he will indeed come down from those heights to face the whole concrete mass of capitalism and rates of profit and speculation and cheating, but we would only lose ~~the whole of the~~ all knowledge of what society really is if we reversed the method. And even though Volume III stopped before he had a chance to develop the chapter on Classes, we know that it was not really the class but the full and free development of the individual that would signify a negation of a negation that was not merely destructive of the old, but constructive of the new. In this sense, and in this sense only, Hegel's last sentence about the Motion perfecting "its self-liberation in the philosophy of Spirit" must be translated, stood right-side up. And Hegel will certainly help us a lot in that book as he goes on to describe freedom, not as a "have", but as an "is".

I hope we will get a chance to discuss all these ideas and more when I see you either the last week of February or first week of March. Let me know which is more convenient for you.

Yours,

*Rosa*