

The Struggle for the United Front

By EARL BROWDER

(Report to Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, September 5-6, 1934)

COMRADES, I want first to give you a few words of news about the health of Comrade Foster. I just received a letter from him in which he gives us a detailed report on his condition, in which I am sure everyone is interested. Comrade Foster, you will be pleased to hear, has made substantial health gains since he left New York, but the process is slow. He now has a feeling of complete confidence that he is getting well.

He further informs us that he will be returning to New York in two or three weeks, and expects gradually to get in touch with the work again, and gradually, over a long period, resume his work.

I take it for granted that this meeting of the Central Committee will send a message to Comrade Foster, hoping for his quick recovery, and hoping that he will be present at our next meeting.

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I will now take up the report of the Central Committee, of the development of the work of the Party since the Eighth National Convention.

THE DEEPENING CRISIS AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE NEW DEAL

All the events since the Eighth National Convention confirm the Party analysis of the course of the crisis, of the direction of the New Deal policies, of the regrouping of class forces that is going on, the rising wave of mass struggles and of the developments towards fascism and war. In these past three months the difficulties of the New Deal policies, the development of their inner contradictions, have come to a head. Precisely out of the successes that have been achieved in accomplishing the central objectives of the New Deal—the restoring of profits to monopoly capital at the expense of the workers and farmers and small capitalists—comes this maturing of the contradictions of the Roosevelt policies. All of these contradictions are sharpening, many of them are coming into open head-on conflict between strata of the bourgeoisie, between various tendencies within the bourgeoisie, and above all, between the two basic class forces, the capitalist class and the working class.

Dissatisfaction with the New Deal is becoming a general phenomenon throughout all classes. Among the capitalist class, including the highest strata, this dissatisfaction is expressed through, for example, the recently formed Liberty League, a coalition of leading Tory politicians of both old parties; it is shown in the attitude of Hearst and his chain of newspapers, which are leading the attack against the New Deal, although a few months ago Hearst was a declared supporter of Roosevelt.

The dissatisfaction among the petty bourgeoisie found its classical expression in the report of the Darrow Committee on the effects of the N.R.A. on the development of monopoly capital. The facts of the dissatisfaction among the farmers are well known, and even well publicized, being admitted in the administration circles, and tremendous masses of farmers are now in motion against the A.A.A., the crop reduction program, etc.

The dissatisfaction of the workers is expressed primarily in the growing strike wave, and even in the maneuvers of the A. F. of L., which is a most direct lackey of the Roosevelt administration, but is forced, in order to maintain its hold over the masses of members, to join in the general demand for the *reformation of the New Deal*.

The central conflict upon which the New Deal has, one can almost say, broken down, is the question of regulation of labor relations in the industries; the question of Section 7a, problems of the relation of the A. F. of L. and company unions, the contradiction of the decline of earnings in face of rising prices, which has aroused upheaval among the masses. This is typified by outstanding strike struggles in this period in Alabama, in Toledo, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, the Pacific Coast marine strike, the San Francisco general strike, and now the national textile general strike. Other great mass battles are maturing in the immediate future. This was spoken of in a recent issue of the Kiplinger Letter, confidential advice for business men, which remarked that "it would be hard to exaggerate the worry caused Washington officials by labor troubles. The government will not be able to prevent the spread of strikes."

The tempo of this development is accelerated by the economic trends. The whole course of economy in this period has served to emphasize the correctness of Stalin's explanation of the depression into which the capitalist class had entered at the end of 1933, as a special kind of depression. We examined this in some detail in the Eighth Convention of our Party. We can now declare that all developments since then confirm the correctness of our thesis.

There has not been a single sign of development towards recovery. On the contrary, everything points to long-continued depression with ups and downs and unevenness between different industries, localities, etc. This perspective of a long-continued depres-

sion is also recognized now by the bourgeoisie. Again I quote from the Kiplinger Letter, often the frankest spokesman of the capitalists:

"Business sentiment has taken a turn for the worse. Prospects for business have dimmed a bit, even allowing for excessive business jitters. Earlier belief that recovery would resume in a healthy fashion this fall is now giving way to fears that any marked revival of business will be delayed until spring of 1935 at the earliest. Relative low level of business will continue through the fall and early winter. High rate of industrial production reached in July, 1933 will not be reached again until sometime in 1935."

Some specific features of the present depression as analyzed at our Eighth Convention are now accentuated—the stimulation of industries through government subsidies has reached into the basic industries very weakly, no expansion of capital investment has taken place, new capital issues are overwhelmingly non-productive in character. Accumulated stocks are again rising, whereas at the Eighth Convention we noted a declining tendency in accumulated stocks. This is especially true in raw materials, due to the relative narrowing of the inner market by the restoration of profits at the expense of the masses. Business indices as a whole are considerably below July, 1933, at the time of the inauguration of the N.R.A. There has been a 30 per cent decline in economy since the N.R.A. went into effect and all indications are that the economic indices are not again reaching the point where they were in July, 1933.

A new economic feature is the drought. This natural disaster which has brought whole sections of the country face to face with famine, has in fact carried out the objectives that were set for the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The A.A.A. had been facing failure due to the offsetting features of many evasions of the crop reduction program carried through by fertilization and mechanization of reduced acreage. But the Roosevelt administration has been seriously embarrassed by the tremendous revelation that the aim of their effort was precisely the same as that condition which was brought about by the drought, which must be recognized as a calamity. The Roosevelt regime declares that while the drought was beneficial, they fear its effects in destroying illusions in the A.A.A.

Unemployment is again heavily increasing. This increase is more rapid than the decline in production, due to the heavy stretch-out and speed-up. Even during the period of the upward movement of the economic index, the increase in employment always lagged behind the increase in production and the lagging continually grew. Now that production is going down and unemployment increasing at a larger rate, the problem of unemployment and all the attendant questions of relief, relief methods, unemployment insurance, etc., are becoming again outstanding problems of millions. Official

spokesmen of the administration predict 5,000,000 families on the relief rolls this winter, with approximately 4,000,000 families on relief at the present time, with an average of four to five to a family. Problems of maintenance of unemployed are even further intensified by the progressive exhaustion of the resources of those who have been long unemployed, with larger proportions of the unemployed claiming relief.

And, to quote the Kiplinger Service:

"Unemployment relief next winter will cost more than last winter. Number on rolls will be greater."

While all of these authorities and the capitalist press try to minimize the extent of the problem, they are all forced to recognize the direction in which it is developing. The crisis in the New York relief plans is duplicated more or less intensively everywhere.

The tremendous growth of the movement for the Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill, H.R. 7598, which is carrying strongholds of conservatism in the A. F. of L., Y.M.C.A.'s, etc., has forced a general acceptance of the principle of unemployment insurance in words by employers.

Big efforts are being made to direct mass sentiment behind this movement to some scheme based upon actuarial principles, as they call it, for protection against *future* unemployment at the cost of the workers. The rising wave of local struggles around relief issues, revival of unemployment councils, unions of relief workers, reflect the crisis in unemployment relief and the bankruptcy of all present relief plans now in operation.

On the basis of these economic and political trends, we must note that the radicalization of the workers, farmers and middle classes is coming to a higher stage, finding newer, broader, more political modes of expression. The basic feature of this is the *general strike* and *solidarity strike* movement that sweeps the industrial localities and even whole industries, like the textile strike. From strikes around small economic issues, it broadens out into political class battles that even raise the whole question of State power, as in San Francisco. The elemental force of the workers' movement sweeps into the broadened stream of this radicalization representative strata of undifferentiated masses such as churches, Y.M.C.A.'s, small home-owners, small depositors, as well as definite middle class groups, intellectuals and professions. To keep this upsurge in safe channels, new forms of demagogy are arising, such as Upton Sinclair's EPIC movement and the Utopians in California. Sinclair's sweeping of the Democratic Party primaries is a distorted reflection of mass radicalization, which obtained a clearer, more direct expression in the

phenomenal vote of 180,000 for Gallagher, running openly as an independent associate of the Communist Party.

A distinct new feature of the radicalization of the masses is the sharply favorable response that is arising and rapidly spreading to the call for a united front against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and war. We must immediately note that this is accompanied by the equally sharp and rapid spread of measures of fascist suppression of the mass movement which are especially directed against the Communist Party. In the center, as the conscious moving and directive force of the united front movement in all its phases, stands the Communist Party. Our position in this respect is clear and unchallenged. That is why the main fascist attack is against us. Thus, the fascist repressive movement must be judged dialectically. It is a blow against the working class and its vanguard; increases our difficulties, but at the same time it registers the growing effectiveness of our work in mobilizing the masses, in building the united front of struggle, and stimulates the development of the united front.

The A. F. of L., in its open leadership of the anti-Red campaign among the workers, is trying to buy its recognition by the employers through putting itself forward as the bulwark against Communism among the workers. Our great movement for H.R. 7598, the Congress Against War and Fascism, the unexampled Leftward movement of the Youth Congress under Communist influence, the numerous united front actions with locals of the S.P., the successful leadership in vast strike struggles and in innumerable small ones—these are the reasons why the bourgeoisie and its agents, General Hugh Johnson, the Liberty League, William Green and the A. F. of L. bureaucracy, the Elks and Eagles, the American Legion, launched the present nationwide offensive against the Communist Party. This is a characteristic feature of the development of fascism in its first stage. Every political party and grouping in America finds it necessary today to define its attitude towards, or its relation with, the Communist Party as a major question of its whole orientation. Our Party by its correct policy and the growing effectiveness of its work has become an inescapable factor in the political life of America.

