Deer Yax:

On the Russian ront: ID continues to contradict himself and even more flyingly his stupid epigones. In the latest issues of the Opposition Bulletin #82-83, Feb.-Karch-April) there appears an article, TALIN AFTER THE FINITY E PERIEUCE, (marked for "written for the Bolish bourgeois press but does not state which particular journal that's a peculiarly novel N.B.; heretofore we would mention either for which paper it was written, or leave loophole notations off). After characterizing Italia as provincial, narrow person san ideas who first took the ideas w Leain, then I inoviev-Kamenev, then Sukharin, and now:

But the state of t

\*In there conditions the only politician who could impress talin was Hitler. Ecce home! Hitler has all the traits character are of Italin: contempt for the masses, freedom from principles, ambitiousness, a totalitarian apparatus. And Hitler also possesses that which Italian has not: imagination, ability to exult the masses, boldness. Under cover of Hitler Stalin tried to adapt the methods of Hitler in internal politics. First it seemed all went smoothly: Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania. But in Final he wis ed firs, and not at all accidentally. The Finnish miscalculation opens up in the biography of Italian the chapter of his downfall.

Remarkably characteristic: Stal in did not even think! according to the example of his inspirer Hitler. The Kremiin is extremely careful not to rink stake his false reputation as a strategist. Moreover, face to face with the masses he has nothing to say. It is impossible even to imagine this gray figure, with the impobile face, with yellowish squirrel-like eyes, with weak and inexpressive actural voice face fo face with masses of soldiers either in the trenches or on the march. The super-Napoleon esutiously remained in the Kremlin, surrounded by telephones and secretaries.

"During 21 months the Red Army exprienced nothing but defents, sufferings and humiliation; nothing was foreseen, not even the climate. The 2nd attack was developed more slowly but cost many sacrifices. The absence of the promised "lightning" victory over a weak opponent was in itself a defeat. To justify at least partially the mistakes, failures and losses, at to peckey/at least retrospectively the masses of the U.R to the rach invasion in Findend was possible only one way, namely, by winning the sympathy of at least part of the Finnish peasants and workers through the path of social revolution. Stalin understood this and openly declared inxit the overthrow of the bourgeoisic his aim; for this

he brought from the chancellery of the Kremlin the ill-starred Kuusinen. But Stalin pot frightened of intervention by England and France, of the dissatisfaction of Hitler, - and retreated. The tragbounder adventure ended with a bastard peace: in form "dictatorial", in essence, a rotten compromise.

With the help of the foviet-Finnish war, Hitlor compromised Stalin and bound him tighter to his charict. With the help of the peace treaty, he assured himself the future delivery of Scandinavian raw materials. The U.SR received, it is true, on the north-mestix strategic advantages, but at what price? The prectige of the Red Army is undermined. The confidence of the toiling masses and oppressed peoples of the whole world is lost. Stalin personally came out of the whole affair fully beaten. The general feeling in the country is undoubtedly as follows: it was not necessary to start this unworthy war; and once it was begun, it was necessary to bring it to a conclusion, i.e., to the sevietization of Finland. Stalin promised this but did not execute it. That means he foresew nothing: neither the resistance of the Finns, nor the forest, nor the dangers from the Allies. Along with the role of diplomat and strategist he suifered a defeat as the "leader of world socialism" and "liberator of the Finnish people." The authority of the dictator suffered an irremerable blow.....

outside: but for this it would have been necessary that the Allies launch a war against the USSR. Such a war would have plated before the people of the USSR the question of the fate, not of the I linist dictatorship, but the fate of the country. Dofense from foreign intervention would have inevitably strengthened the position of the bureaucracy. In a defensive war the Red Army would have undoubtedly conducted itself more successfully than in an aggressive war. In saturate self-defense the Kremlin would have even been capable of revolutionary measures. But even in such a case it would have been a quantitary matter only of postponement (acrement). The insolvenc of the Stalinist dictatorship has clearly become exposed in the past 15 weeks. One should not think that the people, suppressed by the totalitarian hoop, have lost the ability to observe and judge. They draw their conclusions slowly but all the surer and more profoundly. The apogy of Stalin is behind. Aheac there are not a few diricult tests. Now, when the whole planet is beaten out of its balance, Stalin will be incapable of saving the instable equilibrium of the totalitarian buresucracy.

March 13, 1940. (The translation is not smooth; but it is literal)

I have meant to see you also on other matters as I mean to quit work and leave town, but there is time yet to discuss that though I already have plans; when I get the chance of a few free moments I'll drop in to see your high self,

Com:adely, Zot

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