The fascist concentration against the Communist Party in the anti-Red drive cannot hide the growing disintegration, confusion and conflicts within the camp of the bourgeoisie. The bi-partisan coalition of the Tories in the Liberty League to the Right, the Sinclair development to the "Left," the breaking away of LaFollette from the Republican Party in Wisconsin, and also the crisis in the S.P.—these are all symptoms of the flux, disintegration, and regroupings of the whole bourgeois camp. The rising mood of revolt among the masses, their radicalization, the mass struggles growing

broader and deeper in combination with the impact of the world situation, have shattered the whole foundation of the bourgeoisie. We can say, without trying to draw any exact analogies which would lead us astray, but roughly comparing the stages of development, that the situation in the United States in this respect, the atomization, the breaking up into cliques and groups, and the organization of fascist groups among the bourgeoisie, are comparable to the pre-fascist atomization of bourgeois parties in Germany in the period of Bruening.

THE INNER DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE BOURGEOISIE

Serious dissatisfaction with the development of the N.R.A. has arisen in the past few months in the ranks of the big bourgeoisie. This centers around two points.

First and most important, there is a growing fear that the demagoguery in connection with Section 7a, which tended to smother the big strike movements in automobile and steel, is now no longer effective, or is even having the opposite effect. There is a growing demand that the government come out more decisively to prevent strikes before they happen, that the government shall end the ambitions of the A. F. of L. to enter the basic industries. This is not at all because they distrust the good intentions of the A. F. of L. leaders or their desire to prevent strikes. It is rather because the bourgeoisie begins seriously to question the ability of the A. F. of L. leaders to control the mass upsurge of their members. This doubt has grown since the San Francisco and textile strikes.

Secondly, there is a growing conviction that of all of the New Deal policies only three points have seriously contributed to restoring the prosperity of finance capital, namely: (1) inflation; (2) repeal of the anti-trust law and the institution of the control of the big monopolies; and (3) the government subsidies to big business. These sections of the big bourgeoisie became acutely conscious of all of the inner contradictions of capitalism in the form in which they are expressed through the New Deal institutions, the N.R.A., the A.A.A., etc., and the other new structures that have been built up like mushrooms from the New Deal. The idea grows among them, therefore, that inasmuch as these contradictions appear in the building of this new machinery, they can be abolished by doing away with this machinery, and handing the code authorities over directly to big industrialists. Roosevelt undoubtedly sympathizes with them and finds it daily more difficult to find a way out, although he has made many moves and more gestures in that direction.

The emergence of the Liberty League under the slogans "protect the Constitution", etc., is an attempt to influence the Roosevelt administration more sharply toward fascism in this period of reorien-

tation. It is also a preparation for more serious action in the way of political realignment for the presidential elections in 1936. It is, of course, not a demand for restraining fascist developments. Neither is it concerned with cutting down governmental expenditures which go for big business, for this is considered protection of private property, but it is deeply incensed against the growing expenditures for unemployment relief, even though the amount of relief to the individual unemployed family is steadily going down.

Closely connected with the Liberty League is the position of Hearst and his big chain of newspapers. Hearst openly charges that Roosevelt's administration is more Bolshevik than the Communist Party itself. He attempts to turn the anti-Red crusade, of which he was pioneer and remains the sustained leader, into a mass movement to force the administration sharply to the Right. Approximately the same position is taken by the official Republican leadership, although in many localities the Republican policy is not followed by local leaders wishing to keep more friendly relations with the New Deal.

We must avoid the error of seeing in these divisions merely a "division of labor" carried out by agreed-upon plans by the decisive strata of the bourgeoisie. They are real differences over which the most bitter controversy rages, controversy which may have serious consequences. They cut through all the main bourgeois groups. They seriously impede the development of a united bourgeois policy.

But it would be equally wrong to consider these differences as going any further than the question of how best to throw the burden of the crisis upon the masses for the benefit of finance capital. These differences do not go beyond the policy of monopoly capital.

The pressure to increase the demagogy rather than to decrease it is applied upon those sections of the ruling apparatus which deal most intimately with restraining the mass upsurge and in those places where the problem is hottest for the moment, as, for example, in the LaGuardia Progressive administration in New York, where the number of unemployed workers in New York exceeds the number of unemployed in most capitalist countries—one-fourth of the population depending on the city dole. It is seen in the LaFollette Party in Wisconsin, which is the center of a storm of agrarian unrest; it is seen in Sinclair's capture of the Democratic nomination for Governor in California, as a result of the strikes and the extent of the mass unemployment.

The Roosevelt administration tries to be flexible. It will give way to both forms of pressure. It tries to give the Liberty League and the Hearst elements the essence of what they demand, while giving the masses the old demagogy in ever new forms. Spokesmen for the administration give repeated pledges that "private profits"

and "business confidence" are their innermost motive and heart's desire. At the same time, Roosevelt agrees to meet Sinclair, and the New York *Herald Tribune* could write, without contradiction, the following frank analysis of the situation:

"Prior to the primary yesterday, Mr. Roosevelt, it is known, received communications from prominent California Democrats which took Mr. Sinclair's nomination for granted and urged that the national administration be prepared to get behind him. The tenor of this advice was that Mr. Sinclair should be surrounded with practical New Dealers who could keep him from going too far or too fast. It was pointed out that he was bringing into the Democratic Party a great many thousands of votes which otherwise would go to more radical candidates outside of both major parties. . . . According to this analysis of the California political situation which was circulated several days ago among important members of the administration, Mr. Sinclair is a powerful deterrent to the breaking away of large blocks of votes, especially among the unemployed, into the arms of Communism."

That this analysis of Sinclair's role is absolutely correct is proved beyond all doubt, by the fact that over 180,000, most of whom voted for Sinclair, also voted for Gallagher, who was running with the endorsement of the Communist Party. Without Sinclair in this field, most of these votes should have gone for the straight Communist ticket.

Roosevelt, and the bourgeoisie generally, try to draw some advantages out of their mounting inner differences and difficulties. Both the Liberty League and Sinclair are used to try to reburnish the dulling halo of "Savior" about Roosevelt's head. Roosevelt, while yielding to the pressure of the Liberty League, poses as its antagonist; while yielding nothing in deed to the "Left" Sinclair he gives a carefully chosen flow of soft words to bind Sinclair's followers to the New Deal. It is our task to make use of these developments in the opposite way, to expose the inner political unity of finance capital behind all these differences, at the same time showing the unsolvable contradictions of capitalism which they express; especially to expose the reactionary utopianism of Sinclair's program; and to bring forward sharply and clearly the revolutionary way out of the crisis, given by the Communist program, upon the basis of an ever more energetic unfolding of the daily struggle for the most immediate needs of the workers.

LESSONS OF THE MOST RECENT STRIKES

The strike wave which began early in 1934, the first period of which was examined by the Eighth National Convention, has since that time risen to new heights. The strike movement not only grew in number of strikers, intensity and duration of strikes, but also

qualitatively entered a higher stage with the emergence on a nationwide scale of a general strike movement. This general strike movement came to the verge of realization in Toledo, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Portland, Seattle. It was realized in San Francisco in a four-day General Strike of solidarity with the Pacific Coast marine workers' struggle of twelve weeks involving the overwhelming mass of all workers in the San Francisco Bay region. At the same time the strike movement further penetrated the deep South and the basic industries. At the present moment a great movement for a nationwide industrial strike of textile workers has forced their A. F. of L. leaders apparently to submit for the moment to the fighting determination of the rank and file and issue a general strike call for September 4. These struggles, and especially the San Francisco General Strike, mark a new high point in the development of the American working class and are of historic significance even on a world scale. The lessons of these struggles are of first importance for the development of the entire revolutionary movement. The history of these battles must be thoroughly studied and their lessons assimilated by the entire revolutionary movement and the whole working class.

Already at the Eighth Convention the first manifestations of the tendency to mass solidarity of strikes were noted particularly in the local general strike embracing all workers in the small industrial town of Centralia, Illinois.

In May the same tendency rapidly grew in Toledo, Ohio, around the relatively small strike of the Auto Lite Corp. This strike, on the point of being crushed, was suddenly revived by a great solidarity action of mass picketing, initiated and led by the Unemployment Council, involving principally unemployed workers, which completely tied up the plant and made the strike again 100 per cent effective. The declaration of martial law and the throwing of several companies of the Ohio National Guard into the strike area with the consequent killing of two picketers, aroused the entire Toledo working class to action, and a sympathetic attitude even in broad circles of the lower middle class. The slogan issued by the Communist Party for general strike to answer the declaration of martial law, was quickly seized by the trade union membership, which in a period of ten days had forced the adoption of General Strike resolutions in 83 out of 91 trade unions in Toledo. The General Strike was prevented only by a hasty last-minute settlement of the strike demands, on a compromise basis, engineered by the local A. F. of L. bureaucracy after being aided by Muste & Co. to regain the ear of the masses; by the National Labor Board, and put across on the masses with the help of Socialist Party leaders hastily brought from the S.P. Convention in Detroit.

Similarly in Minneapolis a General Strike movement arose in May as a response to the Employers Association's effort to break the truckmen's strike by the violent attack of a force of deputized business men against the strikers, which resulted in two deaths. Here also the solidarity action was halted by a hastily-contrived settlement, heralded by the Farmer-Labor leaders and their Trotzkyite lieutenants as a glorious victory, but actually a return to the pre-strike conditions while leaving hundreds of strikers victimized.

In Milwaukee a strike of street railway men to stop the dismissal of union members, a movement which seemed hopelessly weak on the first day of the action, was in the second day suddenly swept into 100 per cent effectiveness by a mass solidarity action of 40,000 sympathetic picketers mobilized by the Party and Unemployment Councils, who went to the car barns and into the streets and forcibly stopped all street car movements. The efforts of the police of this Socialist Party-administered city to suppress this mass picketing brought, on the fourth day, the decision of the power housemen to go out in sympathy and an insistent demand in dozens of local unions for a General Strike. The tremendous pressure of this mass movement brought the sudden capitulation of the street railway management on the evening of the fourth day of the strike, which halted the general strike movement.

From these three experiences the General Strike slogan had spread throughout the country. The outstanding lesson, that the mobilization of the class forces of the bourgeoisie against strikes could only be answered by a similar mobilization of working class forces in defense of attacked strikes, even small ones, had spread through every industrial center among all the most active and intelligent workers.

It was with this experience and against this background that the San Francisco General Strike of July came about. This historic action was the climax of the protracted Pacific Coast General Marine Workers' Strike, the special problems of which we examine later on.

The Marine Workers' Strike, which began on May 9, tied up all ports on the Pacific Coast except San Pedro, which was partially operated by scabs. In the beginning of July, after almost two months of complete tie-up of the ports, the Industrial Association and the Ship Owners Union of San Francisco, decided to "open up the port by all means". These means were a planned massacre of striking workers on the streets, in which two strikers were killed and many dozens wounded, in a premeditated firing upon an unarmed crowd. Even previously the solidarity movement had begun in the decision of the truck drivers not to transport scab cargo from the docks. The massacre of July set off a veritable explosion of

working class indignation and the demand for solidarity action. At the funeral of the slain strikers (one a Communist) a spontaneous procession, estimated as high as 100,000 workers, marched behind the coffins, taking possession of the main streets of San Francisco, causing the police to be completely withdrawn from view in fear that another collision might put the mass movement completely beyond the control of the bourgeoisie. From this demonstration, the slogan of general strike swept through the unions. But not entirely spontaneously. We must emphasize, it swept through the unions with the assistance of organized visits of the unions by representatives of the basic central strike movement, the Marine Workers' Joint Strike Committee.

Against the open opposition of the A. F. of L. local officials of the Central Trades Council, union after union in overwhelming majority was voting for the General Strike. Unable to stem the tide, the local A. F. of L. leaders suddenly took a new tack. Announcing that the General Strike would be considered, they appointed a specially chosen Committee of Strategy composed of the most hard-boiled reactionary officials, who placed themselves at the head of the movement. It was this committee, together with the so-called General Strike Committee, composed not of elected delegates, but of appointed officials, which issued the official call for the general strike.

In the San Francisco general strike, as in the other strikes spoken of, we have a classical example of the Communist thesis, that in the present period of capitalist decline, a stubborn struggle for even the smallest immediate demands of the workers inevitably develops into general class battles, and raises the whole question of State power and the revolutionary solution of the crisis. Beginning in a typical economic struggle over wages and working conditions of long-shoremen, there took place, step by step, a concentration of class forces in support of one or the other side which soon aligned practically the entire population into two hostile camps: the capitalist class against the working class, and all intermediate elements towards support of one or the other. It became a well-defined class struggle, a test of strength between the two basic class forces. The economic struggle was transformed into a political struggle of the first magnitude. The working class understood that if it allowed the concentration of capitalist forces to defeat the marine workers, this meant the defeat of the entire working class, general wage cuts, speed-up and worsening of conditions. The capitalist class knew that if the marine workers should win their demands, this would launch a general forward movement of the entire working class which would defeat the capitalist program for their way out of the crisis, a program based upon restoring profits by reducing the general living

standards of the masses. It was the capitalist class, which, in panic before the rising giant of the class action of the masses, cried out that this strike, which they could have settled very quickly at any moment by the simple expedient of granting the workers' economic demands, was actually a revolutionary uprising organized by the Communist Party to overthrow the whole capitalist system in San Francisco. Of course, this strike did not have revolution as its objective, certainly not a revolution in a single city, but only winning the immediate demands of the workers. The unity of the workers, however, raised before the employers the spectre of working class power, with the potentiality of revolution.

On the side of the workers, their experience was leading them step by step to more serious challenge of the capitalist class, teaching them the necessity of extending the struggle for power, bringing them face to face with the State power as the guardian of capitalist profits and the force driving down the workers' standards; at the same time it was giving the workers a new understanding of their own power and ability to shake the very foundation of capitalist rule. In this sense, the strike was truly the greatest revolutionary event in American labor history.

LAUNCHING THE TERROR AGAINST THE REDS

After four days, the San Francisco General Strike came to an end. The working class had earned a brilliant victory through its heroic struggle, but it was cheated by a miserable compromise. Not yet fully swung into action, with its fighting spirit high and mounting higher every day, the working class of San Francisco was defeated not so much by the superior strength of the open capitalist forces, but primarily because these worked in close co-operation with the capitalist agents inside the working class, the A. F. of L. leaders who occupied the post of formal leaders of the General Strike. The local A. F. of L. officialdom, headed by Vandeleur & Co., had placed themselves at the head of the General Strike precisely in order to smash it from within, to prevent it from going over their heads, and further hoping to use its betrayal as an instrument to smash simultaneously the prolonged heroic marine workers' battle.

While the strike was betrayed from within by the A. F. of L. leaders, from outside it was attacked by terror unexampled in American history. San Francisco and the Bay area waterfront were military camps. Armed vigilante fascist bands were turned loose against all Left-wing organizations—the Marine Workers Industrial Union, the *Western Worker*, official organ of the strike as well as of the Communist Party, the offices of the Communist Party, International Labor Defense, Workers Ex-Servicemen's League, Workers' Schools, various workers' clubs, etc. The offices were wrecked and their contents destroyed. Homes were invaded, and

treated in the same manner. Hundreds of militant workers were arrested. These fascist gangs, organized and directed by the police, were followed up by police detachments to finish the job and to arrest the attacked workers. All this was the necessary prelude to forcing through a vote to end the strike by the A. F. of L. leaders.

Precisely in the midst of this terror came William Green with his infamous contribution where he disowned the strike, declaring it was unauthorized and inadvisable. Even under this tremendous assault the strike remained firm and the pressure upon the officialdom by the rank and file was so great that even in the General Strike Committee, composed of officials of all the unions, the decision to end the strike was declared to be carried only by a vote of 191 to 174. Even this slim majority was declared by Harry Bridges, the long-shoreman leader, to have been achieved by the last minute rushing in of dozens of new and unaccounted for "members" of the committee. Further, even in this body of officials, in order to obtain this narrow majority, it had been necessary to combine with the campaign of violent suppression and the anti-Red hysteria a series of concessions of a very important character. The original capitalist program of open-shop smashing of the mass trade unions had to be publicly renounced. A few days later, in order to conclude the marine strike, which they had thought to smash through this betrayal, the employers were forced to make further concessions, to agree publicly to treat with all the striking marine unions on all questions in dispute and to acknowledge the Solidarity Pact between the marine unions, whereby they had pledged to stand or fall together, by providing for similar and simultaneous settlement of all demands of all marine unions. Tremendous power, generated by the General Strike movement, was thus effective even in the hour of its betrayal to register some fragments of the victory which had been won by the workers and snatched away from them by their leaders.

The terror campaign against the San Francisco General Strike, which quickly extended throughout the State of California and since has broadened through the entire nation, requires special study because of the far-reaching character which it has taken on. Who initiated, organized and led this campaign? Who was participating in it? It must be registered, first of all, that the signal for the terror was given by General Hugh Johnson, who the night before the raids delivered a speech in the University of California in which he declared that the Communists had gained control of the trade unions and were planning a revolution as a result of the strike. He called upon all patriotic citizens to join together to "exterminate them like rats". General Johnson was declared in the newspapers to be speaking as the personal representative of President Roosevelt.

It is clear that the Roosevelt regime placed itself at the head of, and accepted full responsibility for, all the fascist outrages that followed. General Johnson was ably seconded by the liberal Secretary of Labor, Madam Perkins, who simultaneously announced a campaign of deportation of all foreign-born workers handed over to her by the local vigilantes and police. The Republican Party, locally, in the State, and nationally, organized a serious competition with the Democratic Party as to which should have the most "credit" for the fascist terror. Upton Sinclair seized the opportunity not to protest against the fascist terror, but to denounce the Communist Party, to disclaim the slightest connection with the hunted "Reds", and to place upon the Communist Party responsibility for the terror. The *New Leader*, organ of the S.P., Right wing, denounced the Communists as being responsible for the breaking of the strike and provoking the fascist terror. Even the "militant" Socialist leader, Norman Thomas, while mildly disapproving of the terror, gave his blessings to the betrayal of the strike with the declaration that "the General Strike was soon called off by Labor itself".

General Johnson's command to the A. F. of L. officials that they should "exterminate the Communists like rats" found a quick response from William Green of the A. F. of L. Executive Council, who publicly proclaimed a campaign of expulsion of all militant elements in the trade unions. This campaign has already resulted in the expulsion of whole local organizations, notably Local No. 499 of the Painters Union in New York. The campaign has been taken up by the American Legion, the fraternal societies of the Elks, Eagles, etc., as well as by all the professional Red-baiting societies throughout the country.

The capitalist press, with Hearst at its head, is carrying on the most vicious incitation to fascist violence against all Reds, which means all militant workers' leaders. The growing list of criminal syndicalist cases reflects the terror as applied by the courts, while dozens of reports come in every day showing a mounting wave of fascist criminal assaults against militant workers. In Oregon the campaign takes such form as the publication of lists of all signers of the Communist election petitions and the inciting of fascist violence against the signers unless they publicly repudiate their signatures. The leaders of the American Legion Convention in California climaxed this hysteria by proposing a concentration camp in the wilds of Alaska for all Reds, a proposal which was widely publicized throughout the country. The terror used to break the San Francisco General Strike has thus been spread over the whole country and serves as an enormous stimulus to the whole tendency toward fascism inaugurated by Roosevelt's New Deal.

It is becoming clear that the growing strike movement and especially the San Francisco General Strike has brought about a certain crisis in the evolution of the New Deal policies. Already in the early spring of 1934 decisive circles of finance capital had placed a serious check upon the Roosevelt demagoguery around Section 7a which was first expressed in the automobile and steel settlements negotiated by Roosevelt with the assistance of William Green. In connection with the automobile settlement Roosevelt declared: "We have charted a new course". The nature of the new course was explained by the auto manufacturers who "were particularly pleased that the clarification of Section 7a seems to uphold their contention in behalf of the company union". But even this new course of the New Deal which was a sharp rebuff to the trade unions in the basic industries, together with all the ensuing maneuvers of National Industrial and Regional Labor Boards of Arbitration Committees, with the wholehearted collaboration of the A. F. of L. officialdom, has not been able to keep down the rising anger of the masses or halt the mounting strike wave. Capitalists generally were willing to accept the Roosevelt demagoguery as useful in 1933, after the bank crash when, as General Johnson said: "Both industrial and banking leadership had fallen in the public mind to complete and utter disrepute". But now that their profits are mounting again, while the working class is breaking from control of all their elaborate machinery, they are beginning to ask whether this demagoguery has not outlived its usefulness.

This is the spirit behind the fascist terror, behind the newly formed American Liberty League, behind the announcement of the steel industry that it will withdraw from the code in order to evade the application of Section 7a; it is behind the proposals for new legislation against general and sympathetic strikes and for government control of the trade unions, etc.

It is a foregone conclusion that the decision of the leading circles of finance capital on these issues will immediately be carried through by the Roosevelt administration, with each step carefully camouflaged by Roosevelt's sweet smile and soft speech about the necessity to protect human rights and property, etc. While the precise forms of such new features as will be introduced into the New Deal cannot yet be accurately forecast, their general direction is clearly along the lines of further legal limitation upon the trade unions, their effectual exclusion from basic industries of mass production, and further progress of fascistization.

SPECIAL FACTORS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO STRIKE

In addition to those general influences producing general strike sentiment throughout the country, there were special factors at work

in San Francisco, which, combined with the general factors, brought the general strike into being there in 'Frisco and not elsewhere. It is false to seek to explain the higher stage of the strike movement there through any supposed higher level of the radicalization of the workers.

The special factors at work were concrete and measurable things. Chief among them were: First, the San Francisco general strike arose out of a broad industrial general strike of the whole Pacific Coast marine industry. It was thus given a broader base and a sharper appeal than the general strike movement in any other locality. At the same time San Francisco was the *concentration point* of the Pacific Coast marine strike. Second, the strike-breaking A. F. of L. officialdom had no strongholds inside the organizations of the longshoremen, who were the determining driving force in the whole strike movement, while the militant Left-wing elements dominated this strategic center. This factor was due to the extent to which the treachery of the International Longshoremen's Association officials had resulted in wiping out the San Francisco locals for over ten years and with them the entrenched local bureaucracy, substituting for them the company unions. When the I.L.A. locals arose again in 1933, militant elements who built these unions kept them in the control of the rank and file. Third, the extreme open-shop, union-smashing program of the Pacific Coast employers and the government, centering in San Francisco, who had refused to adopt the Roosevelt demagoguery of the New Deal, with its tactic of combining corruption of trade union officialdom, arbitration boards, etc., and double-meaning promises to the workers, and had by its open threats roused all existing trade unions to the realization of immediate life-and-death danger. The Left-wing and Communist groupings, small and of comparatively recent origin, were thus enabled to exercise a mass influence out of the ordinary proportion to their number and maturity. This favorable relation of forces placed the revolutionary elements, with Communists in the center, at the head of this great elementary upheaval.

What were the decisive features of the Pacific Coast marine strike? The marine workers on the Pacific Coast were able to develop a general strike movement while on the Atlantic Coast and in the Gulf ports, although suffering even worse conditions, they could not do so. This is due to the relatively weaker position of the American Federation of Labor officialdom, in the first place the officials of the International Longshoremen's Association, headed by Joseph Ryan of New York. This weak position was not confined to San Francisco, but arose out of the betrayal of the longshoremen's and seamen's strike in 1920-1922. In those struggles the marine workers had learned two main lessons, namely: (1) that

divided action and leadership among the marine unions, faced with a united enemy, brought defeat, and (2) that this division was deepened and accentuated by the national officials of their own unions. In some of the local unions that survived the period since 1922, militant rank and file elements thus came to leadership. To this Left-wing nucleus was added in 1933 the decisive influence of the rank and file militants who revived the longshoremen's union in San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, San Diego, San Pedro, and which in San Francisco played the decisive role from the beginning.

Thus it was that the regular routine N.R.A. strike settlements broke down in the Pacific Coast marine strike. Through rank-and-file initiative the Pacific Coast Conference was held in February, formulated demands and decided upon strike action to enforce them. The I.L.A. officials, unable to head off the movement, in March appealed to Roosevelt for direct intervention. Roosevelt's promise to adjust the demands succeeded in postponing the strike, but after two months of the usual N.R.A. procedure, producing nothing for the workers, the local unions took matters into their own hands and called the strike on May 9.

It is interesting to note that on May 9 when the decision for strike was taken by the San Francisco longshoremen, this decision came as a surprise to the officials of the A. F. of L. and the International Longshoremen's Association, and *at the same moment came as a surprise to the revolutionary group, the leader of which spoke against the decision to call the strike at that moment.*

HOW THE M.W.I.U. SPREAD THE STRIKE

Up to the point of the beginning of the strike, the M.W.I.U. had played a minor role. In the organization of the longshoremen it had thrown its full support to those militants who had revived and reorganized the International Longshoremen's Association's locals, and had refrained from all competitive organization among them, concentrating its independent organizational activities upon the seamen, who were almost entirely unorganized. The International Seamen's Union had relatively few members. Its activities were confined to that of a group of hard-boiled trade union bureaucrats, typified by Paul Scharrenberg, maintained not by the workers, but pursuing independent careers as labor politicians. The I.S.U. officials allowed no membership meetings. They even refused to recruit new members. They set themselves solidly against the seamen being involved in the strike. But with the docks tied up, the seamen on every ship that came to port, burning with their own grievances, fired by the dockers' example, were eager for strike action. The only organizing center they could find was the Marine Workers Industrial Union, which openly entered the situation, calling the seamen to

strike, opened recruiting halls, recruited over 800 seamen in a brief time, tying up every ship which came into port. This intervention of the M.W.I.U. was decisive in breaking the official A. F. of L. embargo on general action in the industry. In order to maintain even a pretense of representing the seamen, the I.S.U. was forced, finally, to declare itself on May 19 for the strike and begin recruiting and call meetings. As a result of this the small unions of harbor workers of various crafts were also soon drawn into a complete industrial general strike. It was thus that the energetic action of an independent industrial union was the essential factor that brought into the battle the other A. F. of L. unions, made the strike general, and laid the basis for the next forward step, the setting up of the Joint Strike Committee of all unions, and the signing of a Solidarity Pact, between all the striking organizations.

It was the conscious and growing spirit of industrial solidarity among all the marine crafts, eventually crystallized during the course of the strike in the Joint Strike Committee and the Solidarity Pact, which again and again defeated all efforts of Joseph Ryan, International Longshoremen's Association head, and Edward McGrady, Roosevelt's representative, to bring about a separate settlement for longshoremen along the lines of the notorious auto and steel industry settlements. It was this which after the defeat of Ryan's second attempt to sell out the strike enabled the militants to carry through the slogan "All Power to the Rank and File Strike Committee" and publicly declare that Ryan had no right to speak for the strikers, repudiating him in a great public mass meeting. These events demonstrated the enormous importance and power of elected strike committees responsible and reporting back to the members and taking complete control of strike negotiations and settlements.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE ORGANIZED RETREAT

The San Francisco General Strike in the ninth week of the marine workers' struggle, brought the whole marine movement to a climax. The betrayal of the General Strike discouraged and choked off similar solidarity movements on the verge of explosion in Portland and Seattle. The expressed intention of the Vandeleur gang of betrayers was to smash not only the general strike movement, but also the whole Pacific Coast marine strike and take the marine unions out of the hands of the militant rank and file. It was the firm determination of the trade union bureaucrats and the employers that the ending of the San Francisco General Strike would be followed by a demoralized rout of the marine workers. But they reckoned without the steadying influence of the organized rank and file strike committees, and the firm guidance given by the Communist Party in this critical moment. It was, however, the judg-

ment of the strike committees that under these conditions, the strike could not hold out much longer. They decided that a retreat was necessary, but this retreat was an organized one, salvaging all possible gains, however small, out of the betrayal by the officialdom, and guarding to the last moment, as a matter of proletarian honor, the sacredness of the Solidarity Pact between the marine unions.

The strikers and their committees stood firm, with the result that after a few days the capitalists announced new concessions to the workers. This appeared in the newspapers in the extraordinary form of a joint statement issued by a meeting of the Industrial Association, the Ship-Owners Union, all independent shipping companies, and the six daily newspapers in the San Francisco Bay area. This statement in substance recognized the Solidarity Pact of the marine unions by, for the first time, agreeing to settle with all the unions simultaneously and by the same procedure. Previously they had stood fast for arbitrating only the demands of the longshoremen and refusing any consideration to the demands of the other unions. They further agreed to the hiring of workers without discrimination at the docks, thus in effect abolishing the company-union hiring system, although not accepting the demand for union-controlled hiring halls.

On the basis of these concessions, they proposed all demands relating to wages and working conditions be submitted to the arbitration of the President's Board. The Strike Committee agreed to submit these questions to a referendum of the membership, at the same time passing a special motion reaffirming the Solidarity Pact which required that an affirmative vote by the longshoremen would only take effect when and if the proposal was ratified by the other unions involved. The marine strike continued solid for another week, while the votes were being taken on the entire coast and organizational guarantees established for the simultaneous return of all marine unions in all ports. The ending of the marine strike is an outstanding example of orderly retreat in a defeated strike.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE STRIKES

That the open shop offensive of the California employers was beaten back and the trade union movement on the Coast generally is stronger than ever, is in the first place to the credit of the Communist Party which placed itself at the head of the militant rank and file, helping them to find organizational forms for their struggle, to establish rank and file leadership, to defeat the intrigues of the A. F. of L. bureaucracy in many critical moments of the strike, and when the strike was finally betrayed, leading them in orderly retreat which salvaged some basic gains from the struggle.

It was the concentration work of the Communist Party on the

waterfront, especially in San Francisco and Seattle, which consolidated the nucleus of militant leadership in 1932 and 1933, which in February, 1934, crystallized in a Coast-wide rank and file delegates' conference that organized the marine strike, making it general along the whole Coast. It was the stubborn struggle of this leadership which kept the strike out of the hands of Joseph Ryan of the I.L.A., and defeated his repeated attempts to sell out the strike, break up the solidarity of the marine unions, and send them back to work demoralized and disrupted. It was this solid leadership in the heart of the marine strike, that made it possible to develop the general strike movement against the will of the A. F. of L. leaders in San Francisco, Vandeleur & Co. The work of the Communist Party brought this elemental upheaval to a higher level of consciousness and organization than any previous great labor struggle in America.

With the rise of the anti-Communist terror, at the ending of the strike, the Party went through a testing by fire, all along the Coast. It was driven underground, all known premises destroyed, printing plant burned down in San Francisco, hundreds assaulted by fascist vigilantes, more hundreds thrown into prison, private homes were violated and smashed, vigilante and police dragnets hunted down all known Communists and sympathizers, even the homes of suspected middle and upper class sympathizers were attacked.

The Party stood up very well under these attacks, especially in San Francisco and Seattle. The Party committees never ceased to function, nor lost their connections with the main body of the lower organizations. Connection with the masses was maintained by a constant stream of leaflets, both from the District Committees and from the units on their own initiative. We must verify all of these things because as yet we have only very fragmentary reports and we should have further reports of the functioning of the Party organizations, especially the lower organs of the Party during the strike. However, we can say that there was sustained connection with the masses through the issuance of literature, initiative by the lower organs in getting out leaflets, etc. We also have what is usually a very important indicator for the Center—the continued growth of the dues payments throughout this period down to today.

Already on August 1 in San Francisco the Party broke through the terror, holding an open public meeting under the auspices of the American League Against War and Fascism; within two weeks the *Western Worker* appeared again, as well as the *Voice of Action* in Seattle. In both of these main cities where the terror was sharpest, the Party came through this most severe test in a manner which must obtain our approval. The Party never ceased to function. We can be proud of the fact that these two important districts,

in this most difficult situation, showed their ability in this respect. Similar conditions have existed in Alabama, District 17, in connection with the strike movement there, with arrests, confiscation of the *Southern Worker*, etc. Here also a young district, with relatively few members, stood up excellently and strengthened the Party during the struggle. The same sort of experience can be reported from Southern Illinois, which has gone through an exactly similar period of fascist terror, and in which the Party has been strengthened in the course of the fight.

WEAKNESSES AND MISTAKES IN THE STRIKES

However, we must not spend too much time congratulating ourselves upon our achievements. More important for us is to give some detailed attention to the mistakes and weaknesses of our Party, in the first place of the Party leadership, in the most important struggle in San Francisco. There are such weaknesses, mistakes, we must say, notwithstanding the excellent work of the Party, a series of weaknesses and mistakes showed themselves in the course of the strike. In conducting a self-critical examination, we by no means want to set up a standard of perfection. We do not demand that our comrades shall be all-conquering heroes—that is too much to demand of our comrades. We cannot demand that they shall always be victorious, or that they always defeat the enemy the moment he comes on the scene. It is not in this sense we make our criticism. But we must do our best always to see that no mistakes of political orientation shall serve to weaken the struggle.

Our comrades in California made such mistakes of orientation—serious ones. In the struggle against the A. F. of L. official strike-breakers, our leading cadres saw the main danger to be guarded against as coming from the “Left”, in the form of stupid or clumsy or untimely exposure, which the masses would not be prepared to accept. They saw no danger or very little, from the Right; from lagging behind in the exposure, or entirely failing in this central task. Against “Left” deviations the comrades were very, very sensitive. But Right deviations they could not see at all. As a result, they made Right deviations of the most serious kind.

When Ryan went to the Coast to make his first sell-out effort, our comrades were of the opinion that his past record of strike-breaking activities, which should have been popularized among the broadest masses before he arrived, was not of particular advantage to the masses in California. The comrades seemed to think that anything happening outside of California was not a legitimate subject for criticism inside of California; they had no warning lesson to the strikers to whom Ryan was coming as their international president. When Ryan was defeated in his first sell-out, and retreated,

in order to gain a second chance to sell out, the opinion was expressed, and not fought against, that this maneuver of Ryan's should be greeted as a conversion of Ryan to the point of view of the Strike Committee, under the illusion that if this was not true, it was at least clever tactics for us to make it seem that way!

This completely wrong conception of what is clever tactics was not criticized by our comrades, except in the form of making the expression of it more vague when it got into the *Strike Bulletin*. When the Central Committee and the *Daily Worker* criticized this vague formulation and pointed out what was behind it, the comrades were quite indignant against us. They thought we were hunting for small things to be hyper-critical about. They even protested against us in the columns of the *Western Worker*. They did not understand the serious danger behind this seemingly small matter. There was even rising (as in the case of Comrade Morris, editor of the *Western Worker*, who expressed this tendency in a sharp form) something like a theory that precisely what the Central Committee was pointing out as weaknesses and mistakes were really the greatest virtues of the leadership in California. Comrade Morris seemed to think that these mistakes out there were destined to become the dominating line of the Party nationally in its trade union work, and were correcting the whole Party's trade union line.

Comrade Jackson, a very militant, courageous comrade, whom we all value very much, under the influence of this tendency in the California leadership, wrote a letter to the Central Committee after we had raised a few points of criticism, in which he invited us to leave the direction of the strike in the hands of those on the scene, and for the Central Committee to busy itself with the more fruitful tasks of organizing strike relief on a national scale!

Comrade Darcy's article in *The Communist* of July, while very valuable for the information it contained, and treating many separate questions correctly, took its main orientation from this mistaken point of view, which even brought an approving thesis from the Lovestone group, who saw in this some concession to their trade union line.

It was precisely at the moment when we raised these questions with the California comrades that the General Strike movement began to rise in San Francisco. And here we received the conclusive proof that our misgivings were well-founded. Before that, our comrades thought they had a complete answer to all criticism; they said: "You say we don't criticize Ryan sufficiently. But look, we kicked him out, we drove him out of San Francisco". And the comrades thought that closed the question. But came the General Strike, and there we perceived the proofs of our position. The comrades carried on practically no preparations to expose in any

decisive manner the role of the bureaucrats of the Central Labor Council. Some agitational material directed against them beforehand, was directed exclusively to attacking their opposition to the General Strike, but not one word of the greater danger of these fakers at the head of the General Strike movement. When these fakers suddenly made a maneuver to head the movement; even while they were still openly opposed, by appointing this so-called Committee on Strategy, our marine workers were so unprepared for this maneuver that the mere announcement of it was sufficient for them to practically disband the rank and file conference that had been called under our leadership to organize the General Strike, to take no decisions in that conference in spite of the demands from the rank and file. Precisely at the moment when the General Strike movement was coming to a head, when the moral leadership of the masses was absolutely in the hands of the leaders of the marine strike committee, when the Vandeleur family of fakers was isolated from the masses and stood exposed before them as opponents of the General Strike movement for which the whole masses had declared themselves—at *that moment* our leaders declared that inasmuch as Vandeleur and Co. had set up a committee on strategy, we handed the General Strike movement over into their hands.

When the Committee on Strategy, seeing that the movement was going over their heads, came out a few days later for the General Strike, our comrades had laid absolutely no basis for any struggle to elect a General Strike Committee from below. It is true appeals were made for the election of such committees, but the rank and file certainly didn't feel—had not been prepared to feel—that this was such a burning issue it should have to be the subject of struggle inside the unions. And no such struggles took place.

It was impossible afterward to remedy the fatal weakness of those 24 hours, when we handed over the leadership of the masses, that was in our hands, into the hands of these discredited fakers.

We have no guarantee, of course, that even the best policy would have succeeded in pulling this leadership from the head of the general strike. But we know that we could have been much stronger, and that by this wrong policy we certainly were guaranteed defeat. Most surely a serious effort to lead the general strike, to take it out of the hands, from the beginning, of Vandeleur & Co., would have strengthened our position many times, have increased the vitality of the general strike so that it would have lasted more than four days—five, six, eight days, stimulated the general strike movement in Portland and Seattle into activity instead of serving to choke them off by giving them an example of a broken general strike. Certainly our whole position would have been improved, the power of the trade unions would have increased, the concessions

which were forced out of the employers made more far-reaching, and generally the interests of the workers would have been advanced, the leadership of the workers would have been strengthened.

The comrades in Seattle came out with a more bold policy—at the same time our positions in Seattle were not so strong. Most of the work had to be done from the outside, that is to say, by Party leaflets rather than through inside official positions in the strike apparatus. Comrade Darcy wrongly concludes that our stronger position in the San Francisco strike was a result of our more timid (or, as he would say, more skillful) criticism—that our weakness in Seattle was because of our more bold criticism. But we must reject any such theory. Precisely because of their superior position in San Francisco they could more boldly and effectively carry out this criticism.

When we demand a policy of bold criticism no one can accuse us of asking for stupid, clumsy, untimely criticism. We demand that the criticism be as intelligent, as skillful as possible, that we choose the right moment. But we must insist that in choosing the right moment we do not wait so long for that right moment that we find, as in the San Francisco General Strike, for example, that our criticism and warning against the Vandeleurs come after the damage has been done. Here we could quote the old saying that when thieves are around, it is better to lock the barn door before the horse has been stolen.

We must say that in the last days of the strike, our California comrades responded to the pressure of the Central Committee, they improved their work in many respects. Also they made some steps in overcoming the weakness in which the Party appeared before the workers in its own name. But we have not yet come to a full understanding of the basic mistake and serious correction of it. Comrade Darcy, even in republishing his article from *The Communist* in the *Western Worker*, appended an editorial which he thought would cover all this criticism by admitting weakness in the matter of criticism of the A. F. of L. officials. The whole character of this comment tends to reduce this to a point of minor importance and the note fails to correct the basic error of the article, as a whole. Comrade Darcy wants to pass it off by remarking that the language was not strong enough and such minor aspects of the question. We are not concerned with the question of strong language, although language too becomes important if it becomes too weak to express our political ideas. In California we must say that at critical moments there was political weakness in our directives for the struggle to the masses—a political weakness in identifying the most dangerous enemies of the working class, concentrating the fire against these most dangerous enemies. That is what we are criticizing. The

California district must study these experiences. Precisely the absence of sufficient political discussion of such problems before and during the strike is the reason why we have such mistakes and why we fail to correct them quickly enough when they appear, or why we resist sometimes such criticism as the Central Committee tried to give towards correcting such mistakes.

PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED FRONT

I want to review briefly some of the problems of the movement for united action—building the united front. The comrades are familiar with the various proposals that we have made to the Socialist Party National Executive Committee. We are also familiar with the correspondence that developed on these proposals with Norman Thomas, and the action taken just a few days ago by the National Executive Committee in its Milwaukee meeting.

Perhaps we should give a brief characterization of the N.E.C.'s decision as it was reported in the *New York Times*. We have not yet received an official letter that they are reported to have sent to us. Briefly, the action as reported is a rejection of the united front on the grounds that the united front with the Communists would endanger their united front with the A. F. of L. bureaucrats. They cover this up with a platonic endorsement of the idea of a united front, what a good thing it would be if it were possible, and bring out some of the stock tricks to avoid squarely meeting the issue—united action on specific questions. Nowhere do they mention their attitude towards the measures for which we propose united action.

We have already discussed this question in the *Polburo*. In this morning's *Daily Worker* you have an editorial which gives the main lines of our answer to the Socialist Party decision. I must mention in passing, however, that in this editorial there is one mistake, when in speaking of the concrete proposals which we make to the Socialist Party, the editorial speaks of these as "conditions" of the united front. This is wrong. We never made "conditions". We made proposals, which we are ready to discuss to consider any modifications or limitations that the S.P. wanted to make with regard to them, and to deal with all, or a part, or a single one of these issues. In addition to this editorial, we expect to have within the next few days a formal answer to the Socialist Party, as soon as possible, after we receive their official letter.

In the formal answer we propose to take up precisely as the center of our letter, that question they expressed in the words: "No united action on specific issues is possible between Socialist and Communists except on a basis which also gives hope of ending fratricidal strife within the trade union movement".

We propose that we will quote this from their letter, and raise very sharply a demand for a further explanation of what they mean by this. We will say that there are two possible interpretations of this. It may mean elimination of the fratricidal strife between workers who follow the two parties—the Socialist Party and the Communist Party—in which case we are for the ending of this fratricidal strife and are ready to take all measures necessary to end it and bring all workers together against their common enemy.

On the other hand, this formulation may mean, and to many people it does mean, the ending of the struggle by the Communists against the policy of William Green, Matthew Woll, John L. Lewis, McMahon and Co.—the official leadership of the A. F. of L. Perhaps it means, and for some it certainly means, the demand for the extension of the united front to include those who are part of the Roosevelt governmental machine. And we declare that if this is what they mean by the united front, or conditions for the united front, this condition the Communists will never accept, because this condition is a united front against the working class, making permanent the split in the working class. The fight for the unity of the working class is precisely against this.

We can make use of our letter to the Socialist Party in a broader leaflet which we propose to issue, including this letter, and giving further elaboration of the answers to all of the arguments of the enemies of the united front. This letter is to be addressed to the membership and followers of the Socialist Party and distributed in many hundreds of thousands of copies. We further propose that we will have a special pamphlet dealing with the history of our fight for the united front, especially since March, 1933, reprinting all of our documents and correspondence with the Socialist Party, etc., down to these last letters. A sort of a handbook on the history of this struggle in the United States, a cheap pamphlet, perhaps two or three cents, especially for sale among the S.P. followers, as well as for the better education of our whole Party on this question.

We further propose that in every locality the comrades shall engage in an intensified campaign to approach the lower organizations of the Socialist Party. We must absolutely eliminate any tendency to react to this question by saying, now that the N.E.C. has spoken, we are through with the chapter to win the Socialist Party. Quite to the contrary is our program. This merely opens new efforts to win every branch and member of the Socialist Party from below to the united front.

Any hope of swinging the Socialist Party as a whole and any kind of united action depends entirely upon this basic activity from below. If we do this basic work from below, we do not have to worry as to whether the Socialist Party leadership ever agrees to the

united front or not. Because if we do this work from below, we will get the membership, and if we get the membership for united action, we should not worry as to what the leaders are doing. We will worry about them to the extent that they keep their followers away from united struggle.

In addition, we propose that a series of meetings, at least one big meeting in each important district be held at which leading comrades shall report to the workers on this question, inviting leaders of the Socialist Party to come and state their case to the assembled workers, with special attention to get members and followers of the Socialist Party to these meetings.

We must say that in these past months our Party is beginning to understand that for us the united front is a very serious matter. It is a question of fundamental strategy. It is a matter of a long time struggle, a long time perspective, a long time policy. It is not a mere trick in the struggle against the misleaders. It is a basic policy of struggle for the class unity of the workers against the bourgeoisie. Because we more thoroughly understand it in this sense, we are making progress. We have serious developments in the lower ranks of the Socialist Party in practically setting up united front actions—in New Orleans the united front of our Party and the Socialist Party in the magnificent mass demonstration right in between the lines of the rival armed factions of the Democratic Party of Louisiana, demanding that the State and city finances which are being spent in this factional battle over the spoils of corruption should be given to the unemployed, for the relief which had been cut off. This action is being followed up by systematic collaboration by the two parties in New Orleans on current issues, on the calling of a local congress of the American League Against War and Fascism to prepare for the Chicago Congress, etc. In Camden, N. J., the united front August 1 anti-war demonstration was carried out successfully with the participation of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. A growing number of individual Socialist workers are entering into our struggles; dozen of organizations have demanded of the N.E.C. that it act favorably on our proposals.

The greatest progress has been made among the youth. Without any formal negotiations the Y.P.S.L. and the Y.C.L. already find themselves standing upon an agreed platform. This achievement came out of the struggle against the fascist Central Bureau which called the American Youth Congress in which the anti-fascist united front won a complete victory in winning over almost the entire body of delegates to a program entirely opposed to the one proposed by the leaders, with government support, adopting instead a program of struggle against war and fascism, and for the immediate needs of the youth, including unemployment insurance, etc.

This victory, the basis of which had already been laid by the Youth Section of the American League Against War and Fascism which was already a growing united front from below, reaching all strata of youth, now comprises one million seven hundred thousand, ranging from Y.M.C.A.'s, Y.W.C.A.'s, church youth organizations, trade union youth sections, settlement houses, etc., clear down to the Y.P.S.L. and Y.C.L. In this, the political center of gravity is the work of our Y.C.L. Practically all the basic proposals and policy came from us or from those circles influenced by us through the unanimous support of this broad youth movement.

The growing movement for united action in the trade union movement is a characteristic feature of the day. In the steel industry, united front conferences included the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union and the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, in the period of preparations for the strike later choked off by the officials. In the auto industry, serious work in this direction is beginning in Cleveland. In the fur industry, a group of shops are carrying out a united strike of both the A. F. of L. and T.U.U.L. unions, in spite of the bitter opposition of the A. F. of L. officials. In the shoe industry, the struggle for a single industrial union is making progress in spite of the obstacles placed by the reactionary section of the officialdom and their Lovestoneite allies. In the preparations for the great textile strike and in the heat of its first days, we have succeeded in making some decisive moves for unity in Paterson, with possibilities in other places, which had been impossible hitherto when the masses were not in motion. In Paterson our small Textile Workers Union has amalgamated with the United Textile Workers' locals, with two of our outstanding leaders placed on the executive board, membership secured by exchange of cards, with full rights.

The key point in the whole united front struggle at the moment is the Second U. S. Congress Against War and Fascism to be held in Chicago, September 28-30. In connection with this is a special Youth Congress called by the Youth Section. In the American League Against War and Fascism and in this Congress, we have a broad united front which met and defeated the attempts made to disrupt it last spring. We must say that the Communists have not given the League the help and attention that it deserves and there has been too much of a tendency to place the daily functioning of the League into the laps of the middle class elements.

These elements are valuable; their contribution to the League has been considerable, but they will themselves be the first to admit that the most important work of the League—rooting it among the workers in the basic and war industries, cannot be done by them, but only the trade unions and workers' organizations, and first of all

by the Communists. The final work of the Congress in the next three weeks must mark a decisive improvement in the work in this field—engaging of the workers' organizations in this Congress and into active affiliation in the American League.

The biggest political struggle now going on in the United States is the fight for unemployment insurance. The great movement for the Workers' Bill is now taking on a broader form with the preparations for the Social Security Congress in Washington at the time the U. S. Congress opens. It is clear that the time is ripe for broadening the organizational base of the movement such as is proposed in this Congress for Social Security. The sweep of support for the Bill in the A. F. of L. unions which has carried unanimous endorsement in five national union conventions—Molders Union, Amalgamated Association, United Textile Workers, Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union, Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers; the endorsement by the City Councils of 48 cities and towns, including Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Buffalo, Canton, Toledo, St. Louis, Bridgeport, Portland, Des Moines, Allentown, Rockford—in 15 States, endorsement by over 5,000 outstanding professionals; the American Newspaper Guild, innumerable locals of the S.P. and lately Norman Thomas; the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota; practically all important independent unions, including Progressive Miners; by practically all mass unemployed organizations, even those under the control of the enemies of the Bill, who have been forced by mass pressure to endorse it. All these things—and we must mention the American Youth Congress which unanimously endorsed the Bill—all this disclosed a mass support for our Bill which if it can be concentrated and centralized will be a mighty power to force the adoption of this Bill at the coming session of Congress next January.

We have many questions coming up out of this movement for united front which we have to clarify continually to our Party. We find obstacles being placed in the way, questions being raised as to whether we are not making serious opportunistic deviations when we reach out and get these masses into these movements. For example: we have questions raised around the participation of Father Devine, the "Negro God", in the anti-war movement. Father Devine brought his followers into the August 4 demonstration of the American League Against War and Fascism; previous to that in the demonstration of National Youth Day, and the participation of this section with its fantastic slogans aroused very grave doubts in the minds of many comrades whether it wasn't a serious mistake to allow these religious fanatics to march in our parade with their slogans: "Father Devine is God"; "Father Devine Will Stop War", etc.

We have answered this question in editorials in the *Daily Worker*. We must emphasize the correctness of this answer which we have given to point out that this is not a special, isolated problem. This problem is perhaps an exaggerated example of the whole problem of reaching the backward masses and bringing them into participation with the most advanced section of the working class in revolutionary struggles. This is our task—not only to bring in the already politically developed vanguard of the workers, but to bring in the millions of masses who will bring with them all their religious superstition, all of their reactionary ideology and to clarify them and to give them political consciousness in the course of the fight. This is the basic task of the united front; and don't think that this merely applies in the aspect of the fight against superstition among the Negroes. You will find exactly the same religious ideology in broad sections of the white working class, and especially you will find it among the broad masses in the Middle West and West of the United States. I grew up right in the midst of just such religious fanaticism, and when I was a boy, it was taken for granted that if you were a socialist, you must at the same time explain which one of the religious sects you belonged to. That went along with socialism in Kansas in the period of 1906-1910. This condition is not over. Many workers moving into the struggle are very often carrying with them some extreme religious prejudices. We have to learn to bring them into the struggle and in the process of the struggle to educate them; not first to educate them and make good Leninists of them and then bring them into the Party.

The mass demand for united action is clearly growing into a mighty movement. This is even moving such "advocates of unity" as the Muste group. These estimable gentlemen only a year ago, on two occasions, met with us in formal open conferences of delegates from many organizations, and pledged themselves to united action for the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill, for unification of the mass organizations of the unemployed, and for the fight against war and fascism in the American League, whose program was produced by a committee of which Muste was chairman; but they didn't seem to take these public pledges very seriously, never did anything to carry them out, and after months of sabotage they broke away from these united front agreements without any explanation. Now, we received a letter from Mr. Muste and Mr. Budenz. They propose to start a long proceeding of negotiations with us and the S.P., together with their Trotzkyite and Lovestoneite friends, at what they call a "round table" on how to get unity. These gentlemen should understand that the best way to get unity is to carry out agreements when they are made. However, if mass pressure from below is again moving them from their position of open

sabotage, we will not give them a negative answer. They deserve serious attention as long as they still exercise some mass influence among the unemployed in three states. We shall propose that those issues closest to the masses whom they influence, namely, the Workers' Bill, the unity of unemployed organizations—these should be made the beginning of some real actions toward unity without wasting too much time in again talking over the state of the whole world. Let them take one single move toward united action among the masses and our faith in their serious support of a more general unity will be raised above zero. Our attitude toward all minor groupings, or leaders, such as the Musteites, is determined by the question whether they have any mass following and where, and on the issues that relate to the daily life of the masses that follow them, we will negotiate united actions with them. But by no means do we accept the idea which is being carefully cultivated by enemies of united action, that the united front means to bring the S.P. and C.P. together with the small groups of renegade leaders like the Trotskyites, the Lovestoneites, the Musteites, the Gitlowites, the Weisbordites, etc., etc. We consider that such united front has absolutely nothing in common with the needs of the masses. In this respect we have an illuminating example of the mistake made by the youth in Belgium. Over there, the Y.C.L., the Belgian Y.C.L., met with the Socialist Youth organization and the Socialist Youth brought forward a proposal as the basis for the united front that they come out for the defense of Trotsky, for the protection of Trotsky against the "persecution" that the capitalists were inflicting upon him. And our Young Communists in their desire for unity at any cost signed their names to the pledge for the defense of Trotsky. That is, to defend the unity of the working class, they would defend the leader of the forces of counter-revolution among the working class. What masses of workers they expect to reach with such a slogan as this is hard to see, because all the Trotsky organizations in all the world combined certainly do not run into even a few thousand. In the face of the burning issues of the class struggle and the fight for bread and civil rights, and against war, against fascism, these people have the nerve to bring forward slogans for the defense of Trotsky, and we have comrades who are even ready to fall for such things! We have to use this example from Belgium as a very severe warning to us against such dangers which will arise here also.

Now, a few words on the textile strike. I refer you to the basic policy which has been outlined in the editorials of the *Daily Worker* to emphasize also that these editorials are political directives of the Polburo and Central Committee. Evidently our Party does not understand this fully. We find district leaderships of the Party coming to political conclusions and acting upon them in exactly the

opposite sense to the editorials of the *Daily Worker*. We had this in the preparation for the textile strike. The line which we put forward in the *Daily Worker* and also by many special directives to the districts, was the line of preparing for strike struggle. The comrades, however, talked it over among themselves, decided that these A. F. of L. bureaucrats will never lead a real fight, there won't be any real strike; why then should we prepare for it?—it is a waste of time and energy, and nothing was done. Exactly nothing. The comrades were convinced there would be no strike, no matter what we said from the Center, and so they acted upon their conviction. This is really a serious problem for us, comrades, and it represents one of those serious political weaknesses that in different forms we have hammered at time and time again, this idea that the bureaucrats won't lead any struggles. Of course, there will be no struggles if it depends upon the bureaucrats; but it does not depend upon the bureaucrats. It depends upon the masses. And when the masses are going into the struggle anyway, the bureaucrats go along and head the struggle, and even call the struggle, in order to bring it to an end more quickly. If we believe only that they will never lead the struggle, we disarm ourselves in the fight against the misleaders, as the comrades did in San Francisco in regard to Vandeleur and the general strike. They only shouted that Vandeleur is against the general strike; they did not point out how Vandeleur can mislead the general strike. The comrades make exactly the same mistake in the textile situation. This is no way to fight against the misleaders, this strengthens the bureaucracy whenever the fight really gets under way and prevents us from mobilizing the opposition to block the betrayal of the struggle.

[Comrade Browder's discussion of our tasks in connection with work in the company unions is, for reasons of space, here omitted. The topic will be treated in the Party press later—Ed.]

A few words on the question of the drought and our struggle for the Farmers' Emergency Relief Bill. We must say that this problem has not received any attention from the districts, and has not received the serious attention even of the Center. The districts have absolutely neglected it. Every district can do some work among the farmers, every district can reach farmers with the Emergency Relief Bill. We must make this part of the Party's work, not merely of the special apparatus of the Agrarian Commission. In connection with this bill we must point out that many corrections will be made in the form of this bill and will be published in a week or ten days. The amendments that we are making are primarily in the way of eliminating all of those elaborate provisions for farmers' committees to administer the bill, much simplified, and more directly

guarding against the creeping in of class collaboration tendencies and the setting up of confusion among the farmers.

It is necessary to say a few words about the elections. The election campaign is the bearer of all phases of our struggle, that is, it should be. We are making some progress in that direction but there is still too much of a tendency to keep the election campaign separated from the general activity of the class struggle as a departmentalized, specialized form of activity. There is a special weakness in bringing the election campaign into the mass organizations and especially into the trade unions.

In the elections we must give special attention to such issues as the development of the Sinclair movement. The fight against the Sinclair illusions is an essential feature of our whole struggle against social-fascism. Sinclair's type of social-fascism is going to grow in this country. He is going to have a lot of imitators. I am sure that every good "practical politician" in the Socialist Party is searching his heart today to find out how it is that "we practical politicians are sitting around with a few votes; Sinclair goes out and gets half a million". In California the latest was Packard, member of the previous N.E.C. of the Socialist Party, who now announces himself a convert to the Sinclair program. This will increasingly become a feature of the whole political life of America.

Now, I must say a few words on the *Daily Worker*. First, the circulation. Do you comrades realize the significance of the fact that on the day of the opening of the strike of 600,000 textile workers, the biggest strike the United States has ever seen, the Party extended the circulation of the *Daily Worker* by the "enormous" sum of 7,000 copies? Monday's paper circulated 43,000 and Tuesday's strike special was 50,000. That's our estimate of the value of the *Daily Worker* among half a million striking textile workers. Most of them were not even ordered; we just printed them in the hopes that they would be distributed. And a special textile edition is not just a concession on our part to the needs of the particular industry; a special textile edition is directed to the working class of America. It is just as much of interest to the workers of California and Chicago as it is to the workers of the South and New England.

What can we do to wake up the Party to the question of the *Daily Worker*? We must pose this question as one of the most serious practical matters for the Central Committee and for the Party as a whole. When we will not have the *Daily Worker*, when all our papers will be suppressed, which is quite possible and even probable in the not distant future, when that time comes, when we will have to substitute the *Daily Worker* by the most sacrificing work of printing and spreading small illegal organs at the cost of the sacrifice of lives, then we will wonder what were we doing in the days when

we have freedom of action and circulation of a splendid six- and eight-page *Daily Worker*. When we had all this we made no serious attempt to give it a mass circulation. How are we going to answer it? Something must be done to make the Party conscious of the *Daily Worker*. I want to ask everyone to say a word on the matter, to say one word of explanation why we don't go forward seriously in the circulation of our paper.

On the question of work in the A. F. of L., of the task that we have to bring forward the class struggle program and delegates to the San Francisco convention: We know that in some places serious work has been done to get delegates to San Francisco. How much, we don't know yet. We should have a report on this question and some idea of the plans that you are carrying out practically. We know all of you have plans on paper. We are no longer interested in this at all. We want to know what plans you have taken off the paper and begun to carry out in practice, and what work we are doing to begin to develop independent leadership of the economic struggles from within the A. F. of L. unions.

We must say one or two words about certain features of the Negro work. Especially we must mention some considerable victories that have been achieved in this period. In the first place, the victory of winning the release of Angelo Herndon on bail, of getting the Scottsboro appeal before the Supreme Court again. We can register certain small advances, as yet very small, in raising Negro questions in the work of the trade unions. It is extremely interesting, for example, to hear from the comrades in San Francisco that the Longshoremen's Union is systematically setting itself to break down the jim-crow regulations, the exclusion of Negroes from the docks, and as a matter of policy taking in Negro workers into the docks and getting work for them, working side by side with the white longshoremen. Every small sign of work of this kind is "pure gold" for our movement. We must popularize it in order to put much more pressure behind the drive in all the unions to begin to win the basic Negro masses into our trade unions, both the T.U.U.L. and the A. F. of L. unions.

A few words about membership, recruiting and fluctuation in the Party. We spoke about it at the last meeting of the Central Committee. This is a very serious question for us. We measure our membership by the dues payments. This has been our accepted standard because it eliminates all factors of subjectivity in the measurement, gives us a thoroughly objective measure.

If we judge by this only reliable objective measurement of our membership, then we have to report that instead of going forward we have slipped backward, since the Convention of our Party, since the last meeting of the Central Committee where we took this

question up so sharply. In some cases this slip-back takes on serious proportions. We have seen in the past months such fluctuations of membership as reflected in dues payments that it is really alarming.

I think we must say in this respect that we have some—too many—very bad examples. I have already cited a good example, namely the San Francisco district, where the membership for the last four months grew not quite steadily, but decisively upward: 2100 in May, 2500 in June; 2300 in July and 3000 in August. But what about the others? This is not merely a question of the revenue of the Party, but it is a problem linked closely with the political functioning of the Party. If dues are not being paid, it means that the ties of the membership with the Party are being loosened.

Why is this so? We have Philadelphia, which from 1300 in June dropped down to 856 in August—a loss of 40 per cent. We have Pittsburgh, which from 1100 in May dropped to 500 in June, 500 in July, 800 in August (the August returns are only partial). We could go down the list; and while August shows a certain pickup from the terrible drop to below 20,000 in July, and when we get the complete records of August, they may show a rise to 22,000 again—we are still below the figures of January this year, and the average of the first three months of 1934, although we have recruited 17,000 *new* members in this time.

Does this mean that the people are going away from us politically? No, it means no such thing. Large new masses are coming to us politically, but it means that we are falling down on our job of leadership and organization. It means that we are not creating revolutionary organizing forces out of this political influence that we have. It means that we are in danger of losing these forces, that we are failing to secure the guarantees for the continuation of this growth, and that we are opening ourselves to the most serious attacks by our enemies.

What to do about this? At our last meeting, the C.C. proposed and carried through an investigation by a special commission set up for this purpose, on the problems of fluctuation. You have the report of the work of this commission which is full of rich experiences. I don't want to try to discuss at length all the material contained in this report and the various issues it brings out, due to time shortage. This report shows decisively, however, that we have to re-educate our cadres on how to carry on work of the Party. It shows that our old cadres are in many cases choking the growth of the Party. It shows that the Party is being stifled by bad methods of work, especially in the lower units—that all of our circulars and printed matter do not solve this problem. The only way we can bring about a change is by going with specially selected comrades for this purpose down below, to reorientate our cadres towards change

in the methods of work down below, to incorporate new leading forces, to release the energies that exist there which, because they don't find any way to function, go away from the Party. Also, we must say that the methods of assigning and controlling work in the lower units especially result in a decided handicap in building the Party. We have literally thousands of sympathizers who follow the Party, who are Communists in everything except membership and who do not join the Party because: you ask them why—they say—I am interested in my present mass work, and I know from the experiences of my friends that if I joined the Party I would be taken out of work which I want to do and be assigned to a new job every two months and won't be able to do anything effectively. It is a very serious thing when class conscious, Communist workers find that they can do more effective work amongst the masses by remaining outside of the Party rather than inside of it. Perhaps, in many cases, they are mistaken. No doubt with a well-functioning Party apparatus, these workers could multiply the effectiveness of their work through being brought into the Party fraction. But it remains true that the unsystematic, haphazard, non-continuous work of the Party fractions, and the carelessness in assigning work, and the refusal to take into consideration the wishes of new members in mass work and mass organizations is one of the greatest deterrents in building the Party and one of the greatest causes of fluctuation.

In this connection, we find that in our factory nuclei this fluctuation does not exist. On the other hand, factory nuclei grow very slowly. We find serious progress in most districts since the Convention and since the last meeting of the C.C. in the *extension of the number of factory nuclei*; but we find little growth in the average number of members, which shows that the nuclei do not recruit seriously. The new nuclei remain slow and static, so far as membership is concerned.

I will close with a final word about the problem of cadres. With the rise of the present big mass movement, everywhere there rises the cry for forces. Everywhere you hear the old slogan: we are short of forces; we have no cadres. Again the cry goes up from every district to the National Office: send us more forces. But from where to get these new forces, nobody says. Do we lack forces? I think that we are involved in a serious contradiction if we say that because the working class is rising in great activity, therefore the Communist Party has a greater lack of forces. It is precisely with the rise of the masses to activity that we have released to us tremendous new forces. Why do we cry about a shortage? Because we have not learned to take these forces from the masses and make use of them; because we have too many bureaucratic tendencies reflected in the feeling that nobody can take responsible, leading posi-

tions in this mass movement unless he has first gone through our various training schools.

I am a friend of our training schools. I think they have contributed much, but they have also contributed some bad things to the movement. Sometimes our training schools, especially in the districts where not enough attention is paid to them, take a group of good, fresh forces out of the masses and, in from three to six weeks, turn out finished bureaucrats, completely divorced from the masses they just came out of. We have plenty of forces, but we must develop initiative in bringing forward these forces fearlessly, giving them organizational responsibility, helping them and giving them a training and education in the course of the development of their work as leading factors in the movement. In addition, we must have serious development of the school work, which is an essential phase of training of cadres, more serious attention to the type of teaching, more serious check-up in getting a concrete answer to the question—are your teachers teaching Bolshevism or a thousand varieties of Menshevism and Trotzkyism, especially on organizational questions? On these organizational questions there is the widest field for the most fantastic deviations with very little check-up by the districts and sections of the Party.

We have plenty of forces if we learn how to use them. The American working class is ready to give us all the forces we need if we work correctly, go out and get them and bring them into action and show the capacity of bringing these forces into our Party; making them ours. This is the answer to the problem of forces and the answer to the problem of building the revolutionary movement and winning victories in every field of our struggle. This is also the answer to the problem of building a mass Communist Party.